CASE DIGESTS

NOTE: Some case digests are in the PDF SourceBook material.

a.) SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO, 

vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO

FACTS:
 Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition
to any bona fide occupants/residents of said Barangays. Petitioner
Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the military –
and his brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the
military – occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati
City. Mauricio established residence within the lot, while respondent
continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City.9 The lot was later
subdivided into two portions, as Lots 2 and 3.
 Lot 2 – containing an area of 184 squaremeters – was applied for
coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot 3 – containing an area
of 169 square meters – was applied for by respondent. Respondent was
later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable
Permit10 to occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to occupy an
area of only 150 square meters.
 Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate 11 to such effect was
issued by the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau).
  respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s wife,
based on the theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the
353-square meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of
circumventing the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the
latter to apply for the purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing the
same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s stay in the premises is
merelyby tolerance of respondent; 
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 petitioners refused to vacate the premises upon respondent’s formal
demand.
 It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the
DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3.
The DENR held in Case No. 2004-821 that respondent is not qualified to acquire Lot 2
under Proc. 518 since he was already awarded a home lot in Fort Bonifacio, specifically
Lot 19, Block 22, Fort Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig. Moreover, he failed to provethat
Mauricio was not a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 2; on the contrary, it has been
shown that Mauricio, and not respondent, has been in actual possession and
occupation of the lot.

MTC- ruled in favor of petitioner

RTC- affirmed MTC’s decision

CA- reversed the decision of the lower courts

Hence, this petition.

It is undisputed that the revocable permit extended to the plaintiff was to occupy a
parcel of land withan area of 150 square meters.  When the land was declared open
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic Act No. 730 both
parties applied in their respective name pursuant to the size of the land which they are
permitted. Since then defendants have been in possession of the subject property up to
the present pursuant to the permit to occupy the subject land. Furthermore, defendants
had acquired the property in their own name, a valid claim to establish possession.

ISSUE:

WON THE CA ERRED in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. With the
pendency of the DENR Protests?

HELD:

MUST WAIT FOR THE RESULT OF THE DENR PROTEST

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YES.  If the ejectment case is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of
the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing structures thereon
would have to be demolished. If petitioners’ position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further
upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that respondent had no right to
occupy or take possession of the subject lots, which thus negates his right to institute
and maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a
consequence of the demolition of petitioners’ residence and other permanent
improvements on the disputed lots.

The DENR Secretary, denied the appeal on the basis that upon

findings  Mauricio has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications based on
the disposition of Public Lands. The DENR further ruled that upon ocular inspection
made, it was ascertained that 1) per records, Mauricio is a survey claimant of Lot
2, Block 255, Psd-a3-0054204 with an area of 184 sq.m. situated in Pembo, Makati
City; 2) that the land is residential in nature, a house stands erected in said area where
Mauricio and his family reside; 3) that a portion of the said area is being utilized as a
carinderiaand a sari-sari store as their family’s business; 4) thatMauricio is occupying
the area since 1985 up to the present; 5) that Lazaro Tabino (petitioner) is actually
residing in Quezon City; and, 6) the Yvonne Josephine Tabino, petitioner Lazaro Tabino
and Rafael Tabino are bonafideresidents of Quezon City for noless than twenty years

DENR

** it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to
factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Echoing the explanation of the
private respondent DENR, the findings of facts of the Director of Land (now the
Regional Director) is conclusive in the absence of any showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in
estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent
with the preponderance of evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the
findings in question could be made.
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In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme Court held that, "Under the
Public Land Act, the Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary ultimately
have the authority to dispose of and manage public lands. And while the DENR’s
jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve
questions of possession, the DENR’s decision would prevail with regard to the
respective rights of public land claimants. Regular courts would have no jurisdiction to
inquire into the validity of the award of the public land."

Under the circumstances, the Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of public
respondent DENR in its disposition of the subject property.

b.) ROSITO BAGUNU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO

& ROSENDA ACERIT, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:

 On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent[3] over the subject
land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).
 November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner,[5] who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant.
 The parties’ deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the
same lot subject of Atty. Binag’s pending free patent application.
 The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land on the Bureau of
Lands survey,[7] and the free patent applications uniformly identified the subject
land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also uniformly
identified the boundaries of the subject land.
 Respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The
respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, executed in their favor by the heirs of one
Rafael Bautista.
 The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular
inspection and formal investigation and found out that the petitioner actually
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occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area purchased by the
respondents.
 DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his
free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents.
 Petitioner- consideration –denied
  DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of
a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling. Since
the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to
the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258,
notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322
 On appeal, DENR Secretary affirmed[13] the ruling of the DENR Regional Office.
 On appeal to CA- affirmed the DENR Secretary ruling
 CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical
determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the
DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great
respect, if not finality.[15] The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.

CIVIL CASE NO. 751

On November 22, 1994 during the pendency of the respondents protest on DENR, Atty.
Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third
sale, against Bautista and the petitioner and  alleged that while the deeds evidencing
the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land
sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322,
instead of Lot 258.

Petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss citing the pendency of the land

protest before the Bureau of Lands. After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR
Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a
complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. Respondents also alleged that they
were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time
they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner,
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through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his
possession from Lot 258.

 CA affirmed the DENR Secretary

ISSUE:

WON The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENR’s
exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain?

HELD:

YES.  In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot
322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying
on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of
asserting their own private ownership of the property. The petitioners act of applying for
a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by
his application is a public land whose management and disposition belong to the DENR
Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands.

 Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292 reads:

Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural
Resources] shall:

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public
lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose
appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;

xxx

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of

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the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-
classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.]
(Underscoring supplied.)

Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in
carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)] by having
direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain..

** The present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against
the petitioner free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the
Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both
parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the
Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct control over the disposition
and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise
determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent.  Thus, it is the DENR
which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable
public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the
powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands.

JURISDICTION—DENR has jurisdiction

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from

determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.

Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free
patent application and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the
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same lot are within the DENR Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative discretion.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on
the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial
determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory
power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

2.) Local Government Units - RA 7160 (Local Government Code)

Decentralization or decentralisation is the process by which the activities of an

organization, particularly those regarding planning and decision making, are distributed
or delegated away from a central, authoritative location or group.

a. General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code – Sections 5(c) &
16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of RA 7160

SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. – In the interpretation of the provisions of this

Code, the following rules shall apply:

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community;

Liberal interpretation means interpretation agreeing to what the reader believes the
author reasonably intended.  

Liberally construed means interpreting a provision or rule without undue emphasis on

strict compliance with all procedural requirements and technicalities, with a view to
bringing about a resolution that is just and fair to all parties within a reasonable time

SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
CASE DIGESTS
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

1.)

ISSUE:
WON the enacted Ordinances by the said LGUs and the provisions of the
Constitution violative of the rights of the fishermen?
HELD:
NO. Petitioners contentions were baseless and they do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
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Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of Marine
Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the
petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms
subsistence or marginal fishermen,18 they should be construed in their general and
ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin
of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely
sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, 19 while a subsistence
fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his
livelihood.20 Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or
fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be
limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by
himself and his immediate family. 
 Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth.
What must  be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the
Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh
and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants
 Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the
LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of
the community.
CASE DIGESTS
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate
ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-
ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws.24 Further, the sangguniang bayan,
the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall
include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing... and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization26 as expressly
mandated by the Constitution.27 Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC
expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any
fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned,
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or
purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine
waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological
imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support systems. 34 They collect,
retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass
beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a
protective shelter for aquatic organisms.35 It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to
the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish
and plant species that will disappear without them. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon
of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of fish not
only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the market for live banquet fish [which] is
virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.37 These exotic species are coral-dwellers,
and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and
squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once
affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand. 38 The
diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff.
Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are placed in
holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from their system and are
ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags
CASE DIGESTS
filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish. 39 While
the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the
fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish
feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as
habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral.
The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all
color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves. 40 It has been found that
cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated
application.
under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize,
by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing
laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to
[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes or of ecological imbalance.

2.) CELESTINO TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

FACTS:
 On the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena
on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the
abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected
the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine,
 A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to
investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the
neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses,
so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner
occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and
CASE DIGESTS
the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and
properties of the people within the neighborhood.
 Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April
22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a
public nuisance
 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal
Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction.
 Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting
the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire.
 On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause
of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in
accordance with law.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional

and void?

HELD:

NO. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates
from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:
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The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations,
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein. 4

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of
a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

3.) SANGALANG v. IAC (1988)

FACTS:
 Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in
the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation which in 1968 was merged
with appellant Ayala Corporation.
 The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston
and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958,
respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and
easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each
deed of sale.
 When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-
interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia
Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac
Street in the east, was still undeveloped.
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 On September 25, 1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful
study, it was finally decided that the height limitation of buildings on the
commercial lots shall be increased from 12.5 meters to 15 meters.
Appellant further informed BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by
3.5 mters to improve traffic flow in said street. BAVA (Bel-air Village
Association) did not reply to said letter.
 on April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No.
81, providing for the zonification of Makati. Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air
Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in
the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street 
 on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA
directing that, in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of
easing traffic congestion, the following streets in Bel-Air Village should be
opened for public use

 BAVA wrote the Mayor of Makati, expressing the concern of the residents
about the opening of the streets to the general public, and requesting
specifically the indefinite postponement of the plan to open Jupiter Street
to public vehicles.

 the Barangay Captain of Bel-Air Village was advised by the Office of the
Mayor that, in accordance with the agreement entered into during the
meeting on January 28, 1 977, the Municipal Engineer and the Station
Commander of the Makati Police were ordered to open for public use
Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Accordingly, he was
requested to advise the village residents of the necessity of the opening of
the street in the interest of public welfare.

 Thus, with the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic,
the different residential lots located in the northern side of Jupiter Street
ceased to be used for purely residential purposes. They became, for all
purposes, commercial in character.
CASE DIGESTS

 the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang

brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant
Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or
quasi-delict.

 The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural ground, i.e.,

pendency of an Identical action

 CA affirmed trial courts decision and held that Jupiter Street "is classified
as High density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance No. 81-01 for National Capital Region,"
ISSUE:

WON the Ordinance exercised the legitimate police power?

HELD:

 YES.
 The MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise
other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution,
which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests
of general welfare. 
 The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In
that connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the
Court of Appeals.
 It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the
easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-
Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and
enforceable.
 But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs,
and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the
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legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of
contract and is said to be the "law between the contracting parties, 65 but
while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. 66 Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to
police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
whenever necessary.

** That in 1975, the Municipal Government of Makati enacted a zoning ordinance and
classified the blocks between Buendia Avenue Extension and Jupiter Street as an
administrative office zone with the north-northeast boundary of the zone extending up to
the center line of Jupiter street. Under the said ordinance, Bel-Air Village has likewise
been called into a residential zone, with its boundary at the southwest being delimited
only up to the center line of the Jupiter Street. Similarly, under Ordinance No. 81-01 of
the Metro Manila Commission, Jupiter Street has been made a common boundary of
the commercial blocks along the north side of the Buendia Avenue Extension and the
Bel-Air Village Subdivision, so that the said street is subject to the common use of the
owners of both the commercial blocks as well as the residential areas.(footnotes)

4.) METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. BEL-AIR

VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC

FACTS:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a
Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of
request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use
of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and
convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.
This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the
CASE DIGESTS
respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of
the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no
authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the
authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the
State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to

public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

**** Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. 

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted

by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local Government Code of
1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate." 17 — one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. 18 Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 19 They are also the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state. 

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code,
known as the general welfare clause, viz:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
CASE DIGESTS
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. 21

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the
municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
[province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . . " 22 The same Code gives
the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."

HELD:

 NO.
 It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. 12 It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. 13 The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. 14 Once
CASE DIGESTS
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred
on them by the national lawmaking body. 
 MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." 
 The MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A.
No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they
are unnecessary.
 The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police
power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However,
police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a
legislative unit of the government.
 Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA
police power.
 It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
CASE DIGESTS

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005
(google)

lapwhil

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS vs THE HONORABLE ENRICO

LANZANAS

Facts: 

On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (RED Principe) of

Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued an
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary
mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove,
a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.[3]

The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power
barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power
barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental
Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date
of issuance or until 30 June 1999.[4]

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,[5] sought

reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners
plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
CASE DIGESTS
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No.
7160,[9] and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO
96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the
implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all

administrative remedies before taking this legal action in Court. The decision of the
regional director may still be elevated to the secretary of the DENR

ISSUE:

ADDITIONAL CASES:

. Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (GR No. 135385, Dec.
6, 2000)

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
CASE DIGESTS
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same. 

LAWPHIL HELD:

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

ACCORDING TO THE SEPARATE OPINION;

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the
Philippines.

True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural

communities’ right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the
CASE DIGESTS
provisions of this Constitution."  indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public
domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.

RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the
state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has
provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and
authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related
provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's
property regime.

MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. 2869. March 25, 1907

Facts: 

An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held
the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs.
There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The
government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish
Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles.
Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: 

Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian
Doctrine.

 Ruling:
CASE DIGESTS
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United
States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership,
it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.” There is an existence of native title to
land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia

Carino vs. Insular Government (GR No. L-2869, March 25, 1907)
FACTS:

J. Arellano

Facts:

Mateo Cariño, on  February 23 , 1904, filed his petition in the Court of

Land Registration for a title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13
centares in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet. This was heard with a petition for
a title for a portion of the land.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, because they alleged

that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same
was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State.

According to Carino, in 1884, he erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the

property situated to the north of that property now in question. They said that during the
year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same
to Donaldson Sim. Carino abandoned the house and lived on the land in question.

The court of land registration ruled against their favor. They also ruled that the land was
"used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public land.

Issue: Is Carino the rightful possessor of the land?

CASE DIGESTS
Held: No, petition denied.

Ratio:

Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the
legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State.

There was no proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the
Spanish Government.

The possessory information was not the one authorized in substitution for the one in
adjustment of the royal decree of February 13, 1894. This was due to:

1. the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years
last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and
during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had
been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years,
notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated

Or such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or
more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated

2. Under Spanish law, there was a period of one year allowable to verify the possessory
information. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons
in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full
possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said
possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter
can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in
accordance with common law.
CASE DIGESTS
In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average
in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five
years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been
carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, from the record of the case

The right of possession in accordance with civil law remained at all times subordinate to
the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to
royal transferable or alienable lands even until after February 13, 1894.

3. The advent of American sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing

with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition
of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called
public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance
with the Organic Act of 1902 and other laws like Act No. 648, herein mentioned by the
petitioner.

Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, as a basis for obtaining the right of
ownership. "The petitioners claim the title under the period of prescription of ten years
established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use from time
immemorial. But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and
ownership to lands not exceeding more that 16 hectares in extent." Under Sec. 6 of said
act. The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration
his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, therefore it follows that the judgment
denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the
law invoked.

 And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of
same, according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of
which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been
determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that
the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we
should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting
ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already
CASE DIGESTS
exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in
different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration.

Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City vs. RTC Branch 57,
Makati (Gr No. 81564, April 26, 1990)

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:

  petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 57, Makati, Metro Manila, with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
an order authorizing the private respondent, through Domingo Palomares, to
perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel of land known
as Hacienda de Maricaban spread out in various parts of Makati, Pasig, Taguig,
Pasay City, and Parañaque. 
 On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares,
as administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit with RTC for
declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title and
cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title
 the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order, directing the
petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts complained of.

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, G.R. No. 206510, September
16, 2014 

(ARIGO v. SWIFT)

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

VILLARAMA,J;

FACTS:
CASE DIGESTS
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise
known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the
protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity
for the enjoyment of present and future generations." 

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

                On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident,
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

                Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.(YES)

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian. (YES)
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
(NO)

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

CASE DIGESTS
                Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
“calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

                In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public
right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

                On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.

Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be

based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."

INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to

minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing
of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
"collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature."

Second issue: YES.

  The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers

of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial
CASE DIGESTS
actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

                During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took
the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail
to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through
the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

   In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following  exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

                With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and

31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry
into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.
CASE DIGESTS
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international
affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the
global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of
UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,

directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond

dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction
of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of
the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any
other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

 
CASE DIGESTS
                The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

                The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

                The Court also found  unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under
R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

WRIT OF KALIKASAN means a legal remedy available to any natural or juridical

person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization,
or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces. (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rule 7,
Sec. 1)

-- may be sought by anyone a) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful

ecology is violated, or b) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is threatened with violation, by an unlawful act of omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity and such violation or threat involves
“environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants of two or more cities, or provinces.” (Rule 7, Section 1)

Features of the Writ of Kalikasan

The underlying condition for the writ to be issued is that, the magnitude requirement
with regards to the destruction or imminent destruction of the environment which is
sought to be prevented, must be present.

The entities to whom the writ can be directed against, the Rules provides that it could be
anybody. They could be public officials, employees or even private persons, for as so
CASE DIGESTS
long as it could be proven that they violated or threatened with violation the
constitutional right to a healthy environment of other people.

The Rules likewise provides for various reliefs that could be granted by the courts under
the writ which includes, among others, the issuance of order against the respondent to
cease or refrain from committing acts violative of the rights of the petitioners asking for
the writ. It can also be an order commanding the respondent to perform positive acts to
preserve or protect the environment as well as to make reports of their compliance with
these responsibilities. (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC Rule 7, Sec. 15)

Writ of Kalikasan, applied

Currently, there are at least two (2) instances wherein the writ of kalikasan was availed
of. The first one was directed against an electric power distribution company and
the second one was against an oil pipeline operator. The first case is still pending trial
while the latter was successfully granted by the Philippine Supreme Court.

LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. AGHAM PARTY LIST

(represented by its President Rep. Angelo B. Palmones),.G.R. No. 209165

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

  LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located
in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI’s mining area is covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement
 LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy.
Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a
mining company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines
and make the venture economically feasible Brgy. Bolitoc, about 25 kilometers
away from the mine site, makes it an ideal location to build a port facility.
CASE DIGESTS
 LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port
project: (1) Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Compliance Certificate5 (ECC) R03-1104-182 dated 2 May 2011
covering the development of causeway, stockpile and related facilities on LAMI’s
property with an area of 18,142 sq.m.; (2) DENR provisional foreshore lease
agreement with LAMI;6 (3) Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Clearance to
Develop a Port;7 (4) PPA Permit to Construct a Port;8 (5) PPA Special Permit to
Operate a Beaching Facility;9 and (6) Tree Cutting Permit/Certification10 from
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR.
 The Bolitoc community – the barangay, its officials and residents – gave several
endorsements12 supporting the project. Even the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta.
Cruz gave its consent to the construction of the port.13
 However, LAMI allegedly encountered problems from the local government of
Sta. Cruz, LAMI stated that Mayor  unduly favored some mining companies in the
municipality and allegedly refused to issue business and mayor’s permits and to
receive payment of occupation fees from other mining companies despite the
necessary national permits and licenses secured by the other mining companies.
 Mayor Marty issued an order14 directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with its
clearing works and sent a letter to the  DENR Environmental Management
Bureau in Region III inquiring if the ECC the DENR issued in favor of LAMI
allowed the latter to cut trees and level a mountain which under investigation
found that LAMI violated  found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under
the ECC.
 Agham Party List  filed a Petition21 for the issuance of a Writ22 of Kalikasan
against LAMI  DENR, PPA, and the Zambales Police Provincial Office and
alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No. 705,24 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277,25 or the Revised Forestry Code; and (2) Sections
5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
(Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain trees and flattened
a mountain which serves as a natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods
CASE DIGESTS
not only of the residents of Zambales but also the residents of some nearby
towns located in Pangasinan.
 The case was remanded to CA for trial
  the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. 
Issues

1. Whether LAMI violated the environmental laws: the Revised Forestry Code, and
Philippine Mining Act;

2. Whether LAMI flattened any mountain and cause environmental damage of such
magnitured as to prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces

Ruling

1. No. LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by CENRO and passed the
evaluation conducted after the issuance of the permit so it clearly had the
authority to cut trees and did not violate Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
The Philippine Mining Act is not applicable to the case since LAMI is not
conducting anything on the port site and it secured all the necessary permits and
licenses for the construction of  a port and LAMI’s activity was limited to
preparatory works for the port’s construction. The Philippine Mining Act deals
with mining operations and other mining activities.

2. No. The Respondent, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not
cite any law allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. It did not present any
proof to demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales and those of the towns of
Pangaisnan complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land
formation which may affect their lives, health, or properties. Neither was there any
evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the barangay and the
surrounding vicinity.

The records of expert testimonies and government entities and offiicials also show that
there is in fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
CASE DIGESTS
The Supreme Court agreed with the CA in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.

The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an

extraordinary remedy,43 covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or private individual or entity.

The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy:

(1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a

balanced and healthful ecology;

(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

(3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental

damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
provides:

Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the following:

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the
act or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1)
environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or
omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
CASE DIGESTS
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the
magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.

Presumption of regularity

It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been
regularly performed. Therefore, the fact that the "remarks and recommendation" of the
composite team from EMB R3, MGB R3, and PENRO Zambales were made in the
exercise of their government function, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of such official duty stands. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove otherwise, a task
which it failed to do here.

Expert findings are afforded great weight

The findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial
showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed. x x x.64

In sum, contrary to the findings of the appellate court in its Amended Decision dated 13
September 2013, we find that LAMI did not cause any environmental damage that
prejudiced the life, health or property of the inhabitants residing in the municipality of
Sta. Cruz, the province of Zambales or in the neighboring province of Pangasinan.
Agham, as the party that has the burden to prove the requirements for the issuance of
the privilege of the Writ ofKalikasan, failed to prove (1) the environmental laws allegedly
violated by LAMI; and (2) the magnitude of the environmental damage allegedly caused
by LAMI in the construction of LAMI' s port facility in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales
and its surrounding area. Thus, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan must be denied.
CASE DIGESTS
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, INC., Petitioner vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES), G.R. No. 209271, July 26,

FACTS:

 The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered
eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong).
 From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB),
the implementing institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment
on Bt talong under the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP).7 The NCBP, created under Executive Order No. (EO)
430,8 is the regulatory body tasked to: (a) "identify and evaluate potential hazards
involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new
species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to
minimize risks"; and (b) ''formulate and review national policies and guidelines on
biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests and
their genetic materials for the protection of public health, environment[,] and
personnel[,] and supervise the implementation thereof." 9 Upon the completion of
the contained experiment, the NCBP issued a Certificate 10 therefor stating that all
biosafety measures were complied with, and no untoward incident had
occurred.11
  the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two (2)-year Biosafety Permits 12 for
field testing of Bt talong13after UPLB's field test proposal satisfactorily completed
biosafety risk assessment for field testing pursuant to the Department of
Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order No. 8, series of 2002 14 (DAO 08-
2002),15 which provides for the rules and regulations for the importation and
release into the environment of plants and plant products derived from the use of
modern biotechnology.
 respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia filed before the Court a Petition for Writ
of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan alleging that the Bt talong field
CASE DIGESTS
trials violated their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology
considering among other things:
 (ECC), as required by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151,19 was not secured
prior to the field trials;20 
(b) the required public consultations under the Local Government Code (LGC)
were not complied with;21 and
(c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to
human health and the environment, and that there is no independent, peer-
reviewed study showing its safety for human consumption and the
environment.22 Further, they contended that since the scientific evidence as to
the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient or uncertain,
 The Court issued Writ of Kalikasan
  the CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to pem1anently
cease and desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.3
 petitioners separately moved for reconsideration. 41 However CA denied the same
and remarked that introducing genetically modified plant into the ecosystem is an
ecologically imbalancing act
ISSUE:

(a) WON the case should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the
completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of the
Biosafety Permits;55 
(b) WON the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was
not raised as an issue;56 and
(c) WON the Court erred in relying on the studies cited in the December 8, 2015
Decision which were not offered in evidence and involved Bt corn, not Bt talong.
(d)  whether a case involves paramount public interest in relation to the
mootness principle? = YES
HELD:

 it is important to understand that the completion and termination of the field tests do not
mean that herein petitioners may inevitably proceed to commercially propagate Bt
CASE DIGESTS
talong.83 There are three (3) stages before genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may
become commercially available under DAO 08-2002 84 and each stage is distinct, such
that "[s]ubsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and
clearance is given to engage in the next regulatory stage." 85 Specifically, before a
genetically modified organism is allowed to be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a
permit for propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be shown that based on
the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose any
significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety studies show that the
regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and animal health;
and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event has
been duly registered with the FPA.

As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks
related to propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus,
there are no guaranteed after-effects to the already concluded Bt talong field trials that
demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future
threat to the right ,of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and
balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than real.

More significantly, it is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing
the merits of field trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt
talong tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the
regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing.

with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of the
Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with
none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly attending, the Court grants
the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition.
With this pronouncement, no discussion on the substantive merits of the same should
be made.
CASE DIGESTS
MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO JACOSALEM, AND ODON S.
BANDIOLA, Petitioners vs. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE

Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

 Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made
public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime
February 2018. 5 This was followed by several speeches and news releases
stating that he would place Boracay under a state of calamity. True to his words,
President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting
held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson
Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally
announced that the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of
six months starting April 26, 2018. 6
 Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and
military personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for
crowd dispersal management. 7 They also allege that the DILG had already
released guidelines for the closure. 8
 Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about,
fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that
their earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They fear that if the
closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and irreparable damage. Hence,
despite the fact that the government was then yet to release a formal issuance
on the matter,9 petitioners filed the petition on April 25, 2018
  petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 is an invalid exercise of legislative
powers. They posit that its issuance is in truth a law-making exercise since the
proclamation imposed a restriction on the right to travel and therefore
substantially altered the relationship between the State and its people by
increasing the former's power over the latter. 
CASE DIGESTS
Proclamation No. 475 12 formally declaring a state of calamity in Boracay and ordering
its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.

 petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 is unconstitutional for infringing on

the constitutional rights to travel and to due process.
 According to respondents, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future
action. Here, President Duterte had already issued Proclamation No. 475 and in
fact, the rehabilitation of the island was then already ongoing. 
 respondents insist that Proclamation No. 475 does not unduly transgress upon
the local autonomy of the LGUs concerned. Under RA 10121, it is actually the
Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council concerned which, subject to
several criteria, is tasked to take the lead in preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from the effects of any disaster when a state of calamity is declared.
In any case, the devolution of powers upon LGUs pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of ensuring their autonomy does not mean that the State can no longer
interfere in their affairs. This is especially true in this case since Boracay's
environmental disaster cannot be treated as a localized problem that can be
resolved by the concerned LGUs only. The magnitude and gravity of the problem
require the intervention and assistance of different national government agencies
in coordination with the concerned LGUs.
ISSUE:

WON SLAPP as a defense is applicable on this case?

WON Proclamation No. 475 must be upheld for being in the nature of a valid police
power measure?

HELD:

1. NO. Suffice it to state that while this case touches on the environmental
issues in Boracay, the ultimate issue for resolution is the constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 475. The procedure in the treatment of a defense of
SLAPP provided for under Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases should not, therefore, be made to apply.
CASE DIGESTS
2. YES. That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the
scope of police power cannot be disputed. Verily, the statutes 50 from which
the said measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions 51 which
serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and
health, safety, and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of
which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and
regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475
is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only question
now is whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the
manner of implementing them.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a

citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or

threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a
favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the
CASE DIGESTS
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that
his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed
in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In
the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as
amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President,
not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the
Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds
pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s
interest in this particular issue.