The Geopolitics of the Middle East

Geography and History of the Middle East

What is Geopolitics?

 The territorial dimension of global politics: The way in which geography influences
the actions of nations and the exercise of power, in particular military power. It is
also the power relations between nations.

 Until 2014, it was generally believed that geopolitics was in retreat, replaced by
economic and cultural power, largely through the forces of globalization,
technology and multinational institutions.

 Putin changed that with his invasion of Ukraine. This act reaffirmed the notion of
“spheres of influence” and the criticality of geography in the thinking of states,
particularly their sustained security. Like it or not, the state remains the dominant
player in global politics. Global institutions and norms cannot compete.

 A precept of geopolitics is that every state has two primary related concerns: its
own security, and its desire to expand to protect its citizens and/or enhance their
wellbeing. Every state wants hegemony over its own neighbourhood and as big an
adjoining area as possible

 The elements of power are geographic location, area, population, natural

resources, economic strength, military power and most importantly, technological
sophistication. The last can overcome vastly superior area and population.

 Geography in the form of natural barriers, navigable rivers, a good climate, long
coast lines, fertile soil and natural resources are all key determinants of power

 The global political system is anarchic – no one is in charge, although presently,

the United States plays a “global cop” role to a diminishing extent. All the
international norms established by the United Nations post WWII, such as when
 resort to force is warranted, have been breached many times, including by the
Western powers.
 Geopolitics abhors a vacuum. The “natural state” is hegemony or order imposed in
a region by a dominant player or system. Without this there will tend to be anarchy
and violence.

 Finally, geopolitics is amoral. It is about interests, not values.

Should we wish for the end of geopolitics, with a world governed by values rather
than interests?

What is the Middle East?

 The Middle East as a term is a colonial construct, but has gradually been accepted
by most parties as defining a valid region.

 It is a region defined by several natural barriers:

 o The Mediterranean
o The Caucasus mountains
o The Libyan and Iranian deserts
o The Black, Caspian, Red and Arabian seas

 It is also limited by coming up against other civilizations, namely India/Pakistan,

Russia and European Christendom.

 It is not entirely defined by religion although it is almost entirely Muslim. It is not

entirely defined by ethnicity as it includes Arabs, Turks, Persians, Kurds, and Jews.

 There are some areas that are contentious in terms of whether they are part of the
Middle East:
o The South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia
o The Turkic Central Asian republics
o The Maghreb countries of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco,
o Turkey, which is not Arab, has no oil and is a civilization in its own right

 Most geographers and historians view the Middle East to include Turkey, but to
exclude the Maghreb, Central Asia and the South Caucasus

 Geographically and historically, the heart of the Middle East is the Fertile Crescent
(Mesopotamia and the Levant. Five braches then reach out from this core:
o Egypt
o Anatolia (Turkey)
o The Southern Caucasus
o Persia (Iran)
o The Arabian Peninsula

 It is fair to say that the Middle East, despite its colonial nomenclature, represents a
valid “civilization” reaching back to the dawn of human civilization
Is the Middle East a region in its own right, like for example, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, Lain America, South Asia or China?

Ancient History – How relevant is it?

The Beginning – Ancient Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent

Called "the fertile crescent"

because of its lush soil, the
"crescent" of land mostly includes
modern-day Iraq, Syria, Jordan,
and Israel-Palestine. (Some
definitions also include the Nile
River valley in Egypt.) People
started farming here in 9000 BC,
and by around 2500 BC the
Sumerians formed the first complex society that resembles what we'd
now call a "country," complete with written laws and a political system

The Phoenicians – The First Globalizers

The Phoenicians, who lived in

present-day Lebanon and coastal
Syria, from about 1500 to 300 BC,
ran some of the Mediterranean's
first big trading networks, and
dominated the seas along with the
Greeks. Some sailed as far as the
British Isles, and many of them set
up colonies in North Africa, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. This was one of the first of
many close cultural links between the Middle East and North Africa – and why Libya's
capital, Tripoli, still bears the name of the ancient Phoenician colony that established
it.

The Kingdom of Israel

The original Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah and their successor Jewish
nations existed within the Levant for approximately 1200 years between 1100 BC and
100 AD before being finally subjugated by the Romans. During this period, various
empires ruled over the territory, including the Assyrians, Babylonians and Persians.
Zionists claim that a Jewish nation existed in the territory for almost the entire period
from the Iron Age to the present, although almost entirely under the rule of various
states and empires. It is true that Jewish settlements have always existed in what is
now Israel, but the population totaled less than 10,000 from 1500 to 1800.

The rise of Islam and the Caliphate

This is a rough political
map of the world in 750
AD, at the height of the
Omayyad Caliphate ("caliph"
means the ruler of the
global Islamic community).
This is to give you a sense
of how vast and powerful
the Muslim empire had
become, barely one century
after the founding of the
religion that propelled its expansion. It was a centre of wealth, arts, and learning at a
time when only China was so rich and powerful. This was the height of Arab power,
and owes its success to the binding and motivational force of religion. They created a
unified Middle East, extending into North Africa and even Southern Europe
The Rise and Fall of the Ottomans

The Middle East in 1914

The Ottoman Empire is named for

Osman, its first ruler in the early
1300s. From a tiny part of
northwest Turkey it expanded for
about 500 years — longer than
the entire history of the Roman
Empire — ruling over most of the
Middle East, North Africa, and
southeastern Europe for
centuries. The empire, officially
an Islamic state, spread the
religion in southeast Europe but
was generally tolerant of other
religious groups. It was probably the last great non-European empire until it began
declining in the mid-1800s, collapsed after World War I, and had its former territory
in the Middle East divided up by Western Europe. The lines between French, Italian,
Spanish, and British rule are crucial for understanding the region today – not just
because they ruled differently and imposed different policies, but because the
boundaries between European empires later became the official borders of
independence, whether they made sense or not.

The Ottomans had tried to modernize in their last years, but it was case of too little
too late, and the coup de grace was the choice of the wrong side in WWI. This was the
last time Middle East had any kind of unified rule.

Would the Middle East be better off if the Ottoman Empire or some form of large
successor entity had stayed intact?
The Modern Era

 The Middle East today has been shaped by seven main factors: The Sykes-Picot
agreement, the discovery of oil; the creation of the State of Israel; the cold war; the
hegemony in the region of the United States; the Iranian revolution; and the Iraq
invasion of 2003

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916

Under this treaty, the UK and

French (and Russian) Empires
secretly agreed to divide up the
Ottoman Empire's last Middle
Eastern regions among
themselves. Crucially, the
borders between the French and
British "zones" later became the
borders between Iraq, Syria, and
Jordan. Because those later-
independent states had largely
arbitrary borders that forced
disparate ethnic and religious
groups together, and because
those groups are still in conflict
extremism in the Middle East. However, this is still disputed. What is not disputed is
that the Arabs, who had supported Britain in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire,
were betrayed by Britain in the Sykes-Picot carve up and the opening up of Jewish
immigration to Palestine, which was under direct British rule.

Is Sykes-Picot the source of much of the chaos in the Middle East?

The Discovery of Oil

 Starting in 1908 in Persia and in the 1930s in Saudi Arabia, the discovery of oil was
transformational in the Middles East’s modern history. It led to the strong interest
of the Western powers, mainly Britain and the U.S., and the formation of
companies, in league with local rulers, which would dominate the production of
the most important resource in the world.

 Through the 30s and particularly after WWII, the British and Americans reached
deals with the local population whereby they would be given independence and
ownership of the oil resources in return for granting de facto control over its
extraction and global marketing to the Western governments and their oil
companies, mainly Standard Oil of California, Texaco and BP.

 The basic deal from WWII until more of less the present day is that the Western
governments have supported whatever government has allowed them access to oil.
Oil has had the effect of keeping corrupt, authoritarian governments in power, and
holding back the kind of economic, social and political reform in the Arab world
that had taken place in Turkey.

Independence and the Creation of Israel

 During and after WWII, the Arab states achieved independence from Britain and
France, including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Cyprus.

 In Palestine, a struggle took place between the Arabs and Jews, culminating in
British withdrawal and the UN partition of the country into Israel in the West and an
Arab state in the East. This was accepted by the Jewish side but rejected by the
Arabs, who saw the creation of Israel as act of war, and the arrival of hundreds of
thousands of Jews as an invasion, albeit under the auspices of Britain and the UN.

 800,000 Palestinians were displaced from areas annexed by Israel. A similar

number of Jews was expelled or fled from Arab countries after 1948, about two-
thirds settling in Israel.
 Despite many peace attempts, the Arabs are unwilling to accept Israel as a reality
in the Middle East, and Israel is unwilling to permit a return of displaced Arabs to
what is now Israel.

 This is unquestionably a rallying issue for Arabs and other Muslims in the region.

Was the partition of Palestine a good idea in retrospect?

The Cold War and Arab Socialism

 After independence, many of the largest Arab countries, inspired by the Soviet
model of development, flirted with an Arab version of socialism, particularly Egypt
and Syria. They actually united for a period as the United Arab Republic for the
period 1958-1961.

 Syria seceded because they felt dominated by Egypt. However, Egypt continued to
seek a form of “Pan-Arabism”, based on socialist development principles. During
this period, the Soviet Union played a strong role in the region, seeing it as an
opportunity to establish an area of influence, and to spread its ideology.

 Of course, the U.S. was equally if not more active in the region, both because of oil
and its support of Israel (although in its early years Israel was also supported by
the Soviet Union).

 The Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism was essentially destroyed by the Arab’s
humiliating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. The six-day war was pivotal
moment in the region’s history. The failure of pan-Arabism and the socialist
development model led to a vacuum that was gradually filled by nationalism and
Islamism. Nasser’s failed play to unite the region gave way to a balkanization with
all the associated instability.

 The final nail in the coffin of Pan-Arabism was the Camp David peace accord
between Israel and Egypt, which most of the other Arab countries abhor to this
 day. In fact, the Egyptians do not really define themselves as Arabs, but as a
distinct nation and civilization.

 The Camp David Accords effectively gave victory in the region to the United States,
but this was short-lived, lasting only to 1979 and the Iranian revolution.

U.S. Hegemony

 After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the region was balkanized, and with the
failure of Pan-Arabism, the hegemony of the U.S. in the region was essentially
complete. This hegemony took the place of a local hegemony, and put the U.S. in
the position as the guarantor of stability in the region.

 The U.S. not only negotiated the Egypt-Israel agreement, but aligned itself strongly
with Turkey, Iran, Saddam Hussein’s

 Iraq, the Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and most importantly, Saudi
Arabia. The US. made sure that these countries were stable, even at the expense of
supporting dictators

 The Iranian revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war blew a hole in this order.
The U.S. had an implacable enemy in Iran, who spread its anti-U.S. ideology
wherever possible. The U.S. supported Saddam in the in the inconclusive war with
Iran, and was then forced into the first Gulf War to keep order in the region.

 The use of Saudi-Arabia and other Muslim lands as a base to fight in the Gulf War
was a major cause of anti-Western Islamic extremism, as was the U.S.’s
unquestioning support of Israel

 At the end of the day, the role of the U.S. as an imposer of order has failed.
The Iraq War

 The final attempt (so far) at U.S. hegemony was the invasion of Iraq, which has
created instability, strengthened Iran, and inflamed Arab nationalism and radical
Islamism. Largely as a result, the region is in a state of chaos.

 Many believe the U.S. and the West in general have consistently failed to
understand the dynamics of the region and its peoples.

What could the U.S. have done differently?

The Influence of Oil

Is it really the crude, dude?

 Is it a coincidence that the U.S. 5th Fleet, one of the most powerful naval forces in
history, is based in Bahrain, in the Strait of Hormuz? This tells you about the
geopolitical significance of oil.

 Why did the Nazis invade the Soviet Union? Because they did not like communism?
Wrong! Because they felt that the Soviet Union would prevent them from achieving
their political and military aims? Wrong! They invaded because they needed the
Azerbaijani oilfields in order to secure the necessary supply of oil to win WWII.
They failed in this attempt and lost access to a critical war resource.

 The first Gulf War is another example. The United States could not let an unreliable
former ally, who had become an adversary, take control of the Kuwaiti oil fields
and be a potential rival to Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally, destabilizing oil supply. The
invasion had nothing to do with the U.S. protecting the sanctity of state
sovereignty.
 Every international order in early modern and modern history is based on an
energy resource. Whereas the Age of Coal and Steam was the backdrop for the
British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Age of Petroleum has been the
backdrop for the American Empire from the end of the 19th to the early 21st
centuries.

 If the Middle East did not control 25% of the world’s oil reserves and production,
and were not the lowest cost producer, it would be treated like sub-Saharan Africa,
that is, not treated at all.

How important is oil in the geopolitics of the Middle East? Is it the overarching factor
that determines policy and behavior?

ISIS and Iran

 Why do you think the U.S. cares whether a tinpot group of Arabs create an Islamic
State in Syria/Iraq? Is it because they abhor their ideology? Wrong! Is it because
they fear global terrorism from this group? Wrong! They cannot allow a hugely
unpredictable and hostile force to unsettle the region and even potentially take
control of the region’s oil supply. Is the U.S. going to war over Boko Haram , the
Central African Republic or Somalia? Exactly.

 By 2030, 80 percent of China’s oil will come from the Middle East, and 90 percent
in the case of India. (Japan and South Korea remain 100 percent dependent on oil
imports, mostly from the Middle East.) As these countries grow in economic and
political significance, the Middle East will become more, not less, important in
global affairs…..for a while.

 At the moment, the security of this oil supply is provided by the United States,
giving it huge leverage over China and India. At some point, China and to a lesser
extent India will have to establish their own security of supply of Middle Eastern
oil. This is likely to create significant tensions with the U.S. unless the U.S.
essentially vacates its Middle East security role.
 The drop in the price of crude oil from about $100/bbl to $50/bbl has been
largely engineered by Saudi Arabia as a geopolitical play to weaken Iran, its main
competitor for power in the Middle East, and Russia, the main supporter of Syria,
Saudi-Arabia’s enemy. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main existential threat, and
believes it can win an oil price war and drive Iran into a budgetary crisis and
prevent it from continuing to support Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The United
States and Canadian oil industries are collateral damage.

 Further, the Saudi action is intended to remove Russia as an obstacle to Saudi

Arabia and Qatar dominating the lucrative European natural gas market

 The United States has changed the balance of oil power through its shale oil
revolution, making it far less dependent on oil imports. However, the United
States, even if fully independent of foreign oil, cannot permit instability in global
oil markets which would seriously disrupt the global economy. Thus, the U.S. must
protect Middle East oil flow, for the moment anyway.

 Do you think Iran wants nuclear weapons to destroy Israel? Wrong, as they realize
they would also be destroyed. Do you think that the United States cares whether
Iran has nuclear weapons because it worries about Israel’s security? Wrong. Iran
wants nuclear weapons to dominate the Gulf. The United States cannot allow Iran,
an implacable enemy, to upset the balance of power in the Gulf and thus the
security of world oil. Nuclear weapons would enable Iran to achieve hegemony in
the Gulf and potentially dictate oil policy to the Gulf States and even Saudi Arabia.

 Remember also that Iran wants nuclear weapons for defensive political reasons. It
is outnumbered in the region by Sunni states. Nuclear enables it to achieve
balance. Obviously it also needs nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Israel’s
nuclear weapons

Are ISIS and Iran really the threats to global civilization they are being made out to be
or is oil the primary issue motivating Western action?
 In spite of all of the pressure from Washington and elsewhere to have him
persuade Bashar Al-Assad to relinquish power, Putin is staying loyal to the isolated
regime. It’s all about a major gas pipeline from Qatar through Iraq to the
Mediterranean through Syria. This would bypass Russia’s pipeline and weaken its
leverage over Europe. Assad has refused to let this pipeline proceed through Syria,
thus protecting Russia’s position. Further, Assad has agreed to an alternative
pipeline from Iran that would supply Europe, but under Russia’s management.

 The Syrian war is largely about who will control Syria, and through it, access to the
European gas market. It will either be Iran/Russia or Saudi-Arabia and its allies,
including Qatar and the UAE. Without this issue, the sides in the Syrian war would
lose financial support and the war would dramatically reduce its intensity.

Still wondering about why Russia supports Syria?

Why is renewable energy a threat to Israel’s long-term security?

 Why did the U.S. facilitate the creation of the State of Israel? Because it believed in
a homeland for the Jewish people? Because of collective global guilt over the
Holocaust? Wrong on both counts. The U.S. created and has supported the State of
Israel to establish a client state with strong military capability in the world’s most
important region. Of course, in recent years, it has also been to get political
donations from the American Jewish community.

 If oil and gas become insignificant in the global energy picture, the Middle East
becomes Zimbabwe, and Israel becomes of little geopolitical importance. At that
point, its political support from the U.S. evaporates. Renewable energy that could
ultimately replace oil and gas would thus place Israel alone in facing its Arab and
Iranian adversaries. Of course the good news for Israel is that the Arabs and Iran
would very soon have little money for arms, but without U.S. support Israel would
be very lonely in a hostile region. All this will not happen for maybe 30 years, but
it will eventually happen.
 The other factor affecting Israel’s position is that relatively soon, the
overwhelmingly main customers for Middle Eastern oil will be China, India and
Japan. The question is whether they will have as much interest in ensuring Israel’s
security as does the United States. They may see a better strategy as being to
support their suppliers. Remember that China, Japan and India do not have Jewish
political donors.

Should Israel be building stronger alliances with China, Japan and India, the future
customers?

The Sunni-Shia Divide

How important is the Sunni-Shia Divide?

 The divide in Islam between Sunni and Shia goes back to the death of Mohammed
the argument about the succession to the leadership of Islam.

 This led to the establishment of two main distinct branches of Islam, although
there are several other sub-branches of the two main sects and smaller branches.

 Historically, the leadership of Sunni Islam has been in Saudi-Arabia, with Mecca
and Medina as the main spiritual centres. Leadership of Shi’ism is in Iran, with the
main spiritual centre in Qom.

 Of the total global Muslim population of 1.6 billion, only about 200 million are
Shia, with 1.4 billion Sunni. The Shia live almost entirely in four countries: Iran,
Iraq Pakistan and India, although there are smaller groups in Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain amongst others.
 Country Total population Shia population Shia of total (%)

Iran 68.7 million 61.8 million 90%

Iraq 26.8 million 17.4 million 65%

Saudi Arabia 27.0 million 2.7 million 10%

Lebanon 3.9 million 1.7 million 45%

Kuwait 2.4 million 730,000 30%

Bahrain 700,000 520,000 75%

190,000 (+2.8
Syria 18.9 million 2 1% (+15%)
million)
The United Arab
Emirates 2.6 million 160,000 6%

Qatar 890,000 140,000 16%

Source: Nasr: ‘When the Shiites Rise’.

 Islam has been dominated by the Sunni, although the Sunni themselves are
subdivided into many sects and the approach to religion is quite different in, for
example, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

 The Shia have practically always been the oppressed in Islam and, partly for this
reason, are usually perceived as the more politicized of the two strands. This
makes them a potential threat in the new geopolitical situation in the eyes of the
Sunni Arab regimes in those countries that have a Shia population, either a
minority (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, most small Gulf states, Yemen and to some
extent Jordan) or a majority (Bahrain and Iraq)

 The Sunni domination is not just through numbers, although that is important, but
through the long-term religious leadership of Mecca, somewhat analogous to the
leadership in the Christian world of the Vatican.

In general, how much of a role does religion play in geopolitics? Is it a major

motivating factor?
 Shi’ism went through a period of relative dormancy when Iran, the centre of the
branch, was under the secular leadership of the Shah and his ascendants, and
under U.S. control. The revival of Shi’ism can be traced to the Iranian revolution of
1979 and the accession to power of Ayatollah Khomeini. From that point, Iran
defined itself in far more religious terms.

 The first major clash between the two branches in the modern era was the Iran-
Iraq war of 1980-1988. This began when Iraq invaded Iran via air and land on 22
September 1980. It followed a long history of border disputes, and was motivated
by fears that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 would inspire insurgency among Iraq's
long-suppressed Shia majority as well as Iraq's desire to replace Iran as the
dominant Persian Gulf state.

 A major motivating factor for the war was control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway
on the Persian Gulf, an important channel for both nations’ oil exports. However,
after the Iranian revolution, the Pan-Islamic movement stimulated by that
revolution threatened Saddam Hussein’s Arab nationalist views. The Sunni-Shia
animosity contributed to the conflict, but deeper political issues did as well.

 The U.S. invasion of Iraq, and its loss of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, has
led to a dramatically altered geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Iran has been
able to accelerate its ambition of being the dominant power in the region, a
position it held historically before the emergence of the Ottoman Empire, one that
is realistic in light of Iran’s area, population and superior state of development.

 The Sunni-ruled Arab states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, are increasingly
challenged by Iran in the race for regional power. A region that has traditionally
been ruled by Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo sees its fate falling into the hands of
Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran. Having to choose between the United States, the
current regional hegemon, and Iran, the Sunni Arab states prefer the former.
Sunni-led Arab states are also discovering that their security interests increasingly
converge with those of Israel.
 The talk about a Shia revival at the regional level is essentially a response of the
United States, the Sunni states and Israel to the new geopolitical situation. The
long-term desire for regional supremacy of Iran has become increasingly manifest
in the post-Saddam Middle East. As a response, the United States has resorted to a
strategy of geopolitical containment and it counts on the support of all its allies in
the region to achieve this. It is critical to these players to prevent Pan-Islamism, so
a divide and rule strategy is essential.

 It is in the interests of the U.S. and its allies to maintain an arbitrary divide of
‘Sunni states’ and ‘Shia states’ or ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’. This strategy is aimed
primarily at containing Iran’s power and strategic ambitions.

 The rhetoric on all sides has created a real rise in sectarianism that may play a role
in shaping events, particularly in states that are weaker, such as Iraq, Syria and
Lebanon. In a way “the genie is out of the bottle” and it will be hard to put it back.
It may burn itself out but it will take time and those who see an advantage in
stoking it will have to stop

 However, it is hard to conclude that the prime motivating force in Middle Eastern
events is religious sectarianism rather than the ambition for elimination of
colonialism, and for power over land, resources, access to key oceans, control over
key waterways and control over geographies that provide military advantage.

 In the long term, this power game can possibly lead to a regional system divided
into two spheres: the Shia and the Sunni – led by Iran and Saudi Arabia
respectively. If this is the case, the United States and its Sunni allies will benefit
from this regional dichotomy in the short term. In the long term, a sectarian divide
is not beneficial for regional stability.

 Iran’s goal is to have sufficient power to force the other players to accept its policy
of an Islamic revolution, not necessarily Shi’ism, but a rejection of the West,
including Israel.
Is the conflict in the Middle East primarily driven by the Sunni-Shia divide or is that
divide masking the real struggle to prevent a region-wide Islamic Revolution
The Arab Spring

What are the likely long-term consequences of the “Arab Spring”?

 The Arab Spring was a series of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle
East, triggered initially in Tunisia by the self-immolation of a street vendor.

 This act set off a revolt in Tunisia against a corrupt and authoritarian government,
followed by similar uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, all
authoritarian governments, as well as in Iraq.

 The governments in Egypt and Libya fell, while in Syria, the excessive use of force
resulted in a violent reaction, ultimately leading to civil war, in which 220,000
people have been killed and millions displaced. In Bahrain, the Shia majority rose
up against the Sunni minority. The Gulf Cooperation Council sent in troops to help
put down the revolt, in some cases using torture and murder. In Yemen, the
government changed but with little change in policy. This government has been
overthrown and current Yemen has no unified government.

 In Tunisia, the transition to a new government has been peaceful and the country
has a liberal constitution and is stable. It is the success story of the Arab Spring.
Egypt, after the failed democratic experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood, is back
to being run by the generals. Libya has two competing governments, in Tripoli and
Tobruk respectively. Tribal militias and jihadist groups have taken advantage of
the power vacuum. Most notably, radical Islamist fighters seized Derna in 2014
and Sirte in 2015 in the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

 Protests in Iraq by the Sunni minority led to government change, some reforms
and the release of political prisoners. However, by this time ISIS had gained
traction.
 On the positive side, the Arab Spring triggered democratic and economic reforms
in Jordan and Morocco without significant uprising.

 There are three different readings of the impact of the Arab Spring:
o One is that the revolutions have unleashed forces in the region that cannot
be reversed in that the people found their voice and forced the regimes into
change and/or brutal crackdown. Several governments were removed. The
invulnerability of authoritarian regimes has been shattered. Next time, the
outcome will likely be more democratic power to the people. The power of
social media to facilitate change was demonstrated and it will be used again.
o A second is that the Arab Spring has unleashed negative forces in the form
of jihadist movements that were previously kept under tight control. This
will result in disorder in the region for a long time as national governments,
with international support, try and stop these movements from gaining
ground. Democratic reform in these circumstances is a dream.
o A third is that the Arab Spring failed and that, mostly, the dictators have
remained in power and will do for the foreseeable future. The aspirations of
the people for democratic and economic reform will be thwarted indefinitely

Which of these narratives of the Arab Spring do you most agree with?

The Geopolitical Consequences of the Arab Spring

 The Sunni Arab countries have moved closer together to contain the disorder
resulting from the revolutions, and to counter the influence of Iran

 Iran has lost in the sense that Syria, its ally has almost disintegrated, but it is clear
that no settlement in Syria will be reached without Iran’s agreement, thus
reinforcing Iran’s power. Also, the chaos in Iraq has strengthened Iran’s hand
there, making Iraq highly dependent on Iraq to provide order and help defeat ISIS.

 The United States is the biggest geopolitical loser. The order in the region, in
which it was effectively the regional hegemon has been destroyed. The ability of
 the U.S. to call the shots in the region is no more. It’s reputation as a supporter of
the authoritarian regimes has been damaged. It will likely even be forced to make
a deal with Assad to try and end the civil war in Syria, and will have to include Iran
in these negotiations.

 Turkey has lost in that it chose the “wrong” side in Egypt, and the Kurds, with
whom they have fought an ongoing war in Turkey, may get their own state from
part of Iraq and Syria. Turkey has been shown to be pro-Islamist (soft Islamist, not
ISIS), with serious consequences for NATO and its relationship with the U.S. and
Israel. A new Turkey-Qatar axis seems to have emerged.

 The Turks and the Sunni Arab nations, particularly Saudi-Arabia, are more at odds
than they have been in a long time, making stability in the region difficult. In fact,
it is possible that the Turks and Iranians will find more common cause, despite the
fact that one is Sunni and the other Shia. The three-way rivalry between Saudi-
Arabia, Iran and Turkey makes for a highly unstable geopolitical scenario, with
each player jockeying for influence and power, and attempting to bring other
players into its sphere of influence.

 In summary, the pre-Spring geopolitical order in the Middle East was the U.S. in
charge, with its allies, Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia, with Iran and its
allies Syria and Hezbollah as a relatively weak opponent, particularly since Syria
would not actively act against U.S. interests.

 The new geopolitical situation is two major factions, namely U.S.- supported
Saudi-Arabia and Egypt, with Israel also under the U.S. security umbrella; and
Russia-supported Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah. There are also two significant
wild cards: Turkey, in close alliance with Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood in
several countries; and Jihadists, particularly ISIS, which aims to create a new state.
Finally, the Kurds are also a stand-alone group seeking self-determination.

 This is a highly unstable situation that likely cannot stand. There is a power
vacuum created by the end of the U.S. order in the Middle East. The question is
what new order will emerge and how.
Was the Arab Spring transformational? Should we hope for further freedoms for the
people of the Middle East, or would continued dictatorships be a safer option?
ISIS

What is ISIS and Why Does it Exist?

 Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United
States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the
Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even
understand the idea.” Yet we shall explain all.

 This description in the March 15 issue of the Atlantic: “their state rejects peace as
a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it
constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might
ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player
in—the imminent end of the world.”

 An alternative interpretation is that it is a bunch of out-of-control adolescents

from around the world with no adult supervision.

 Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a
group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like David Koresh
or Jim Jones wielding absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but 8
million.

 The Islamic State believes in returning society to 7 th Century Islam, with all that
means – in law, society, the role of women and more. It therefore believes in the
destruction of modernity wherever it exists – in the Middle East and beyond. It is
the most fundamentalist, absolutist Islamic sect that has so far emerged this
century.

 Despite its rejection of modernity, paradoxically the Islamic State has a highly
organized administrative and military structure and makes better use of the
 internet than almost every developed nation government or political party. This is
not just a bunch of wild-eyed radicals

 It has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, mostly from the disaffected
populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most
ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

 The late Edward Said, possibly the most influential scholar of Islam and the Arab
world made it clear that the roots of modern-day Islamic fundamentalism is tied
up with the conditions in which these ideologies arose—the bad governance, the
shifting social mores, the humiliation of living in lands valued only for their oil.
 However, there is also a pure ideological element to ISIS. They are preaching and
acing out what strict adherence to Islam literally demands. They revel in the purity
of their interpretation and practice of the religion.

 ISIS has been compared to the Khmer Rouge in its nihilism. However, the KM were
the official government of a recognized nation state and took heir seat at the UN,
something ISIS would never do. They totally reject the world order.

 What differentiates ISIS from your common or garden jihadist is that they have
territory and aspire to govern. They basically want to create a state from at least
Iraq to Istanbul, although they say they want more. ISIS is not the next version of
Al Qaeda, and counter-terrorism strategies will not defeat them. Although it uses
terrorism as a tactic it is not really a terrorist group.

 ISIS has 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive
military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure,
funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. If ISIS is anything, it
is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army.

 ISIS came into being largely thanks to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. After Al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was essentially wiped out in 2006, it renewed itself inside U.S.-
run prisons in Iraq, where insurgents and terrorist operatives connected and
formed networks—and where the group’s current chief and self-proclaimed caliph,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, first distinguished himself as a leader.

 According to Gideon Rose in Foreign Affairs, March, 2015: “…three new factors
came into play: increasingly inept and sectarian rule by the Shiite-led
government, increasing detachment on the part of Washington, and
increasing violence in Syria. Together, these kindled the glowing
embers of the left-for-dead Iraqi jihadist movement. Elements of the
group formerly known as al Qaeda in Iraq resurfaced as the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS; gained a foothold in the badlands of
eastern Syria; and eventually conquered large swaths of western Iraq to
boot, bringing death, destruction, and fanaticism in their wake”
Should the U.S. have detected the formation and growth of ISIS and stopped it before
it became a significant force? What does it say about the U.S. and other Western
powers that they completely missed it?
What is the geopolitical significance of ISIS?

 The answer to this is not yet clear, but it could range from negligible to
transformational.

 On the negligible side, it is clear that no state supports ISIS, and therefore there is
little chance of ISIS creating a coalition of states pursuing its objectives.

 However, there are relatively weak states that could succumb to an ISIS invasion.
These include Jordan and Lebanon. This is not likely but is conceivable. If this
happened, it would create a massive threat to many other nations, including Saudi
Arabia and Israel, and could cause a major war in the Middle East, with
unforeseeable consequences. It could cause the fall of the Saudi government which
would open up massive opportunities for Iran and Turkey to effectively control the
region. This would be transformational.

 A more likely geopolitical consequence of ISIS is the creation of an axis of

cooperation between the U.S., Iran and Turkey. The latter two are the most capable
militarily of stopping ISIS in its tracks. Such an alliance could lead to serious
negotiations about how to end the war in Syria. This is a positive scenario,
although it may not be liked by Saudi Arabia or Israel, as it would give clout to its
sworn enemy, Iran, and its more subdued adversary, Turkey. Given recent events
between Israel and the United States, and the results of the Israeli election, it could
result in a more balanced U.S. policy to the Middle East, with Israel having less
favour.

 Another scenario is that Turkey and Iran effectively contain ISIS without actually
working together. This would give Iran greater power in Iraq and continue their
influence in Syria. Turkey would merely remove the threat of ISIS on its southern
border, but would not gain influence. The Syrian War would end to be settled on
 terms favourable to Iran. Israel would be a loser by having a stronger Iranian
presence on its border.

 A final scenario is that ISIS gradually dies out through being unable to sustain its
capacity to expand or even retain its territory. It is not clear how likely this is, but
if it happened over the next year or two, it would mean little change in the
geopolitics of the region, and it would be more or less “business as usual”

What is the most likely scenario resulting from ISIS and what should we hope for?

The Syrian War

What caused the Syrian war and where does it stand now

 The modern Syrian state was established after World War I as a French mandate,
and represented the largest Arab state to emerge from the formerly Ottoman-
ruled Arab Levant. It gained independence in April 1946, as a parliamentary
republic. The post-independence period was tumultuous, and a large number of
military coups and coup attempts shook the country in the period 1949–1971.
Between 1958-61, Syria entered a brief union with Egypt, which was terminated by
a military coup.

 For the last 40 years, under rule of the Baathist party, Syria has been a one-party
dictatorship. In fact, since independence, Syria has never been a democracy. For
the last 45 years the country has been ruled by the al-Assad family.

 The main “opposition” has been Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In the
late 1970s, an Islamist uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood was aimed against the
government. Islamists attacked civilians and off-duty military personnel, leading
security forces to also kill civilians in retaliatory strikes. The uprising had reached
its climax in the 1982 Hama massacre, when some 10,000 – 40,000 people were
killed by regular Syrian Army troops.
 Syria actually participated in the first Gulf War coalition against Saddam Hussein.
Since then, however, Syria has had deteriorating relations with the West.

 A key issue motivating politics in Syria is that the country is ruled by Alawite Shia,
despite the fact that the majority of the population is Sunni. The Alawites control
the key cities, the main economic assets and the military.

 When the Arab Spring erupted in early 2011, a significant protest movement
emerged in Syria. This was strongly supported by the West and brutally resisted by
the Assad government. What the West failed to understand was that the uprising
would create the opportunity for Islamist forces to come out from underground
and seek power.

 By 2015, the progressive, democratic Syrian freedom forces have been pushed into
a small area of Northwest Syria by the Assad government with the help of Iran and
Hezbollah. Al-Qaeda and related groups such as Al Nusra and the Khorasan
network, also control parts of this area including the largest city, Aleppo. The
Kurds have taken control of large swaths of the North and Northeast, and ISIS
controls the large and sparsely populated desert area in the East.

 The general view now is that Assad will survive, albeit controlling a smaller
territory, and that the rest of Syria will be divided into a Kurdish area and a Sunni
area, possibly controlled by ISIS.
Current military situation: Red: government, Green: rebels, Yellow: Kurds (Rojava), Grey: Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, White: al-Nusra Front; Brown: disputed areas (for a more detailed map,
see Cities and towns during the Syrian Civil War).

Did the West misjudge the impact of weakening Assad? Should they have supported
him or just stayed out of it altogether?

What are the geopolitics of the Syrian war?

 While geopolitics may not have started the Syrian war, they have now become a
key dimension of it, to the extent that it has become a proxy war both regionally
and globally.

 Regionally, on the side are Iran, the Shi’ites of Iraq (including the government) and
Hezbollah, the de facto rulers of at least part of Lebanon. Iran provides Assad with
funding and weapons.
 On the Sunni side are Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in particular, but also less
actively, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. However, this support is complicated by the
concerns that Islamist Sunni Jihadists would take control, destabilizing the region
and threatening Sunni dictatorships. Thus, some of the Sunni governments are
ambivalent. Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf States are clearly anti-Iran and will do
whatever it takes to prevent an Iran-dominated Syria.

 The Gulf States, particularly Qatar, have been accused of funding extreme Islamist
movements, including those involved in Syria such as Al Nusra. The role of the Gulf
States is murky. On the one hand they want stability at home, but they seem to be
funding jihadi activity elsewhere.

 The regional battle is part of the broader struggle for hegemony in the region.
Until the Iraq war, this was not an issue, but Iran now has far more power and is
perceived as a huge threat by the Sunni countries.

 The global dimension is largely a struggle for influence between the U.S. and
Russia, with China also involved peripherally. Russia and China are both using the
Syrian War as another opportunity to deny the U.S. hegemony as part of the
broader agenda of weakening the U.S.’s influence globally.

 However, Russia has far more specific reasons to support Syria, mainly access to
the Mediterranean port of Tartus for military use, and even more to prevent the
use of Syria as a transit route for a gas pipeline from the Qatar gas fields to serve
Europe, which would weaken Russia’s stranglehold of gas supplies to Europe.
Instead, Russia wants to see a pipeline from the Iranian gas fields through Syria.
This would be controlled by Russia.

 The U.S. would like to see the Syrian War end without Iran having strong influence,
but recent events with ISIS threatening to make Syria a major base have led the
U.S. to be less hostile to Assad staying in power. At the moment, no outcome of
the Syrian war is good for the U.S. and the West. If Assad wins, the Iranians have
influence. If Assad loses, radical Sunnis will likely have control. A lengthy stalemate
results in large tracts of territory controlled by ISIS and/or other radicals.
 Looking longer-term, a possible scenario is a formal partition of Syria as part of a
broader Middle East rearrangement. Possibly, the Sunni parts of Syria and Iraq with
Lebanon and the north would be a Kurdish state, combined with Iraqi Kurdistan.

 The alternative longer-term picture would be a combined Iraq, Syria and Lebanon
under the de facto control of Iran.

What should we hope for as an end to the Syrian War? What is most likely?

Turkey and the Kurds

Is Turkey the logical dominant power of the Middle East?

 The historical context of Turkey is firstly that it was the governing centre of the
Ottoman Empire and also the home of the Caliphate until it abolition in 1924. The
Caliphate was, for centuries, the main organizing force of Sunni Islam, so
effectively, Turkey (as the Ottoman Empire) was the centre of Sunni Islam.

 A corollary of the Ottoman Empire is that the Turks ruled over the Arabs. This was
the backdrop to the Arab liberation movement depicted in Lawrence of Arabia. The
Arabs were desperate to obtain freedom from the Ottomans and achieved this as a
result of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. (However, as we know,
the Arabs were immediately betrayed by Britain and France.)

 Another key historical factor is that secularism was a key principle behind creation
of the modern Turkish state in 1922. This continued until the election of the
current President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan in 2003. Erdogan has taken
Turkey in the direction of re-establishing Islam at the centre of Turkish life, with
strong opposition from secular elites.

 Turkey should be a bastion of stability in the Middle East, and to a large extent it
is. It is a functioning democracy, despite Erdogan’s tendency to autocratic rule. It
has a functioning civil society, a large population of almost 80 million and it has a
 strong economy, with a GDP per capita (PPP) of about $20,000. Turkey also has a
large and strong military. Turkey is an important member of NATO.

 A complicating factor is that because of the Ottoman history, the Arab Middle East
would never accept Turkish leadership, so Turkey can only play a balancing and
influential role.

 Turkey, under Erdogan has chosen to advocate for a new Middle East order
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Turkey sees as an effective
transnational Islamic network, but not one that is “jihadist”. The West and the
Middle Eastern autocrats in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (other than
Qatar) strongly disagree with this as it would eliminate their power base.

 Geopolitically, Turkey is staking out positions on many fronts that are anti-U.S.
and anti-West. This is partially a reaction to Turkey not being welcomed into the
EU and also an attempt to establish Turkish leadership over the Turkic peoples
who stretch from Turkey, through Central Asia and into Western China. The Middle
East is almost an afterthought for Turkey, other than wanting to prevent instability
there from affecting Turkey, and wanting to prevent the formation of a Kurdish
power base that would include Turkish Kurds.

 For the meantime, Turkey will play a pragmatic, relatively low key role in the
Middle East, seeking stability above all else, but not playing an activist role. If push
comes to shove, it will tend to align with anti-Western forces such as Russia, with
whom Turkey has established an alliance. Turkey will have a soft anti-Israel
stance, but will not align directly with Iran. Erdogan dislikes the current regimes in
Saudi-Arabia and Egypt but will not take a strong position against them. Their
main ally is Qatar but this will be a non-active alliance.

 Turkey’s global ambitions are to one of the leading non-aligned nations in the
world, with strong influence across Central Asia. They will work with all major
powers on a case-by-case basis. On the Middle East they will let the chips fall as
long as they do not negatively affect Turkey.
Can Turkey play an important role in stabilizing the Middle East?

Who are the Kurds and why are they significant?

ou

 The Kurds are an ancient ethnic group that has inhabited an area straddling Iran,
Iraq, Syria and Turkey for at least 1,500 years. They have a distinct language and
culture. Most are Sunni Muslim, but some are Shia, and some are even Christian
and animist. The Yazidis are a Kurd sect.

 In total there are 35-40 million Kurds today, with about 15 million in each of
Turkey and Iran. Iraq has about 5 million Kurds, Syria 2 million. The Kurds
represent one of the four main ethnic groups in the Middle East, the others being
Arabs, Persians and Turks.

 The Kurds have been fighting for their own country for over a century. With the
breakup of the Ottoman Empire, they were promised a homeland but the global
powers reneged on this under pressure from Turkey, and they were left out of the
division of the Ottoman Empire.

 Since then the Kurds have been fighting wars of liberation in Turkey, Iraq and
Syria. They have had most success in Iraq, where after the first Gulf war, they were
 given a more or less autonomous region in northern Iraq. Under the pressure of
the ISIS threat, Assad has acknowledged Kurdish control over parts of northern
Syria. The Kurds have been fighting an insurgent war against Turkey for decades,
which has so far been inconclusive.

 The Kurds are significant because they occupy territory taken or threatened by ISIS
and represent one of the few fighting forces capable of resisting ISIS, as they have
done in Kobane in northern Syria. The Turks, Syrian and the U.S. have been forced
to work closely with the Kurds in the campaign against ISIS.

 It is possible that the Kurds will obtain their own state in at least Iraq and Syria as
part of their role in ultimately defeating ISIS (if this happens). They would probably
play a role in stabilizing that region.

 The argument against a united Kurdistan is that further fragmentation of the

Middle East might prevent the kind of integration that ultimately would help bring
peace and development to the region.

Should the Kurds get their own country or would it be preferable to have pluralistic
countries incorporating minorities such as Kurds, Yazidis, Christians and Jews?

Egypt

Whither Egypt? Is it still a power?

 Egypt is one of the oldest civilizations on earth, having had a continuous presence
in the Nile basin. Egypt is today one of the largest countries in the Middle East in
area and the largest in population, at 88.2 million people. It has a substantial and
diversified economy of $1trillion (PPP) and a per capita GDP (PPP) of $11,400,
making it a middle-income country. Its Human Development Index is .628 or
Medium. The income distribution is amongst the most equal in the developing
world, although there is a high level of poverty
 Egypt is located pivotally between the Middle East and North Africa, and this
together with its size, has made it the critical country tying the Arab world
together for centuries.

 The Arab League, the main pan-Arab political organization, is headquartered in

Cairo and its Secretary-General has traditionally been an Egyptian.

 Egypt has, since the mid-1970s, been a strong ally of the U.S. and a “cold ally” of
Israel. The country has been a military dictatorship since 1953, other than the brief
flirtation with democracy after the Arab Spring. Egypt obtains significant military
aid from the U.S.

 Geopolitically, Egypt is “in play”. As the U.S. diminishes its involvement in the
Middle East, Egypt is developing strong relations with China and Russia. From a
geographic point of view, Egypt’s natural alignment is with Europe. The EU is by far
Egypt’s largest trading partner, and this will increase. While the relationship with
the U.S. is critical, it is not as sustainable as that with Europe, and depends on U.S.
interest in the region, which is declining.

 If the EU takes a strong BDS position vis-à-vis Israel, Egypt will be in a difficult
position. It will be torn between its European economic relationship and its U.S.
military relationship.

 The U.S. also has criticized Egypt’s poor human rights record. Although it
supported the Arab Spring and the ouster of Mubarak, it quickly reversed this
posture once the Muslim Brotherhood became the government. Calls by the U.S.
for improvements in human rights for the Egyptian people ring hollow.

 The Arab world still looks to Egypt for leadership in foreign affairs, although it
does not always follow. If Egypt shifts away from a strong U.S. alliance, this may
signal a broader shift in the Middle East. Regionally, Egypt is strongly aligned with
the Sunni nations other than Turkey and Qatar, both of which supported the
Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt also has poor relations with Iran, given its anti-Sunni
posture.
 In summary, how Egypt responds to the changing geopolitical landscape,
particularly the falling U.S. involvement in the Middle East and a rising interest by
the EU, China and Russia, may dictate how the Arab world in general responds.
Egypt is thus important to the geopolitics of the Middle East.

Will Egypt drift away from its U.S. relationship and become more Europe centric and
also perhaps more interested in relationships with China and Russia?

Israel and Palestine

What underlies the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians?

 The lands that currently make up Israel and the Occupied Territories were part of
the Ottoman Empire until the end of WWI. Then the territory became known as
Palestine under a British mandate. In 1947 the land was partitioned by a UN vote
between a Jewish state and an Arab state.

 The biblical Kingdom of Israel existed in these lands, including the West Bank until
the second nation of Israel was defeated by the Romans in the 1 st century AD. The
Jewish peoples scattered mostly to Europe. The Central and Eastern European Jews
became the Ashkenazi sect of Judaism, while the Iberian Jews became the
Sephardis, the other main Jewish sect. As a result of persecution around the 15 th
century, the Sephardis fled mostly to North Africa and the Middle East but also
Southern Europe and even India and the Far East.

 The Jews in modern Palestine were relatively few in number, totaling only about
2,000 in 1800, 25,000 in 1882, 50,000 in 1900 and 85,000 in 1915, at most
about 15% of the population. Palestine, despite being the location of ancient Israel,
was not an easy place to live, being a poor agrarian society, other than on the
coast, where a trading economy existed, with greater affluence.
 Larger numbers of Jews migrated to Palestine before and after WWI, not as formal
immigrants but as settlers who had purchased land, mostly from absentee
Ottoman and Arab landowners.

 In 1917 the Balfour declaration gave British approval to a “national home for the
Jewish people”, although perhaps not a state per se. The intent is still disputed.

 The Palestinians were excluded from the post-WWI peace talks and deals were cut,
through fierce lobbying by the global Zionist community to permit Jewish
migration and purchase of land.

 After WWII, the State of Israel was established through a successful UN resolution.
Palestine was partitioned between Israel and the West Bank which was eventually
incorporated into Jordan. Obviously, the Holocaust played a role in this. However,
the legitimacy of the State of Israel rests heavily on biblical roots.

 There is little doubt that the Arabs came to view this resolution and the mass
migration of Jews to Israel as an act of war. The creation of Israel and the
subsequent war between the Arabs and Israel resulted in mass flight of the
Palestinians to neighbouring lands, where they were mostly very poorly treated.

 Israel established a ”right of return” for Jews worldwide to migrate to Israel. No

such permission was allowed to the Arabs who had fled.

 Subsequent to the initial UN resolution, Israel has expanded its territory on several
occasions and there are those who want to see greater expansion. Expansion has
been a key dimension of Israel’s policy, for security and resources, as well as
religious reasons.

 Israel would prefer that the Palestinians go away and be absorbed into other Arab
countries. So far this has not happened, partially because they are not accepted
and partially because they want their previous territory back.
 The Palestinians, on the other hand, have never accepted Israel’s right to exist,
given that the creation of the country, from their point of view, was essentially an
invasion.

Was the partitioning of Palestine a mistake? Should it just have been a single country
with all the people - Arabs, Jews and others – living in it?

Why does Israel need the Occupied Territories?

 Historically, the political entity or peoples occupying the area that is present day
Israel have had control over the entire region up to the Jordan River, namely Israel
and the Occupied Territories.

 There are three reasons for this:

o Security. There is no natural defense to the east of Israel other than the
Jordan river and the Jordanian Highlands. If the area to the west of the
Jordan river is occupied by another entity or peoples, Israel is vulnerable.
Israel lacks the strategic depth unless it controls the land all the way to the
Jordan river.
o Environmentally. Israel resides in a water-challenged region. Although Israel
has done an excellent job of managing water, it cannot do so if it lacks
access to the headwaters of the Jordan river and aquifers that are at least
partially in the Occupied Territories.
o Economically. While less compelling, the area between the Jordan and the
Mediterranean represents a natural economic entity. The peoples of the
coastal plain are naturally complemented by those living in the agricultural
interior.

 For these reasons, Israel feels compelled to occupy the West Bank and ultimately
absorb it into Israel. However, it cannot do so and give Palestinians living there
political rights, unless it accepts that Israel/West Bank become a full democracy
with political rights for all.
 There are several scenarios for the future of Israel/Palestine:

o Two State Solution: Under this scenario, the Occupied Territories would
become a Palestinian state, roughly in the territory left after the 1967 war,
with land swaps to take settlements into account. This scenario is unlikely
and becoming less likely every year, given the large numbers of settlements,
the complexity of the land swaps required, the restrictions Israel will place
on true sovereignty for any Palestinian state and because Israeli political
opinion will not permit it. The Palestinians may unilaterally declare their own
state, with global support, but it would be a state in name only, with Israel
controlling it in many ways. Israel may be forced to negotiate a more
substantive Palestinian state, but it is difficult to imagine that this state
would be viable unless it economically integrated with Israel. As noted
above, the most logical state is one including both Israel and the West Bank.
Overall, the window for a two state solution is likely already shut.
o Continued Occupation: This is the status quo, with Israel denying
Palestinians political or basic human rights, and building more and more
settlements. Israel’s strategy here is to hope that eventually the Palestinians
give up and accept occupation or just leave the territory. So far, the
Palestinian have shown no signs of doing either, and global opinion is not
likely to support it. The BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanction) campaign would
get stronger. The level of violence in Israel would increase significantly, and
Israel would become even more of a security state.
o One State Solution: This could, and likely will evolve from the present
situation when the Israeli government formally admits that it will never
accept the two -state solution, as it more or less did in the recent election.
This would initially, perhaps for a decade or two, be a state with political
rights only for citizens of Israel. However, the Occupied Territories would be
fully integrated into Israel. Global action against this scenario would be
intense, with a high level of BDS. Eventually, as in the case of South Africa,
this would collapse and a true single state would emerge, with political and
human rights for all. However, there would be no “Jewish State” per se,
although Jewish elites would dominate this integrated state, as is the case of
whites in South Africa. This scenario would be difficult to achieve because of
resistance by the Israeli right. However, it may be forced on Israel eventually,
 perhaps 10-20 years from now. The question is whether it would be
achieved peacefully.

Which scenario for Israel/Palestine is most likely?

What are the geopolitics of the Israel-Palestine situation?

 Since its inception, the Israel-Palestinian conflict has been part of a bigger
geopolitical game. Initially, both the U.S. and Soviet Union supported the creation
of Israel in order to gain influence in the Middle East, and in the latter case, also
for ideological reasons.

 From the early 1950s, the Soviets aligned themselves with the Arabs because they
saw an opportunity to expand their ideology to the region as Arab countries,
notably Egypt and Syria, embraced socialism. Strangely, this was the only era in
which the U.S. adopted a somewhat even-handed approach to the Israel-Arab
conflict, although they still favoured Israel as a bulwark against Soviet influence

 From 1967 onwards, U.S. support for Israel became unquestioned, and Soviet
support for the Arabs became the norm. However, the U.S. influence in the region
was far stronger than any other power, because the region was of critical
importance to the U.S.

 The end of the cold war saw Soviet influence further diminish, such that
geopolitically, the Middle East was under the sole domination of the U.S. which
became the prime influencer of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. orchestrated
peace talks at various points, such as Oslo (1993 onwards), Camp David (2000)
and the abortive John Kerry attempt of 2013-2014.

 The current “peace process” is being orchestrated by the “Quartet”, namely the
U.S., EU, UN and Russia. This has gone nowhere.
 Given the complexity of and threats within the Middle East in general, and
domestic politics, it is unlikely that the U.S. will do much to address the Israel-
Palestine issue during Obama’s remaining term. However, Obama is going to
change the tone of U.S. relations with Israel. He may withhold a U.S. veto over UN
votes for a Palestinian state. Also, the nature of Jewish support for Israel in the U.S.
is changing, with less unquestioned support, particularly amongst younger Jews.

 Russia has re-entered the picture, with alliances with Iran and Turkey. It is
possible that Russia will gradually have a bigger influence in the Middle East and
be part of a global coalition to pressure change by Israel. The EU, while not a big
influencer in foreign affairs, is already strongly for a Palestinian state. The EU
could change the game with a strong BDS campaign in response to Netanyahu’s
recent statements. Israel is heavily dependent on imports from and exports to EU
nations, and an effective BDS campaign would hurt Israel, perhaps seriously.
(Europe makes up 44% of Israel’s exports, compared with 12% to the U.S.)

 Looking at the bigger picture, oil politics are changing. The biggest customers of
Middle East oil are now China, Japan and India. The U.S. is oil self-sufficient.
Gradually, the U.S. interest in the Middle East is declining as it faces the China
challenge, an assertive Russia, an increasingly independent Latin America and a
whole set of unaligned powers such as India, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey. None of
these countries views Israel in a particularly positive light. In short, the U.S. need
to support Israel unquestioningly as an ally for energy reasons is diminishing, and
there are other nations who are more likely to want to keep oil suppliers happy.

 Paradoxically, it is some of these oil suppliers who are emerging as supporters of

Israel, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as part of the struggle against
Iranian hegemony and because they see Israel as a bulwark against radical
Islamism. Nevertheless, Israel faces an implacable enemy in Iran and an emerging
enemy in Turkey. These are the two biggest powers in the Middle East today.

 The picture that is emerging is global isolation of Israel.

Will geopolitics change the Israel-Palestine picture in the next 10 years?

Iran-Saudi Competition

What does Iran really want and how should the West act towards Iran?

 According to Stephen Kinzer in the Boston Globe, January 18, 2015: “ In a region
full of fake, made-up countries, one Muslim power is sure to survive: Iran. It is the
opposite of a fake country. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are less
than a century old. Iran has existed — more or less within the same boundaries,
with more or less the same language — for 2,500 years. Colonialists never
managed to divide it, and it stands today as an island of stability in a volcanically
unstable region.”

 Similarly, Robert D. Kaplan, one of the world’s leading geopolitical analysts, in Real
Clear World on March 18, 2015 describes Iran as follows: “ The external behavior of
Iran's regime is simply more dynamic and more effective than that of any other
Muslim regime in the Middle East. Iran has constructed thousands of centrifuges.
Tehran has trained and equipped Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite forces in Iraq
and Yemen, and it has propped up Syria's embattled president. Turkey and the
Arab world appear sleepy-eyed in comparison. Iran acts. The other Muslim
countries struggle to formulate responses, and when they do, they are still less
effective than the Iranians”.

 Kaplan goes on to make the point that Iranian success derives from the fact that it
is more than a state: it is both a civilization and includes a “sub-state”, namely a
large group of highly committed believers with a clear ideology and the capacity to
project this ideology. This is of course the Revolutionary Guard, described by
Kaplan as a “lethal and innovative force”. It consists of 125,000 military personnel,
as well as 90,000 paramilitary forces and 300,000 reservists.

 Other than a nuclear attack, Iran’s military position is impregnable. Even the U.S.
would almost certainly be unable to defeat Iran on Iranian territory.
 Iran also is a large country in a unique and highly privileged geographic position,
along the east-west transit route from the Middle East to India and beyond. It also
controls access to the critically important Straits of Hormuz.

 The Iranian ideology is anti-West and anti-Israel. It is informed by Shi’ite Islam as

well as resentment for Western actions over the last 100 years, particularly the
initial exploitation of oil wealth and the CIA coup that removed nationalist leader
Mohamed Mossadegh from office in 1953. However, according to various analysts
the real Iranian agenda is to protect Shi’ism and prevent Western domination and
efforts at regime change.

 The Iranian state is obviously bolstered by massive oil and gas reserves, which,
despite sanctions, brings Iran significant foreign revenue. Iran’s population is 78
million and it has a GDP (PPP) of $1.3 trillion and a per capital GDP (PPP) of
$16,500. Its human development index is “high”, and its level of inequality is
relatively low. Iran already has one nuclear reactor.

 All of this is to say that Iran is a formidable player by almost any standard.
Economic sanctions have made life difficult but have not remotely brought the
country to its knees. The West has to live with Iran whether it likes it or not.

 Iran has been a winner result of Middle Eastern events in recent years. The pivotal
event was the Iraq war, which largely destroyed Iraq as a functioning country and
put the Shi’ite majority in power, under the influence of Iran. Shi’ite groups under
Iranian influence are major players in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen and also possibly
in Bahrain where a Shi’ite majority is under Sunni rule.

 Iran is in a situation in which it will either reach a nuclear control agreement with
the West or likely obtain nuclear weapons. If the former, then the geopolitical
alignment against Iran will change, with more normal relations between Iran and
the West. If the latter, Iran will dominate the Middle East and clearly be able to
confront its Sunni rivals in various ways. It would almost certainly not use its
nuclear deterrent against conventional attack.
 The West deplores Iran’s ideology and actions, but it is in fact a relatively
predictable player with well-understood goals. Geopolitical analysts actually see it
as a stabilizing force in the Middle East because it confronts jihadi groups such as
ISIS. Israel’s own security leadership views Iran as an exaggerated threat. The
Israeli government uses Iran as a tool to keep the U.S. supporting Sunni
dictatorships that implicitly support Israel.

 There are voices in Israel and the West that believe there should be a
rapprochement with Iran beyond just signing a nuclear deal, as they see Iran as a
country that can prevent Middle Eastern chaos. They see Iran as having more
legitimacy than Saudi and Gulf monarchies that export radical ideology while
having the benefit of U.S. protection.

 The counter argument is that Iran cannot be trusted and that its agenda is
annihilation of Israel and domination of the Middle East. However, According to Pat
Buchanan, a conservative U.S. commentator, there is no reason for Iran to want
nuclear weapons when they are on a path to achieve their objectives without them.

Should the West have a more balanced approach to the Middle East, building a
constructive relationship with Iran?

What about Saudi Arabia?

 Saudi Arabia has, for several decades, been the global leader in oil markets, not
always in production quantity, but in its low-cost production and its ability to
swing global oil markets, as it is by far the biggest oil exporter. Only Russia is
even remotely close.

 Saudi Arabia has only existed as a country since 1932 but it is the home of the
holiest sites of Islam, giving it a special place in the global Muslim community,
particularly amongst Sunni Muslims.
 The country has a population of 30 million, a GDP (PPP) of $1.65 trillion and a per
capita GDP (PPP) of $54,000, making it a very rich country. It has a “very high”
Human Development Index, indicating that its wealth is used to benefit the
population.

 However, the Kingdom officially practices a Wahhabism, a very conservative form

of Islam, and exports this religious ideology across the Sunni world. Even more
extreme Salafists also are present in Saudi society, and these groups are seen as
having given rise, financing and support to Al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups. This
is generally known in the U.S. but not publicly acknowledged.

 Human rights, particularly women’s rights in the Kingdom are severely

constrained, far more so than in Iran, where it is mainly political rights that are
limited.

 Since its creation, Saudi Arabia has been a vassal of the United States, relying ofn a
U.S. security umbrella and aligning its foreign policy with U.S. interests. Because of
its immense wealth, Saudi Arabia is a huge player in global financial markets,
again tying it tightly to U.S. interests.

 Some analysts see Saudi Arabia not so much as a country but as an oil producing
dependency of the United States. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia was at one time an
adversary of Israel, but now has similar foreign policy objectives, namely the
retention of the Sunni dictatorships in the Middle East, and the demonization of
Iran and other Shi’ite states. Saudi Arabia funnels large sums to the Sunni
dictatorships to promote Wahhabism, and to fund military spending to keep them
in power. However, elements within Saudi Arabia also fund the jihadis.

 Saudi Arabia has the highest percentage of military spending to GDP in the world,
more than 10% (the U.S. is about 4%). It has a standing army of 200,000.

 Saudi Arabia is generally regarded to have lost influence in the Middle East
because of the growing ascendancy of Iran. The two countries, in addition to their
religious differences, have fundamental differences in foreign policy. The Saudis
are content being closely tied to the U.S., while Iran takes a strongly independent
 stance. Both countries are exporting their form of Islam, although in Iran’s case,
this is more of a defensive motivation given Shi’isms minority status and history of
being marginalized and oppressed in the Muslim world.

 The Iraq and Syrian conflicts are seen as being proxy wars between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, as is the civil war in Yemen. Most analysts do not see peace and stability in
the Middle East until Saudi Arabia and Iran reach some rapprochement.

 Interestingly, until the Iranian revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia co-existed more or
less in harmony. This was largely because both were tied closely to the U.S., but
more particularly because the Shah had submerged Shia identity under
modernization. Shi’ism in the Middle East was until 1979 highly marginalized. The
Iranian revolution changed that, bringing the two countries, and their respective
allies, into sharp confrontation.

Why should the West continue to be aligned with Saudi Arabia? Does this represent
idealism, protection against an Iranian threat or a desire to retain the status quo in
the Middle East?

The External Players

The U.S.

 Since WWII, other than a limited Soviet disruption, the U.S. has effectively ruled the
Middle East. It has provided a security guarantee, placed governments in power,
removed governments from power, created the State of Israel and made war on
numerous occasions.

 Of course, this has been justified on the basis of spreading democracy and
ensuring stability and peace, but it has mainly been about securing oil supply.
 It seriously miscalculated the situation in Iran in the latter days of the Shah,
leading to its complete break from perhaps the most significant Middle Eastern
country. It is now desperately trying to normalize this situation.

 It made perhaps the biggest foreign policy error of the last 60 years with its
invasion of Iraq.

 It totally missed the Arab Spring and its flawed reaction to this has allowed
outright chaos in the region.

 The U.S. no longer needs Middle Eastern oil, although it does need oil to flow for
the sake of the global economy.

 U.S. Middle Eastern policy is in shreds. There is no longer a coherent policy other
than “don’t do stupid stuff”, which might have been a good idea starting 60 years
ago. The current policy is to retain some balance of power in the Middle East,
whereby no regional hegemon emerges, and to intervene as minimally as possible
to limit chaos. The U.S.’s Israel policy of a two state solution was at one time
rational but is probably no longer viable.

 The Iranians, sworn enemies, are making gains. Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen are in
a state of chaos. Two of these are major oil suppliers. Thus the U.S. has to check
this by supporting the Saudis, Gulf States and Egypt.

Russia

 Russia retains influence in the Middle East, mostly with Iran and Syria. This is
partially an attempt to disrupt U.S. influence in the region, but is also an attempt
to retain access to the Mediterranean and influence gas pipelines. It should be
noted that the Russia could transit land forces through Azerbaijan, Iraq and Syria
to the Mediterranean if such territories were weak or friendly, which they now are.

 Russia’s geopolitical agenda is clearly to push back on U.S. hegemony and to

create a multi-polar world, in which Russia is one of the major power centres. As a
 result, Russia takes opposing positions to the U.S. Russia’s support for Iran and
Syria reflects this. In addition, Russia has a long historical relationship with Syria,
through the cold war.

 Russia clearly does not want to see radical Islam gain ground given its problems
with its own Islamist groups in its southern republics of Chechnya and Dagestan,
so this is a further reason to support Syria and Iran against ISIS.

 It is unlikely that Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East, and it may
lose some influence if there is a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, but
most likely it will remain Iran’s strongest global ally.

China

 China has little historical political relationship with the Middle East. Like Russia, it
is obstructive of U.S. hegemony in the region, using its Security Council veto to
block U.S. resolutions against Iran.

 However, China’s interest in the region is mainly energy and economic

opportunity. China has just overtaken the U.S. as the largest importer of oil. It
sources just over half its oil from the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Iraq, Oman, the UAE and Kuwait. It obtains the rest from several other countries.
China’s position as a large oil importer from the region will give it increasing
interest and influence in the region. So far it has avoided taking strong positions
on political matters in the region, and this is likely to remain the case.

 China also sees a significant opportunity in the Middle East market. China is
building a rail link from Western China through Central Asia to the Middle East.
China is investing large sums on infrastructure across the Middle East and is
exporting large volumes of consumer goods to the Middle East, largely through
Dubai, and then on to other countries.

 While Saudi Arabia is critical to China as its largest oil supplier, much of China’s
expanding role in the region is linked to Iran and its larger geopolitical
importance. China-Iran trade rose from $400 million in 1994 to $11 billion in
 2008 and finally to $50 billion in 2012. Fifty percent of Iran’s total trade is now
with China, Iran’s third largest trading partner.

 Since the early 1990s, China has been helping Iran build and rebuild infrastructure
projects such as highways, subways, factories, dams, ports, airports, shipyards,
and energy projects, some of which were severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq
war and the Iraq War. One of the few countries to have violated the US-led
sanctions against Iran, China opposed tougher sanctions pushed by the United
States to curtail Iran’s oil exports.

 One added benefit for China in dealing with Iran is to exploit its favourable
geographic location. Bordering the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, Iran can serve
as an essential geographic bridge to China’s efforts to secure energy resources in
Central Asia and the Middle East (see map ), a critical locational influence Robert
Kaplan calls “the Iranian pivot”.

 China has stayed more or less neutral in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
managed to earn a constructive role in the eyes of both Palestinians and Israelis

 China’s large and growing economic footprint will give it growing geopolitical
influence in the region, over time possibly superseding that of the U.S.
What would be the implications of China being the main geopolitical power
influencing the Middle East?