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VOL. LXII
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Volume 10:
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Foucault and the Practice of Patristics
Patristic Studies in Latin America
Historica
PEETERS
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Table of Contents
HISTORICA
ABSTRACT
When discussing the Neoplatonic system of incorporeal reality scholars traditionally des-
ignate its three main levels – the One, the Intellect and the Soul – as three primary
hypostases. Yet Neoplatonists themselves would hardly agree with it. They avoid to call
the First Principle of being a ‘hypostasis’. Plotinus for example explicitly says that the One
transcends all hypostases, while being a supreme cause of all, and his pupil Porphyry
doesn’t include the highest God in a number of ‘universal and perfect hypostases’. Platon-
ists for the most part thought a ‘hypostasis’ to be a result of ‘hypostatization’, that is of
manifestation and reflection of some higher reality in a lower level of being. It always
means something which is caused by something else. So the term can hardly be attributed
to the first One, but only to the results of its external activity, that is to Intellect, Soul and
Cosmos. Yet already in antiquity there appeared a tradition to interpret three Neoplatonic
immaterial realities in terms of three hypostases. The origins of this tradition can be traced
back to the 4th century AD, when Christian theologians began to use the term ‘hypostasis’
in order to emphasise a separate existence of three Persons of the Godhead in contrast to
numerous efforts to present the Son and the Holy Ghost as inseparable parts of the Father.
Eusebius of Caesarea, as well as some other adherents of the three-hypostases theory saw
close parallels between their own concept of the Holy Trinity and metaphysical systems
of contemporary Platonism. As a result they began to interpret them in their own terms,
bringing the One, the Intellect and the Soul in correlation with three divine Persons and
applying the term ‘hypostasis’ not only to the offspring of the One, but to the First Princi-
ple as well. One can suggest that pagan philosophers of the 5th century could be influenced
by this Christian tradition of interpretation, because there are some places in Proclus’ writ-
ings where he ascribes ‘hypostasis’ to the primal One and uses the formula tre⁄v ârxikaì
üpostáseiv as referring to the One, the Intellect and the Soul.
The term ‘hypostasis’ enters in the Platonic tradition rather late. Middle Platon-
ists used this term very rare, and only to the middle of the 3rd century AD in
the systems of Plotinus and Porphyry it gradually acquires philosophical mean-
ing. At the turn of the old and new era ‘hypostasis’ was strongly associated
with sensible things, that were of a little interest for Platonists, because unlike
Stoics and Peripatetics they didn’t believe sensible things to be substances
(oûsíai) in the truest sense of the word. For example, the anonymous author
of the Commentary on Plato’s ‘Theaetetus’ (1st century AD) denied the pos-
sibility of identifying individual material things with the first category of Aris-
totle. According to him, any sensible thing was a set of qualities, emerging in
the sense-organs in the process of perception; it couldn’t be something definite
(ti) and had no hypostasis, but existed only in relation to the subject of percep-
tion.1 As follows, all that seemed to have a substantial being in the sensible
world fell in fact under the category of relation, so it was natural to assume that
substances belonged to the realm of the intelligible. And indeed in the writings
of Middle Platonists of the 1st century BC – 2nd AD ‘hypostases’, that is, sub-
stances, began to be associated with incorporeal and intelligible being. Alcinous
in his Handbook of Platonism says that ‘the soul is an incorporeal essence,
unchangeable in its hypostasis and intelligible, and invisible and uniform’,2 and
that intellect is even superior to the soul and prior to both of them exists
(üféstjken – got a hypostasis) the primal God.3 Atticus also speaks about
hypostasis of the soul. Objecting Peripatetics, who considered soul to be only
a function of the body, he writes that ‘they destroy therefore all its hypostasis’.4
Philo believes that God alone has a hypostasis, because he is firmly established
in being, while everything after Him ‘is nothing in it’s being and only seems
to exist’.5 None of mortal things has a real subsistence or hypostasis; its state
is always precarious and fragile, as if ‘it is fluttering over the emptiness’.6
Such transition of the term ‘hypostasis’ to the realm of immaterial, together
with the denial of substantiality of sensible things was rooted in a specific con-
cept of being, common to all Platonists. ‘To be something’ meant for them ‘to
participate in an idea’, ‘to have a form’. Consequently, everything that appeared
to be somehow definite or having form was seen as hypostasis and substance,
regardless of whether it was quantity, quality, relation, state or their substratum.
Later Platonists like Plotinus, Porphyry and Simplicius could attribute hypostasis
to different mental states (such as wisdom, happiness, love),7 activities (sensation,
1
Anonymi Commentarius in Platonis Teaetetum, ed. by H. Diels and W. Schubart (Berlin,
1905), 68, 1-12. See also H. Dörrie, ‘Hypostasis. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte’, in Platonica
Minora (München, 1976), 12-69.
2
Alcinous, Didaskalikos, ed. by P. Louis (Paris, 1945), 25, 1,6. Translation by J. Dillon in:
Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford, 2002), 32.
3
Alcinous, Didaskalikos 10, 2,3.
4
Atticus, Fragmenta, ed. by J. Baurdy (Paris, 1931), 9, 10, 3.
5
Philo, Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat, ed. by L. Cohn (Berlin, 1896), 160, 7: ö qeòv
mónov ên t¬ç e˝nai üféstjken … Üv t¬n met’ aûtòn oûk ∫ntwn katà tò e˝nai, dózjÇ dè
mónon üfestánai nomihoménwn.
6
Philo, Quod deus sit immutabilis, ed. by P. Wendland (Berlin, 1897), 172, 1-173, 1.
7
Plotinus, Enneades, ed. by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Leiden, 1951-1973), I 4, 9,19: ™
t±v sofíav üpóstasiv; III 5, 2-4.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 43
reasoning),8 magnitudes and ratios (double, triple),9 space and time.10 Even mat-
ter, usually understood as non-existent (m® ∫n) because of its formlessness,
wasn’t regarded as entirely deprived of hypostasis and regularly described by
platonic philosophers as ‘by-hypostasis’ (parupóstasiv) and ‘tendency towards
hypostasis’ (üpostásewv ∂fesiv).11 Total deprivation of hypostasis meant
either something logically impossible (parálogon), some mistake of reason and
art (as a square circle or a flat ball), or something unnatural, such as goat-stag or
hippocentaur.12 Proclus, for example, in his Commentary on ‘Parmenides’ reports
that Origen the Platonist believed the One of the 1st Hypothesis to be something
completely ânupóstaton and not-existent, because it was deprived of all pos-
sible characteristics both positive and negative. In other words, according to
Origen, the assumption discussed in the 1st hypothesis was wrong and was to be
rejected as impossible.
Thus from the viewpoint of Platonists, everything that exists because of its
participation in an idea has a hypostasis. But the ideal being can reveal itself
in things more or less clearly, so it makes sense to speak about different degrees
of being: soul for example exists more truly than the body, intellect – more
truly than the soul and the highest God is superior to both of them. As follows
there appears a hierarchy of entities or hypostases, understood as different
degrees of manifestation and self-revelation of an idea. Platonists therefore
preserved the primary meaning of the term ‘hypostasis’, initially developed by
Stoics and Peripatetics. They also thought it to be a ‘realization of previously
latent being turning into appearance’.13 But the understanding of what is hap-
pening in this process became quite different. Whereas for Stoics and Peripatet-
ics the process of hypostatization was a passage from potential to actual being,
giving rise to a substance (oûsía), which previously didn’t exist, for Platonists
it was a reflection of an actually existent substance on a lower level of reality.
According to their point of view, hypostasis was always a reflection, an image
of some higher reality, coming into appearance in a less actual mode of being.
It was always ‘something which has been caused by something else’, as
8
Plotinus, Enneades III 4, 1.
9
Plotinus, Enneades VI 1, 7, 28.
10
Simplicii In Aristotelis Physicorum commentaria, ed. by H. Diels (Berlin, 1882-1895), IX,
766: ‘Aristotle doesn’t eliminate the proper hypostasis of time’ (oûdè ânaireì t®n oîkeían toÕ
xrónou üpóstasin ˆAristóteljv).
11
Plotinus, Enneades III 6, 7, 13.
12
Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. by V. Cousin (Paris, 1864), 885, 13-5: … kaì ˜n oûk
eîsín, ofion t¬n parà fúsin, t¬n parà téxnjn, t¬n parà lógon, t¬n ânousíwn, aût¬n t¬n
ânupostátwn, trageláfwn légw kaì ïppokentaúrwn. ‘… from non-existent ones, as for
instance mistakes of nature, or art or reason, things without existence, things even without sub-
stances, such as goat-stags or hippocentaurs’. Trans. by G. Morrow and J. Dillon, in G.R. Morrow
and J.M. Dillon, Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton, 1987), 246.
13
R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh, 1988), 182.
44 S. MESYATS
S. Gersh says.14 And what about the idea? Does it in its turn have a hypostasis?
The answer on this question depends on whether idea is reckoned among beings
or taken in its very nature as the idea of ideas, that is as a latent and completely
ineffable being, which transcends all things and can be therefore identified with
Good or the supreme One. In the first case an idea can be treated as a hyposta-
sis, in the second – as a latent cause of all hypostases, transcending all its
effects. Indeed in the history of Platonism we encounter two types of meta-
physical systems. Those belonging to Middle Platonism put on the top of the
hierarchy of hypostases the realm of a true being, considered whether as a
divine Intellect with its thoughts or as an intelligible paradigm, containing plu-
rality of ideas. Others, belonging for the most part to Neoplatonism, believe the
highest God to exceed being. As follows in the systems of the first type the
First Principle is necessarily endowed with a hypostasis (see the aforemen-
tioned quotations from the writings of Alcinous and Philo), whereas in the
second ones it is usually considered as transcending hypostasis.
14
S. Gersh, KINJSIS AKINJTOS. A study of the spiritual motion in the philosophy of
Proclus (Leiden, 1973), 31.
15
Plotinus, Enneades V 1, 3, 12: de⁄ dè labe⁄n êke⁄ oûk êkréousan, âllà ménousan mèn
t®n ên aût¬ç, t®n dè ãlljn üfistaménjn. Armstrong’s translation see in: Plotinus, Ennead V
with an English transl. by A.H. Armstrong (London, 1984), 21.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 45
the other that goes out from it.16 The first energy can be named internal; it is
a certain kind of activity, by which thing realizes itself, thus gaining its essence.
For example, Intellect realizes itself in contemplation of ideas, fire becomes
fire because of burning, the sun – because of shining. Energy of the second
kind is the external activity of thing, when it acts in accordance with its essence
outside itself. Acting so it generates in the surrounding area something like
itself, as if reproducing itself in something other: fire heats up, the sun illumi-
nates all around it, Intellect utters a word that expresses its thought. The same
situation can be observed among the metaphysical principles. The One, expand-
ing its uniting activity outside itself produces Intellect as an image of its own.
As Plotinus says: ‘The activity generated from its [the One’s] perfection and
coexistent activity acquires hypostasis (üpóstasin laboÕsa) … and arrives
at being and substance’.17 The Intellect, unfolding its intelligible content in the
verbal expression, generates Soul: ‘Just as a word in its utterance is an image
of the word in soul, so the Soul itself is the expressed thought of Intellect and
its whole activity and the life which it sends out to establish another hyposta-
sis’.18 Finally, the Soul reproducing itself in matter, creates a unitary, harmoni-
ously moving cosmos. ‘The hypostases of some realities come into existence
while the realities themselves remain unmoved, but soul has been already said
to be in motion when it generates sense-perception, which has a hypostasis
(Plotinus here means the sensible part of the Soul. – S.M.), and the power of
grows which extends also to plants’.19 Therefore when some perfect immaterial
being extends its activity outside itself, its external activity begins to exist
independently of it and become a new substance (oûsía) and hypostasis. Such
a hypostatization can be explained by the equation of energy and substance in
Plotinus’ philosophy. In the sphere of incorporeal realities every activity con-
stitutes a substance and every substance realizes itself in some kind of activity.
The external energy of the One constitutes the internal energy of Intellect, as
if Intellect’s thought was equal to the One coming out of itself and becoming
different from itself. Exactly the same takes place in the case of other hypostases.
All of them are different kinds of the First Principle’s external activity, which
comes into existence as a number of self-sufficient distinct substances.
Does the One also have a hypostasis? In traditional expositions of Plotinus’
system this question is usually answered affirmatively. Already in antiquity there
16
Plotinus, Enneades V 4, 2, 27-9: Enérgeia ™ mén êsti t±v oûsíav, ™ dè êk t±v oûsíav
ëkástou. ‘In each and every thing there is an activity that belongs to substance and goes out from
substance’. Translation of A.H. Armstrong in: Plotinus (London, 1984), 147.
17
Plotinus, Enneades V 4, 2, 32-8. Slightly changed translation of A.H. Armstrong: Plotinus
(London, 1984), 147.
18
Plotinus, Enneades V 1, 3, 7-10. Slightly changed translation of A.H. Armstrong: Plotinus
(London, 1984), 19f.
19
Plotinus, Enneades III 4, 1, 1-3. Slightly changed translation of A.H. Armstrong: Plotinus,
Ennead III (London, 1967), 143.
46 S. MESYATS
Like his teacher Plotinus, Porphyry for the most part uses the term ‘hypostasis’ in
order to mean some self-existent thing, in so far as it is a manifestation of some
higher principle. In his treatise Pathways to the Intelligible he describes the pro-
cession of incorporeal lives by saying, that principles that are prior to incorporeal
lives ‘confer hypostasis’ on what is inferior to them.24 Because all things proceed
from the One, Porphyry divides hypostases into two kinds: ‘universal and perfect’
20
Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, ed. by K. Mras (Berlin, 1954, 1956), XI, 17; 20. Augusti-
nus, ciu., ed. E. Dombart, A. Kalb, CChr.SL XLVII/XLVIII (Turnhout, 1955), X, 23.
21
Plotinus, Enneades VI 6, 12, 1-3: ˆAll’ eî kaì tò πn kaì t®n monáda m® üpóstasin
légoi ∂xein…
22
Plotinus, Enneades VI 8, 7, 47.
23
Plotinus, Enneades VI 8, 10, 37.
24
Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. by E. Lamberz (Leipzig, 1975), 24,3:
… eîv t®n t¬n üp’aûtà üpóstasin.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 47
on one hand and ‘particular and imperfect’ on the other. Among the first he rates
such realities as universal Intellect, Soul and visible Cosmos. Among the second
– individual ideas, intellects, souls and bodies. Like earlier Platonists, Porphyry in
his writings identifies hypostasis and substance (oûsía). For example in his Intro-
duction to Aristotle’s ‘Categories’ he says that ‘rational and mortal are com-
pounded for the hypostasis of man’.25 The phrase means that these two character-
istics constitute essence and nature of man, so ‘hypostasis’ here is used as a
synonym of essence. In Pathways to the Intelligible while speaking about the
sphere of the Intelligible Porphyry calls it both essence and hypostasis: ‘When
you have fastened on an inexhaustible substance, infinite in itself in power, and
set out to conceive of a hypostasis, which is unwearied, unabated … etc.’26 How-
ever by distinguishing two classes of hypostases Porphyry paves the way to the
subsequent distinction between hypostasis and essence (oûsía), which can be
traced in works of later Platonists as well as Christian theologians. In so far as
many individual hypostases are parts of universal and perfect reality, they share
one and the same nature or essence (in Aristotle’s terms, they belong to one and
the same species). For example, individual souls are souls because of being parts
of the universal one. Thus universal and perfect hypostases, which are themselves
independent and self-existent beings, act as common predicates of individual
hypostases and in so far can be interpreted as species or oûsíai in the sense of
Aristotle’s ‘second substances’. Consequently partial and imperfect substances can
be considered as Aristotle’s first substances or hypostases in the strict sense of the
word, whereas universal and perfect realities will play a role of their common
natures and essences (Aristotle’s second substances). Perhaps by this latent distinc-
tion between oûsía and hypostasis one can explain an interesting fragment from
Porphyry’s lost Philosophical History, preserved by Cyril of Alexandria: ‘Up to
the three hypostases proceeds the essence of the Godhead’ (ãxri tri¬n üpos-
tásewn … t®n toÕ qeíou proelqe⁄n oûsían),27 in which many historians of
theology saw anticipation of the further Trinitarian terminology of church-fathers.28
But do these words really belong to Porphyry? Or are we dealing here with
a rather inadequate interpretation of his views? Heavy doubts about the authen-
ticity of this sentence arouse by the fact, that under three hypostases of the
Godhead Porphyry means One, Intellect and Soul. The text reads as follows:
While giving an account of the teaching of Plato, Porphyry says that the essence of the
Godhead proceeds up (proelqe⁄n) to three hypostases, so that the Good is the highest
25
Porphyrii Isagoge sive quinque voces, ed. by A. Busse, CAG (Berlin, 1887), 19,1.
26
Porphyry, Sententiae 40, 1-3. Translated by J. Dillon, in Porphyre, Sentences, ed. L. Brisson
(Paris, 2005), II, 825.
27
Porphyry, Historia philosophiae, ed. A. Nauck (Leipzig, 1886), fr. 16.
28
See for example: A. Spassky, A history of doctrinal movements in time of oecumenical
councils (Sergiev Posad, 1906), 489.
48 S. MESYATS
God, the Demiurge comes after him as the second God, and the World Soul – as the
third one. For the Godhead proceeds up to the Soul.29
But as we have shown before, Porphyry like his teacher Plotinus thought
hypostasis to be a product and a reflection of some higher principle coming
into appearance in a lower level of reality. That he didn’t consider the One to
be a hypostasis is quite clear from Sentence 30 of his Pathways to the Intelli-
gible. This sentence says that none of the ‘universal and perfect hypostases’
turns its attention towards its offspring, but on the contrary directs itself towards
its generator:
Of those realities (üpostásewn) which are universal and perfect none has its attention
turned towards its own offspring, but all direct themselves upwards towards their gen-
erators, even down to the body of the Cosmos; for it, in its perfection directs itself
towards its Soul, which is intellectual and for this reason performs a circular motion,
while its Soul directs itself towards the Intellect, and the Intellect towards the First.30
From this text it is quite clear, that the First Principle doesn’t direct itself to
anything else. So Porphyry couldn’t count it among the ‘universal and perfect
hypostases’.31
Some difficulties however begin with the title of Plotinus’ treatise: On Three
Primary Hypostases (Perì t¬n tri¬n ârxik¬n üpostásewn). It is generally
known, that this title was given by Porphyry. What did Porphyry mean by these
‘three hypostases’? Did he want to indicate three incorporeal realities of Ploti-
nus’ world, One, Intellect and Soul, or have in mind three main effects of the
First Principle – Intellect, Soul and Cosmos? Some scholars pointed out, that
the predicate ârxikóv, used by Porphyry in order to define these ‘hypostases’,
seems to mean something belonging to the ârxaí, causal principles, so that
under ‘three hypostases’ one must understand the One, the Intellect and the
Soul, because the sensible Cosmos cannot be a cause of anything. This opinion
was expressed in particular by Heinrich Dörrie in his excellent article about the
history of the word ‘hypostasis’.32 But as Yu. Shichalin has shown, the title of
Plotinus’ treatise can be understood quite differently. The word ârxikóv can
be translated not as ‘belonging to causal principles’, but simply as ‘primary’,
‘basic’, ‘main’, that is as referring to the main products of the One, and not to
the One itself.33
29
Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Julianum, ed. by P. Burguière and P. Évieux, SC (Paris, 1985),
I, 47, 5-9.
30
Translated by J. Dillon, in Porphyre, Sentences, ed. by L. Brisson (2005), II, 807.
31
Analogous conclusion draws Yu. Shichalin in his commentary to Plotinus’ treatise V 1. See
Plotinus, Treatises 1–11, transl. and commentary Yu. Shichalin (Moscow, 2007), 415.
32
Dörrie translates ârxikóv as ‘ârxß-artigen’. See H. Dörrie, ‘Hypostasis. Wort- und Bedeu-
tungsgeschichte’ (1976), 51.
33
Y. Chitchaline, ‘A propos du titre du traité de Plotin Perì t¬n tri¬n ârxik¬n üpo-
stásewn (Enn. V 1)’, REG 105 (1992), 253-61.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 49
If our conclusion about Porphyry’s use of the term ‘hypostasis’ is right, than
the sentence cited by Cyril of Alexandria appears not to be a direct quotation
from Porphyry’s book, but rather its interpretation, apparently provoked by the
aforementioned analogy between three hypostases of the divine Trinity and
three immaterial divine realities of Neoplatonism. A careful reading of Cyril’s
text allows us to make some interesting observations, which appear to confirm
this conclusion. First of all, Cyril explicitly uses the distinction between
hypostasis and oûsía, which is quite usual for a Christian of the later 4th – early
5th century but scarcely be detected in such apparent form in the writings of
Porphyry. Second, Porphyry didn’t consider Intellect to be the Demiurge of the
Cosmos. According to Proclus, he ascribed demiurgic functions to unpartici-
pated Soul whereas Intellect played by him a role of intelligible paradigm of
the sensible Cosmos.34 And last but not least: it is hard to imagine that Por-
phyry could think the highest Good to be a result of procession of some higher
oûsía, because the First Principle cannot proceed from anything else. All these
observations confirm our initial conjecture that the sentence attributed by Cyril
of Alexandria to Porphyry was not a direct quotation from the philosopher, but
rather a misinterpretation of his thought.
What caused such an interpretation? Why were theologians of the 4th and
th
5 centuries so inclined to interpret the Neoplatonic system of three incorporeal
realities in terms of three hypostases? In my opinion, it was caused by the fact
that Christian thinkers attached to the term ‘hypostasis’ a completely different
meaning than Neoplatonists. Introduction of the term ‘hypostasis’ into Christian
theology in the 3rd – 4th century was conditioned by the concern to express a
separate existence of three Persons of the Godhead in contrast to numerous
efforts to present the Son and the Holy Ghost as inseparable parts of the Father.
We know about such efforts in particular from the writings of Origen. In his
Commentary on John he speaks about some Christian scholars who regarded
the title ‘Word’ as the most important title of the Son and accordingly ‘didn’t
allow Him any independent hypostasis’, thinking that the Son was an insepa-
rable act of the Father (‘the utterance of the Father deposited in syllables’).35
Others called Him the wisdom of God and hence apprehended His hypostasis
in ‘mere visions of the God-Father like the phantasms of human thoughts’.36
The third kind of theologians believed the Son does not differ from the Father
not only in number, but also in point of substance and subject. The Father and
34
Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. by E. Diehl (Leipzig, 1903), I, 306,32-
307,4: t®n mèn cux®n t®n üperkósmion âpokale⁄ djmiourgón. 322,1-3: ö dé ge filósofov
Porfúriov t®n mèn cuxßn … djmiourgòn üpéqeto t®n âméqekton, tò dè parádeigma tòn
noÕn.
35
Origenes, Commentarii in euangelium Joannis, ed. C. Blanc, SC 120 (Paris, 1966), I, 24,
151-2: proforàn patrik®n oïoneì ên sullaba⁄v keiménjn e˝nai tòn uïòn toÕ qeoÕ, kaì
katà toÕto üpóstasin aût¬ç … oû didóasin.
36
Origenes, In Joannis I, 34, 243,4-244,8.
50 S. MESYATS
the Son were said to be different ‘in some mental representations (katá tinav
êpinoíav) but not in their hypostases’.37 Origen disproves all these opinions
and insists that the Son and the Holy Ghost exist independently from the Father.
Elsewhere in his Commentary he writes that ‘we are persuaded that there are
three hypostases, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit’.38 Another theologian
of the 3rd century, Dionysius of Rome, speaks about the reasons of the introduc-
tion of the word ‘hypostasis’ in Christian theology in the most unambiguous
manner. In his dispute with Dionysius of Alexandria he expresses an opinion
that the doctrine of three hypostases was developed in response to Sabellianism.
Whereas Sabellius insisted on an identity of Farther and Son, the adherents of
the three-hypostases theory ‘preached three Gods, as dividing the sacred Monad
into three hypostases foreign to each other and utterly separate’.39 The Bishop
of Rome condemns the use of the word ‘hypostasis’ in respect of God-Father,
Son and Holy Ghost, because it seems to him to admit a separate existence of
three gods and cut up to pieces the divine Monarchy. Nonetheless the theory
of three hypostases continued to be popular on the Christian East throughout
the 4th century. Among its adherents were Eusebius of Nicomedia, Eusebius of
Caesarea, George of Laodicea as well as many other theologians traditionally
labeled as Semi-Arians or Homoiousians. A whole number of examples of the
usage of the term in this milieu is cited by J. Zachhuber in his article ‘Basil and
the Three Hypostasis Tradition’, initially presented at the XIII Patristic Confer-
ence. Thus he points to the Second Creed of Antioch (341), where it is said that
the names of Father, Son and Holy Ghost
are not given without meaning or effect, but denote accurately the peculiar hypostasis,
rank and glory of each that is named, so that they are three in hypostasis (t±Ç mèn
üpostásei tría), and one in agreement.40
Among the ancestors of this Creed was Asterius the Sophist, who also sharply
distinguished Father and Son as two distinct hypostases being one in agree-
ment.41 George of Laodicea, a homoiousian author of the 4th century, uses the
term in a similar way. In one of his epistles he explains why the so called
‘Easterners’ prefer to name Persons of the divine Trinity ‘hypostases’. He says
that they do so ‘in order to indicate the truly existent individuality of the
37
Origenes, In Joannis X, 37, 246, 7-14.
38
Origenes, In Joannis II, 10, 75, 1f.: ™me⁄v méntoi ge tre⁄v üpostáseiv peiqómenoi
tugxánein, tòn patéra kaì tòn uïòn kaì tò †gion pneÕma.
39
Athanasius, De decretis Nicaenae synodi, ed. by H.G. Opitz (Berlin, 1940), 26, 2, 3-7.
40
The Second Creed of Antioch was cited in: Athanasius, De synodis, ed. by H.G. Opitz
(Berlin, 1940), 23,6. See also J. Zachhuber, ‘Basil and the Three Hypostasis Tradition. Reconsid-
ering the origins of Cappadocian theology’, ZAC 5 (2001), 65-85, 67.
41
Asterius von Kappadokien, Die Theologischen Fragmente, ed. by M. Vinzent (Leiden,
1993), fr. 9, 60, 11. See also R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edin-
burgh, 1988), 289.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 51
In all these texts the word ‘hypostasis’ indicates a real existence or subsistence
of a particular thing as opposed to its merely apparent being whether in word
or in mind. It seems that theologians borrowed this meaning not from some
philosophical source, but rather from a common use of the term, according to
which being kaq’ üpóstasin (real and actual one) was opposed to being kaq’
∂mfasin (in appearance) or kaq’ êpínoian (in mind). This usage, initially
developed by Stoics, became usual in the imperial age and can be detected by
many authors of the 1st – 2nd centuries, such as Artemidorus, doxographer
Aetius, author of the Pseudo-Aristotle’s treatise De mundo, philosopher Posi-
donius and others. Posidonius for example says that some atmospheric phenom-
ena exist only in appearance (kaq’ ∂mfasin), such as a rainbow, which is
nothing else but a reflection of the Son in a moist air, whereas others – such as
lightning and comets – subsist kaq’üpóstasin.44 Emerging from this general
use of ‘hypostasis’ the Christian use of the word does not reveal any trace of
a Platonic concept of hypostasis, nothing that resembles ‘a realization of a
previously latent being’ or a reflection of some higher principle. Nevertheless,
the application of the term to three Persons of the Godhead has given rise to a
concept of the Holy Trinity, which strongly resembled the structure of Neopla-
tonic incorporeal reality. This concept, considered by most scholars as a fore-
runner of the Cappadocian Trinitarian thought, was thoroughly examined by
J. Zachhuber in the aforementioned article. The scholar points out that the use
of a three-hypostases formula by those theologians of the 3rd and 4th centuries
who ‘find it essential in their Trinitarian thought to emphasize the separate
existence or subsistence of the three Persons of the Godhead’ regularly coin-
cided with a subordinationism of a particular kind.45 Traces of such a subordi-
nationism can be found, for example, in the writings of Eusebius of Caesarea,
in so far as he derives the divinity of the Son from that of the Father as His
evaporation and ‘eikon’ or applies the title ‘God’ to the Son without definite
42
J. Zachhuber, ‘Basil and the Three Hypostasis Tradition’ (2001), 67: dià toÕto gàr üpo-
stáseiv oï ânatolikoì légousin, ÿna tàv îdiótjtav t¬n prosÉpwn üfestÉsav kaì üpar-
xoúsav gnwríswsin.
43
Ibid. = PG 26, 801B.
44
Posidonius, Fragmenta, ed. by W. Theiler (Berlin, 1982), fr. 331.
45
J. Zachhuber, ‘Basil and the Three Hypostasis Tradition’ (2001), 66-8.
52 S. MESYATS
article or compare Persons of the Holy Trinity with the First, Second and Third
God of Plato’s 2nd Epistle.46
How can one explain this limited but decisive subordinationism? In so far
as the adherents of the three-hypostases theory declared the separate existence
of the three Persons of Trinity, emphasizing at the same time the real divinity
of Son and Holy Ghost, they found themselves open to accusations of polythe-
ism. Was not the belief, asks Zachhuber, that besides God the Father there are
two other equally divine hypostases of the Godhead tantamount to confessing
three gods and thus a violation of monotheism? One fragment from Eusebius
shows, how far these people were aware of a problem. In one of his treatises
Eusebius asks his opponent the following question: ‘Are you afraid, man, that
by accepting two hypostases you introduce two principles and so fall away
from the single authority of the Godhead?’47 There were some ways to avoid
this danger. On the one hand it was possible to deny true divinity of the Son
and the Holy Spirit; on the other – to declare that there is only one God, who
sometimes appears to be a plurality. Both ways however seemed to the three-
hypostases theologians to be heretical. That’s why they sought to escape the
accusation of polytheism by adopting some kind of theory that explained the
Son’s divinity as a lower one than that of the Father, as its evaporation, image
or something like this. Analogous theories however could be found in the met-
aphysical systems of some contemporary Platonists like Numenius, Plotinus
and Porphyry. Three-hypostases theologians found them very attractive because
of the close parallels to their own concept of the Holy Trinity and began to
interpret them in their own terms, applying the term ‘hypostasis’ not only to
the offspring of the First Principle, but to all divine realities, including the
highest God as well.48 As a result they misinterpreted the Neoplatonic system
of hypostases as we have seen from the above citations of Eusebius of Caesarea
and Cyril of Alexandria.
46
About the subordinationism of Eusebius of Caesarea see J.M. Robertson, Christ as Media-
tor (Oxford, 2007).
47
Eusebius of Caesarea, De ecclesiastica theologia, ed. by E. Klostermann and G.C. Hansen
(Berlin, 1972), II, 7, 1-4: âllà fob±Ç, √ ãnqrwpe, m® dúo üpostáseiv ömologßsav dúo ârxàv
eîsagágoiv kaì t±v monarxik±v qeótjtov êkpésoiv.
48
See for example Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio euangelica XI, 16, 3-4; 17, 1-11; 20,
3-5 etc.
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 53
49
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. by E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1963), 27, slightly changed
translation of E.R. Dodds.
50
Ibid. 64.
51
Ibid. 72,8: ™ mèn Àlj, êk toÕ ënòv üpost¢sa.
54 S. MESYATS
About the hypostasis of the first One Proclus speaks also in a number of other
places, but the most explicit example is that from his Theology of Plato, where
the philosopher says that in the Sophist Plato ‘argues dialectically about Being
and the first One, hypostasis of which is separated from all beings (t±v toÕ
ënòv âpò t¬n ∫ntwn xwrist±v üpostásewv)’56
How can one explain such an inconsistency in attaching hypostasis to the
One? This question is still open. But in the light of what has been recently said
by Yu. Shichalin about the influence of Christian terminology on Athenian
Platonists and in particular on Proclus,57 one can suppose that the term
52
S. Gersh, KINJSIS AKINJTOS (1973), 32.
53
See for example his Elements of Theology 153, where he speaks about ‘hypostases of the
super-essential principles’ – üpostáseiv t¬n üperousíwn.
54
Proclus, Theologia Platonica, ed. by D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink (Paris, 1974), II, 31,
8-19.
55
Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, ed. by V. Cousin (Paris, 1864), 1065,
31-1066, 7, translated by J. Dillon, in G.R. Morrow and J.M. Dillon, Proclus’ Commentary on
Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton, 1987), 420.
56
Proclus, Theologia Platonica I, 18, 13-21.
57
Yu. Shichalin, ‘The Traditional View of Late Platonism as a Self-contained System’, SP 62
(2013), 3-9 (this volume).
Does the First have a Hypostasis? 55
58
Proclus, In Parm., 1085,22-1059,8; 1118,21-32, 1135,21-40, 1212,32-1213,9. Discussion
of these fragments see in the paper of Yu. Shichalin, ‘The Traditional View of Late Platonism as
a Self-contained System’ (2013), 3-9.
56 S. MESYATS
late Antiquity both by the Platonic philosophers and their Christian contempo-
raries, brings them together more intimately than any common terminology,
borrowed from each other.
STUDIA PATRISTICA
PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
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APOCRYPHA
Julian Petkov, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Techniques of Disguise in Apocryphal Apocalyptic Literature:
Bridging the Gap between ‘Authorship’ and ‘Authority’.....................241
22 Table of Contents
Volume 14
STUDIA PATRISTICA LXVI
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
Jana Plátová, Centre for Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Texts, Olo-
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Die Fragmente des Clemens Alexandrinus in den griechischen und
arabischen Katenen...............................................................................3
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CAPPADOCIAN WRITERS
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LATIN WRITERS
NACHLEBEN
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