SPOUSES CUSTODIO VS CA Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or then sued Amonoy
egal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or then sued Amonoy questioning the validity of his mortgage agreement with
FACTS: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with a two-door apartment from
Spouses Rayos and Quintero. The land is surrounded by other immovables.
On the left side, going to Mabasa's property, the row of houses belonging to
Spouses Custodio, then Spouses Santos and then Ofelia Mabasa’s. On the
right side, the house of Morato and then a Septic Tank.
When he purchased the property, there were tenants occupying the premises.
However, when one of the tenants left the apartment, Mabasa saw that there
was an adobe wall (constructed by the Spouses Santos along their property)
built in the first passageway that made it narrower in width. Morato
constructed her fence in a way that the entire passageway was closed.
RTC: Ordering Custodios and Santoses to give Mabasa permanent access
ingress and egress, to the public street.
Not satisfied therewith, Mabasa represented by his heirs, went to the Court
of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in
not awarding damages in their favor.
CA: Affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the grant of
damages. CA denied Custodios and Santoses’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the grant of right of way to herein Heirs of Mabasa is proper,
and WON the award of damages to Heirs of Mabasa is in order
RULING: YES. Custodios and Santoses are already barred from raising the
right of way issue. The did not appeal from the decision of the court a
quo granting the Heir of Mabasa’s right of way, it is presumed that they
were satisfied with the judgment.
For failure to appeal the decision of the RTC to the CA, Custodios and
Santoses cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the RTC. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this
Court.
DAMAGES. No. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. In
the Court of Appeals’ decision, the award of damages was based solely on
the fact that Pacifico Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized
rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure
of the passageway.
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient
to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering.
ww
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and
(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of Custodio and Santos in constructing a fence within their lot is a
valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property.
As a general rule, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person
upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage
or loss is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for
hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to
achieve a lawful means.
AMONOY VS GUTIERREZ
FACTS: In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda
(Formida in some records) in a partition case. Since Fornilda had no money
to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he acquires as a security
for the payment of Amonoy’s attorney’s fees which amounts to P27k. In
July 1969, Fornilda died.
A month later, the property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through his
heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute. Fornilda was however
unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in
1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda
Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorney’s fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage due to
the existing att0rney-client relationship between him and Fornilda at the time
the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they
appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.No. L-72306. Meanwhile,
in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the property. Amonoy was also the
highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure. He
was able to buy the property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said
property was the house of the spouses Gutierrez.
Pending the spouses’s appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was able to
secure a demolition order and so on May 30, 1986, Amonoy started
demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on June 2, 1986, the Supreme
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)  against the demolition
order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on
June 24, 1989, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision on G.R.No. L-
72306 where it ruled  that the mortgage between Amonoy and Fornilda is
void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this time, the
house of the spouses was already demolished because it appears that despite
the TRO, Amonoy continued demolishing the house until it was fully
demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of
Amonoy that he incurred no liability because he was merely exercising his
right to demolish (pursuant to the demolition order) hence what happened
was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury without damage).
ISSUE: WON Amonoy was liable to Spouses Gutierez and Fornilda
RULING: YES. Damnum absque injuria cannot be applied in this case.
Although Amonoy commenced the demolition of Spouses' house under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. The records show that
a TRO, ordering the demolition of Spouses' house, was issued by the
Supreme Court. The CA also found that a copy of the TRO was served on
Amonoy.
Amonoy did not heed the TRO of this Court. He unlawfully pursued the
demolition of Spouses' house.
Although the acts of Amonoy may have been legally justified at the outsset,
their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious
abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had
he not insisted on completing the demolition, Spouses would not have
suffered the loss that caused the suit before the RTC.
Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid
exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO. By
then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. In insisting on
his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly
caused the destruction of Spouses’ house.
Amonoy cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the
valid exercise of a right. Amonoy's liability is premised on the obligation to
repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act
or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.
(3) Precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts
humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
RTC: Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called
Quiamco a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a
baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law. Uypitching’s acts were found to be contrary to Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code.
on Quimaco’s establishment and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal
seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
statement.
No doubt, Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of Quiamco. His acts violated the
law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.

UYPITCHING VS QUIAMCO CA: Affirmed the RTC. Thus this petition. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another.20 The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
FACTS: In 1981, Gabuter bought a certain motorcycle from Ramas ISSUE: WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
Uypitching Sons, Inc. When he could no longer pay the installments, the Anti-Fencing Law warranted (Mental & Exemplary) damages in favor of must be no intention to harm another. 21 Otherwise, liability for damages to
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. However, Quiamco the injured party will attach.
Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told Uypitching that
RULING: YES. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’
the motorcycle has been allegedly take by Quiamco’s men.
groundless complaint against Quiamco but also for making a slanderous instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
In 1982, Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to remark and for taking the motorcycle from Quimaco’s establishment in an procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by abusive manner. statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle
Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
BARRED. Uyptiching never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA
motorcycle. Quimaco asked for the original certificate of registration but precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to
they never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, Uypitching were deemed to
an open space inside Quiamco’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions
have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to
Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule
hold Uypitching liable for damages to Quiamco.
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice
In 1991, Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, Quiamco’s business of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to
RTC and CA correctly ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with
establishmet to recover the motorcycle. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.
malice and bad faith. Uypitching were bent on portraying respondent as a
were talking, Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment
thief.
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." CEBU COUNTRY CLUB VS ELIZAGAQUE
There was malice or ill-will because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew
The policemen left to look for Quiamco in his residence while Uypitching FACTS: San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of
or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at
stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to CCCI, designated Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations
all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity
find Quiamco, the policemen followed Uypitching’s instruction and took the Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary
against Quiamco. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that
motorcycle. member. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of
Quiamco stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill
Directors.
Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of collector that Dabalan will no longer pay the installments as certain men of
the Anti-Fencing Law against Quimaco. Quiamco allegedly took the motorcycle.
Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, application was indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members, namely:
Quiamco moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an
findings of fact of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
offense as he did not steal nor buy the motorcycle. Complaint was dismissed
and denied Uypitching’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and
Elizgaque purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million.
the CA.
Consequently, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to
Quiamco filed an action for damages against Uypitching. He sought to hold
DAMAGES. If a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged Elizagaque.
the the latter liable for the following:
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to
Elizagaque received a letter from CCCI’s corporate secretary that the Board
(1) Unlawful taking of the motorcycle; recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain
disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
judicial foreclosure.
(2) Utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and
Elizagaque, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration three times but CCCI did
Uypitching corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to
not reply.
acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, Uypitching descended
Elizagaque filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against CCCI Board
of Directors.
RTC: In favor of Elizagaque.
CA: Affirmed the trial court’s Decision but modified the damages. CCCI
filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion for
oral arguments. CA denied the motions for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership with
CCCI, CCCI Board Members are liable to Elizagaque for damages
RULING: YES. As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret
balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member
will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is
required. When Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership was
voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was
disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation,
has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In rejecting Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership, we find
that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles
to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of social order.
The RTC & CA aptly held that CCCI committed fraud and evident bad faith
in disapproving respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant
to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
Elizagaque was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board
members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners
apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special
non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners
with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have informed him
why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in
accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily,
unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 6 It bears
reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’
disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by bad faith.
DAMAGES. As to CCCI’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque
injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is
misplaced. This principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a
person’s right
ARDIENTE VS JAVIER
FACTS: Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes. Joyce Ardiente sold the housing unit in favor
of Pastorfide for ₱70,000.00. The MOA carries a stipulation that Pastorfide
shall be the one paying for the water and power bill but the same shall
remain in the name of Javier.
For four years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of
Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed. Until without notice, the
water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
In Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD), Ma. Theresa was told that she
was delinquent for three months and that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off. Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent
bills and on the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to
the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line. COWD
reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was
cut off.
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide filed complaint for damages against COWD.
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when
the RTC court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
RTC: In favor or Pastorfide, with damages. The cross-claim of Cagayan de
Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The
Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of Pastorfide was
because they were influenced by Ardiente. They were negligent too for
which they should be liable.
CA: Affirmed the RTC, modifying the damages. COWD filed their
respective Motions for Reconsideration but were denied.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
but the same was denied with finality.
Ardiente timely filed the instant petition. Ardiente insists that she should not
be held liable for the disconnection of Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply,
and alleged that Pastorfide has violated Art 19 when she did not pay the
power bill for 3 months.
ISSUE: WON Ardiente should be held liable under Art. 19
RULING: Yes, Ardiente should be liable. It cannot be denied that it was
through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply
was disconnected in the first place.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. 
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of Ardiente
when she requested for the disconnection of Spouses’ Pastorfide water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Ardiente
should have advised Spouses Pastorfide before or immediately after
submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request was
simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is
the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice
and even failed to reconnect the water supply despite payment of their
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD
and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
BARRED. COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court was already denied with finality making the presently
assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez
are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from
participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by
filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the
same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
SESBRENO VS CA
FACTS: VECO was engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity in
Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service
contract. To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and
that none of it meters had been tampered with, VECO employed Engrs.
Constantino and Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC) inspectors. Sgt. Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO, 16 his participation
Balicha accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their was to render police assistance to ensure the personal security of
inspection of the households pursuant to a mission order issued to him. Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection, rendering him a necessary BUENAVENTURA VS CA
part of the team as an authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he
When VOC inspectors and Sgt. Balicha conducted a routine inspection of was authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended FACTS: Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
the houses for illegal connections. After Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, such authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives" of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside VECO. Isabel Singh Buenaventura. After Isabel filed her answer, Noel, with leave of
down. Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric meter. They court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, Sesbreño It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
was in his office and no one called to inform him of the inspection. premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño turned upside down. Their marriage. Isabel filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she
doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed was psychologically incapacitated.
The VOC Team asked for and received permission to enter the house to by his household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their
examine the appliances and light fixtures to determine its electrical load. RTC found that petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to
inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the authorized entry.
marry, and deceived Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to
There was no question then that their ability to determine the unbilled
According to Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he
electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity
the VOC Team did in his house. Their entry to the premises was effected had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble,
inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a
without his permission and over the objections of his maids. They he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.
search warrant to do so.
threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the
electric meter, turned it upside down and took photographs thereof. They Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the RTC: Marriage was declared null and void. Ordering the Noel to pay Isabel
then replaced it with a new electric meter. They searched the house and its inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of the moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages
rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by virtue of of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
sign two documents, making her appear to be his representative or agent. his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 & Ordering him to give a regular support in
Afterwards, he found that some of his personal effects were missing, routine inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00
apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house. monthly.
house by the VOC team did not constitute a violation of the guaranty.
RTC: In favor of VECO and VOC Noel appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents
CA, Isable filed a motion to increase the  monthly support pendente lite of
were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights
CA: Affirmed the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Noel filed an opposition, praying that it
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad
reconsideration, Sesbreño appealed. be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument.
faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The
ISSUE: WON Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights? rationale for the concept is to present some basic principles to be followed CA: Issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.00.
for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social Noel filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence the present
RULING: NO, Sesbreno is not entitled to recover damages for abuse of order. petition.
rights.
Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages to Isabel is proper in such cases.
The VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer exercise of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a)
to enter his premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty RULING: NO, the award of damages is not proper.
meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority emanated and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all
from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into between The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and
rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under Article 19 must
VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as follows: 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
be observed.24
Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there
enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
be an abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in
met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of
their entry had the objective of conducting the routine inspection of the computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a
meter.13Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to the garage result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole
where the meter was installed. 14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at around 4 intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 25 There is no hard and fast rule that ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
the meter were duly authorized for the purpose by VECO. to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of compensate the latter for the damage.
each case.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 17 of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it
mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21
states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another.
There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete
freedom.
RTC declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36
of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel
Buenaventura.
Psychological incapacity is no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Lower courts considered the acts of the Noel after the marriage as proof of
his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and considered
these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that Noel
purposely deceived Isabel. If Isabel was deceived, it was not due to a willful
act on the part of Neol. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
The acts or omissions of Noel which led the lower court to deduce his
psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the
annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling Isabel
to litigate, since both are grounded on Noel’s psychological incapacity,
which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground
for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the
award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the
award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
ALBENSON VS CA
FACTS: Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed
Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part
payment, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No.
136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks.
The check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Albenson
traced the origin of the dishonored check and discovered that the president of
Guaranteed was one "Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudicial
demand upon Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.
Baltao denied that he issued the check. He further alleged that Guaranteed
was a defunct (invalid) entity and hence, could not have transacted business
with Albenson.
Albenson filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.
It appears, however, Baltao has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who
manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, the very same business
address of Guaranteed.
An information was filed against Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had
given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but
the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Baltao immediately filed a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that the check
for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued
by him and the signature in said check was not his.
Fiscal Castro of Rizal reversed Fiscal Sumaway’s findings and exonerated
Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is
not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, Baltao
filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson.
RTC: In favor or Baltao and he be paid P1M in moral damages, P133,350.00
in actual or compensatory damages and P200,000.00 in exemplary damages.
Albensons’ counterclaim was dismissed.
CA: Reduced the moral damages to P500,000.00. Dissatisfied, Albenson
filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON there is indeed a cause for the damages against Albenson
RULING: NO, there is no cause for the damages.
Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three (3)
articles are all related to each other. Article 21, combined with articles 19
and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly
broadened. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a
right which could not be checked by the application of these articles".
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question
of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes
injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. There is a
common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done
either "willfully", or "negligently".
Albenson could not have violated the principle of abuse of right. They were
only prompted to file the case of BP 22 due to their failure to collect the
amount that was due to them on a bounced check which they honestly
believed was issued to them by Baltao.
Baltao, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first
hand. Instead, he waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for
damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. A party injured by the filing of a court case against
him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded
either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution.
In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It
is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause.
"Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.”
In the instant case, it is evident that Albenson were not motivated by
malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass Baltao but only by a
well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal
complaint against Baltao.
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of
Albenson to vex or humiliate Baltao by instituting the criminal case against
him. While Albenson may have been negligent to some extent in
determining the liability of Baltao for the dishonored check, the same is not
so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of
damages.
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the
action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising
his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
ARTICLE 20. Baltao did not present proof of the cost of the medical
treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his
business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual
damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as
to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages
becomes erroneous.
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation
— and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantiated, no damages will be. For these reasons, it was gravely
erroneous for CA to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of
private respondent in the absence of proof thereof. Where there is no
evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or
oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded. As to the
award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception
rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees
must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated.
Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution
against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that
ground.
SHOOKAT BAKSH VS CA
FACTS: On 27 October 1987, Gonzales filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint for damages against Baksh for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges Baksh, is an Iranian citizen courted
and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester. Baksh then visited Gonzales' parents to secure their
approval to the marriage.
Gonzales forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, Baksh's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; she sustained injuries. Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore because he is already
married to someone in Bacolod.
Gonzales prayed for judgment ordering Baksh to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
Baksh claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the Gonzales; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents
nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told
her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport. Insisting that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded as a result, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
RTC: In favor of Gonzales. That Baksh pay P20,000.00 pesos as moral
damages.
CA: Affirming in toto RTC's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis.
Baksh filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong
RULING:
A breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. This notwithstanding, the said Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, CA found that it was Baksh's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage."  In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction by Baksh.
Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction.
We are unable to agree with Baksh's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, Gonzales cannot recover damages from the
Baksh.
It is clear that Baksh harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for
Gonzales on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case.
WASSMER VS VELEZ
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days
before the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to
postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. The next day,
Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
TAN VS VALERIANO
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared
in default. Judgement was rendered ordering Velez to pay wassmer P2.000 FACTS: The Holy Name Society held a multi-sectoral consultative
as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as conference at the Bulan Parish Compound. Valeriano, the president of the
religious organization, delivered a welcome address during the conference
attorney’s fees.
Velez filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Wassmer moved to strike it cut.
But the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it to
explore the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution. Velez failed to appear.
ISSUE: WON the breach of promise to marry is actionable in this case
RULING: YES, the breach of promise to marry is actionable.
It must not be overlooked that the extent to which acts not contrary to law
may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract
marriage. Their wedding was set for and invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased. And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply
left a note stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired Wassmer: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said
Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code
the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
Velez clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
and allegedly lambasted certain local officials, specifically Municipal
Councilors Gilana and Vice Mayor Gonzales.
Tan, with Gilana and Gonzales, filed an administrative complaint against
Valeriano who was an incumbent resident auditor of the Commission on
Audit. Believing that the real purpose of the conference was to choose the
candidates who will be endorsed by the Holy Name Society for the 2001
elections. Gilana and Gonzales, charged Valeriano with acts of
electioneering and engaging in partisan politics. They were convinced that
Valeriano had set the political tone of the conference. They also claimed that
Valeriano did not advise or prevent the other speakers from criticizing the
local administration with which they are politically aligned or identified. 5
The COA was furnished with a copy of the administrative complaint against
Valeriano. The COA, however, did not take any action on the complaint in
view of the pendency of the case before the CSC. 6
CSC: Dismissed the complaint. The CSC noted that the complaint-affidavit
was not filed under oath.
The petitioners subsequently re-filed a Complaint-Affidavit but was
withdrawn. They filed another administrative complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman, this time for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, in
relation to Section 55 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
OMB: This complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman.
Valeriano filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against the
petitioners.
RTC: In favor of Valeriano. By reason of his physical suffering, mental
anguish, and social humiliation, the RTC awarded Valeriano ₱300,000.00 as
moral damages; ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and ₱30,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses
CA: Reversed the trial court's ruling insofar as Gonzales and Gilana were
concerned, but affirmed that petitioners should be held liable for damages.
ISSUE: WON petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in filing the
administrative complaints against Valeriano.
RULING: NO, there was not malice or bad faith in the complaints filed
against Valeriano.
These exceptional circumstances when we have entertained questions of fact
are: 
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; 
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;  to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious RULING: No. Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the
prosecution.32 maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;  made rich out of another's injury), states:
Valeriano failed to prove that the subject complaints against him were
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;  motivated purely by a sinister design. It is an elementary rule that good faith Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
alleging the same. Absent such, petitioners cannot be held liable for of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
damages.
appellant and the appellee; There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the
HULST VS PR BUILDERS loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; 
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence FACTS: Hulst and his spouse Ida, Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract
to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed
on which they are based; 
in PR's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. to benefit from his act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main constitutional proscription.
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;  When PR Builders failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the
project, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, law or judicial rule. Rather, equity is exercised in this case "as the
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and  damages. complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts HLURB: In favor of spouses Hulst. power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a incompetent to do so."50
different conclusion.25 Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the
purchased property to Hulst (husband). From then on, Hulst alone pursued The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
Article 19 of the Civil Code contains what is commonly referred to as the the case. unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do
principle of abuse of rights which requires that everyone must act with complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The law A Writ of Execution was then addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon the complaint of the respondent, the of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51
norms of human conduct must be observed. A right, though by itself legal levy was set aside, leaving only the respondent's personal properties to be
because it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become levied first. The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which the net proceeds (bidded amount is P5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after
The Sheriff set a public auction of the said levied properties, however, the deducting the legal fees in the amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is only
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
respondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the ground that the entitled to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the purchase price of the real
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of the property paid by petitioner to respondent under the Contract to Sell. Thus,
wrongdoer must be held responsible.26
properties at P6,500 per sq m is P83,616,000. the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal petitioner to return the excess amount of P2,125,540.00.
Instead of resolving the objection of the PR Builder's regarding the auction,
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) with the sole intent
the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since there was no restraining order Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the
of prejudicing or injuring another.27
from the HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then awarded to Holly spouses Hulst, are disqualified form owning real property. However, under
The existence of malice or bad faith is the fundamental element in abuse of Properties Realty at a bid of P5,450,653. On the same day, the Sheriff article 1414 of the Civil Code, one who repudiates the agreement and
right. In an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it remitted the legal fees and submitted to contracts of sale to HLURB, demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to
must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There however, he then received orders to suspend proceedings on the auction for recover.
is necessity of proof that the suit was patently malicious as to warrant the the reason that the market value of the properties was not fair. There was
award of damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code or that the suit disparity between the appraised value and the value made by Hulst and the Hulst is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of
was grounded on malice or bad faith. 29 There is malice when the prosecution Sheriff, which should've been looked into by the Sheriff before making the his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground to annul such sale, the that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were court is justified to such intervention where the price shocks the conscience. Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of
false and groundless.30 The award of damages arising from malicious P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent.
ISSUE: WON the spouses Hulst's request for damages is actionable?
prosecution is justified if and only if it is proved that there was a misuse or
31
abuse of judicial processes.  Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being
nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties
involved. Further, Hulst is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
BLISS VS DIAZ
FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is the registered owner of
Lot No. 27, Block 30. It sold the property in favor of Spouses Melgazo, both
of whom are now deceased.
A certain Nacua sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo transferred to
him their rights over the property. He further expressed willingness to pay
the outstanding obligations of Sps. Melgazo to BDC. Before the property
was fully paid, however, Nacua sold his rights to Garcia. Later, Garcia
transferred her rights to Reyes. Reyes then transferred her rights to Tapay,
who then later sold his rights to Diaz for P600,000.00.
Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property and BDC issued a
permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced
improvements on the property, amounting to P700,000.00.
BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. However, BDC informed
Diaz that Arreza was claiming that the heirs of Spouses Melgazo sold to him
the rights over the property. BDC placed Diaz’s account in “inactive status”.
To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, BDC filed a complaint
for Interpleader against them, before the RTC.
(Arreza) RTC: In favor of Arreza. That the signatures of Sps. Melgazo
transferring their rights to Nacua were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that
Arreza had a better right over the property. This decision became final and
executory.
Diaz filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC before the
RTC. Diaz argued that BDC and Tapay’s representations led him to believe
that he had a good title over the property, but due to the court’s ruling in the
interpleader case, he was constrained to transfer the property to Arreza.
Thus, he prayed for damages (500k for moral damages and 500K for
exemplary damages).
BDC and Tapay argued that their respective acts were lawful and done in
good faith. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss, that the claim of Diaz is a
compulsory counterclaim that should have been pleaded in the Interpleader
case.
(Arreza) RTC: Denied motion to dismiss.
(Arreza) CA: Affirmed RTC.
(Arreza) SC: The claim against Arreza is barred by res judicata. The case
against Arreza was dismissed.
(Diaz) RTC: Diaz failed to prove that he is an assignee in good faith. Diaz
appealed to the CA
(Diaz) CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC and ruled that Diaz is entitled to
be paid reimbursement and damages.
BDC moved for reconsideration, insisting that Diaz cannot be declared a
buyer in good faith, in light of the Interpleader case, which had long been
final and executory. Tapay also moved for reconsideration, arguing that he
was not aware of the defect in the title sold to Diaz, and, hence, he should
not be made liable for the P600,000.00 that Diaz paid to him.
ISSUE: WON there was unjust enrichment on the part of BDC
RULING: Yes, BDC is liable to return the amortizations paid by
respondent Diaz, under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent purchaser in good faith
and for value, BDC is nevertheless liable to return to him the amortizations
which he already paid on the property, applying the rule on unjust
enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, 21 there is unjust enrichment when (1) a
person is unjustly benefited and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of
or with damages to another.
Allowing BDC to keep the amortizations paid by Diaz is tantamount to
unjust enrichment. It would result in BDC receiving amortizations twice the
amount it should have received, that is, the amortizations paid by Diaz and
Arreza. While BDC claims that it did not receive amortizations from both
Diaz and Arreza covering the same period, such a claim is self-serving, and
is not amply supported by any documentary evidence.
Even if BDC can prove that there was no overlap between the payments
made by Diaz and those made by Arreza, allowing it to keep the
amortizations paid by Diaz still amounts to unjust enrichment. As a direct
result of the final and executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful buyer of the
subject property, the buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and BDC is
rendered null and void. Consequently, there remains no valid consideration
whatsoever for the payments made by Diaz to BDC. There being no
indication of intent to donate, because such payments were made under the
impression that Diaz is the rightful buyer of the property, it is only but just
that Diaz be allowed to claim back what he has paid. This is only a natural
consequence of the final and executory ruling that Diaz is not the rightful
buyer of the subject property. Allowing BDC to keep such payments, at the
expense of and to the damage of Diaz, still amounts to unjust enrichment.
RCPI VS VERCHEZ
FACTS: Editha was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an
ailment. Her daughter immediately went to RCPI whose services she
engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida who was residing Quezon
City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services,
Grace paid P10.50 for which she was issued a receipt.
As three days, Editha got no response from Zenaida so the former sent a
letter to the latter thru JRS and reprimanded her from not sending money.
After receiving the letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato
Catibog, left for Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
Zenaida and her husband brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital
in Quezon City.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later. RCPI reasoned
out that the messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the telegram
could not locate the adress, hence, the telegram was resent on February 2,
1991, and the second messenger finally found the address on February 15,
1991.
Verchez’s lawyer wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian requesting for a conference
on a specified date and time, but no representative of RCPI showed up at
said date and time.
Editha died.
Verchez et.al. filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC for damages,
alleging that he delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early
demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, 8 for which they
prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
RTC: In favor of the Verchezes and against RCPI and ordering the latter to
pay damages.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence the present petition. RCPI insists
that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between its delay in
transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.
ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages proper
RULING: Yes, the award for moral damages is proper. Moral damages may
be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of Ching then called Tan and informed him that Castro said "talking to him was
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, dangerous."
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief: Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against Castro.
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents.
As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity"
among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an
emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case
are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil
Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award
moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the Verchezes of moral damages is in order, as is the
award of attorney’s fees, having been compelled to litigate to protect their
rights.
CASTRO VS PEOPLE
FACTS: Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan’s son, Justin
Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation. Upon Tan’s request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed
"non-appealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from
participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Tan filed a complaint in the Dep-Ed for violation of the Manual of
Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the
Civil Code against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was
undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS’ code violation point system
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no
basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence,
the Dep-Ed nullified it.  deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The rationale
Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. 6 Thus,
he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement
ceremonies. Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. Tan
intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including Castro who was the assistant headmaster.
Ching telephoned Castro and told him that Tan was planning to sue the
officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, Castro told
Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that’s dangerous.
Castro was charged with grave oral defamation in MeTC. Castro pleaded not
guilty during arraignment.
MeTC: Found Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral
defamation:8
RTC: Affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. It found petitioner guilty
only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint almost
five months from discovery RTC ruled that prescription had already set in,
acquitted Castro.
OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the decision of the
RTC.
CA: Found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found Castro guilty
only of slight oral defamation. CA reinstated the MeTC decision. Castro
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted Castro
RULING: YES. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2)
before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has
been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate
court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. 15
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail
the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was
behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this
reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC’s finding on the nature of
petitioner’s statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral
defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on
the RTC’s "erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties. We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, Castro could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the
Civil Code21 :
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Castro is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for
the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
LEDESMA VS CA & DELMO
FACTS: Student Leadership Club elected the Violets Delmo as the
treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club
to some of the students of the school. Ledesma claims that the said act of
extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, Ledesma, as
President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was
being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but Ledesma denied it.
Delmo appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public
Schools.
Director of Bureau of Public Schools: Sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers
and members thereof by dropping them from membership. However, this
Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her
capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members
of the Student partnership Club.
Ledesma received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of
the case. On the same day, Ledesma received a telegram stating the
following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the Ledesma
allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision
back. On the same day, he returned all the records plus the decision of the
Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
Ledesma was ordered by the Director to furnish Delmo with a copy of the However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo
decision. Ledesma sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately
he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof. from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the
deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
On the day of the graduation, Ledesma received a telegram from the damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was
impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of
the honor students, Ledesma let her graduate as a plain student instead of
being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.

Ledesma wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the latter’s decision

because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with
honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request. Ledesma finally
instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records of
Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."

Delmo was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the
petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away.

RTC: In favor of the spouses Delmo. RTC awarded P20,000.00 to the estate
of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages;
P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of
P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

CA: Affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Ledesma is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code

RULING:Yes, Ledesma is liable. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo

went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.

Assuming that Ledesma could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the
decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by
informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss
Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it
during the commencement exercises.

Ledesma disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss
Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the
prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.

Ledesma did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo,
father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office
thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.

Ledesma, as a public official, should have acted with circumspection and

due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope
of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior,
Director Bernardino, Ledesma is liable for damages in his personal capacity.
ART 28 UNFAIR COMPETITION
WILLAWARE V JESICHRIS
FACTS:
Manufacuring Company (Jesichris) alleges in its complaint for damages for
unfair competition that it is a company engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of plastic and metal products. It pioneered the use of plastic in
place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive underchassis parts such as
spring eye bushing, stabiliser bushing, and others. Willaware Products
Corporation, on the other hand is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware
items made of plastic and metal, has an office with physical proximity to its
office, and in view of the fact that some of its employees had transferred to
it, Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colours as Jesichris manufactures and distributes, but at a lower
price. Willware deliberately copied its product designs which constitute
unfair competition. It thus prayed for damages in terms of unrealised profits
in the amount of P2Million. On the other hand, Willaware, in its defense,
denied all the allegations in the complaint except as to the proximity of their
office to that of Jesichris, and that some of its employees transferred to
Willaware. As an affirmative defense, Willaware posits that there was no
unfair competition as the plastic products were mere reproductions of the
original parts which merely conform to their original designs and
specifications. Thus, Jesichris cannot claim that it originated the use of the
plastic automotive parts, and even assuming that it did so, it still has no
exclusive right to sell these products since it has no patent over these
products. In fact, other establishments were offering them for sale.
ISSUE: W there is unfair competition
HELD: Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means used are fair and legitimate. In order to qualify
the competition as “unfair,” it must have two characteristics: (1) it must
involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts
which are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to
judicial sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law,
these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method.
Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are
competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-
made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly
“contrary to good conscience” as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied respondent’s products
and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s
customers. Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a
warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was
blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not
get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same
position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to
his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De
Guzman.
Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition
as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plasticmade automotive parts; his luring the employees of the
respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets
of the respondent. Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of
business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for
the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he
can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of
wanton wrong
ART 29 CIVIL ACTION
Two Kinds of Acquittal
DALURAYA V OLIVIA
FACTS:
One afternoon, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near
the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina
Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually
died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file
a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against
Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
The prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an
eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman
crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the
latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN172. The
prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the
civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s death; (b)
Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector
Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the
incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven
by Daluraya, albeit   he did not witness the incident.
However, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)
asserting that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution
witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was
no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired. Crime
charged: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
MeTC: granted Daluraya’s demurrer   and dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently
establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him. As to the
civil aspect  of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no
civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was
the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise.
RTC: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s ruling,
declaring that “the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did
not at all exist ”  CA: reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay
Marla the amounts of P152,547.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity , and P50,000.00 as moral damages. It also held that the MeTC’s
Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt . As such,
Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his
acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. YES
HELD: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however , does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.
The Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by
our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as
follows: First  is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of . This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict  , civil liability ex delicto  ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict  complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court . The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused . In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only .
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt   as only preponderance of
evidence is required; 2) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil ; and 3) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted .
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the and hence, “it is not a crime against property but public order.” Petitioner Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. 
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge.
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil Hence this appeal. Roy Padilla, et al
liability may arise did not exist.  This is because when the accused files a Issue: 1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for 2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises
and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for violation of BP 22 which does not provide for civil liability. and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had
the prosecution. enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a
Held: nuisance per se
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court   requires that the judgment state Yes. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, ‘every person criminally liable for a felony 3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall
“whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt is also civilly liable.’ Thus a person committing a felony offends namely (1) owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premise
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission  from law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose RTC: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”  person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
damaged by the same punishable actor omission. While an act or omission is coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
(5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law;
MeTC declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
accused precisely committed the crime charged against him.” Furthermore, punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
CA: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The
when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting liability only if the same felonious petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that “the prosecution was act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted because
not able to establish that the accused was the accused was the driver of the proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some
Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva” and that “there is no foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to
other offense such as threat or malicious mischief
competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person be criminally liable, it
responsible for the death of Marina Oliva.”  is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of  Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds
whether or not it also causes material damage to another. Article 20 of 1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
Hence, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as the New Civil Code provides: “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal
doubt  reasonable doubt , which would necessarily call for a remand of the same.” Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed
case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
upon him
aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may
“the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist”  in of another.
not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil
view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the
action for the recovery of the said amount
author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability PADILLA V CA
should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
FACTS:
CAIÑA V PEOPLE requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
On February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio
acquitting them from the criminal charge. 
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market,
BANAL V TADEO Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently
Facts: forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing HELD:
Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed and destroying said stall and the furniture therein by axes and other massive No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
against Rosario Claudio. Claudio is charged with 15 separate information for instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise 
violation of BP22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. Petitioner Vergara Family A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate
moved to intervene through private prosecutor but it was rejected by 1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless
respondent judge on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the (2a)
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly for actual damages. provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party expressly No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a) only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime. deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such criminal action. (3a)
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for civil action separately shall be allowed.
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish
acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.  involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
or omission may be instituted." court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
on the judgment. appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97) the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible the estate of the deceased.
mode of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal the deceased. (n)
filed.  action.
ART 30 If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a
RULE 111 before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of
Prosecution of Civil Action is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the the civil action. (4a)
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
such reservation. During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n) similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages. civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed criminal action may proceed. (5a)
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action ART 31 CIVIL OBLI NOT ARISING FROM FELONY

FRIAS V SAN DIEGO
FACTS:
Bobie Rose Frias owns a house and lot acquired from Island Masters Reality
and Development Corporation (IMRDC) through a Deed of Sale and
covered by transfer certificate of title (TCT) in the name of IRMDC.
 
Frias, as the First Party, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison as the Second
Party, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) over the property
with the following terms and conditions:
 
“xxx for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000,000.00 receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY,
the parties have agreed as follows:
 
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months from the date
of the execution of this contract xxx to notify the FIRST PARTY of
her intention to purchase xxx at a price of P6,400,000.00 xxx
another six months within which to pay the remaining balance of
P3.4 million.
2. xxx
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first
six months from the six months from the execution of this
contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY on
the P3million however, in the event that on the sixth month the
SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the
aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of
another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million
pesos provided that the said amount shall earn compounded bank
interest for the last six months only. Under this circumstance, the
amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be
treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as the
security for the mortgage which can be enforced in accordance
with law.”
 
Frias received from San Diego-Sison P2million cash and P1million post-
dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the
check stale. Frias then gave  the TCT in the name of IRMDC and the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the property between Frias and IRMDC.
 
San Diego-Sison decided not to purchase the property and informed Frias
through a letter reminding of the agreement that the amount  of P2Million be
considered as a loan payable within 6 months. However, Frias failed to pay
San Diego-Sison who later filed a complaint for sum of money with
preliminary attachment. Also, San Diego-Sison averred that Frias tried to
deprive her of the security for the loan when Frias made a false report of the
loss of her owner’s copy of the TCT and be issued a new owner’s duplicate
copy of said title.
 
The trial court ordered Frias to pay San Diego-Sison the sum of P2million
plus interest at the rate of 32% per annum beginning December 7, 1991 due
to the compounded interest stipulated in the MOA. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the rate of interest from 32%
to 25% effective June 7, 1991 when the interest rate prevailing in 1991
ranged from 25% to 32% per annum and that the P2Million was considered
as a loan in June 1991.
 
Frias argued that the interest rate was contrary to the MOA because it
provided that if San Diego-Sison would decide not to purchase the property,
Frias has the period of another six  months to pay the loan with compounded
bank interest for the last six months only.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether San Diego-Sison is entitled to moral damages.
HELD:
Yes. The court agreed with “the findings of the trial court and the
CA that petitioner’s act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her
loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for
the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles
respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong.  It partakes of the nature of fraud.” Xxx
“Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for
her loan were it not for respondent’s timely filing of a petition for relief
whereby the RTC set aside its previous order granting the issuance of new
title.  Thus, the award of moral damages is in order
CARANDANG V SANTIAGO
 
FACTS:
Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner
herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
where the case is now pending.
Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and hisparents,
damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him.
 PEOPLE V ARAMBULO
  Defendants presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil
case, pending the termination of the criminal case against Tomas Valenton,
Jr. in the Court of Appeals.
The judge ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the
result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was
submitted, but the court denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as
follows: “In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
maybe brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
Respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to
designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and therefore
said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in
accordance with the rules statutory construction.
Accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was
inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar
Carandang, which wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed is not
physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction
of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.
 
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge committed an error in superseding
the trial of the civil case to wait for the result of the criminal case
HELD: Yes Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and
"physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense
because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using
these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms
defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any
technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
Evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is
difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the
same article, some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other
words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used
with the latter are general terms.
ART 36 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
TE V CHOA`
FACTS:
Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in Sept 1988. They do not live
together but meet regularly until after Liliana gave birth that Arthur stopped
visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while their marriage was still subsisting,
Arthur contracted a second marriage with Julieta Santella. On August 1990,
Liliana filed an information charging Arthur with bigamy. Meanwhile, in
July 1990, Arthur Te filed an action for annulment on the ground that he was
forced to marry her, that she concealed her pregnancy by another man at the
time of their marriage and psychologically incapacity. On November 8,
1990, Liliana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of
their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts
of immorality and an act of falsification against Arthur when he stated in his
2nd marriage contract that he was still single. After the prosecution or
criminal case, petitoner filed demurrer to evidence and motion to inhibit the
judge were filed but were eventually denied by the court.
ISSUE:
W there is a prejudicial question in the case of annulment and bigamy
HELD:
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of  passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the 1 st marriage be subsisting at
the time the 2nd marriage is contracted. Even a declaration that their marriage
was void ab initio would NOT necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability. Art. 40 of Family Code is already in effect at the time of their
marriage (Sept 1988) stating that a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding.
Civil case for annulment does NOT pose a prejudicial question to
suspend an administrative proceeding. There is no prejudicial question
where one case is administrative and the other is civil. The concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. Furthermore,
Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the
administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding
the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving
the same facts as the administrative case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its
decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-
judicial body.
ART 37 JURIDICAL CAPACITY
CATALAN V BASA
FACTS:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from
active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married
Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister
Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution of a document,
titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued
its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the
Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was
appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979,
Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s
guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents.
BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI
averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano
because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome
the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court
of Appeals and denied the petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it
should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must
be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders
the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By
merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano
Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the lower court
correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since
the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove
the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with
fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus
Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the
first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to
note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a
void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years.
ARTS 38 & 39 RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL PERSONALITY
MERCADO V ESPIRITU
FACTS:
Margarita Espiritu was the owner of a 48 hectare land. In 1897, she died and
the land was left to her husband (Wenceslao Mercado) and her children,
Domingo Mercado, Josefa Mercado and 3 other siblings.
Apparently however, during the lifetime of Margarita in 1894, she executed
a deed of sale transferring about 71% of her land (covering 15 cavanes of
seeds) to her brother Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu) for P2,000.00.
After her death, Wenceslao had a hard time making ends meet for his family
and so he took out a loan from Luis in the amount of P375.00. The loan was
secured by the remainder of the lot. Later, that loan was increased to
P600.00.
In May 1910, Luis entered into a notarized agreement with Domingo and
Josefa whereby the two, while purporting to be of legal age, acknowledged
the sale and the loan previously entered into by their parents with Luis. In
the same agreement, the siblings agreed that for and in consideration of the
amount of P400.00, they are transferring the remainder 29% (covering 6
cavanes of seeds) to Luis.
But later, the siblings contested the said agreement. Luis later died and he
was substituted by Jose. It is the contention of Domingo et al that the
agreement is void because they were only minors, 19 and 18 years of age
respectively, when the contract was entered into in May 1910 (21 being the
age of minority at that time).
ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between Luis and Domingo et al in
May 1910 is valid despite the minority of the latter party.
HELD: Yes. In the first place, their minority of Domingo and Josefa was
not proven with certainty because of the loss of official records (got burned
down). However, even assuming that they were indeed minors, they are
bound by their declaration in the notarized document where they presented
themselves to be of legal age. Domingo claimed he was 23 years old in the
said document. The Supreme Court declared: the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid,
and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of
the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of
the provisions of Law. Further, there was no showing that the said notarized
document was attended by any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit.
Article 27 – Relief against Public Officials
Ledesma vs CA & Delmo – GR L54598
Campugan vs Tolentino Jr. – AC 8261
Article 28 – Unfair Competition
Willaware Products vs Jesichris Manufacturing – GR 195549
Article 29 – Civil Action
Two Kinds of Acquittal
Daluraya vs Olivia – GR 210148
Illustration of Article 29
Caiña vs People – GR 78777
Banal vs Tadeo – GR 78911-25
No need to institute a separate civil action
Padilla vs CA – GR L39999
Article 30 –
Relevant Provisions of Law: Rule 111, Section 1-3 (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Article 31 – Civil Obligation not rising from Felony
Frias vs San Diegos-Sison – GR 155223
Carandang vs Santiago – GR L8238
Article 36 – Prejudicial Question
Yap vs Cabales – GR 159186
Dreamwork Construction Inc vs Janiola – GR 184861
Pimentel vs Pimentel – GR 172060
People vs Arambulo – GR 186597
Te vs CA & Choa – GR 126746
Relevant Rules: Rule 111, Section 6-7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Article 37 – Judicial Capacity and Capacity to Act
Catalan vs Basa – GR 159567
Article 38 & 39 – Restrictions on Civil Personality
Mercado vs Espiritu – GR L11872
Atizado vs People – GR 173822
Natural Persons
Article 40
Geluz vs People – GR L16439
Quimiguing vs Icao – GR 26795