716

716
SYSTEM CONDITIONS FOR AND PROBABILITY

OF OUT-OF-PHASE
BACKGROUND, RECOMMENDATIONS, DEVELOPMENTS
OF INSTABLE POWER SYSTEMS
JOINT WORKING GROUP

A 3 / B 5/ C 4.37
JANUARY 2018
SYSTEM CONDITIONS FOR AND
PROBABILITY OF OUT-OF-PHASE
BACKGROUND, RECOMMENDATIONS, DEVELOPMENTS OF
INSTABLE POWER SYSTEMS
JWG A3/B5/C4.37
Members
A.L.J. JANSSEN, Convenor NL Q. ZHUANG DE
A. KUBIS, Vice-Convenor DE M. PALAZZO CH
J.M. WILLIEME FR G. POGGI FR
K. APROSIN RU S. MCGUINNESS IE
Corresponding Members and Guests

L.N.F. DE VILLIERS ZA K. JONES US
S. SUGANUMA JP S. YOSHIMOTO JP
S. TEMTEM CH T. GERAERDS NL
Copyright © 2018
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“CIGRE gives no warranty or assurance about the contents of this publication, nor does it accept any responsibility, as to the
SYSTEM CONDITIONS FOR AND PROBABILITY OF OUT-OF-PHASE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2014 three CIGRE Study Committees A3, B5 and C4 established a joint working group JWG
A3/B5/C4.37 to study the system conditions for and the probability of out-of-phase (out-of-step)
cases. One of the primary questions for the group is whether this kind of event is still a risk for power
systems. The JWG had to investigate this in multiple aspects: service experience, its consequences,
the requirements for protection/control and for circuit breakers, etc. This requires the input from
experts in the field of power system studies, protection, generators, power plants and circuit breakers.
In order to understand the experts with a different background, uniform definitions and descriptions
are needed. These are given in Chapter 2 and the most important are:
An Out-of-Step (OOS) is a condition whereby the transmission angle of a transmission
device (e.g. transmission line, transformer) connecting sub-systems or the rotor-angle of a
generator go past 180 degrees. Here, the transmission angle is defined as the difference
between the voltage angles of the sending and receiving buses. During this condition, the
location of the electrical centre can be considered somewhere along the impedance in
between This term will be used in the context of power system networks, especially
interconnected power systems, that have lost the synchronism and single generators that
have lost the synchronism with the power system network.
An Out-of-Phase (OOP) is an abnormal circuit condition between the parts of an electrical
system on either side of a circuit breaker in which, at the instant of operation of the circuit
breaker, the phase angle between rotating phasors, representing the generated voltages on
either side, exceeds the normal value. The normal value corresponds usually to an angle of
90° with voltage phasors as large as the rated voltage of the circuit breaker.
From these definitions, it can be concluded that OOS refers to a phase difference of more than 180°
between one or more interconnected generators or between interconnected power system networks.
OOP does not necessarily require an angle of 180° or larger and the term OOP is typically used by
circuit breaker experts for whom switching under OOP conditions covers conditions with angles
exceeding normal values, e.g. 90° and above. OOS is used by power plant experts, protection experts
and system study experts. These cases occur, if generators or parts of power system networks lose
stability. JWG’s observations indicate that multiple terms are used to describe identical phenomena.
The transition from a stable and well synchronized power system into an unstable and eventually in
an asynchronously operated system is the result of power system instability. Multiple phenomena
occur in (causal) series or even at the same time. However, as our observations indicate, since some
terms and definitions are used interchangeably, even if the probability is high that they refer to a very
specific effect, we recommend experts of academia and industry to review the definitions of these
terms, in order to find appropriate definitions distinguishing phenomenon within the causal chain of
the loss of stability (see Chapter 2).
There are always small power swings (also known as small-disturbances) in a transmission network;
these can be caused by small transients and the excitation of inherent oscillation conditions between
parts of the power system. The actions of power plants controllers (for instance: Power System
Stabilizer) and HVDC controllers are typically sufficient to dampen the swings and prevent the
escalation of such small power swings. In addition, larger but still stable power swings may occur due
to larger excitations (sudden loss of a large power plant, a change in system impedance, a jump in
system load). When unstable power swings appear, they need a serious intervention by protection
and control equipment in the power system. Both stable and unstable power swings are caused by
sudden unbalance in active power (frequency instability), an unbalance in reactive power (voltage
instability) or a too large power transfer through a generator or a transmission corridor (angular
instability). Often frequency, voltage and angular instability coincide ending in an OOS condition.
Here, a power plant or parts of the system will be separated due to automatic tripping by protective
functions or special protection & control schemes. The limits of stable electric power transmission are
explained in Chapter 3 with a further elaboration in Chapter 5, where some large power system
disturbances are treated and power system protection schemes are discussed.
As explained in Chapter 4, the investigations of CIGRE JWG A3/B5/C4.37 found that system
separation and large disturbances occur more often than expected. They are experienced in all parts
of the world and are not restricted to certain topologies of networks (for instance: radial networks).
3
Although the probability of system separation is smaller in densely meshed networks, a cascading line
tripping will change the topology into that of a radial network with identical effects. By definition, the
out-of-step switching concerns the last line between two parts of a power system to be separated. It
is the opinion of CIGRE JWG A3/B5/C4.37 that the risk of OOS or OOP conditions should not be
ignored and must be taken into account by protection experts as well as circuit breaker experts. But it
was found to be impossible to supply a quantitative probability of system separation in a grid.
Future developments are addressed in Chapter 5. Stimulated by the liberalization of the energy
market and the limitation of getting permits for new infrastructure, the components of the networks
have to work harder: larger power flows, a larger utilization time and a much longer lifetime. In
addition, the power flows and utilization may vary rapidly and often, especially because of the priority
that is, in certain contexts, given to renewable power generation. This again leads to bulk power
flowing along larger distances with potentially less margin to the transmission capability limits.
At the same time power generation becomes more dispersed in the sense of being connected to
distribution networks as well as being volatile in course of time. Distribution grids have to cope with
such developments, but still active power versus load balance and reactive power versus voltage
deviations are of major concern.
Moreover, most sustainable power sources are connected to the AC-network by power electronic
converters. Inherently this can lead to less inertial energy immediately available in the AC network
(the back-bone of electricity power supply system). It could also lead to lower contribution to the
short-circuit current. But looking at the overall system, there are also signs of compensation of the
loss of inertial energy and short-circuit power, as explained in Chapter 5.
There is the expectation that both transmission grids and distribution grids become more complicated
with a higher probability of disturbances in the balance between power production and load, between
reactive power needs and required power quality, between the need for power wheeling and the
necessary transient transmission capability.
The impact of loss-of-synchronism of a power plant in comparison to a nearby three-phase short-
circuit is described in Chapter 6. As a special case, false synchronization is highlighted, since it may
give the highest mechanical stresses to the generator and drive train. The protection against false
synchronization and other relevant protection functions are approached in this Chapter. It is important
to have a proper balance between saving the power plants from severe damage and preventing the
power system from collapsing. To find a fair balance, the parties involved are supposed to understand
the difficulties, risks and economic consequences experienced by all stakeholders in a respectful way.
The impact of unstable power swings on system protection is described in Chapter 5; the impact on
power plants and their protection and control is described in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 is devoted to the
impact on circuit breakers, which have to perform the switching action to separate parts of a power
system or to separate a generator from the grid. After illustrating some basic characteristics of current
switching, the OOP current switching type test as specified in the international standards is explained.
Historical background information as well as observations under disturbance conditions are addressed
for transmission circuit breakers. A special section is for MV generator circuit breakers. In both cases,
the standards cover the majority of prevailing conditions, but it is deemed necessary, especially for
the generator circuit breakers, to carefully check each particular application for the probability of a
coincidence of circumstances that lead to conditions more severe than stated in the standards.
The conclusion of Chapter 5 is that distribution grids are moving to the more complicated structure
and requirements of transmission grids. This applies also to circuit breakers. Requirements such as
generator switching, OOP switching, synchronization, withstand the dielectric stresses across open
contacts are becoming applicable to MV circuit breakers as well.
Chapter 8 gives the conclusions and recommendations. The main conclusion is that large disturbances
inherently with system separation occur more frequently than expected and in all topologies of
networks: radial, semi-radial and meshed. It is the cascading effect of tripping overhead lines and
power plants that leads to a last overloaded corridor where angular instability, frequency instability
and voltage instability come together. System separation is a likely consequence of OOP condition as
a result of losing power system stability. The present standards for high voltage circuit breakers
covers this kind of OOP conditions.
4
Due to the developments in the power systems with an ever increasing power transfer along larger
distances, with strongly varying power flows and a change from inertial energy to very fast power
electronic controllers (HVDC, non-synchronous generators, FACTS, storage), it could be that systems
will be operated with smaller stability margin and thus will become more vulnerable to the loss of
stability.
System stability, the dynamics of synchronous and non-synchronous power plants, the behaviour of
controllable loads and auxiliaries, the protection systems and the circuit breakers form together a
complicated system with multiple disciplines and far from straight forward engineering experience.
Mutually understood definitions and terms are needed. Risk management under such conditions is not
easy, taking into consideration the limited experience per expert with system disturbances. But also
establishing adequate rules (grid-codes) and verifying the proper design, settings, and functioning of
all kind of equipment and systems is not an easy task. Good cooperation with mutual respect between
TSOs, power plant operators, regulators and third parties is a necessity to assure a correct response
of the power system to large disturbances.
Very severe OOS conditions for generators occur at false synchronization. Several causes are
reported, mostly wiring mistakes combined with lack of appropriate tests. At faulty synchronization of
a power plant, fast tripping may be given by adapting certain protections schemes (like for example,
the inadvertent energization protection). However, in general it is not clear which protection will give
a trip command at false synchronization and how fast. For the generator circuit breaker, either at the
MV-side of the step-up transformer or at the HV-side, false synchronization goes with large currents
and possibly with delayed current zeros. An immediate tripping command, as assumed in the
generator circuit breaker standard, would limit the electromechanical stress on the machine but it
could give the highest stresses in terms of current magnitude for the involved circuit breaker; on the
other hand, the degree of asymmetry of the current might be much higher if the contact parting is
delayed. Hence project-specific studies shall be performed to endorse the suitability of the generator
circuit breaker to handle the worst-case scenario. Careful evaluation before application is deemed to
be necessary.
Half of the interviewed TSOs have fixed locations to split the power system in case of OOS conditions.
They apply special OOS functions or special (wide-area) protection schemes to trip at these locations
or apply blocking functions in their distance protection functions to prevent false-tripping. The other
half of utilities wait for the tripping of distance protection, most probably close to the electrical
centre(s) of the OOS conditions. However, most of them also adapt distance protection blocking
functions. More in general all kinds for blocking have been reported: none, all zones and everything in
between. This triggers the feeling that some guidance for the utilities’ policies is required: a possible
role for a future CIGRE working group.
5
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 3
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 11
2. DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................... 13
2.1 RELEVANT DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 13
2.2 OBSERVATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
2.3 GRID-CODES ..................................................................................................................................................................... 17
2.4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 18
3. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF OOS CONDITIONS ................................................................ 19

3.1 LIMITS TO THE POWER TRANSFER CAPABILITY OF A TRANSMISSION CORRIDOR......................................... 19
3.2 LOSS OF SYNCHRONISM .............................................................................................................................................. 21
3.3 GENERAL POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................................. 22
3.4 REQUIREMENTS IN GRID-CODES AND STANDARDS ............................................................................................... 23
3.5 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 25
4. PERCEPTION OF OOS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT ................................................................... 27

4.1 RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................. 27
4.2 “NORMAL RISKS” HANDLED BY TODAY’S RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT ................................................ 28
4.3 “STRATEGIC RISKS” OF UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY OR AMBIGUITY .............................................................. 28
4.4 PERCEPTION OF OUT-OF-STEP IN PDCA OF RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT .......................................... 30
4.5 EVIDENCES OF OUT-OF-STEP AS STRATEGIC RISKS IN THIS TECHNICAL BROCHURE ................................... 34
4.6 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 35
5. LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM AND OUT-OF-STEP IN POWER SYSTEM NETWORKS........... 37

5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 37
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................... 37
5.3 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS .............................................................................................................. 41
5.3.1 Discussion of South Australian Blackout (2016) ................................................................................................ 41
5.3.2 Discussion of Turkish Blackout (2015) .................................................................................................................. 42
5.3.3 Discussion of Indian Grid Disturbance (2012) ................................................................................................... 43
5.3.4 Discussion of European Disturbance (2006)....................................................................................................... 44
5.3.5 Discussion of European Disturbance (2003)....................................................................................................... 45
5.3.6 Discussion of Blackout in Northeast America (2003) ....................................................................................... 46
5.3.7 Conclusions from the analyses .............................................................................................................................. 47
5.4 PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 48
5.4.1 Requirements and principles ................................................................................................................................. 48
5.4.2 Response of relay-based protection functions .................................................................................................. 49
5.4.3 System protection schemes .................................................................................................................................... 54
5.4.4 Survey ........................................................................................................................................................................ 55
5.5 AFTER SYSTEM SEPARATION ......................................................................................................................................... 58
5.6 DEVELOPMENTS................................................................................................................................................................ 58
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................................................................... 61
6
5.8 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63
6. SYNCHRONOUS & NON-SYNCHRONOUS POWER SOURCE RESPONSE TO LOSS-OF-

SYNCHRONISM ......................................................................................................................................... 67
6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 67
6.2 SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES ......................................................................................................................................... 67
6.2.1 Generator withstand to out-of-step and out-of-phase conditions ................................................................ 67
6.2.2 Synchronous generators and loss-of-synchronism in case of prolonged faults .......................................... 68
6.2.3 Synchronous generators out-of-phase synchronization ................................................................................... 70
6.2.4 Power plant auxiliary systems .............................................................................................................................. 71
6.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................................ 71
6.3.1 Under-voltage protection (ANSI 27) ................................................................................................................... 73
6.3.2 Over-voltage protection (ANSI 59) .................................................................................................................... 73
6.3.3 Frequency protection (ANSI 81) ........................................................................................................................... 74
6.3.4 Voltage-controlled and voltage-restrained over-current (ANSI 51V-C and 51V-R) ............................... 74
6.3.5 Over-current protection (ANSI 51) ...................................................................................................................... 75
6.3.6 Generator and transformer differential protection (ANSI 87G and 87T) ................................................. 75
6.3.7 Transformer restricted earth-fault protection (ANSI 87REF) .......................................................................... 76
6.3.8 Neutral over-current in the HV transformer connection to earth (ANSI 51N) ............................................ 76
6.3.9 Pole-slip protection (ANSI 78) .............................................................................................................................. 76
6.3.10 Loss-of-field protection (ANSI 40) ....................................................................................................................... 76
6.3.11 Stator earth-fault protection (ANSI 51NG or 59NG)..................................................................................... 77
6.3.12 Reverse power (ANSI 32R) ................................................................................................................................... 77
6.3.13 Distance/under-impedance protection (ANSI 21) ............................................................................................ 77
6.3.14 Inadvertent energization (ANSI 51/27) ............................................................................................................. 78
6.3.15 Unbalanced load or negative sequence protection (ANSI 46) ..................................................................... 78
6.3.16 Over-excitation (Volt per Hertz) protection (ANSI 24)................................................................................... 78
6.4 COORDINATION OF GENERATOR AND TRANSMISSION GRID PROTECTION ................................................. 79
6.5 NON-SYNCHRONOUS POWER SOURCE RESPONSE TO LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM..................................... 80
6.6 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 82
7. CIRCUIT BREAKER PHENOMENA ................................................................................................ 85

7.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................................ 85
7.2 TIME FRAME OF CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCHING PHENOMENA............................................................................ 85
7.2.1 Time frame of fault detection ............................................................................................................................... 85
7.2.2 Time frame under system instability conditions ................................................................................................. 85
7.2.3 Time frame of the contact separation in circuit breakers ............................................................................... 86
7.2.4 Current interruption phenomena .......................................................................................................................... 87
7.3 RECOVERY VOLTAGE AS FUNCTION OF THE INTERRUPTED CURRENT .............................................................. 89
7.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................... 89
7.3.2 Power flow at the location of the circuit breaker ............................................................................................ 90
7.3.3 Network model at location of the circuit breaker ............................................................................................ 90
7.3.4 Recovery voltage versus interrupted current..................................................................................................... 91
7.3.5 Additional remarks to the power factor............................................................................................................. 92
7.3.6 Other switchgears ................................................................................................................................................... 93
7.3.7 Summarizing ............................................................................................................................................................. 93
7.4 OUT-OF-PHASE TEST DUTY IN THE STANDARDS ..................................................................................................... 93
7.4.1 Present Standards ................................................................................................................................................... 93
7.4.2 History ........................................................................................................................................................................ 95
7.5 OUT-OF-PHASE CURRENTS............................................................................................................................................ 96
7.6 GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS .................................................................................................................................. 96
7.6.1 HV or MV circuit breaker ...................................................................................................................................... 96
7.6.2 Out-of-phase requirements in the Standard ..................................................................................................... 97
7.7 HV CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND OUT-OF-PHASE CONDITIONS .............................................................................. 100
7.8 SYSTEM OUT-OF-PHASE CONDITIONS ................................................................................................................... 101
7
7.9 OTHER SWITCHING DUTIES ....................................................................................................................................... 104

7.9.1 Series compensated line ..................................................................................................................................... 104
7.9.2 Long line fault........................................................................................................................................................ 104
7.10 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................................. 104
7.11 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................................... 105
8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 107

8.1 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................................. 107
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 109
APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 111
APPENDIX B. MULTI-PHASE AUTO-RECLOSING (MPAR) ............................................................... 113
8
Figures
Fig. 3-1 PV-curve ......................................................................................................................... 19
Fig. 3-2 Power transfer along a reactance X, being a generator, transmission line, transformer or
combination of these ................................................................................................................... 20
Fig. 3-3 Power transfer before, during and after a fault ................................................................. 21
Fig. 3-4 Schematic view of power output at a regular synchronization of a power plant ................... 25
Fig. 4-1 An aging mechanism in an asset population is a typical “normal risk”, which is suitable to be
analysed at the tactical level of asset management ....................................................................... 28
Fig. 4-2 Overview of world’s largest disturbances[6] ...................................................................... 33
Fig. 5-1 Simple two-area power system ........................................................................................ 37
Fig. 5-2 Transmission Angles based on the Equal-Area Criterion ..................................................... 38
Figure 5-3: RMS-values of voltages and currents at the sending s and receiving r bus as well as at the
centre c of a transmission line during OOS .................................................................................... 38
Fig. 5-4 RMS-Values of Active Power Flow at the sending s and receiving r bus as well as the
frequency at the corresponding buses of a transmission line during OOS ........................................ 39
Fig. 5-5 Comparison of transmission angle θ, Active Power Flow P and slip-frequency fslip at a stable
power swing condition (a-c) and an OOS condition (d-f) . .............................................................. 39
Fig. 5-6 Transmission Line Loadability Curve [4] ............................................................................ 40
Fig. 5-7 Power-Angle-Curve [5] .................................................................................................... 40
Fig. 5-8 Wind farm power reduction based on wind turbine grouping ([6], Fig. 11) ......................... 42
Fig. 5-9 Turkish transmission system with sequence of events [7] .................................................. 42
Fig. 5-10 Development of angular instability after first and second Transmission line trip ([7] Fig. 6) 43
Fig. 5-11 Indian Grid Disturbance (30th July 2012) ([8] Fig. 3.1 with information from Fig. 2.4)....... 44
Fig. 5-12 European Grid Disturbance (4th November 2006) [9] ...................................................... 44
Fig. 5-13 European Grid Disturbance (28th of September 2003) [10] .............................................. 45
Fig. 5-14 The area of the USA and Canada with a blackout on August 14th, 2003 [11] .................... 46
Fig. 5-15 Load encroachment lead to an impedance entering the set zone 3 [11] ............................ 47
Fig. 5-16 Impedance trajectories during a power swing in a simple two-bus-system. ....................... 51
Figure 5-17 Example of measured impedances during OOS [26]..................................................... 52
Fig. 5-18 Voltage Depression During Power Swing ......................................................................... 53
Fig. 5-19 Voltage Depression at Location Further Away From Centre of Oscillation .......................... 53
Fig. 5-20 Voltage Fault Ride-Through Requirements in Irish Grid-code [27] .................................... 53
Fig. 5-21 Number of participating TSOs per continent .................................................................... 55
Fig. 5-22 TSOs applying special protection schemes considering power swings or OOS .................... 56
Fig. 5-23 TSOs applying predefined locations for system separation in case of unstable power swings
.................................................................................................................................................. 56
Fig. 5-24 TSO blocking distance protection functions for power swings ........................................... 56
Fig. 5-25 Zones blocked in distance protection functions for power swings...................................... 56
Fig. 5-26 Zones blocked in distance protection functions for power swings in Europe ...................... 57
Fig. 5-27 Power system test model for out-of-step function (algorithm) certification tests. From Fig.
B.1. of [40] ................................................................................................................................. 62
Fig. 6-1 FRT limits to the European Requirements for Generators larger than 50 MW. Minimum and
maximum requirements are given for synchronous generators and non-synchronous generators (PE
connected, i.e. connected by a power electronic convertor) [7] ...................................................... 69
Fig. 6-2 Power plant protection ANSI-codes (TB 479 [4]) ............................................................... 72
Fig. 6-3 Irish Grid Code Requirements for Active Power Frequency response of Wind Farms [11] ..... 81
Fig. 7-1 Schematic view of initial TRV with traveling waves and time delay ..................................... 88
Fig. 7-2 Three-phase current interruption with transient recovery voltages ..................................... 89
Fig. 7-3 Passive load at load side of circuit breaker ........................................................................ 90
Fig. 7-4 Active load at load side of a circuit breaker ....................................................................... 91
Fig. 7-5 Superposition of injected current ...................................................................................... 91
Fig. 7-6 Complicated network at both sides of CB with each its natural frequencies ......................... 92
Fig. 7-7 Two parameter TRV with time co-ordinates ...................................................................... 94
Fig. 7-8 Ratio T2 and t3 as function of kaf....................................................................................... 94
Fig. 7-9 Four parameter envelope with its co-ordinates .................................................................. 94
Fig. 7-10 OOP angles depend on first pole-to-clear factor kpp [3] .................................................... 95
9
Fig. 7-11 Ratio OOP current and short-circuit current to be cleared by a circuit breaker ................... 96
Fig. 7-12 Locations of main circuit breaker to protect the generator ............................................... 97
Fig. 7-13 Prospective fault current considering the moment of inertia of the synchronous machine and
resulting from synchronizing under OOP conditions (OOP angle φ0 = 90°) ..................................... 98
Fig. 7-14 Ratio of the a.c. component of the out-of-phase breaking current IOOP to the a.c. component
of the system-source short-circuit breaking current ISCsys as a function of initial out-of-phase angle .. 99
Fig. 7-15 Degree of asymmetry of the out-of-phase breaking current DOAOOP as a function of initial
out-of-phase angle ...................................................................................................................... 99
Fig. 7-16 Angle θ along an inductive connection to transfer an amount of active power, being the
natural power PN = E2/√(L/C) (left) of more (right) : 30° per 100 km at 5 PN ................................101
Fig. 7-17 Angle difference between two regions in India shortly before and right after system
sepration (July 30st, 2012) [12] ................................................................................................... 102
sepration (July 31st, 2012) [12] ................................................................................................... 102
Fig. 7-19 : OOP recovery voltage at 81.8% of the rated voltage as a function of the OOP angle for kpp
= 1,3 (blue) and kpp = 1.5 (red) ..................................................................................................103
Tables
Table 4-1 Characteristics and examples of six types of strategic risks ............................................. 29
Table 4-2 Characteristics of four types of strategic risks related to OOS .......................................... 32
Table 5-1 Comparison of Scheduled and Effective Power Exchanges between Italy and its neighbours
taken from [10]........................................................................................................................... 45
Table 5-2 Summarized overview of enquiry results among TSOs worldwide (0 to Z) on their power
swing protection policy ................................................................................................................ 57
10
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2014 three CIGRE Study Committees A3, B5 and C4 established a joint working group JWG
A3/B5/C4.37 to study the system conditions for and the probability of out-of-phase (out-of-step)
cases. One of the primary questions for the group is whether this kind of event is still a risk for power
systems. The JWG had to investigate this in multiple aspects: service experience, its consequences,
the requirements for protection/control and for circuit breakers, etc. This requires the input from
experts in the field of power system studies, protection, generators, power plants, circuit breakers,
research, utilities, manufacturers and consultants. With 14 members and one guest (Ton Geraerds,
NSC A1, NL) from nine countries in four continents, a worldwide representation is achieved. The
combination of disciplines will hopefully give the answers to the relevant questions.
The questions that triggered the necessity for further investigations are:
• Are out-of-phase conditions nowadays still considered as a real risk for transmission and
distribution systems, despite protection and control systems?
• Is there any service experience available?
• What system disturbances have to be covered by protection systems, circuit breakers
and/or other devices?
• Which system and equipment consequences are foreseen in case protection and control
systems and/or circuit breakers fail or malfunction?
• Which out-of-phase angles, currents, voltages may be expected?
• Is there a need for some guidance by CIGRE?
Consequently, the scope of the joint working group A3/B5/C4.37 consisted of four items:
1. Investigation of service experience with out-of-phase conditions and probable circumstances,
leading to them. Investigation of the relevant system parameters and how these develop
during the disturbance. Investigation of the influence and behaviour of the related protection
functions and protection systems.
2. Define the probability and risk of out-of-phase conditions and the consequential need for
primary and secondary equipment to cope with it.
3. Addressing requirements for protection and automatic control equipment as well as HV
equipment to prevent out-of-phase or function properly under these conditions.
4. The WG will actively cooperate with related SCs (e.g. A1, A3, B5 and C4) and IEC TCs, and
build on the work of, for instance, WG B5.14, A3.13, and A3.22/28. Presumably, the
information on out-of-phase conditions is scarce and a survey among utilities and TSO’s was
required to collect relevant cases.
One of our early findings was, that Out-of-Phase is a term that is commonly applied by circuit breaker
experts. The definition and switching of these conditions is well covered by international standards
(see Chapter 7). Out-of-Step is a case of Out-of-Phase and is considered as a severe risk for power
systems and generators. Thus, the Technical Brochure will concentrate on this condition. A proper
definition of Out-of-Phase and Out-of-Step is given in section 2.2.
A power system that becomes unstable will end in out-of-step conditions and mostly with system
separation. Since in practice frequency instability, voltage instability and angular instability coincide,
for the occurrence of out-of-step phenomena it doesn’t matter whether the power system instability
started with an unbalance in active power, unbalance in reactive power or a too large power transfer
along a transmission corridor. Fortunately, the probability of power system instability is rather low.
However, one of the findings is that it may occur in any type of network (radial, semi-radial or
meshed) and occurred on every continent. The consequences of a system falling apart due to power
system instability are very large. As such the risks of these out-of-step conditions cannot be
disregarded. Moreover, new developments, such as less synchronous inertial energy due to
generators that are connected by power electronic converters and large power flows between power
plant sites and the load centres (remote sustainable sources; influence of market mechanism) will
lead to a system operation with less stability margins.
There is a lot of interest in out-of-step phenomena; more in general: in system (in)stability. At the SC
B5 Session 2016, the second Preferential Subject was devoted to the coordination between generator
and power system protection. Recently NERC published the Reliability Standards PRC-026-1 and PRC-
11
023-3 on protection relay performance under stable power swings and on the transmission function
load-ability, respectively. Two IEEE Power System Relay Committee working groups have been
established: WG 303 (Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination) and 305
(Application of Out-of-Step Protection Schemes for Generators). The European Network Code
"Requirements for Generators", drafted by ENTSO-E, is in force since May 17th, 2016. There are many
publications on the influence of sustainable energy sources on system stability and a continuous flow
of publications on protection technology to discriminate between short-circuit situations and stable or
unstable power swings. The new combined IEC and IEEE Standard on MV generator circuit breakers
has been published in October 2015, IEC/IEEE 62271-37-013. All these developments are related to
system instability and the possibility of systems falling apart due to the loss of power system stability
ending up in out-of-step conditions.
This Technical Brochure addresses the coordination between power plant and system behaviour under
consideration of transient and dynamic disturbances in power systems. Much can be learned from
large disturbances including system separation, which occur from time to time around the world. For
this reason, references to international regulations, publications and working groups (e.g. CIGRE,
NERC, ENTSO-E, IEEE) on the coordination of protection and control are given.
The perspectives of power systems and power plants are discussed with emphasis on coordination of
protection and control devices, especially with respect to the timing of protection intervention, critical
clearing time (CCT), fault-ride-through requirements (FRT), reactive and short-circuit power
contribution. The brochure pays attention to power systems after separation and, shortly, to
resynchronization. Further, overall risk perception is discussed and mitigation strategies are
addressed.
During out-of-step conditions, system separation can be restricted to predefined locations or be
allowed to occur naturally (mostly near the electrical centre). The application of out-of-step protection
and the usage of power swing blocking and/or tripping functions by several TSOs are reported as well
as system integrity protection systems. Regarding this topic the reliability of such functions and their
impact on the performance of distance protection is briefly discussed as well as considerations for
developing relay settings, designing test plans for lab-testing and on-site commissioning of relays and
synchronization apparatus, the overall responsibility plus verification of load shedding, curtailment,
FRT, etc. In addition, the requirements for HV circuit breakers and MV generator circuit breakers will
be addressed.
The future developments of power systems, including the increasing influence of HVDC and power
generation connected by power electronics, have a large impact on system stability, both in a positive
way and in a negative way. This influence will be mentioned.
In this document, a description of definitions related to power system instability are given (Chapter 2),
general system requirements (Chapter 3), risk perception (Chapter 4), loss-of-synchronism, power
swings and system separation (Chapter 5) are addressed. In Chapter 5 attention is paid to system
protection and control during loss-of-synchronism and out-of-step conditions while Chapter 6
considers power plant protection and control. New developments, including inverter coupled
generators and HVDC will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 7 describes circuit
breaker phenomena. The conclusions and recommendations are given in Chapter 8. References are
given per Chapter.
12
2. DEFINITIONS
At the start of JWG A3/B5/C4.37 it became immediately clear that members with a different technical
background use different terms or have a different interpretation of terms used. For that reason, it
has been considered essential to understand and align the terms applied for conditions related to an
unstable power system. Another reason to address definitions is to understand in detail the
phenomena that play a role when a power system is stressed up to its limits.
In this Chapter relevant definitions including their origin are given. Further, some observations will be
given and descriptions of the interpretations of the terms as used in this Brochure will be given.
2.1 RELEVANT DEFINITIONS
The definitions used by JWG A3/B5/C4.37 will be introduced in section 2.2. Beforehand a review of
internationally accepted definitions will be given. Definitions have been taken from the International
Vocabulary of IEC, especially IEV 60050-603-03 [1], but also from chapter 60050-14-35 [2]. Further
definitions have been taken from IEEE PSRC WG D6 [3] and from the IEC and IEC/IEEE Standards,
specifically those for (generator) circuit breakers [4][5]. In addition, a definition from the European
grid-code for generators has been applied [6]. For some terms other publications have been used
[7][8][9][10].
Power swing
a variation in three phase power flow which occurs when the generator rotor angles are advancing or
retarding relative to each other in response to changes in load magnitude and direction, loss of
generation, faults, and other system disturbances [3]
Stable power swing

a power swing is considered stable if the generators do not slip poles and the system reaches a new
state of equilibrium, i.e. an acceptable operating condition [3]
Power system stability

Power system stability is the ability of an electric power system, for a given initial operating condition,
to regain a state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical disturbance, with most
system variables bounded so that practically the entire system remains intact [10]
Unstable power swing

a power swing that will result in a generator or a group of generators experiencing pole slipping for
which some corrective action must be taken [3]
Out-of-step condition
same as unstable power swing [3]
Loss-of-synchronism
same as out-of-step [2]
Pole slip
a condition whereby a generator, or a group of generators, terminal voltage angles (or phases) go
past 180 degrees with respect to the rest of the connected power system [3]
13
Asynchronous operation
same as pole slip [6]
Transient instability
loss-of-synchronism, due to a large disturbance or a change in operating conditions, of one or more
generating units, singly or as a group, with the remainder of the power system ([1], amm. 1)
Note: a large disturbance may be, for example, a short-circuit or a sudden change in
impedance.
Dynamic instability, oscillatory instability

lack of damping which results in a build-up of oscillations in the power system, and may or may not
lead to loss-of-synchronism ([1], amm. 1)
Note: under this condition, the derivative of the active power with respect to rotor speed is
negative for at least one generator.
Out-of-step operation
the operation condition of a group of interconnected synchronous machines in which the angles of
deviation between two or more machines vary up to the final loss-of-synchronism or until synchronism
is restored [1]
Electrical system centre or voltage zero

it is the point or points in the system where the voltage becomes zero during an unstable power
swing [3]
Synchronous restoration
the process by which a synchronous machine recovers the synchronous operation after having
operated out of synchronism [1]
Islanding (Network splitting)

the process whereby a power system is split into two or more islands ([1], amm. 1)
Note: islanding is either a deliberate emergency measure, or a result of automatic protection
or control action, or the result of human error.
Island
portion of a power system, that is disconnected from the remainder of the system, but remains
energized ([1], amm. 1)
Load shedding
the process of deliberately disconnecting preselected loads from a power system in response to an
abnormal condition in order to maintain the integrity of the remainder of the system ([1], amm. 1)
Curtailment
a reduction in the scheduled capacity or energy delivery of an interchange transaction [9]
14
Synchronization of two systems

the matching of two systems with respect to their frequency and to their voltage magnitude and
voltage phase for interconnection purposes [1]
Self-synchronization
the process of synchronization of an unloaded and unexcited synchronous machine that is excited
either at the same time as it is coupled to the system or shortly afterwards [1]
Critical clearing time

If a particular disturbance includes the initiation and isolation of a fault on a power system, the critical
clearing time is the maximum time between the initiation and the isolation such that the power
system is transiently stable [7]
Under voltage ride through

ability of a wind turbine or wind power plant to stay connected during voltage dips [8]
Internal angle of an alternator

the phase difference between the terminal voltage of an alternator and its electromotive force (EMF)
[1]
Angle of deviation between two EMF’s

the phase difference between the EMF of an alternator taken as a reference and that of another
alternator or that of an infinite bus [1]
Out-of-Phase conditions
abnormal circuit conditions of loss or lack of synchronism between the parts of an electrical system on
either side of a circuit breaker in which, at the instant of operation of the circuit breaker, the phase
angle between rotating phasors, representing the generated voltages on either side, exceeds the
normal value. ([4], cl. 3.1.115)
Note: the requirements of this standard cater for the great majority of applications of circuit
breakers intended for switching during out-of-phase conditions. Out-of-phase angles
corresponding to the specified power frequency recovery voltages are given in 6.110.3 in [4].
For extreme service conditions see 8.103.3 in [4].
Out-of-Phase conditions
abnormal circuit conditions of loss or lack of synchronism between the parts of an electrical system on
either side of a generator circuit breaker in which, at the instant of operation of the generator circuit
breaker, the phase angle between rotating phasors, representing the generated voltages on either
side, exceeds the normal value ([5], cl. 3.1.104)
2.2 OBSERVATIONS
With respect to the terms, synonyms and definitions given, several observations can be made. The
most important observations are:
1. Out-of-step (OOS) is a special condition within the context of Out-of-phase (OOP). The term
out-of-phase is typically used by circuit breaker experts for whom switching under out-of-
15
phase conditions covers conditions with angles exceeding normal values, e.g. 90°, while out-
of-step includes a phase difference of more than 180° of one or more generators or between
interconnected power system networks. As an out-of-phase condition does not necessarily
require an angle of 180° or larger, out-of-phase can be seen as a special out-of-step
condition. Out-of-step is used by power plant experts, protection experts and system study
experts and covers the case of generators or parts of power systems that lose stability.
2. The last two definitions are related to those for circuit breakers. The last one is for MV
generators circuit breakers and contains only small adaptations with respect to the first one,
that is related to circuit breakers in general.
3. Out-of-step condition, loss-of-synchronism, asynchronous operation, transient instability, out-
of-step operation and pole slip all refer to a condition where angular stability has been lost.
An unstable power swing might lead to the loss of stability but could also occur, if the stability
has already been lost.
4. After a pole slip of one or more generators, these generators may recover and run further
synchronized with the power system (synchronous restoration), but most probably they will
be automatically disconnected from the power system.
5. In the latter case, the generator(s) may be disconnected individually by their protection
systems or the power system is split into several parts (network splitting or islanding).
6. Within an island, the load and/or the power generation have to be adapted to the new
conditions within the portion of the power system by means of load shedding and/or power
plant curtailment. An island is a part of a power system and not a power plant supplying only
its house load.
7. The term under-voltage-ride through is often replaced by fault-ride-through, also in this
Technical Brochure.
8. The definitions are mainly based on power systems with a dominant power production by
synchronous generators. In real cases, the influence of HVDC and non-synchronous
generators has to be considered.
Descriptions used in this Brochure

Our observations indicate that multiple terms are used to describe identical phenomena. The
transition from a stable and well synchronized power system into an unstable and eventually in an
asynchronously operated system is the result of power system instability. Multiple phenomena occur in
(causal) series or even at the same time. Thus, in this brochure we will make use of the following
redefined descriptions - for the ease of the readers of this brochure. However, as our observations
indicate, that some terms and definitions are used interchangeably, even if the probability is high that
they refer to a very specific effect, we recommend that experts of academia and industry should
review the definitions of these terms, in order to find appropriate definitions distinguishing
phenomenon within the causal chain of the loss of stability. All before given definitions, that are not
redefined will be used as introduced before.
Out-of-Step Condition
a transient condition whereby the transmission angle of a transmission device (e.g.
transmission line, transformer) connecting sub-systems or the rotor-angle of a generator go
past 180 degrees and continue to increase if not interrupted, driven by a difference in the
electrical rotation speed (rotor angles) of synchronous generators connected at both ends.
Here, the transmission angle is defined as the difference between the voltage angles of the
(representative) sending and receiving buses. During this condition, the location of the
electrical centre can be considered somewhere along the impedance of this device. This term
will be used in the context of power system networks, especially interconnected power
systems, that have lost the synchronism and single generators that have lost the synchronism
with the power system network. Generator groups that may have lost the synchronism with
other generator groups is considered as an event, where the synchronism is lost in the power
system network.
16
Out-of-Step Operation
The operation of a generator connected with the network or power system networks, while an
Out-of-Step condition is evident, e.g. in case that such a condition is not appropriately tripped
by protection systems.
Asynchronous operation (applied to a synchronous generator)

same as out-of-step operation, the generator excitation is still operating [6]. In case of
complete loss of excitation, the generator will become an asynchronous machine that absorbs
strong currents and generates rapid overheating.
Loss-of-synchronism
As the Out-of-Step Condition refers to a condition where the synchronism is already lost
(angle difference ≥ 180° for at least one time or with multiples of 360°), the term loss-of-
synchronism refers to the intermediate state where the angle difference starts to increase
according to the slip-frequency leading to an out-of-step condition.
Slip-frequency
The slip-frequency is defined as the frequency differential between a generator and the
system or two subsystems of a power system network during an out-of-step condition.
Electrical centre
it defines the locations, where the voltage becomes zero, while the current (rms-value)
reaches its maximum during an out-of-step condition or pole slip (when the angle difference is
180°). The electrical centre appears in the middle of the total system impedance.
Pole slip (applied to generators)

a condition whereby the rotor angle of a generator goes past 180° with respect to the voltage
angle of the connected power system network. Each passing of 180° difference is considered
as a pole slip. In this brochure, this term will be used to indicate out-of-step conditions in the
context of power plants.
Out-of-Phase conditions (applied to circuit breakers)

abnormal circuit conditions between the parts of an electrical system on either side of a circuit
breaker in which, at the instant of operation of the circuit breaker, the phase angle difference
between rotating phasors, representing the source voltages on either side, exceeds the
normal value. The normal value corresponds usually to an angle of 90° with voltage phasors
as large as the rated voltage of the circuit breaker.
2.3 GRID-CODES
In the Technical Brochure, reference will be made to the requirements put forward to guarantee a
stable power system. Requirements for normal and abnormal operating conditions of a power system
are nowadays formulated in so-called grid-codes. The requirements are applicable to power plant
operators, transmission grid operators (TSOs), to distribution system operators (DSOs) and to other
parties connected to the transmission and distribution grids. Grid-codes may have a legal status, even
an international legal status, or may have a contractual status between two or more involved parties.
In general, the TSOs are involved and may be even the party that proposes the grid-codes, but also
17
regulators may be involved and even a political process to put a grid-code into force. Requirements in
relation to system instability are usually formulated in grid-codes.
2.4 REFERENCES
[1] IEV 60050-603-03, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, Chapter 603: Generation,
transmission and distribution – Power system planning and management, Amendment 1, 1998
[2] IEV 60050-448-14-35, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, Chapter 448: Power system
protection, 1995
[3] IEEE PSRC WG D6 Report to the Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power
Engineering Society, Power Swing and Out-of-Step Considerations on Transmission Lines,
2005
[4] IEC 62271-100 ed. 2.1 (2012), High-voltage circuit breaker and controlgear – Part 100: High-
voltage alternating current circuit breakers, 2012
[5] International Standard IEC/IEEE 62271-37-013, ed. 1.0 (2015). High-voltage circuit breaker
and controlgear, Part 37-013: Alternating-current generator circuit breakers
[6] ENTSO-E Network Code (2013), Requirements for Grid Connection Applicable to all
Generators
[7] IEC 61400-27, ed. 1.0 (2015), Wind Turbines
[8] “Proposed Terms & Definitions for Power System Stability”, IEEE PAS-101, No.7, 1982, pp.
1895, Task Force on Terms & Definitions System Dynamic Performance, Power System
Engineering Committee
[9] Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (24 September 2014)
[10] CIGRE Technical Brochure 231 (2003), “Definition and Classification of Power System
Stability”
18
3. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF OOS CONDITIONS

3.1 LIMITS TO THE POWER TRANSFER CAPABILITY OF A TRANSMISSION CORRIDOR
Power system instability is caused by a sudden change in power production (or load), an extreme
fault condition in the network, a sudden increase in impedances or a lack of damping of power
oscillations in the system. It results into a local or regional imbalance between active power
generation and active load (frequency instability) or an imbalance between reactive power generation
and reactive load in the system (voltage instability) or a lack of synchronising torque (transient
instability) or a lack of damping torque (oscillatory instability). In terms of networks, the transient
instability can be seen as caused by a power transfer through a transmission corridor that exceeds the
stability limit of this corridor (angular instability). Often frequency, voltage and rotor or angular
instability coincide. Especially, it is the case when a cascade tripping of transmission lines,
transformers and/or power plants occurs. Then a deficit of (reactive) power production occurs
together with an increased (reactive) power flow and an increased impedance between source and
load leading to further voltage drop.
Taking for instance a transmission line; the amount of power that can be transferred depends on the
thermal rating of the line, the required voltage profile along the line and the allowed angle between
the voltages at both line ends. The maximum current is directly related to the conductor material and
the weather conditions, mainly the wind speed as well as the environmental temperature. The
conductor temperature is limited due to restrictions on the maximum sag of the line, and also by the
temperature at which the grease between conductor layers starts to drip or other physical damage to
conductors and their hardware will appear. Most important for system stability (reliability) is the
increased sag in combination with too high vegetation in the line’s corridor. Under heavy load
conditions a flash-over to earth would overload other lines and could provoke cascading trips.
At the same time, a heavily loaded line requires reactive power in order to maintain the operational
voltage limits at both line ends. In addition to the active power to be transmitted, a larger amount of
reactive power has to be transferred or supplied as well. In case the reactive power needs cannot be
fulfilled, the voltage will decrease. Transformers supplying loads are normally equipped with on load
tap changers. Since voltage control equipment may adapt the tap position to compensate the voltage
drop at the distribution side, the load requirements will not decrease with the lower transmission
voltage. Thus, the transmission line has to supply even more current as required via the loaded
transformers. Based on a rather simple model of the line and its (power) sending end voltage, the
limit of active power transfer can be shown in so-called PV-curves. In Fig. 3-1 such a curve is
presented with a transmission line circuit modelled by only a reactance and a resistance. The sending
end voltage is kept constant, while the receiving end voltage ER is given as a function of the active
power PR of the load. The ratio between reactive ( Q) and active power (P) of the load is kept constant
by a fixed power factor. Starting from the upper part and increasing the load, the receiving end
voltage will drop until the critical point, the point of singularity, is reached and no more active power
can be transferred. The critical point gives the voltage stability limit under these conditions.
Fig. 3-1 PV-curve

Along a reactance X, like a transmission line, a transformer or a generator, power flow is mainly
determined by the angle difference θ between the voltage phasors at both sides of the reactance.
19
With equal amplitudes of the voltage phasors (E), the transmitted active power P is 𝑃 = 2𝐸 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜃/2)/
𝑋; see Fig. 7-16. Another way to present the maximum power flow that can be transmitted as a
function of the angle θ between the two voltages, is presented in Fig. 3-2. The left-hand diagram
presents the current vectors seen at the receiving end (Er), while the right-hand side presents the
current vectors at the sending end (Es). The latter is usually applied to generator diagrams, with Es as
the EMF. Id is the direct axis component of the current related to the active power P and Iq is the
quadrature component related to the reactive power at the sending end. From these diagrams the
relationship between transferred power and the voltages can be calculated.
jX·Id
jX·I jX·Re{I} jX·I jX·Iq
I
jX·Im{I}
Es Er
jX
Es Es
Er Er
P = Er·Re{I} =
Im{I}
Er·I·cos(φ) = I I
Er*Es/X·sin(θ) = Id
Es·Id = Re{I}
θ θ Iq
Es·Er/X·sin(θ) φ φ
Fig. 3-2 Power transfer along a reactance X, being a generator, transmission line, transformer or
combination of these
Despite the simple model, the formula for the receiving end voltage is rather complex, also with a
fixed power factor and a fixed sending end voltage Es. Note that Q is given by the power factor φ.
𝐸 − 2𝑄𝑋 ± 𝐸 − 4𝑄𝑋𝐸 − 4𝑃 𝑋
𝐸 =
2
From Fig. 3-2, it can also be learned that the maximum (rotor) angle θ to transmit power is 90°.
Beyond this angle the power to be transmitted will decrease and a condition where the power system
becomes unstable is met. At 90°, a small overshoot of power input, leading to a small acceleration
and an increase in the angle θ, leads to a decrease in power that can be transferred to the other end.
Consequentially, a further acceleration will take place, θ increases further and so on. In Fig. 3-3 a
situation is presented where a fault between a power generation site and a load site leads to a sudden
decrease of the voltage, while the power input to the system stays constant. The increase in (rotor)
angle θ is represented by the angle “before” up to “after” the short-circuit. After fault clearance, the
voltage returns to a value between the voltage before and the voltage during the fault. The power
that is transferred, Pafter short-circuit, is larger than the power input and a deceleration takes place, so that
the angle returns to a new stable operating point. Beyond a certain combination of voltage drop
during the fault and duration to clear the fault, it will no longer be possible to prevent a pole slip.
After a pole slip, the generator, the group of generators or the part of the power system may run
again synchronously with the remaining part of the power system (this condition is not so common) or
it may be separated from the remaining part.
Power system instabilities can also be divided into short term phenomena (within seconds for voltage
and frequency instability) and long-term phenomena (within tens of seconds to minutes). Rotor angle
instability develops within seconds after a large disturbance and within tens of seconds after a small
disturbance (leading to inter area oscillations) [4]. Inter area oscillations (0.2 to 0.5 Hz) are to be
20
controlled in a way that they damp out; for instance, by PSS (power system stabilizers on the large
power plants) or by the control of HVDC converters.
Quite often rotor angle instability goes with voltage and frequency instability. Oppositely, voltage
and/or frequency instability usually result into angle instability as well. For an actual system
disturbance, the variation of both the voltage magnitude and the phase angle is shown in Appendix J
of [1]. The authors speak about a saddle node bifurcation and point at the coincidence of voltage
instability and angular instability as function of line loading. More details of the system behaviour and
how to prevent system separation are treated in Chapter 5.
Fig. 3-3 Power transfer before, during and after a fault
3.2 LOSS OF SYNCHRONISM

Two different cases can be distinguished: (a) a generator or power plant that loses synchronism with
the network and (b) parts of the system or network that mutually lose synchronism. In case (a), the
electrical centre will be located near and probably within the generator-transformer unit. Whereas in
case (b), it will be located on an overhead line or another connection in the system (e.g. a substation
transformer or a cable connection).
Case (a) may occur at system disturbances or at disturbances close to the power plant. For instance,
following a short-circuit close to the power plant, or following a false synchronization. The power plant
may be separated from the system at the HV-side of the step-up transformer or at the MV-side (by
means of an MV generator circuit breaker). Anyway, the power plant availability has to be protected
[2] and the generator has to be protected for severe damage due to the repulsive out-of-step (OOS)
current that may reach values as high as the sub-transient short-circuit current peak value or higher
[3]. The high currents may result in damaged stator end windings and due to the high value of the
torque that stresses the machine shaft, in damaged couplings and rotor windings.
Case (b) may occur during system instabilities, large system disturbances, mal-operation (by
operators or protection) and failing circuit breakers. The instability and/or disturbance can be
triggered by too long fault clearing time, a sudden change in the power balance or a change in the
system impedance, e.g. due to cascading line tripping.
Depending on the dedicated settings of protection functions or on their spontaneous actions (if
blocking under power swing conditions is not foreseen), case (b) could lead to system separation due
to OOS conditions. It should be noted that each separated part will not necessarily show a balance
between power generation and power load. Load shedding or generator tripping may be required to
achieve a balance in active power. Adapted reactive power control will be required to achieve an
acceptable voltage profile.
21
3.3 GENERAL POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

Ultimately, the power system design, protection, operation and control have to fulfil the requirement
to prevent the system from black-outs and from collapsing. Specific requirements are: stand-by
generating power, spinning reserve, redundant transmission equipment, sufficient and redundant
reactive power supply and dissipation, voltage control, temporary and transient over-voltage
protection, selective and fast and dependable protection, automatic load shedding and power plant
curtailment, out-of-step prevention, protection and Power System Stabiliser. In addition, components
such as power plants, control systems, protection systems, circuit breakers and HVDC converters have
to operate properly during a system disturbance. For instance, during a stable power swing, a power
plant has to stay connected as long as possible to serve the system stability. However, as damaged
power plants cannot support system restoration anymore, it is necessary to disconnect them in due
time.
In case a black-out cannot be prevented, the area or number of affected consumers has to be limited
and system restoration has to be achieved as fast as possible. Measures have to be in place to
accommodate the restoration of power supply. Spare transformers, spare materials, an emergency
organization, emergency transmission line load abilities, emergency power generating sets, resilient
communication systems are among the countermeasures to be considered in advance. The involved
power plants (including wind parks and HVDC-connections) have to be designed to stay connected
during a short period of large voltage deviations, including short-circuit conditions (fault-ride-through:
depending on the voltage dip seconds or less). In addition, after being disconnected from the grid, the
large power plants are generally required to keep running and deliver its own supply (hours): house-
load operation. Another requirement is to be capable to deliver power to the system or a part of the
system during system restoration; i.e. a matter of control and range of regulation of both active and
reactive power with special attention for the inherent capability to energize unloaded transmission
lines and cables.
In case of a system falling apart, each part most probably is in unbalance with respect to the power
generation and the load. Load shedding and power plant curtailment have to be in place to try to
restore the regular power frequency in each part. A lack of power generating capacity will lead to a
blackout of that part of the system, if sufficient load shedding does not take place in due time. In a
similar way, a lack of reactive power supply and mis-operating voltage control, like the control of
transformer tap changers or capacitor banks might lead to a blackout.
Protection systems have to detect faults in components of the network and isolate these components
as soon as possible, so that the network is able to recover into a healthy state. Dedicated protection
systems are in place for generators and power plants, for transformers, for transmission lines and
cables, for substations and buses. And even back-up protection is usually provided by redundant
systems and/or by systems that act, when the considered main protection does not eliminate the
fault. A protection system consists of transducers for monitoring physical variables such as voltage,
current, frequency, angles, temperature, pressure, light and vibrations. Further it consists of
(micro)electronic devices that transform the physical quantities into information that can be handled
by the circuitry or algorithms used for the decision making. As far as applicable, the applied logic
selects the relevant phases, including the neutral, the relevant parameters, the relevant tele-
communication information, historical and system information, etc. Within a certain period, based on
pre-set criteria, a command to break the current may be given to the related circuit breaker(s) and
the faulty component will be disconnected from the system.
Transmission lines may be equipped with protection that is selective per phase and that recloses the
faulty phase after a time delay long enough for an arc flash to be extinguished. Further, transmission
lines are often equipped with so-called distance protection functions, the logic of which estimates the
distance to a short-circuit on the line by impedance measurements. In case the fault occurs within the
section (first zone) to be protected, it will give an instantaneous command to clear the fault current,
otherwise it is assumed that the next distance protection will clear the fault in its zone. In case the
fault is not cleared within a certain time frame of 150 to 250 ms, it is assumed that the next
protection or circuit breaker failed to break the current and the distance protection will take over by
enlarging the zone it has to protect, thus performing a back-up function. In fact, the protection
functions measure the impedance to the fault and the zones are expressed as the percentage of the
22
line covered by the criteria to trip the circuit breaker. The fast first zone (i.e. without time delay) is set
at for instance 85% and the next zone for instance at 120% to 150%, depending on the network
configuration. A third and even a fourth zone may be used as well, sometimes in backwards direction
to offer protection to the substation. A quite normal additional feature is that the distance function
sends a signal to the function at the other line end when a fault is detected in its first or second zone,
in order to identify the faulty area and accelerate the trip. At transmission levels more and more
differential protection is implemented for OH-lines whereas distance protection is used as back-up
protection.
Transformers, substation equipment, transmission lines and cables are designed and type tested to
withstand a full asymmetric short-circuit current up to their rated short-circuit current withstand
capability. Since in transmission grids the short-circuit current will be larger than the OOS current,
even though at phase opposition twice the voltage is applied, in general no special requirements are
put forward for transmission equipment to withstand OOS conditions. An exception is formed by the
circuit breakers which will be addressed shortly in the next section and extensively in Chapter 7.
Though the stresses during OOS are less severe, transmission equipment and its capability to
withstand the thermal stress of the load currents play an important role in preventing the cascading
effect that leads to system instability. It is very important to assess the thermal limits of the
equipment, like transformers, cables and transmission lines in the most flexible way to prevent
unnecessary tripping due to an overload protection with too large margins in its setting.
The voltages and currents during out-of-step conditions could be mistaken as the voltages and
currents during multi-phase faults. It is therefore important and quite challenging to discriminate
between out-of-phase (OOP) conditions and short-circuit conditions. Protection functions used for
OOS conditions can be divided into two kinds. One kind is to prevent that a command to break the
current is given during a power swing (i.e. without a short-circuit fault). The other one is to trip a
circuit breaker in order to split the system (at that location) or separate components from the system
(e.g. power plants). Numerous publications are available on the topic of a selective detection of
OOP/OOS and to find the best location for system splitting. See also [5].
Especially for OOS conditions, in some countries system protection schemes (SPS [6]) are installed to
detect OOS conditions and to select the most adequate locations to split the system in order to
prevent a large blackout. Such protection schemes also take into account the effect of angular
instability together with voltage instability. Good experience with SPS has been reported [6][7[8][9].
Recent developments in Japan, to maintain system stability under conditions of shortage of regular
power generations are described in [10]. A recent CIGRE Technical Brochure on wide area protection
is [11]. CIGRE Technical Brochures 187 [6] and 316 [12] give an overview of system wide protection
schemes and defence plans to prevent major disturbances. At the website of ENTSO-E is another
document with worldwide policies for defence plans available [13]. These and similar documents
underline the necessity to avoid extreme contingencies as much as possible.
3.4 REQUIREMENTS IN GRID-CODES AND STANDARDS

The requirements given in grid-codes are in general terms specified per area, per country, per TSO.
From case to case the details of the requirements in the grid-codes vary, but the main idea is to have
a set of transparent rules for all parties connected to a synchronously operated network, including the
TSO(s).
In different parts of the world, a completely different approach of Grid-codes has been embedded. In
some countries a strong historical relationship between power producers, transmission grid operators
and distribution system operators exists with a strong technical driven attitude to together take care
for the whole power system. In other countries a hierarchical relationship, where the TSO by law is
enforcing grid-codes or similar requirements, exists. There are also situations, where a national or
federal body has this position and forces TSOs, power plant operators, etc. to follow strict rules. Many
regions face a contradiction between a political philosophy based on a strong belief in the unlimited
possibilities and facilities of a free market mechanism without much regulation and a philosophy based
on the strong feeling that strict rules and requirements are essential to guarantee a proper functioning
of the electric energy system.
23
In Europe, a grid-code for generators has been approved at the political level and from 17 May 2016
the ENTSO-E requirements for the connection of generators are in place. Depending on the type
(synchronous and non-synchronous) and size of the power plant (A, B, C and D), requirements have
been put forward among others for the active and reactive power output under conditions of deviating
network voltage and frequency, for fault-ride-through and for system restoration. In coordination with
the TSO, a power plant owner may be allowed to adapt the fault-ride-through requirements to
mitigate any damage to the plant (art, 11.5.b) [14]. It is up to the relevant individual TSO to
determine the boundaries of the classes A, B, C and D with their successively more severe
requirements.
At the moment, the national grid-codes are not yet harmonized with the European grid-code (member
states have three years to adapt their national codes and requirements to the new European grid-
code). In Ireland and in the Netherlands, for instance, power plants have permission to be tripped
respectively at 100% and at 90% of the critical clearing time in case of a grid fault, thus preventing
any damage to the generator. In France, UK and Germany, for instance, in case of out-of-step
conditions, tripping is not allowed before a certain number (1 to 4) of pole slips have occurred.
More in general, the present European grid-codes leave much freedom for the TSOs to formulate the
precise technical requirements and are still far from achieving a European level playing field for power
producers and other parties. On the other hand, some requirements in the grid-code for generators
can be interpreted in a stricter way than technically feasible (for instance RoCoF requirements or
requirements to stay connected for system voltages above the rated (IEC) voltage of the equipment),
while strict requirements for transmission grids (for instance with respect to fault clearing time or
transient voltage control) are still missing.
To the IEC [15] and IEEE Standard [16], an optional OOP switching duty can be assigned to high-
voltage circuit breakers. The duty is defined by an OOP current, an OOP transient recovery voltage
across the open contacts and an operating sequence (a series of open and close operations). To the
IEC Standard the OOP currents is standard 25% of the rated short-circuit current. The operating
sequence is CO-O-O (close-open with full test voltage and full test current, twice followed by a close
without test voltage/current and an open operation with full test voltage/current), thus including a full
closing operation, maybe to simulate false synchronization or an auto-reclosing duty. The triple O is
used to find the minimum arcing time and to find the maximum arcing time and a medium time for
testing.
The recovery voltage is 2.0 p.u. for systems with an effectively earthed neutral and 2.5 p.u. for other
systems. As for the first pole to clear the fault (or OOP) current one has to consider the neutral shift
(since the other two poles are still conducting) a so-called first-pole- to-clear factor has been
introduced, being respectively 1.3 and 1.5. Because the first pole to clear factor is included in the 2.0
and 2.5 p.u., it can be deduced that the OOP angle covered is 105° resp. 115°. See Chapter 7.
The transient recovery voltage covers the transient response of the system, including the natural
frequencies at both sides of the open pole, the overshoot of the transient voltage and its damping.
This results in an amplitude factor being 1.25. The peak value of the transient recovery voltage in the
IEC Standard is thus 2.5 p.u. resp. 3.13 p.u. In comparison with the type tests for short-circuit current
interruption, the peak value of the test duty for OOP current switching gives the largest value.
Therefore, it is also used as a reference for other switching cases with a fault current less than 25%
of the rated short-circuit current of the circuit breaker. Examples are the breaking of the current at
long line faults and the breaking of fault currents in series compensated Transmission lines.
The given specification applies also for circuit breakers applied as generator circuit breakers at the HV
side of a step-up transformer. For dedicated MV generator circuit breakers the IEEE Standards [17]
and [18] are applicable. Recently the harmonized IEC/IEEE Standard has been issued by IEC: [19].
Much higher OOP currents, much steeper rate of rise of the recovery voltage and much higher
amplitudes (in p.u.) than for HV circuit breakers have been specified. In [3] a statistical overview of
the possible OOP currents in a number of configurations is given. Publication [20] gives in a similar
way a statistical overview of TRV values for OOP current breaking.
Note that circuit breakers have to switch under the conditions of system instability. The equipment
has been designed and tested for the highest operating voltage, which is the so-called rated voltage.
In case the system voltage would reach a level higher than the rated voltage, circuit breakers may
24
fail, even as they are necessary to switch off power plants, transmission lines, shunt capacitor banks.
As stated before, the European grid-codes seem to overlook this fact.
Another type of apparatus is the synchronization equipment that is used to control power plants to
adapt the frequency, the phase angle and the voltage in such a way that the generator or the part of
the system can be connected to the (other part of the) system. At power plants, it belongs to the
regular procedure to use synchronization equipment. Also at crucial locations in the network
synchronization equipment has to be installed.
Regular synchronization normally takes place with a little overspeed of the generator with respect to
the synchronous speed belonging to the network frequency. This is to prevent the reverse power
function from interrupting the synchronization immediately. After closing the circuit breaker, it results
in a transient oscillating power flow around a small positive value. After a short while the torque will
be increased up to the value required for the minimum load; as sketched in Fig. 3-4. False
synchronization may happen due to secondary wiring mistakes (false direction of rotation, false
connection of phases) and causes rotor angle differences being several multiples of 60°.
Fig. 3-4 Schematic view of power output at a regular synchronization of a power plant
OOS conditions with large phase angles lead to severe stresses to a generator, its driving equipment
and the auxiliary plant. Although generators have to be designed to withstand three-phase terminal
fault currents, they are not tested for their performance. Moreover, after experiencing heavy short-
circuit currents an investigation into the damage to the stator windings will be required. So, power
plant owners will do their utmost best to avoid by design and by operation such conditions. By their
repetitive character phase opposition conditions are even more detrimental to the power plant, since
the current might even exceed that associated to a generator-fed three-phase short-circuit current,
since the auxiliary equipment may stall and since protection and control equipment may not function
properly during the voltage swings. Multiple power swings with their beating voltage patterns are also
detrimental to consumer equipment and proper functioning of protection equipment further on in the
power system [13].
3.5 REFERENCES
[1] AEMO-report Black System South Australia 28 September 2016, published March 2017
[2] UCTE Final Report System Disturbance on 4 November 2006, published at ENTSO-E/UCTE
website on 30 January 2007
[3] M. Palazzo, M. Delfanti, “New Requirements for the Application of Generator Circuit Breakers”,
IPST 2013, Report 088
[4] CIGRE Technical Brochure 231 (2003), “Definition and Classification of Power System
Stability”
[5] NERC PRC-026-1, “Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings”
[6] CIGRE Technical Brochure 187 (2001), “System Protection Schemes in Power Systems”
25
[7] K. Matsuzawa, K. Yanagihashi, J. Tsukita, M. Sato, T. Nakamura, A, Takeuchi, “Stabilizing

Control System Preventing Loss of Synchronism from Extension and its Operational
Experience”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Aug. 1995, Vol.10, No.3, pp.1606-1613
[8] S. Agematsu, S. Imai, R. Tsukui, H. Watanabe, T. Nakamura, T. Matsushima, “Islanding
Protection System with Active and Reactive Power Balancing for Tokyo Metropolitan Power
System and Actual Operational Experiences”, 7th International Conference on Developments
in Power System Protection, April 2001, pp. 351-354
[9] P. Gomes, S, Sardinha, S. Martins, R. Perret de Magalhães, “The Conception of a New Special
Protection System Involving Long Distance – Coordinated Remedial Actions”, Electroevolução,
June 2013, Biennal 2012
[10] T. Yasuda, Y.Suzuki, Y. Ichikawa, H. Oshida, Y. Kowada and H.Nishino, “TEPCO’s Experience
of Stability Problems and Development of Wide Area Special Protection Scheme without
Telecommunication”, 6th International conference on Advanced Power System Automation
and Protection in Nanjing China, Sep. 2015, pp 306-313
[11] CIGRE Technical Brochure 664 (2016), “Wide area protection & control technologies”
[12] CIGRE Technical Brochure 316 (2007), “Defense Plan against Extreme Contingencies”
[13] ENTSO-E, Report on Technical Background and Recommendations for Defense Plans (31
January 2011), available at ENTSO-E Website
[14] Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631, “Establishing a network code on requirements for grid
connection of generators”, 14 April 2016, entered into force 27 April 2016
[15] IEC Standard 62271–100, 2.1 ed. (2012), High-Voltage Circuit breaker and Controlgear - Part
100: High-Voltage Alternating Current Circuit breakers,
[16] IEEE/ANSI Standard C37.06, AC High-Voltage Circuit breakers Rated on a Symmetrical
Current Basis Preferred Ratings and Related Required Capabilities
[17] IEEE Standard C37.013 (1997, R2008), Standard for AC High-Voltage Generator Circuit
breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis
[18] IEEE Standard C37.013a (2007), Amendment to C37.013 (1997, R2008)
[19] International Standard IEC/IEEE 62271-37-013, ed. 1.0, (2015) High-voltage circuit breaker
and controlgear – Part 37-013: Alternating-current generator circuit breakers
[20] M. Palazzo, M. Popov, A. Marmolejo, M.Delfanti, “Revision of TRV Requirements for the
Application of Generator Circuit breakers”, IPST 2015, Report 221.
26
4. PERCEPTION OF OOS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT

Out-of-phase (OOP) or particular out-of-step (OOS) conditions in a power system might lead to
system separation. OOS is a risk of huge consequence and low probability. In today’s regime of risk-
based asset management (RBAM), OOS is likely to be unrecognized, underestimated or ignored. As
will be shown, system disturbances occur more often than expected at a first glance. And they occur
in all parts of the world in all kinds of networks, including meshed networks. However, it was found to
not be possible to publish quantitative information about the probability of system separation.
Therefore, information is provided in a qualitative and illustrative way.
In this chapter, we will discuss how managers in today’s TSO’s can understand OOS. Nowadays, TSO’s
tend to introduce RBAM. This means that OOS needs to be modelled as a risk and assessed with its
probability and consequence.
4.1 RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT
Under the regulation of local authorities, utility companies need to reinforce their network under
economic constraints. This gives rise to the regime of risk-based asset management, which has been
internationally standardized by ISO 55000 [1] with compliance to ISO 31000 [2]. These standards
recommend applying the loop of plan, do, check and act (PDCA) to balance the overall performance of
an asset portfolio with its expenditure. We will briefly introduce each phase of PDCA in RBAM below.
In the “plan” phase, the total investment on asset portfolio is allocated to projects. For most projects
covering life cycle activities of assets, the performance of each project on all business values should
be estimated, so that they can be “checked” after the “do” phase. Occasionally, certain projects in line
with the vision and of strategic significance can be planned without specifying expected performance.
Moreover, the projects should be coordinated in order to optimize the usage of resources.
In the “do” phase, the planned projects are executed, while operational managers must ensure their
quality. Such quality traditionally means operational excellence, e.g. being on schedule, cost efficient,
well built, safe/healthy to stakeholders, etc. Nevertheless, another responsibility is added to today’s
“do” phase: providing data of sufficient quality to support management functions.
In the “check” phase, the risks associated to an individual asset system or an asset population are
identified and prioritized. In theory, a risk represents a hazardous potential recognized as poor
performance in the future. In Asset Management (AM) practice, a (candidate of) risk ready for being
assessed is typically composed of a cluster of hazardous events of similar (joint) technical triggers. In
this sense, these hazardous events are considered repetitive, therefore the probability of their
technical triggers can be predicted statistically, and their technical consequence can be learned
empirically. Based on the probability and consequence, a risk can be pinned down in a risk matrix, in
which the diagonal position indicates the expected loss of a risk. Accordingly, a risk closer to the top-
right corner of in the risk matrix has a higher priority to be solved. Through applying a risk matrix,
asset managers can rank multiple risks across an entire asset portfolio.
In the “act” phase, asset management plans are developed as countermeasures to highly ranked
risks. These AM plans work in different ways to reduce risks. Some aim to eliminate the technical
trigger, while others aim to prevent the escalation of consequences or aim to react to incidents just in
time. In the regime of risk-based AM, no matter which strategy an AM plan adopts, its revenue is the
(expected value of) risk reduced by executing the plan. The decision maker should examine the profit
of an AM plan from (1) its revenue, (2) its cost and (3) the extra risks caused by its execution.
PDCA is performed in a loop. This means that, firstly, the “plan” phase in the next iteration should
select the most profitable AM plans from the last “act” phase and concretize them as projects.
Moreover, in the “do” phase, the development of the identified risks and the effectiveness of the AM
plans should be constantly traced and monitored.
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4.2 “NORMAL RISKS” HANDLED BY TODAY’S RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT

“Normal risks” are studied quantitatively in PDCA at the tactical level of AM, in contrast to “strategic
risks” studied in other methods at the strategic level of AM. A typical example of such risks is an aging
mechanism in an asset population. Fig. 4-1 shows the causal chain of this example.
Fig. 4-1 An aging mechanism in an asset population is a typical “normal risk”, which is suitable to
be analysed at the tactical level of asset management
The bottom row of Fig. 4-1 shows what physically happens in operation on a specific asset. The initial
stimulus is the (physical or chemical) stress which initiates the aging of this asset. The direct stimulus
is a certain mode of failure on a specific subcomponent of the asset. The intermediate consequence is
the failure (loss of functionality) of the asset and corresponding asset system. The final consequence
is the loss of performance of the asset portfolio, such as SAIFI (system average interruption frequency
index) or SAIDI (system average interruption duration index), which should be reported to the asset
owner and regulator.
At the tactical level, the initial stimulus, direct stimulus, intermediate consequence and final
consequences stated above are respectively modelled for an asset population as “aging mechanisms”,
“failure modes”, “failure effects”, and “criticality (of failure modes)”. They are studied in a
straightforward causal chain as the middle row in Fig. 4-1 shows.
From the perspective of the strategic level, such a straightforward causal chain is suitable to be
analysed with the risk matrix at the tactical level, because it satisfies three conditions below.
• First, it is stimulated technically, so that the knowledge of asset workers is sufficient to
identify and measure the stimuli.
• Second, it results in technical effects on assets, which can be observed in operation,
controlled with technical O&M activities and predicted based on experience.
• Third, it leads ultimately to the consequences which can be financially measured, i.e. the
loss can be measured with units (e.g. customer minute in SAIDI) which can be further
converted to currency as, e.g. regulatory penalty.
A risk should not be studied at the tactical level of AM, if its causal chain does not satisfy the above
three conditions. Meanwhile, to be relevant to asset manager, a risk should at least contain some of
the technical elements from Fig. 4-1 in its causal chain. Based on this twofold reasoning, we will
identify in the next section six categories of “strategic risks”, i.e. the risks which should be studied at
the strategic level of AM.
4.3 “STRATEGIC RISKS” OF UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY OR AMBIGUITY

The primary goal of the strategic level of AM is to find out a feasible roadmap which satisfies all
stakeholders and provides a stable business environment for the optimizations at the tactical level. In
other words, the business factors threatening this primary goal will initiate the “strategic risks” [3].
A risk becomes strategic, when its characteristics prevent analysts from quantifying it. In risk
management in general, these characteristics have been identified as uncertainty, complexity and
ambiguity [4]. We adapt their meanings to our field of AM as below.
• Uncertainty: the unavailability of knowledge for the asset manager to identify, to measure
and to quantify the elements in the causal chain of the studied risk. In AM, high
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uncertainty is frequently caused by missing (the knowledge from) the experts from a
certain area. Such area can vary from technology, economics, to social science.
• Complexity: the degree to which multiple causal chains are interdependent. The
straightforward causal chains analysed at the tactical level are based on a few conditions
on, for example, the load profiles on assets, the supply chain, the regulatory rules, etc.
Once any of these conditions are broken, a strategic risk of high complexity is likely to be
formed.
• Ambiguity: the variety of the interpretation of the same facts, as well as the consequent
normative conflicts between different stakeholders. In AM, even when a technical stimulus
is known to all internal and external parties, they can still disagree on the
countermeasures, due to different personal experience or understanding on the
consequences.
Different combinations of the above three characteristics can be merged into the six situations, named
with the Greek half gods [4]. These six types of (strategic) risks will be adapted to the triple level AM
model, as Table 4.1 summarizes.
Table 4-1 Characteristics and examples of six types of strategic risks
Type Uncertainty Complexity Ambiguity Example in AM
Pythia High Low Unknown Reliability of ICT and
cyber security
Pandora High Medium to Unknown Quality of GIS data for the
high Network
Cyclops Medium High Low to New load profiles from energy
medium transition affect existing assets
Damocles Low High Low Black start of a smart grid
(e.g. after a natural disaster)
Cassandra Low Low High Hindrance of infrastructural
assets in the public area
Medusa Medium Medium to High Fear of EM field from the
high electricity grid
The risks of type “Pythia” and “Pandora” are featured with their high uncertainty. In AM practice, the
most observable and available knowledge is about the losses or changes of the functionality of assets.
From the strategic perspective, such losses or changes are the “technical effects on assets” in the
causal chain (e.g. as shown in Fig. 4-1). With these types, the “technical stimuli” is likely to be unclear
to risk analysts; the prediction of “financially measured loss” is not feasible.
The main difference between “Pythia” and “Pandora” is their final consequences. Pythia is the oracle
of Delphi whose prophecies should be further interpreted to be linked with the real world. A strategic
risk of “Pythia” in AM describes the situation when (technical) knowledge is insufficient to understand
the (technical) effects on assets, either regarding its causes or its impact on asset systems.
Example: Risks of type “Pythia” typically appear when the assets are not familiar to the
sector. For utility companies, the wide application of information and communication
technology (ICT) in the transition to “smart grid” is such an example. Few TSO’s have
experienced an outage caused purely by ICT failures. Without such reference information, the
risk of ICT failures on power and gas delivery cannot be quantified.
In contrast, a strategic risk of type “Pandora” in AM tends to have consequences on some scarce
resources provided by certain stakeholders, rather than some resources purchasable on the market.
The wide range of stakeholders brings complexity to risks of type “Pandora”. As its name “Pandora’s
box” suggests, loss of such scarce resources will disturb or even interrupt essential operation
activities, and therefore threaten continuity of the business. For our sector, such resources include
public support for network reinforcements, confidence of personnel on safe working environment,
suppliers of critical assets, etc.
Example: The technical stimulus of “Pandora” is often widely used or consumed in the
normal O&M. The geographical information system (GIS) is a typical example for
infrastructures which integrate tightly with the community. Low data quality of GIS will lead to
low efficiency of field maintenance, which further disturbs the community.
29
The risks of type “Cyclops” and “Damocles” can frequently be found in the risk register, since they do
not have high uncertainty. Some scenarios of their causalities have been noticed by the risk analysts.
However, their high complexity prevents risk analysts from evaluating all scenarios. In the risks of
type “Cyclops”, the high complexity leads to a certain degree of uncertainty. In other words, when the
risks have many possible causes, it is likely that some of them are missing for expert knowledge.
Therefore, it is named with Cyclops, the Greek giants who only have one eye, with which only a single
side of the facts can be revealed.
Example: Our sector is investigating intensively on one risk of “Cyclops”: the new load
profiles caused by energy transition can affect the reliability and remaining lives of existing
assets. The aging of many assets, such as cables or switchgear, can be accelerated by these
load profiles in a high rate which forces our asset owner to replace in large scale.
The uncertainty of “Cyclops” is mainly in its technical stimuli, while the uncertainty of “Damocles” is
mainly in its technical effects. The sword of Damocles is a scenario of risk which has catastrophic
effects, but such a scenario can be missing from risk register since its probability is extremely small.
Example: In practice, the probability of a catastrophic incident (e.g. a death in failure) is
frequently calculated from multiplying the probabilities of several triggering conditions (e.g.
the frequency of explosion of instrument transformers and the percentage of duration in
which personnel is working near an instrument transformer). However, if the triggering
conditions are not mutually independent, but both result from a certain event (e.g. an on-site
diagnostic test on an instrument transformer), the calculated probability of death will be
incorrect.
The risks of type “Cassandra” have a high ambiguity internally due to the “delay effect”. As occurred
in the fall of Troy, the decision makers refuse to react to a precisely predicted risk, because the
hazards take many years to appear. Organizationally, the decision maker will no longer be
accountable for the hazards. Scientifically, decision making methods such as net present value tend to
downgrade the long-term effects with the discount rate.
Example: The long lives of infrastructure assets make “Cassandra” quite common in the
beginnings of their life cycles. Positioning new substation improperly in the public space, for
example, will lead to higher expenditures of regular maintenance and future expansions.
However, asset manager will neglect this problem if he only considers the cost of the present
project without considering future costs to avoid hindrance.
In the risks of type “Medusa”, asset managers are facing ambiguity from external, non-professional
parties. The spread of psychological effects, such as horror like its name suggests, is the main effect
of such risks. Purely technical measures decided at the tactical level of AM are normally inefficient or
even powerless.
Example: The negative public images on the electricity network are widely supported in
today’s media. In personal experiences of inhabitants, such image can result from noise or
visual impact. But when the opposition against infrastructures is explicitly expressed by the
community, reference is made to terrifying messages on e.g. electromagnetic fields.
4.4 PERCEPTION OF OUT-OF-STEP IN PDCA OF RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT

PDCA starts with the “plan” in its original usage, namely quality control in manufacturing. However,
infrastructure has existed (and hence, been planned) for long before they adopt the concept of risk-
based AM. Moreover, it is common that infrastructure evolves (and hence was planned) purely in
response to extrinsic factors e.g. political actions or preference of the public. In these cases, asset
manager of infrastructure has to accept the existing “plan” and “do”, start PDCA with the “check”
phase and cope risk-based decisions with extrinsic influences.
In today’s electricity grid, historical and ongoing developments have laid more and more potential for
OOS. OOS typically appears in loosely meshed grids. Electricity grids kept merging with each other in
the last century. This mergence is accelerated in the last decade due to the demand to integrate
fluctuating renewable energy sources. The long-distance connections across countries or even
continents create more conditions for OOS. Furthermore, complicated cascading effects also in
meshed grids turn these grids into loosely meshed or even radial grids.
30
Asset managers should “check” the risk of OOS introduced by the above “plan” and “act” properly.
However, when modelled as a risk, OOS has properties which makes it a “strategic risk”. Such
properties include:
• Extreme: OOS is an extreme risk, i.e. of catastrophic consequence but very low
probability. Many asset managers will not experience OOS in their whole life. Hence, some
of them never have recourse to OOS.
• Multiple parties: OOS can occur between the grid and the generator, or between multiple
grids. When tackling the OOS, the operator of each grid or generator has its own interest.
A TSO wishes to retain the stability of its grid, while a generator operator wishes to
minimize the damage on its generators. An economically rational party prefers NOT to
“act” or “do” to reduce the risks of other parties, since it normally means extra costs.
• Multidisciplinary: Knowledge from various technical areas is necessary to understand how
a local failure can escalate to OOS or a system-wide disturbance. In our opinion, these
areas include system stability, (power swing) protection of synchronous generators,
converters of distributed energy resources, HVDC and circuit breakers.
• Missing records: The low probability of OOS prevents many utility companies from
experiencing them. But even within those which have experienced OOS, the precise
record of how OOS has developed is frequently unavailable due to two reasons. Firstly,
when OOS happens, the utility company will be so busy with the recovery that most direct
evidence of how OOS occurs will be put aside and eventually get lost. Secondly, being
afraid of the responsibility of causing the OOS disturbance, a utility company tends to
conceal the fact of how OOS develops.
• Delay effect: The direct trigger of OOS is often not the reason that the disturbance
reaches its scale. A decision can be made many years before it is finally proven to be
contributing to a system-wide disturbance, while a specialist who had a long-term
foresight could not influence/reach the decision maker.
The above properties make the risks of OOS strategic. The pattern can be Pythia, Cyclops, Damocles
or Cassandra, depending on how it is handled as described below.
• In the Pythia pattern, the TSO is insufficiently aware of the component influencing the
OOS or the blackout resulted from an OOS. From the aspect of risk management, the
potential of OOS is uncertain, because of the reasons below
o Poor coordination between different parties in the “plan” phase creates the conditions
of OOS.
 Grid-codes tend to put forward requirements to stakeholders without knowing
exactly what technically and economically is feasible. TSO’s may think that
requirements are fulfilled, but in reality they are not because of a lack of
common sense.
o The condition of OOS is difficult to be revealed in the “check” phase, because:
 To deduct the conditions of OOS, knowledge across the disciplines is
necessary.
 The record on OOS is seldom sufficient to induct its conditions.
o Example: Turkey (2015) one was not aware of the risk of bypassing series
compensation [5]
• In the Cyclops pattern, a scenario of OOS cannot be assessed in the “check” phase, due
to two reasons:
o Cognitive barrier between experts: experts from one discipline (e.g. power system)
are unaware of the way of thinking and therefore the contribution of others (e.g.
power plants) to OOS.
o Separate administration and responsibilities with information barriers:
 The grid-code does not create conditions for an overall responsibility and
accountability between TSO’s mutually and between TSO’s and other
stakeholders like power plant operators and DSO’s.
 The technical standards and investment policies on components (e.g.
generators, protection systems and circuit breaker) differ between
organizations and countries, while OOS can occur across them.
31
 The actual electrical parameters and protection configurations from a wide

area across organizations and countries can hardly be completely available,
up to date, coordinated and checked.
 Germany (2006): protection setting at the two sides of an interconnection
between TSO’s was based on different policies [6].
• In the Damocles pattern, a scenario of OOS, as an extreme risk, is underestimated in the
“check” phase. Typically, OOS is triggered by a combination of conditions such as
generating power, planned outage of lines, breakdown of components, etc. When these
conditions are considered mutually independent, an extremely low probability will be
estimated, which discourages managers to take actions in the “act” phase. However,
there are situations in which the triggering conditions coexist. These scenarios are difficult
to be exhaustively enumerated, partly due to communication barriers between parties.
Missing scenarios lead to underestimation of OOS probability, and insufficient reaction
accordingly.
o One example is the extreme weather conditions such as hurricane, icy rain (China,
Chengzhou, 2008, [7]) or vegetation management (Italy, 2003, [8]).
• In the Cassandra pattern, actions need to be taken now (e.g. in the planning) to prevent
a catastrophic outage which can occur within decades, i.e. with delay effect. But the
decision makers refuse to respond due to ambiguous responsibility typically in two ways
below
o Consequences occurring after the service period of a manager provide him/her with
little incentive to take countermeasures (après nous le déluge).
o When multiple parties share the responsibility to reduce a risk, the decision-making
process tends to become lengthy.
 There is a development in technology that slowly leads to less synchronous
inertial energy in the power systems. Decision makers wait for studies, pilots
and developments in general.
 With respect to power system support during large disturbances, no firm
requirements for fault clearing time, fault-ride-through criteria, network
voltage control and power plant performance under deviating voltage and
frequency conditions are (yet) established. Decisions are left to individual
TSO’s and countries.
 Homogeneity (i.e. identical design and control/protection settings) leads to a
similar behaviour of relevant equipment across the whole power system.
Apart from wrong settings (for instance in 2006 most wind turbines
disconnect and reconnect at wrong frequency deviations [6]), homogeneous
transient behaviour is a risk by its large numbers of application.
The table below summarize how properties of OOS can bring hazards in the PDCA loop and generate
a strategic risk of a certain pattern.
Table 4-2 Characteristics of four types of strategic risks related to OOS
Pythia Cyclops Damocles Cassandra
Extreme risk Check and Act:
extreme scenarios
are missing, so that
the probability is
under-estimated
Multiple parties Plan: uncoordinated Check: standards Act and Plan: conflict
planning and policies are not between parties, e.g.
complying with each regarding the
other allocation of cost
Multidisciplinary Check: add difficulty Check: cognitive
to learn OOS barrier between
deductively experts
Delay effect Act and Plan: little
incentives to
manager as an
individual employee
Missing records Check: reduce Check: information
materials to induct barrier between
OOP parties
32
Fig. 4-2 Overview of world’s largest disturbances[6]
33
4.5 EVIDENCES OF OUT-OF-STEP AS STRATEGIC RISKS IN THIS TECHNICAL

BROCHURE
This technical brochure has collected some experience with OOS. Within them, some evidence can be
found that OOS shows the patterns of strategic risks.
At the CIGRE Workshop “Large Disturbances – System operation and Market Performance
Perspectives” in August 2014, an overview of large disturbances until and including 2012, has been
presented [9]. Figure 4.2 is based on one of the figures of [9], but extended with a few disturbances
after 2012. The two largest disturbances occurred in the last years within two days.
Some examples of large disturbances (including some of Fig. 4-2) are given in the following list (see
also [9]):
 South Australia, September 28, 2016
 Turkey, March 31, 2015
 Netherlands, March 27, 2015
 India North-East-West Region, July 30, 2012
 India North-East-West Region, July 31, 2012
 Argentina, April 4, 2012
 USA Southwest, September 8, 2011
 Japan, earthquake, March 11, 2011
 Brazil, February 4, 2011
 Canada Toronto, March 10, 2010
 Brazil/Paraguay, November 10, 2009
 Republic of South Africa, February 26, 2008
 China Chenzhou, January, 2008
 Continental Europe, November 4, 2006
 Japan Tokyo, August 14, 2006
 New Zealand, June 12, 2006
 Republic of South Africa, February, 2006
 Republic of South Africa, January, 2006
 North-Western Germany, November 25, 2005
 Indonesia, August 18, 2005
 Greece, July 12, 2004
 Italy, September 28, 2003
 Sweden-Denmark, September 23, 2003
 USA Eastern Interconnection, August 14, 2003
 Brazil, January 21, 2002
 Japan, Tokyo, November 22, 1999
 Brazil, March 11, 1999
 USA Western Interconnection, August 10, 1996
 USA Western Interconnection, July 2, 1996
 South China, May 25, 1994.
This far from complete overview shows that large disturbances occur worldwide on a regular basis.
There is no exception for special regions or network topologies and the consequences are large. Of
course, the probability of a large disturbance in a heavily meshed network is relatively small and the
probability is not equal for all regions. Furthermore, the developments in the electric power systems
are in the direction of more volatile power generation, more non-synchronous generators (i.e.
connected by a power electronic converter), power plants with less synchronous moment of inertia,
large power flows along larger distances, less corridors to transfer the power and operating systems
more to the limits of stability. All these developments lead to an increase of the probability of system
instability.
A survey has been organized to learn TSO’s policies with respect to preselected locations for system
separation, when necessary, with respect to blocking distance protection for power swings, with
respect to wide area protection systems, etc. The results of the survey will be dealt with in Chapter 5,
but some inconsistencies are remarkable and show that these companies treat OOS as a prophet from
Pythia: little measures have been taken to control the scale of a danger, probably because it is too
34
difficult to interpret. Or they encounter a Cyclops pattern. The wide-area design against OOS could
also be, sometime, not complying with a local design of distance protection.
The statistics on OOS shows that it is detected and made public at least once per year in the world’s
major grids. It is possible that similar phenomena happen in the frequent black-out of smaller and less
developed grids, without having been recorded or identified. The probability is not that small as many
managers think, as the Damocles pattern suggests. For example, extreme weather represents a
scenario that N-1 rule can break and system splitting could be necessary. In our list, the Italian
outage in 2003 and the Chinese outage in 2008 are respectively caused by vegetation
management[8] and icy rains[7]. Moreover, in D4-1, E-Highway 2050 [10], researchers have
highlighted that climate change and consequent drought in Southern Europe is one of the strategic
risks for the future pan-European grid.
In this technical brochure, the OOS is treated as strategic risk of type “Pythia” in Chapter 5, and
“Cyclops” in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5 will analyse the most common scenarios and most likely
triggers of this rare phenomenon, so that the causal chain in an OOS incident can be revealed.
Chapter 5 and 6 concentrate on the protections of TSO’s and power plant. The protection schemes
and settings of each side will be introduced, in which the potential conflicts can be traced. Chapter 7
will cover the performance of circuit breakers in OOP, as this is the knowledge often missing from
system analysts.
4.6 REFERENCES
[1] ISO 55000:2014, “Asset management – Overview, principles and terminology”
[2] ISO 31000:2009, “Risk management – Principles and guidelines”
[3] Qikai Zhuang, "Managing Risks in Electrical Infrastructure Assets from a Strategic
Perspective", PhD thesis, Delft University of Technology, 2015
[4] A. Klinke and O. Renn, “A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk-Based,
Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 6, 2002.
[5] ENTSO-E and TEIAS Report on Blackout in Turkey (2015), available on ENTSO-E website
[6] UCTE Final Report – System Disturbance on 4 November 2006, available on ENTSO-E website
[7] J. Lu, M. Zeng, X. Zeng, Z. Fang, J. Yuan, “Analysis of Ice-Covering Characteristics of China
Hunan Power Grid”, IEEE Trans. IA, Vol. 51, No. 3, May/June 2015, pp. 1997-2002
[8] UCTE Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the 28 September 2003 Blackout in Italy
available on ENTSO-E website
[9] CIGRE Technical Brochure 608 (2015), “Lessons learnt from Recent Emergencies and Blackout
Incidents”
[10] ENTSO-E, E-Highway 2050, D4-1: “Operational validation of the grid reinforcements by 2050”
35
36
5. LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM AND OUT-OF-STEP IN

POWER SYSTEM NETWORKS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the concept of loss-of-synchronism in power system networks. Here, the focus is
on large interconnected power systems, where whole areas may lose synchronism against each other
ending in unintentional power system separation forced by cascading line tripping. Section 5.2
describes the theoretical background of such multi-area Out-of-Step (OOS) situations and why it leads
to cascading line tripping. Further, several aspects of OOS and power swings are briefly introduced.
Section 5.3 reviews real world blackouts and highlights the mechanisms of loss-of-synchronism. In
Section 5.4 the response of conventional protection systems on OOS is discussed, while some
comments about the restoration after a system separation are given in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
discuss the challenges of today’s system developments and their relation with OOS. Section 5.7
concludes with some recommendations that should be taken into account to minimise the risk of OOS.
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A lack of synchronizing torque may force interconnected power systems to slip into an asynchronous
operation mode. Following, the theoretical background and practical consequences of such an event
are highlighted. Readers who would like to learn more about the fundamentals of this phenomenon
are referred to the well-done explanations of [1] and [2]. This section is a further elaboration of the
general background given in Chapter 3.
Following, a simple two machine system is considered for the representation of two synchronous
areas connected by an interconnecting transmission line. As it can be derived from the static power
flow equation (Eq. 1), an increase of active power P increases the transmission angle 𝜗. Here, 𝜗 is the
difference of the voltage angles 𝛿 measured at the sending 𝑆 and receiving 𝑅 buses (Eq. 2). The
highest steady state power flow can be achieved, when the transmission line is operated with 𝜗=90°.
Unfortunately, an operation close to this condition is very risky due to the circumstance that a further
increase of the transmission angle will lead to a small signal stability problem. In order to ensure a
sufficient safety margin, transmission lines are usually operated with a stability margin far less than
90°. Note that, if the system is in a transient state, such as in consequence of a physical fault, 𝜗 can
momentarily be even larger than 90° without losing the angular stability, when sufficient
synchronizing torque is available.
Fig. 5-1 Simple two-area power system
𝑉 ∙𝑉
𝑃= ∙ sin 𝜗 (1)
𝑍
𝜗 =𝛿 −𝛿 (2)
Based on the concept of critical fault clearing time derived from the equal-area criterion ([2] and [3]),
the critical angle 𝜗 defining the so-called point of no return can be defined. For determining this
critical angle, it is necessary to calculate the oscillatory behaviour of the subsystems under
consideration of the generator swing-equations and the equal-area criterion. Here, the area of angle
acceleration 𝐴 can be calculated according to Eq. 3, while the area of angle retardation 𝐵 is
( )
calculated according to Eq. 4. Here, 𝑇 is the inertia constant of the system, 𝑃 the cummulated pre-
( )
disturbance turbine power of the system and 𝑃 is the cummulated post-disturbance electrical
power. The superscript (0)
refers to the pre-disturbance state, (1) to the state at fault clearing and (2)
37
identifies the state of post-disturbance equilibrium. If 𝐴 < 𝐵 , the disturbance can be considered
as stable. If the acceleration area equals the area of retardation (𝐴 = 𝐵 ), 𝜗 can be considered
to have reached its maximum value (Eq. 5). If 𝐴 > 𝐵 , the transmission angle overshoots the
critical angle and the generator groups will consecutively lose synchronism. This means, that 𝜗 keeps
on accelerating and leads to pole slipping, if the condition is not cleared by adequate protection.
( ) ( )
𝑑𝜗 2
𝐴 = = ∙ 𝑃 𝑑𝜗 (3)
𝑑𝑡 𝑇 ( )
( ) ( )
𝑑𝜗 2
𝐵 = = ∙ (𝑃
( )
−𝑃
( )
𝑑𝜗 (4)
𝑑𝑡 𝑇 ( )
𝜗 = 𝜗 ( ) (𝐴 −𝐵 = 0) (5)
Fig. 5-2 Transmission Angles based on the Equal-Area Criterion
At a condition, where 𝜗 is 180°, the voltages at the sending and receiving ends are in phase
opposition. Practically speaking, the voltages are oriented in opposite directions, so that the voltage at
the electrical center (typically located at the middle of the total system impedance) drops to 0, while
the current reaches its maximum rms-value, determined by the double amplitude of the voltages at
both ends divided by the total impedance between the two ends. In case of a slip-frequency between
the voltage sources at both ends, the OOS angle will vary with the speed of the slip-frequency from
0° via 180° to 360°. Depending on the actual angle, the OOS current, the phase shift between current
and voltages (the power factor) and the real power to be transferred will vary as well. Fig. 5-3a gives
the rms voltages at both ends (Vs and Vr) of the connection and in the electrical centre (Vc), while the
angle slowly varies with the slip-frequency. The OOS current is given in Fig. 5-3b, as flowing from
both ends towards the connection, thus with opposite sign (is and ir), but in this simple model with
equal rms amplitude. When the OOS-angle is close to 0° or 360° the voltage is at local maximum
along the connection, while the current through the connection is close to zero. At 180°, the
amplitude of the current is maximal, and the voltages are minimal. In the electrical centre the
amplitude of the voltage is even close to zero.
1
IS
IR
0.5
Voltage [p.u.]
-0.5
-1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Time [s]
(a) (b)
Figure 5-3: RMS-values of voltages and currents at the sending s and receiving r bus as well as at
the centre c of a transmission line during OOS
38
52
BB S
51.5 BB R
51
50.5
50
49.5
49
48.5
48
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Time [s]
(a) (b)
Fig. 5-4 RMS-Values of Active Power Flow at the sending s and receiving r bus as well as the
frequency at the corresponding buses of a transmission line during OOS
The active power flow along this transmission line is depicted in Fig. 5-4a. As it can be seen, the
active power flow oscillates periodically between positive and negative values according to the
multiplication of OOS voltages and currents. The frequency of this example of OOS are shown in Fig.
5-4b.
The location of the electrical centre or equilibrium point is rather clear in radial networks, but not so in
meshed networks. In meshed networks, the electrical centre could appear anywhere, and it may even
shift from one connection to another, when overhead lines are tripped in a cascading way. In
networks, where meshed parts are connected by radial connections, it may be wise to force system
separation at predetermined connections. In that case for each part of the system a balance has to be
guaranteed between active and reactive power production and consumption. However, today with an
increase of long distance power transfer due to energy trading and the influence of renewable (and
volatile) power generation, such guarantees become more difficult to be sustained.
From protection point of view, the OOS is likely to show similarities with a short-circuit and can be
interrupted by short-circuit protection functions at the affected lines, since the measured impedance
cross the inner zones of impedance protection functions due to low voltage and high current. For lines
in the near, next to the line with the electrical centre or for very long lines, the voltage drop might not
drop deep enough to reliably indicate a short-circuit. So, special emphasis needs to be paid in the
distinction between a loss-of-synchronism, a power swing and also between a voltage collapse, which
also shows a progressive voltage drop.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)

Fig. 5-5 Comparison of transmission angle θ, Active Power Flow P and slip-frequency fslip at a stable
power swing condition (a-c) and an OOS condition (d-f) .
39
This paragraph addresses the differentiation between power swings and OOS events. A discussion of
various concepts for the identification of power swings can be found in [3]. Both phenomena may
lead to rotor angle instability, but they are somehow different in detail. While power swings like Low
Frequency Oscillations (LFO) indicate a damping problem, the loss-of-synchronism ending in OOS and
power system separation is a problem of lacking synchronizing torque. Fig. 5-5 a-c shows the
transmission angle 𝜗 , the slip-frequency 𝑓 as well as the power flow 𝑃 over an interconnector
between two subsystems facing a LFO, while an OOS condition is depicted in Fig. 5-5 d-f. It can be
seen, that the power flow of a LFO corresponds to the change of 𝜗 , while both values oscillate
sinusoidal around their equilibrium states. The slip-frequency 𝑓 oscillates around 0 Hz. During an
OOS, 𝜗 keeps on rotating with a speed that corresponds to 𝑓 . The change of 𝑓 during an OOS is
different to 0 and non-sinusoidal. It clearly indicates a persistent frequency difference between the
subsystems. During an uncleared OOS, the transmission angle 𝜗 indicate several pole slips depending
of the slip-frequency also forcing power flows changing direction periodically. Such power flow
oscillations will massively stress rotating electrical machines due to periodically changing electrical
torque. Thus, it is imperative to protect electrical machines against this extensive stress.
Breaching the transient stability limit can give rise to power swings and loss-of-synchronism between
the connected systems. For this reason, loading of such lines is limited under normal and contingency
conditions, but may still occur during severe system disturbances when multiple outages occur. The
limits of line loadability are usually defined according to the so-called St. Clair Curves, which were
originally published in 1953 [4] based on empirical observations. In 1979, Gutman et al. presented an
analytical description of these curves [5], which are up to now used to describe the loadability of
transmission lines.
Fig. 5-6 Transmission Line Loadability Curve [4] Fig. 5-7 Power-Angle-Curve [5]
Fig. 5-6 shows the universal line loadability curve referring to the line’s surge impedance loading (SIL)
as a function of the line length. From this curve, it can be easily derived, that short lines (< 80 km)
are typically limited by their thermal rating for preventing the conductors from annealing and ensuring
that the conductors do not sag excessively and breach clearance limits. Especially in heavy meshed
networks, like the European ENTSO-E network, thermal limitations are usually the main limiting factor,
as more than 90 % of all transmission lines are shorter than 100 km. Medium long lines (80 –
320 km) are typically limited due to voltage drop limitations, while long lines (> 320 km) are limited
due to aspects of angular stability. For preventing small signal stability problems, the transmission
angle 𝜗 is commonly limited based on the maximum loadability, which is given with the maximum
transmission angle (𝜗=90°). Such limitations can be easily defined according to Eq. 6, where 𝑃
corresponds to the maximum loadability (𝜗=90°) and 𝑃 to a manually defined operational stability
limit 𝑠 . Such limit is usually defined by the TSO and can vary depending on the system state.
Typically, the limit is larger for emergency operation than at normal operation conditions. As an
40
example, the maximum allowed stability margin 𝑠 corresponds to a transmission angle 𝜗 of 44°, if
𝑃 is set to 0.7𝑃 (see Fig. 5-7) [10].
𝑃 −𝑃
𝑠 = ∙ 100% (6)
𝑃
Except for stability limitations, further limitations e.g. limitations referring to equipment protection,
additionally limit the allowed power flow and need to be considered. However, the loss of a
transmission line may lead to an increase of power flow at nearby lines. If multiple relevant
transmission lines trip, the power flow at the remaining lines may violate the given equipment and/or
system protection limitations and trigger cascading line outages possibly ending in the loss-of-
synchronism between grid areas, as described in the previous section.
5.3 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS

In this section, special aspects of recent blackouts are discussed. All mentioned blackouts have in
common that they occurred in large interconnected power systems where the overloading of assets
due to unscheduled power flows or other violations of the n-1 security forced the protection
equipment to initiate a cascade by tripping highly congested transmission lines. Therewith, vast line
overloads lead to cascading line tripping forcing tremendous blackouts affecting millions of people.
5.3.1 Discussion of South Australian Blackout (2016)
On 28 September 2016 tornadoes hit South Australia (wide area around Adelaide) and damaged
several 275 kV transmission line circuits. Besides, a number of single-phase and two-phase faults
occurred. Shortly before system separation developed, half of the required power has been generated
by wind mill farms, one sixth by thermal power generation and one third has been imported through
the Heywood interconnector from Victoria; in total about 1800 MW, while the conventional generators
together showed an inertial energy of 3000 MWs. In [6] it has been reported that initially the wind
turbines successfully withstood the voltage dips and performed fault-ride-through according to the
requirements. However, a group of wind turbines tripped or reduced output to zero after a certain
number of voltage dips. The reasons for this action were to prevent excessive stress and fatigue of
the mechanical parts due to repetitive faults and to account for the cooling cycle of the dump resistors
used for enhanced fault-ride-through capability. Other wind turbines reduced their output to achieve
the same objective. A third group of wind turbines kept on supplying power, but blocked the output
when the grid voltage dropped below 0.8 p.u. and restored power output when the voltage became
larger than 0.8 p.u. A last group stayed also connected, but did only recover to the pre-fault power
output after several hundreds of ms. The behaviour of each group, called respectively group A, B, C
and D, and the total wind power output during the system disturbances is shown in Fig. 5-8 (i.e. Fig.
11 of [6]).
The wind power output reduced by 456 MW, as can be seen in Fig. 5-8. At that moment system-wide
voltage instability commenced and a further reduction of wind power active power has been caused
by the required reactive power output in order to support the grid voltage. The substantial loss of
power generation caused a rapidly increasing angular difference between the power generating plants
on one hand and the network behind the interconnector. As soon as an angle of 90° is passed any
attempt to transfer more power results in a reduction of system voltage and generally voltage
instability is unavoidable. The OOS protection correctly tripped the Heywood interconnection, the
resulting rate of change of the frequency (RoCoF) was about 6 Hz/s and far too fast for adequate load
shedding to prevent a complete black-out. For several hours, 850,000 customers lost electric energy
supply.
In [6] it has been reported that the heavy wind did not lead to severe tripping of windmills due to
overspeed. Wind gusts appear very locally and lead to a shutdown of individual wind mills for only a
few minutes. Also reported is the mal-function of two distance protection functions because the way
the distance elements are polarized; i.e. by using positive sequence memory voltage. Mal-operation
occurs when the frequency of the memory voltage and the actual voltage do not correspond, as may
happen with fast transient phenomena.
41
Fig. 5-8 Wind farm power reduction based on wind turbine grouping ([6], Fig. 11)
5.3.2 Discussion of Turkish Blackout (2015)

On March 31st, 2015, 4 of 11 Transmission lines between East and Western Turkey were out of
service due to modifications and maintenance. In addition, all series capacitors in the long East-West
corridors were out-of-service. One Transmission line tripped on overload (distance zone 5 with a time
delay of 2 sec, as described in [7]) as it was set for a disconnector overload criterion. Within 1.9
seconds cascade tripping of the other 6 Transmission lines led to system separation between Eastern
Turkey with much hydro power and Western Turkey with conventional power plants and wind mill
farms (see Fig. 5-9). Far too much power generation in the Eastern part led to too much generator
tripping on over-frequency and within a few seconds to a blackout in East Turkey. Too much load and
no adequate load shedding led within one second to under-frequency separation of Turkey from
Bulgaria and Greece by special under-frequency protection functions. Within 10 s also the Western
part of the Turkish network collapsed. 78 million people lost electric energy for several hours (50%
restored within 1.5 hours, 80% within 6.5 hours).
Fig. 5-9 Turkish transmission system with sequence of events [7]
42
Most of the 6 Transmission lines tripped on OOS as can be learned from the trajectory of the
impedance through the characteristics of the modern distance protection. A reconstruction of the OOS
angles at system separation is shown in Fig. 5-10; i.e. Fig. 6 of [7]. After tripping of the second
Transmission line, large OOS angles are reported. The effect of series compensation is that the
reactance of the long lines is partially reduced by the series capacitors, so that the angle difference
along the lines becomes much smaller as well as the margin to angular instability. According to [7]
with the series compensation in service the system separation would have been avoided. Also with
more margin in the zone 5 setting of the first tripped line.
Fig. 5-10 Development of angular instability after first and second Transmission line trip ([7] Fig. 6)
On March 30th a similar case has occurred, albeit with less hydro power. By a higher percentage of
load shedding the system survived. It can be concluded that the system conditions before both events
were close to the border of system stability.
5.3.3 Discussion of Indian Grid Disturbance (2012)

The 30th July 2012 blackout in India is the largest blackout in world’s history and affected more than
300 million people. The Indian power system consists of two synchronous grid areas. The North, East,
and Western (NEW) region form one synchronous grid area, while the Southern Region (SR) forms
another synchronous area in island operation. The NEW-region faced the 30th July blackout, where
the Northern region separated from the Eastern and Western regions. As discussed in [8], the power
flow between the grid-regions currently differed significantly from the scheduled flows. Here, the
Western region planned to import 300 MW from the Eastern region at 02:30 h. Due to a couple of
reasons, which are out of scope of this review, the Western region exported more than 2600 MW to
the Eastern region. Thus, the Eastern region had a power surplus and transferred more than 3100
MW to the Northern region, while only around 1200 MW were scheduled. At 02:33:11.907 h the first
400 kV line tripped due to a zone 3 distance protection trip and initiated a fast cascade of line trips.
220 kV lines interconnecting the Northern and Western regions also tripped due to overload. These
trips forced the 400 kV circuits to carry the preceding load of the 220 kV lines and led to a heavy
overload. This can be concluded with respect to the report, which states the phase to phase voltage
was around 374 kV with a phase current of 2.23 kA at Bina with no evidence of a fault. After around
1.5 s later (02:33:13.438 h), 220 kV lines in the region of Bhinmal disconnected due to a zone 1 trip
and separated Dhaurimanna and Sanchore from the Northern region. Around 500 ms later, two 400
kV lines in the Eastern region tripped due to overload. All of the remaining interconnectors tripped
within 150 ms starting at 02:33:15.400 h and ending at 02:33:15.542 h. Therewith, the separation of
the Eastern region from the Northern region was finally executed. It is conspicuous that these line
43
trippings originate from zone 1 operation or power swings according to the report [8]. Moreover, the
voltages and currents at further trips are known and indicate low voltages, while the currents were
high. Nevertheless, the voltage was not low enough to indicate a short-circuit on the respective line.
Furthermore, several power swings with negative damping were detected shortly before and during
the disturbance. Thus, these outages might originate from OOS conditions.
Fig. 5-11 Indian Grid Disturbance (30th July 2012) ([8] Fig. 3.1 with information from Fig. 2.4)
5.3.4 Discussion of European Disturbance (2006)

One of the most severe and largest disturbances in Europe happened in the night of the 4th
November 2006. At around 22:10 h, the 380 kV line Landesbergen-Wehrendorf (Germany) tripped
due to overload and triggered a cascade of line disconnections. The various blackout stages are
reported in detail and very precisely in [9]. The following excerpt gives a comprehensive summary of
the sequence of events: “The overload trip of the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line triggered a cascade
of further line disconnections. In the first stage, the lines tripped due to over-current protection.
Starting at 22:10:28 h, as the system was weakened by tripped lines and stability conditions could not
be ensured any more, all lines south of the Main River in the middle of Germany tripped due to under
impedance protection due to a dramatic voltage drop on both ends of those lines. At this time, there
was a loss-of-synchronism between the three areas. However, due to the fast separation, subsequent
damages to equipment caused by high mechanical forces were avoided.”
Fig. 5-12 European Grid Disturbance (4th November 2006) [9]
44
5.3.5 Discussion of European Disturbance (2003)

The disturbance on the 28th of September 2003 was an historical major disturbance in Europe leading
to loss-of-synchronism between Italy and the UCTE system [10]. Here, power flows higher than
scheduled occurred as they are depicted in Table 5-1. Note that these flows do not force the direct
overloading of the respective lines. The deviation from the scheduled power flows is in sum just 258
MW which corresponds to a relative deviation of 3.8 %, but in detail, the interconnections to
Switzerland and France face a massive deviation of 542 MW (17.7 %) from Switzerland in combination
with an export of -438 MW (-16.6 %) to France. Moreover, the flows to Slovenia differ around 36.6
%. Even if the overall deviation is comparably small (< 5 %), the deviations at the interconnectors are
so large, that the n-1 security calculation performed in the system operational planning stage needs to
be questioned. The sequence was initiated by the line trip of the 380 kV line Mettlen (Switzerland) –
Lavorgo (Italy) at 03:01:21 h because of a single phase to ground fault due to increased line sag
forced by high loading. The load of approximately 2100 A was taken up by neighbouring lines and led
to an overload of 380 kV line Sils (Italy) – Soazza (Switzerland) which trip at 03:25:21 h. 4 seconds
after this trip, an internal 220 kV line was highly overloaded and tripped. Afterwards, the Italian
system loses synchronism with the UCTE system and was disconnected due to the operation of
protection equipment. As reported in [3], the loss-of-synchronism is well documented and concluded
by the evaluation of fault decoders.
Table 5-1 Comparison of Scheduled and Effective Power Exchanges between Italy and its
neighbours taken from [10]
Power flows to Scheduled Effective Total Deviation Relative Deviation
Italy from Exchanges [MW] Exchanges [MW] [MW] [%]
Switzerland 3068 3610 542 17.7
France 2650 2212 -438 -16.6
Slovenia 467 638 171 36.6
Austria 223 191 -32 -14.4
Greece 285 300 15 5.2
Sum 6693 6951 258 3.8
Fig. 5-13 European Grid Disturbance (28th of September 2003) [10]
45
5.3.6 Discussion of Blackout in Northeast America (2003)

On August 14th, 2003, the North-Eastern part of the USA and a part of Canada just across the border
suffered a very severe blackout. In total 70 GW and 50 million people were cut from electricity supply
for several hours or more. As sketched in Fig. 5-14, the states Ontario, Michigan, Ohio, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and parts of the states Québec, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont
were hit.
Fig. 5-14 The area of the USA and Canada with a blackout on August 14th, 2003 [11]
The incident started in the 345 kV-grid south of Lake Erie (the most Southern lake in Fig. 5-14).
Shortly after each other, three 345 kV-lines tripped, reclosed, tripped again and locked out because of
earth faults, caused by vegetation. Consequently 138 kV-lines in the underlaying network tripped on
overload in a cascading sequence. Severe voltage drops occurred and in addition a 138 kV bus has
been switched off and a 345/138 kV transformer. Load of about 600 MW was shut down.
Crucial was the tripping of a 345 kV-line (Sammis-Star in Ohio) by zone 3 distance protection. At that
moment there was no fault on the line and also no major power swing, but the voltage was low with a
large reactive power flow and a current above the line rating. Fig. 5-15 shows the impedance
measured by the distance function and its zone 3 setting.
46
Fig. 5-15 Load encroachment lead to an impedance entering the set zone 3 [11]
Due to the loss of this line and the low voltage in the power system, many other 345 kV transmission
lines tripped subsequently, also beyond Ohio; mainly by distance zone 3 tripping commands. The
reactive power and voltage control policy (reactive resources, system planning, system operation) was
insufficient. Automatic load shedding based on under-voltage was not in place. In [11] it is stated that
the actual transmission and generator protection function settings, including under-frequency load
shedding may not be sufficient to reduce the likelihood and consequences of a cascade.
A further cascading of line trips was unavoidable within the area showed in Fig. 5-14. Within ten
minutes 508 generators (265 power plants) were lost and a complete black-out took place.
5.3.7 Conclusions from the analyses

The reviewed blackouts show a correlation in their sequence of events. In this context, it is necessary
to point out, that these situations have not originated by physical faults but rather by deviating from
agreements among System Operators (SO) and/or power generating companies. In consequence, the
blackouts were driven by ineffective scheduling of power infeed in combination with a lack of
situational awareness by the SO to system behaviours including the consequences of protection
settings. However, these unplanned system conditions amplify the tremendous effects of minor grid
interventions or minor faults which triggered the cascades. Thus, the origin for a cascading event has
to be distinguished from the triggering event itself. The triggering event itself is more or less to be
treated like a symptom and therewith aforementioned blackouts were triggered by a line tripping
event forced by protection system operation. According to this discussion about origins and
symptoms, physical faults like short-circuits (origin) need to be distinguished from the happening
“distance protection zone 1 tripping” (symptom). Applying this logic, following origins for line trippings
in cascading events have been identified: (i) Overloading, (ii) Faults, (iii) Switching, (iv) Mis-operation
of protection equipment (including interactions with power swings).
Considering the sequence of events of the reviewed disturbances, it can be concluded that all
cascading events were triggered by an overloading condition which could not be relieved in
appropriate time with respect (backup) protection overload settings. So the line sag increases and
leads to a single phase to earth fault or to a protection trip due to overload. Afterwards, the prior
transported power flow spread among neighbouring lines, overload them and initiate the cascade. It is
obvious that the speed with which the lines have tripped significantly increased during the cascading
47
events. Here, the outage of the affected transmission lines decreased both, the overall transmission
capacity among the respected grid areas as well as the synchronous torque between the grids. So, in
cases where only a fraction of the ordinary set of transmission lines remains in operation, it is likely
that not all of the demanded power can be transferred due to angular line loadability restrictions [12].
In this case, the grid areas constantly operate with a lack or rather a surplus of power resulting in
slight frequency changes in each affected grid area. If the grid areas are weak but still electrically
coupled, the grids will lose synchronism and slip against each other after a certain time depending on
the power exchange deficit. A loss-of-synchronism event ending in OOS causes damage to loads,
generators and other grid assets. This is why the electric connection has to be opened by the
protection equipment fast, secure and reliable.
5.4 PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

5.4.1 Requirements and principles
Power system protection generally requires reliability, selectivity, sensitivity and speed. In this
context, reliability is the ability of a protection device to safeguard tripping for a fault within its
responsibility area. The selectivity criterion ensures that only faults within its area of responsibility are
tripped, while appropriate sensitivity is necessary to distinguish between faulty and normal system
conditions in order to correctly identify faults. If there is a fault within the protection functions area of
responsibility, the fault should be cleared as fast as possible to prevent damage of power system
components.
In power systems, the purpose of protection systems can be distinguished into asset protection and
system protection (e.g. under-frequency load shedding). Asset-protection focuses on protecting
capital intensive primary equipment like transformers, generators or transmission lines. In liberalized
power systems, this could be further subdivided into the responsible parties. While network protection
is in the duty of the network operator, protection of generators and industrial facilities is in the duty of
third parties. In such an environment, it could happen that each party primarily focuses on the
protection of its own assets, in order to put as little stress as possible to them. This might imply a
tendency to overprotection. In case of large electrical machines, this could have a significant impact
on the overall power system performance. Thus, appropriate coordination among the protection
settings of all involved parties, including public grid, industry grid and generator operators, must be
maintained in order to provide a stable; secure and reliable power system operation. Therefore,
agreements and rules between system operators and third-parties are mandatory for satisfying these
needs.
One prominent example of such a rule can be found in the concept of critical clearing time (CCT). The
CCT of a transmission grid is defined as the minimum duration of a fault in a particular point of the
grid (normally a bolted three-phases fault) that can cause one or more generator(s) or a part of a
power system to lose synchronism with the rest of the grid. The CCT is normally calculated by
simulating a fault on each bus of the grid in each typical grid operation condition. It depends on many
factors, like the grid configuration, the grid short-circuit power at the fault location, the number of
generators connected to the grid, the available rotational inertia, the grid voltage, the excitation
condition of the synchronous generators etc. At a particular point of the grid, the CCT usually refers to
the shortest calculated CCT-value in all reasonable conditions. The CCT is usually shorter for three-
phase faults than for two-phase or single-phase faults. The CCTs are then used to determine the
minimum performance requirements for transmission grid protection functions and relevant schemes
at various voltage levels and/or areas of the grid. The general principle is that the grid main
protection and, in the strategic points, also the back-up protections should remove the fault before a
loss-of-synchronism could occur. If one of the involved parties does not fulfil this requirement, the
whole power system integrity is at risk. This intuitive example demonstrates the importance of
protection coordination among all involved parties. References [13] [14] report about a case in the
South-African grid, where the existing CCT requirements couldn’t be fulfilled. Based on transient
stability studies, it was decided to install a special transient stability scheme consisting out of two 3-
pack stations with series reactors. This increases the CCT for 3-phase faults from 43 ms to 86ms.
Protection equipment has to be able to distinguish between short-circuit conditions and power swing
conditions. Usually they are equipped with some logic to detect whether the relevant phenomena are
relatively slow, as with power swings, or relatively fast, as with short-circuit currents. A wide range of
48
algorithms is available for the detection, with a varying rate of success. Most often the distance
protection is equipped with software that measures the time lapse that the trajectory of the measured
impedance up to the fault needs to pass two borders; see for instance [15].
After the logic assessment of the occurrence of a power swing, it has to be decided by the protection
equipment whether the power swing is stable or unstable, and whether a tripping command has to be
issued or not. Essentially with stable power swings no further action is required. In case of an
unstable power swing it may be wise to perform the system separation (in a pre-defined or random
location depending on the chosen defence plan) or to neglect the assessment if the algorithm is not
regarded as reliable enough in comparison to the probability of an unstable power swing.
Anyway, distance protection with its distinct zones and inherent over-current protection facility may
need some blocking function for power swings. Note that distance protection is also applied to large
transformers and to power plants. When distance protection has to act on unstable power swings,
careful considerations have to be given to the locations which are suited for system separation.
Network simulations and software packages are available to assist the utility in selecting locations and
conditions, but still the procedure needs a lot of effort. Dedicated studies performed by experienced
system engineers and return of experience have also to be taken in consideration.
Some utilities prefer a policy of reduced facilities to trip under unstable power swing conditions and
apply a method to prevent cascading effects which lead to instabilities. Since the large system
disturbances go with cascade tripping of transmission lines and power plants due to overloading
and/or voltage instability, these utilities tune their protection equipment to keep the components in
service as long as possible [16].
Automatic reclosure is often applied at transmission lines where (earth)faults extinguish after de-
energizing the phase conductor or the 3-phase circuit. This single-phase or three-phase auto-reclosing
has a “dead time” of 0.3 to 3 seconds, enough for the power arc to extinguish. (Care has to be taken
for induced voltages that may prohibit arc extinction; the so-called secondary arcs). However,
reclosure should be prevented when breaking a power swing, especially three-phase auto-reclosing.
When breaking a power swing, uncontrolled (i.e. without synchro-check) reclosure, especially three-
phase auto-reclosing, may occur at rather large OOP angles and consequential large and dangerous
OOP currents and extreme torques on shafts and couplings of motors and generators. A special auto-
reclosure policy is applied in Japan and Korea; it is called multi-phase auto-reclosing (MPAR) and it
facilitates as much as possible a continuous (reduced) power flow along a double circuit transmission
line. Only those bundle conductors, that are hit by a fault to earth, are for a very short moment
switched off, up to a maximum of four bundle conductors (under the provision that at least two
phases remain connected). In this way the stability is not lost. See Appendix B.
Re-connection may also be performed manually and at certain disturbances it is necessary to detect
beforehand whether the system at both sides of the circuit breaker involved is still synchronous (same
power frequency) and even isochronous (same phase angle and same voltage amplitude). Synchro-
check apparatus are needed to verify whether these conditions are within certain limits.
As the loss-of-synchronism between power system areas is prone to affect the whole system, a
careful examination of all involved protection functions and their response at OOS events will be
discussed in this chapter. First, the response of common relay-based protection functions and system
protection schemes is evaluated based on literature review, experience and the results of a survey.
For the case, that the loss-of-synchronism was unavoidable, recommendations for system restoration
will be given. Finally, recent global developments that might increase the probability of loss-of-
synchronism in interconnected power systems are discussed.
5.4.2 Response of relay-based protection functions

Protection functions respond differently to power swings and OOS depending on their underlying
algorithm, configuration and setting. Therefore, the response of common main and backup protection
functions will be reviewed. General knowledge about the functionality of these common protection
functions is assumed. Readers that may be interested in learning more about the fundamentals of
these functions are referred to [17][18][19][20].
49
5.4.2.1 Over-current Protection

Over-current protection is not typically applied to major transmission lines excepting some cases
where it could be used as backup protection with long time delays. Sometimes over-current protection
is only activated on loss of voltage input (VT fuse failure etc.) of distance protections. But in some
cases, it may be applied where there is a concern for certain contingencies resulting in overloads, but
this practice is seeing rarer usage on modern grids, as these are susceptible to be the initiating causes
to a number of large blackouts (see section 5.3). Some grid operators apply over-current backup
protection functions to their power transformers. They could also be used as a main or back-up
protection for single feed lines (for example on the HV side of distribution transformer) or as a back-
up protection for lines with one weak in-feed. Large currents excessing line ratings may flow during
power swings and OOS. If over-current protection functions are enabled on lines through which the
current traverses, unanticipated tripping of the protections may occur. Basically, this is depending on
the slip-frequency in case of OOS or the oscillation-frequency of the power swing. The lower the
frequency, the longer the currents might exceed the rated current.
While instantaneous or short-time delayed over-current settings thresholds are generally quite high,
the time delayed over-current setting may be closer to the short-term overload capability of the
protected asset and thus potentially present a risk of tripping, if slow swings traverse the power
transformer. While this may be considered a less probable event, the possibility of such trippings
should be considered as part of the planning studies and protection engineers should be alerted.
While over-current time delays may be set to ensure coordination with other protection during short-
circuits, consideration should also be given to ensuring stable over-current protection operation during
power swings or OOS, which may give rise to elevated current flow for longer time periods (seconds).
As for over-current protections directional protections could trip in case of a power swing, when they
are used as main protection or set to trip rapidly. This is due to the fact, that generally directional
protections do not have a power swing blocking function. During OOS conditions, the operation of
directional over-current will obviously be affected, as the current direction changes depending on the
slip-frequency.
5.4.2.2 Current-differential Protection functions
Current-differential protections should be stable during power swings and OOS, as they measure the
current-differential between the area of interest, e.g. the sending and receiving end of a transmission
line. Both, during OOS and during power swings, the current-differential along the protected asset
should not be affected by the swing, as it can be considered as external event. However, current-
differential protection devices may be equipped with an additional backup over-current protection
function for the loss of communications. Here, it should be checked whether the over-current
protection function could be affected by the swing. Current-differential protection functions are
generally very secure against swings. Their operation during OOS or power swing events in the past
has not been reported.
5.4.2.3 Distance Protection
During an OOS event, a distance protection function may detect the OOS as a fault, if the impedance
locus enters into the operating characteristic. Assuming a simple two-source system with the sources
EA and EB at the buses A and B connected via a transmission line L with the impedance ZL (see Fig.
5-16), the phase angle between the sources is representing the transmission angle θ. Next, an OOS
condition is assumed. Characteristically, the transmission angle θ will vary due to the slip-frequency.
Under the condition, that both voltage sources have equal magnitudes, the measured impedance
locus during an OOS condition corresponds to line P. The point in which P crosses the transmission
line segment AB is the electrical centre. The transmission angle θ is the angle of the connection
between A and B with the impedance locus on P. When θ reaches 180°, the measured impedance is
exactly at the electrical centre. It can be seen, that the measured impedance will cross any function
characteristic, if the electrical centre is within the transmission line. If the ratio between the source
magnitudes is different from one, it can be seen that the impedance trajectory will follow a circular
route. In such cases, it could happen that the impedance trajectory does not cross an inner un-
delayed function characteristic, but a delayed characteristic. Based on this principle, the reliable
detection of OOS events is possible. [21] If an OOS protection function is applied, it should be further
considered whether the protection trip signal should be sent, when the impedance is entering the
impedance characteristic or when it is leaving. If the trip signal is sent, when the measured
50
impedance leaves the characteristic, the circuit–breaker stress is less due to delayed current zeros on
the way in.
ϑ
EA A B EB
ZL
X B
ZL
|E
___A| Electrical
=1 |E
___A|
|EB| Center >1
|EB|
ϑ
P
R
|EA|
___ < 1
A |EB|
Fig. 5-16 Impedance trajectories during a power swing in a simple two-bus-system.
In normal operation mode, the measured impedance is the load impedance. If a fault occurs, the
measured impedance moves quickly into impedance operation characteristics that represent the fault
on the impedance fault plane. In case of OOS or a power swing, the impedance would move slowly in
dependency of the slip-frequency. The velocity of the impedance change can be used as an indicator
to differentiate between faults and swings. Therefore, a common approach is to define two concentric
impedance characteristics, separated by impedance ΔZ, for measuring the time it takes to cross both
impedance characteristics. If the measured impedance passes these characteristics before a timer
expires, the event is considered a fault. If the timer expires while the measured impedance is between
these characteristics, the event is considered a power swing. Being able to differentiate faults from
swings enables the application of Power Swing Blocking (PSB) functions. These functions can be used
to selectively block characteristics on the impedance plane in accordance with the applied protection
concept/philosophy. Please note, that the described method about the identification of power swings
is a simplified explanation. More detailed information and discussions can be found in [22][23][24].
At this point, it should be noted that an ordinary distance protection function is able to naturally
detect an OOS condition securely, selectively and reliably, if the electrical centre is located within the
protected impedance reach. As the electrical centre passes inside the undelayed inner zones, a trip
should be guaranteed independent of the velocity of the impedance change. However, depending on
the applied protection concept, the situation can become more complex. For example, if the applied
protection scheme is coordinated according to the concept of underreaching, the undelayed
impedance characteristic (Zone 1) might have a reach of approximately 80% of the asset impedance.
Thus, at least 20% of this impedance would be protected by the circuit breaker on the opposite side
of the line with a time-delayed zone (e.g. Zone 2 or 3). Here, it could happen that the slip-frequency
might be so high, that the measured impedance enters and leaves a time-delayed fault characteristic
before the timer expires [25].
51
Figure 5-17 Example of measured impedances during OOS [26]
If PSB is applied, it should be carefully evaluated which impedance characteristic zones will be blocked
for power swings in order to ensure a selective fault clearing in case of internal faults and further the
disconnection of OOS conditions. Furthermore, it should be taken into consideration, that the
application of PSB could lead to a slightly delayed tripping in case of internal faults as it takes an extra
cycle to distinguish between power swings and genuine faults.
Figure 5-17 exemplarily shows the measured impedance of a real power swing within a multi-machine
power system. Note, the impedance trajectory enters the polygon moving in X-direction only as
impedance trajectories of multi-machine systems do not follow the typical path of two-machine
systems [26].
In section 5.4.4, a survey investigating the protection and blocking philosophies of global TSOs is
presented. It can be seen, that various blocking and protection philosophies are applied and that
there is no common practice. Even TSOs within interconnected power systems are applying diverse
protection philosophies for handling OOS and power swing phenomena.
5.4.2.4 Under-Voltage Protection
During a power swing or OOS, the rms voltage magnitude will oscillate. The period of this oscillation
corresponds to the frequency of the swing itself. Where the oscillation is due to a frequency difference
between two locations, the slip-frequency and hence voltage oscillation frequency will equal the
difference between these two frequencies. Thus, if two parts of a grid lose synchronism and one is
operating at 50.0 Hz, while the other is at 49.5 Hz, the period of the voltage beat will be 1/0.5 Hz =
2.0 seconds.
Whether voltage protection will trip during such a swing will depend on the voltage measurement
location as well as the settings of under-voltage protection functions. Where the voltage measurement
is close to the electrical centre, the rms voltage will drop close to zero during the OOS condition, as
shown in Fig. 5-18. In contrast, voltage measurements further away will see less severe drop in
magnitude such as that shown in Fig. 5-19. If the slip-frequency is low, the under-voltage function is
more likely to trip, as the voltage dip recovers quite slow and vice versa.
52
Fig. 5-18 Voltage Depression During Power Fig. 5-19 Voltage Depression at Location Further
Swing Away From Centre of Oscillation
Grid under-voltage protections, where existing, are typically configured with long time delays of the
order of a few seconds in order to prevent undesirable tripping during short-circuits and other
transient phenomena such as transformer in-rush. These protections are normally used as extreme
back-up in case of grid voltage collapse and their time setting is normally slower than all the grid
differential, distance and the other grid protections.
Under-voltage protections could also be used on the grid in order to open certain circuit breakers in
case of a blackout. These circuit breaker opening operations by under-voltage protection functions
would split the grid in pre-determined locations allowing the grid operators to re-energize step-by-step
different portions of the grid, on the basis of a studied voltage restoration plan. These under-voltage
protections would be also set with long time delay (several seconds) and, therefore, they shouldn’t
operate during swings or OOS.
If for some reason, a grid has some condition which requires faster acting under-voltage protection,
this may trip during the power swing. Thus, in many cases, voltage protection will only be exposed to
a risk of tripping for very slow slip frequencies; however, this condition tends to happen, when larger
grids begin to lose synchronism as discussed in section 5.3. In such cases, the OOS swing would have
had a period in the range of 2-10 seconds, which is outside the fault ride-through requirements of
many grid-codes and it could result, for example, in disconnection of converter-interfaced generation
near or along the path that the power swing traverses. The voltage fault ride-through requirements of
the Irish grid-code are exemplarily shown in Fig. 5-20.
Fig. 5-20 Voltage Fault Ride-Through Requirements in Irish Grid-code [27]
5.4.2.5 Under-Frequency Protection

Near the electrical centre during an OOS condition, the instantaneous voltages magnitudes may vary
in amplitude from cycle to cycle due to the slip-frequency between the asynchronously operated
systems. Depending on the algorithm used for measuring the frequency of an under-frequency
protection function, e.g. for load-shedding purposes, the precision of the frequency measurements
might be disturbed and may lead to wrong indications. Due to this, the response of frequency
measurements during OOS should be carefully checked even, if there is currently no referenced case
of mal-functioning.
53
5.4.3 System protection schemes

According to NERC [28], “a System Protection Scheme (SPS) or Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) is
designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take predetermined, corrective actions (other
than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve system integrity and provide acceptable system
performance. SPS actions include among others, changes in load (e.g. load shedding), generation or
system configuration to maintain system stability, acceptable voltages and/or power flows”. For
example, relay-based under-frequency load shedding is a classical method to restablise the system
frequency during a system disturbance and can be considered as a “predetermined corrective action”,
while this aspect needs to be weakened, if we are speaking about a centralized online under-
frequency load shedding scheme that calculates the amount of load to be shed according to measured
quantities in the grid. The reaction of the SPS is therewith depending on the system disturbance and
is not fully predetermined. It is response based, while the relay-based under-frequency load shedding
is event-based. In the literature, there are several reports about event-based SPS for the prevention
of stability loss. In the following, only some of them are highlighted. Readers looking for
comprehensive lists of such SPS are referred to [29][30][31].
An example of a dedicated protection scheme is described in Report [32], based on the prevailing
system conditions of TEPCO, Japan, where a tight power generation capacity margin has arisen since
nuclear power plants were taken out-of-service. By using diurnal energy storage (filling the water
basins during the night and releasing the water during the day), energy demands can be met, but the
loss of a transmission line to the hydro plants would lead to stability problems. Therefore, an
automatic hydro plant shedding scheme is being implemented to keep the system stable. This is a
new special protection scheme, which will operate autonomously at each hydro plant without the need
of analysing remote information.
According to the Russian grid-code [33], the control centre intervenes manually by load shedding
when long interconnecting overhead-lines are loaded above 80% of their secure power transfer
stability limit, as defined by the TSO. Apart from that, system wide contingency analyses based on a
state estimator are used to detect possible stability problems and simulate the effect of load shedding.
Then, load shedding follows automatically. If automatic load shedding is not effective and the power
system falls into OOS conditions, the network is split by special OOS tripping functions at pre-
determined locations.
Not much has been published on the reliability of the existing and the new (proposed) protection
schemes or on the reliability of distance protection with blinders or other software tools to detect
very slow or very fast power swings. This is basically due to the expected low probability of such
an event. However, due to geographic reasons, Japan was subject of several large natural
disasters that challenged their power system integrity. In several reports [32][34], the Japanese
experiences on stability problems and performance of wide area SPS are presented. In Japan, out-
of-step in one generator easily affects other ones because many power stations are densely
constructed, so it is too late to take an action against OOS after the beginning of a pole slip.
Utilities implement rapid and secure fault clearing measures, like duplication of main relays, rapid
response of backup relays, etc., and various kinds of high-speed SPSs for rapid and optimized
generator shedding, as described in [32][34]. If a relay or SPS is blocked because of trouble and
maintenance, primary equipment, having a close relationship with this SPS, shall be stopped or
adjusted to the pre-determined status in advance to adapt to/mitigate the emergency condition.
The OOS protection relays are installed as a last resort.
A Chinese expert group evaluated 210 major disturbances including OOS conditions, frequency and
voltage collapse which occurred in the period from 1970 to 1980. One of their findings and
recommendations was that generation and transmission protection systems should avoid tripping
under OOS conditions in order to maintain the system integrity [16].
Since the loss-of-synchronism is accompanied by low voltages and high currents, the grid distance
protections could recognize them as three-phase short-circuits. Without activating any of the power
swing blocking and power swing tripping out-of-step functions, distance protection functions are likely
to trip close to the electrical centre. As discussed in [25], such a policy is likely to provoke that the
electrical centre will be detected within the un-delayed zone 1. The disadvantage of such a policy is
the low predictability of the system cut-set that goes with numerous and cascading line trips. In
densely meshed power systems, the utilization of distance protection zone 1 for selectively tripping at
OOS conditions could be highly reliable and a cheap solution. The practicality of such an approach
54
was demonstrated during the European disturbances in 2003 and 2006. However, as it was shown in
[25], such a scheme should be extended with a backup protection function, for the case, that the slip-
frequency becomes quite large and the impedance locus is not within zone 1. Here, voltage-angle
differential protection could be the matter of choice. Such a protection could be realized analog to
current-differential protection locally or centrally with synchronized phasor measurements.
As it can be seen, there are various protection philosophies related with OOS. They can be described
within these categories:
1) Uncontrolled Islanding with distance protection
2) (Consequent) Power swing and OOS-blocking of grid and generator protection functions
3) Pre-arranged islanding (pre-defined splitting locations and power swing blocking of grid
protection at other locations)
The first philosophy relates to the ability of impedance protection functions to trip immediately, if the
electrical centre is detected within its impedance characteristic. One could argue, that tripping lines
one by one would continually shift the electrical centre so that lots of lines would be instantaneously
tripped. On the other hand, there is evidence that this is an effective and desired behaviour. In
literature, there are multiple reports about large disturbance that successfully split the system along
the electrical centre between the sub-systems that lost synchronism (see section 5.3).
The second philosophy is reported in [16]. It foresees the blocking of all generator and transmission
protection functions at OOS in order to maintain system integrity. The philosophy is based on the
assumption that it would be more easy and efficient to resynchronize out-of-stepped generators and
areas, when they have been kept in operation, than to black start. The system integrity is maintained
due to under-frequency and under-voltage load shedding. It is at hand, that this approach accepts the
exposure of massive stress to out-of-stepped generators, but seems to have advantages for the
reliability of the whole power system.
The third philosophy foresees to split the affected system into predefined islands. It is based on the
assumption that this kind of controlled separation will end up in islands with sufficient rotational
inertia and better-balanced load and generation, as would be the case with uncontrolled separation.
The pre-arrangement can be achieved through the consequent application of PSB functions except at
the transmission lines that are foreseen to be opened for splitting the system. The tripping signal
could be determined by dedicated OOS protection functions, unblocked distance protection or central
OOS protection systems. In many systems around the world the deliberalisation has drastically
changed power flows due to economic reasons. It should be carefully examined, if the assumption of
an adequate balance between generation and load within these predefined islands is still applicable
under such conditions. Examples of this philosophy can be found in [35]
5.4.4 Survey
CIGRE JWG A3/B5/C4.37 conducted a basic enquiry among the TSOs represented in the JWG or
associated to the members. In total, answers from 35 TSOs have been received. Fig. 5-21 shows the
number of participating TSOs per continent.
Fig. 5-21 Number of participating TSOs per continent
55
As it can be seen from Fig. 5-22, 40 % of the TSOs apply system wide protection systems considering
power swings or OOS. About half of the TSOs have selected special locations where the power system
will be separated in case of unstable power swings. 51 % of the asked TSOs apply dedicated local
OOS or distance protection functions to split the system (Fig 5-23). It is remarkable that all TSOs that
indicated to apply a wide-area special protection scheme additionally apply local OOS protection
functions, while 4 TSOs only rely on local OOS functions.
Fig. 5-22 TSOs applying special protection Fig. 5-23 TSOs applying predefined locations
schemes considering power swings or OOS for system separation in case of unstable
power swings
86 % of all TSOs apply blocking of distance protection functions in case of power swings (see Fig.
5-24). Meanwhile, a number of utilities without predefined locations to split the power system have
also activated the power swing blocking function. As shown in Fig. 5-25, the blocking is most of the
time limited to zone 1 and 2, but sometimes it is oppositely limited to the zones 2, 3 and 4. Some
utilities even block all zones without applying a dedicated OOS protection function or the out-of-step
trip function in some of their distance functions. Details of their policy are not known.
Fig. 5-24 TSO blocking distance protection Fig. 5-25 Zones blocked in distance protection
functions for power swings functions for power swings
As there where 13 participants from Europe, it could be assumed that a large share of them are
members of the interconnected ENTSO-E continental system. It can be seen from Fig. 5-26, that
these TSOs apply diverse policies related to power swing blocking and OOS. While 23% apply no
power swing blocking functions, 31 % block all zones, 23 % block zones 2-4 and 15 % block zones 1
and 2. 38% of the European TSOs apply special OOS protection functions and 23% even special
protection schemes. It is unknown to the JWG, if these diverse settings and their impact are
coordinated among and evaluated with all involved parties.
56
Fig. 5-26 Zones blocked in distance protection functions for power swings in Europe
Almost all TSOs reported that they do not put forward requirements to power plants about the
number of pole slips that a generator has to be able to withstand. Nevertheless, some require that the
power plants out-of-step functions are set with a delay of 2, 3 or even 4 pole slips.
Details of the survey are given in Table 5-2. The 37 participating TSOs are numbered as 1 to 9 and 0.
In addition they are numbered A to Z (without “Y”). The five most important questions from the
enquiry are summarized per line.
The first question is about the policy to define pre-defined locations where system separation is forced
to happen in case necessary.
The second question is whether protection functions are applied to force the system separation; a
separate relay (ANSI 78) or the out-of-step tripping function embedded in distance relays.
The third question is whether special protection systems have been applied: voltage swing functions,
inter-trip schemes, voltage phase angle comparison, line loading.
The fourth question is about the policy with respect to enabling the power swing blocking function in
distance protections.
The last question asked which zones in such a case have to be blocked.
Table 5-2 Summarized overview of enquiry results among TSOs worldwide (0 to Z) on their power
swing protection policy
1
Whether TSO applies pre-defined locations for system separation in case of unstable power swings
2
Whether TSO applies out-of-step functions ANSI 87 or out-of-step tripping function in distance functions
ANSI 21
3
Whether TSO applies special protection systems, such as voltage swing functions, inter-trips, voltage phase
angle comparison, line loading. The application of centralized wide area protection systems has not been
reported.
4
Whether distance protection functions are blocked for power swings and which zones are blocked
57
5.5 AFTER SYSTEM SEPARATION

In case of a system separation, it is crucial to maintain system integrity by balancing load and
generation. Therefore, under-frequency load shedding as well as generator curtailment strategies
should be in a good condition to limit frequency excursions in the subsystems. As the splitting corridor
cannot be foreseen, if no special functions have been applied to force splitting at a predetermined
location, there is a probability that the split could pass through the control area of a TSO. For that
case, it is crucial to maintain a proper state estimation of these separated systems. The same issues
arise for the automatic generation control. If such a system is not able to adapt to these drastic
topological changes, control actions might jeopardize the system stability after a split. In case of
interconnected power systems, it could be beneficial to exchange information about the split corridors
as fast as possible.
After separation and islanding, grid restoration is the major issue. Currently, ongoing CIGRE Working
Groups are working on this issue. CIGRE WG C2.23 puts together “System Restoration Procedures and
Practices”, while CIGRE WG B5.54 considers “Protection and Automation Issues of Islanded Systems
during System Restoration/Black Start”.
5.6 DEVELOPMENTS
Change in society is from technical solutions based on large ratings towards large quantities of small
technical solutions. Small solutions seem to fit into the human scale and the human imagination.
Almost all renewable energy sources and certainly the small scale renewable sources show a volatile
energy flow. But to the general opinion, volatility is not a big issue, since electricity storage, load
management and smart grid solutions are believed to solve the problem without losing the quality of
supply and at reasonable costs. It is even believed that transmission grids and large power plants are
no longer required in the near future. That feeling supports the socio-political resistance against new
and old sites for power plants and routes for transmission lines. It culminates even in resistance
against large cable projects, large wind farms and large hydro plants.
Nevertheless, the whole electricity supply system, as it has been developed within about hundred
years, is needed to warrant the degree of reliability the society is used to and depending on. As long
as the community is not willing to take the risk of a shortage of electricity, a link to the large scale
international electricity grid will be required. Many laws, rules, codes and standards are in place to
safeguard the functioning of this grid, albeit with more and more hindrance to extend and adapt the
grid. The internationally coupled AC-network is the backbone of the whole electricity supply system.
As a consequence of such developments, the components of the networks have to work harder: larger
power flows, a higher utilization time and a much longer lifetime. In addition, the power flows and
utilization may vary rapidly and often, especially because of the priority that is given to renewable
power generation. This influences for instance the economics of conventional power plants. But it
leads also to bulk power flowing along larger distances. These developments are further stimulated by
the liberalization of the energy market, where economics seem to overrule technical constraints.
Certainly, when the technical constraints are seen as an old-fashioned way of thinking to avoid as
much risk as possible (i.e. for incidents with a very low probability of occurrence).
Despite the hype of human scale solutions (mainly PV), a substantial part of renewable energy is
again produced by large rating solutions like wind farms (GWs, preferably on sea) and PV-farms (tens
of MWs). The same applies to small run-of-river (micro) hydro-plants versus large hydro power
stations. It seems that large rating solutions are acceptable to society as long as they cannot be seen
(at sea, underground cables, in countries far away). For such solutions, short distance HVAC cables
and long distance HVDC interconnectors are applied more and more. At sea and in dense populated
regions, the HVDC interconnectors have to be installed underground.
The trend of more connections by PE-converters, as applied for HVDC, can be seen with wind turbines
and PV-installations, which are also interfaced by PE-converters. Power flows through PE-converters
show a few particular characteristics. First of all, they uncouple the power frequency at the AC-
network side from that at the other side of the converter. At the other side a DC-connection, a DC-
coupling, a DC-grid, an AC-machine or a separated AC-grid may be present. While in a conventional
AC-network all generators, motors and equipment runs at essentially the same power frequency; with
PE-converters that is no longer the case.
58
Where in the AC-network all rotating AC-equipment forms an enormous storage of inertial energy,
that stabilizes dynamic transients in the power system, the inertial energy behind the PE-converters is
uncoupled and does not contribute by itself to the dynamic stability of the AC-network, the backbone
of the electricity supply system.
The costs of the PE-converters are substantial and are determined by the rated current and the rated
voltage of the converters. In order to utilize the investment as much as possible, the converters are
designed with a minimum overload capacity. The controllers of the thyristors and IGBTs are tuned to
restrict the currents to values a little higher than the rated current and only for a very short time. The
effect is that the reactive power supply is limited to the rated power; and at the cost of active power
supply. This characteristic has an important influence during transients in the AC power system.
The maximum contribution to the short-circuit current of a converter coupled (non-synchronous or via
HVDC connected) generator is determined by the overload capacity of the involved power electronic
components, the actual contribution may be less. The actual contribution is influenced by the reactive
power controller setting of the converter. Usually it is a constant power factor control (thus limiting
the actual fault current contribution), but it could also be a voltage or voltage droop control regime.
As such, the actual short-circuit current contribution depends on the control setting and is
proportional to the power output before the voltage dip as well as the size of the voltage drop. It is
also possible that the power controller of electronic converters will have to be adapted to provide
reverse current contribution in case of unbalanced fault (phase-to-phase, phase-to-earth, etc.), while
zero-sequence current contribution could be provided by step-up transformers, when they have the
adapted winding connection (for example YNd with HV earthed neutral).
As the short-circuit current contributed by converter coupled generation is limited to a maximum of
the converters rated current due to thermal restrictions of the power electronics, the available short-
circuit power (SCP) in grids with large share of renewables or HVDC may behave very different from
today’s. The type and grid connection of certain renewable plant (for example Doubly Fed Induction
Generators) can also affect the available SCP. In literature, there are various opinions on how the
available SCP will develop. One says, the available SCP will decrease due to the fact that synchronous
generators with high provision capabilities will be disconnected [19], while practical measurements in
the Dutch transmission network indicate an increase of SCP due to additional network reinforcements
[36]. One of the most detailed studies concerning this subject is presented in [37] and [38]. Here, the
development of available SCP in the German transmission and distribution network is jointly evaluated
based on hourly simulations of the existing power system in the full year 2011 (aggregated
transmission network of continental Europe equipped with a detailed German distribution network
model, including conventional generation units and renewables), in comparison with the simulations of
the power system expected in 2033 (including planned grid reinforcements and further expansion of
renewable energy sources). The study identifies that the SCP in Germany tends to increase by about
20% in average, while the bandwidth of minimum and maximum available SCP will remain.
It is striking that the available SCP increases in some regions, despite a reduced installed capacity.
This increase cannot be explained solely by a slight increase in the SCP supplied from abroad, as it
originates mainly from German plants. It has been shown that this increase is plausible, as a reduction
of instantaneous short-circuit current providing sources in the vicinity of the fault leads to a flattening
of the grid-side voltage gradient during the fault. Thus, geographically more distant generators will
participate in feeding the fault. This situation is exacerbated by additional grid enforcements that
shorten the electrical distance between distant power stations and the fault location. Another
significant finding is that the SCP can be subject to heavy daily fluctuations depending on the installed
converter based generation capacity. In order to control this volatility, one must consider forcing
converter based generators to stay connected to the grid at any time for the provision of SCP. As
mainly voltage source converters are applied as converters for renewables and HVDC, the technical
feasibility should be possible.
Besides the studies concerning the magnitude of the available SCP, the duration of the short-circuit
current contribution also needs to be taken into consideration in order to verify the correct operation
of the grid protection. This is particularly important for the operation of all back-up protection of the
system whose typical tripping time is in the range between several hundreds of ms and up to a few
seconds.
However, developments like distributed power generation and non-synchronous generators lead to
different patterns of short-circuit currents, that may interfere with these fast protection and back-up
59
schemes. On one hand the fault currents may flow in opposite directions compared to the old top-
down flow and it may vary because of weather or market conditions. On the other hand, the short-
circuit current contribution per generator will be limited due to the power electronic converters. But at
the same time the installed power is much larger in order to deliver a comparable amount of electrical
energy. All these aspects make it difficult to predict whether the fault current will become larger or
not at a certain location and at a certain moment. Other protection concepts, for instance based on
differential protection with a back-up coming from another differential protection or a voltage angle
comparison protection will be required.
Another characteristic is the very fast and flexible control of the converters. Within their rating, the
converters can adapt the power flow and reactive power flow within one or a few power frequency
cycles. They can be tuned to whatever is required, as long as the inertial energy is available at the
other side. Controllers of most converters are tuned by the manufacturer.
The possibility of a fast and flexible control may lead to unusual transient current patterns, for
instance with short-circuits. Another effect is that series produced equipment with PE-converters show
all exactly the same response to power system dynamics, for instance at a deviating power frequency.
The possibility of a fast and flexible control with HVDC couplings between different AC-networks may
result into a very stiff control, thus achieving maximal support between both AC-networks. On the
contrary, it is possible to tune the control to achieve a very weak coupling, thus avoiding the export of
problems within one AC-network to the other AC-network.
The larger power flows along long distances and through only a few OH-lines/cables can lead to less
margin in the power system with respect to angular stability; and consequently, voltage and
frequency instability. Reactive power compensation, such as by series capacitors and by shunt
compensation (capacitors, reactors, SVC, Statcom) may contribute to angular stability as well as
voltage stability. Care must be taken for the reactive power output of shunt capacitors, shunt reactors
and SVC, as these are very voltage dependent and not adequate during severe disturbances.
Countermeasures to improve frequency stability are possible by for example synchronous condensers,
that improve the dynamic stability by their inertial energy, or by running power plants with
synchronous generators at a lower active power output (thus increasing the inertial energy per MW
output). Such ancillary services can also be delivered by wind turbines - when running - as the
controllers of the converters can be set to deliver virtual inertial energy/ synchronous torque to the
AC-network. Though herewith not much experience has been gained yet.
A special aspect of the described developments, is the behaviour of connected equipment during
power frequency deviations. Physically conventional power plants will react to a drop-in power
frequency by their inertial energy that retards the drop-in frequency and by the power/frequency
droop control that increases the output from the steam-turbine or gas-turbine. In the next step, the
secondary and tertiary control take over in order to regulate the power contribution from this and
other power plants in the system. In case the power frequency drops further, load shedding and
ultimately the separation of systems and power plants might take place. Load shedding is normally
done by switching off complete substations or transformers that supply a distribution grid. However,
nowadays dispersed generation may be connected to the distribution grid. More and more the
dispersed generation is renewable and therefore volatile, so that over time the amount of power
generation in the distribution grid is varying strongly. Disconnecting a power transformer at a power
frequency drop might involve power generation that right at that moment is urgently needed by the
power system. In other words: the simple load shedding by under-frequency functions becomes
complicated in order to fulfil its role in switching off a certain amount of load.
Active and smart distribution networks show characteristics similar to transmission grids and may
export as well as import energy and power. Smart grids are supposed to be able to operate separated
from the AC-network and may even be designed to separate, when large disturbances in power
frequency and/or voltage occur in the AC-network. Note that separation of a smart distribution
network is not an obvious capability, certainly not under transient and dynamic conditions. Even for
transmission grids, system separation goes with special protection and control actions which are not
always successful.
Maybe wide area protection or Wide Area Monitoring, Protection And Control (WAMPAC) technology
will contribute to a stable transition of a smart grid from a connected to a separated grid, also during
disturbances [30]. Such a development is at least by some experts foreseen for transmission systems.
60
Such systems rely on wide-area measurements enabling a full system observability, e.g. with
consideration of synchrophasors, and thus allowing more advanced online stability calculations,
monitoring, protection and control functions. Others believe in more decentralized autonomous
protection and control solutions, e.g. multi-agents, to achieve a more heterogeneity and less common
mode failures, while others even propose hybrid solutions. However, it is at hand, that these types of
solutions rely on a highly available communication network, as even decentralized solutions are often
required to have a communication link between substations. Increasing the dependence of the power
system on communication networks or even the internet increases the likelihood of extreme
contingencies due to the loss of communication or cyber-attacks.
Distribution equipment like transformers, circuit breaker, protection, reactive power control is
expected to get the same functionality as transmission and sub-transmission equipment. This
development results in, for instance, more complex protection functions, tele-control, on-load tap-
changers, SVC and Statcom. Conventional circuit breakers, like load break switches and fuses, will no
longer do the job, since the switching duties become more severe. The new switching functions are,
for example, loop current switching, short-circuit current interruption, auto-reclosing, generator
current switching, system separation, dielectric withstand voltage across open contacts, etc. Adaptive
protection functions, which can handle the varying short-circuit current levels, etc., may be required.
Anyway, there is the expectation that both transmission grids and distribution grids become more
complicated with a higher probability of disturbances in the balance between power production and
load, between reactive power needs and required power quality, between the need for power
wheeling and the necessary transient transmission capability.
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS
From the large power system disturbances, it can be learned, that due to deviations from agreements
between involved parties and a lack of situational awareness a cascade of line, transformer and power
plant trips has developed. Examples are: vegetation management, too low settings of over-current
protection functions, inadequate time delay settings of protection, incomplete contingency analysis,
unawareness of available margins with respect to transient transmission capacity, the effect of fast
power swings on the positive sequence memory voltage for the fault direction function.
Large disturbances also show that either the setting of protection functions or the component’s
behaviour at deviating frequencies and voltage are not in line with the agreements. An example is
under-frequency load shedding where unexpected amount of load (i.e. load minus power generation)
is cut at a predefined deviation. Another example is power plant tripping due to problems in the
auxiliary plant.
More and more TSO’s change from distance protection to differential protection. Differential protection
is inherently insensitive for power swings, but a built-in over-current function may act as back-up
function and therefore act on a power swing. Furthermore, distance protection is quite often installed
as back-up for the differential protection and for the next substation.
At OOS, the low voltage and large current appear to the distance protection as an impedance lower
than the normal load characteristics. Depending on the distance to the electrical centre and the
setting of the function, the measured impedance may enter one or more of the zones of the distance
function and force a trip command. An international enquiry among 35 TSOs shows that most utilities
activate the power swing blocking function of their distance functions. Half of them activate also the
OOS trip function or apply a dedicated out-of-step function. These TSOs block the un-delayed zone 1
and many also block other zones. They have predetermined the locations where the power system
should be split in case of OOS. Such a policy requires a reasonable balance between power generation
and load in each part of the separated system; a condition that nowadays is more difficult with the
power wheeling due to the liberalization and volatile generation. The other half (i.e. without OOS trip
function) blocks usually the delayed zones only. These utilities seem to follow a policy of tripping near
the electrical centre, that moves after each line trip. The location of the consequential system cut is
not predictable.
International bodies, manufacturers and utilities are dealing with the setting of the relevant function
parameters, even recently (e.g. IEEE Power System Relaying Committee Working Group J5, NERC
Reliability Standard PRC-026-1 and PRC-023-3, [39]). Continuous evaluation of the function setting
61
policy, especially after system disturbances, is of prime importance. As is the coordination of the
function setting policy for strongly interconnected transmission grids. With respect to testing
protection systems for their power swing functions (blocking, tripping, selectivity) the IEC Standard
series 60255 “Measuring functions and protection equipment” is yet not complete.
In case the clearing time of a nearby three-phase fault is larger than the critical clearing time (CCT),
conventional power plants may reach a pole slip. The CCT depends on the ratio between inertial
energy and the nominal power of the power plant, on the actual power output, on the momentary
excitation, on the involved reactance and on characteristics of the fault (single, double, three-phase)
and fault tripping sequence (single pole, multiple pole or three-pole auto-reclosing). The CCT varies
with changing network topology, changing short-circuit power at the connection point and location of
the fault. One has to determine a minimum value of the CCT, but to be cautious not to assume too
extreme system conditions. The fault clearing time in the network should be as small as possible.
Anyway, it should be smaller than the minimum value of the CCT and take into account circumstances
with failing protection, telecommunication and/or circuit breakers. Again, one is supposed not to take
into account too extreme back-up conditions. The fault clearing time and the recovery of the power
frequency voltage after clearing are usually expressed in the fault-ride-through (FRT) diagrams. An
appropriate coordination between CCT and FRT is deemed to be necessary with special attention for
the conditions to be covered.
System studies on the dynamics in a transmission (and future distribution) networks are necessary to
supply the information required to understand the frequencies of possible power swings, OOS
conditions, the locations where predetermined system separation will take place, the amount of load
to be tripped at certain power frequency deviations, the ratio between load and dispersed generation,
the reasonable conditions to determine CCT and FRT, the representative network topology and
conditions to specify and test protection functions, etc.
Type testing of protection functions and the applied algorithms for the phenomena that occur at
system instability is a difficult task. To the authors’ knowledge, no representative cascade trips are
simulated with the purpose to test protection functions, but some TSOs define protection settings
principles trying to avoid random protection tripping on the basis of transient simulations or previous
fault experiences. However, an extensive type test of the algorithm to detect power swings and to
block or give a (delayed) trip command is performed in Russia [40]. A network is used, as given in
Fig. 5-27 and the functions locate at the buses 2 and 5. A large number of cases with different load,
faults and power swings are simulated with an RTDS and the behaviour of the protection algorithm
can be extensively tested. But it is not possible to simulate the cascading effects that occur in
practice, because of the missing communication feed-back loop between protection devices and the
real-time simulator.
Fig. 5-27 Power system test model for out-of-step function (algorithm) certification tests. From Fig.
B.1. of [40]
However, advances in real-time simulation allow the consideration of communication feed-back loops
by means of co-simulation of electrical power system and communication infrastructure including the
consideration of measurements, protection and controller devices and their impact on the real-time
62
simulation. This enables testing of mutually depending system equipment. The protection devices can
be connected via voltage and current transformers as hardware with analog outputs of the real-time
simulator. The trip signals of the protective devices can be fed back to the real-time simulator
enabling the opening of the circuit breaker models within the real-time simulation. With this approach,
it becomes feasible to simulate cascading events, but attention should be paid to the latency of the
circuit breaker trip time and the signal transfer. However, it should be noted, that this kind of
advanced simulation is still under development in research projects and not yet fully available for
practical use [43]. As for the case of OOS, various controllers and protection devices may interact, it is
recommended to apply application testing for the case of OOS protection coordination instead of type-
testing only in order to derive the validity of coordinated schemes. References [41][42][43] pay
attention to these developments.
Apart from type testing (that is not limited to testing the algorithms), routine testing and regular
verification of the function settings is an important activity. The involvement and split roles and
responsibilities of TSOs, power plant operators and regulators in these activities are not always well
established. Because of the split responsibilities and the limited available knowhow, this is of large
concern.
With respect to power system operation, it can be concluded that the most important measure for
avoiding large disturbances ending in power system separation, is to maintain the stability of the
power system by means of appropriately controlling power flows even at unexpectable conditions. As
the complexity of power system operation increases steadily due to increased volatility of generation
and load as well as further regulations, assistance systems that help system operators in very stressed
system conditions to find appropriate counter-measures for returning the system into a safe and
stable state are required. This could be done with systems based on dynamic security or protection
assessment that prospectively calculate the impacts of unforeseen contingencies and evaluate
countermeasures on-line in parallel to system operation [44]. Such systems provide the operators with
possible countermeasures at hand. There validity and quality has been prechecked with advanced
algorithms, but the final decision whether to apply such a measure or not remains with the operator.
In high dynamical system operation, such systems may be worthwhile to prevent power system
instability and therefore the loss-of-synchronism. Moreover, trends in research apply the technology of
real-time thermal line monitoring for a precise assessment of transmission line temperatures. The
usage of such technologies allows consideration of the true temperature of the transmission line and
enables thereby a better determination of the moment, when an overloaded transmission line needs
to be switched off due to overheating [45].
Dynamic line rating enables a higher utilization of existing transmission lines and therefore a closer
operation at thermal and stability limits. It is often neglected, that the operation of transmission lines
close to their thermal limits also impact the heat-depending resistance of transmission lines. Many
utilities and researcher assume a constant conductor temperature, when performing power flow
calculations, state estimation or even stability analyses. As it is shown in [46], the spatial distribution
of line temperatures may be diverse due to different weather conditions and power flows. This may
lead to a redistribution of active as well as reactive power flows due to Ohms laws, increasing
transmission losses and less voltage stability margins compared with traditional power flow
calculations and dynamic simulations. Therefore, it is recommended to pay more attention on the
impacts of changed line temperature profiles in power systems especially in highly congested grids.
5.8 REFERENCES
[1] “Definition and Classification of Power System Stability IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on
Stability Terms and Definitions,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 19, no. 3, pp.
1387–1401, 2004.
[2] “Power Swing and Out-of-Step- Considerations on Transmission Lines: report of the Power
System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society,” IEEE PSRC, 2005, WG
D6.
[3] E. Handschin, Elektrische Energieübertragungssysteme, ser. Eltex Studientexte Elektrotechnik.
Heidelberg: Hüthig, 1983, vol. 2.
63
[4] H. P. St. Clair, “Practical Concepts in Capability and Performance of Transmission Lines
[includes discussion]”, Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. Part III:
Power Apparatus and Systems, Bd. 72 (2), 1953.
[5] R. Gutman, P. P. Marchenko und R. D. Dunlop, “Analytical Development of Loadability
Characteristics for EHV and UHV Transmission Lines”, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus
and Systems, Bd. PAS-98 (2), S. 606–617, 1979.
[6] AEMO (2017), “Black System South Australia, 28 September 2016”, available on AEMO
website
[7] ENTSO-E and TEIAS (2015) “Report on Blackout in Turkey on 31 March 2015”, available on
ENTSO-E website
[8] Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), “Report on the Grid Disturbance on 30th
July 2012 and Grid Disturbance on 31st July 2012: August 2012.”, available at
www.cercind.gov.ind/2012/orders/Final_Report_Grid_Disturbance.pdf
[9] Union for the Co-Ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), “Final Report – System
Disturbance on 4 November 2006.”, available at ENTSO-E website
[10] Union for the Co-Ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), “Final Report of the
Investigation Committee on the 28 September 2003 Blackout in Italy.”, available at ENTSO-E
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[11] NERC Steering Group, “Technical Analysis of the August 14, 2003, Blackout”, available on
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[13] D.G. Jennings, L.N.F. de Villiers, “Transient stability improvement using series reactors: A case
stuy”, IEEE EPEC, London, 2015
[14] L.N.F. de Villiers, et al., “Defining and Computing the Margin in Critical Clearing Time –
Eskom’s Experience”, CIGRE SC C4 Session 2016, Report C4-303
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[18] CIGRE Technical Brochure 432 (2010), “Protection relay Coordination”
[19] CIGRE Technical Brochure 613 (2015), “Protection of Distribution Systems with Distributed
Energy Sources”
[20] L.N.F. de Villers, J.M. van Coller, “The Impedence Chart and its Application in Obtaining the
Shape and Complex Plane Position of the Out-Of-Step Polygons”, IEEE PES PowerAfrica
Conference and Exposition, 2007
[21] CIGRE Technical Brochure 629 (2015), “Coordination of Protection and Automation for Future
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[22] IEEE PES Power System Relaying Committee, “Power Swing and Out-of-Step Considerations
on Transmission Lines”, 2005
[23] D.A. Tziouvaras, D. Hou, “Out-of-Step Protection Fundamentals and Advancements”, A
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64
[25] A. Kubis, C. Rehtanz, J. Xu, Y. Li, “About the Relationship of Line Overload Cascading and
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[26] J. Blumschein, “Power Swings during Faul Conditions – Blackout Analysis and Avoidance”,
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[27] Eirgrid Grid Code, version 6, 22 July 2015, available at website
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Conference on Advanced Power System Automation and Protection, Najing, China, September
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ups.ru/fileadmin/files/laws/orders/pr277-300603me.pdf
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[35] CIGRE Technical Brochure 316 (2007), “Defense Plan against Extreme Contingencies”
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66
6. SYNCHRONOUS & NON-SYNCHRONOUS POWER

SOURCE RESPONSE TO LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the effects that a loss-of-synchronism could have on power
plants (synchronous generators and auxiliary systems) as well as the interaction with non-
synchronous power sources like HVDC converters and converter coupled power plants.
The possible causes of loss-of-synchronism have already been listed in the previous chapter and can
be briefly summarised below:
 high level of power transfer through ‘narrow’ corridors that create large rotor angles between
two parts of the electrical system
 Loss-of-synchronism of one or more synchronous generators in case of intense, prolonged or
repetitive faults.
 malfunctioning of regulation and/or control systems.
An out-of-phase synchronization of a synchronous generator would also provoke power swing and
electromechanical transient phenomena.
A particular case of a generator loss-of-synchronism can be caused by the generator ‘Loss of
Excitation’ or ‘Loss of Field’. In this case the generator loses its excitation and it becomes an
asynchronous machine. The pole slipping and corresponding high currents in the rotor generated by
the asynchronous operation would create rapid overheating of the generator damper system that will
have to be tripped very fast or de-loaded very fast. It might be necessary to shut down the machine
and investigate the whole shaft line. Particularly electrical protections are normally foreseen to protect
the generator from these cases of ‘Loss-of-Excitation’ or ‘Loss-of-Field’.
The coordination between grid and generator protections and the potential risk of random tripping of
these protections during out-of-step conditions are also briefly treated.
6.2 SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES

6.2.1 Generator withstand to out-of-step and out-of-phase conditions
The following paragraphs briefly summarises the generator withstand criteria given by the IEC and
IEEE generator standard in case of out-of-step (OOS) conditions and out-of-phase (OOP)
synchronization. The generator withstand criteria and potential effects of the short-circuit conditions
are also listed, in order to be compared with the OOS and OOP conditions.
6.2.1.1 Generator withstand to three-phase short-circuit
The International Standard IEC 60034-3 “Requirements for synchronous generators driven by steam
turbine or combustion gas turbine” [1] (paragraphs 4.16) requires that a generator shall withstand
“without failure” a three-phase short-circuit at its terminal while operating at rated load and 1,05
nominal voltage. At the same time, the standard states that some deformation to the stator windings
might occur. In a note to this paragraph, in case of severe over-currents (for example short-circuit in
the vicinity of the generator), it is considered prudent to examine thoroughly the generator. The
checking should dedicate particular attention to the stator windings. In the standard it is
recommended that any loosening of support or packaging should be repaired, before returning to
service in order to avoid vibration and consequential damage. In certain cases of intense faults, it
could be good practice, to repeat the check of the stator windings after 6 months of operation.
Cracks, that were invisible during the first check (immediately after the incident) could then be visible
due to the abrasive dust. In the IEC Standard it is also suggested to check for possible changes in the
shaft balance and deformation of the coupling bolts and couplings.
In the IEEE 50.13 “Standard for cylindrical rotor 50 Hz and 60 Hz Synchronous Generators rated 10
MVA and above” [2] (at paragraph 4.2.4.1) it is stated that after a sudden short-circuit at the
generator terminals, minor repairs may be required, and an inspection is recommended immediately
after such events.
67
In case of a short-circuit close to the generator, that would impose severe over-currents, in the IEC
Standard 60034-3 (clause 4.2.4.1) it is considered prudent to inspect the generator before returning it
to service. In general, after a three-phase short-circuit at the HV side of the step-up transformer,
major generator manufacturers consider that generators could return to service without repair and an
immediate inspection shouldn’t be necessary.
6.2.1.2 Generator operation in out-of-step conditions
The IEC and IEEE standards do not seem to provide clear requirements relevant to generator
withstand to pole slipping that could happen in case of loss-of-synchronism between the generator
and the network. Distinction has to be made between a single generator that is running OOS and a
part of the network (also mentioned a “cohesive generator group” [3]) that is no longer synchronous
with the other part. A single pole-slipping generator will not return to synchronous operation and
should be disconnected from the grid.
But in case of inter-area oscillations or system separation, the generators have to return to the
synchronous operation in their area. In that case pole slip will occur between the two parts of the
system, but not within the cohesive generator group (at least for most generators). It is therefore in
such disturbance conditions not clear which and how many pole slips are meant. On the other hand, it
is obvious that in case of pole slipping due to ‘Loss-of-field’, the generator will have to trip rapidly in
order to avoid the overheating created by the over-currents that would be induced by the
asynchronous operation. Particular electrical protections are foreseen to protect the generator from
‘Under-Excitation’ or ‘Loss-of-Field’ conditions (ANSI 40 [4]).
6.2.1.3 Out-of-phase synchronization: requirements of standard IEEE 50.13
In the IEEE Std. 50.13 it is considered that an OOP synchronization of a generator with the grid (for
example at 180° or 120° of phase angle difference) may require repairs or replacement of the rotor
and stator.
Generator manufacturers consider it prudent to inspect the machine immediately after such events
and they consider that repairs would likely be required. Continued operation with some compromised
parts will likely lead to accelerated wear and eventual mechanical or electrical failure of the
components. Repairs could be expected to the stator end-winding support system, the cross-sectional
yield experienced by the rotor should be evaluated and the rotor should, at the very least, require
rebalancing. The turbine shafts, couplings and turbine rotating hardware should also be evaluated as
well as the generator foundation hardware after such events.
6.2.1.4 Out-of-phase synchronization: requirements of standard IEC 60034-3
In the International Standard IEC 60034-3 (in the note to paragraphs 4.16) it is stated that in case of
disturbance conditions that can impose severe over-currents, like for example faulty synchronizing, it
would be prudent to examine thoroughly the generator.
As in the case of three-phase short-circuit next to the generator, the standard recommends that this
inspection should dedicate particular attention to the stator winding and that any loosening of support
or packaging should be repaired before returning to service, in order to avoid consequential damage
due to vibration. The Standard also suggests to check for possible shaft balance changes and
deformation of the coupling bolts and couplings.
6.2.2 Synchronous generators and loss-of-synchronism in case of prolonged faults

The rotational speed of synchronous generators tends to accelerate during the inception of nearby
short-circuits, especially in the case of a three phase short-circuit. If the short-circuit is sustained for
long enough – a time known as the critical (fault) clearing time – the generator will lose synchronism
with the main transmission system. When the fault is cleared, power swings will occur between the
generator and the main transmission grid until either the generator regains stable operation with the
system (without pole slip), or the generator loses synchronism and the generator OOS protection
(when installed) or some other protection or control system command disconnects the unit from the
grid.
This phenomenon is normally studied using transient stability simulations to identify the critical
clearance time, including the time delay of the (generator) circuit breaker, as discussed in Chapter 5.
68
Such transient stability studies are normally performed for each single generator or power plant in
case of a fault (normally a three-phase fault) on the power plant busbar or on the HV side of the step-
up transformer.
Many grid-codes define the short-circuit conditions on the Grid and the fault time duration that each
generator has to withstand without losing synchronism (fault-ride-through) and they normally request
to prove it by a dedicated stability study. These stability studies are often requested to be performed
in the worst reasonable operation conditions, that means the lowest value of the grid short-circuit
power and the generator in underexcitation conditions. Such conditions have to be described by the
TSO, whereas the TSO is responsible for clearing faults within the time frame specified under all
prevailing conditions of faults and failing equipment.
6.2.2.1 Critical Clearing Times for Synchronous Generators
The Critical Clearing Time (CCT) of a generator is also sometimes used to identify the shortest fault
duration on the HV grid that causes the generator to lose synchronism.
The CCT is typically much shorter for three-phase faults than for two-phase or single-phase faults. It
also depends on the grid short-circuit power, on the ratio of the rotational inertia and the nominal
power of the power plant, the actual active and reactive power generated before and after the fault,
the excitation conditions and the involved reactance.
The CCT is a physical quantity, that can be calculated and/or simulated for all relevant prevailing
conditions of the power system and the power plant. From these cases, the minimum value of the
outcomes is usually specified as being the CCT. For a typical example and ways how to deal with very
short CCTs see [5][6].
The Fault-Ride-Through (FRT) is a requirement for power plants to stay connected to the grid during
voltage deviations (voltage dips). Such dips may be caused by three-phase faults in the vicinity of a
power plant; for instance, at the bus forming the connection point. The FRT is expressed as a curve
above which the power plant should be able to stay connected; see Fig. 6-1. An FRT-requirement for
both synchronous and non-synchronous generators is shown in Fig. 6-1.
Fig. 6-1 FRT limits to the European Requirements for Generators larger than 50 MW. Minimum and
maximum requirements are given for synchronous generators and non-synchronous generators (PE
connected, i.e. connected by a power electronic convertor) [7]
The FRT requirement is the envelope of the maximum tripping times for faults in the grid and the
recovery voltages during and after the process of intervening protection and control functions. The
power plant itself may influence the recovery voltage, but under the clauses related to FRT no
requirements are put forward for the power plant output.
69
While the CCT mostly is determined for a short period of zero voltage at the point of connection, the
FRT includes a minimum voltage that is larger than 0.0 p.u., but also a longer period of voltage well
above 0.0 p.u. For the synchronous generator, the CCT is a physical limit. It has to be superior to the
requirement of the FRT and to the conditions for which the compliance of the CCT is verified.
Normally the power plant will trip for a fault duration longer than the requirement of the FRT. The
FRT curve, apart from the minimum value, is not easily transposable or coherent with the criteria that
are used for the coordination between generator and grid protections. For non-synchronous
generators see section 6.5.
Also for the auxiliary equipment and physical processes inside the power plant, the FRT requirements
are important, as this equipment, its protection systems and its control functions have to be adapted
to the FRT requirements. To keep the plant running, such requirements are rather severe.
6.2.3 Synchronous generators out-of-phase synchronization

When the generator has to be connected to the grid, the necessary synchronising conditions must be
met for closing of the generator CB. If the necessary conditions are not met and a mismatch of
frequency, voltage or phase angle exists at the moment of synchronization, large currents will flow,
and intense electro-mechanical stresses would arise that could potentially damage the generator’s
stator, rotor, coupling, foundation bolts, etc.
When a generator OOP synchronization occurs, it should not be assumed that a generator will trip
unless specific protection schemes are installed to do so. Generator under-impedance could probably
detect a false synchronization, if the under-impedance has not been disabled by a power swing
blocking and if the electrical centre of the resulting oscillation is inside its impedance setting (the
forward setting is normally set between 50 and 120% of the transformer impedance and the
backward setting, when applied, could cover the whole generator impedance). At the same time, the
under-impedance time setting has to be short enough to detect the power swing and this is not sure,
if the power swings resulting from false synchronization has a high slip-frequency.
The inadvertent energization protection consists of an instantaneous over-current protection that is
used in modern generator protection systems in order to detect and trip instantaneously the generator
in case of an inadvertent circuit breaker closing, when the generator is at standstill or turning speed.
The protection can be armed (enabled) by several selected functions that allow detection of the
generator off-line condition (generator circuit breaker status, under-voltage, etc.).
The protection could also detect a false synchronization, if its arming conditions allow to trip in case of
over-current occurring when the circuit breaker is closed in order to synchronize the generator with
the grid and, therefore, with voltage present at both sides of the circuit breaker. If the protection is
armed in the above-mentioned mode, the over-current threshold of the inadvertent energization could
trip instantaneously in case of faulty synchronization, although its setting is usually not meant for
faulty synchronization. Care should be taken in order to make sure that the over-current threshold of
the inadvertent energization protection would be disabled within a few hundred milliseconds after the
closing of the circuit breaker. This will avoid random instantaneous trip of this protection in case of
over-current due to a fault on the grid or due to power swings. See also 6.3.13.
If a faulty synchronization occurs when a generator is connected to the grid by means of an HV circuit
breaker and if the HV circuit breaker is equipped with a distance protection, the over-current
generated by the faulty synchronizing might be detected by the ‘Switch On To Fault’ (SOFT) function
of the distance protection or similar protection with built-in over-current and SOFT functions. But its
threshold will normally not be reached in case of faulty synchronizing.
This function is normally available in all modern distance protections and it would trip instantaneously
the HV circuit breaker, if an over-current is detected right after the circuit breaker closing. Meanwhile,
the SOFT function is normally set to detect circuit breaker closing on a pre-existing short-circuit fault.
It is therefore not sure that the over-current generated by a faulty synchronising could reach the
threshold of the SOFT function of the distance protection at the HV side, especially when small or
medium generators are connected to a very strong high voltage grid.
70
6.2.4 Power plant auxiliary systems

As explained in the previous chapter, the OOS conditions between one generator and the grid or
between two parts of the grid, generate voltage oscillations with periodic voltage dips increasing close
to the electrical centre; see Chapter 5. The effect of these voltage variations on the auxiliary systems
of a power plant will therefore be more important, when the power plant is located near the electrical
centre. Depending on internal natural frequencies and oscillations in the auxiliaries, the impact can be
worse. These swings and the relevant periodic voltage dip could affect the operation of some motors,
of electronic converters, etc.
In order to verify the potential impact on such equipment, dedicated simulations should be performed
taking into consideration the most reasonable and probable power swing. The auxiliary systems of a
power plant are normally composed by hundreds of motors and devices and it would be complicated
to take in consideration the dynamic behaviours of each single auxiliary device. Where necessary,
such a study should be probably limited to the response of certain critical electrical consumers
(pumps, ventilators, converters, etc). Lack of voltage could cause temporary motor stall and LV motor
contactor could drop, if their auxiliary voltage is directly from the LV distribution system. Particular
studies could also be necessary for motors that use electronic variable speed drives.
Beside detailed simulation, attention should be paid to auxiliary system protection function settings, in
order to avoid that protection functions, like under-voltage, over-current, overload, etc. could trip too
quickly, during voltage oscillation and due to the transient phenomena that they could induce (motor
deceleration/re-acceleration, etc.). If a power plant is requested to withstand a certain kind of power
swing, the generator, the auxiliary systems equipment and the relevant protection and control
systems should be specified and designed, in order to withstand the stresses that could be provoked
by these phenomena. Note that the FRT-requirements, which are also applicable to the auxiliary plant,
require to withstand a voltage dip that is generally deeper but shorter than that corresponding to the
voltage dips during OOS.
6.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION

The following paragraphs are providing a brief description of the most common protection functions
that are installed on large generators and their relevant typical setting.
Protection engineers are normally setting the generator and transformer functions in order to protect
this equipment from the various type of power plant internal and external faults. They are also trying
to define the protection time settings in order to limit the damage in case of a fault. Also, selectivity in
case of short-circuit on the transmission network has to be guaranteed between the power plant
protections and the grid protections. This principle could imply that certain trip time and/or threshold
values of the power plant protections have to be increased. This is normally a requirement of the TSO
and the setting and selectivity of the power plant protection that could detect faults on the grid should
be discussed and agreed between power plant and grid protection engineers. However, the protection
of the equipment and human safety is most important and fast grid protections are also necessary for
this purpose in order to allow an easier coordination of grid and generator protection. In general, the
main goal of the protection setting and coordination calculations is to detect electrical faults and
dangerous operation conditions (short-circuits, dielectric faults, overloads, etc.), in order to isolate
faulty parts and protect components from dangerous stresses. The protection behaviour at OOS and
their potential risk to trip is sometimes only briefly approached or even completely neglected. This is
mostly due to the low probability of OOS conditions in comparison to the probability of electrical
faults. In order to prevent additional and unnecessary random tripping in case of OOS conditions,
protection behaviour during OOS should be taken into consideration at the setting stage.
In the following paragraphs a brief resumé is given of the power plant protection operation principles
and their risk of operation in case of OOS or power swings with reference to their detection principles
and their typical settings. For the protection of the electrical part of power plants reference is often
made to the ANSI-codes. Fig. 2.1 of the Appendix of CIGRE Technical Brochure 479 [4] gives a useful
overview of the protection used for conventional power plants larger than 200 MW; see below (Fig. 6-
2). From the overview the related ANSI-codes for protection functions can be learned but the
protection principles of this figure are presented in this document only as an example of protection
schemes and other solutions and protection principles can be used.
71
Fig. 6-2 Power plant protection ANSI-codes (TB 479 [4])
As a general principle, a dedicated protection study has to be performed for each single power plant
depending on its connection to the grid, the type of turbine and generator, the grid-code connection
requirements, the strategic importance of the power plant, the number of circuit breakers and their
positions in the single line diagram, the neutral connection to earth at each voltage level, the type of
the connections between the generator and the transformers and between the step-up transformers
and the grid, the auxiliary system supply including their redundancy criteria and the emergency
72
supplies, the generator excitation system, the starting system of the turbine, the synchronization
points, the house load capability of the machine and so on.
As a result of the above mentioned considerations, power plant protection engineers have to define
the position of current and voltage transformers, the protection functions necessary to detect and
clear each type of fault in the machines and in the various interconnections, the protection function
and the relay redundancy, the tripping action of each protection function (circuit breaker trip, turbine,
trip, etc.), the protection interfaces with the transmission grid, the protection lock-out and reset
principles, the protection local and remote alarms, the fault recording principles and all the relevant
auxiliary circuits necessary to assure fast and selective tripping and appropriate monitoring.
For example, the 87U overall differential protection given in this scheme provide redundant differential
protection for generator and transformer but it doesn’t provide selectivity in case of generator fault,
because it would also provoke the trip of generator step-up transformer and the auxiliary connection.
The protection dedicated study will have to assess if this is acceptable for a specific power plant. [14]
The same verification method should be applied to each particular protection solution.
6.3.1 Under-voltage protection (ANSI 27)

As described in the previous paragraph for grid under-voltage protections, during a power swing or
OOS the rms voltage magnitude will oscillate. The period of this oscillation is due to a frequency
difference between two locations and hence voltage oscillation frequency will equal the difference
between these two frequencies. Where the voltage measurement is close to the electrical centre of
the oscillation the rms voltage will drop close to zero during the power swing as shown in Fig. 5-18.
On
the contrary, voltage measurements further away will see less severe drop in magnitude such as
shown in Fig. 5-19. Whether generator under-voltage protection could trip during a power swing will
therefore depend on the distance between the under-voltage protection measurement point and the
electrical centre of the oscillation, as well as on the protection settings.
Generator under-voltage protection is normally used as an alarm or, especially in old power plant, as
an ultimate back-up for a grid or a generator fault that would not be detected by main protections
functions like differential, distance, over-current, loss of field, etc. When it is used to trip, the
generator under-voltage is therefore set in order to be selective with the above-mentioned protections
and it is typically set with a voltage threshold around 80% of rated voltage (or below) and a time
delay of several seconds. The under-voltage protection time delay should be anyway greater than the
slowest clearing time of the transmission grid protections. The under-voltage protection should also be
coordinated with under-voltage load shedding, when this is existing.
The above mentioned typical setting of the generator under-voltage protection should normally allow
to make this protection insensitive to power swings, unless they are very slow and with an electrical
centre close to the generator.
6.3.2 Over-voltage protection (ANSI 59)

The generator over-voltage function setting should comply with the over-voltage level and time
durations that are requested in the grid-codes for normal and abnormal operating conditions. The
over-voltage protection should also avoid tripping in case of transient over-voltages due to load
rejection, house load or island mode operation, when these operations modes are foreseen. It should
be verified that the above mentioned abnormal and transient over-voltages are taken into
considerations during the power plant design. Typical generator over-voltage settings are in the range
of 120% and 140% rated voltage with a time delay that could be, respectively, a few seconds or a
few hundred milliseconds.
Power swings or OOS normally shouldn’t generate over-voltage of a level and time duration sufficient
to cause over-voltage protection trip.
73
6.3.3 Frequency protection (ANSI 81)

When a major system disturbance occurs resulting in large energy imbalance, frequency protection
may operate in order to re-balance energy demands. This can be load-shedding where there is
insufficient regional power and consequently an under-frequency state or it could be generation run-
back or tripping, where there is excess regional energy and consequently an over-frequency state [8].
From the grid perspective, it is preferable that generators should remain connected for as long as
practical during under-frequency events as further loss of generation could de-stabilize the grid
further, resulting in cascade tripping of generators and a blackout. Similarly, for over-frequency
events it is preferable from a grid perspective that all generators do not trip at the same time and turn
an over-frequency event into an under-frequency event. This coordination may be managed through
discussions between grid operator and generator protection engineers.
The under- and over-frequency operation conditions and their time durations are normally given by
TSOs in the grid-code. These minimum requirements are chosen to be coordinated with dynamic
power-frequency transient phenomena, with power-frequency regulation system, with load-shedding,
etc. In general, generator frequency protections should not trip for a condition for which the governor
could restore the unit to an acceptable operation condition. Further, generator frequency protections
should be coordinated with under-frequency load-shedding in order to avoid tripping units before
frequency decline is stopped by load-shedding.
Frequency protection settings should also comply with the turbine and generator capability. In
particular, under-frequency operation for prolonged time could create problems to parts of turbine,
generator or to power plant auxiliary systems and, therefore, the requested under-frequency
operation range and its time duration should be assessed at the initial stage of the project. Under-
frequency and over-frequency protection functions should therefore be set in accordance with these
requested operation conditions. In addition to the electrical under-frequency protection, some turbine
control systems could be equipped with under-frequency tripping thresholds in order to protect the
turbine and generator from dangerous mechanical stresses provoked by under-frequency operation.
The over-frequency electrical protection time delays should also be set to avoid tripping in case of
transient frequency over-shoot due to generator house load or island mode operation, when these
operations modes are foreseen. The turbine control systems are generally also equipped with a safety
tripping system in order to avoid dangerous over-speed.
For the above mentioned reason, the under-frequency and over-frequency protections are normally
set with fairly long-time delays when they are set just outside the normal operation range (several
seconds). Faster tripping time are normally used for underfrequency protection when the thresholds
are set at limit of the exceptional operation range, in order to protect the machine rotors from
possible mechanical resonances. On the other hand, overfrequency protection can be set with fast
delay time only if their thresholds are over the normal frequency overshoot in case of house load or
island mode operation (when requested by grid-codes).
For instance, the European grid-code RfG [7] put no requirements to power plants at frequencies
above 51.5 Hz and below 47.5 Hz (Continental Europe Synchronous Area), but these requirements are
yet not implemented uniformly in all TSOs participating in the Continental Europe Synchronous Area
and some require a short duration operation above 51.5 Hz or below 47.5 Hz. It should be verified
that falling into house load or island mode (when requested) is still possible as well as fast
reconnection to the grid, but this could be complicated to achieve for certain types of machine in case
of overfrequency tripping because the overshoot could lead to overspeed trip (generally 110% of
rated speed).
If the above mentioned general setting principles are respected, overfrequency or underfrequency
tripping conditions should not be reached during a pulsing phenomenon like a power swing or OOS,
even when fairly slow.
6.3.4 Voltage-controlled and voltage-restrained over-current (ANSI 51V-C and 51V-R)

The voltage-controlled overcurrent protection (51V-C) could be set with a current threshold lower that
generator rated current. This protection is therefore activated by an undervoltage threshold that
74
should be set underneath the lowest recoverable system voltage, in order to avoid random tripping in
emergency under-voltage conditions.
The voltage-restrained overcurrent protection (51V-R) protection consists of an inverse time over-
current protection whose tripping time is accelerated by voltage drop at generator terminal and this
particularity has to be taken in consideration in the protection setting calculations. The 51V-R voltage-
restrained overcurrent protection settings should also be calculated in order to avoid tripping during
grid emergency condition in the case of lowest recoverable system voltage.
The voltage dependency of these 51V protection function allows the detection of the sustained short-
circuit current of the generator that could fall under the value of the generator rated current after a
few seconds of fault.
The 51V protection functions are used as back-up protection to detect phase faults in the grid and,
therefore, their tripping time delay have to be selective with the HV grid protections. When a
generator under-impedance protection (ANSI 21) is available, it is not necessary to activate both 51V
and 21 protection functions and the use of the under-impedance protection is recommended.
The voltage oscillation during OOS is accompanied by over-current and under-voltage pulsing with
magnitudes up to those of short-circuits. Generator voltage controlled and voltage-restrained over-
current may thus trip in case of OOS whose period is ‘long’ in comparison with the protection trip
setting time.
A generator that is close to the electrical centre of the OOS will experience the greater voltage
depression and hence supply proportionally more current. These conditions are likely to activate the
voltage-controlled protection and they will accelerate the voltage-restrained over-current time delay
and increase the possibility of generator tripping during OOS.
6.3.5 Over-current protection (ANSI 51)

In modern generator protection design, the voltage-restrained over-current protection is more used
than the simple over-current protection because it is more adapted to detect the generator sustained
short-circuit current. When applied, the over-current protection is used as a back-up protection to
detect phase faults in the grid and, therefore, it has to be set with a tripping time of 1 or more
seconds, in order to be selective with grid protections. As for the voltage-restrained over-current, the
‘simple’ over-current could trip only in case of power swings whose period is ‘long’ in comparison with
its trip setting time.
6.3.6 Generator and transformer differential protection (ANSI 87G and 87T)
Generator and transformer differential protections are used to protect these machines and the
relevant HV and MV connections. The generator differential protection is normally set with a low
threshold (5 to 10 % differential current) with instantaneous tripping. The typical settings of the
threshold of transformer differential protections are normally higher (generally 20 to 30 % rated
current) and the setting threshold increases if the transformer is equipped with an on-load tap-
changer.
There are two types of differential protection functions: high impedance, where the different CT’s are
physically connected together to a stabilizing resistor. With the availability of electronic relays this
type is not used anymore, because it has high requirements to the CT’s. With electronic relays,
differential protection is usually low impedance type. For stability in case of through-faults, a restraint
characteristic is set, to increase the required differential current to trip, dependent on the through
current (or restraint current).
Due to the above mentioned current-differential measuring principles, these protections are normally
stable during power swings and OOS.
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6.3.7 Transformer restricted earth-fault protection (ANSI 87REF)

The restricted earth-fault transformer differential protection is used in certain countries in order to
detect an earth fault inside the star connected HV winding of the transformer.
This protection measures the differential zero-sequence current. The threshold of this protection is
generally set lower than the transformer differential protection (generally 5 to 10 % rated current) for
an instantaneous trip.
This protection measures zero-sequence current and it is therefore stable in case of power swings.
6.3.8 Neutral over-current in the HV transformer connection to earth (ANSI 51N)

This protection is used as a back-up for earth fault in the HV grid and, therefore, its tripping time
should be selective with the grid earth fault protection. This protection is normally set with a time
delay in order to be selective with the grid ground protections within its reach also taking in
consideration single pole reclosing time.
As this protection detects zero-sequence current, it is therefore stable in case of power swings or
OOS.
6.3.9 Pole-slip protection (ANSI 78)

The OOS protections are generally used only for large generators. The measuring principle of these
protections is generally based on the displacement of the locus of the impedance that is measured at
the generator terminal. In certain countries the measurement of the generator rotor angle (counting
the number of pole slips) combined with the measurement of the number of power inversions at
generator terminals is also used to detect OOS.
The TSOs can provide type and setting rules for generator OOS protections or they simply check the
protection type and setting in order to verify their coherence with the OOS protection policy for the
HV grid. The generator OOS protections are generally set to detect and trip only for OOS, whose
electrical centre is within the generator or within the transformer. The generator OOS protections are
normally set in order to avoid tripping for stable power swings and should be selective with the grid
OOS protections, if any. Sometimes, they can be set to trip for an OOS whose electrical centre is in
the grid, but only after the protection has counted a certain number of slips, in order to give time to
the grid out-of-step protections to split the network. The OOS protection setting should anyway
always be compatible with the electromechanical stresses that could be generated by power swings.
In general, the type and setting guideline of the generator OOS protections should be defined in
coherence with the grid OOS protection as a part of the Grid Defence Plan. This policy is generally
applied by main TSOs, but it is not always clear for smaller network or for the fast-developing grid in
certain regions. See also section 6.2.1.2.
6.3.10 Loss-of-field protection (ANSI 40)

This protection has the purpose to detect and trip the generator in case of under-excitation or
complete loss of field in order to avoid that the generator could lose stability with the grid or become
asynchronous (in case of complete loss of excitation). In order to detect under-excitation or loss-of
field, the protection functions are normally applying the impedance method or the admittance
method.
Two tripping characteristics with different time delay are generally used for these types of functions.
One characteristic corresponds to the dynamic stability limit or extreme under-excitation and has a
tripping stage of a few hundred milliseconds. A second characteristic corresponds to the steady state
stability limit and it could have a longer tripping time. A threshold detecting a very low excitation
voltage is also used by some protection manufacturers in order to accelerate the tripping time in case
of sure loss of field. The measurement of the generator rotor angle (counting the number of pole
slips) is also used in certain countries to detect the pole slips originating from a loss of field and
consequent asynchronous operation.
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The asynchronous operation of the generator leads to intense overheating and, therefore, the
protection should rapidly detect the loss of field and trip. Meanwhile, the time delay of the protections
that are using the impedance or admittance methods should be set to avoid tripping in case of power
swings that could cross one of the tripping characteristics. This can be generally obtained by setting
the protection with a trip time delay sufficiently long to make the protection insensitive to the slowest
power swing that could cross its tripping characteristics. The tripping time of the loss of field
protections should also be set in order to give time to the Automatic Voltage Regulator to react in
case of transient excitation undershoot. [15]
6.3.11 Stator earth-fault protection (ANSI 51NG or 59NG)

The stator earth fault protection is based on measuring the generator zero-sequence current or
voltage. In order to limit the damages provoked by the generator earth faults, generator neutral is
normally earthed through a resistor (or by means of a transformer with a resistor connected to its
secondary winding) that limits the earth fault current to 20 A or less. The generators are normally
connected to step-up transformers with a MV delta winding and, therefore, the generator windings
could be treated as an isolated system that is less influenced by faults on the grid. Meanwhile, certain
HV grid disturbances could induce transient earth current on the generator through inter-winding
capacitances of the step-up transformers. The stator earth fault protection setting time delay should
be chosen as a compromise to trip as soon as possible in order to limit generator damage and not be
influenced by grid transient disturbances (typical time settings are in the range of 0,5 and 1 second or
even superior).
This stator earth fault protection measures zero-sequence components and it’s therefore stable in
case of power swings.
6.3.12 Reverse power (ANSI 32R)

Reverse power protections are installed in order to detect and trip the generator when it is operating
as a motor for a prolonged time due to the loss of mechanical torque of the prime mover.
This protection is normally set to trip with a time delay in the range between 10 and 30 seconds in
order to avoid random tripping due to transient power inversion. If it is set with a sufficient time
delay, this protection is therefore insensitive to power inversions that can originate from OOS
conditions, even when they are very slow.
For gas turbines, certain suppliers could set this protection to trip in a few seconds or less, in order to
protect the machine in case of flame-off, when a high power will be withdrawn from the grid by the
compressor. Other suppliers apply slower tripping delay for the reverse protection and rely on the
flame-off detection system to trip the turbine, in case of loss of flame. When the reverse protection
function is set with fast tripping time delay, it could trip the machine in the case of power inversion
due to slow power swing or OOS conditions.
For steam turbines, it is typical to have a second and quicker tripping time delay of the reverse power
protection, but only when the turbine has already tripped.
6.3.13 Distance/under-impedance protection (ANSI 21)

Due to its easy setting, the under-impedance protection is frequently used in modern generator
protection schemes in order to detect HV grid faults that would not be cleared by HV grid protections.
Due to the impedance measuring algorithm, this protection is often preferred to the generator voltage
restrained or voltage controlled overcurrent (ANSI 51V). The use of both under-impedance and
generator over-current is not necessary and sometimes not recommended by protection experts.
This protection is also used as a back-up of the generator differential protections and it is normally set
with two tripping stages. The first stage normally has a forward setting around 50 to 80 % of the
transformer impedance and the backward setting, when applied, it could cover the whole generator
impedance. The time delay of this stage is normally chosen to be selective with the transformer and
generator differential protection (in the range between 0,15 or 0,3 secs). The second stage is
77
generally used as a back-up for phase faults into the HV grid (typical settings are in the range from
120 to 200 % of step-up transformer impedance). Within its operating zone, the time delay of this
second stage should be selective with the longest grid protections within its reach. The time delay will
therefore be longer if the protection reach goes deeper into the grid. As for the other back-up
protections that are set to detect faults on the grid, the under-impedance settings should be
calculated to avoid tripping in the case of the lowest recoverable system voltage.
If the under-impedance protection is not disabled by a power swing blocking logic, it could trip in case
of OOS whose electrical centre is close to the generator.
6.3.14 Inadvertent energization (ANSI 51/27)

This function is used in many modern schemes of generator protections and it is primarily used to
identify the condition, when a generator runs at turning speed (almost standstill) or operates below
nominal synchronous speed and is then unintentionally connected to the transmission grid. This
random occurrence could severely damage the generator within a short period of time. Such incidents
have been experienced in the past, during commissioning or maintenance, when the generator circuit
breaker close command contact was accidentally bridged or activated.
The inadvertent energization protection is armed (enabled) some seconds after the generator is
disconnected from the grid. Protection functions are normally using the AND logic of the circuit
breaker open position and an under-voltage threshold at generator terminals as arming condition.
Once armed, an over-current threshold with instantaneous tripping is activated (enabled). This over-
current protection is disabled a few hundred milliseconds after the closing of the circuit breaker and,
therefore, it could detect the over-current generated by the generator energized at standstill.
It should be verified at testing stage that these arming conditions are correctly configured, in order to
ensure that instantaneous protection is disarmed once that the machine will be connected to the grid.
This will avoid random instantaneous trip of this protection in case of over-current due to a fault on
the grid or due to power swings.
6.3.15 Unbalanced load or negative sequence protection (ANSI 46)

This protection calculates the generator negative sequence by measuring the three-phase currents on
the neutral side of the generator. System unbalanced operation, faults or open phase conditions
create negative sequence components of currents, that would induce rotor currents that can create
dangerous temperatures in a fairly short time. The negative sequence protection has to avoid that
continuous unbalance capability and the short time negative sequences capability (I22 t) of the
generators are exceeded. The negative sequence generator capabilities are given in IEEE C50-12 for
salient pole generators [9], in IEEE C50-13 for cylindrical rotor generators [2] and in IEC 60034-1 for
all type of generators [10].
In accordance, with the above-mentioned IEEE and IEC standards, the generator’s continuous
capability is in the range from 5 to 10 % rated current, depending on the type of generator and
cooling system. Unbalanced faults in the grid (like phase-to-earth, phase-to-phase, phase-to-phase-to-
earth) or open phase conditions can generate a fairly high value of negative sequence current that
could cause the negative sequence protection to trip rapidly (few seconds) in order to protect the
generator, if these faulty conditions persist. The negative sequence protection could therefore detect
faults in the HV grid and it should be set to be selective with grid protections against unbalanced
faults (also taking in consideration single-phase opening and reclosing cycle), if this is compatible with
the generator short-time negative sequence capability.
This negative sequence protection measures the reverse sequence current and it’s therefore stable in
case of power swings and OOS.
6.3.16 Over-excitation (Volt per Hertz) protection (ANSI 24)

The over-excitation function is used to protect generators and transformers from prolonged over-
fluxing that would cause saturation of the magnetic circuits with consequent overheating and potential
78
damages of the magnetic core. The IEEE and IEC standards provide indication of the over-fluxing
(Volts per Hertz) capability of generators and transformers. These protection functions can consist of
one or more time-definite stages or of a combination of a definite-time and an inverse time stages.
This second solution is much more adapted to the capability curves of the generators. In certain case,
an additional dedicated over-excitation protection could be provided for the step-up transformer. The
over-excitation protection should also be set to comply without tripping with the combination of over-
voltages and under-frequency operation conditions requested by the grid-codes, unless these
conditions exceed the capabilities of the machines and it should also be coordinated with Under-
frequency Load-shedding.
Power swings or OOS normally shouldn’t generate volt/hertz increase with a duration sufficient to
cause an overexcitation protection trip.
6.4 COORDINATION OF GENERATOR AND TRANSMISSION GRID PROTECTION

The generator protection system has to be designed and set in order to protect generators, step-up
transformers and auxiliary transformers against internal faults, but they also have to protect the
generation system against the potentially dangerous effects of prolonged and/or repetitive grid
disturbances (grid short-circuits, under-/overfrequency and under-/over voltages, loss-of-synchronism,
etc.). At the same time, the generator protections that could detect one of the above-mentioned grid
disturbances have to be set in order to leave the time at the grid protections to remove the origin of
the grid disturbance, before disconnecting or tripping the generators.
TSOs should also provide fast and reliable protection systems, in order to remove grid fault as quick
as possible. This would prevent stability problems and it would allow an easier coordination between
grid and generator protections. Redundancy of the protection system and circuit breaker failure
circuits should also be implemented for important transmission systems and power plants. This is
particularly important where the critical fault clearing time is short, and a protection or circuit breaker
failure could provoke a loss of stability.
In order to achieve the above mentioned general points, an open and transparent collaboration
between network protection and generator protection must be properly coordinated. This also implies
an exchange of all the system and function data that are necessary for protection selectivity and
coordination studies. In addition, choices must be made in order to find the best balance between
switching off a power plant before taking the risk of a potential damage, with the advantage of fast
returning into operation or switching off later with the (potential) consequence that we will need much
more time for system restoration.
On the other hand, if the generator is ‘over-protected’ and it is tripped when it is not at risk, other
generators could be left to share the system load. This could create sequential tripping of other
generators and the remaining generators could be at risk of damage. This situation could concern an
extreme emergency condition and it could lead to cascade tripping, OOS and, potentially, blackout.
The trip actions of the various generator and transformer protections depend on the chosen single line
scheme, the position of the HV and MV equipment (circuit breakers, current transformers and voltage
transformers), the connection of the auxiliary supply, the type of turbine, the type of excitation
system, etc. At basic engineering stage, a trip matrix has to be defined in order to define which kind
of trip will have to be provoked by each electrical protection function (turbine trip, generator trip,
transformer trip, excitation trip, etc.). Generators are equipped with back-up protections in order to
detect and remove faults that accidently would not be cleared by main protections. These over-
current, distance, and under-voltage protections can also detect faults in the HV grids and they would
protect the generators from the effect of prolonged faults on the grid that have not been cleared by
HV grid protections.
Several TSOs grid-codes require generators to remain connected to the grid without losing stability,
for a minimum time duration that depends on the voltage dip level. These requirements are often
expressed by a FRT-curve that represents the voltage dip of the HV grid versus the time duration of
the disturbance. The voltage drops of the grid voltages are often caused by short-circuit faults, which
could be detected by the generator back-up protections (distance, over-current, minimum voltage).
These generator protections shouldn’t disconnect or trip the generator with a time delay that is
inferior to the time durations given in the FRT-curve. The fault ride through requirements are anyway
not easy to be transposable in protection setting coordination. In fact, this diagram represents a
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voltage dip on the grid, while most of the generator protections operates by measuring dynamic
impedances or currents. In addition, the voltage profile is evolving during faults (subtransient and
transient impedances, field forcing, fault evolution, etc.) or power swings.
Certain TSOs request that the generator protections leave the time to the grid protections
(differential, distance, earth fault protections, etc.) to clear the fault in a selective way, before
disconnecting the generator. Further, they request the generator protections to be selective, at least,
with the grid protection that are within their reach. Certain TSOs could request to increase the time
delay of these generator protections to even higher values to be selective with slower grid protections
(distance protection zone 2 or zone 3, automatic reclosing, earth fault grid protection, etc.). But to
Table 3.1 of [6], the FRT for the lowest voltage dip is only 140 to 150 ms (with 250 ms for exceptional
cases which have to be agreed upon and documented).
Single-phase fault conditions have far less impact on the generator dynamics than three-phase faults,
so that a larger time delay might be acceptable for the power plant operator, but the generator
backup protection time setting does not differentiate between single-phase or multi-phase faults. In
addition, the generator back-up protections are normally connected on the triangle side of a YNd step-
up transformer, where the fault currents are not circulating in the phases as on the HV grid. The
setting of the generator back-up protections has anyway to be kept below the over-current generator
capability, with a certain safety margin.
In case of OOS, certain TSOs may require that generators must remain connected to the transmission
grid for a number of pole slips, in order to give the time to grid protections to split the grid in case of
inter-zone power swings. These OOS grid protections could be set in pre-determined grid location as a
part of the grid Defence Plan. Other TSOs are only requesting to verify the generator OOS protections
settings and certain TSOs have no specific requirement.
6.5 NON-SYNCHRONOUS POWER SOURCE RESPONSE TO LOSS-OF-

SYNCHRONISM
Many grids are experiencing growing proportions of converter-interfaced energy sources, such as
VSC-technology HVDC-converters, wind farms and solar PV. The power sources which are fully
connected through a power electronic converter are called non-synchronous power plants, as the
primary power source is not running synchronously with the grid frequency.
In order to convert the DC-voltage to an AC-voltage in synchronism with the main grid power
frequency, such devices rely on rapid switching (kHz to tens of kHz) of the power electronics. To
ensure that the output power is synchronous with the grid, phase-locked loop controls constantly
monitor the grid power frequency. Typically, these controls are very fast acting and thus can quickly
track fluctuations in the grid frequency and remain in synchronism with it. In contrast, synchronous
machines are much slower to adjust to changes in grid frequency as the massive rotating parts of
turbine and generator must physically accelerate or decelerate to change their rotational speed and
thus track the grid frequency. The moment of inertia of these rotating parts related to the power in
comparison to the power of the grid dictates how quickly they will accelerate. This characteristic of
synchronous machines is beneficial as the power frequency will slowly alter due to changes in energy
balance. During prolonged nearby three-phase faults, the phase-locked loop control of a converter will
not have sufficient measurable voltage magnitude to ensure that it remains synchronized to the grid.
At this point the converter will automatically disconnect itself. In many countries specific FRT
performance requirements are enforced to ensure that this tripping does not occur too quickly with
the result of removing the short-circuit current contribution and voltage support supplied by the
converter.
The response of converter interfaced energy sources to grid frequency disturbances and power swings
is dependent on the control mode. Many converters are just configured to provide output power
based on scheduled flows (HVDC, storage) or available input power (wind/solar PV) and will track
fluctuations or swings in grid frequency without changing active power output. Additional control
functions may be implemented to provide specific performance characteristics or grid requirements.
These may be fixed power increments in response to grid frequency thresholds or may be more
graduated response based on an algorithm or look-up table. Support to negative power frequency
80
deviations or gradients requires some headroom in the power available from wind and/or solar energy
sources; i.e. a loss of power during normal operation.
Fig. 6-3 illustrates the active power response requirements of wind farms according to the Irish Grid
Code. When the grid frequency goes outside a fixed dead-band wind farms are required to initially
provide a droop characteristic where the frequency deviation is small or fixed response characteristics
for larger frequency deviations. The increase in active power output at low frequency is predicated on
the assumption that some wind farms may be curtailed at the time of the frequency disturbance and
thus have additional available capacity. The change in active power output is required within a defined
time-range.
Similar to the European Network Code on Requirement for Generators (NC RfG [7]), there is a
European Network Code on requirements for grid connection of High Voltage Direct Current systems
and direct current-connected power park modules (NC HVDC), drafted by ENTSO-E, in force since 28
September 2016 (EU 2016/1447). This code requires FRT as well as active power response such as
synthetic inertia (Article 14).
Studies like [8] show that the combination of such requirements for non-synchronous generators and
the inertial energy of synchronous generators (possible running at partial active power output) leads
to a changing but not detrimental transient behaviour of future power systems. Many publications
address the potential of producing synchronous torque by proper adaption of the controllers of HVDC
and other PE-connected power sources. Most of them are based on simulations only, for instance
recently [12][13].
Note: FA to FE are the power frequency set-points at which the wind farm has to deliver maximum active power
output (A), dead-band control (B to C), minimum output (D: Design Minimum Operating Level) or no output (E).
Fig. 6-3 Irish Grid Code Requirements for Active Power Frequency response of Wind Farms [11]
81
The non-synchronous power sources are not vulnerable to active power swings as they flexibly follow
all power frequency and phase angle variations. This applies at least for the mostly applied voltage
source converters with their fast switching IGBTs. But, such converters are sensitive to reactive power
swings and the accompanying voltage variations. In case converters are controlled to support the
voltage at the point of coupling, they may become overloaded or at least have to reduce the active
power contribution to limit the load current. In case they don’t support the voltage at the point of
coupling, they may even absorb reactive power at the cost of a further voltage drop.
Line current converters, as applied at the large conventional HVDC converter stations, are based on
thyristor technology and push the active and reactive power depending on their controller setting. For
their commutation, these converters need a strong power from the grid, which is not available during
a short-circuit in the direct neighbourhood. During voltage dips, the controllers also lack a reference
and may run into commutation problems.
This shows that power swings indirectly influence the behaviour of non-synchronous power sources.
The behaviour depends on the settings and on the dynamic response to transient phenomenon of the
controllers rather than a protection problem. However, their behaviour may prevent proper
functioning of installed grid protection devices and should be considered.
6.6 REFERENCES
[1] IEC Standard 60034-3, ed. 6.0 (2007), "Requirements for synchronous generators driven by
steam turbine or combustion gas turbine"
[2] IEEE Standard C50.13 (2014), "Standard for Cylindrical-Rotor 50 Hz and 60 Hz Synchronous
Generators Rated 10 MVA and Above"
[3] NERC System protection and control subcommittee (2010), “Power Plant and transmission
System Protection Coordination”
[4] CIGRE Technical Brochure 479 (2011), “International Guide on the Protection of Synchronous
Generators”
[5] G.D. Jennings, L.N.F. de Villiers, Transient Stability Improvement Using Series Reactors: a
Case Study, EPEC, London 2015
[6] L.N.F. de Villiers, e.a., “Defining and Computing the Margin in Critical Clearing Time – Eskom’s
Experience”, CIGRE SC C4 Session 2016, C4-303
[7] ENTSO-E proposal Requirements for Generators (RfG) has been accepted as Commission
Regulation (EU) 2016/631 “establishing a network code on requirements for grid connection
of generators”, and entered into force within 20 days after publication on April 27th, 2016
[8] D. Hewes, I. Boiarchuk, R. Witzmann, S. Altschaeffl, “Impacts of Reduced Rotational Inertia
on Frequency Stability in the European Transmission System”, CIGRE Symposium
“Experiencing the Future Power System … TODAY”, Dublin 2017, Session 2, Report 025
[9] IEEE Standard C50.12 (2005), “Standard for Salient-Pole 50 Hz and 60 Hz Synchronous
Generators and Generator/Motors fo Hydraulic Turbine Applications Rated 5 MVA and Above”
[10] IEC Standard 60034-1, Ed. 10.2 (1999), “Rotating electrical machines – Part 1: Rating and
performance”
[11] EirGrid Grid Code Version 6, 22 July 2015, available through EirGrid website
[12] E. Rakhsani, et al. “Virtual Synchronous Power Strategy for Multiple HVDC Interconnections of
Multi-Area AGC Power Systems”, IEEE Transactions on Power System, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp.
1665-1677, 2017
[13] M. Hwang, et al. “Disturbance-Adaptive Short-Term Frequency Support of a DFIG Associated
with the Variable Gain Based on ROCOF and Rotor Speed”, IEEE Transactions on Power
System, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 1873-1881, 2017
82
[14] CIGRE SC B5 Session 2016, B5-203, J.S. Kang e.a., “Coordination of Generator and Power
System Protection in Korea”
[15] NERC PRC 019 “Coordination of Generation Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulation
Controls and Protection”
83
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7. CIRCUIT BREAKER PHENOMENA

7.1 GENERAL
Circuit breakers are the HV apparatus that have to make, carry and break all kinds of AC currents. For
instance, under normal operational conditions:
 load currents flowing through transmission lines, through cables, through transformers,
through generators, etc.
 capacitive currents related to unloaded transmission lines or to cables and to shunt capacitor
banks
 small inductive currents related to shunt reactors or to unloaded transformers.
But also during abnormal conditions:
 fault currents, such as those related to single or multi-phase terminal faults
 fault currents related to faults at a short distance on a transmission line (short line faults) or
at a long distance (long line faults)
 fault currents mainly determined by a transformer (transformer limited faults) or a series
reactor (reactor limited faults)
 fault currents related with cross country faults
 fault currents determined by a large generator
 out-of-phase (OOP) currents.
As such, circuit breakers form the primary part of a protection system. In case of a tripping command
during out-of-step, the circuit breaker has to interrupt the OOP current, while an OOP recovery
voltage appears across the open contacts.
Step by step it will be explained how circuit breakers, being mechanical devices, act time-wise, and
how the recovery voltage depends on the current to be interrupted. Then the requirements in the
circuit breaker Standards will be explained, followed by recent studies on the statistics of OOP
currents and recovery voltages (for generator circuit breakers) and new studies on the conditions
when the power system is split into parts.
7.2 TIME FRAME OF CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCHING PHENOMENA

7.2.1 Time frame of fault detection
When a short-circuit occurs or another incident that requires some automatic switching actions (e.g.
Buchholtz, load shedding, temporary over-voltage) it takes some time to detect the fault. Protection
devices need between somewhat less than half a cycle to some cycles to analyse the system
conditions, take decisions and send a command to open or to close to a circuit breaker. Because of
selectivity reasons, deliberate delay-times up to several hundreds of ms or even seconds may be
implemented. Delay may also be caused by intermediate auxiliary relays and by the exchange of
information with other protection devices through telecommunication channels.
Protection for system stability functions, like load shedding at under-frequency or automatic
connection of shunt reactors at line ends under too high-power frequency voltages, take a second or
so to verify whether the prevailing conditions are not of a transient nature.
As soon as a command to open or close has been sent to a nearby circuit breaker, no relevant time
delay occurs to activate the opening or closing coil of the circuit breaker.
7.2.2 Time frame under system instability conditions

Due to large power flows caused by energy trading, overhead lines in a meshed international system
are more and more operated close to their thermal rating. Load variations, problems with power
plants and maintenance activities on overhead lines somewhere in the system may lead to unforeseen
deviations from the scheduled energy exchange patterns. In such a case some HV equipment,
especially overhead lines, may become overloaded. An excessively large current leads to an
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unacceptable sag of the conductors with either a preventive intervention by protection functions or a
flashover to earth with a consequential line tripping. Under heavy load conditions, line tripping will
cause overload on the remaining lines and potentially a cascading effect of line trips. At the same
time, angle instability and reactive power deficit may lead to frequency and voltage problems that
endanger the integrity of the power system. The system might be split, and parts of the whole system
might collapse and suffer a black-out.
Apart from the planning stage during the months before a system collapse and the operational
decisions in the day and hours before the incident, the time scale just before a system collapse is as
follows. After the first line trip, it takes tens of minutes until the next line trips due to overload (25
minutes at the blackout in Italy dd. 28 Sep 2003, 30 minutes at the UCTE system separation dd. 4
Nov. 2006, 10 minutes at the black-out in India dd. 31 July 2012, several overload trips in the hours
before system collapse and a crucial trip 30 minutes before the black-out in India dd. 30 July 2012).
The next line trip is then followed by rapid trips of a number of other overhead lines; i.e. within
seconds to tens of seconds.
Since the load current is high and the voltage relatively low at out-of-step, line trippings are mostly
triggered by time dependent over-current protection functions and distance zone 3 or higher low
impedance detection. As the load current increases to high values, the voltage phase angle difference
along the line (i.e. between areas that are connected through the involved overhead lines) will reach
high values as well. At the moment of tripping, the last line that connects two areas encounters OOP
conditions.
7.2.3 Time frame of the contact separation in circuit breakers

A circuit breaker, like other switchgear, is mainly a mechanical device. During its total life, it shows a
very static behaviour; mostly with closed contacts. On average, a circuit breaker has to open and
close the contacts far less than a thousand times. However, it is required to open and close very
reliably and very fast. Closing of the contacts can normally take up to about 100 ms and opening up
to about 40 ms. So, about one minute of its total lifetime the circuit breaker is not in a static position.
Circuit breakers for electric power transmission and distribution are three phase components with a
pair of contacts in each pole (in each phase). At higher voltages (generally above 420 kV) more than
a single pair of contacts may be applied in series.
At lower voltages a single operating mechanism will drive all three contact pairs. That is to say, the
moving contact of a pair, as mostly the other contact is fixed. At higher voltages a single operating
mechanisms is applied per pole or even, in case of multiple contact pairs, several operating
mechanisms per pole. The operating mechanisms are synchronized so that the mechanical scattering
between poles and between series contact pairs is less than a few ms.
The energy to accelerate the moving parts of the circuit breaker and its linkages is stored in a spring
system or in a compressed air/nitrogen accumulator. The energy is released, and the mechanical
power controlled by a hydraulic or a pneumatic mechanism and/or a mechanical linkage system,
equipped with dampers. An electric coil is energized to move initially a latch or piston in the drive
mechanism.
Thus, a command to open results in a physical separation of the contacts within about 40 ms, for all
three poles. But, the load or fault current will continue to flow as the electromagnetic force of the
power system will not allow a current to be interrupted without being forced to zero. It is the
magnetic energy ½L*I(t)2 stored in the power system inductance that otherwise would be converted
into an electric energy ½C*V(t)2 and consequently to enormous switching over-voltages. Several
methods are available to reduce the current to zero, but high voltage AC breakers will wait until the
power frequency current reaches the next zero. Meanwhile the current will flow through the electric
arc that is established between the departing contacts.
At the first power frequency current zero the contact gap (i.e. the gap between the contacts of that
pole) may still be too small to withstand the recovery voltage and its transients. As the circuit breaker
may not be able to interrupt the current at the first power frequency current zero after contact
separation, the circuit breaker pole has to wait for the next opportunity, e.g. half a cycle later in a
single-phase circuit. The duration after contact separation up to the final interruption is called the
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arcing time (or arc duration). For fault current clearing, modern HV circuit breakers need an arcing
time of 10 to 20 ms.
The time from command to open until current interruption in all three phases is therefore 50 to 60
ms.
7.2.4 Current interruption phenomena

Although vacuum technology is developing rapidly from medium voltage applications to voltages
above 100 kV and although there are still old technologies like air-blast, bulk oil and minimum oil
circuit breakers in service, the dominant technology for HV circuit breakers is the single pressure SF 6-
gas circuit breaker. This technology will be described to illustrate the time-wise phenomena at current
interruption.
In closed position the current flows through a part of the contacts that is called the main contacts.
Usually this is a configuration of a silver-plated contact part (the moving contact) and silver-plated
contact fingers (the tulip contact of the fixed part). Parallel to the main contacts, arc contacts are
installed, that guide the current during the process of opening of the contacts. They show a higher
resistance, but are designed to withstand the electric arc after contact separation.
At opening, an aerodynamic system is activated to build up SF6-gas pressure around the departing
contacts and to guide the cooling SF6-gas along the electric arc. Fresh SF6 molecules have to be
available right at the moment of power frequency current zero, so that the hot plasma ions of the arc
remnants will recombine, and the conductive hot gas is removed.
The window of opportunity is only a few μs, before the voltage across the open contacts builds up to
a value that accelerates the remaining ions to energy levels leading to an avalanche effect and re-
establishment of the electric arc. This window is called the thermal phase, as the possible re-ignition is
caused by a thermal phenomenon (the acceleration and consequential multiplication of plasma ions).
The recovery of the voltage is initially determined by the very fast traveling waves in the substation
(sub μs time scale) and in the nearby overhead lines (tens to hundreds of μs). Somewhere in the
network, the traveling waves will reflect negatively causing a decrease of the transient recovery
voltage at the circuit breaker terminals. The well-known zigzag pattern of the transient recovery
voltage, caused by the traveling waves, will be a little retarded by the substation capacitance, that
gives a time delay characterized by an RC time constant. R being the equivalent surge impedance of
the connected overhead lines and C the capacitance of the substation equipment. Usually the time
delay is some μs at the busbar side of the circuit breaker and a fraction of a μs at the line side. In Fig.
7-1 schematically the initial part of the recovery voltage is illustrated.
It is this initial part, that determines whether the cooling of the arc is enough to prohibit an avalanche
effect or not. After the initial part, the traveling waves return from the line ends and most of them will
show an opposite sign, thus decrease the recovery voltage. Around the same time, the system natural
frequencies start to play a role, and these determine the further response of the system. Recovery
voltages typically show a damped 1-cos wave shape with frequencies of several kHz. It may be that
the contact distance after, say, 1 ms is not large enough to withstand the peak value of the recovery
voltage. A dielectric re-ignition may occur, and the electric arc will be re-established.
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Fig. 7-1 Schematic view of initial TRV with traveling waves and time delay
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At a thermal re-ignition or at a dielectric re-ignition, the circuit breaker pole has to wait for the next
power frequency current zero to initiate another attempt to interrupt the current. In the meantime,
the other two poles (phases) will face a power frequency current zero and have their opportunity to
interrupt the current. Mostly, the first pole to interrupt undergoes the toughest conditions of current
to be interrupted and recovery voltage to be encountered. For the second and the last pole the
current interruption is easier.
An SF6-gas circuit breaker is designed and evaluated to interrupt the currents within an arcing window
of typically 10 to 20 ms. So, only a few current zeroes per pole can be handled. In case it is not able
to clear at a certain power frequency current zero, it will fail and probably explode. That, luckily,
happens very seldom.
After successful current interruption, the voltage across the contacts returns to the system voltage
within a few ms. Essentially, within this time frame the power frequency voltage is influenced by the
other poles to clear and this takes a sixth to a third cycle. As long as one or two poles haven’t cleared
the fault current, there is an unbalance between the power frequency voltages and consequently a
neutral voltage. The neutral voltage is depending on many factors, the most important being the
neutral treatment of the system. For non-effectively earthed systems the neutral shift is larger than
for effectively earthed systems, like systems of 245 kV and above. The effect of the neutral shift on
the power frequency recovery voltage across a pole of the circuit breaker is taken into account by the
so-called first pole-to-clear factor kpp. The IEC and IEEE standards have specified kpp being 1.5 for
non-effectively earthed systems and 1.3 for effectively earthed systems. Note that in service
conditions of effectively earthed systems kpp mostly is smaller than 1.3; sometimes even less than 1.0.
A full three phase picture valid for a non-effectively earthed system is given in Fig. 7-2
Legends:
Top: first pole to interrupt
Middle and bottom: the second and third pole (that in this example break the current at the same moment)
Blue dots: the normal system voltage.
Fig. 7-2 Three-phase current interruption with transient recovery voltages
7.3 RECOVERY VOLTAGE AS FUNCTION OF THE INTERRUPTED CURRENT

7.3.1 Introduction
Some confusion may arise about the voltage-current relationship when a circuit breaker interrupts a
current of any kind: load current, short-circuit current, OOP current, capacitive charging current or a
small inductive current. Circuit breaker experts are used to thinking in terms of phenomena with a
time frame of some ms or shorter, in terms of recovery voltage across the open contacts and in first,
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second and last clearing pole conditions. Power system, power plant and protection engineers, for
instance, are used to thinking in power flows, in real power versus reactive power, in local system
voltages, in power frequency phenomena. This section tries to clarify the misunderstandings between
these two worlds of experts.
7.3.2 Power flow at the location of the circuit breaker

In transmission systems, sub-transmission systems and the main structure of distribution grids, the
network will offer multiple options for the electric power to flow. Only under abnormal conditions
there is no redundant path available. In the latter case and at locations in the network without
redundancy, a circuit breaker that interrupts the current of the last branch may face a passive load or
an active load. An active load involves power generation, that by itself gives redundancy to some
extent. With active load, the case can be treated as the normal redundant cases for transmission
systems.
Without redundancy and with a passive load, the power frequency recovery voltage - i.e. the
(longitudinal) voltage that will appear across the open contacts of the circuit breaker – is essentially
identical to the system voltage at the location of the circuit breaker. This is caused by the fact that,
after interruption, at the load side there is no current, so no power frequency voltage; see Fig. 7-3.
The power factor between recovery voltage and interrupted current is identical to the power factor
between load current and system voltage, just before the interruption. It can be a resistive load
current, a capacitive current, an inductive short-circuit current, a small inductive current or a mixture
of these. This current gives the real and reactive power flow at the location of the circuit breaker. Its
meaning is the same for circuit breaker experts and system engineers. Note that here the term
“power factor” relates to the power frequency phenomena. Quite often the interruption of inductive
and/or capacitive currents involves also trapped charges (DC-component), damped resonances
(resonance frequency), traveling waves or ferro-resonance phenomena, where the term “power
factor” cannot be applied.
Note also that with interruption of a current, the term “power factor” is incorrectly applied to the
current before and the voltage after interruption.
Fig. 7-3 Passive load at load side of circuit breaker
For the remaining part of this section the case of current interruption without a redundant path for
the power flow and with only passive elements in the de-energized part, will not be considered
anymore.
7.3.3 Network model at location of the circuit breaker

In the “normal cases”, after interruption of the current the power will flow through the alternative
paths, being lines, cables, transformers or power plants. The power flow at the location of the circuit
breaker is diverted and the power flow at that location becomes nil.
Seen from the circuit breaker terminals, the current to be interrupted flows through a series of
inductances that form a loop; see Fig. 7-4. The driving forces are the voltage sources in this loop and
these are the same forces that divert the power flow to another path. In the loop, the driving forces
can be substituted by a single voltage source, being the phasor-sum of all voltage sources.
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Fig. 7-4 Active load at load side of a circuit breaker
The single voltage source faces a series of mainly inductances formed by the involved transmission
lines, cables, transformers and generators. In that sense, it is an inductive current that is to be
interrupted.
7.3.4 Recovery voltage versus interrupted current

The recovery voltage (RV) is the power frequency voltage across the open contacts. The RV has to be
equal to the interrupted current multiplied with the sum of the inductances. The power factor between
the current before interruption and the recovery voltage after interruption bears therefore an
inductive character.
Fig. 7-5 Superposition of injected current
The RV is in fact the disappearing voltage drop across the involved inductances and can also be
presented in another way. By superposition, the situation after current clearing is identical to the
situation before current clearing plus the response of the system to a current of opposite amplitude
injected at the location of the circuit breaker; see Fig. 7-5.
The recovery voltage is leading the inductive current to be interrupted by almost 90°. Both are power
frequency components: the current being a sinus function and the recovery voltage a cosinus
function. As AC circuit breakers interrupt a current at current zero, the recovery voltage jumps from
zero before interruption to its peak value. The transient from zero to peak value goes with high
frequency components and is called the Transient Recovery Voltage (TRV). The term “power factor” is
not applicable to the TRV. Moreover, the TRV is determined by a more complicated network model at
both sides of the circuit breaker with capacitances, natural frequencies between inductances and
capacitances, oscillations and traveling waves: Fig. 7-6.
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Fig. 7-6 Complicated network at both sides of CB with each its natural frequencies
Apart from that, both RV and TRV are different for the first pole that clears the current and for the
second and third pole, because of the fact that the three-phase network is changing at each pole that
clears the current. For instance, the neutral of the network or of a part of the network may shift, the
charge on capacitances may become trapped instead of varying, etc. Usually the first pole to clear
shows the most severe RV and TRV.
The 90° shift between the power frequency component of the recovery voltage and interrupted
current applies to all kinds of power flows: resistive currents with/without an inductive or capacitive
component, short-circuit currents, OOP currents. For all types of power flows the RV, and therefore
the TRV, is similar and only proportional to the amplitude of the interrupted current [1].
7.3.5 Additional remarks to the power factor

The power factor between system voltage at the location of the circuit breaker and the current
flowing through the circuit breaker is determined by the power flow under stable, unstable, short-
circuit or other abnormal conditions.
The power factor between the recovery voltage and the interrupted current shows to be inductive. But
the term “power factor” is here in fact rather strange as the current before interruption is meant and
the voltage after interruption. In addition, the voltage is the voltage drops along the system. Further
the TRV is considered to be more important than the RV, at least for circuit breaker experts, and the
TRV involves other frequencies than the power frequency. Even the RV may contain other
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frequencies, caused by DC-charge, resonances (e.g. compensated Transmission line switching) and
ferro-resonances.
7.3.6 Other switchgears

Similar considerations are applicable to other switchgear that has to switch a loop current. Well-known
is bus-transfer current switching by disconnectors used in substations for each bay to select the bus to
which the bay has to be connected. Another example is the induced current switching with earthing
switches, as applied for transmission lines. The first earthing switch to be opened has to interrupt the
magnetically induced current in the loop formed by the phase conductors of the transmission line, the
earthing switch at the other end of the line and the earth. Here, the “power factor” is also 90°. But
the other earthing switch has to interrupt the electrostatically induced current, so a capacitive current,
similar as the case without redundancy and with only passive elements.
7.3.7 Summarizing
 Power flows go with terms as “power factor”, that indicate the relationship between the
reactive power and the real power. The reactive power component may be inductive or
capacitive.
 Current interruption is often related to opening a loop, while the power flow is taken over by
other branches in the network. Since the loop consists of voltage sources and mainly inductive
elements (generators, transformers, transmission lines, cables), the loop current shows an
inductive character in relation to the sum of the driving sources in the loop. In such a loop,
circuit breakers have to interrupt inductive currents. The power frequency component of the
recovery voltage will therefore be 90° leading. Note that the recovery voltage is to be seen in
the longitudinal direction of the loop.
 In case circuit breakers have to clear a current in a branch that does not form a loop, the
power frequency component of the recovery voltage will show a power factor similar to the
power factor between current and system voltage. However, here the term “power factor” is
not appropriate.
 For circuit breakers the transient recovery voltage with its higher frequency components is
more important as well as the DC component of the RV.
7.4 OUT-OF-PHASE TEST DUTY IN THE STANDARDS

7.4.1 Present Standards
To IEC Std 62271-100 [2], the Standard for high voltage circuit breakers, two test duties cover OOP
phenomena: OP1 and OP2; i.e with an OOP current equal to 25% of the rated short-circuit current of
the circuit breaker and with 5%.
The TRV waveform for OOP conditions consists of an initial part, relevant during the thermal phase of
the voltage recovery, and a peak value, relevant for the dielectric phase. The characteristics of the
initial part are the dV(t)/dt and the time delay. To the IEC Std and the IEEE Std C37.09 [3], TRV
waveforms are described by its envelopes. These are two-parameter or four-parameter curves,
covering more or less a single frequency resp. a multi-frequency system response. A single frequency
system response gives a TRV waveform similar to a damped 1-cos function. A multi-frequency
response can be seen as a 1-exp function, overlapped by a 1-cos function. For OOP, the four-
parameter envelope is used, but first the two-parameter envelope will be explained.
The two-parameter envelope is defined as the peak value of the TRV, Uc1 with a horizontal line
through the peak value, and another line through the origin and touching the TRV waveform: the
RRRV (rate of rise of the recovery voltage). The RRRV is a measure for the steepness dV(t)/dt, but it
is not the same, as can be seen in Fig. 7-7. The two envelope lines of a damped 1-cos function cross
at the time coordinate t3. Fig. 7-8 shows the ratio between the time to peak T2 and the time co-
ordinate t3 as a function of the damping that is expressed as the amplitude factor (kaf). A factor of 2.0
means no damping.
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Voltage
uc
RRRV
t3 T2
Time
Fig. 7-7 Two parameter TRV with time co-ordinates

1.4
1.3
T2 / t3
1.2
1.1
t3 / T2
0.9
0.8
0.7
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
Amplitude Factor (p.u.)
Fig. 7-8 Ratio T2 and t3 as function of kaf
The four parameter TRV is depicted in Fig. 7-9: U1 , t1 and Uc , t2. The initial part represents the
traveling waves with dV/dt = Z* dI/dt, Z being the equivalent surge impedance of the system at the
location of the circuit breaker. The positive reflections of traveling waves are covered by the upper
part of the damped 1-cos function. Essentially, the 1-exp function represents an over-damped system
(low equivalent surge impedance, e.g. transmission lines, cables), while the damped 1-cos function,
as shown for the two-parameter envelope, represents an under-damped system (high equivalent
surge impedance, e.g. transformers).
The circuit breaker has to withstand a TRV waveshape that follows the specified envelope. The TRV
waveforms in service have to show an envelope that lies below the specified envelope.
t2
Uc
Transient recovery voltage
Damped 1-cos
t1
U1
1-exp
us
Fig. 7-9 Four parameter envelope with its co-ordinates
In IEC Std 62271-100, the RRRV=U1/t1 of the four-parameter envelope for OOP switching is defined
as 1.54 kV/μs, but the actual stresses may also be covered by another test duty T30 with a much
higher RRRV. The most important stress of the OOP duty is the peak value of the TRV, Uc , as it is the
highest peak value specified in the Standard for any test duty. The technical background of its
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specification is not completely clear, but in chapter 8 of the IEC guide 62271-306 [4] some
information is given about the presumed background of the TRV parameters. Among this information
it is stated that statistically in practice a 180° OOP condition very rarely occurs and that therefore an
additional factor of 0.8 can be introduced to the peak value of the TRV. The factor of 0.8 is applied to
the first-pole-to-clear factor kpp, and can also be expressed as an OOP condition of 115° instead of
180° (in fact this is depending on the neutral earthing conditions, i.e. kpp ; see Fig. 7-10).
Fig. 7-10 OOP angles depend on first pole-to-clear factor kpp [3]
7.4.2 History
Historically, TRV’s have been specified in the Standards at the third edition of IEC 56 (1971) and
around the same time in the IEEE Standards. To the second edition (1954) the TRV (called “restriking
voltage”) has only to be measured or determined from the recordings.
An OOP test method has been described in the ANSI-Std. C37.079 (1973). The application guide
(ANSI C37.0721) was already published in 1971. The next application guide was: ANSI/IEEE C37.010
Application guide for AC high-voltage circuit breakers rated on a symmetrical current basis (1979).
The OOP current switching was and is an optional switching duty with an optional rating, not
applicable to general duty circuit breakers. When applied, the preferred rating is identical to that
applied in the IEC Standard for circuit breakers (IEC Std. 62271-100, [2]). To the ANSI/IEEE
application guide (1979) [5], clause 4.15, note (2):
The requirements of this standard cover the great majority of applications of circuit breakers
intended for switching during out-of-phase conditions. Several circumstances would have to
be combined to produce a severity in excess of the tests in this standard and, as switching
during out-of-phase conditions is rare, it would be uneconomic to design circuit breakers for
the most extreme conditions.
Where frequent out-of-phase switching operations are anticipated, or where for other reasons
OOP switching is a matter of importance, the user should consider actual system recovery
voltages. A special circuit breaker, or one with a higher voltage, may sometimes be required.
As an alternative solution, the severity of the out-of-phase switching duty is reduced in
several systems by using relays with coordinated impedance-sensitive elements to control the
tripping instant, so that interruption will occur either substantially after or substantially before
the instant the phase angle is 180°.
Already in 1952, an AIEE paper on OOP voltages has been published at the AIEE General Winter
Meeting, as paper 52-16 [6]. In the paper an analytic study, complemented with analogue computer
simulations and field tests, has been presented on the investigation of the voltage stresses across a
circuit breaker that interrupts an OOP current. The paper states that in effectively earthed systems
theoretically a voltage factor of 2.0 to 2.5 is possible with a transient overshoot of 25 to 60%. These
numbers agree with the measurements during a field test in a 230 kV-system. The peak values of the
TRV are not influenced by possible earth faults. Thus, for effectively earthed systems the peak value
of the OOP TRV varies between 2.5 pu and 4.0 pu. Although not stated in the paper, it may be
assumed that the larger values are caused by larger OOP angles; up to 180°.
The authors recommended to verify the circuit breaker performance by OOP type tests, but with TRV
peak values smaller than the theoretically predicted maximum values. For reasons of costs and of a
low probability of the maximum values, they picked the lower range of the theoretically possible
values for the voltage factor (i.e. 2.0) and for the overshoot (i.e. 25%). Further they recommended to
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specify an OOP current to be 25% of the rated short-circuit breaking current of the circuit breaker.
These are exactly the values that, years later, could be found in the international standards for HV
circuit breakers, both IEC and IEEE. Since, the specified values have not been changed.
7.5 OUT-OF-PHASE CURRENTS

The larger the OOP angle, the larger the recovery voltage and the transient recovery voltage. But also
the larger is the OOP current, as it is determined by the amplitude of the representative voltages, by
the OOP angle and by the impedance between the representative voltages at each side of the circuit
breaker.
The reference for the circuit breaker test duties is the maximum short-circuit current it has to interrupt.
Under service conditions the amplitude of the three-phase short-circuit current at the substation
involved depends on the network topology and operating conditions. In addition, it depends on the
location of the circuit breaker within the substation, as it may be subjected to the short-circuit current
contribution from all representative voltage sources together or not (Fig. 7-11). Usually, all circuit
breakers in a substation are specified for the maximum fault current that is expected to be possible in
the substation and no differentiation is made per bay. In that case the fault current per voltage source
will be equal to the voltage of each source divided by its source impedance. In Fig. 7-11 for equal
voltages V and equal impedances Z: Iscc = 2 V/Z. The OOP current will be: Ioop = 2 V/(2 Z). With
unequal impedances Z1 and Z2: Iscc = V/Z1 + V/Z2 = V (Z1+Z2)/(Z1*Z2) and Ioop = 2V/(Z1+Z2). In this case
the OOP current will always be lower than the short-circuit current. But when the fault current is
determined by only one voltage source, as is the case with generator circuit breakers, the short-circuit
current is only V/Z1. Depending on the ratio between Z1 and Z2 the OOP current may become larger
than the fault current, but never larger than the largest of V/Z1 and V/Z2.
Fig. 7-11 Ratio OOP current and short-circuit current to be cleared by a circuit breaker
Note that the amplitude of the OOP current is an important stress factor during the current
interruption process, as it directly influences the amount of energy to be absorbed by the arc between
the circuit breaker contacts. The larger the amount of energy, the more difficult it is to withstand the
transient recovery voltage immediately after current zero. For transmission circuit breakers, an OOP
angle of 180° gives a 40 % larger OOP current than an OOP angle of 90°; and a 40 % larger
steepness of the TRV (RRRV). For generator circuit breakers, an OOP angle of 180° might give a
much higher current, up to 80 % larger than that occurring in case of an OOP angle of 90°. But, from
the point of view of the circuit breaker it does not matter what impedances, OOP angles and voltage
differences are considered, as long as the maximum value of the OOP current is fixed. For that
reason, in the standards the rated (i.e. maximum) OOP current is defined as a percentage of the rated
short-circuit current. System separation goes with a cascading effect of tripping connections, thus with
an increase of the impedance between the representative voltages at both sides of the circuit breaker.
Therefore, it is quite reasonable that for high voltage circuit breakers the specified amplitudes of the
OOP current are as large as 5% and 25% of the rated short-circuit current of the circuit breaker
involved.
7.6 GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS

7.6.1 HV or MV circuit breaker
Power plants are equipped with a circuit breaker that is used to connect the generator to the network
and to separate the generator from the network. Special precautions are required to connect and
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disconnect the power plant in a correct and controlled way. The circuit breaker to connect and
disconnect the power plant may be located at the HV-side of the step-up transformer or between
generator and step-up transformer; Fig. 7-12. In the latter case the circuit breaker is called a generator
circuit breaker. Generator circuit breakers are medium voltage circuit breakers. A special international
standard has been published for generator circuit breakers: IEC/IEEE Standard 62271-37-013 [7].
This section is limited to these generator circuit breakers.
When generator circuit breakers are applied, also at the HV-side of the power plant a HV circuit
breaker will be installed for protection (transformer and back-up protection) and maintenance
activities. Normally, the MV generator circuit breaker is used to synchronize the generator to the grid
and to protect the generator from internal fault but also from too-long external short-circuits that could
damage the generator. The Generator Circuit Breaker, when existing, will also limit the duration of the
generator short-circuit contribution in case of a fault inside the step-up transformers. In case of false
synchronization, the MV generator circuit breaker could provide subsequent tripping. Sometimes also
the HV circuit breaker could be tripped when it is closed in false synchronization conditions.
Fig. 7-12 Locations of main circuit breaker to protect the generator
7.6.2 Out-of-phase requirements in the Standard

In the Standard for generator circuit breakers, a distinction is made between the so-called generator
source short-circuit current and the system source short-circuit current. The largest value is usually the
short-circuit current flowing from the system through the step-up transformer and through the
generator circuit breaker to the fault at the generator side of the circuit breaker. This fault current
shows the typical behaviour of a short-circuit current with a constant AC-component and a DC
component that depends on the exact moment of the fault occurrence with respect to the voltage sine-
wave. A fault occurring at voltage maximum will show no DC component in that phase, while a fault
that occurs at voltage zero will show a DC component as large as the AC peak value. The worst
condition (maximum DC-component) is taken as reference. Note that the decrement of the DC
component is relatively slow due to the large DC time-constant, mainly determined by the step-up
transformer. The ratio between the peak value and the RMS-value of the short-circuit current will
consequently be large. In the Standard [7] it is given that a DC time-constant of 133 ms covers the
majority of cases and leads to a peak factor of 2.74.
The peak factor is an important characteristic for the short-circuit current forces. For a circuit breaker
the DC component is also important at the moment that the contacts separate and an arc is
established between them. Depending on the protection time, contact separation will take place
around 40 ms (or more) after the fault occurred and at that moment the DC-component will be around
75% of the AC component peak value.
Although the generator source short-circuit current usually has a lower AC component 1 than the
source side short-circuit current, it shows some typical characteristics, that make it very severe with
respect to breaking the current. The DC time-constant of the generator (i.e. the time constant
1
note that the control of the excitation system will activate the ceiling voltage, but its effect on the
stator short-circuit current is too late to be considered.
97
determined by the stator DC resistance and direct axis sub-transient reactance) is also very large, but,
moreover, the AC component is decreasing during the first cycles. The relatively slow decay of the DC
component and the fast decrease of the AC component cause the fault current in that particular pole
not to cross the zero-line. Without current zeroes, current interruption is very difficult for modern circuit
breakers. More information about system source and generator source short-circuit currents is given in
[8][9] and its references.
Fig. 7-13 Prospective fault current considering the moment of inertia of the synchronous machine
and resulting from synchronizing under OOP conditions (OOP angle φ0 = 90°)
The specified OOP current in the Standard [7] is 50 % of the rated system source fault current and the
recovery voltage is corresponding to an OOP angle of 90°. As stated in the Standard, for the majority
of cases under full phase opposition conditions, only an OOP current making capability is required and
not a make and break capability. Conversely, for cases where OOP switching is of special importance,
the OOP current and recovery voltage have to be specifically calculated and specified, taking an angle
of 180° into consideration. In [8] and [10] possible OOP currents and recovery voltages for a large
number of actual service conditions have been simulated and statistically evaluated as function of the
OOP angle.
The out-of-phase switching test duty consists of a closing operation, immediately followed by an
opening operation (CO) and is repeated after 30 minutes. This test has to be performed twice, once
with a symmetrical out-of-phase current (no DC-component) and once with an asymmetrical current
(75% DC component at contact separation). According to [8] for a large number of simulated cases
the degree of asymmetry of the current at an out-of-phase angle of 90° is typically 115% and it can
even exceed 130% at lower out-of-phase angles. In general, the a.c. component of the out-of-phase
current tends to increase with the out-of-phase angle, whereas the degree of asymmetry of the out-of-
phase current tends to decrease with the out-of-phase angle. Specifically, the out-of-phase current is
higher when the generator terminal voltage is lagging the grid (HV-system) voltage referred to the LV-
side of the step-up transformer. On the other hand, the degree of asymmetry of the current is higher
when the generator terminal voltage is leading the grid (HV-system) voltage referred to the LV-side of
the step-up transformer [8]. It is also remarkable that delayed current zeros are observed with any one
of the initial out-of-phase angles analysed. An overview of the results of this statistical analysis is
depicted in Fig. 7-14 and 7-15. In [7], a degree of asymmetry of 75% is used only to reproduce the
energy stress imposed on the generator circuit breaker during 90° out-of-phase testing. Project-
specific studies are deemed to be performed to ensure that the generator circuit breaker is able in
service to force the current to zero in case of delayed current zeros. In addition, the peak values of the
out-of-phase currents may become larger than those belonging to the system source fault currents, at
least for out-of-phase angles of 120° and above.
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Fig. 7-14 Ratio of the a.c. component of the out-of-phase breaking current IOOP to the a.c.
component of the system-source short-circuit breaking current ISCsys as a function of initial out-of-
phase angle
Fig. 7-15 Degree of asymmetry of the out-of-phase breaking current DOAOOP as a function of initial
out-of-phase angle
But making an OOP current by closing a generator circuit breaker is rather exceptional, since
provisions are normally embedded to take care for a proper synchronization of the power plant. Wiring
errors are mentioned as the main cause of such failures. Wrong settings of synchronization apparatus
and manual synchronization may lead to false synchronizing as well. Further it is not quite clear in
general which protection device will give a command to open, immediately after a false
synchronization. When applied and the protection setting is covering false synchronization, the
inadvertent energization protection may give an immediate tripping command (i.e. without intentional
time delay) (see Chapter 6).
For system-source short-circuit currents, any delay in commanding the circuit breaker to open will
reduce considerably the stresses by the DC-component. But in case of generator-source short-circuit
99
currents and OOP currents the situation is different and, especially for OOP currents, far more
complicated. In [9] and [11] it has been described that the acceleration of the rotor determines the
behaviour of the OOP current at false synchronization. The rotor angle with respect to the stator
magnetic field turns towards a phase angle difference close to zero. Consequently, the AC component
will decrease rapidly. However, the decay of the DC-component will not be influenced accordingly,
thus resulting in a period of time during which the DC component is higher than the AC one and hence
prohibiting current zero’s to occur. To prevent missing current zero’s, a timely tripping command is
required. As a rule of thumb, it may be assumed that for an initial out-of-phase angle of 90° the DC-
component will be around 115% at contact separation and stay at 115% for the next 80 to 100 ms,
thus giving a window of opportunity to break the out-of-phase current. A tripping command later than
80 to 100 ms might lead to serious problems to break the out-of-phase current since the AC
component of the current might be very small (and even close to zero) and the DC component of the
current may take some time before it decays sufficiently for a current zero-crossing to occur and circuit
breaker to interrupt the current. Note that the arc voltage in the generator circuit breaker will contribute
to forcing a current zero.
According to [10] the simulations of the TRV for 90° OOP switching show slightly smaller peak values
and RRRV than those given in the Standard. Larger OOP angles lead to more severe TRV
requirements, as may be expected.
Despite the fact that the Standard for generator circuit breakers has been based on an OOP angle of
90°, quite a number of users specify an OOP angle as large as 180°. When these users also specify
the maximum OOP current to be larger than rated OOP current to the Standard (i.e. 50% of the rated
short-circuit current), the user requirements can only be fulfilled by a design for a higher rating class.
7.7 HV CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND OUT-OF-PHASE CONDITIONS

HV circuit breakers may be subjected to two different cases of OOP conditions that have to be
considered [4]. Case A is that of system separation OOS and case B is that of a power plant
separation due to OOS conditions. Case A will be dealt with in the next section 7.8. Case B is quite
similar to the MV generator circuit breaker case described in section 7.6, but the parameter values are
different. Reference can be made to Fig. 7-12.
For instance, the OOP current as a percentage of the rated short-circuit current will be lower. A simple
example, used in many publications as well as in [4], may illustrate it. Take a generator with a
subtransient reactance of 0.15 p.u. and a transient reactance of 0.3 p.u., a step-up transformer with a
reactance of 0.2 p.u. connected by an HV circuit breaker to the bus of a system with a short-circuit
impedance of 0.1 p.u.; Fig. 7-11. The fault current through this circuit breaker, fed by the generator
and step-up transformer will be 1/0.35 = 2.86 p.u., while the fault current fed through the grid will be
1/0.1 = 10 p.u. A fault current fed by both the power plant and the grid will reach the sum: 12.86
p.u. and probably all circuit breaker connected to the HV bus will be specified for at least this value:
13 p.u. or more; see also Fig. 7-11. The OOP current under the condition of full phase opposition at
rated voltage is determined by the generator transient reactance. The OOP current will be 2/(0.5+0.1)
= 3.33 p.u. being about 25% of 13 p.u. The value of 25% is used in the HV circuit breaker Standards.
As elaborated in [12], the TRV waveshape will be dominated by the characteristics of the step-up
transformer and the depression characteristics of the generator. The first pole-to-clear factor is a
combination of the first pole-to-clear factors at both sides of the circuit breaker, but dominated by
that of the step-up transformer (with its earthed neutral) and therefore close to 1.0 (or even less).
The damping of the TRV-part attributed to the generator and step-up transformer will be very low,
leading to a large amplitude factor. But, a significant depression of the voltage at the generator
terminals and therefore of the RV at the HV-side of the transformer can be expected; see Fig. F.1 of
[2]. It results in an initial source voltage of 0.8 to 0.9 p.u. in the first few hundreds μs after clearing of
the OOP current [12]. In this simple model the TRV consists of three components: the largest one
being the contribution of the voltage drop across the generator (with some reduction due to the
depression), the second one due to the voltage drop across the transformer and the smallest (third)
component due to the voltage drop in the grid. The last one will show the lowest frequency and thus
the lowest rate of rise. The generator part will show a moderate frequency, while the transformer part
will show the highest frequency. The last is also the part with the lowest damping, thus highest
amplitude factor (about 1.8). It will form the first and steepest part of the TRV, but with roughly one
third or less of the total RV. The next part in the time domain will come from the generator with a
100
considerable lower rate of rise, due to its large capacitance, and covering about half of the RV. The
slowest and smallest part forms the total peak value that appears quite late. The stressfull part for the
circuit breaker will be the first and second part.
To the Standards, the initial part of the OOP TRV will be covered by T30, the short-circuit interruption
type test for 30% of the rated short-circuit current (with a steep TRV requirement) and not by the
OOP test duty. Depending on the parasetic capacitance between step-up transformer and HV circuit
breaker, the special requirements for transformer limited faults may be applicable. Meaning that in
case of a minimum capacitance (short length of air insulated bus) the user has to specify a HV circuit
breaker suited for Transformer Limited Faults (appendix M of [2]).
Further, to [12], the TRV peak value, specified in the Standards for OOP will not cover a full phase
opposition (an angle of 180°), despite the fact that under conditions of false synchronization (as
described in the former section), 180° is quite possible. False synchronization, though, involves an
unloaded generator and therefore a considerably reduced source voltage compared to the source
voltage in case of a terminal short-circuit. For such cases, simulations including some depression have
to give an answer whether the TRV peak value is covered by the Standards.
7.8 SYSTEM OUT-OF-PHASE CONDITIONS

To the information given in Chapter 4, the probability of out-of-step conditions is relatively low. But
the risk is not negligible since the consequences are huge in number of customer minutes lost and the
societal impact of large disturbances. This applies to both radial and meshed networks, albeit that the
probability is considerably lower in heavily meshed networks. Utilities have to take precautions to
prevent unstable power swings, OOS and system separation as well as to reduce the area lost as
much as possible. Proper functioning of protection systems, including the involved circuit breakers, is
a prerequisite to achieve these goals.
When a cascading effect occurs and a power system falls apart, the OOP angle at the location of the
system separation might be quite large. This is caused by the large power flow through the last lines
(or transformers) that kept the parts of the system together. In meshed systems, shortly before the
separation, the cascading effect of tripping transmission lines leads to a last narrow corridor existing
of far less parallel circuits (if any) than usual in the meshed system. At that very moment the network
in the corridor looks like a radial network and the OOP angle is determined by the power flow and the
reactance of the series connection of transmission line circuits. See Fig. 7-16.
Fig. 7-16 Angle θ along an inductive connection to transfer an amount of active power, being the
natural power PN = E2/√(L/C) (left) of more (right) : 30° per 100 km at 5 PN
101
sepration (July 30st, 2012) [12]
sepration (July 31st, 2012) [12]
102
For those large disturbances where such detailed information has been published, OOP angles far
larger than 90° have been reported. For instance, in the CERC Final Report on the Grid Disturbances
in India, July 30th and 31st, 2012 [12], from Fig. 3.2 (page 32 of the Report) the angle between
involved regions went from 60° to 260° (system separation around 02:33:15.4 on July 30 th). From
Fig. 6.2 (page 78 of the Report) the angle increases from 90° to 190° at system separation (around
13:00:18 on July 31st); see Fig. 7-17 and 7-18.
Report [12] is one of seldom cases that detailed information is given about the development of the
difference in angle between two regions that face a separation. Obviously these angles become large.
At the same time the large disturbances lead to voltage instability problems. At the moment of system
separation large voltage dips, depressed voltages and dramatic voltage drop have been reported,
together with huge power flows. For instance, with the separation of the Italian grid from the
European continental grid (2003), for the depressed voltage a percentage less than 80% has been
published.
This phenomenon has been mentioned in [13] as well. The cascading tripping of overhead lines and
other components have lead to a sudden increase of local reactive power unbalance and consequently
to system voltage depression and eventually collapse. More information can be found in section 5.3.
For high voltage circuit breakers this means that large OOP angles coincide with voltage levels far less
than the rated voltage. Even below the minimum acceptable voltage level, that is normally 20 %
below the rated value. To be precise: the maximum voltage (rated voltage) is 110 % of the nominal
voltage and the minimum voltage 90 % of the nominal voltage or less for a short period of time; thus
the minimum operating voltage is the rated voltage divided by 1.1 and multiplied with 0.9: 81.8 %.
The next figure shows the actual OOP recovery voltage at minimum operating voltage as a function of
the OOP angle. It is compared with the OOP recovery voltage to the Standard for high voltage circuit
breakers, based on the rated voltage and a first pole-to-clear factor of 1.3 (effectively earthed
networks: blue) and a first pole-to-clear factor of 1.5 (non-effectively earthed networks: red).
Out-of-Phase recovery voltage

for varying out-of-phase angles
at minimum operating voltage (81.8% of rated)
1,2
1
Out-of-phase 0,8
voltage/rated
0,6
OofPh.voltage
0,4
0,2
0
80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Out-of-phase angle (degrees)
Fig. 7-19 : OOP recovery voltage at 81.8% of the rated voltage as a function of the OOP angle for
kpp = 1,3 (blue) and kpp = 1.5 (red)
At the minimum operating voltage, which is larger than the system voltages reported during large
disturbances, the OOP recovery voltage, even for the largest OOP angles show to be (far) less than or
equal to the value used for type testing. As such, actual cases seem to be covered, for smaller OOP
angles (up to 90°) up to the rated voltage and for larger angles, large power flows, (up to 180°) for
the minimum operating voltages.
103
7.9 OTHER SWITCHING DUTIES

For high voltage circuit breakers, the specified values of the TRV give the highest peak values
mentioned in the standards. Therefore, the OOP TRV peak value is also used as a reference for
switching duties, where high peak values may be expected as well. Two well-known examples are the
short-circuit current interruption for faults in series compensated transmission lines and for faults
further away on long transmission lines (the so-called long line fault).
7.9.1 Series compensated line
Series compensation consists of single-phase capacitor banks that are put in series with each phase of
a transmission line circuit, at one or both line ends or in the middle. By means of the capacitor the
inductance of the transmission line is partly compensated, so that for the power frequency the
effective line inductance becomes less. As a consequence, the angle along the transmission line
decreases (see Fig. 7-16), the power transfer capability increases, the voltage profile has improved
and the stability limit (voltage and angle) is increased.
But also, the short-circuit current level will increase, thus leading to a higher (rate of rise) value of the
TRV. In addition, at the moment of fault current clearing (at current zero), the series capacitor is
charged to its maximum value of tens of kV or more. The charging voltage will appear as an addition
to the regular TRV peak value and give an extra stress to the circuit breaker. Such peak values are to
be compared with the peak value of the TRV during OOP current switching.
There are several mitigations possible to reduce the TRV stress caused by the series capacitor. The
best known are a trigger gap across the capacitor to discharge it before tripping the circuit breaker,
the application of an MOV (metal oxide varistor) to limit the voltage across the capacitor and the
application of an MOV across the circuit breaker to limit the peak value of the TRV. Many studies and
simulations are available and always reference is made to the OOP TRV peak value. [14][15]. Modern
technologies such as thyristor protected series capacitors and Fast Protection Devices are able to by-
pass the series capacitor bank so fast that its influence on the TRV peak value has disappeared [16].
7.9.2 Long line fault
From Fig. 7-1, it can be deduced that a line fault not far from the circuit breaker will cause traveling
waves between fault location and circuit breaker terminal, that appear as high frequency low
amplitude triangles. The short-circuit current for a location close to the circuit breaker will be relatively
large (to the standard: 90% of the rated short-circuit current) and the rate of rise of the TRV will be
very high. These so-called short-line faults are very stressfull for SF 6 circuit breakers.
It can also be deduced that a fault far away, with a much smaller short-circuit current, will cause
traveling waves, that appear as low frequency high amplitude triangles. Here it is not the steepness of
the TRV or the severity of the fault current that give the largest stress to the circuit breaker, but the
amplitude of the TRV. The long traveling time between circuit breaker and fault location (and
backwards) causes a steadily increasing TRV waveshape, that leads to a peak value larger than known
from the other short-circuit current interruption duties. For long distances to the fault, the peak value
may be compared with the peak of the OOP duty. For shorter distance it will be compared with other
switching duties. [17]
7.10 CONCLUSIONS
1. The OOP switching requirements in the Standards for circuit breakers seem to be taken from
a proposal in a 1952 AIEE paper, where calculations, simulations and real tests in a power
system have been analysed. The rated OOP currents have been proposed to be 25 % of the
rated short-circuit current. For economic and statistical reasons, minimum peak values from
the TRV analyses have been proposed: a RV of 2.0 p.u. and an overshoot of 25 % (Uc is 2.5
p.u.).
2. As system separation goes with cascading tripping of transmission lines and thus an increase
of the system impedance, a maximum value of 25 % of the rated short-circuit current seems
to be reasonable, even today. The maximum value of the OOP current is an important
parameter for the circuit breaker capabilities.
104
3. Large disturbances show OOP angles much larger than 105° to 115°, that correspond to the
TRV peak values in the Standards. This applies also to meshed networks. But, large OOP
angles belong to system conditions where at the same time low operating voltages occur. The
combination of a large OOP angle and a low operating voltage give TRV peak values similar to
those mentioned in the Standards for situations with a relatively low OOP angle and rated
voltage (maximum operating voltage).
4. Especially for generator circuit breakers, the out-of-phase current may show a large DC-
component. Large peak values of the current and even delayed current zeros are possible. An
out-of-phase current due to false synchronization should be interrupted within a timeframe of
80 to 100 ms after closing the generator circuit breaker. If the current is not interrupted in
this time frame the fast-decaying AC component of the current may lead to a period of time
during which the current is almost purely DC. Should this occur there may be a significant
time delay until the current experiences another zero-crossing, necessary for the circuit
breaker to interrupt the current (but most probably beyond the permissible arcing window of
the circuit breaker, unless the arc voltage of the generator circuit breaker is high enough to
ensure current zero crossing to allow current interruption). Due to the range of protection
practices and configuration philosophies, it is not clear whether it is generally the case across
the industry that a protection function will be configured to detect and quickly issue trip
commands in response to false synchronization.
5. Simulations including the depression phenomenon of the generator voltage and the dynamic
behaviour of the rotor are required to show whether OOP current clearing after false
synchronization of generators is covered by the type tests and also the TRV at the required
out-of-phase angle, for instance 180°.
7.11 REFERENCES
[1] Task Force 13.00.2 of Study Committee 13 (Switching equipment), “Generator circuit breaker.
Transient recovery voltages under load current and out-of-phase switching conditions”,
Electra No. 128, pp. 54-63
[2] IEC Std. IEC 62271-100 ed. 2.1 (2012), “High-voltage circuit breaker and controlgear – Part
100: High-voltage alternating current circuit breakers”
[3] IEEE Std C37.09 – 1999, Cor 1-2007, “IEEE Standard Test Procedure for AC High-Voltage
Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis – Corrigendum 1”
[4] IEC Guide IEC 62271-306, “High-voltage circuit breaker and controlgear - Part 306: Guide to
IEC 62271-100, IEC 62271-1 and other IEC standards related to alternating current circuit
breakers”
[5] ANSI/IEEE C37.010 – 1979, “Application Guide for AC High-Voltage Circuit breakers Rated on
a Symmetrical Current Basis”
[6] W.M. Leeds, D.J. Povejsil, “Out-of-Phase Switching Voltages and Their Effect on High-Voltage
Circuit breaker Performance”, AIEE PAS January 1952, pp. 88-96
[7] International Standard IEC/IEEE 62271-37-013, ed. 1.0. 2015-10, “High-voltage circuit
breaker and controlgear, Part 37-013: Alternating-current generator circuit breakers”
[8] M. Palazzo, M. Delfanti, “New Requirements for the Application of Generator Circuit-Breakers”,
[9] M. Palazzo, D. Braun, M. Delfanti, “Investigation on the Occurrence of Delayed Current Zeroes
Phenomena in Power Stations and the Related Stress Imposed on Generator Circuit breakers”,
[10] M. Palazzo, M. Popov, A. Marmolejo, M.Delfanti, “Revision of TRV Requirements for the
Application of Generator Circuit breakers”, IPST 2015, Report 221
[11] I.M. Canay, D. Braun, G.S. Köppl, “Delayed Current Zeros due to Out-of-Phase
Synchronizing”, IEEE TEC, Vol. 13No.2, June 1998, pp. 124-132
105
[12] Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), “Report on the Grid Disturbance on 30th
July 2012 and Grid Disturbance on 31st July 2012: August 2012.”, available at
www.cercind.gov.ind/2012/orders/Final_Report_Grid_Disturbance.pdf
[13] Ding Zhong Meng, “Maintaining System Integrity to Prevent Cascading Blackout”, CIGRE SC
B5 Session 2006, B5-207
[14] CIGRE Technical Brochure 336 (2007), “Changing Network Conditions and System
Requirements, Part II, The impact of long distance transmission on HV equipment”
[15] CIGRE Technical Brochure 693 (2017), “Experience with Equipment for Series/Shunt
Compensation”
[16] B.R. Spherling, et al., “Reduction of the TRV for Terminal Circuit Breakers on Series
Compensated Lines”, CIGRE SC A3 Session 2016, Report A3-102
[17] CIGRE Technical Brochure 408 (2010), “Line fault phenomena and their implications for 3-
phase short- and long-line fault clearing”
106
8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 CONCLUSIONS
 In order to understand the experts with a different background, uniform definitions and
descriptions of out-of-phase and out-of-step were needed. These are given in Chapter 2 and
the most important are:
o An Out-of-Step (OOS) is a condition whereby the transmission angle of a
transmission device (e.g. transmission line, transformer) connecting sub-systems or
the rotor-angle of a generator go past 180 degrees. Here, the transmission angle is
defined as the difference between the voltage angles of the sending and receiving
buses. During this condition, the location of the electrical center can be considered
somewhere along the impedance of this device. This term will be used in the context
of power system networks, especially interconnected power systems, that have lost
the synchronism and single generators that have lost the synchronism with the power
system network.
o An Out-of-Phase (OOP) is an abnormal circuit condition between the parts of an
electrical system on either side of a circuit breaker in which, at the instant of
operation of the circuit breaker, the phase angle between rotating phasors,
representing the generated voltages on either side, exceeds the normal value. The
normal value corresponds usually to an angle of 90° with voltage phasors as large as
the rated voltage of the circuit breaker.
From these definitions, it can be concluded that OOS implies a phase difference of more than
180° of one or more generators or between interconnected power system networks, while
OOP refer to a switching operation and does not necessarily require an angle of 180° or
larger. The term OOP is typically used by circuit breaker experts for whom switching under
OOP conditions covers conditions with angles exceeding normal values, e.g. 90° and above.
OOS is used by power plant experts, protection experts and system study experts. These
cases occur, if generators or parts of power system networks loose stability.
 The probability of large power system disturbances is larger than expected. The disturbances
are a result of a cascade of line, transformer or power plant trips that triggers power system
instability. Often angular instability goes with frequency and voltage instability, not only in
radial networks but also in meshed networks. Without adequate precautions, power system
instability leads to system separation and consequential collapse of one or more parts of the
power system. System separation is an OOP/OOS condition.
 The root cause of many large disturbances seems to be a deviation from the agreements
between system operators mutually as well as between systems operators and power plant
operators. Another root cause is the lack of situational awareness.
 The cascading effects originate from overloading components, multiple and/or long duration
faults, switching actions and misoperation of protection equipment.
 Protection functions and back-up protections are meant to eliminate the component with a
serious fault (short-circuit, etc.) as reliably, securely and fast as possible. Those protection
functions which are based on the measurement of over-current, under-impedance and under-
voltage are potentially vulnerable for acting on power swings and out-of-step conditions, but
the potential risk of protection random tripping in these transient conditions is sometimes
neglected at setting calculation stage. This is mostly due to the low probability of power
swings and OOS conditions in comparison with the probability of electrical faults. Users should
be aware of this effect and take the range of possible power swing and slip-frequencies into
account when setting the protection functions; especially when determining the time delay
setting.
 The generator protection system has to be designed in order to protect the power plant
against internal faults but also to protect the generation system against the potentially
dangerous effects of severe grid faults. At the same time, generator protections must be
coordinated in order to leave time at the grid protections to remove the origin of the grid
107
fault, before disconnecting the generators. TSOs should provide fast and reliable protection
systems, in order to remove grid fault as quick as possible. Redundant protections and circuit
breaker failure devices should also be implemented for important transmission system and
power plant, where a prolonged fault could cause a loss of stability. For this purpose, an open
and transparent collaboration between network and generator protection engineers is
necessary and this also implies exchange of all the data that are necessary for protection
selectivity and coordination studies. In general, the best solution has to be found by all parties
to switch off a power plant before taking the risk of a potential damage and to keep the power
plant connected when it is not at risk avoiding the potential cascade tripping of other
generators and/or parts of the grid.
 Special protection functions are available to separate the power system or a power plant in
case of out-of-step. The function is available and can be enabled in modern distance
protection functions, in special out-of-step functions, or in special wide area protection
systems. The function is applied at dedicated locations in the network, by certains TSOs.
When this principle is applied, for other locations distance protection functions may or have to
be blocked when a power swings or OOS occurs. Other TSOs don’t have special protections to
split the grid at dedicated locations and they let distance protections to split the grid nearby
the OOS electrical center, unless when they are blocked by power swing detection. An
overview is given of nowadays policies of a number of TSOs that operate in each of the
continents. As shown in Fig. 5-25 in section 5.4.4 from a small survey among TSOs
worldwide, it can be learned that their policy with respect to distance protection blocking for
power swings varies from no blocking to blocking all zones and nearly all combinations in
between. It is astonishing that even within a synchronous area of interconnected transmission
networks this wide variation of policies can be found (Fig. 5-26).
 Special attention is asked for the protection and control functions after system separation,
when each part has to recover as fast as possible and the parts have to be reconnected when
possible.
 Application testing and type testing of protection functions for their behaviour in case of
power swings and OOS needs to be stressed. With respect to testing protection systems for
their power swing functions (blocking, tripping, selectivity) the IEC Standard series 60255
“Measuring functions and protection equipment” is yet not complete. The proper design and
verification of protection functions requires highly educated and experienced experts. The lack
of knowledge and knowhow may become the largest concern for future power system and
power plant engineers and operators.
 The forces a synchronous generator has to withstand during severe out-of-step conditions are
compared with those during close in three-phase faults. Such events require a careful
checking of the generator and the drive train before putting it back in service in order to avoid
some defects to evolve into faults. But it is not said on beforehand that well designed
generators are lost. The most serious incident is that of a false synchronization, when
currents and forces may become even larger than those with a three-phase generator
terminal fault.
 Therefore, false synchronization has to be avoided by carefully checking the wiring and the
setting of the synchronization equipment. But still some events are unavoidable, and the
generators are to be switched off as fast as possible. The most adequate protection here is
the inadvertent energization protection.
 Circuit breakers for transmission grids and at the HV-side of step-up transformers can be
specified with an optional test duty for out-of-phase switching. It has been discovered that
the test duty’s transient recovery voltage requirements fulfil a system condition with relatively
small out-of-phase angles at the rated voltage of the circuit breaker, as well as a system
condition with a large out-of-phase angle with a relatively low operating voltage. The major
disturbances have shown that large angles go with low operating voltages and therefore, it
seems that the test duty covers both. Special attention has to be paid to the possible
occurrence of delayed current zero’s when evaluating the suitability of the circuit breakers.
 At false synchronization, MV generator circuit breakers may face out-of-phase currents that
show a large DC-component and a fast decreasing AC-component; thus, a long time without
108
current zeroes can be expected after the moment of false synchronization. The period without
current zero’s occurs sooner at smaller initial OOP angles and later at larger OOP angles.
Users should be aware of and manufacturers should investigate carefully the characteristics of
the generator, its excitation and control, the protection system and its settings, etc. in order
to simulate the conditions a generator circuit breaker has to encounter.
 The trend to transport electric power over longer distances and in increasing quantities
reduces the stability margins of the transmission corridors. In addition, during the day power
flows are changing rapidly in amplitude and direction due to volatile renewable power
generation and due to the hourly changes in the electric energy market. Such developments
will have an influence on the probability of power system instability and system separation,
and eventually system collapse.
 An increasing amount of power flow is injected in the AC network through power electronic
converters that introduce a number of special characteristics, like a lack of synchronously
coupled inertial energy, a limited contribution of short-circuit current and a fast controllable
response to transient phenomena in the grid. The exact influence of the application on a large
scale of these characteristics is still under investigation.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
 In Chapter 2 an overview of definitions that in relation to power system dynamics can be
found in international standards has been given. A number of terms and definitions are used
interchangeably, even if mostly used for a very specific effect of power system dynamics and
transients. It is recommended that experts of academia and industry review the definitions
and put them together, while differentiating for the relevant aspects, like for instance for
large and small scale out-of-step phenomena.
 During the last decades worldwide vertically organized utilities (power generation,
transmission, distribution and all related commercial activities in one hand) changed to
horizontally organized utilities in order to facilitate liberalization and third-party access. By this
trend the integral responsibility is lost, and care must be taken that stakeholders like power
plant operators, transmission grid operators, aggregators face a level playing field. Officially
grid-codes and regulators have to take care, but on one hand the lack of knowledge and
overview that covers all fields of interest and on the other hand the societal/political climate
seem not to promote equal positions for all stakeholders with mutual balanced responsibilities
and authorities.
 There is a need for detailed rules and policies as to how the setting of protection functions
with respect to power swings and OOS are determined. Maybe a CIGRE WG can prepare such
a guide where system analysis is combined with protection expertise. Apart from the policy
with respect to blocking and tripping (which zones, tripping time) relevant issues are also the
impact of such functions when enabled on the regular tripping time, how the transient and
dynamic stability studies are to be performed, whether the OOS trip is to be given on the way
into the impedance criteria or at the way out (the circuit breaker manufacturer should also be
consulted!), the impact of memory voltage polarization at fast phenomena (when the voltage
drops close to zero and the voltage cannot be read by protection devices), the behaviour of
protection and control equipment after system separation, the secondary power/frequency
control and the functioning of the state estimator after system separation, etc.
 It is felt that deeper investigations on power system instabilities in combination with the
response of protection systems are to be recommended in order to come up with adequate
type testing procedures. Special attention is asked for testing protection functions under
conditions of cascading trips.
 Further investigations by CIGRE are to be recommended to address further the particularities
of individual connections by power electronic converters as well as the response of many of
such connections.
109
110
APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
AC alternating current (1) system (2) component of current (3) time constant
AIEE American Institute of Electrical Engineers (predecessor of IEEE)
AM asset management
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CB circuit breaker
CCT critical clearing time
CIGRE Conseil International de Grands Réseaux d’Electricité (International Council on
Large Electric Systems)
CO close-open sequence (circuit breaker)
DC direct current (1) system (2) component of current (3) time constant
DSO distribution system operator
EMF electromotive force (i.e. the source voltage in the Thevenin equivalent circuit)
ENTSO-E European network of transmission system operators for electricity
EU European Union
FACTS flexible AC transmission system
FRT fault-ride-through (under voltage ride through)
GIS geographical information system
HV high voltage
HVDC high voltage direct current (system)
ICT information and communication technology
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IEV International Electrotechnical Vocabulary
IGBT insulated gate bipolar transistor
JWG Joint Working Group (i.e. a working Group reporting to several Study Committees)
Kpp first pole-to-clear factor
LFO low frequency oscillation
LV (1) low voltage (2) lower voltage side of a transformer that could be MV or even
HV
MPAR multi-phase auto-reclosing
MV medium voltage
NERC North-American Electric Reliability Corporation
OH-line overhead line
OOP Out-of-Step
OOS Out-of-Phase
OP1, OP2 Out-of-Phase switching type tests
PDCA plan-do-check-act
PE power electronic(s)
PF power factor
PSB power swing blocking
PSS power system stabilizer
PSRC Power System Relaying Committee (IEEE)
PV photo voltaic
RAS remedial action scheme
RBAM risk based asset management
RfG Requirements for Generators
RMS Root-mean-square
RoCoF rate of change of frequency
RRRV rate of rise of recovery voltage
RTDS real time digital simulator
RV recovery voltage
111
Abbreviation Meaning
SAIDI system average interruption duration index
SAIFI system average interruption frequency index
SCP short-circuit power
SO system operator
SOFT switch on to fault
SPAR single-phase auto-reclosing
SPS system protection scheme
Statcom static compensator
SVC static voltage control
T30 short-circuit current interruption type test with 30% of the rated short-circuit
current of the circuit breaker
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
TPAR three phase auto-reclosing
TRV transient recovery voltage
TSO transmission system operator
UCTE Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity
VT voltage transformer
WAMPAC wide area monitoring protection and control
112
APPENDIX B. MULTI-PHASE AUTO-RECLOSING (MPAR)

Short-circuits, mostly single phase-to-earth faults, occur often on transmission lines. In order to
eliminate the fault, the involved phase conductor is shortly switched off or the involved circuit is
switched off. It takes only one or a few seconds for the power arc to disappear, depending on the
electromagnetically of electrocstatically induced voltage on the electrically floating conductor. Four-
legged shunt reactors, special shunt reactor switching schemes or high-speed earthing switches
facilitate a short reclosing time, since the power arc disappears faster. Short auto-reclosing times
prevent the phasor angle across the involved ciruit to become too large.
Next to the single-phase auto-reclosing (SPAR) and the three-phase auto-reclosing (TPAR), a special
reclosing scheme is the multi-phase auto-reclosing (MPAR). It is applied in Japan and suites double-
circuit transmission lines that cross regions with a high thunderstorm density. Such lines can be hit by
multiple lightning strokes, thus causing several phase conductors to be short-circuited to earth within
a very short period of time (within ten to hunderds of µs). As long as at least two conductors of
different phases are not switched off, a considerable amount of power can still flow along the
transmission line. The scheme is shown in Fig. B-1.
Single pole reclosing
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
Only faulted poles tripped Both terminals reclosed
simultaneously
Multi pole reclosing
Line #1 Line #1 Line #1
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
Line #2 Line #2 Line #2
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
Only faulted poles tripped Both terminals reclosed

simultaneously
Fig. B-1 Scheme of SPAR and MPAR
More information, especially for bulk power transmission lines, can be found in for instance [1].
[1] CIGRE Technical Brochure 570 (2014), “Switching Phenomena for EHV and UHV Equipment”
113

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SYSTEM CONDITIONS FOR AND PROBABILITY

JOINT WORKING GROUP

Corresponding Members and Guests

Disclaimer notice ISBN : 978-2-85873-418-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 3

3. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF OOS CONDITIONS ................................................................ 19

4. PERCEPTION OF OOS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT ................................................................... 27

5. LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM AND OUT-OF-STEP IN POWER SYSTEM NETWORKS........... 37

5.8 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63

6. SYNCHRONOUS & NON-SYNCHRONOUS POWER SOURCE RESPONSE TO LOSS-OF-

7. CIRCUIT BREAKER PHENOMENA ................................................................................................ 85

7.9 OTHER SWITCHING DUTIES ....................................................................................................................................... 104

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 107

APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 111

APPENDIX B. MULTI-PHASE AUTO-RECLOSING (MPAR) ............................................................... 113

Stable power swing

Power system stability

Unstable power swing

Dynamic instability, oscillatory instability

Electrical system centre or voltage zero

Islanding (Network splitting)

Synchronization of two systems

Critical clearing time

Under voltage ride through

Internal angle of an alternator

Angle of deviation between two EMF’s

Descriptions used in this Brochure

Asynchronous operation (applied to a synchronous generator)

Pole slip (applied to generators)

Out-of-Phase conditions (applied to circuit breakers)

3. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF OOS CONDITIONS

Fig. 3-1 PV-curve

Fig. 3-3 Power transfer before, during and after a fault

3.2 LOSS OF SYNCHRONISM

3.3 GENERAL POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

3.4 REQUIREMENTS IN GRID-CODES AND STANDARDS

[7] K. Matsuzawa, K. Yanagihashi, J. Tsukita, M. Sato, T. Nakamura, A, Takeuchi, “Stabilizing

4. PERCEPTION OF OOS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT

4.2 “NORMAL RISKS” HANDLED BY TODAY’S RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT

4.3 “STRATEGIC RISKS” OF UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY OR AMBIGUITY

4.4 PERCEPTION OF OUT-OF-STEP IN PDCA OF RISK-BASED ASSET MANAGEMENT

 The actual electrical parameters and protection configurations from a wide

Fig. 4-2 Overview of world’s largest disturbances[6]

4.5 EVIDENCES OF OUT-OF-STEP AS STRATEGIC RISKS IN THIS TECHNICAL

5. LOSS-OF-SYNCHRONISM AND OUT-OF-STEP IN

5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Fig. 5-1 Simple two-area power system

Fig. 5-2 Transmission Angles based on the Equal-Area Criterion

(a) (b) (c)

(d) (e) (f)

5.3 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS

5.3.2 Discussion of Turkish Blackout (2015)

Fig. 5-9 Turkish transmission system with sequence of events [7]

5.3.3 Discussion of Indian Grid Disturbance (2012)

5.3.4 Discussion of European Disturbance (2006)

Fig. 5-12 European Grid Disturbance (4th November 2006) [9]

5.3.5 Discussion of European Disturbance (2003)

Fig. 5-13 European Grid Disturbance (28th of September 2003) [10]

5.3.6 Discussion of Blackout in Northeast America (2003)

5.3.7 Conclusions from the analyses

5.4 PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

5.4.2 Response of relay-based protection functions