SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220127. November 21, 2018.]

CARLOS CELDRAN y PAMINTUAN , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a
Resolution dated November 21, 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220127 — Carlos Celdran y Pamintuan vs. People of
the Philippines
This resolve the motion for reconsideration 1 filed by petitioner Carlos
Celdran y Pamintuan and the Omnibus Motion 2 filed by People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) questioning our
Resolution 3 dated March 21, 2018, the dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
December 12, 2014 and Resolution dated August 14, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36170 are hereby AFFIRMED. 4

Factual Antecedents

In our Resolution dated March 21, 2018, the antecedent facts of this
case are as follows:
Petitioner was charged in an Information filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 4, for the offense of
Offending the Religious Feelings defined and penalized under Article
133 of the RPC.
The facts of the case established that in celebration of the
second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and
the launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the
feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people composed mainly of catholic
church dignitaries intermixed with those of different religions such as
members of the military, police, media, non-catholics, students,
representatives of various religious organizations gathered around
the Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30, 2010. cSEDTC

The event was comprised of three (3) inseperable parts. The

first part was the ecumenical liturgical religious worship wherein the
heads of the different protestant mainland churches and the catholic
church were present celebrating the words of God. It was followed by
the Eucharistic celebration — the holy mass. The last part was the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 hand written unity bible.
While Brother Edgar J. Tria Tirona was reading a passage from
the Bible around 3:00 p.m., petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral
clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the
aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly brought out a placard
emblazoned with the word "DAMASO." Commotion ensued when
petitioner started shouting while inside the church saying "Bishops,
stop involving yourself (sic) in politics," disrupting and showing
disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that the incident did
not happen during the celebration of the holy mass and nothing
happened that disturbed the proceedings.
The MeTC in its Decision dated December 14, 2012, found
petitioner guilty of the crime Offending Religious Feelings, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioner] is
found "Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Offending Religious Feelings under Article 133 of
the [RPC], and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, there being no mitigating and aggravating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of two (2) months and twenty-one (21)
days as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and
eleven (11) days as maximum of prision correccional in
its medium period, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter in its Decision affirmed
petitioner's conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
affirming the Decision dated December 14, 2012
rendered by the [MeTC], Branch 4, Manila finding
[petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Offending Religious Feelings under Article 133 of the
[RPC], and sentencing him to an indeterminate prision
term of two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of
arresto mayor, as minimum to one (1) year, one (1)
month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
maximum with costs de officio.SDAaTC

SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
In its Decision dated December 12, 2014, the CA affirmed the findings
of the MeTC and the RTC which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the 12 August 2013
Decision and the Order dated 11 November 2013 of the
[RTC] of Manila, Branch 32 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 5

Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Both petitioner and the OSG argue as to the unconstitutionality of
Article 133 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). They claim that Article 133 of
the RPC violates the constitutional right of freedom of expression and of free
speech. Article 133 of the RPC regulates the contents of a speech and its
overbreadth and vagueness application result in a chilling effect on what
would otherwise be considered as free speech.

Ruling of the Court

The motion for reconsideration and omnibus motion are both

denied.
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states that "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail."
All laws are presumed to be valid and constitutional. As held in the
case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan: 7
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the
idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has
passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune
with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance. x x x. 8
Further in case of Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan: 9

Every statute is presumed valid. On the party challenging its

validity weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, the rationale for the presumption of
constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt
is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has
been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 enacted. 10 (Citations omitted)
In the present case, petitioner seeks to declare the unconstitutionality
of Article 133 of the RPC indirectly through the appeal of the criminal case.
In their motions, petitioner and the OSG claim that Article 133 of the RPC is,
on its face, and as applied to petitioner, void on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. acEHCD

Even if this Court considers petitioner's arguments on the purported

unconstitutionality of Article 133 of the RPC, the same would not result to
the reversal of his conviction.
At the outset, facial invalidation of statutes is generally disfavored. This
is because it results in the striking down of an entire statute on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. Certainly, facial challenges to statutes
constitute as an exception to the case and controversy requirements of
deciding constitutional issues.
In his Concurring Opinion in Estrada, 11 Justice Mendoza succinctly
discussed the nature of a facial and as applied challenges and its
applicability to penal statutes:
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma , the Court ruled that "claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason,
it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others." EcTCAD

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and

vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when
what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As
has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law
on its face and in its entirety. 12 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
As an exception, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine may be allowed when the subject penal statute encroaches upon
the freedom of speech. Thus, in Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice,
et al., 13 this Court allowed facial invalidation of the criminalization of aiding
and abetting cyberlibel because of its chilling effect on the constitutionally-
protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use the
cyberspace, and boost a social media post by liking, commenting or sharing
the same.
Evidently, such is not the case here. Article 133 of the RPC does not
encroach on the freedom of expression as it does not regulate free speech.
The gravamen of the penal statute is the disruption of a religious ceremony
and/or worship by committing acts that are notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful inside a place devoted to religious worship or during
the celebration of a religious ceremony. There is nothing in the provision
that imposes criminal liability on anyone who wishes to express dissent on
another religious group. It does not seek to prevent or restrict any person
from expressing his political opinions or criticisms against the Catholic
church, or any religion.
A facial challenge on the ground of the overbreadth doctrine is also
impermissible in this case. In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 14 this
Court refused to facially invalidate Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on
such ground that it does not regulate free speech but covers a spectrum of
conduct which is manifestly within the State's authority to regulate. The
Court held that "claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words." 15 Again, Article 133 of the RPC does not regulate only spoken
words. It encompasses all acts that are notoriously offensive to the religious
feelings. Such acts are within the State's authority to regulate.
Notably, the OSG argued that Article 133 of the RPC is vague also "as
applied to petitioner." In Romualdez, 16 the Court allowed an "as applied
challenge" through examining the vagueness of the assailed statute as
applied to the party raising its vagueness. In determining whether the term
"intervene" is vague, the Court held:
As to petitioners claim that the term intervene is vague, this
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can
easily be understood through simple statutory construction. HSAcaE

The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a

statute will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the
meaning can be determined through the judicial function of
construction. Elementary is the principle that words should
be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning. 17 (Citation
and italics omitted and emphasis ours)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Jurisprudence further provides that the void-for-vagueness doctrine can
only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction. As such, a statute is not vague if it defines the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. 18
Petitioner and OSG claim that the terms "notoriously offensive" and
"religious feelings" are vague. We disagree.
The said terms are not utterly vague as they are composed of words
commonly used. As such, any person of ordinary intelligence may
understand the same in their ordinary and usual meaning. Further, although
the Court has not specifically defined the said terms, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence providing examples of acts which are considered notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings such as stoning of a minister while he was
preaching or spreading his belief on a public road before a crowd of around
500 persons. 19 In contrast, the accused charged with an offense under
Article 133 of the RPC was acquitted in the following cases:
In People v. Reyes, et al. (CA-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955),
the accused Reyes, who was the chief of police of the town of San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur, ordered his policemen to stop Minister Sanidad of
the Iglesia ni Kristo, which was then holding a meeting at the public
plaza, from continuing with his sermon when the latter attacked in
the course of his sermon the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, as well
as the women of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. Accused were convicted of
violation of Art. 131 of the Revised Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx
People v. Mandoriao (CA-G.R. No. 12114, February 25, 1955, 51
O.G. 4619) started with a rally organized by the Iglesia ni Kristo,
attended by about 300 people, 50 of whom belonged to the said sect
at a public park in Baguio City. One of the ministers of the sect
expounded on a topic asserting that Christ was not God but an
ordinary man, causing the crowd to become unruly, whereupon,
appellant went up the stage and grabbed the microphone challenging
the minister to a debate. (The lower court convicted appellant of
violation of Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code but the Court of
Appeals acquitted him). 20
Given the foregoing cases where the Court either applied or refused to
apply Article 133 of the RPC, petitioner cannot claim a total lack of
understanding of what constitutes a notoriously offensive act. In fact,
petitioner himself cited the case of People v. Baes 21 and argued that the
standard provided therein (i.e., judging whether the acts are notoriously
offensive according to the feelings of the person professing such faith)
should be revisited. Further, petitioner's acts of purposely dressing in a Jose
Rizal costume while raising a placard and shouting "Bishops, stop meddling
in politics" during a big gathering/celebration attended by important
dignitaries of the Catholic Church and other religious sects clearly evinces
his intent to cause dishonor, offend and disrepute the church. To argue that
the term "notoriously offensive" is vague is belied by petitioner's calculated
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 acts to cause offense and disruption in the said gathering.
At any rate, the absence of definition of terms constituting an offense
is not uncommon. For instance, the Court had opined that the term
"obscenity" has no perfect definition. Thus, it is an "issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judges sound discretion." 22 Likewise, whether an act is notoriously offensive
to the religious feelings is an issue that should be treated on a case to case
basis. HESIcT

Moreover, this Court cannot give credit to petitioner and the OSG's
contention that Article 133 of the RPC violates non-establishment clause of
Section 5, Article III of the Constitution.
At the outset, the non-establishment clause is a reinforcement of the
principle of separation of church and state. It is not equivalent to separation
of religion and state. It is not indifference nor denial of the religious nature of
the Filipino society. In the case of In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano,
Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City , 23
this Court succinctly explained the non-establishment clause:
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional
mandate that " no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause. Indeed,
there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment,
which makes it even more imperative to understand each of these
concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's perspective.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation
between Church and State. It simply means that the State
cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activity or institution whatever they may be called or
whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion;
that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the
affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa.
Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an
official religion.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.
Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:
"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 government neutrality in religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be summarized in four
general propositions: (1) Government must not prefer
one religion over another or religion over irreligion
because such preference would violate voluntarism
and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must
not be applied to religious purposes because this
too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension; (3) Government action must not aid
religion because this too can violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4)
Government action must not result in excessive
entanglement with religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension." (Italics in the original and emphasis ours) caITAC

In this case, petitioner himself admitted that Article 133 of the RPC
"protects all religion." It does not endorse nor give aid to one religion over
the other. No excessive entanglement will result from the effectivity of
Article 133 of the RPC as it does not punish every act which may be
construed to attack one religion. It only covers those acts which are
"notoriously offensive" to the feelings of the faithful. In determining whether
there was excessive entanglement of the State in church matters, the
following factors are considered: 1) the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited; 2) the nature of the aid that the State
provides; and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority. 24 In this case, petitioner and the OSG has not
endeavored to establish how the State can be unduly involved with church
matters. It also bears to note that there is nothing in Article 133 of the RPC
which requires the State, or the courts for that matter, to be partisan in favor
of any church in making its factual findings.
On the contrary, we agree with the CA that Article 133 of the RPC
merely implements the right of the religious to conduct their rites within
their place of worship.
As to the violation of equal protection of laws, we fail to see merit in
petitioner's contention that Article 133 of the RPC is a discriminatory penal
statute against non-believers. As stated above, non-believers are not
prohibited from expressing dissent outside premises devoted to public
worship, and after the celebration of religious ceremony. TAIaHE

In all, we do not find any cogent reasons to modify, much less reverse
our Resolution dated March 21, 2018. As stated, the acts of petitioner were
meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those clergy whose beliefs and principles
were diametrically opposed to his own, 25 as such, petitioner is guilty of
Article 133 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED. Our Resolution dated March
21, 2018 STANDS.
NO FURTHER pleadings or motions shall be entertained herein.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Let an ENTRY of judgment in this case be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED." Peralta, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle
dated October 22, 2018 in lieu of Leonardo-de Castro, C.J.; Bersamin, J.,
designated Additional Member per Raffle dated October 22, 2018 in lieu of
Sereno, C.J.; Del Castillo, J.; Caguioa, J., designated Additional Member
per Raffle dated March 12, 2018 in lieu of Jardeleza, J.; and Tijam, J.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA

Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 799-832.

2. Id. at 777-796.
3. Id. at 772-776.
4. Id. at 775.

5. Id. at 772-774.
6. Article 133. Offending the religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during
the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
7. 421 Phil. 290 (2001).
8. Id. at 342-343.
9. 479 Phil. 265 (2004).
10. Id. at 284-285.

11. Supra note 7.

12. Id. at 354-355.
13. 727 Phil. 28 (2014).
14. 522 Phil. 705 (2006).

15. Id. at 776.

16. Supra note 9.
17. Id. at 287.
18. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 7, at 352.
19. See Concurring Opinion of Justice Felix Makasiar in Pamil v. Judge Teleron, 176
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Phil. 51, 108 (1978).
20. Id.
21. 68 Phil. 203 (1939).
22. Fernando v. CA , 539 Phil. 407, 417 (2006).

23. A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017.

24. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Rollo , p. 126.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com