(a) Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No.

130716, 9 December 1998 - info

(b) Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250, 9 July 2002

(c) Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169777, 169659, 169660,

169667, 169834, and 171246, 20 April 2006

(d) US v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 , 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727, 32 A.L.R.2d 382

(1953)

(e) Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 4 September 2008 info

(f) Akbayan Citizens Action Party vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, 16 July 2008 - info

(g) Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 88637, 7 September 1989

(h) Valmonte vs. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, 13 February 1989

(i) Legaspi v, CSC, G.R. No. L-721119, 29 May 1987

(j) Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 14 August 2000

(k) Baldoza v. Dimaano, A.M. No. 1120-MJ, 5 May 1976

(l) Air Philippines Corporation v. Penswell, G.R. No. 172835, 13 December

2007- justice

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL
GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A.
JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A.
JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, 4 demands that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering
the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-
gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect
on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that
he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has,
PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Issue:

Whether or not PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth.
Ruling:

Yes, the PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
The Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions
of the Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no
specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.

With respect to the right to information, it being a public right where the real parties in interest
are the people themselves in general and where the only recognized limitations is "public
concern," it would seem that the framers of the Constitution have favored the liberal approach.

FACTS:

The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,  (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. 
It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.”
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in
the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1)      The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential  and non-delegable

presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.  

2)         The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of

the President or the President himself.  The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.

3)         The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may

be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.