Citizen Engagement: Participatory Citizens’ Co-production in Law almost all aspects of local policing, with a wide variety of roles,
icing, with a wide variety of roles, responsibilities and authority that
Enforcement
Paper presented before the 2019 Annual Conference of the Asian Association for Public
Administration (AAPA), Manila, Philippines (May 22-24, 2019).
Robert J. Dickey1
INTRODUCTION
Traffic. Policing. Two issues with strong association through traffic law enforcement and, hopefully,
safer and smoother travel. The opening question, however, is whether there are other options. In a
time of declining governmental resources and increase demand, alternative strategies such as load-
sharing, including public-private partnerships, participatory governance, citizen engagement, and co-
production of public services by residents must become the new norm.
Metro Manila is comprised of 17 autonomous local government units (LGUs), but some services are
coordinated through the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), including transport, waste
management and flood control functions, each of which impact the focal area of traffic management.
While Dan Brown’s Inferno (2013) characterizes Manila’s “six-hour traffic jams” as entry into the
“gates of hell” and some have described Manila’s traffic as “world’s worst” (Fallaria et al., 2019;
Hegina, 2015) others a slightly more kind verdict, including the National Capital Region (NCR) only at
number nine (Cantlas, 2015), while many others do not include the Philippines or Metro Manila in their
world’s worst lists. While nature, population density, and infrastructure are significant issues for
Manila’s traffic, another aspect is driving behavior. Enforcement of road rules, including both driving
and parking, may alleviate some of the traffic issues.
This preliminary fieldwork study examines Filipino drivers' acceptance of the Korean model of citizen-
volunteer traffic enforcement, known as Caparazzi (car paparazzi) or citizen traffic officers (CTOs).
The Caparazzi model, one approach in a “civilian policing” model (Huey, Nhan, & Broll, 2012) is
based on uploads to authorized governmental repositories of smartphone photographs evidencing
traffic or other civil infractions, a type of “police-civilian partnership” (ibid). Smartphone technology
would seem an option for traffic enforcement in the Philippines, as many drivers are already using a
locally-developed government-endorsed (yet privately managed) “MMDA Traffic Navigator” and there
is also the Israel-developed Waze app, both offering real-time traffic updates (Yujuico 2015). Unlike
real-time systems that require online connectivity and data streaming, an enforcement app can allow
for occasional uploads based on (free or discounted) internet access, thus reducing online fees.
Furthermore, use of non-governmental agents may lead to enhanced enforcement, since, as Cohen
and Rubin (1985) observe, private enforcement agents, unlike government regulators, possess
ongoing economic interests directly related to the costs and benefits of public policy implementation
(169). As there are two schemes in Korea’s Caparazzi programs (compensated and non-
compensated), both types are considered here.
CITIZENS IN POLICING
Coproduction in policing services, as with all other public services, is hardly new, perhaps even
tracing back to Biblical times (Koven, 1992). Since the 9th century English families were expected to
raise the “hue and cry” (Neely, 1990), and from the 13th century all men in town had to serve on the
unpaid nightwatch, a rotating responsibility (Dobrin, 2016). Dobrin (2017, 81) further notes that
through the history of the Anglo/American police, volunteers have always participated significantly in
Keimyung University, Daegu S. Korea email: rjdickey@kmu.ac.kr
1 2
benefit their agencies and communities, yet there are still great gaps in what we know about
volunteerism in policing (Dobrin & Wolfe, 2016; Wolf, Holmes, & Jones 2016; Wolf, Pepper, & Dobrin,
2016).
Traditionally, the police protect public interests while security agents have protected private interests
and assets (Dobrin, 2016, 723). Extra-judicial enforcement through vigilante groups, armed private
security forces, community militias, and private-action lawsuits are beyond the scope of this
volunteerism analysis, although their members may claim their acts are entirely consistent with the
self-help tradition of policing (at least, up to the point where they conduct extra-judicial trials,
sentencing, and execution of sentence). On the other hand, a valid reason for voluntarism in policing
under Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) “steering not rowing” framework for New Public Management
(NPM) is the concept of load-shedding (Johnston, 1992, p. 58), also known as “load-sharing.”
Whether this voluntary staffing used to reduce police costs, or extend police services, both are
legitimate NPM aims and in keeping with the UN-defined Sustainable Development Goals of
Sustainable Cities and Communities, and Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions; for it is clear that
increased compliance with traffic laws should decrease traffic congestion and reduce the impacts of
climate change caused by energy, consumption, as well as improve ecosystems and peace and
justice by removing inequalities.
Volunteers also serve in office functions of policing, most invisible to the public. Use of volunteers in
policing may be seen as a way of increasing capacity and reducing demand while providing a better
service to the public, yet the arguments for an expansion of police voluntarism are much broader,
including potential for empowering and engaging communities (Callender et al. 2018). The concept of
“community policing” is strongly driven by both improved police-community ties and decreased
policing costs through the engagement of citizens (Kempa et al, 1999). Percy (1978) argued that
reporting criminal activity—both real and suspected—is a fundamental role for citizens in coproduction
of policing (187).
In the continuum of citizen-volunteers in policing, most common are the low-engagement (passive)
neighborhood watch, who report crimes they observe. (Ostrom (1978) includes all witnesses who
report crimes in the policing continuum.) At the other extreme are the Special Constables in England
and Wales, along with those police reserve in the United States and elsewhere who are fully-
warranted yet unpaid law enforcement officers. Intermediary levels include school crossing guards,
teen-aged Explorers, citizens on patrol (with police radios), non-sworn police reserves on walking
patrols, police ride-alongs, traffic & parking guides, community patrols, and office-support volunteers.
Johnston (1992) has divided these types of volunteerism in policing as Responsible Citizenship,
where neighbors watch out for each other, and Autonomous Citizenship, where reporting neighbors to
government, vigilante behavior, and independent policing groups such as the Guardian Angels
become common (p. 137), while Cook (2011) observes that one of the basic ways for citizens to
coproduce policing is “by carrying a mobile phone” (104) and participating in various “Tips” programs
(105). In contrast are the paid yet non-sworn policing personnel such as traffic & parking enforcement
wardens (meter-maids), crime and accident investigators, safety inspectors, and police department
staff. Various programs encourage citizens to be proactive, perhaps providing cash rewards for those
whose information (“tips”) leads to convictions. Depending on the design of the system, payments for
reporting infractions may also provide a modest income for elderly, unemployed or disadvantaged
members of the community.
Volunteers in policing extends beyond the Anglo-American model, including not only lands formerly
under British influence, but also Hungary, Germany and the Netherlands (Wolf, Pepper, & Dobrin,
2016), also Korea (Dickey, 2012) and, in a more limited sense, in Sweden (Uhnoo & Löfstrand, 2018)
and Belgium (van Eijk, Steen, & Verschuere, 2017). In terms of traffic issues, cities in Hunan (China)
have granted ordinary citizens the power to write tickets and keep up to 80% of the fines (Zheng &
Feng, 2012; Jacobs & Century, 2012); the City of Santa Maria (California) uses trained volunteers to
mark, and tow, cars violating the 72 hour parking ordinance; in Boulder (Colorado) paparazzi record
and submit evidence of animals relieving themselves on park grounds so that the owners would have
to pay a $10 fine (The Denver Channel); PoliceWitness.com is a support organization for photo-
vigilantes who wish to report traffic and other infractions to the police in the UK (Gye, 2011;
PoliceWitness.com, no date); and many US cities train volunteers to write summonses for disabled
parking violations. A common bond in the above programs is some degree of training and supervision
by law enforcement authorities. As an example of minimal training, the New York State Vehicle Code1
specifies a minimum of two hours training, and established procedures, for volunteers to enforce the
handicapped parking law.
The Philippines, too, have a long history of non-governmental policing, although there has been great
concern over the vigilante approach taken by many (May, 1992), such as the Confederate Sentinels
Group (Evangelista, 2018) and the Civilian Volunteer Organizations’ Barangay patrols
(GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). Many of these “volunteers” are “working” full-time in law enforcement, with
some level of compensation, but without extensive training (Philippine News Agency, 2018).
Fully-warranted (sworn) volunteer officers, whether known as Reserves, Auxiliaries, Special
Constables, or other, incorporate police authority (e.g., power of arrest, perhaps right to bear fire-
arms) beyond the scope of this study, although their empowerment points to the possibility of
providing lesser policing powers to the broader citizenry. Volunteers serving in administration-only
roles, too, are not included here.
TRAFFIC AND PARKING ENFORCEMENT
Across the 20th century, most law enforcement came from the hands of uniformed police officials.
However, as Moffat and Salzburg (1999) observe, public resources for traffic enforcement must
compete against higher-priority crime response activity. Additional enforcement personnel, Traffic
Wardens or Civil Enforcement Officers, are uniformed but non-warranted government officials. In the
US, Parking Enforcement Officers (colloquially known as “Meter Maids”) are generally a department
within the Police Department, whereas in England and Korea they are attached to enforcement
divisions in local governments (not included in the regular police agencies). Fire & building inspectors,
health inspectors, and truant officers are other types of enforcement officials not associated with crime
and traffic enforcement.
During the past four decades, governments have made use of a variety of automated traffic law
enforcement mechanisms: the most common radar and cameras for speed, traffic and parking
enforcement (or at least infraction deterrence). There are numerous objections to these devices,
generally related to questions of accuracy and lack of discretion. A trained officer, whether on the
scene, or reviewing machine-generated evidence, exercises discretion in issuance of citations.
Automated system may lack this discretion. See Figure 1 for a flow chart of process in issuance of a
citation, inclusive of citizen reporters, technology-based observations, and enforcement officer
observations.
Additionally, it has been argued that governments may be “investing” in these devices for revenue-
generation purposes rather than public safety or law enforcement (see Fang, 2012; Moffat & Salzburg,
1999; and Mahoney & Helperin, 2009). Similarly, it has been claimed that governments have a
financial motivation to promote citizen reporter “paparazzi” schemes: they can reduce costs for
enforcement officers, and even after paying the citizen-informants still make a profit (Choe, 2011;
Glionna, 2009). On the other hand, a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ -like argument was raised by some
respondents in Kim’s 2004 survey concerning excessive spending by government on the program due
to more reports filed than anticipated. Clearly, any profit-sharing deals with the private sector should
be designed to avoid the promotion of revenue-generation over safety (see CALPIRG 2011).
Nevertheless, revenue generation, despite displeasure from citizens, is one of the New Public
Management tools. Ultimately, as Bagolong et al. (2014) have offered, “the primary goal of traffic law
enforcement is to encourage voluntary compliance with traffic laws while keeping traffic moving safely
and smoothly” (p.1).
1
New York Vehicle Code Section 1203-F: Handicapped parking enforcement.
3 4
=============================
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
=============================
METHODOLOGY
This was a preliminary investigatory survey of residents perceptions, examining whether a more in-
depth study of residents’ acceptance of a citizen-policing model would be warranted.
Data Collection
Survey responses from 103 licensed drivers were gathered by three educated Filipina research
associates during an August 2014 weekday near the foodcourt at SM MegaMall in Mandaluyong City.
This location was selected as a major foot traffic area and representative of middle-class
urban/suburban residents in the National Capital Region. The survey instrument consisted of six
demographic items, including driving patterns, and four subject items relating to perceived
appropriacy and willingness to participate in a Carparazzi-style program in Metro Manila. Sampling
was of convenience, with survey gatherers aware of the need for representativeness of respondents
based on obvious distinctions of age and gender. A small foodcourt gift coupon was offered in
exchange for the 5-minute survey, which was done verbally and recorded on a paper survey
instrument. The survey was conducted in Tagalog based on an English-written survey document
(survey instrument in Appendix A) except where Filipino respondents preferred to use English.
All data is treated as categorical response, although age is reported in ranges: at the time of survey
administration these were approximately age 54 ½ or more, age 24½ or less, and two intermediate
ranges (see the survey instrument for specifics). Distance driven per week was treated similarly: less
than 10km, 10-40km, 40-100km, and more. Survey responses and lack of questions from
respondents suggest that these treatments were reasonable.
The amount of compensation for volunteers was not defined, but for any respondents who asked, we
suggested that upper limits might be set related to aspects such as “not more than 25% of the fine
amount” and not more some defined amount per month, e.g., 20,000PhP/US$500.
Descriptive Statistics
The tables below indicate the raw response rates for the survey items (Table 1), and the Pearson’s
Chi Square Test Score (goodness of fit) for the acceptance of the citizen volunteer enforcement
project based on the demographic items in the survey (items 1-6 displayed in Tables 2-7).
=============================
TABLES 1 - 7 ABOUT HERE
=============================
ANALYSIS
Although confirmatory data has not been located, much of the summary demographic data “feels”
representative of the wider community of drivers in Philippines National Capital Region (Metro Manila),
although the nearly 2:1 ratio of male to female respondents may be a distortion On the other hand,
deeper investigation might show that the gender or other measures are less representative within
other demographics fields, e.g., the number of young women, or the number of older women, or older
women driving more frequently, etc. As a preliminary very small scale survey we should accept these
limitations and look at wider questions. The number of drivers stopped for a violation also seems a bit
excessive, but outcome may be specific to driving frequency in the Metro Manila area.
The data indicates acceptance of stricter traffic enforcement from volunteer reporters, despite the fact
that over 75% of respondents report having been stopped for a traffic violation, while less supportive
of compensation, still less supportive of self or a family member being a volunteer reporter, and not
supportive of self or family member being a reporter if compensation were available. Not surprisingly,
those who had not been stopped for a traffic violation were more supportive of the volunteer program,
but surprisingly, were less supportive of themselves or a family member serving as a CTO. Distance
and frequency of driving in Metro Manila (survey items 3 and 4) were mostly not statistically significant
in terms of “Yes” responses to the key questions of the CTO program (survey items 7a-d). Women
were more accepting of the CTO program, paid or unpaid, than men, but men were more willing to
serve as a CTO, or allow a family member to do so.
While the data analysis provided statistically significant outcomes for age vis-à-vis the CTO program,
they do not provide clear guidance how age impacts acceptance, other than that the younger (not
youngest) age group of “born between 1975 and 1989 were least likely to say “Yes” to each of the
four CTO program proposals (7a-d).
12 respondents commented that volunteers should not be paid, but while all of these commenters
thought that the CTO project was a good idea; only seven of those 12 (or their family member) would
be willing to volunteer, only 3 thought a payment would be “OK”, and only 5 would themselves (or a
family member) serve as a CTO if paid.;
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION
As Dobrin (2016) observes, the “primary responsibility” of volunteers in policing is “to augment patrol,”
that is, it frees up the professional law enforcement officers to handle more complex duties and to
increase their general presence across the city, thus discouraging potential criminal activity (724).
The respondents to this survey have indicated an acceptance of a traffic enforcement citations system
based on reports from volunteer citizen traffic officers, although there is somewhat less acceptance if
payments are made to reporters based on the number of citations issued.
Philippines has a noted propensity for corruption in traffic enforcement (Nolasco et al. 2014).
Removing potential corruption is one consideration here. In cases of automated enforcement, location
is important. Koven discussed displacement—moving criminal activity from one neighborhood to
another--(e.g., where there is a known stationary camera, drivers slow down, or possibly choose
another route). Non-stationary citizen volunteers minimize displacement effects, as enforcement
locations are uncertain. Citizen-reporters have an incentive to remain “invisible” – their capture rate
will rise and the risk of confrontation with drivers is reduced (see Yang & Kim 2003). This use of
“invisible” volunteers may assist in reduction of corruptive practices, although there could also be
CTOs who choose to negotiate a fee to destroy evidence as well. One outcome from “invisible” CTOs
is that drivers would be pressured to drive more cautiously everywhere, not knowing where
enforcement might take place.
Kim’s (2004) study may be of similar concern in the Philippines: from approximately 200 survey
respondents, of those who supported the program, 2/3 believed it would lead to higher degree of
traffic law compliance and roughly 25% thought it would lead to fewer accidents; whereas nearly half
of those who were opposed to the program were concerned with harmony between citizens, and over
1/3 felt the program was ineffective. Problems in particular could be summarized as a concern for
privacy, the possible development of “career informants,” and photographers taking advantage of
5 6
unavoidable traffic law violations where a police officer would have exercised discretion. Kim also
observed that both insurers and NGOs were active in the scheme: the former partially-funded
informant rewards, the latter aimed to develop higher awareness of traffic safety in a country which
often was near the top of global traffic fatalities listings. On the other hand, Korea’s Caparazzi
received no training beyond technical specification for image quality and delivery, which indicates a
significant difference from many police volunteers or neighborhood watch programs. Instead there
were and are private “Paparazzi schools”, where schools recommended particular recording devices
and strategies for maximizing reporters’ revenues (Lee, 2018; Schwartzman, 2011). We should also
note that the government and, importantly, the private sector (NGOs and insurance companies,
mostly) have continued to develop and operate paid photo-tipsters programs in Korea. In 2019 a new
reporting app was released by the central government to integrate a number of reporting fields
previously reported through separate apps.
This preliminary study of the possibilities for the Korean-model citizen-reporter in traffic enforcement
for the Philippines suffers from several limitations. The small number of respondents, from a single
location in Metro Manila, leads to sampling questions and limits the depth of statistical analysis.
Deeper understanding of respondents economic condition, history of driving (experience), and use of
cellphone apps might also indicate important characteristics of the community, thus the survey should
be expanded in both depth and breadth.
Korea’s Caparazzi system allowed citizens to take photographs or videos of traffic infractions –
principally parking and other non-moving violations, which were then uploaded to government
websites where enforcement officials reviewed the evidence. However, the 99% acceptance rate
(Yang & Kim, 2003) on submissions would appear to indicate that discretion was muted. While the
citizen volunteer reporters scheme in Korea has never been reversed, many of the financial rewards
have been terminated or reduced to very small grants.
Many people who serve as volunteer law enforcement officers tend to view their law enforcement
positions as a way to provide service to their communities (Dobrin & Wolf, 2016, 222). However, the
sharply lower numbers of volunteer reports in contemporary traffic enforcement in Korea may be an
indicator that much of the citizen reporter activity last decade was profit-driven rather than altruistic.
Citizen engagement as a means of transforming public service delivery has not been deeply
examined for negative effects: this enforcement reporting form of co-production would appear to have
deeper social impact than what might be viewed on the surface. In light of the sustainable
development goals related to the environment and financial support to the disadvantaged, one option
might be to limit participation in this public-private partnership to defined disadvantaged groups within
society (such as elderly and poor), and to limit the level of financial reward. Still, this survey suggests
that citizen-enforcement in the Philippines may serve a nobler cause of citizen engagement. Further
investigation is warranted.
REFERENCES
Bagolong, S.P., Julian, S., Sabio, R.R., & Sabio, R. (2014). Traffic management center’s enforcement
and traffic collision in Davao City. Paper presented at the 2014 World Conference for Public
Administration June 25-27, 2014 in Seoul, Korea. Retrieved from
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2533818
Callender, M., Cahalin, K., Cole, S.J., Hubbard, L., & Britton, I. (2018). Understanding the motivations,
morale, and retention of Special Constables: Findings from a national survey. Policing: A Journal
of Policy and Practice. Advance online publication. doi:10.1093/police/pay058
CALPIRG. (2011). Caution: Red Light Cameras Ahead; The Risks of Privatizing Traffic Law
Enforcement and How to Protect the Public. Retrieved from
http://www.calpirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Caution-Red-Light-Cameras-Ahead---vCA-Web.pdf
Cantlas, K.C. (2015, Jan 22). Worst traffic in the world: Countries ranked and Philippines is number ...
Retrieved from https://www.wheninmanila.com/worst-traffic-in-the-world-countries-ranked-and-
philippines-is-number/
Choe, S-H. (September 29, 2011). Help Wanted: Busybodies With Cameras. The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/asia/in-south-korea-where-digital-
tattling-is-a-growth-industry.html
City of Portland. (n.d.), Disabled Parking Enforcement Volunteers. Retrieved from
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/699663
City of Santa Maria. (n.d.). Volunteer Opportunities. Retrieved from
https://web.archive.org/web/20101203170844/http://www.ci.santa-maria.ca.us/40459.shtml
Cohen, M.A., & Rubin, P.H. (1985). Private enforcement of public policy. Yale Journal on Regulation 3,
167-193.
Cook, P.J. (2011). Coproduction in deterring crime. Criminology & Public Policy 10(1), 103-108.
Dickey, R.J. (2012). Vigilante, Volunteer, or Profiteer? Deploying independent citizen-investigators for
law enforcement: The case of Korea's "Caparazzi." Paper presented before the Northeast
Conference on Public Administration (NECoPA), November 3, 2012 at University of
Massachusetts, Boston. Retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/2076037/Vigilante_Volunteer_or_Profiteer_Deploying_independent_ci
tizen-investigators_for_law_enforcement_The_case_of_Koreas_Caparazzi
Dobrin, A. (2016). Volunteer police: History, benefits, costs and current descriptions. Security Journal
30(3), 717–733.
Dobrin, A. (2017). State-level estimates of the number of volunteer police in the United States.
International Journal of Police Science & Management 19(2), 81-88.
Dobrin, A., & Wolf, R. (2016). What is known and not known about volunteer policing in the United
States. International Journal of Police Science & Management 18(3), 220-227.
Evangelista, P. (2018, Oct 5). The cops were showing off [Murder in Manila part 2]. Rappler.com.
Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/tondo-vigilante-gang-war-on-
drugs-series-part-two
Fallaria, A.J., de Jesus, R., Carpio, M., Jacinto, F.L., De Leon, L., Agapito, J., & Ramos, J.G. (2019).
Emerging from the ‘worst’: An ethnography of the modern Filipino commuting culture behind the
Metro Manila traffic crisis. MATEC Web of Conferences 272, pp. 1-10. Retrieved from
https://www.matec-
conferences.org/articles/matecconf/abs/2019/21/matecconf_icfmce2019_01032/matecconf_icfmc
e2019_01032.html
Fang, L. (2012). Police Unions, For-Profit Traffic Light Companies Lobby To Set Up RLC For
Revenue Not Public Safety. Retrieved from http://banthecams.org/Taking-on-the-
Government/police-unions-for-profit-traffic-light-companies-lobby-to-set-up-rlc-for-revenue-not-
public-safety.html
Glionna, J. (February 15 2009). In South Korea, vigilante-paparazzi patrol the streets. The Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/feb/15/world/fg-korea-
paparazzi15
GlobalSecurity.org. (no date). CVO - Civilian Volunteer Organization. Retrieved from
https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/philippines/cvo.htm
Gye, H. (Nov 23 2011). ‘Cameraphone lynch mob’: Former police chief’s volunteer scheme to catch
drivers who use mobiles at the wheel. The Daily Mail Online. Retrieved from
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2065118/Former-police-chief-sets-cameraphone-lynch-
mob-catch-drivers-use-mobiles-wheel.html
Hegina, A.J. (2015, Oct 2). Waze users rate Metro Manila traffic world's worst. Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Retrieved from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/726986/metro-manila-has-worst-city-traffic-
on-earth-study
Huey, L, Nhan, J., * Broll, R. (2012). “Uppity civilians” and “cyber-vigilantes”: The role of the general
public in policing cyber-crime. Criminology & Criminal Justice13(1), 81-97.
Jacobs, A., & Century, A. (August 30 2012). Chinese City’s Retirees Given a License to Ticket. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/world/asia/chinese-city-
gives-retirees-license-to-ticket.html
Johnston, L. (1992).The rebirth of private policing. London: Routledge.
Kempa, M., Carrier, R., Wood, J., & Shearing, C. (1999). Reflections on the evolving concept of
"private policing." European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 7, 197-223.
Kim, J.S. (2004). The Study on the Citizen (Inhabitants) Involvement about the Police Activity
(Unpublished Master’s thesis, official English (trans.) title). Yeungnam University, Daegu, Korea.
7 8
Koven, S.G. (1992). Coproduction of law enforcement services -- Benefits and implications. Urban
Affairs Quarterly 27(3, 457-469.
Lee, K-m. (2018, April 3). 'Dog-paparazzi' to prey on pet owners. The Korea Times. Retrieved from
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/113_245195.html
Mahoney, E., & Helperin, J. (2009). Caught! Big Brother May Be Watching You With Traffic Cameras.
Retrieved from http://www.edmunds.com/driving-tips/caught-big-brother-may-be-watching-you-
with-traffic-cameras.html
May, R.J. (1992). Vigilantes in the Philippines: From fanatical cults to citizens' organizations.
[Philippines Studies Occasional Papers No. #12]. Honolulu, Hawaii: Center for Philippine Studies,
University of Hawaii at Manoa.
Moffat, J., & Salzberg, P. (1999). Police enforcement of traffic laws. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 68,
18-20.
Neely, R. (1990). Take back your neighborhood: A case for modern-day “vigilantism”. New York:
Donald Fine, Inc.
Nolasco, L., Sevillano, K., Regala, A., & Tieng, D. (2014). Street-based corruption in the Philippines:
Motives, ethical considerations and organizational context. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics
26(1&2), 145–160.
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1993). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is
transforming the public sector. New York: Plume.
Ostrom, E. (1978). Citizen participation and policing: What do we know? Journal of Voluntary Action
Research 7(1-2), 102-108.
Percy, S. L. (1978). Conceptualizing and measuring citizen co-production of community safety. Policy
Studies Journal 7(s1), 486–493.
Philippine News Agency (2018, Apr 5). Davao City cop volunteers to get minimum wage in 2019.
Retrieved from https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/04/05/davao-city-cop-volunteers-to-get-minimum-
wage-in-2019/
Schwartzman, N. (Aug 27, 2011). Paparazzi schools in South Korea. Asian Correspondent. Retrieved
from http://asiancorrespondent.com/63548/paparazzi-schools-in-south-korea/
The Denver Channel. (n.d.). Pooper Snooper Paparazzi Acquitted. The Denver Channel. Retrieved
September 3 2012 from http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/879883/detail.htm (this page no
longer available online)
Uhnoo, S. and Löfstrand, C., 2018. Voluntary policing in Sweden: media reports of contemporary
forms of police citizen partnerships. Journal of Scandinavian studies in criminology and crime
prevention.
van Eijk, C., Steen, T., & Verschuere, B. (2017). Co-producing safety in the local community: A Q-
methodology study on the incentives of Belgian and Dutch members of neighbourhood watch
schemes, Local Government Studies, 43(3), 323-34.
van Steden, R., & Mehlbaum, S.M. (2018). Police volunteers in the Netherlands: a study on policy and
practice. Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy. Advance online
publication. doi:10.1080/10439463.2018.1523165
Wolf, R., Holmes, S.T., & Jones, C. (2016). Utilization and satisfaction of volunteer law enforcement
officers in the office of the American sheriff: an exploratory nationwide study. Police Practice and
Research 17(5), 448–462.
Wolf, R., Pepper, I., & Dobrin, A. (2016). An exploratory international comparison of professional
confidence in volunteer policing. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 90(2), 91-
106.
Yang, B-M, & Kim J. (2003). Road traffic accidents and policy interventions in Korea. Injury Control
and Safety Promotion 10(1-2), 89-94.
Yujuico, E. (2015). Considerations in the diffusion of a public traffic app for Metro Manila. Journal of
Transport Geography 42, 48-56.
Zheng, J., & Feng, Z. (August 22 2012). Controversial Hunan fine policy may be scrapped. China
Daily. Retrieved from http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-08/22/content_15694890.htm
 APPENDIX A Figure 1.
Survey of Drivers in Metro Manila

Conducted at SM MegaMall in Mandaluyong City Aug 18, 2014

I. Demographics

1. Age
Born after January 1 1990
Born between January 1 1975 and December 31 1989
Born between January 1 1960 and December 31 1974
Born before January 1 1960

2. Gender
Male Female

3. Metro-Manila driving frequency (within Metro-Manila in a typical week)

1 round-trip per week
2-3 round-trips per week
More

4. Metro-Manila distance driven (within Metro-Manila in a typical week)

Less than 10km (6 miles)
10-40km (6-25 miles)
40-100km (25-60 miles)
More

5. Have you ever been stopped for a violation of the Philippines Traffic & Vehicle Law?
Yes No

II. Camera citations program

Flow Chart of Process in Issuance of a Citation, Inclusive of
6. Did you know that camera and radar are used to issue traffic citations in the Philippines? Citizen Reporters, Technology-based Observations, and
Yes No Enforcement Officer Observations

7. In some countries, citizen volunteers have authority to issue citations, which are handled through
the normal government channels, based on photographic evidence of infractions (examples: illegal (from Dickey, 2012.)
parking, failing to stop, blocking the intersection).
a. Would citizen-volunteer traffic enforcement be a good idea in Metro Manila?
Yes No

b. Would you or a family member be willing to become a part-time Citizen-volunteer Traffic-

enforcement Officer (CTO)?
Yes No

c. Would it be OK if CTOs received a small payment (10Piso?) for each citation

accepted/approved by the Land Transportation Office?
Yes No

d. Would you be willing to become a part-time citizen-volunteer traffic enforcement officer

(CTO), or would you allow a family member to be one, if there was a small payment for each
citation accepted/approved by the Land Transportation Office?
Yes No

e. Any comments? (open response) (other side of page)

9 10
 Table 1. Age & “Yes” Responses for CTOs

Percentage of “Yes” Reponses

TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
1. Age 102 0.696 * 0.559 * 0.636 * 0.636 *
Table 5. Stopped for Violation & “Yes” Responses for CTOs
Born after January 1 1990 11 (.108) 0.909 * 1.000 * 0.500 * 0.417 *
Born between Jan 1975 and Dec 1989 24 (.235) 0.500 * 0.458 * 0.542 * 0.354 *
Percentage of “Yes” Reponses
Born between Jan1960 and Dec 1974 48 (.471) 0.688 * 0.500 * 0.684 * 0.684 *
TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
Born before January 1960 19 (.186) 0.842 * 0.579 * 0.569 * 0.461 *
5. Have you ever been stopped for a violation? 100 0.686 * 0.552 * 0.562 * 0.457 *
Yes 77 (.77) 0.636 * 0.545 * 0.532 * 0.468 *
* p < 0.05
No 23 (.33) 0.870 * 0.565 * 0.691 * 0.391 *
Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.
* p < 0.05
Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.

Table 2. Gender & “Yes” Responses for CTOs

Percentage of “Yes” Reponses Table 6. Know Camera & Radar are Used & “Yes” Responses for CTOs
TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
2. Gender 102 0.686 * 0.552 * 0.562 * 0.457 *
Male 64 (.627) 0.641 * 0.578 * 0.516 * 0.484 * Percentage of “Yes” Reponses
TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
Female 38 (.373) 0.786 * 0.526 * 0.658 * 0.421 *
6. You know camera and radar used in Phils? 103 0.686 * 0.552 * 0.562 * 0.457 *
* p < 0.05
Yes 94 (.913) 0.723 * 0.585 * 0.564 * 0.479 *
Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.
No 9 (.087) 0.444 * 0.333 * 0.667 * 0.333 *

* p < 0.05
Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.

Table 3. Driving Frequency & “Yes” Responses for CTOs

Percentage of “Yes” Reponses

TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
Table 7. Citizen Volunteers with Authority to Issue Citations (CTOs)
3. Metro-Manila driving frequency typical week) 102 0.696 0.569 0.578 0.471 *
1 round-trip per week 8 (.078) 0.875 0.625 0.250 0.375 *
a. good idea in Metro Manila? 102
2-3 round-trips per week 18 (.176) 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.556 *
Yes 71 (0.696)
More 76 (.745) 0.684 0.539 0.592 0.461 *
No 31 (0.304)

* p < 0.05 b. You/family member willing to CTO? 101

Figures may not total 100 due to rounding. Yes 57 (0.564)
No 44 (0.436)

c. OK if CTOs received a small payment? 102

Yes 59 (0.578)
No 43 (0.422)
Table 4. Distance Driven & “Yes” Responses for CTOs
d. Willing CTO, allow a family member if pay? 102
Yes 48 (0.471)
Percentage of “Yes” Reponses No 54 (0.529)
TOTAL 7A 7B 7C 7D
4. Metro-Manila distance driven (typical week) 101 0.693 * 0.564 0.574 0.465 e. Any comments? (open response) (other side of page)
Less than 10km (6 miles) 13 (.129) 0.769 * 0.615 0.615 0.385
10-40km (6-25 miles) 24 (.238) 0.917 * 0.542 0.583 0.500
40-100km (25-60 miles) 22 (.218) 0.636 * 0.591 0.773 0.409
More 42 (.41.6) 0.571 * 0.548 0.452 0.500

* p < 0.05
Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.
11 12