CHREA VS CHR (RESOLUTION) additional sources of funding for the staffing modification
July 21, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J. | CHR – limited fiscal autonomy 4.
PETITIONER: Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association (CHREA)
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Human Rights
SUMMARY: In its earlier Decision, the Court upheld the disapproval made by
the DBM with respect to the upgrading and reclassification scheme made by the
CHR. This motion for reconsideration ruled that the CHR only has limited fiscal
autonomy, as opposed to that granted by the Constitution to the Judiciary,
Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman. The provision in
the Constitution only mandates that its appropriations be automatically and
regularly released, while expressly excluding the grant of fiscal autonomy to
such body. Automatic and regular release of appropriations is but an aspect of
fiscal autonomy but not the entirety of it.
DOCTRINE:
This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to [CHR] a certain
degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from
[the CHR] fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the
Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The grant of fiscal autonomy is more extensive than the mere automatic and
regular release of approved annual appropriations of the government entity.
FACTS:
1. This motion for reconsideration was filed by the CHR with respect to the
earlier Decision by the SC ruling in favor of CHREA.
2. Earlier, Congress passed the General Appropriations Act of 1998 (GAA
1998). It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. It provided that offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices.
3. Pursuant to the Special Provisions, CHR issued:
a. Resolution adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions. It proposed the creation of ten
additional plantilla positions.
b. Resolution upgrading the salary grade of certain positions and
authorized augmentation from savings
c. Resolution collapsing vacant positions in the CHR to provide for
DBM Secretary Diokno denied the requests for the staffing modification and
upgrading scheme. According to Diokno,
a. There was no specific provision of law allowing the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office (and
according to GAA 1998, no changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President)
b. The upgrading of certain positions would change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions
5. In light of DBM’s disapproval, the CSC-NCR Office issued a Memorandum
recommending to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
6. CHREA then requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. It stated that the DBM is the
only agency with appropriate legal authority to evaluate and approve
matters of reclassification, upgrading and creating of positions.
7. CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request. It reversed the
recommendation of CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
disapproved.
8. CHREA appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the CSC-
Central office and upheld the validity of the upgrading and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the basis of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
9. In its Decision, the Supreme Court reversed the CA’s and ruled in favor of
CHREA i.e. the upgrading and reclassification scheme in the CHR was
unwarranted in light of DBM’s disapproval.
ISSUE/S + RATIO:
WoN the Constitution vests the CHR with absolute fiscal autonomy – NO
1. CHR contends that it is vested with fiscal autonomy by the Constitution
2. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman. The provisions with respect to such offices
consist of two sentences stating that:
a. The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy
b. Its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and
regularly released
3. Art XIII, Sec 17 (4): The approved annual appropriations of the [CHR]
shall be automatically and regularly released
a. This provision does not contain the first sentence expressly
granting fiscal autonomy.
b. Based on the records of the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Davide asked for the deletion of the express grant
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 of fiscal autonomy. It would be a “surplusage” because the
autonomy actually intended is the automatic release of the
appropriations. Commissioner Bengzon also made it clear that
“the sentence means what it says and it is clear” and that “it only
refers to the release which should be automatic and regular.”
c. This Court is convinced that the ConCom had intended to
grant to the [CHR] the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations automatically and regularly released, but
nothing more.
d. While it may be conceded that the automatic and regular
release of approved annual appropriations is an aspect of
fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others.
4. Bengzon vs Drilon: the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, CSC,
COA, COMELEC and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require
a. The grant of fiscal autonomy is more extensive than the mere
automatic and regular release of approved annual appropriations
of the government entity.
b. In Bengzon, the Court only recognized the fiscal autonomy of the
aforementioned offices, leaving out the CHR.
5. Moreover, the ConCom deliberations (Monsod specifically) showed that
fiscal autonomy would include other rights than just merely automatic and
regular disbursement.
6. The Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) defined the term “fiscal
autonomy” in its Joint Resolution, which stated that, “fiscal autonomy xxx
does not mean mere automatic and regular release of approved
appropriations xxx”
a. Since then CHR Chairperson Navarette-Reci a duly signed the
Joint Resolution, the CHR should be bound by the definition.
b. Fiscal autonomy includes, among other things, budget preparation
and implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations, and use of savings and disposition of receipts.
7. This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to [CHR] a
certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its
approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly.
However, it withholds from [the CHR] fiscal autonomy, in its broad or
extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius = the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others
8. Moreover, the Administrative Code on the fiscal autonomy of the
constitutional commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman and the CHR
merely follow the phraseology of the 1987 Constitution.
a. CHR asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy based on Book VI,
Chapter 1, Section 1, paragraph 9 of the Administrative Code
(Title: Constitutional Policies on the Budget): Fiscal autonomy
shall be enjoyed by the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions,
Office of the Ombudsman, Local Government and Commission on
Human Rights.
i. As the title suggest, the provision is supposed to merely
re-state the policies on budget as declared by the 1987
Constitution, and therefore, cannot grant or extend to the
[CHR] a privilege not found in the 1987 Constitution.
WoN the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of an
upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
CHR – YES (MAIN ISSUE OF THE CASE BUT FIRST ISSUE IS MORE RELEVANT)
1. The grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must,
all the same, comply to the Salary Standardization Law.
2. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade and create positions without the
approval of the DBM.
3. Although the Judiciary is allowed to reorganize, any such reorganization
must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence to the Salary Standardization
Law. Ergo, any reorganization therein must be in conformity of the DBM
inasmuch as it is the government arm tasked by law to implement the
Salary Standardization Law.
4. If the Judiciary, which was expressly granted by the Constitution with fiscal
autonomy, required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law and is
subject to the scrutiny of the DBM, the CHR cannot be deemed to enjoy a
better position than the Judiciary.
RULING: The MR is partially granted. The assailed Decision is modified, declaring
the respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in
the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved
annual appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law.
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