BPI V IAC
The subsequent acts of the parties also
On December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to
COMTRUST which is now called BPI, thru Garcia,
the bank manager, US $3,000.00 cash for safekeeping.
The agreement was duly documented.
When he requested the return of the money on May
10, 1976, COMTRUST explained that US$2,000.00
was sold on December 29, 1975, the US$1,000.00 was
sold on February 3, 1976, and all the peso proceeds
were deposited to his current account.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was
properly credited to Zshornack's current account at
prevailing conversion rates, BPI now argues that the
contract embodied in the document is the contract of
depositum (as defined in Article 1962, New Civil
Code), which banks do not enter into.
The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers
when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is
claimed, the bank cannot be liable under the
contract, and the obligation is purely personal to
Garcia.
The court held that they entered into a contract of
depositum, as defined by Art. 1962 of the NCC. The
document which embodies the contract states that
the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for
safekeeping.
show that the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time. Under Article 1962, New
Civil Code, a deposit is constituted from the moment
a person receives a thing belonging to another, with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning
the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is
not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.
However, it was established that the contract
between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign
exchange. Hence, the transaction was covered by
Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold
and Foreign Exchange Transactions. Since under CB
Circular No. 20, the mere safekeeping of the
greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank
within one business day from receipt, is an
unauthorized transaction, it must be considered as
one which falls under the general class of prohibited
transactions.
More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a
cause of action against the other. "When the nullity
proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of
the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall
have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art.
1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on
behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for
violating the law.
In other words, the transaction between Zshornack
and the bank was void having been executed against
the provisions of a mandatory law (CB Circ No. 20).
Being in pari delicto, the law cannot afford either of
them remedy.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ET AL. VS. THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA, ET AL.
128 SCRA 577. 4 April 1984. Second Division
(Makasiar, Actg., C.J.)
Topic: Article 1980; Bank deposits are in the nature of
irregular deposits.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular
deposits, they are really loans because they
earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits,
whether fixed, savings, or current are to be
treated as loans and are to be covered by the
law on loan.  Current and saving deposits,
are loans to a bank because it can use
the  same. While the Bank has the obligation
to return the amount deposited, it has,
however, no obligation to return or deliver
the  same money  that was deposited. And, the
failure of the Bank to return the amount
deposited will not constitute estafa through
misappropriation but it will only give rise to
civil liability over which the public
respondents have no- jurisdiction.
Facts
Private respondent Clement David invested with the
National Savings and Loan Association (NSLA) placed
on 9 deposits through the inducement of an
Australian national who was allegedly a close
associate of petitioners herein. NSLA was then placed
under receivership by the Central Bank. David filed
claims for his and his sister’s investments and
received a report that only a portion of the
investments they claim were entered in the records
of NSLA. David alleged that there was
misappropriation of funds and violation of Central
Bank circulars, hence charged petitioners herein with
estafa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges on
the ground that David’s claims comprised a purely
civil obligation which was itself novated.
From March 20, 1979 to March, 1981, private
respondent David, together with his sister, Denise Kuhne,
invested with the Nation Savings and Loan Association
(NSLA) the total sum of Pl,336,614.02 on several savings
and time deposits. It appears further that private
respondents David and Kuhne also made investments in
the aforesaid bank in the amount of US$75,000.00.
When the NSLA was placed under receivership on
March 21, 1981, petitioners Guingona and Martin, upon
the request of private respondent David, assumed the
obligation of the bank to the latter by executing on June
17, 1981 a joint promissory note in favor of private
respondent acknowledging an indebtedness of
Pl,336,614.02 and US$75,000.00
Thereafter, David received a report from the
Central Bank that only P305,821.92 of those investments
were entered in the records of NSLA; that after demands,
petitioner Guingona Jr. paid only P200,000.00, thereby
reducing the amounts misappropriated to P959,078.14
and US$75,000.00.
On December 23,1981, private respondent David
filed I.S. No. 81-31938 in the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, which case was assigned to respondent Lota for
preliminary investigation.
In I.S. No. 81-31938, David charged petitioners
and the directors of the Nation Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., with estafa for allegedly
misappropriating the balance of the investments, and
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related
Central Bank regulations on foreign exchange
transactions.
Issue
Whether the transactions between David and
NSLA were simple loans which are civil in nature, and
not estafa?
Ruling
It must be pointed out that when private
respondent David invested his money on time and
savings deposits with the NSLA, the contract that was
perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and
not a contract of deposit. Thus, Article 1980 of the New
Civil Code provides that:
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits
of-money in banks and similar institutions shall
be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan.
The relationship between the private respondent
and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of
creditor and  debtor; consequently, the ownership of the
amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the
perfection of the contract and it can make use of the
amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to
pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While
the Bank has the obligation to return the  amount
deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or
deliver the  same money  that was deposited. And, the
failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not
constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable
under Article 315, par. l (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
but it will only give rise to civil liability
Sia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102970, May
13, 1990
Contract of the use of a safety deposit box of a bank is not
a deposit but a lease under Sec 72, A of General Banking
Act. Accordingly, it should have lost no time in notifying
the petitioner in order that the box could have been opened
to retrieve the stamps, thus saving the same from further
deterioration and loss. The bank’s negligence aggravated
the injury or damage to the stamp collection.
Facts: Plaintiff Luzon Sia rented a safety deposit box of
Security Bank and Trust Co. (Security Bank) at its
Binondo Branch wherein he placed his collection of
stamps. The said safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff
was at the bottom or at the lowest level of the safety
deposit boxes of the defendant bank. During the floods
that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into
the defendant bank’s premises, seeped into the safety
deposit box leased by the plaintiff and caused, according
damage to his stamps collection. Security Bank rejected
the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged
stamps collection.
Sia, thereafter, instituted an action for damages against
the defendant bank. Security Bank contended that its
contract with the Sia over safety deposit box was one of
lease and not of deposit and, therefore, governed by the
lease agreement which should be the applicable law; the
destruction of the plaintiff’s stamps collection was due to
a calamity beyond obligation on its part to notify the
plaintiff about the floodwaters that inundated its premises
at Binondo branch which allegedly seeped into the safety
deposit box leased to the plaintiff. The trial court rendered
in favor of plaintiff Sia and ordered Sia to pay damages.
Issue: Whether or not the Bank is liable for negligence.
Held: Contract of the use of a safety deposit box of a bank
is not a deposit but a lease. Section 72 of the General
Banking Act [R.A. 337, as amended] pertinently provides:
In addition to the operations specifically authorized
elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other than
building and loan associations may perform the following
services (a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and
valuable objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the
safequarding of such effects.
As correctly held by the trial court, Security Bank was
guilty of negligence. The bank’s negligence aggravated the
injury or damage to the stamp collection. SBTC was
aware of the floods of 1985 and 1986; it also knew that the
floodwaters inundated the room where the safe deposit box
was located. In view thereof, it should have lost no time in
notifying the petitioner in order that the box could have
been opened to retrieve the stamps, thus saving the same
from further deterioration and loss. In this respect, it
failed to exercise the reasonable care and prudence
expected of a good father of a family, thereby becoming a
party to the aggravation of the injury or loss.
Accordingly, the aforementioned fourth characteristic of a
fortuitous event is absent. Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which reads “Those who in the performance of their
obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages” is applicable. Hence, the petition was
granted.
The provisions contended by Security Bank in the lease
agreement which are meant to exempt SBTC from any
liability for damage, loss or destruction of the contents of
the safety deposit box which may arise from its own
agents’ fraud, negligence or delay must be stricken down
for being contrary to law and public policy.