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G.R. No. 149177

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,
- versus -
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providingtechnical and management support in

the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of
Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.
Kitamaru was named as the project manager in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon‘s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion
of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru‘s contract was for a fixed term
that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon‘s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC
of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru‘s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the
proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
The CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the
validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex locisolutionis.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages
involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, or forum non conveniens.

 HELD: 

NO.

In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex for it will often coincide, the ―minimum
contacts, for one do not always provide the necessary ―significant contacts, for the other.

  The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the
courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue — jurisdiction. Jurisdiction,
however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over
the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving
property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is
actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the
movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to
adjudicate the claims

G. R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000]

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. petitioners,
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vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G. SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
In May 1988, Santos was hired as an overseas worker in Oman. In June, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in China.
Because it offered higher pay and benefits, Santos accepted the offer and started working in November. The employment between
him and Palace Hotel was without the intervention of POEA. In August 1989, Santos was informed he will be terminated due to
business reverses. Subsequently, he was terminated and paid all benefits due to him, including plane fare back to the Philippines.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corp., (MHC), a government owned
and controlled corporation and Manila Hotel International, Ltd (MHIL), a Hong Kong Corp, 50% of which is owned by MHL.
The LA decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC
had jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC promulgated a resolution, stating that the appealed Decision be declared null and void for
want of jurisdiction.
Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He argued that the case was not cognizable by the
POEA as he was not an “overseas contract worker.” The NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The NLRC directed another
LA to hear the case on the question of whether private respondent was retrenched or dismissed. The LA found that Santos was
illegally dismissed from employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract. The NLRC ruled in favour of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
No. NLRC had not jurisdiction over the case. It is an inconvenient forum. Though Santos is a Filipino, his contract was not
entered into in the Philippines. It was also entered into without the intervention of POEA.
Although MHC owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. MHC and MHIL are
separate entities. Further, MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not
residents of the Philippines.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses
to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., ASPAC MULTI-TRADE, INC., (formerly ASPAC-ITEC PHILIPPINES, INC.)
and FRANCISCO S. AGUIRRE, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ITEC, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI, for brevity) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC.,
(ASPAC, for brevity) are both domestic corporations, while petitioner Francisco S. Aguirre is their President and majority
stockholder. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC, for brevity) are corporations duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, United States of America. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

On August 14, 1987, ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC referred to as "Representative Agreement".
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Through a "License Agreement" entered into by the same parties on November 10, 1988, ASPAC was able to incorporate
and use the name "ITEC" in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC
(Philippines).

By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported by ITEC, to their sole customer, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, (PLDT, for brevity).

To facilitate their transactions, ASPAC, dealing under its new appellation, and PLDT executed a document entitled "PLDT-
ASPAC/ITEC PROTOCOL" which defined the project details for the supply of ITEC's Interface Equipment in connection with the
Fifth Expansion Program of PLDT.

One year into the second term of the parties' Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because
petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. 

ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL,
for brevity), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITEC's products
specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC's own, and
offering them to ITEC's former customer.

On January 31, 1991, the complaint in Civil Case No. 91-294, was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134.

In due time, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

On February 8, 1991, the complaint was amended by virtue of which ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC. was substituted as
plaintiff instead of ITEC, INC.

In their Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,  defendants took note of the amendment of the complaint and asked the court to
consider in toto their motion to dismiss and their supplemental motion as their answer to the amended complaint.

After conducting hearings on the prayer for preliminary injunction, the court a quo on February 22, 1991, issued its
Order: (1) denying the motion to dismiss for being devoid of legal merit with a rejection of both grounds relied upon by the
defendants in their motion to dismiss, and (2) directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the same day.

From the foregoing order, petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The respondent appellate court dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation doing business in the Philippines, and if it is,
whether or not this fact bars it from invoking the injunctive authority of our courts.

HELD:

Considering the above, it is necessary to state what is meant by "doing business" in the Philippines. Section 133 of the
Corporation Code, provides that "No foreign corporation, transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors
or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine Courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." 

With the abovestated precedents in mind, we are persuaded to conclude that private respondent had been "engaged in"
or "doing business" in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and
agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country, particularly ASPAC and Telephone Equipment
Sales and Services, Inc. (TESSI, for brevity). The latter is a local electronics firm engaged by ITEC to be its local technical
representative, and to create a service center for ITEC products sold locally. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate
convincingly ITEC's purpose to bring about the situation among its customers and the general public that they are dealing directly
with ITEC, and that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country.
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A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do
business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation.To put it in another
way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a
contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate
existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking
advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.

By entering into the "Representative Agreement" with ITEC, Petitioner is charged with knowledge that ITEC was not
licensed to engage in business activities in the country, and is thus estopped from raising in defense such incapacity of ITEC,
having chosen to ignore or even presumptively take advantage of the same.

In Top-Weld, we ruled that a foreign corporation may be exempted from the license requirement in order to institute an
action in our courts if its representative in the country maintained an independent status during the existence of the disputed
contract. Petitioner is deemed to have acceded to such independent character when it entered into the Representative Agreement
with ITEC, particularly, provision 6.2 (supra).

Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international
law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to
apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced
because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as
we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by
virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due
course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume
jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's disposition to give due course to the questioned
action, the matter of the present forum not being the "most convenient" as a ground for the suit's dismissal, deserves scant
consideration.

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

FACTS:
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with and was granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility.

In 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time,
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and
severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

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This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and
may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall
have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. …

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and inasmuch as the private respondents
still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj before
RTC of Quezon City.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court
denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from
taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper
forum. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?

HELD:
YES

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: A State does not have jurisdiction in the absence
of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private
respondents.

In the case of Neville Y. LamisEnts., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was “[i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction
shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.” We held:Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to
say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b),
Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the
only venue agreed upon by the parties.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In
International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and
diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latter’s authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and
throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:

… In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And
even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens. …
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the IAC should not have relied
on such principle.

Petition granted.
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G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LIMITED, and ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O. DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and
WILLIAM H. CRAIG, respondents.

FACTS:
1488, Inc. executed a warranty deed with vendors lien by which a parcel of land in Harris County Texas, USA was sold to
Petitioner ATHONA for US$2,807,209.02 in order to assume Ducat’s obligation to AYALA and PHILSEC for the payment of his
loan, secured by shares of stock.
AYALA and PHILSEC extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000 as initial payment of the purchase
price of the parcel of land the balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc.
Subsequently, upon their receipt of US$ 2,500,000 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness
and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance and the entire amount become due and demandable. Private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance of
US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and
Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that
private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00.
Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private respondents' fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were
induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the Houston property. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against the real and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-avis Civil Action
No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-
IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat's motion to dismiss, stating that "the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be
more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens." The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they were nonresidents
and the action was not an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of summons was ineffective. The
trial court subsequently lifted the writ of attachment it had earlier issued against the shares of stocks of 1488, Inc. and Daic.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic's motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia
and forum non conveniens and in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the civil action filed is barred by the judgement of the U.S court.
2. Whether or not the dismissal of the civil action is justified on the ground of forum non conveniens.
3. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic.

RULINGS:
1. The foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it
on grounds stated in Rule 39, sec. 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact." In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings
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in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the
U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being
litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute
res judicata. As the trial court stated in its disputed order dated March 9, 1988.
2. The trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case is unjustified under the principle of forum non conveniens.
First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec. 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a
matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by private
respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic
corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which
was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not
a party in the U.S. case.
3. Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and
Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14,
§17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a nonresident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines
by leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 18 It is not
disputed that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under
the Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

G.R. Nos. 90306-07 July 30, 1990

K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO and FU HING OIL CO., LTD., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ATLANTIC VENUS CO., S.A., and THE VESSEL M/V "ESTELLA", respondents

FACTS:
Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan, filed a complaint for
the collection of a sum of money with preliminary attachment against Atlantic Venus ("Atlantic"), a corporation registered in
Panama, the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping Corporation ("Crestamonte"), a Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the
owner of the MV Estella.
The complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court, alleged that Crestamonte, as bareboat charterer and operator of the MV
Estella, appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation ("NSS"), a Japanese corporation, as its general agent in Japan. The appointment
was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the
MV Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay the amounts due.
NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (Keihin) filed complaints-in-intervention.
Petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in Hong Kong and not doing business in the
Philippines, filed a motion for leave to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing supplied marine
diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and incurred barge expenses for the total sum of One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred
Twelve Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents (US$152,412.56) but such has remained unpaid despite demand and that the claim constitutes
a maritime lien. The issuance of a writ of attachment was also prayed for.
Petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (K.K. Shell), a corporation organized in Japan and not doing business in
the Philippines, likewise filed a motion to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that upon request of NSS,
Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell provided and supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the W Estella at the ports of Tokyo
and Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous demands Crestamonte has failed to pay the amounts of Sixteen Thousand Nine
Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and Ninety- Six Cents (US$16,996.96) and One Million Yen (Y1,000,000.00) and that K.K. Shell's claim
constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The complaint-in-intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
The trial court allowed the intervention of Fu Hing and K.K. Shell respectively. Writs of preliminary attachment were upon
posting of the appropriate bonds. Upon the posting of counterbonds, the writs of attachment were discharged.
Atlantic and the MV Estella moved to dismiss the complaints-in- intervention filed by Fu Hing and K.K. Shell.
 8

Atlantic and the AWU Estella filed a petition in the Court of Appeals against the trial court judge, Kumagai, NSS and
Keihin, which sought the annulment of the orders of the trial court. Among others, the omnibus order denying the motion to
reconsider the order allowing Fu Hing's intervention and granted K.K. Shell's motion to intervene. Again Fu Hing and K.K. Shell
intervened.
The Court of Appeals annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to cease and desist from proceeding with the
case. According to the Court of Appeals, Fu Hing and K.K. Shell were not suppliers but sub-agents of NSS, hence they were bound
by the Agency Agreement between Crestamonte and NSS, particularly, the choice of forum clause, which provides:
12.0-That this Agreement shall be governed by the Laws of Japan. Any matters, disputes, and/or differences arising
between the parties hereto concerned regarding this Agreement shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the District Courts
of Japan.
Thus, concluded the Court of Appeals, the trial court should have disallowed their motions to intervene. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Fu Hing and K.K. Shell but this was denied by the Court of Appeals.
However, Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the courts will not find that K.K. Shell is expressly
bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall back on the argument that even if this were so, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention.

ISSUES: (CONFLICT OF LAWS)

Whether or not the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the dismissal of k.k. shell's
complaint-in-intervention

RULING:
FORUM NON CONVENIENS cannot be ruled as a valid ground to cause the dismissal because there are still numerous
material facts to be established in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the true nature of the relationship between Crestamonte and
K.K. Shell and between NSS and K.K. Shell. The best recourse would have been to allow the trial court to proceed with case and
consider whatever defenses may be raised by private respondents after they have filed their answer and evidence to support their
conflicting claims has been presented.
The Supreme Court elucidated thus:
Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the exact
nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge
who is in the best position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require that his court
desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit. It was clearly reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals to annul the trial
court's orders, insofar as K.K. Shell is concerned, and order the trial court to cease and desist from proceeding.

No. 04-71843

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

IN RE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Philippine National Bank, Petitioner,
v.
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, Respondent, Maximo Hilao; Estate of Ferdinand Marcos;  Imelda R. Marcos;  
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Real Parties in Interest.

FACTS:
There are two parties in this case which sought the estate of Marcos. One is the Class Plaintiffs and the other is the
Republic of the Philippines (RP).

The U.S. District Court (USDC) in Hawaii rendered judgment in favor of the class of plaintiffs against the Marcos estate
for Human Rights violations by the Marcos Regime. The judgment included an injunction restraining the estate from transferring
anyestate’s assets. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines sought to forfeit the Marcos estate’s assets on the ground
that they were stolen by Marcos from the Phil. Gov’t and its people.
 9

There was an earlier case (Credit Suisse Case) wherein the Swiss Asset of Marcos estate had been frozen by the Swiss
Gov’t atthe request of the Republic of the Philippines. The Class plaintiffs obtained injunction from USDC of Hawaii to hold the
assets for the benefit of the class Plaintiffs. The US CA issued a writ of mandamus and held that the injunction violated the act of
state doctrine, which preclude American courts from declaring “invalid” a foreign sovereign’s official act, that is, the freeze order
of the Swiss gov’t.

Thereafter, the Swiss government released the funds frozen in Switzerland for transfer to the Philippine National Bank in
escrow pending a determination of proper disposal by a competent court in the Philippines. The Philippine National Bank
deposited the funds in Singapore. The Philippine Supreme Court subsequently held that the assets were forfeited to the Republic
of the Philippines.

The USDC of Hawaii then made a ruling that the Philippine SC had violated “due process by any standard” and the
lattersjudgment was entitled to no deference. It ordered reinstatement of an earlier settlement agreement in the District Court
wherein the RP refused to approve and consent to it.

The District Court then issued an “Order to Show Cause” against the Philippine National Bank, which was not a party to
the litigation in the district court, requiring the Bank to show why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court’s injunction
against transfer of assets by the estate.

The Philippine National Bank then filed the present petition for mandamus in the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
seeking to restrain the District Court from enforcing its “Order to Show Cause” and from pursuing discovery against the Bank
officer.

The Bank asserted that it had transferred nearly all of the funds in issue to theRepublic of the Philippines pursuant to the
judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court. It contended that the entire proceeding against it for its transfer of funds to the
Republic of the Philippines violated the “act of state” doctrine.

ISSUE:
W/N the USDC of Hawaii violated the act of state doctrine.

HELD:
Yes. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
(Underhill v. Hernandez)

The District Court’s orders in issue violated this principle. In order toobtain assets from the Philippine National Bank, or
tohold the Bank in contempt for the transfer of those assets to the Republic of the Philippines, the District court necessarily (and
expressly) held invalid the forfeiture judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court.

NOTES: Other issues raised by the Class Plaintiffs:

W/N the act of state doctrine do not apply to judicial decisions

Although the act of state doctrine is normally inapplicable to court judgments arising from private litigation, there is no
inflexible rule preventing a judgment sought by a foreign government from qualifying as an act of state. (Liu v. Republic of China)

W/N the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court did not concern
matters within its own territoryThe USCA held that, “generally, the act of state doctrine applies to official acts of foreign
sovereigns “performed within their own territory.” (CreditSuisseCase). The act of the Philippine Supreme Court was not wholly
 10

external, however. Its judgment,which the district court declared invalid, was issued in the Philippines and much of its force upon
the Philippine National Bank arose from the fact that the Bank is a Philippine corporation.

Because the RP’s “interest in the enforcement of its laws does not end at its borders,” the fact that the escrow funds were
deposited in Singapore does not preclude the application of the act of state doctrine.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE’S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appelants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid, his distributable estate should be divided among
his heirs, viz: to his first wife - $240,000.00, to his three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis – Php 40,000.00 each and the remainder shall go to all his surviving seven (7) children by his first and second wives.

Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate Court of
First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” wherein it reported the satisfaction of the legacies therein enumerated.
It also stated therein the division of the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor’s final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Subsequently, their respective motions for reconsiderations were denied. Hence, they
appealed to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

ISSUE:

1.) In determining the intrinsic validity of the will, what law must apply – Texas law or Philippine law?

HELD:

The national law of the decedent must be used.

The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
 11

of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

Article 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that –
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 —
now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos
G. Bellis.

G.R. No. 104235

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners, 

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and SuthiraZalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets
from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets
of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations. While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them
had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages
based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the
lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held
that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or
bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith
could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
 12

Whether or not Philippine Law is applicable.

HELD:

YES.

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los
Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never
been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.  Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office. 

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with
the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline.  Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. A decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Grace J. Garcia – a Filipina – married Rederick on January
12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, Rederick was declared as “Single” and “Filipino”.

Starting October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declaration secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court on the ground of bigamy
– Grace alleged she had no knowledge of the prior marriage of Rederick until November 1997.

Rederick answered that Grace knew of his prior marriage as far back as 1993 and its subsequent dissolution. He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989, thus he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.

Five years after the couples’ wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia. He prayed in his Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for
no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on
the ground that the divorce was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The trial court held that the Australian divorce had ended
the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

Can the Australian divorce decree be admitted in evidence with no further proof of its authenticity and due execution?

HELD:
 13

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.

G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private
respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v.
Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to
guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High
Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial
court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it
brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over
the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay
Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading
filed before the court.
The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but
the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:
I
 14

Whether or not the malaysian court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over pncc, notwithstanding that (a) the foreign
court had served summons on pncc at its malaysia office, and (b) pncc itself appeared by counsel in the case before that court
II
Whether or not the philippine court should deny recognition and enforcement of the judgment of the malaysian court

RULING:
I.
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for
collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected
by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is,
remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a
duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that
Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as
alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision
thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.[44]
II.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation
or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on
the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and
respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the
same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by
the evidence it offered. Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment,
said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private
respondent, to prove otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent merely argued,
to which the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly
erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party seeking to
enforce it be required to first establish its validity.
 15

G.R. No. L-23145

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant. November
29, 1968

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation

SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other
than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to
be distributed among his heirs.

SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by
Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines,
Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary
administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock
certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet
Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the
possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE:
1. What is the scope of power of the ancillary administrator?

2. Is it right to declare or consider the certificates lost when they are in the possession of the domiciliary administrator?

3. Was there a failure on observing certain requirements provided in the by-laws of the corporation in issuing new stock
certificates?

4. Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:
1. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. an administrator appointed in a foreign state
has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than
that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs.
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right certificates be
respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
2. Yes. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of
stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing
unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby,
the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
3. No, such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the
foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission
of appellant that as far as it is concerned, it is immaterial who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates. Even if such
 16

were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a
contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
4. No, the appeal lacks merit.
Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set
forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration
is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have
any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no
authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of
his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the
actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be
respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

G.R. No. 124110

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW
FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanillabought from United Airlines,through the Philippine Travel Bureauin Manila,three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets
from himself, his wife and his minorson, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.All flights had been
confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the firstcoupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changedtheir itinerary, paid the penalty for
rewriting their tickets and was issuedtickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They were
then set to leave but were denied boarding becausethe flight was overbooked. TheCA ruled that private respondents’ failure to
comply with the check-in requirementwill not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applyingthe laws
of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of theUSA.

ISSUE:
WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:
No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where acontract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity,obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even
thoughthe place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to beperformed. Hence, the court should apply
the law of the place where the airline ticketwas issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and
theticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contractof carriage was to be performed in the
United States, the tickets were purchasedthrough petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in
D.C.,however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage enteredinto by the parties in Manila.
 17

G.R. No. 104776

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS,
thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL,
INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class
suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as
a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated
prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the
unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.
2. Whether or not the Bahrain law on prescription of action or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law
and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-
employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the
observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the
host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein.
However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may be “adjusted
downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation” therein agree,’
another part of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host
country regulation and custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted
it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.” The presumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law,
the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of
 18

terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by
the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to
the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their
transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain
law because the services were rendered in that country.
2. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippine Islands.”
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propiovigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the AmiriDecree No. 23 of 1976.The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS:

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members
Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels,
they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te ( sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly
after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and
rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident.
They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer
Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but
did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want
because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local
dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.

Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to
deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI ( sic). In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.

On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested
her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the
police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
 19

One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to
Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, AslamSaleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but
on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. YahyaSaddick
took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.

On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment
and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court
found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its
country manager. On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the following grounds, to wit:
(1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that
the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to try the case. On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss). Saudia filed a
reply thereto on March 3, 1994. On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party
defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. The trial court issued an
Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia. On February 20, 1995, SAUDIA
filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise
directed, in the interim. On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995. However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that  certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch
as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394
ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".

2. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE
LAW SHOULD GOVERN.

HELD:

1. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980",
is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
 20

xxxxxxxxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind ,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)

xxxxxxxxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) xxxxxxxxx

(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court  a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere,  i.e. in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the
parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and
Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex AbundanteCautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from
the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively
submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

2. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most
interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application
to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could
properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "since private respondent instituted this suit,
she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." As aptly said by private respondent, she has
"no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21"
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking
the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi
Arabia is".

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein
petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state
intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
 21

elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.

Nos. 130, 34

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)

Argued April 10, 1894
Decided June 3, 1895

FACTS:
Guyot, a Frenchman, sued Hilton, an American, in a French court for the recovery of a sum of money. The French court
rendered judgment in favor of Guyot. Plaintiff brought the action to a US court to recover the sum of money adjudged by the
French court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nation’s court entitled to full credit and has a conclusive effect when sued to other
nation.
HELD:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent
to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree
shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation depends upon the comity of nations.The court stated that comity
was reciprocal. Since France did not recognize final judgments of the U.S., and would try such judgments anew, judgements given
by France would be given the same treatment.Therefore, the comity of the United States did not require the court to give
conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France.

A foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon another nation, but is a prima facie evidence only
of the claim.Comity was not afforded to foreign judgments when the country did not reciprocate comity.

Defendants could be granted a new trial.

242 N.Y. 381 ( 1926)

Johnston v. CompagnieGeneraleTransatlantique,
FACTS:
A steamship carrier, which is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of France wrongfully
delivered goods in which the American plaintiff Johnston first sought relief in the French Court. However, plaintiff failed to win the
cause of action. He decided, then, to bring a separate action before the Americans courts in the State of New York.Defendant,
CompagnieGeneraleTransatlantique set up as a defense a judgement from a French court upon the same cause of action. Lower
courts refused to give effect to the French judgment on the ground of the reciprocity requirement following by decision of the
Supreme Court in Hilton vs. Guyot where inThe case then went to the New York Court of Appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the New York Court of Appeal were bound to apply the reciprocity requirement following the decision the
Hilton case

HELD:

No. Even though questions of international relations and comity are to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United
State - and therefore the Hilton's decision is controlling such questions as a statement of law- the courts in New York were not
bound to follow the Hilton's ruling because the question is one of private rather than public international law, of private right rather
than public relations and [American] courts will recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws. The case was brought by an
 22

American before a foreign court and the French judgment was sought to be used defensively. Nevertheless, the court preferred to
speak generally, and established a general principle by which reciprocity is not a condition for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the state of New York. The court went even further in disregarding the Hilton's ruling. Given the fact that the
French court heard and decided the case judicially, honestly, and with full jurisdiction and with intension to arrive at the right
conclusion...the French judgment should be given full faith and credit.

LOUCKS et al.

v.
STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.
CASE DIGEST
Rule of Law
A right of action created by the law of a neighboring state is enforceable in any other state unless the law is penal in the
international sense or enforcement of the right would violate the strong public policy of the forum.

FACTS:
Loucks was killed when a negligent driver employed by Standard Oil (Defendant) ran him down. The accident took place
in Massachusetts, but he was a resident of New York, and his administrator (Plaintiff) brought a suit for wrongful death in New
York. The suit was based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which provided a minimum recovery of $500 and a
maximum recovery of $10,000 with the amount of damages awarded to be based on the degree of fault of the defendant.
Standard Oil (Defendant) moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Massachusetts Statute was penal in nature and
therefore unenforceable in New York.

ISSUE:
May a right created by statute in one state be enforceable in another state if the enforcement of the right would not violate
the public policy of the forum and the underlying statute is not penal in nature?

HELD:
(Cardozo, J.) Yes. One state’s penal laws are not enforceable in any other state. Whether a statute is penal depends on
the type of liability it creates. Where the penalty is awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest of the
whole community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is penal. While this statute is penal in the sense that
damages are awarded on the basis of the defendant’s conduct rather than the plaintiff’s measure of damages, the right to recover
is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the international sense. The public policy of New York is not violated by the
enforcement of the right, as New York recognizes the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death. The fact that the
Massachusetts Statute is different in the way it is enforced does not make the Massachusetts Statute wrong. The forum may
refuse to enforce a right based on a foreign statute only where enforcement would violate an express strong public policy of the
forum. That is not the case here and since the Statute is not penal in the international sense, there is no bar to its being enforced
in New York. Judgment reversed and order of the Special Term affirmed.

G.R. No. 149177

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,

v.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

FACTS:
On March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered
into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered
into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler
Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro
Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon
 23

to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of
lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the
motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand
invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
HELD:
No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided
for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts
cases, there are three phases and each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the
issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws
must automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTC’s taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a
motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper
procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in
the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.

G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private
respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v.
Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to
guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
 24

Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High
Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial
court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it
brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over
the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay
Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading
filed before the court.
The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the malaysian court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over pncc, notwithstanding that (a) the
foreign court had served summons on pncc at its malaysia office, and (b) pncc itself appeared by counsel in the case
before that court

2. Whether or not the philippine court should deny recognition and enforcement of the judgment of the malaysian court

RULING:
I.
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for
collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected
by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is,
remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a
duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that
Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as
alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision
thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.[44]
II.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation
or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on
the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and
 25

respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the
same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by
the evidence it offered. Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment,
said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private
respondent, to prove otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent merely argued,
to which the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly
erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party seeking to
enforce it be required to first establish its validity.

L.R. 6 Q.B 139

GODARD vs. GRAY

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Godard are Frenchmen sued the defen¬dants, who are Englishmen, on a charter party made at Sunderland,
which charter party contained the following clause: "Penalty for non-performance of this agreement, estimated amount of freight."
The French Court below, treating this clause as fixing the amount of liquidated dam¬ages, gave judgment against the defendants
for the amount of freight on two voyages. On appeal, the superior Court reduced the amount to the estimated freight of one
voyage, giving as their reason that the charter party itself and the tribunal proceeds to observe that the amount thus decreed was
after all more than sufficient to cover all the plaintiffs' loss.
All parties in France seem to have taken the word for granted in the charter party which is to be understood in their natural
meaning,
However in English law is accurately expressed that passage been brought to the notice of the French tribunal, it would
have known that in an English charter party, as is there stated, "Such a clause is not the absolute limit of damages on either side;
the party may, if he thinks fit, ground his action upon the other clauses or covenants, and may, in such action, recover damages
beyond the amount of the penalty, if in justice they shall be found to exceed it. On the other hand, if the party sue on such a penal
clause, he cannot, in effect, recover more than the damage actually sustained." But it was not brought to the notice of the French
tribunal that according to the interpretation put by the English law on such a contract, a penal clause of this sort was in fact idle and
inoperative. If it had been, they would, probably, have interpreted the English contract made in England according to the English
construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not this is a bar to the action brought in England to enforce that judgment.

HELD:
It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a State is bound to enforce within its territories the judgment of a
foreign tribunal. Several of the continental nations (including France) do not enforce the judgments of other countries, unless where
there is reciprocal treaties to that effect.
However in England and in those States which are governed by the common Iaw, such judgments are enforced, not by virtue of
any treaty, nor by virtue of any statute, but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., in Williams v. Jones (13 M. & W. 628; 14
L.J. Exch. 145):
"Where a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal
obligation aribes to pay the sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judg¬ment may be maintained. It is in this way that the
judgments of foreign and colonial Courts are supported and enforced."
 26

A judgment in personam of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction cannot be questioned by the parties on the merits
when recognition or enforcement of the judgment is sought in England, notwithstanding that it may have been wrong either in fact
or law. This derived from the mode of pleading an action on a foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the
obligation to pay the underlying liability.

G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC.,petitioner,

vs.
FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (“FASGI”), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum
Wheels, Incorporated (“PAWI”), a Philippine corporation, and FratelliPedriniSarezzo S.P.A. (“FPS”), an Italian corporation. The
agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by
PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in
non-compliance with the contract.
On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of
damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In the
interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI’s
persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the agreements for judgment against
PAWI.
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within
the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for “enforcement of foreign judgment”, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however,
dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower
court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered
the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth
containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said,
agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready,
counsel for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

ISSUE:
WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.

HELD:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and
the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and
fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation
or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is
clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he
honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client’s interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with
sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.
Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the
enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US
Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within
this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where
judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is
rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which
 27

goes to the very existence of the cause of action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.

G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LIMITED, and ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O. DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and
WILLIAM H. CRAIG, respondents.

FACTS:
1488, Inc. executed a warranty deed with vendors lien by which a parcel of land in Harris County Texas, USA was sold to
Petitioner ATHONA for US$2,807,209.02 in order to assume Ducat’s obligation to AYALA and PHILSEC for the payment of his
loan, secured by shares of stock.
AYALA and PHILSEC extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000 as initial payment of the purchase price of the
parcel of land the balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc.
Subsequently, upon their receipt of US$ 2,500,000 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness
and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance and the entire amount become due and demandable. Private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance of
US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and
Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that
private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00.
Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private respondents' fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were
induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the Houston property. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against the real and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-avis Civil Action
No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-
IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat's motion to dismiss, stating that "the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be
more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens." The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they were nonresidents and the
action was not an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of summons was ineffective. The trial court
subsequently lifted the writ of attachment it had earlier issued against the shares of stocks of 1488, Inc. and Daic.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic's motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia
and forum non conveniens and in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the civil action filed is barred by the judgement of the U.S court.
2. Whether or not the dismissal of the civil action is justified on the ground of forum non conveniens.
3. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic.

RULINGS:
1. The foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on
grounds stated in Rule 39, sec. 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
 28

clear mistake of law or fact." In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings
in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the
U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being
litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute
res judicata. As the trial court stated in its disputed order dated March 9, 1988.
2. The trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case is unjustified under the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a
motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec. 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in
connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of
the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object of the
transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.
3. Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic
could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on
extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a nonresident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by
leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 18 It is not disputed
that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under the Order
of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

G.R No. L-3693 GR July 29, 1950

MARGARET QUERUBIN relapsing-appellant, 
vs. SILVESTRE QUERUBIN turned-appealed.

FACTS:

(In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married peti¬tioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 'They had a
daughter, Querubina.
Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cru¬elty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Marga¬ret's
infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was
to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were re-strained from taking Querubina out
of California without the permission of the Court.
On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the
neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living with another man.
Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she was living with
and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father.
Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the Philippines and stayed
in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the
child to be raised in a better environment.
In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina urlder
the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court,
granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the Philippines.]
ISSUE:
1. If the interlocutory decree ordered in California court be in force in Philippines?

RULING:
 29

1. Because the interlocutory decree is not a final decision, it cannot be asked for their fulfillment in the Philippines. Before
such a judgment rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in courts of another state, as conclusive merits, it must
be a final judgment and not merely an interlocutory decree. Under the divorce law the spouse who was declared guilty of
marital infidelity is not entitled to the custody of minor children. For the welfare of the child Querubina, which is what
matters most in this case, the custody of the father should be considered preferential. The judgment of foreign courts
cannot be in force in the Philippines if they are contrary to laws, customs and public order. The ruling is upheld on appeal.
The appellant pay the costs.

G.R. No. 77085 April 26, 1989

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (PISC), GEORGE LIM, MARCOS BAUTISTA, CARLOS LAUDE, TAN
SING LIM, ANTONIO LIU LAO, ONG TEH, PHILIPPINE CONSORTIUM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PACIFIC MILLS,
INC., and UNIVERSAL STEEL SMELTING CO., INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, as Judge presiding Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, INTERPOOL, LTD. and SHERIFF NORBERTO V. DOBLADA JR.,respondents.

FACTS:
In 1979 to 1981, Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) leased from Interpool Ltd. and its wholly owned
subsidiary, the Container Trading Corporation, several containers pursuant to the Membership Agreement and Hiring Conditions
and the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement both dated June 8, 1979. The other petitioners Philippine Construction Consortium
Corporation, Pacific Mills Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Company, guaranteed to pay the obligation due and any liability of the
PISC arising out of the leasing or purchasing of equipment.
In 1979 to 1981, PISC incurred outstanding and unpaid obligations with Interpool representing unpaid per diems, drop-off
charges, interest and other agreed charges, resulting in a case before the US District Court, Southern District of New York wherein
a default judgment against petitioners was rendered ordering the corp. to pay the liquidated damages, together with interest.To
enforce the default judgment of the US District Court, a complaint was instituted against PISC and other guarantors before the QC
RTC. PISC failed to answer the complaint and they were declared in default. The RTC ruled in favor of Interpool and which was
affirmed by the CA.
In the first instance, petitioners contend that the U.S. District Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they
had not been served with summons and a copy of the complaint. In the second instance, petitioners contend that such jurisdictional
infirmity effectively prevented the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
39927 and from enforcing the U.S. District Court's Default Judgment against them. Petitioners contend, finally, that assuming the
validity of the disputed Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only against petitioner PISC the 9 petitioners not having been
impleaded originally in the case filed in New York, U.S.A.

ISSUE:
W/N the US District Court default judgment can be enforced and against the 9 other petitioners?

HELD:
Yes,to begin with, the evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction over
PISC under the procedural law applicable in that forum i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the Summons
and Complaint which were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with the SC, were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983,
PISC Manila." indicating that service thereof had been made upon and acknowledged by the PISC office in Manila on, 18 January
1983 That foreign judgment-which had become final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom and perfected by
petitioner PISC-is thus "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title." The SC note, further that there has been in this case no showing by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered by the
U.S. District Court was vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. " In other words, the
Default Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of U.S.$94,456.28 in favor of respondent Interpool, is valid and may be
enforced in this jurisdiction.
 30

The existence of liability on the part of petitioner PISC having been duly established in the U.S. case, it was not improper
for respondent Interpool, in seeking enforcement in this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such liability, to have included
the other 9 petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim, Marcos Bautista, Carlos Laude,Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu Lao, Ong Teh Philippine
Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in civil case, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The record shows that said 9 petitioners had executed continuing guarantees" to
secure performance by petitioner PISC of its contractual obligations. As guarantors, they had held themselves out as liable.
"whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to respondent Interpool under their separate "continuing guarantees" executed in
the Philippines. The New York award of U.S.$94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its own obligations under
those Agreements. The SC consider the 9 other petitioners as persons against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions [has been] alleged to exist" and, consequently, properly impleaded as defendants.
There was, in other words, no need at all, in order that case would prosper, for respondent Interpool to have first impleaded the 9
other petitioners in the New York case and there obtain judgment against all 10 petitioners.

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota,
U.S.A., sought to enforce in the RTC- Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent C.F.
Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales
Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of
the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant
in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
After the two attempts of service at its Office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma,
Kanagawa Prefecture by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to
have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila.
On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons
through diplomatic channels upon the defendant’s head office in Manila and defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit the writ of summons on August 28, 1980. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s complaint and on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980
up to and until payment is completed.Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was
filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54. Defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese Court: (1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is
contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of law.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait
wherein it was held that “the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state.” To support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:

In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons within the forum is required for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer jurisdiction on the
court, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Japanese court has jurisdiction over C.F. Sharp & Company Inc.
 31

HELD:
YES
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It
is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the
invalidity of such judgment.It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon
a defendant are governed by the lexfori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is, it is a
question of fact, not of law.It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and
to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. But, it did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-
called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no
such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a
foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in
Japan.While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the officers or agents of SHARP at its three other
branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not preclude service upon the proper government official, as stated
above.As found by the respondent court, two attempts of service were made at SHARP’s Yokohama branch. Both were
unsuccessful. Thus, the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and
other legal documents to the Philippines.
Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court
processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the
same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP’s contention that
such manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
We find NORTHWEST’s claim for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. We
find no evidence that would justify an award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWEST’s claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in sustained the
trial court’s dismissal of NORTHWEST’s complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to
NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
filing of the complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.

G.R. No. 139325.

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C.
LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii, petitioners,
 32

vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States
District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respondents, April 12, 2005

FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era,
obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in
compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final
Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying
P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, §7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Estate of Marcos however, filed a motion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees.
RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. In dismissing the complaint, the
respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.

ISSUE:
I.
Whether or not the amount paid by the petitioners is the proper filing fee
(realted issues as to conflict of laws)
II.
Whether or not it is necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment
III.
Whether or not there is a distinction between action one in personam and in rem

IV.
Whether or not the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal
notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law

HELD:
I.
Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”.
RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of
the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment,
the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first
level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested
with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an
assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of
B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but
at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section
7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”
II.
Yes. It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such
judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
 33

III.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the
foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However,
in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to
defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

IV.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the
service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure
that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord
Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law:“rest and quietness.” If every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.

G.R. No. L-28082 June 28, 1974

COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and CAPTAIN DELFIN MACALINAO, CIS, PC, petitioners, 

vs.
JUAN GARCIA, respondent.

FACTS:

TebanCaoile, with his three brothers, arrived at the port of Manila on June 7, 1961. He applied for admission as a
Philippine citizen under his documentation issued for that purpose by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong. After hearing,
the Board of Special Inquiry rendered a decision dated June 23, 1961, allowing his admission on the assumption that he was the
son of Antonio Caoile of Urdaneta, Pangasinan who was allegedly born on July 30, 1913 as the illegitimate child of Maria Caoile
and a Chinaman. On July 7, 1961 the Board of Commissioners of Immigration took the following action on the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry: Commissioner Emilio L. Galang voted for the exclusion of TebanCaoile and his brothers, while Deputy
Commissioners Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis simply wrote the word "noted" and, below that ambiguous word, the two
affixed their signatures. The significance of that equivocal action is a controverted point in this case. On July 10, 1961 the Bureau
of Immigration issued to TebanCaoile Identification Certificate No. 15648 which stated inter alia that "TebanCaoile, male, 28 years
old, single, whose picture and fingerprint are affixed hereto, was born in Amoy Fukien, China on November 4, 1932, ex CPA plane
on June 7, 1961, was admitted as citizen of the Philippines as per decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated June 23, 1961,
duly, affirmed by the majority of the members of the Board of Commissioners, I. C. No. 61-1881-C" (sic). Thereafter, TebanCaoile
registered as a voter, obtained a Philippine passport, paid residence and income taxes, worked in the Avenue Electrical Supply
Company (Avesco) and became a member of the Social Security System. The Secretary directed the Board of Commissioners to
review "all decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give preference to all cases
where entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines". The Commissioners concluded that
TebanCaoile and his three brothers had not satisfactorily established their Philippine citizenship. Their return to the port whence
they came or to the country of which they are nationals was ordered. On that same date, June 23rd, the Commissioner of
Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion to implement the decision. Pursuant to that warrant, TebanCaoile was arrested on March
10, 1964 by Captain Macalinao and detained at the Office of the Constabulary's Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Crame. On
March 12, 1964 Juan Garcia, a relative of TebanCaoile, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, on the ground that Caoile, as a Filipino citizen, was illegally detained. The trial court issued an order requiring
the production in Court of TebanCaoile. On March 14, 1964 the Commissioner of Immigration, in his return, explained that Caoile
was detained by virtue of the warrant of exclusion implementing the decision of the Board of Commissioners. The case was
submitted for decision on the basis of a stipulation of facts and on the testimonies of Antonio Caoile and Immigration Commissioner
Vivo. Antonio Caoile, the supposed father of TebanCaoile, declared that he is a Filipino citizen. He categorically affirmed "that he
does not know TebanCaoile", that "it was only in the hearing of the case that he saw TebanCaoile" and that he (Antonio) was
married only about five years prior to 1964. On March 24, 1964 the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
 34

for habeas corpus. It found that TebanCaoile was legally detained. Juan Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he
renewed his motion for Caoile's release on bail which had been denied by the trial court. The Commissioner of Immigration
opposed the motion. The Court of Appeals allowed Caoile's release upon his posting bail in the sum of P5,000. The Commissioner
filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, wherein he assailed the resolution allowing the release of Caoile on bail.
The petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether the ruling of the Board of Commissioners, as strengthened by Antonio Caoile's testimony, should prevail over the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry which was "noted" by Deputy Commissioner De la Rosa and Talabis but disapproved by
Commissioner Galang.

HELD:

The first Board of Commissioners did not meet collectively to discuss and deliberate on the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry. Its action was set aside by Memorandum Order No. 9 of the Secretary of Justice. Individual action by the members
of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a board. The later Board of Commissioners,
headed by the appellant, acted on the hypothesis that the documentation supporting TebanCaoile's alleged Philippine citizenship
was fraudulent and manufactured. That conclusion was confirmed by the testimony of Antonio Caoile, who, at risk of being indicted
for perjury, denied any paternal relationship to TebanCaoile. His testimony implied that a monstrous deception was practiced upon
the immigration authorities. The foundation of TebanCaoile's assertion of Philippine citizenship is his representation that he is
Antonio Caoile's son. That foundation collapsed when Antonio Caoile revealed that he could not have been the father of
TebanCaoile. His revelation belied TebanCaoile's documentation of Philippine citizenship and unmasked it as an imposition.
"When a party resorts to falsehood or fraud in order to strengthen his evidence, it is presumed that he knows perfectly well that his
cause is groundless".

G.R. No. L-25439 March 28, 1969

IN RE: PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH OF THE MINOR, CHUA TAN CHUAN. CHUA
TAN CHUAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:
A verified petition was filed on April 28, 1965 by the petitioner Chua Tan Chuan thru counsel Atty. Peregrino M. Andres for
the purpose of changing the nationality of his son Jacob Chua from Chinese to Filipino as could be found in the birth certificate of
Jacob Chua.
The petitioner in this case is a resident of Sta. Ana, Davao City, Philippines and is a Chinese citizen, while the minor
Jacob Chua is under the custody and support of the petitioner as according to the decision of this Honorable Court ...; that
according to the certificate of birth of the minor prepared by the attending physician he was born at the Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital on October 24, 1965.
The nationality of the minor is indicated in the birth certificate as Chinese instead of Filipino and according to the decision
of this Court ... of the complaint filed by Leoncia Manglangit against the petitioner Chua Tan Chuan, it was found that the petitioner
and the plaintiff were not legally married but they live as common-law husband and wife; that Jacob Chua is the illegitimate child of
Leoncia Manglangit; and according to Exhibit 'E' which is the birth certificate of the minor, stated that the nationality of the child is
Chinese and such entry was explained by the petitioner that there was a mistake so that he has been asking for correction of the
certificate of birth of the minor.
The lower court, the Honorable Vicente P. Bullecer presiding, rendered its decision ordering the correction of the birth
certificate of the minor Jacob Chua by changing his nationality from Chinese to Filipino.

ISSUE:
Can an alien national become a Filipino citizen by virtue of a petition for correction of entry in the certificate of birth?

HELD:
No.
 35

The lower court is apparently oblivious of a 1964 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Chief Justice Bengzon
about ten months before in Reyes v. Republic, wherein this Court reiterated that doctrine that a change of citizenship cannot
effected by a mere correction of an entry in the Civil Registry because in effect, it requests the judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship. We have clearly stated time and again, that declaratory relief is not available for the purpose of obtaining a judicial
declaration of citizenship.

G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet and ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO,
assisted by her mother HELEN POA, respondents.
Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding?

FACTS:
The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident
of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po
to Veronica Pao. For this purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's name
appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN.
At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her
mother.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao has presented a proper and reasonable cause for the
change of her name.
2. Whether or not the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birth certificate of Anita Po can be changed in the
same proceeding for the change of name of Anita Po.

HELD:
1. No. Under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the
proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned
was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case
cannot be made. 9
2. No. The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole
purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's
name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same
proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.
Accordingly, petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and substance and was dismissed by the trial court for lack of
merit.

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
 36

residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau
Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that she
does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus,
if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As
the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that
she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the
husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON.
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.Hethen embraced and was converted
to Islam.
 37

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two
children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of
petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration. Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to permanent resident
legal.

HELD:
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s
visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since
the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted
into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. An alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status
and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or
husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

G.R. No. L-33216 June 28, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHING TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: TAN CHING,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor- appellant.

FACT:
Tan Ching, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on September 8, 1959with the now defunct Court of First
Instance of Quezon. The petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 74-G.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hearings on the petition were held wherein an assistant provincial fiscal represented the Solicitor General. In a decision
dated December 20, 1960, the court rendered the following judgmenthaving complied with all the requirements of the naturalization
law of the Philippines and possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed in the law, is hereby
ADMITTED to Philippine citizenship as a naturalized Filipino, subject to the conditions prescribed in Republic Act No. 530, that his
decision shall not become final and effective until after the lapse of two years from the date of the promulgation of this decision and
after the Court shall have made the findings in that hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, that
 38

during the intervening period of two years, the applicant TAN CHING (1) has not left the Philippines, (2) has continuously dedicated
himself to a lawful calling or profession as found in this decision, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government
announced policies. He shall further sever forever all his affiliations with any and all associations and organizations which are
exclusive to Chinese citizens in the Philippines or elsewhere.
On June 3, 1970, Tan Ching filed a verified "MOTION TO DECLARE PETITIONER QUALIFIED TO TAKE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Motion was opposed by the Solicitor General on the ground that it was "filed only in June 1970 or more than nine (9)
years from the rendition of the decision in December 20, 1960 granting the petition for naturalization and it is not shown that the
delay was excusable, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned his petition."
On August 26, 1970, the Court issued an Order which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The decision in this case dated December 20, 1960, admitting petitioner Tan Ching to Philippine citizenship as a
naturalized Filipino was promulgated on January 6, 1961.

On June 9, 1970, petitioner filed a pleading styled MOTION TO DECLARE PETITIONER QUALIFIED TO TAKE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE. To this motion the Solicitor General filed an opposition dated July 31, 1970, on the ground that as more than nine
years have elapsed from the date the decision was rendered and it has not been shown that the delay is excusable, petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned his petition.

The Court Finding that petitioner Tan Ching has complied with all the requirements provided for in Republic Act No. 530,
the Court hereby confirms the decision in this case dated December 20, 1960 and promulgated on January 6, 1961 and orders its
registration in the civil registry of Catanauan, Quezon. After petitioner shall have taken his oath of allegiance in the form and
substance prescribed by law, let the corresponding certificate if naturalization be issued to him, after which let him be under the
duties and enjoy and be entitled to all the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen."

On September 8, 1970, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal "to the Supreme Court the order rendered
by this Court dated August 26, 1970, allowing the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance on the ground that it is unsupported by
law and the evidence."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the petitioner to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen despite
the fact that he has not complied with all the requirements provided for in republic act no. 530 and does not possess all the
qualifications required by law for admission to Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; PETITION INVOLVES PUBLIC INTEREST; STATE NOT
PRECLUDED FROM OBJECTING TO PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION DURING HEARING OF PETITION TO TAKE OATH. — It
is now well settled that a petition for naturalization is of a special nature necessarily involving public interest. Accordingly. "in case
of appeal, the entire record of the case it opened for scrutiny whether an objection has been submitted in the lower court or not. As
a matter of fact, it may not only interpose an appeal from the decision granting the petition , but the State is not even precluded
from objecting to petitioners qualification during the hearing of the latter’s petition to take the oath." (Cheng v. Republic of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 415, 416-417 [1965).
2. DECISION GRANTING APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP NOT FINAL UNTIL AFTER TWO YEARS;
COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY. — RA No. 530 (1950) provides in Section 1 that no decision granting an
application for Philippine citizenship shall "become executory until after two years from its Promulgation and after the court. on
proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative is satisfied, and so finds, that during the
intervening time the applicant has 1) not left a. Philippines, 2) has dedicated continuously to a lawful calling or profession, 3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, 4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies.
3. LUCRATIVE CALLING; DEEMED SATISFIED WHERE THE TOWN PETITIONER LIVES HAS A LOW COST OF
LIVING AND HE HAS NOT BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE. — According to the Republic "In petitioner’s income tax returns for
 39

1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969, it appears the he had a gross income of P14,135.40, P14955.75, P14,611.99, P8,002.91 and
P14,266.55, respectively for those years. It is claimed that these figures which show annual income declining progressively proves
that the appellee does not have a lucrative calling. We do not agree. The appellee lives in a small town in Quezon with his family
where the cost of living is low. So far it has not been shown that he has become a public charge.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is hereby dismissed; the Order of the court a quo dated August
26, 1970, is hereby affirmed, no costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban.
She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of
Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
 40

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of
Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1
year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6,
Art.VI of the Constitution.

HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove
that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of
his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
 41

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance admitted to probate the last will and testament of C.O Bohanan. The lower court finds,
according to the evidence of the proponents that the testator C.O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Nevada. It provides in his last will and testament that out of the total estate (after deducting the
administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of
several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or
a total of P12,000.
` The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner
above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received.
The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow
on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the wife of the testator and his children are entitled to their legitime

RULINGS:
1. As to his wife, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909,
and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife
exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator
and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
2. The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the
amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of
the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State
of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar,
the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was
considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during
the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on
March 5, 1951, he instituted Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen
 42

Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is
clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the
internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could
dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything
and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

HELD:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the
matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to
Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where
personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen
being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.

G.R. No. L-35694         December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant. 
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of  California and domiciled therein since
their marriage in July 1906. There was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the existence of their
marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands,as conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs
died and that inaccordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without
administration.
Allison D. Gibbsfiled anex partepetition on September 22,1930 in an intestate proceedings. The court granted said petition
and entereda decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absoluteowner of said lands,
applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. When this decree was presented to the Register of
Deeds of Manila and demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as binding
said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that
thecorresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed inthe said court a petition for an order requiring the
said register of deeds "toissue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any
inheritance tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the timesof her death is the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands.

RULING:

Yes. The second paragraph of Article 10 of the Civil Code provides: “Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions,
in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated”.

The second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028,
1031), the court said: “It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the
rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.”
 43

This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is
subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.” In accord with
the rule that real property is subject to the lexreisitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of
an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated.

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the
community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with the lexreisitae.It is admitted that the Philippine lands
here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, a title
equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance
and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which
levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the
successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which
was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
Petition dismissed.

G.R. No. L-13114 November 25, 1960

ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ESTHER PERALTA, defendant-appellee,

FACTS:
At the outbreak of the war in 1941, the defendant Esther Peralta abandoned her studies as a student nurse at the
Zamboanga General Hospital. In June of 1942, she resided with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia, in Maco, Tagum, Mabini Davao.
Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and an officer of the United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of Australia,
had been ordered to sent to the Philippines during the enemy occupation to help unite the guerillas in their fight for freedom. In
1944, he was the commanding officer of the 130th Regiment, under the overall command of Colonel Claro Laureta of the 107th
Division, with general headquarters at Magugpo, Tagum, Davao.
Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger sister of the defendant, was accused of having collaborated with the
enemy, and for this she was arrested, and accompanied by Esther, brought to Anibongan and later to the general headquarters at
Magugpo for investigation that Silva first met Esther Florence was exonorated of the charges made against her and was ordered
released, but with the advice that she should not return to Maco for the time being. Heeding such advice, Florence and her sister,
appellee herein, went to live with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero at Tipas, Magugpo, Davao.
Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed love for Esther. Having been made to believe
that he was single, she accepted his marriage proposal; and the two were married on January 14, 1945 by one Father Cote on the
occasion of a house blessing. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed, allegedly because there were no available
printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived together as husband and wife. From the "marriage", a child, named
Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born.
On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising, for which reason, he was transferred to Leyte, and
later to the United States, he divorced Precilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with plaintiff Elenita Ledesma
Silva.
Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther Peralta demanded support for their child, and, his refusal, instituted a
suit for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the present action was filed against Esther, and another suit
against her was instituted in Cotabato.
Except for the statement that a marriage actually took place between Saturnino Silva and Esther Peralta; the evidence on
record fully supports the foregoing findings of fact the lower court. No evidence was offered, other than the testimonies of the
defendant herself and her counsel, Atty. Juan Quijano, to prove any such alleged marriage, although there is convincing proof that
the defendant and Saturnino Silva, for a time, actually lived together as common-law husband and wife. But the witness'
 44

asseverations regarding the marriage, taken by themselves and considered with other circumstances appearing on the record,
reveal too much uncertainty and incoherence as to be convincing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellee misrepresented herself as mrs. Silva
RULING:
Yes. In view of the non-existence of appellee's marriage with Saturnino Silva, and the latter's actual marriage to plaintiff
Ledesma, it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise.
In the face of the evidence, we cannot give value on the presumption of the marriage under section 69 (bb) of the Rules of Court,
especially because, at the time of the alleged marriage on January 14, 1945, Saturnino Silva was still married to one Priscilla
Isabel, an Australian national.

G.R. No. L-1780 August 31, 1948

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw.CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.

FACTS:

Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on
November, 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had lived from the time
they were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the
conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose whereabouts she made inquiries from among
her husband's friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where, according, however, to
information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be
found; that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain; and that, because of her husband's
absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be
alive and later on appear, be preserved. Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is
not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a person
unheard from in seven years is dead, does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated.
The petitioner has appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is allowed.

HELD:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed
property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule
invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such
person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a
judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the
judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is. therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juristantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of
the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been
heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
 45

appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
 46

G.R. No. L-9268 November 28, 1959

VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of petitioner, was sleeping on board M/V “Miss Leyte”, when it caught
fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then he has not been heard of. The employee was unmarried
and his father, respondent Juan Icong was his partial dependent. On April 30, 1954, Juan Icong filed with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission a petition and a notice of claim for death compensation. The Commission rendered an award in favour
of respondent Juan Icong.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for the review of the award.

ISSUE:
Would the provisions of Article 391 of the old Civil Code on presumptive death apply on this case?

HELD:
No.
Though petitioner argues that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro Icong, the person to be presume dead must
be unheard of for at least four years; that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few months from the alleged
accident, there is yet legal presumption that Pedro Icong is alive.
The Supreme Court however, ruled that, in the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, et. al.
G.R. No. L-13130, 10-31-1959, it approves of the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article 391 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case
wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts,
inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection
with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In
the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or
missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when
petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on
presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. In the
same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., supra, we said:
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might probably result in his death and has never been seen
or heard from again, though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be drawn. (Brownlee, et al., vs.
Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident Association, 29 Fed [2nd] 71).
 47

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913

CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.

This case is about an APPEAL from two judgments (by the plaintiff and defendant) of the Court of First Instance of Manila

FACTS:
February 7, 1875: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married (Catholic/canonical) in Malaga, Spain.
On February 1892: Fuster went to the Philippines, settled, and acquired real and personal property.
1896: Constanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899
April 4, 1899: they made an agreement (public document):
They resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband
authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases.” (B. of E., P.13)
Fuster acknowledged that he would send the sum of 300 pesatas monthly, payable in Madrid, Spain to support his wife
starting June 1899. However, on the month of August of the same year, he stopped to make further payments.
March 11, 1909  Constanza started filing divorce proceedings against Fuster, indicating adultery committed by her
husband in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and
cohabited and by whom he had two children.

Plaintiff prays that:

• she be granted a decree of divorce.

• the court order the separation of properties between the plaintiff and defendant.
• the conjugal society be therefore liquidated and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that one
half thereof be adjudicatedto her.
• as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of
36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of
the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction

• decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant
• ordered the latter to pay the former 5,010.17
• That the communal property be divided between the parties with costs against the defendant
• And in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law

Both parties appealed, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded
with.

Defendant’s Appeal
• Lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending
parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.
• The court erred in its finding that he had committed adultery with a certain woman from 1899 until 1909.
• The court also erred in its finding that the adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife.
o In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt
for the wife. There is no law that requires this.
• for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.
• against the finding of the court that there exists conjugal property (appellant maintains that it has no foundation)
 48

• the court erred in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P5,010.17, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in
her complaint with respect to this sum and that the plaintiff has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed
in 1904, that is to say, after 5 years.
• the court erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of property and in appointing commissioners to
make the partition and distribution between spouses
• the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his
Plaintiff’s Appeal
• petitioner prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her
claim of P12,959.90 (instead of P5,010.17) plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month,
dating from the 1st of August 1909 until the date of payment with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
date of payment.
• Findings of the court:
o the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas
o the sum that the plaintiff had collected in Madrid was 6,365.68
o that the remainder was 27,834.32 and was equivalent t 5,566.86 Mexican currency
o Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency
o Therefore, the sum was equivalent to P5,010 Phil currency
o There was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the time
and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas
• it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition of property decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance should be confirmed

HELD:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September 1911, should be and is hereby
confirmed. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
Paraphernal property is that which the wife brigs to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may
acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto. But, it is a provision of article 1384 that “the wife shall have the
management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may
administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may
receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property.”
Article 16 : Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF
JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the
petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
 49

________________________________________
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-
SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA
VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground
that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia
of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but
Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty
of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not
recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In addition, it requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was
a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
 50

after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that she
does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus,
if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As
the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that
she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the
husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City)
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978.  Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972.  Karl then
filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of
latter’s former marriage.  Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends that the first marriage is null and
void.  Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage. 

ISSUE: 

Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely
voidable.  Such marriage is valid until annulled.  Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she
is still validly married to her first husband.  Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.  Likewise, there is no need of introducing
 51

evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. 
Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar&Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

FACTS:

Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
without the knowledge of Castro’s parents (thus, a secret marriage). Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license (license
no.3196182). The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife, but only did so when Castro was pregnant.
However, they only lived together for 4 months and eventually parted ways. Their baby was later adopted by Castro’s brother, with
the consent of Cardenas, and brought to the US. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro consulted a lawyer regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. They discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage. She was issued by the Civil Registry of Pasig a certification of “due search and inability to find” to back this claim. The
trial court denied Castro’s petition for nullity of marriage, ruling that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged
nonissuance of a marriage license. Castro then appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the trial court’s decision and
declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, then filed for petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the certification of “due search and inability to find” marriage license presented as evidence is sufficient to render
the marriage void.

HELD:

Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court3, a
certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that the local civil registry office did not issue marriage license to
the contracting parties. Since no marriage license was issued, marriage is rendered void ab initio (under the Family Code, Art.4).

Also worth noting that Castro failed to offer any other witness regarding the celebration of her marriage. This is because of
its peculiar circumstance being a “secret marriage”. Cardenas did not appear during the annulment trial, so he is considered in
default.

Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

FACTS: 
 52

ZenaidaCortezaBobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family
since he was four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting
the petition for hearing and subsequently granted the petition for adoption.

The petition was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was
Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of
the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was
filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint
adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the
latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of
spouses Bobiles. 

HELD: 
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the
qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
the holder.When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in
force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

The error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start
with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a
retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions.
However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment.

A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it
was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We see no reason why the following doctrines in
American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes,
as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the
child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents.The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial
custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy.
Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

FACTS:
The municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed an administrative case against the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law for solemnizing the weeding of Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife and for performing the marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Somaylo and Gemma
G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction.
 53

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seek exculpation from his act of solemnizing the marriage of Mr.
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife by stating that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the MTC judge of Basey
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years and such affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Peñaranda’s presumptive death. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that he did not violate Art. 7 par. 1 of
the Family Code when he solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario and points out article 8 and it’s exeptions as the
justification for having solemnize the marriage outside of his court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy acted with gross misconduct in this instances.

RULING:
Article 41 of the Family Code Provides that “For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)”
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7
and 8 of the Family Code. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability. The respondent judge, in this case, was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa,
Surigao Del norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the
cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them
is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON.
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
 54

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda ManalaysayPilapil, a Filipina and therespondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support
andseparation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986,
the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Five months after the
decree of divorce, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent, petitioner had
an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against thepetitioner is still valid given the fact that both had
been divorced prior to the filingof charges.

HELD:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Now, the law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law…..Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay
City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972,established residence in the Philippines and begot two children. The parties were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dornalso in Nevada.

In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.

The Court denied the Motion ToDismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not foreign divorce of the parties is binding to the Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Yes. As embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
 55

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.Alice Reyes Van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.

Petition granted.

G.R. No. 152577

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner ,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

FACTS:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request.
Sometime in 1985, Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American,
with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was
named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and
continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of her present nationality shall govern her status.

ISSUE: (CONFLICT OF LAWS)

I.
Whether or not fely was able to obtain a valid divorce from crassus
II.
Whether or not article 26, paragraph 2 of the family code of the philippines is applicable to the case at bar

RULING:
I.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
II.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. According to Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines:
 56

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.”
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen
and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen.

G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

FACTS:

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957. On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted
to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, CeferinoLlorente. Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On January 16, 1958,
Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the
same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On
March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly
signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed
all his property to Alicia and their three children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was valid.

HELD:

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from
Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule,
issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity." Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent
 57

FACTS:

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ of the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an
American citizen.
Cipriano thereafter file with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. No opposition was file. The court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, it filed petition to the Supreme Court raising a pure question
of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:
Yes.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.       A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
G.R. No. L-8639 March 23, 1956

In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik.
LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of
marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his
father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may
be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go
against Art. 335.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother.

HELD:
Yes. The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only
to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire
 58

these rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption
of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural
child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.

G.R. No. L-6294             June 28, 1954

In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE
SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:

On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yñigo and his wife for
the adoption of a minor named MarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their
consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners had
reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring
up and educate the minor.

By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due time, filed a written opposition
on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified
to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.

The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of their own, yet said children
were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court found that said
agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be granted under this new
Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed
upon by the parties. From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.

ISSUE:

1. The lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335, new
Civil Code.
2. The lower court erred in giving Exhibit "A", the agreement to adopt, a binding effect.

RULING:

While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the proposition that
such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court.
The reason is simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772, inclusive),
which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one case, said
chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded
as the expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil
Code.

On the matter."(In re  adoption of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring
to adopt a minor shall  present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he resides (section 1). This means that
the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule,
which shows that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.

`Notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning
adoption, those provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly
repealed, such as the one providing that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74).

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

 59

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region,
Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE,respondents.

FACTS:
On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of America and his
Wife, Evelyn A Clause, Filipino at birth who later became a natural citizen of the United
States petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala. On June 20, 1990 the judge decree said Filipino minor be their child by adoption.
Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption for the
spouses are not qualified to adopt under the Philippine Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse being an alien are disqualified to adopt under the
Philippine law.
HELD:
Yes. The spouse are disqualified to adopt the Filipino child Solomon. Article 184,
paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz:
An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly the later.
Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. On the other hand Evelyn Clouse may seem to be qualified on Article 184, however adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone for the Family Code requires that the husband and wife must jointly adopt as stated on Article 185.
 60

G.R. No. L-6294 June 28, 1954

In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE
SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellant.

Abelardo S. Fernando for appellees.

FACTS:

On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yñigo and his wife for
the adoption of a minor named MarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their
consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners had
reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring
up and educate the minor.

By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due time, filed a written opposition
on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified
to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.

The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of their own, yet said children
were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court found that said
agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be granted under this new
Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed
upon by the parties. From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.

ISSUE:

The lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335, new Civil
Code.

II

The lower court erred in giving Exhibit "A", the agreement to adopt, a binding effect.

RULING:

While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the proposition that
such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court.
The reason is simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772, inclusive),
which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one case, said
chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded
as the expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil
Code.

On the matter."(In re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring
to adopt a minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he resides (section 1). This means that
the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule,
which shows that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
 61

Notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning
adoption, those provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly
repealed, such as the one providing that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74).

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L.
VELOSO, respondents.

FACTS:

Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon and respondent Irma Lazatin. One month after Mariano’s death, his widow, Margarita de
Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding.

Two months after, Margarita de Asis also died leaving a holographic providing, among others, for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late
sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.

During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could
open. Five days after Margarita’s death, Respondent Nora, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents.

Private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of
respondent Court, Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son,
Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted
for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de
Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the
estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of
Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr.
Mariano M. Lazatin, that petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later
modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis. When
petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and
gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
Respondent court, ruling on petitioner’s motion for definite resolution on his previous motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption, issued the following order:

"As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is concerned and his Petition to establish his status as an adopted child, the
Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The Court denies any motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof."

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Renato has established his status as an adopted child and is allowed t intervene in the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate.

RULING:
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence.
Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the
evidence by which such adoption may be established.
 62

The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol
evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Withal,
the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted
illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his petitioner for
intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or
destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss
or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really existed and
was lost. This is indispensable. If adoption was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at
the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced.
As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to
intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has
an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord
with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired
by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. The burden of proof in
establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to
adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.
we hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned
orders of March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this
proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof." The
Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as
established the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such
in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his inheritance."
 63

G.R. No. L-21951           November 27, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES JOSEPH BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND
THERKELSEN and ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR, petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
The petitioners in the adoption proceeding are husband and wife married on June 2, 1962. The minor sought to be
adopted was born on February 16, 1960 and the natural child of petitioner wifewho has been living with them ever since the
marriage of petitioners.Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines and
has treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls him "Daddy." Although the possibility exists that petitioners may yet have their
own children, the adoption at this time, before any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future domestic
relations.

The court a quo denied the adoption because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and
the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not adoption process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the
adopting parent.

RULING:
No. It would operate to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law.As pointed out
by the Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens
that are either(a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with
their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under
our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.

The citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay
outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign
state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws
does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public
policy would be thereby subverted.

Petition granted.

G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:

Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain by
Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the
Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for adoption
and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption document "con
arreglo al articulo 177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption document became necessary for the reason that under Article 177 of the
Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la adopcion por el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las condiciones
con que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el Registro Civil correspondiente."

In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies the court order of adoption
— whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed before Notary Public Braulio Velasco
 64

Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y
universal heredera de todos sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.

In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez,
Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.1

The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar,
however, refused to register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial
proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.

Petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on mandamus. As adverted to earlier, the mandamus petition did
not prosper. The lower court in its decision of February 28, 1964, dismissed said petition.

ISSUE: (CONFLICT OF LAWS)

Whether or not the order of adoption issued by the court of first instance of madrid can be registered in the philippines

RULING:

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption,
created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter
state to the status of adoption when created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under
the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its
enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori.

At any rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons interested are
fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."

It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption created
under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be
understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.

G.R. No. L-5405 January 31, 1956

ERNESTO M GUVERA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO, Respondents.

FACTS:

On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan, executed a will, distributing assorted
movables and a residential lot among his children. To his second wife, the testator bequeathed among others a portion of 25
hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel, plus another five (5) hectares in settlement of here widow’s usufruct. The
remainder of the 259 odd hectares were distributed to the desires of the testator as follows:

100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator’s lifetime and for payment of his debts and family expenses;

108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342 hectares by way of mejora; and

21.6171 hectares to ‘mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.

Ernesto Guevara, son of the testator, was appointed executor without bond.

On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara the southern half of the 259-
hectare lot above mentioned, and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara the owner of the northern-half.
 65

Prior to this sale, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied for registration of the big parcel, but in view of the sale
of Victorino to Ernesto, the decree was issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract. A certificate of
title was issued to this effect on October 12, 1933.

However, Victorino Guevara died on September 27, 1933 and his will was not filed for probate. About four years later,
Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of Victorino, and on the assumption that he died intestate, brought a
suit against Ernestor Guevara to recover her legitime.

The case reached the Court of Appeals and was decided in favor of Rosario but upon certiorari, the Supreme Court
modified the judgment.

Claiming to act pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court, Rosario commence on October 5, 1945, special
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.

Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for Rosario in the former litigation, was
allowed to intervene in view of his duly recorded attorney’s lien.

On January 31, 1946, Ernesto, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

On December 9, 1946, Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion but upon reconsideration, Judge Mañalac of the same
court, on June 23, 1947, reconsidered and set aside the previous resolution and ordered the petition dismissed.

An amended petition for the probate of the will in toto and another petition to reconsider the previous order were
subsequently denied. Rosario and Atty. Quinto thereupon brought the case on appeal. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of
Rosario and Quinto.

Ernesto filed a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Is the petition for probate of a will barred by the Statute of Limitations?

HELD:

No.

The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those
of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedent’s will to the competent court has always
been deemed by our law as more of a duty than a right, and the neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty
and it is inconsistent with that policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. The
authority given to testators to dispose freely of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded, unless adequate
measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased would be carried out. Because the decedent may
no longer act to have his testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority must take over the opposite vigilance and
supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does not remain a delusion and a dream.

Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire
to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in
accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may
they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and
public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted
to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be
cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves
to the exclusion of others.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will,
none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by
 66

the court: first, because the law expressly provides that ‘no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with
and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the
testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the
will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and
legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in
personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for
revindicacion or partition.

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York,
each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which
one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not
an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He
further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the
reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New
York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order,
disallowing the wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are
as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
 67

country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of
Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and
last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she
noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215
SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of
an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place
for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within
which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

G.R. No. L-42780             January 17, 1936

MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

The plaintiff is a corporation operates a gas plant in the City of Manila and furnishes gas service to the people of the
metropolis and surrounding municipalities by virtue of a franchise granted to it by the Philippine Government. Associated with the
plaintiff are the Islands Gas and Electric Company domiciled in New York, United States, and the General Finance Company
domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. Neither of these last mentioned corporations is resident in the Philippines.

For the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, dividends in the sum of P1,348,847.50 were paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas
and Electric Company in the capacity of stockholders upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totalling
P40,460.03 For the same years interest on bonds in the sum of P411,600 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric
Company upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totalling P12,348. Finally for the stated time period,
interest on other indebtedness in the sum of P131,644,90 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company and
the General Finance Company respectively upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totalling P3,949.34.

An action was brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery of
P56,757.37, which the plaintiff was required by the defendant to deduct and withhold from the various sums paid it to foreign
corporations as dividends and interest on bonds and other indebtedness and which the plaintiff paid under protest. On the trial
court dismissing the complaint, with costs, the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUES:
 68

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the dividends paid by the plaintiff corporation were subject to income
tax in the hands of its stockholders.

2. Whether or not The trial court erred in not holding that the interest on bonds and other indebtedness of the plaintiff
corporation, paid by it outside of the Philippine Islands to corporations not residing therein, were not, on the part of the
recipients thereof, income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject to Philippine income tax.

HELD:

ISSUE NUMBER 1:

Appellant first contends that the dividends paid by it to its stockholders, the Islands Gas and Electric Company , were not
subject to tax because to impose a tax thereon would be to do so on the plaintiff corporation, in violation of the terms of its
franchise and would, moreover, be oppressive and inequitable. This argument is predicated on the constitutional provision that no
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted. The particular portion of the franchise which is invoked provides:

The grantee shall annually on the fifth day of January of each year pay to the City of Manila and the
municipalities in the Province of Rizal in which gas is sold, two and one half per centum of the gross receipts
within said city and municipalities, respectively, during the preceding year. Said payment shall be in lieu of all
taxes, Insular, provincial and municipal, except taxes on the real estate, buildings, plant, machinery, and other
personal property belonging to the grantee.

The trial judge was of the opinion that a corporation has a personality distinct from that of its stockholders, enabling the
taxing power to reach the latter when they receive dividends from the corporation. It must be considered as settled in this
jurisdiction that dividends of a domestic corporation, which are paid and delivered in cash to foreign corporations as stockholders,
are subject to the payment in the income tax, the exemption clause in the charter of the corporation notwithstanding.

For that reason, the decision of the trial court is sustain and to overrule appellant's first assigned error.

ISSUE NUMBER 2:

The appellant contends that, as the Islands Gas and Electric Company and the General Finance Company are domiciled
in the United States and Switzerland respectively, and as the interest on the bonds and other indebtedness earned by said
corporations has been paid in their respective domiciles, this is not income from Philippine sources within the meaning of the
Philippine Income Tax Law.

Taking first under observation that last point, it is to be observed that neither in the pleadings, the decision of the trial
court, nor the assignment of errors, was the question of the validity of Act No. 3761 raised. Under such circumstances, and no
jurisdictional issue being involved, we do not feel that it is the duty of the court to pass on the constitutional question, and
accordingly will refrain from doing so. (Cadwaller-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario [1913], 26 Phil., 192; Macondray and
Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, P. 137, ante; State vs. Burke [1912], 175 Ala., 561.)

In the case at bar there is some uncertainty concerning the place of payment, which under one view could be considered
the Philippines and under another view the United States and Switzerland, but which cannot be definitely determined without the
necessary documentary evidence before, us.

The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within its jurisdiction without violating the due process clause
of the constitution. The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but within such it may tax persons,
property, income, or business. If an interest in property is taxed, the situs of either the property or interest must be found within the
state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which the
income issues must be situated within the state so that the income may be said to have a situs therein. Personal property may be
separated from its owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where the property is although it is not the place of his
own domicile and even though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax. But debts owing by corporations
are obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands of the creditors. These views concerning situs for taxation
purposes apply as well to an organized, unincorporated territory or to a Commonwealth having the status of the Philippines.

Pushing to one side that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits taxation of interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid
without the Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources within the Philippine Islands.
 69

In the judgment of the majority of the court, the question should be answered in the affirmative. The Manila Gas
Corporation operates its business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from local sources. The place of
material delivery of the interest to the foreign corporations paid out of the revenue of the domestic corporation is of no particular
moment. The place of payment even if conceded to be outside of tho country cannot alter the fact that the income was derived
from the Philippines. The word "source" conveys only one idea, that of origin, and the origin of the income was the Philippines.

Judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987

FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, INC., plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.
BENJAMIN TAN, defendant-appellee. Lichauco, Picazo&Agcaoili Law Office for plaintiff-appellant. Ramon A. Nieves for defendant-
appellee.

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are the songs entitled: "DahilSaIyo",
"SapagkatIkaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You" filed a complaint with the lower court for
infringement of copyright against defendant-appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-appellee's restaurant of said songs
copyrighted in the name of the former. Defendant-appellee, countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not
denying the playing of said copyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee maintains that the mere singing and playing of
songs and popular tunes even if they are copyrighted do not constitute an infringement under the provisions of Section 3 of the
Copyright Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the playing and signing of musical compositions which have been copyrighted under the provisions of the
Copyright Law (Act 3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee constitute a public performance for profit within the
meaning and contemplation of the Copyright Law of the Philippines; and assuming that there were indeed public performances for
profit, whether or not appellee can be held liable therefor.

HELD:

NO. It has been held that "The playing of music in dine and dance establishment which was paid for by the public in
purchases of food and drink constituted "performance for profit “within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been explained that while it is
possible in such establishments for the patrons to purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of the
orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose of inducing the public to patronize the establishment
and pay for the entertainment in the purchase of food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business for profit, and it is
public; and the music is performed for profit. Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have infringed upon the Copyright Law.
Appellee’s allegation that the composers of the contested musical compositions waived their right in favor of the general public
when they allowed their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain before applying for the corresponding
copyrights for the same is correct. The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3(as
amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice in the Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration of
Copyright Claims' promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other things that an intellectual creation should be
copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if made in Manila, or within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which
renders such creation public property." Indeed, if the general public has made use of the object sought to be copyrighted for thirty
(30) days prior to the copyright application, the law deems the object to have been donated to the public domain and the same can
no longer becopyrighted.Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical compositions in question had long become public
property, and are therefore beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
 70

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, 
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO
MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990

DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, 
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA,
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN,respondents.

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

FACTS:

The subject property in this case which is the Roppongi is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
Government under the reparation agreement entered into with Japan. The properties and Capital goods and services procured
from the Japanese Government for the national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their
loses in life and property and their suffering during world war II.

The Roppongi property consists of the land and building “for chancery of the Philippine embassy”. As intended it became
a site of Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to
the failure of the government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi has remained undeveloped since that time.

President Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch of
the government pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been postponed and later restrained by the
SC.

Petitioner Laurel asserts that Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership
under article 420 of the civil code. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even
by the State. The subject property cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it
cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts.

The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our
Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining
the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. The respondents add that even
assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of
public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for
over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the Executive Department and the
Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine Government.

2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the real property is situated there) and
Philippine law.

RULINGS:
 71

1. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property
belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens
only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such.
We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service
and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred
from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable
will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166
SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
2. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation
arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and
(2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership
or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
 72

G.R. No. 2721. March 22, 1906

RAFAEL MOLINA Y SALVADOR, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO DE LA RIVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Gibbs & Gale, for Appellant.

Pillsbury &Sutro, for Appellee.

FACTS:

This is an action to recover a debt due upon a contract executed July 27, 1903, whereby plaintiff transferred to the
defendant the abaca and copra business carried on by him at various places in the Island of Catanduanes, with all the property and
right pertaining to the said business, or the sum of 134,636 pesos and 12 cents, payable in Mexican currency or its equivalent in
local currency. Defendant paid at the time of the execution of the contract, on account of the purchase price, the sum of P33,659
pesos and 3 cents, promising to pay the balance on three installments P33,659 pesos and 3 cents each, with interest at the rate of
5 per cent per annum from the date of the contract. The first installment became due July 27, 1904. It was for the recovery of this
first installment that their action was brought in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.

Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. The
court overruled the demurrer and defendant refused to and did not, as a matter of fact, answer plaintiff’s complaint. Judgment
having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 33,659 pesos and 3 cents, Mexican currency, equal to 30,052 pesos
and 70 centavos, Philippine currency, an interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from July 27, 1903 and costs, the
defendant duly excepted.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of an act

2. Whether or not the court erred in fixing Philippine currency the sum which the appellee should recover without hearing
evidence
3. Whether or not the court erred in rendering judgment in a sum larger than that sought to be recovered.

HELD:

1. A personal action to recover a debt may be brought, under section 377 of the Code of Civil procedure, either in the Court
of First Instance of the province where the plaintiff resides or in that where the defendant may reside, at the election of the
plaintiff. The residence in such case should be that which the parties had at the time of the commencement of the action
and not prior thereto.
The law does not authorize parties litigant to submit themselves, by express stipulation, to the jurisdiction of a
particular court, to the exclusion of the court duly vested with such jurisdiction. An express agreement tending to deprive a
court of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void and of no legal effect.
2. When the value of Mexican currency in Philippine currency as stated in the complaint has been admitted by the defendant
through his failure to deny, dispute, or controvert the same, it shall not be necessary for the court to hear evidence upon
this point. The proof required by section 3 of Act No. 1045 is only necessary when the parties disagree as to the actual
value of either currency.
3. The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his
complaint. (Sec. 126, Code of Civil Procedure).

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

 73

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister;
ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.

FACTS:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the
other with private respondent Mamasig. The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as
follows:

5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY

This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.
xxxxxxxxx

6. TERMINATION
xxxxxxxxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at
any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu
thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxxxxxxxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:

This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of
Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.

Farrales&Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and
flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the
contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters,
informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.

Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and
bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual
absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at
the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that
practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the
employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents was granted. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of
regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the
employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from
the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.

Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD:
Philippine Law and Philippine Courts.

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan
as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. The
 74

contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine
citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business)
and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to
the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for
the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine
agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable
provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. L-2935, March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant,

FACTS:

In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, The Defendant Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the
Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to
be paid in advance the expenses incurred in travelling from city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of
travel.

The contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the Defendant, he should become
liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in travelling from Chicago to Manila
and the one-half salary paid during such period.

The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date until the date of his
arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Defendant left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the
contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the Defendant the sum of
money, which the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to the latter as expenses incurred in travelling from Chicago to Manila, and as
half-salary for the period consumed in travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging that:(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract; and that (2) he was a minor at the time
the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law. The lower court rendered a judgment against
Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of $265.90.

ISSUE: (CONFLICT OF LAWS)

Whether or not the defendant can allege minority or infancy

RULING:
 75

No. It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the contract in
question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such
as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought.

978 F.2d 493

116 A.L.R.Fed. 765, 61 USLW 2257

Agapita TRAJANO; Archimedes Trajano, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Defendant, And Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS:
After former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, fled to Hawaii in 1986, they
were sued in federal court by Agapita Trajano, a citizen of the Philippines who then lived in Hawaii, for the torture and wrongful
death of Trajano’s son, Archimedes, in the Philippines on August 31, 1977. Marcos-Manotoc did not appear and a default
judgment was entered against her. In 1991, she moved to set aside entry of default on the ground of insufficiency of service. The
motion was denied and, after a damages hearing, judgment was entered based on the court’s findings that Archimedes was
tortured and his death was caused by Marcos-Manotoc. The court concluded that this violation of fundamental human rights
constitutes a tort in violation of the law of nations under 28 U.S. C. § 1350, and awarded damages of $4.16 million and attorneys’
fees pursuant to Philippine Law.

Manotoc filed this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the US district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

HELD:

Yes. The district court does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction of the case under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

Section 1350 provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien or a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.

The Alien Tort Statute was enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 but has seldom been invoked. The debates
that led to the Act’s passage contain no reference to the Alien Tort Statute, and there is no direct evidence of what the First
Congress intended it to accomplish. The statute has, however, bee comprehensively analyzed by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, which recognized a cause of action and subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1350 in an action between
Paraguayan citizens for acts of torture committed in Paraguay, and by the District of Columbia Circuit in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, which affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of an action by Israeli citizens against the
Palestine Liberation Organization for acts of terrorism in violation of international law.
 76

The Alien Tort Statute requires a claim by an alien, and a violation of international law. Trajano’s complaint alleges that
she and her son were citizens of the Philippines, and that her claims for relief arise under wrongful death statutes and various
international declarations.

There is no doubt, as the district court found, that causing Trajano's death was wrongful, and is a tort. Nor, in view of
Marcos-Manotoc's default, is there any dispute that Trajano's death was caused by torture. And, as we have recently held, "it would
be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary international law." Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699

We believe, therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful death, committed by military intelligence officials
through torture prohibited by the law of nations, is within the jurisdictional grant of § 1350.

Marcos-Manotoc argues, however, that the district court erred in assuming jurisdiction of a tort committed by a foreign
state's agents against its nationals outside of the United States, and having no nexus to this country. If § 1350 were construed to
confer jurisdiction under these circumstances, she asserts, it would exceed the constitutional limits on federal court jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution. We disagree. We are rather constrained by whats § 1350 shows on its face: no limitations as to
the citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury.

Marcos-Manotoc's argues that general principles of international law may not provide a basis for federal court jurisdiction
under § 1350. Regardless of the extent to which other principles may appropriately be relied upon, the prohibition against official
torture "carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm," which," 'enjoy[s] the highest status within international law.' " Siderman, 965
F.2d at 715, 717 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C.Cir.1988)). As our
survey of the scholarly and judicial opinion in Siderman reflects, there is widespread agreement on this; "all states believe [torture]
is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own citizens. Under international law,
any state that engages in official torture violates jus cogens." Siderman at 717 (citations omitted). We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in founding jurisdiction on a violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer filed by said appellee
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.

HELD:
 77

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of
jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our
territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and
the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the
last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were still a US territory when this was
decided in 1922).

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about
in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public
order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes
the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

FACT:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via
the call ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search of the cargo.

• Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon

• larger sack in the hold

• Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep

• The firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore so it was returned.

Two (2) charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:

unlawful possession of opium

unlawful sale of opium

Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack.
 78

The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf
of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvencyxxx It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction to try the case; and

Whether or not the facts concerned constitute a crime.

HELD:

Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.

G.R. No. L-7991.  May 21, 1956.

PAUL MACDONALD, ET AL., Petitioners,

vs.
THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK,Respondent.

Facts:

  Stasikinocey is a partnership formed by da Costa, Gorcey, Kusik and Gavino. It was denied registration by the SEC due to
a confusion between the partnership and Cardinal Rattan. Cardinal Rattan is the business name or style used by Stasikinocey. Da
Costa and Gorcey are the general partners of Cardinal Rattan. Moreover, Da Costa is the managing partner of Cardinal Rattan.
Stasikinocey had an overdaft account with Nationa City Bank, which was later converted into an ordinary loan due the partnership’s
failure in paying its obligation. The ordinary loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over 3 vehicles. During the subsistence of the
loan, the vehicles were sold to MacDonald and later on, MacDonald sold 2 of the 3 vehicles to Gonzales. The bank brought an
action for recovery of its credit and foreclosure of the chattel mortgage upon learning of these transactions.

 ISSUE:

 Whether or not the partnership, Stasikinocey is estopped from asserting that it does not have juridical personality since it
is an unregistered commercial partnership

HELD:

Yes. While an unregistered commercial partnership has no juridical personality, nevertheless, where two or more persons
attempt to create a partnership failing to comply with all the legal formalities, the law considers them as partners and the
association is a partnership in so far as it is a favorable to third persons, by reason of the equitable principle of estoppel. Where a
partnership not duly organized has been recognized as such in its dealings with certain persons, it shall be considered as
“partnership by estoppel” and the persons dealing with it are estopped from denying its partnership existence.

Da Costa and Gorcey cannot deny that they are partners of the partnership Stasikinocey, because in all their transactions
with the National City Bank they represented themselves as such. McDonald cannot disclaim knowledge of the partnership
Stasikinocey because he dealt with said entity in purchasing two of the vehicles in question through Gorcey and Da Costa. The
sale of the vehicles to MacDonald being void, the sale to Gonzales is also void since a buyer cannot have a better right than the
seller. As was held in Behn Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin, where a partnership not duly organized has been recognized as such in its
dealings with certain persons, it shall be considered as “partnership by estoppel” and the persons dealing with it are estopped from
denying its partnership existence. If the law recognizes a defectively organized partnership as de facto as far as third persons are
concerned, for purposes of its de facto existence it should have such attribute of a partnership as domicile.

G.R. No. 79986 September 14, 1990

 79

GRANGER ASSOCIATES, petitioner, 
vs.
MICROWAVE SYSTEMS, INC., LORETO F. STEWARD, MENARDO R. JIMENEZ and JOHN PALMER,respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan &Pantaleon for petitioner.
Fernando Ma. Alberto for respondents.

Core topic: Judicial Persons (The Court is once again asked to interpret the phrase "doing business in the Philippines" as applied
to an unlicensed foreign corporation that has filed a complaint against a domestic corporation.)

FACTS:

The foreign corporation Granger Associates, the herein petitioner, which was organized in the United States and has no
license to do business in this country sued the domestic corporation, Microwave Systems, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents for recovery of a sum equivalent to US$900,633.30 allegedly due from it to the petitioner.

The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two parties, principally the contract dated March 28,
1977, under which Granger licensed MSI to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended to the latter certain
loans, equipment and parts; the contract dated May 17, 1979, for the sale by Granger of its Model 7100/7200 Multiplex Equipment
to MSI and the Supplemental and Amendatory Agreement concluded in December 1979.

Payment of these contracts not having been made as agreed upon, Granger filed a complaint against MSI and the other
private respondents on June 29, 1984, in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1982-P. In
its answer, MSI alleged the affirmative defense that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue, being an unlicensed foreign corporation,
and moved to dismiss.

The law invoked by the defendants was Section 133 of the Corporation Code reading as follows:

No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; ...

The trial court, after considering the evidence of the parties in light of their respective memoranda, sustained the
defendants and granted the motion to dismiss. 1 On appeal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the respondent court prompting
the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the ground that MSI has failed to prove its
affirmative allegation that Granger was transacting business in the Philippines. It insists that it has dealt only with MSI and not the
general public and contends that dealing with the public itself is an indispensable ingredient of transacting business. It also argues
that its agreements with MSI covered only one isolated transaction for which it did not have to secure a license to be able to file its
complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is doing business in the Philippines.

RULING:

According to Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 5455 —

...the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices whether called "liaison"
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
Philippines for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or
control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplates to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of
these functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the
business organization.
 80

With the examination of the terms and conditions of the contracts and agreements entered into between petitioner and
private respondents, it indicates that they established within our country a continuous business, and not merely one of a temporary
character. Such agreements did not constitute only one isolated transaction, as the petitioner contends, but a succession of acts
signifying the intent of Granger to extend its operations in the Philippines.

In any event, it is now settled that even one single transaction may be construed as transacting business in the
Philippines under certain circumstances, as we observed in Far East International Import and Export Corporation v. Nankai Kogyo
Co., Ltd., 10 thus:

The rule stated in the preceding section that the doing of a single act does not constitute business within the meaning of
statutes prescribing the conditions to be complied with by foreign corporations must be qualified to this extent, that a single act may
bring the corporation within the purview of the statute where it is an act of the ordinary business of the corporation. In such a case,
the single act or transaction is not merely incidental or casual, but is of such character as distinctly to indicate a purpose on the part
of the foreign corporation to do other business in the state, and to make the state a base of operations for the conduct of a part of
the corporations' ordinary business. (17 Fletchers Cyc. of Corporations, sec. 8470, pp. 572, 573, and authorities cited therein.)

The petitioner stresses that whoever makes affirmative averments has the obligation to prove such averments and points
out that the private respondent has not established its allegation that the petitioner is doing business in the Philippines. On the
other hand, it is also the rule that the factual findings of the lower court are binding on this Court in the absence of any of those
exceptional circumstances we have enumerated in many cases that warrant a different conclusion. Having assailed the finding of
the respondent court that the petitioner is doing business in the Philippines, the petitioner had the burden of showing that such
finding fell under the exception rather than the rule and so should be reviewed and reversed. The petitioner has not done this.

The purpose of the rule requiring foreign corporations to secure a license to do business in the Philippines is to enable us
to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in this country, If a foreign corporation operates in the
Philippines without submitting to our laws, it is only just that it not be allowed to invoke them in our courts when it should need them
later for its own protection. While foreign investors are always welcome in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit,
they must be prepared as an indispensable condition to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases, as in the one at
bar.

WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED, Granger is considered doing business in the Philippines.

G.R. No. L-3869             January 31, 1952

S. DAVIS WINSHIP, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Eastern Isles Import corporation and Eastern Isles, Inc., are corporations organized under and existing by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines, all of the capital stock of which are owned by American citizen, except, in Eastern Isles Import, one share of
the capital stock was owned by Antonia Sevilla and another share was owned by Edmund Schwisinger and in Eastern Isles Inc.,
one share was owned by F. Capistrano, who had a current account deposit with the Philippine Trust Company amounting
P51,410.00 and P34,827.74 respectively.

The Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines issued an order requiring all deposit account of the hostile people
to be transferred to the bank of Taiwan, as the depositary of the Japanese Military Administration. The Philippine Trust Company
complied with the said order and transferred and paid the credit balances of the current account deposits of the Eastern Isles
Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. to the Bank of Taiwan.

The pre-war current deposit accounts of the Eastern Isles Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. were
subsequently transferred to S. Davis Winship, who presented to the Philippine Trust Company checks Nos. A-79212 and H-579401
covering the aforesaid deposits. The Philippine Trust Company, however, refused to pay said checks. S. Davis Winship instituted
the present action against the Philippine Trust Company in the Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover upon the first cause of
action the sum of P51,410.91 and under the second cause of action the sum of P34,827.74.
 81

In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust Company invoked the order of the Japanese Military Administration by virtue
of which it transferred the current deposit accounts in question to the Bank of Taiwan. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered a decision upholding the contention of the defendant and accordingly dismissing the complaint.

RULING:

In view of this pronouncement, we have to affirm the appealed judgment. As it has been stipulated by the parties that the
defendant transferred the deposits in question to the Bank of Taiwan in compliance with the order of the Japanese Military
Administration, the defendant was released from any obligation to the depositors or their transferee. Appellant's contention that
there is no positive showing that the transfer was made by the Philippine Trust Company in compliance with the order of the
Japanese Military Administration, and its logical effect is to make such act binding on said company. At any rate, the defendant
corporation has not impugned its validity.

The nationality of a private corporation is determined by the character or citizenship of its controlling stockholders; and this
pronouncement is of course decisive as to the hostile character of the Eastern Isles, Inc., as far as the Japanese Military
Administration was concerned, it being conceded that the controlling stockholders of said corporations were American citizens.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-41337 June 30, 1988

TAN BOON BEE & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HILARION U. JARENCIO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
GRAPHIC PUBLISHING, INC., and PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CAN DRUG COMPANY, respondents.
De Santos, Balgos& Perez Law Office for petitioner.
Araneta Mendoza & Papa Law Office for respondent Phil. American Drug Company

Facts:
In 1972, Anchor Supply Co. (ASC), through Tan Boon Bee, entered into a contract of sale with Graphic Publishing Inc.
(GPI) whereby ASC shall deliver paper products to GPI. GPI paid a down payment but defaulted in paying the rest despite demand
from ASC. ASC sued GPI and ASC won. To satisfy the indebtedness, the trial court, presided by Judge HilarionJarencio, ordered
that one of the printing machines of GPI be auctioned. But before the auction can be had, Philippine American Drug Company
(PADCO) notified the sheriff that PADCO is the actual owner of said printing machine. Notwithstanding, the sheriff still went on with
the auction sale where Tan Boon Bee was the highest bidder.
Later, PADCO filed with the same court a motion to nullify the sale on execution. The trial court ruled in favor of PADCO and it
nullified said auction sale. Tan Boon Bee assailed the order of the trial court. Tan Boon Bee averred that PADCO holds 50% of
GPI; that the board of directors of PADCO and GPI is the same; that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced based on the
premises. PADCO on the other hand asserts ownership over the said printing machine; that it is merely leasing it to GPI.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely exceeded, if not acted without jurisdictionwhen he acted upon the motion of
PADCO.
2. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he refused to pierce the PADCO’scorporate identity

HELD:
Petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely exceeded, if not, acted without jurisdiction, in nullifying the sheriffs sale
not only because Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was not complied with, but more importantly because PADCO could not
have litigated its claim in the same case, but in an independent civil proceeding. This contention is well-taken. Section 17 of Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rights of third-party claimants over certain properties levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the
judgment should not be decided inthe action where the third-party claims have been presented, but in the separate action instituted
by the claimants. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce the authority only over properties of
the judgment debtor, and should a third party appeal- to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by
the Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate and independent action.
However, the fact that petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court during the initial hearing of the case but nevertheless
actively participated in the trial, bars it from questioning now the court's jurisdiction. A party who voluntarily participated in the trial,
like the herein petitioner, cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction.
 82

As to the second issue (the non-piercing of PADCO's corporate Identity),it is true that a corporation, upon coming into
being, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as well as from any other
legal entity to which it may be related. As a matter of fact, the doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from
the members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and respected in all cases which are within reason and the law.
However, this separate and distinct personality is merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote justice.
Accordingly, this separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in cases where
it is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to achieve equity or when necessary
for the protection of creditors. Corporations are composed of natural persons and the legal fiction of a separate corporate
personality is not a shield for the commission of injustice and inequity. Likewise, this is true when the corporation is merely an
adjunct, business conduit or alter ego of another corporation. In such case, the fiction of separate and distinct corporation entities
should be disregarded.

G.R. No. L-40163 June 19, 1982

LEVITON VS. SALVADOR

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

LEVITON INDUSTRIES, NENA DE LA CRUZ LIM, DOMINGO GO, and LIM KIAT vs. HON. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Judge, Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XIV and LEVITON MANUFACTURING CO., INC.

FACTS:

Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a complaint for unfair competition against petitioners Leviton
Industries before the CFI of Rizal (RTC), presided by respondent Judge Serafin Salvador. The complaint substantially alleges that
plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, United
States of America with office located at 236 Greenpoint Avenue, Brooklyn City, State of New York, U.S.A. That defendant Leviton
Industries is a partnership organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at 382 10th Avenue, Grace
Park, Caloocan City; while defendants Nena de la Cruz Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant Domingo
Go acting as General Manager of defendant Leviton Industries. That plaintiff, founded in 1906 by Isidor Leviton, is the largest
manufacturer of electrical wiring devices in the United States under the trademark Leviton, which various electrical wiring devices
bearing the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since 1954;
that due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public, the same are well known to Filipino consumers
under the trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. and trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use of plaintiff’s
trademark and trade name in the Philippines, defendants (Leviton Industries) began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast,
fuse and oval buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.

That Domingo Go, partner and general manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the Philippine Patent Office
the trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse under Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-1132 and
15517, respectively, which registration was contrary to paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of
plaintiff’s right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but likewise copied the design used
by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and that the use thereof by defendants of its products would cause confusion in the
minds of the consumers and likely to deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling defendants to pass off their
products as those of plaintiff’s. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed for damages. It also
sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit defendants from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the
trademark Leviton.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, drawing attention to the plaintiff’s failure
to allege therein its capacity to sue under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended. After the filing of the plaintiff’s
opposition and the defendant’s reply, the respondent judge denied the motion on the ground that the same did not appear to be
indubitable.

The motion for reconsideration having likewise been denied, defendants instituted the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, charging respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss.
 83

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents, failed to allege the essential facts bearing its
capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

RULING:

Yes.

We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon
its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Private respondent’s action is squarely founded on Section 21-A of Republic Act No.
166, as amended, which we quote:

Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or tradename has been registered or assigned under
this Act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description,
whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act numbered Fourteen Hundred and Fifty-Nine, as
amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings the complaint; Provided, That the country of which the
said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar
privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As amended by R.A. No. 638)

Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants to a foreign corporation, whether or not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, the right to seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the said law is not without qualifications. Its
literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trade mark of the suing foreign corporation with the
Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that it be an asignee of such registered trademark. The said section further requires that
the country, of which the plaintiff foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations or
juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty, convention or law,

All that is alleged in private respondent’s complaint is that it is a foreign corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to
comply with the requirements imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of Section 4, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court that “facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred ”

In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law
which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution thereof. It is therefore incumbent
upon private respondent to comply with these requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be that
private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require that the necessary qualifying
circumstances which clothe it with such right be affirmatively pleaded. And the reason therefor, as enunciated in “Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Co., et al. versus Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc.” 4 is that — these are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of appellants
alone, and it would be unfair to impose upon appellees the burden of asserting and proving the contrary. It is enough that foreign
corporations are allowed by law to seek redress in our courts under certain conditions: the interpretation of the law should not go
so far as to include, in effect, an inference that those conditions had been met from the mere fact that the party sued is a foreign
corporation.

It was indeed in the light of this and other considerations that this Court has seen fit to amend the former rule by requiring
in the revised rules (Section 4, Rule 8) that “facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must
be averred,

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby granted and, accordingly, the order of the respondent judge
dated September 27, 1974 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. The Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Caloocan City), the court of origin, is hereby restrained from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. C-2891, except to
dismiss the same. No costs.
 84

CONTENTS

A. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

Hasegawa vs. Kitamura............................................................................................................. 1
MHC and MHICL vs. NLRC....................................................................................................... 3
Communication Materials and Design, Inc. et al vs. CA et al.................................................... 4
HSBC vs. Jack Robert Sherman, et al....................................................................................... 7
Philsec Investment, et al vs. CA................................................................................................ 9
K.K. Shell Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil co., Ltd vs. CA................................................ 12
In re: Philippine National Bank vs US District Court for the District
of Hawaii.................................................................................................................................... 14
Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis et al. vs. Edward Bellis.......................................................... 16
Sps. Zalamea vs. CA and Transworld Airlines Inc..................................................................... 18
Garcia vs. Recio ........................................................................................................................ 20
Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs CA ............................................................................................ 22
Tayag Renato vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc............................................................................ 25
United Airlines Inc. vs. CA......................................................................................................... 27
Cadalin vs. POEA...................................................................................................................... 28
B. Theories on the Application of Foreign Laws
Hilton vs. Guyot.......................................................................................................................... 35
Johnston vs. Companie Generale Transatiantique.................................................................... 36
Loucks vs. Standard Oil Co. of New York.................................................................................. 37
C. Nature, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgment
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura............................................................................................................. 38
Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. CA............................................................................................ 40
Godard vs. Gray......................................................................................................................... 43
Hilton vs. Guyot.......................................................................................................................... 35
PAWI vs. PASGI Enterprises..................................................................................................... 45
Philsec Invest, et al. vs. CA....................................................................................................... 47
Querubin vs. Querubin............................................................................................................... 50
Philippine International Shipping vs. CA.................................................................................... 51
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. CA........................................................................................ 53
Mijares vs. Hon. Ranada, et al................................................................................................... 56
D. Personal Law
Comm. Of Immigration vs. Garcia.............................................................................................. 59
In re: Petition for correction of Entry of certificate of birth of the minor Chua
Tan Chuan................................................................................................................................. 61
Republic vs. Belmonte............................................................................................................... 62
Moya Ya Lim Yao vs. Comm. Of Immigration............................................................................ 63
Djumantan vs. Domingo............................................................................................................. 65
Tan Ching vs. Republic.............................................................................................................. 67
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC........................................................................................... 70
Aquino vs. COMELEC............................................................................................................... 72
Testate Estate of Bohanan........................................................................................................ 73

E. The Problem of Renvoi

In re: Testate Estate of Edward Christensen vs. Garcia............................................................ 75
Testate Estate of Bellis vs. Bellis............................................................................................... 16
F. Conflict Rules on Status and Capacity
Gibbs vs Government................................................................................................................ 76
Silva vs. Peralta......................................................................................................................... 78
In re: Presumption of the death of Necolai szatrow................................................................... 80
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Victory Shipping vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission................................................... 83

Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster................................................................................................... 84
G. Conflict Rules on Marriage
Eugenio vs. Velez...................................................................................................................... 86
Moya Ya Lim Yao vs. Comm of Immigration.............................................................................. 88
Djumantan vs. Domingo............................................................................................................. 69
Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy............................................................................................................... 90
Republic vs. CA and Castro....................................................................................................... 91
Navarro vs. Domagtoy............................................................................................................... 94
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera.............................................................................................................. 96
Van Dorn vs. Romillo................................................................................................................. 97
Republic vs. Iyoy........................................................................................................................ 98
Llorente vs. CA.......................................................................................................................... 100
Republic vs. Orbecido................................................................................................................ 102
H. Status of Children
Prasnik vs. Republic.................................................................................................................. 104
Yñigo vs. Republic..................................................................................................................... 105
Republic vs. Judge Toledano..................................................................................................... 107
Santos-Yñigo vs. Republic......................................................................................................... 108
Lazatin vs. Judge Campos......................................................................................................... 110
Republic vs. CA......................................................................................................................... 92
Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen vs. Republic................................................................................. 112
Marcaida vs. Aglubat................................................................................................................. 113
I. Wills, Succession and Administration of Estate
Phil. Trust Co. vs. Bohanan....................................................................................................... 73
Testate Estate of Bellis vs. Bellis............................................................................................... 16
Guevara vs. Guevara................................................................................................................. 115
Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete........................................................................................................... 118
Idonah Perkins vs. Roxas, et al................................................................................................. 25
J. Properties
Manila Gas Corp. vs. Collector.................................................................................................. 120
Filipino Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers vs. Tan............................................... 123
Laurel vs. Garcia........................................................................................................................ 125
K. Contracts
Molina vs. Dela Riva.................................................................................................................. 127
Pakistan International Airlines vs. Ople..................................................................................... 129
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Frank........................................................................ 131
Cadalin, et al. vs. POEA............................................................................................................ 28
L. Torts
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura............................................................................................................. 1
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA.................................................................................................... 31
Trajano vs. Marcos-Manotoc..................................................................................................... 133
M. Crimes
People vs. Wong Cheng............................................................................................................ 135
U.S. vs. Look Chaw................................................................................................................... 137
N. Juridical Persons
McDonald vs. FNCBNY............................................................................................................. 139
Granger Associates vs. Microwave System, Inc........................................................................ 140
Davis Winship vs. Phil. Trust..................................................................................................... 143
Tan Boon Bee and Co. vs. Jarencio.......................................................................................... 145
Leviton Industries vs. Salvador.................................................................................................. 147
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