SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De las Alas vs. Court of Appeals No. L-38006. May 16, 1978.*
NATALIA DE LAS ALAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
_____________
* FIRST DIVISION.

PURIFICACION SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, ANTONIO FABIO, and NATIVIDAD

SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, CARLOS BALINGIT, respondents.
Appeals; Motion for reconsideration; New Trial; Pursuant to the case of Lloren vs. De Vera
(4 SCRA 637), the time during which a motion to set aside a judgment or order or for new
trial or for reconsideration has been pending shall he deducted from the reglementary
period of appeal, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court.—Applying now the doctrine in Lloren to the case at bar, WE agree with
petitioners. They had up to October 9, 1972, within which to perfect their appeal. Their
motion for reconsideration was filed on October 7, 1972, and, if this date of filing must be
added to the remainder of the period of appeal, petitioners clearly had three (3) more
days left of their period of appeal—October 7, 8 and 9, 1972. Therefore, if petitioners
received the order denying their motion for reconsideration on November 16, 1972, which
day should also be excluded from the period of appeal in line with the Lloren doctrine,
perforce their period of appeal extended up to November 19, 1972. But November 19,
1972, is a Sunday. Hence, petitioners’ period to perfect their appeal was extended ipso jure
to the first working day immediately following thereafter ie., November 20, 1972. Having
filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond on November 20, 1972, and their record on
appeal within the period extended by the respondent lower court judge, it follows that
petitioners perfected their appeal within the legal period.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Furthermore, there should not be any dispute that from
September 9, 1972, the date the decision was received, to November 16, 1972, the date
petitioners received the order of denial of their motion for reconsideration, there are
actually 68 days, using the exclude-the-first and include-the-last method for computing any
period of time. But, We have to consider also the express provision of the Revised Rules of
Court, x x x under which “the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or
order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted” in reckoning the thirty-day
period within which appeal may be taken.
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine in Lloren vs. Vera (4 SCRA 637) applies to all cases.—
whether the motion for reconsideration is filed before or on the last day of the appeal
period.—Private respondent contend that the doctrine laid down in Lloren applies only to
motions for reconsideration filed on the last day of the period of appeal. WE do not agree.
The Lloren doctrine must be applied to all cases whether the motion for reconsideration is
filed before or on the last day of the appeal period.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—WE repeat, the decision in Lloren did not expressly or impliedly
limit its application to cases where the motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of
the period of appeal. WE want to emphasize here that, for purposes of appeal, the time
during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been
pending shall be deducted from the reglementary period of appeal, unless such motion fails
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. To limit the application of the Lloren case to motions
for reconsideration filed on the last day of the appeal period would be giving premium to
laziness and punishing industry or punctuality if a grace period of one day would be given
to a party who files his motion for reconsideration on the last day of the period of appeal
and the same grace period is denied to a party who filed it before the last day.

Same; Prevailing Trend in computation of period of appeal is one of liberality.—Regardless,

however, of the above findings and, even assuming that respondents’ position were correct,
WE find that one-day delay does not justify the dismissal of the appeal under the
circumstances obtaining in this case. The real purpose behind the limitation of the period of
appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to
put an end to controversies (Dy Chay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521-526). In resolving the
instant case, WE must also bear in mind the prevailing atmosphere of liberality which has
swept this Court in similar matters since the case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals (L-
36629, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).

APPEAL by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Calixto O, Zaldivar and Ceferino S. Gaddi for petitioners.
     Jorge A. Dolorfino for private respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City Branch) to approve and certify the appeal taken by
petitioners from the decision in Civil Case No. 2117 of the said court.
It appears that the respondent lower court judge rendered a decision on August 7, 1972 in
the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2117;
that copy of the said decision was received by petitioners’ counsel on September 9, 1972;
that on September 28, 1972, petitioners’ counsel filed an urgent motion for extension of
fifteen (15) days from October 9, 1972—the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration
and/or perfecting the appeal—within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision of August 7, 1972;
that this motion for extension was granted as prayed for;
that on October 7, 1972, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration;
that on November 9, 1972, the respondent lower court judge denied the motion for
reconsideration and a copy of the order of denial was furnished petitioners’ counsel on
November 16, 1972;
that on November 20, 1972, petitioners sent by registered mail their notice of appeal and
an appeal bond, serving a copy thereof upon private respondents’ counsel also by
registered mail;
that on the same day, November 20, 1972, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
twenty (20) days within which to file their record on appeal, which motion for extension
was granted;
that under this extension the record on appeal was due for filing on December 25, 1972;
that on December 8, 1972, petitioners filed their record on appeal; t
that on December 9, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and to
dispprove the record on appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond
and the record on appeal were filed out of time;
that on December 20, 1972, herein petitioners filed their opposition to said motion to
dismiss appeal and to disapprove record on appeal;
that on January 26, 1973, the respondent lower court judge granted the said motion to
dismiss and petitioners received a copy of the said order on February 9, 1973;
that on March 9, 1973, petitioners filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from
March 11, 1973, within which to submit a motion for reconsideration;
that on the same date, March 11, 1973, private respondents filed a motion for the execution
of the decision of the respondent lower court judge dated August 7, 1972; and
that on March 21, 1973, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the order of
the respondent lower court judge dated January 26, 1973, which motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 18, 1973.

It should be noted that in their opposition to the motion to dismiss appeal and to
disapprove the record on appeal, petitioners stressed that they had until October 9, 1972
within which to perfect their appeal;
that this period was suspended on October 7, 1972 when they filed a motion for
reconsideration;
that they had still three more days within which to perfect their appeal and the remaining
three days started to run anew on November 17, 1972 and expired on November 19,
1972;
that since November 19, 1972 falls on a Sunday, petitioners had until November 20, 1972
within which to perfect their appeal; and that, having filed their notice of appeal, appeal
bond and motion for extension of time to file record on appeal on November 20, 1972, their
appeal was timely.

On July 3, 1973, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction before the respondent Court of Appeals.
After private respondents filed their answer to the aforesaid petition, the respondent Court
of Appeals rendered on September 12, 1973 a decision dismissing the petition as follows:

“After a careful review of the record and of the arguments of opposing counsel, we are
constrained to uphold the contention of the private respondents (there, plaintiffs). The
order of October 2, 1972 granting the petitioners-defendants fifteen days within which to
file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of August 7, 1972 is clear and unequivocal.
It is for the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of August 7, 1972 and not
for perfecting the appeal. Consequently, when petitioners-defendants filed the motion for
reconsideration on October 7, 1972 within the original period, they did not avail of the
extension. Such act on their part amounted to a waiver of the extension, hence, the order of
October 2, 1972 granting the extension became functus officio. Besides, there is nothing in
the law or rules which prohibits a party from waiving the right or privilege of the
extension.
And this brings Us to the second issue of whether or not from petitioners-defendants’
receipt of the order of November 9, 1972 on November 16, 1972, they had only two days
within which to perfect the appeal.
 We think the contention of the private respondent is correct . This follows from Our
view that the extension of fitteen days for filing the motion for reconsideration granted to
the petitioners-defendants did not extend the period of appeal. From September 9, 1972
when they received a copy of the decision of August 7, 1972 to October 7, 1972 when they
filed their motion for reconsideration, twenty-eight (28) days had elapsed.

So, on November 16, when they received a copy of the order of November 9, 1972 denying
the motion for reconsideration, they had only two days within which to perfect their
appeal.

The reglementary period of thirty days for perfecting appeal thus expired on
November 18, 1972.

Thus, the filing on November 20, 1972 of the record on appeal, appeal bond and the motion
for extension of twenty days for presenting the record on appeal, was beyond the said
period.
It follows from this that the granting of the extension of twenty days for presenting the
record on appeal and the filing of the said record on appeal on December 8, 1972
within the extended period are null and void, for the respondent court had lost
jurisdiction to grant the same and to approve the record on appeal.

“The filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal within the
reglementary period of thirty days from notice of the decision is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional; and the provisions of the Rules of Court must be complied with strictly. Thus,
an extension of time granted to amend a record on appeal does not carry with it an
extension of the reglementary period for the filing of the appeal bond (Salva vs. Palacio, et
al., 52 Off. Gaz., p. 3089). Similarly, an extension granted for the filing of the record on
appeal does not carry with it an extension for the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal
bond. (Altavas Conlu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 106 Phil. 940). The ratio decidendi of said
cases applies to the case at bar. The extension of time for the filing of the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of August 7, 1972 does not carry with it the extension for
the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal.

“It follows from the foregoing discussion that the respondent Judge did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the record on appeal and in dismissing the appeal
and that, therefore, mandamus does not lie” (Annex A; pp. 50-53, Idem.).
Under date of October 19, 1973, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, alleging, among other things, that:

“x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals was in error in holding that petitioners ‘had only two
days within which to perfect their appeal’ when on Oct. 7, 1972 they received a copy of the
respondent Court’s decision dated Aug. 7, 1972; in holding that the reglementary period of
appeal expired on Nov. 18, 1972; and in holding that the notice of appeal, appeal bond and
the motion for extension of twenty days for presenting the record on appeal were filed
beyond the said period.

“With all due respect, petitioners humbly contend that, as alleged and claimed in the
opposition to the motion to dismiss and to disapprove the record on appeal dated Dec. 20,
1972, quoted above, they still had three more days unused of their period of appeal as of
the filing of their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972, which unused period was
interrupted and suspended on this date, and started to run anew on November 17, 1972,
the day after November 16, 1972, when they received the respondent court’s order of
November 9, 1972 denying said motion for reconsideration. Therefore, petitioners still had
up to November 19, 1972, within which to perfect their appeal This last day being a
Sunday, ‘this period was extended to the first working day immediately following
thereafter,’ i.e. November 20, 1972 (Mintu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36845, Sept. 19,
1973, 53 SCRA 114, 117-118, citing Meralco v. PSC, 18 SCRA 651; Sec. 31, Rev. Adm. Code;
italics OURS).

xx     xx     xx     xx

In fine, petitioners’ appeal was improperly dismissed and the herein petition should have
been granted” (Annex D, pp. 110411, 116, Idem).
On November 7, 1973, the private respondents filed their opposition to the motion for
reconsideration (Annex E, pp. 120-139, Idem).
On November 20, 1973, petitioners filed a reply to private respondents’ opposition (Annex
F, pp. 134-151, Idem). On December 13, 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration (Annex G, pp. 152-157 Idem).
Hence, on January 17, 1974, petitioners filed the instant petition.
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not the appeal interposed by petitioners
from the decision of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance dated August 7,
1972, was perfected on time. The resolution of this issue hinges solely on how many
more days were left of the 30-day reglementary period of appeal as of the day
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972.

Petitioners maintain that they still had three (3) more days left of the period of appeal as of
the day they filed their motion for reconsideration October 7, 1972, and this period was
interrupted and suspended upon such filing, and started to run anew on November 17,
1972, the next day after November 16, 1972, when they received the respondent lower
court Judge’s order of November 9, 1972 denying their said motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, petitioners claim that they had up to November 20, 1972 within which to
perfect their appeal, since November 19, 1972, was a Sunday.

On the other hand, respondents contend that when petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on October 7, 1972, they had only two (2) days left of their period of
appeal after receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, and hence the
filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and the motion for extension to file record on
appeal on November 20, 1972, was beyond the reglementary period, invoking the rule
embodied in the last paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
“computing a period, the first day should be excluded and the last day included.”

It is discernible from the questioned decision that the respondent Court of Appeals
followed the doctrine laid down in Federal Films vs. Gutierrez David (78 Phil. 472, 44, O.G.
3813), which overruled so much of the Taroma case as included the date of the filing of the
motion for new trial and the date the movant was notified of the order of denial in the time
consumed by the court in considering the said motion for new trial and deducted from the
30-day period for perfecting the appeal.

Said ruling in the Federal Films case, however, had ceased to be a precedent with the
promulgation of Lloren vs. De Vera(4 SCRA 637), wherein this Court formulated a
computation which, in the words of Chief Justice Moran “settles authoritatively the
computation of appeal periods, which had hitherto given rise to divergent decisions of the
Supreme Court” (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed. 414; 2 Martin, Rules of Court, 1969 ed.
472).
It should be noted that in deciding the Lloren case this Court not consider but disregarded
the Taroma and the Federal Films cases and adhered strictly to the rule of computation
embodied in Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court. Thus, in the Lloren case, WE held
—

“The question that now arises is: Was the appeal perfected outside of the reglementary
period of 15 days? (Section 17, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

“It is contended by petitioner Lloren that from March 18, 1958 to April 2, 1958 there is an
intervening period of 15 days, and having filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2,
the exact number of days that has actually elapsed was only 14 days, because he filed his
motion for reconsideration on exactly the 15th day. This day was interrupted and so when
he received copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he was entitled to at
least 1 more day within which to appeal. Applying the rule of computation prescribed in
Rule 28 that the first day should be excluded and the last included, it follows that when he
filed his notice of appeal bond on April 17, 1958, the same were filed exactly within the
reglementary period of 15 days.

“Counsel for respondent, however, sustains the contrary view. He argues: ‘By mathematical
operation, we find that from March 18 (when petitioner received a copy of decision) to
April 17, 1958 (when he filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond) there were actually 30
days, March 18 being excluded and April 17 being included in the counting. In the same
manner, we find that from April 2, 1968 (when petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration) to April 16, 1958 (when he received a copy of the order denying his
motion for reconsideration) there are actually 14 days, April 2 being excluded, and April 16
included in the counting. Deducting, therefore, 14 days from 30 days the result is 16 days.
This means that petitioner (respondent below) filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond
on the 16th day or one day late, tardiness which is sufficient to bar the appeal.’ This method
of computation is in accordance with the rule followed by this Court in the case of Federal
Films, Inc. v. Judge of the First Instance of Manila, 78 Phil. 472, which expressly modified
the method of computation adopted in the case of Taroma v. Cruz and Galinato, 68 Phil.,
281.

“After a mature deliberation, where the members of the Court delved once more into the
methods of computation discussed in the cases mentioned by counsel for respondent, the
Court resolved not to follow the ruling in either of them and to adhere strictly to the rule
of computation embodied in Rule 28 of our rules. The idea that prevailed is that since
petitioner Lloren filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the period within
which he may perfect his appeal, that day should be excluded so that when he received
copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he had still 1 day within which to
perfect his appeal. This period of one day should be computed again in accordance with the
rule above cited by excluding the day of receipt and including the next day, which in this
case is April 17, 1958. Hence, the Court concluded that the appeal interposed by petitioner
Lloren was still within the reglementary period” (Lloren vs. De Veyra, supra).

A meticulous comparative analysis of the three cases—Taroma, Federal Films and Lloren—
shows that Lloren is a virtual revival of or reversion to the doctrine WE laid down in
Taroma, earlier referred to in this opinion, wherein this Court observed:

“The pertinent facts related to the issue and not disputed by the parties are the following:
The petitioner received on April 5, 1938 a copy of the decision which the respondent judge
had rendered in the aforementioned land registration case; and filed his motion for new
trial as a formal requisite to perfect his appeal on May 3, 1938, and his bill of exceptions on
the twenty-first of the same month and year, which was three days after he was notified of
the order which denied his motion for new trial.

“Relying upon the foregoing facts, petitioner maintains that he perfected his appeal within
the period of thirty days, inasmuch as he makes the following computation: From April 5 to
May 3, 1938, both dates excluded, only twenty-seven days elapsed; from May 3, when he
filed his motion for new trial to May 18, 1938 when he was notified of the order of the
respondent judge denying it, both dates included, 16 days passed, which period, petitioner
contends, should not be counted against him, in view of the rule established and sanctioned
several times by this court in the cases of Paez vs. Berenguer (6 Phil., 521); Lavitoria vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas (32 Phil., 204); Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Director of Lands (34 Phil., 623); Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado (34 Phil., 920);
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Ruiz and Catli (36 Phil., 279); Bermudez vs.
Director of Lands (36 Phil., 774); Director of Lands vs. Maurera and Tiongson (37 Phil.,
410); Layda vs. Legazpi (39 Phil., 83); Director of Lands vs. Sanz (45 Phil., 117); and from
the aforementioned date of May 18, 1938 to the twenty-first of the same month and year,
the first date excluded, following the rule of computation provided by section 4 of Act No.
190, no more than three days elapsed, which is equivalent to saying that, according to his
computation, petitioner perfected his appeal within the prescribed period.

“The respondent judge, in turn, maintains that the bill of exceptions in question was filed
by the petitioner thirty-one days after the decision from which he desired to appeal had
been promulgated, and computes the time that has elapsed as follows: From April 5 to May
3, 1938, excluding the first and including the last day there were twenty-eight days; from
the eighteenth to the twenty-first of the same month and year, also excluding the first and
including the last day, there were three days, to arrive later at the conclusion that,
excluding the time during which petitioner’s motion for new trial was under the
respondent judge’s consideration until petitioner was notified of the order denying it, or
from May 4 to May 18, 1938, thirty-one days elapsed or one day more than the thirty days
fixed by law.

“In other words, the same facts and the same question may be thus expressed: From April 5
to May 21, 1938, according to the theory of both petitioner and respondents, after the first
day is excluded and the last day is included, there were forty-six days. After deducting from
these forty-six days the sixteen days which the respondent judge spent in considering the
petitioner’s motion for new trial plus the time which elapsed since then until the latter was
notified of the order denying his motion referred to, there are no more than thirty days.
Petitioner then argues that his bill of exceptions was filed within that time. The respondent
judge does not admit that there are sixteen days which must be deducted from the forty-six
which elapsed from April 5 to May 21, 1938, the first day excluded, because he contends
that there is and there should be no more than one rule of computation applicable both to
himself and the petitioner and that is the one provided in section 4 of Act No. 190, restated
in section 13 of the Administrative Code. The rule aforementioned really says:

“Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be
Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded.’

“It is true, however, that the rule which has been almost invariably followed and observed
in this jurisdiction, at least since the case of Paez vs. Berenguer, supra, is that the time
employed by the court in deciding motions for new trial of a party desiring to appeal from
an adverse judgment should not be counted against him because it is not within his power
to avoid it, nor hasten their resolution, except perhaps by motions when there are
substantial grounds therefor. It is not amiss to repeat at this point what this court already
said in this same case in its resolution of September 27, 1938 because it squarely resolves
the question:

“If the rule of computation provided by section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure be applied
with rigorous technicality, it is clear that the bill of exceptions was filed out of time because
from April 5 to May 3, twenty-eight days elapsed, and from the eighteenth to the twenty-
first of the same month another three days passed, making a total of thirty-one days. But, as
we have already said, it is not here attempted to so compute the period of thirty days, but
to apply the rule which have uniformly held in the sense that the time which the court
employs in considering the motion for new trial should be excluded. It is admitted that May
3, being the date on which the motion for new trial was filed, should be excluded; but in the
computation of the thirty days, section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to be
applied and May 3 is sought to be included in the counting so that until said date twenty-
eight days had already elapsed. This procedure entirely nullifies the rule of exclusion which
we had laid down and which now constitutes a precedent in procedural law. There is
neither logic nor sense in this procedure which amounts to the exclusion of May 3 only to
be included later on. It is either counted or dropped out. The latter excludes the former; no
two antithetical ideas may be harmonized or given effect’ ” (Taroma vs. Cruz, et al., supra:
italics supplied).

Applying now the doctrine in Lloren to the case at bar, WE agree with petitioners. They had
up to October 9, 1972, within which to perfect their appeal. Their motion for
reconsideration was filed on October 7, 1972, and, if this date of filing must be added to
the remainder of the period of appeal, petitioners clearly had three (3) more days left of
their period of appeal—October 7, 8 and 9, 1972. Therefore, if petitioners received the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on November 16, 1972, which day should
also be excluded from the period of appeal in line with the Lloren doctrine, perforce their
period of appeal extended up to November 19, 1972. But November 19, 1972, is a Sunday.
Hence, petitioners’ period to perfect their appeal was extended ipso jure to the first
working day immediately following thereafter, i.e., November 20, 1972. Having filed their
notice of appeal and appeal bond on November 20, 1972, and their record on appeal within
the period extended by respondent lower court judge, it follows that petitioners perfected
their appeal within the legal period.

Furthermore, there should not be any dispute that from September 9, 1972, the date the
decision was received, to November 16, 1972, the date petitioners received the order of
denial of their motion for reconsideration, there are actually 68 days, using the exclude-
the-first and include-the-last method for computing any period of time. But, We have to
consider also the express provision of the Revised Rules of Court, thus—

“SEC. 3. How appeal is taken.—Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice
on appeal The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new
trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.” (Rule 41, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court; italics Ours).
under which “the time during which a motion to set aside thejudgment or order or for a
new trial has been pending shall bededucted” in reckoning the thirty-day period within
which appeal may be taken.

The record shows that the motion for reconsideration has been pending since October 7,
1972, the date of its filing and remained so until November 16, 1972, when petitioners
received the order of denial of their motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the motion for
reconsideration has been pending for a period of 41 days—25 days in October and 16
days in November of 1972. October 7, the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration,
should not be excluded in the computation of the period during which the motion for
reconsideration was pending since it will be in violation of the express provision of the
aforequoted provision of the Revised Rules of Court. To emphasize, the motion for
reconsideration was pending from its filing on October 7, 1972, not from October 8, 1972,
the day after it was filed on October 7, 1972; because it was already pending consideration
by the trial court during the remaining hours of the 24 hours of October 7, 1972, the day it
was filed. October 7, 1972 did not (ipso facto) terminate or end upon the filing of said
motion, much less automatically usher in the following day, October 8, 1972. Deducting 41
days from 68 days WE have 27 days.

WE, therefore, agree with petitioners that, on November 16, 1972, when they received the
trial court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration, they still had THREE (3) days
more within which to perfect their appeal.

Private respondents contend that the doctrine laid down in Lloren applies only to motions
for reconsideration filed on the last day of the period of appeal. WE do not agree. The
Lloren doctrine must be applied to all cases whether the motion for reconsideration is filed
before or on the last day of the appeal period. A perusal of Lloren shows that, in a criminal
cases, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1958, after receipt of the
questioned decision on March 18, 1958. He received the order denying his motion for
reconsideration on April 16, 1958, and perfected his appeal on April 17, 1958. This court
ruled that petitioner’s appeal was timely filed, because from April 2, 1958, the date of filing
up to and including April 16 1958, the date of receipt of the order of denial, there are
actually 15 days, and deducting these 15 days from the 30-day period from March 18 to
April 17, 1958, there are 15 days. Hence, the appeal was filed on time.

WE repeat, the decision in Lloren did not expressly or impliedly limit its application to
cases where the motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of the period of appeal.
WE want to emphasize here that, for purposes of appeal, the time during which a motion to
set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted from
the reglementary period of appeal, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 37. To limit the application of the Lloren case to motions for reconsideration filed on
the last day of the appeal period would be giving premium to laziness and punishing
industry or punctuality if a grace period of one day would be given to a party who files his
motion for reconsideration on the last day of the period of appeal and the same grace
period is denied to a party who filed it before the last day. Stated differently, to deny
application of the Lloren doctrine to the case at bar, would be to favor the filing of a motion
on the very last day of the reglementary period and to penalize the filing of the same
motion several days before the expiration of such a period.

In holding that the Lloren doctrine is not applicable to the petitioners’ case, the respondent
Court of Appeals observed in its resolution of December 13, 1973, denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, that the Revised Rules of Court has not incorporated Section 1
of Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court, but merely incorporated the Lloren doctrine in the
second paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, and from this is
concluded that the computation of time based on Section 1, Rule 28, of the Old Rules of
Court is no longer tenable. This view is incorrect; because the non-incorporation of Section
1, Rule 28, of the Old Rules of Court, in the Revised Rules of Court, does not change the rule
on the computation of periods for filing pleadings as the very same provision is already
embodied in Article 13 of the New Civil Code and in Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which legal provisions are superior to a rule of court, aside from the
fact that its incorporation into the Revised Rules of Court would be a mere superfluity.
Regardless, however, of the above findings and even assuming that respondents’ position
were correct, WE find that a one-day delay does not justify the dismissal of the appeal
under the circumstances obtaining in this case. The real purpose behind the limitation of
the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of
justice and to put an end to controversies (Dy Chay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521-526).

In resolving the instant case, WE must also bear in mind the prevailing atmosphere of
liberality which has swept this Court in similar matters since the case of Berkenkotter vs.
Court of Appeals (L-36629, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228), followed by Pimentel, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals (L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 476), then by Maqui and
Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-41609, Feb. 24, 1976, 69 SCRA 368), and lately by
Lopez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-43767, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 401), wherein WE
said:
“x x x the provision of section 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
specific grounds for dismissal of appeal ‘manifestly confers a power and does not impose a
duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.’ Hence, it should be exercised with a
great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances.”

Furthermore, WE note from the records the absence or lack of the element of intent to
delay the administration of justice on the part of petitioners in this case. On the contrary,
petitioners’ counsel have demonstrated cautiousness, concern and punctuality in the
prosecution of the appeal. They filed their motion for reconsideration October 7, 1972,
even if the respondent lower court judge had given them an extension up to October 24,
1972, within which to file the said motion. Petitioners had up to December 25, 1972, within
which to submit their record on appeal, yet they filed their record on appeal on December
8, 1972, or 17 days before the deadline.

Also, even assuming further that petitioners’ counsel committed a mistake in the
computation of the period of appeal, this error is clearly not attributable to negligence or
bad faith and should not be counted against petitioners. On a doubtful and controversial
question of law such as the one before Us in this case, the benefit of the doubt must be
given to petitioners. “Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis
of good faith” (Last par., Art. 526, New Civil Code).

Lastly, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality, and under the circumstances obtaining in this case, WE are reminded of what
WE said in the case of Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 120,
126), thus—

“x x x Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. The rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
made, their aim would be defeated.”

Once again, the teaching of Alonso vs. Villamor becomes imperative:

“x x x A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is,
rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits,
unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities. x x x” (Vol. 16
Phil. 315, 321-322).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, PROMULGATED

ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1973, AND ITS RESOLUTION DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, DATED DECEMBER 13, 1973, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPROVE
PETITIONERS’ BOND AND RECORD ON APPEAL AND TO CERTIFY THE SAID APPEAL TO
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS.
NO COSTS.

     Teehankee (Chairman), Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Decision and Resolution are reversed and set aside.

Notes.—The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to convince the court that its ruling
is erroneous and improper or contrary to law or the evidence. (Philippine Advertising
Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246). A party asking a reconsideration of a court’s
decision or order should, therefore, be able to point out which facts or law were not
properly considered by the court. (De los Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 60 SCRA 116).

The filing of a motion for reconsideration which in substance is but a reiteration of reasons
and arguments previously set forth in the respondent’s memorandum submitted to the
trial court and which the latter had already considered, weighed and resolved adversely to
him when it rendered its decision on the merits did not suspend the running of the period
of perfecting an appeal because it is pro forma. (Dacanay vs. Alvendia, 30 SCRA 31).

A second motion to reconsider is not pro forma when it is based on a different ground, even
if in its first part it sets forth in greater detail the argument against the correctness of the
first order to dismiss. (Dauden-Hernaez vs. De los Angeles, 27 SCRA 1276).
The fact that a defendant had been deprived of due process, taken together with the
circumstance that writ of execution had already been issued, perforce takes his case
outside of the purview of the rule requiring a previous motion for reconsideration. (Matute
vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768).

Where the arguments in support of a motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed
must nevertheless be denied. The judgment becomes final. (Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 25 SCRA 58).

The perfection of an appeal within the statutory and reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and executory the
questioned decision and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
(Careon vs. Workmen’s Compensation, 77 SCRA 297.)

A motion for reconsideration interrupts the thirty-day period to appeal. (Collector of

Internal Revenue vs. Convention of Philippine Baptist Churches, 1 SCRA 114.)

Where the last day for filing the motion for reconsideration falls on a holiday, a motion filed
on the first working day immediately following the date of expiration of said period within
the reglementary period. (Manila Electric Company vs. Public Service Commission, 18 SCRA
651.)

——o0o—— De las Alas vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200, No. L-38006 May 16, 1978
No. L-37229. October 21, 1975.*

HEIRS OF CEFERINO MORALES, represented by MARCELINA SALVADOR VDA. DE

MORALES, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PURITA MORALES, FLORO MORALES,
EUSTAQUIO MORALES, ENRIQUETA MORALES, GORGONIA MORALES, NARCISO MORALES,
PRESENTACION MORALES, SANTIAGO MORALES, CLARA BUSTAMANTE, SOFIA
BUSTAMANTE, VICTOR PALMA GIL, JOSEFINA PALMA GIL AND ENCARNACION LOGAÑ O,
respondents.
_______________

Appeals; Purpose of requirement that record on appeal must contain such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time.—The main purpose of the requirement is to
enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record on appeal itself and
without need of any independent evidence, that the appeal has been made on time, because
in cases appealed by record on appeal, the records of the trial courts are not forwarded
to the reviewing tribunal and for the appellate court to examine the respective proofs of the
parties on the due perfection of the appeal would delay the speedy administration of
justice.

Same; Deficiency in the record on appeal which failed to state when the decision of the trial
court was received by the appellants is not a ground for dismissal of the appeal where it is
a fact of record that the trial court approved the record on appeal; appellate court should
have relied on such approval for the purpose of determining that appeal was made on time.
—But, there is an inescapable feature that redeems petitioners’ record on appeal from its
apparent deficiency. It is a fact of record that the trial court approved petitioners’ record on
appeal in an Order, dated November 9, 1972 which materially reads: “It was shown by
movants-counsel (petitioners’ counsel) that the notice of appeal and the posting of a cash
bond, as required by the Rules of Court for appeals, were made within the reglementary
period. Likewise, the record on appeal was filed on time, x x x WHEREFORE, finding that
the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal were all filed within the
reglementary period, and finding further that the herein appeal is deemed perfected, the
record on appeal is hereby approved.” Since the accuracy and validity of this approval
order of the trial court has not been questioned by private respondents, respondent
Appellate Court should have relied thereon and held that the petitioners’ appeal had been
made on time, x x And rightly so, because, as pointed out in Berkenkotter v. Court of
Appeals, “No trial Judge in his right mind and who is aware of the serious responsibilities of
his office, would approve a record on appeal that was not timely filed.”

Same; Civil procedure; Cadastral Act; Rules of practice, procedure and evidence in a court
of first instance are applicable to trial of contested case in a cadastral court.—We cannot
entertain the view of petitioners that the requirements of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court should not operate in cadastral cases. The trial of a contested case in a cadastral
court is the same as that in a court of first instance, and the usual rules of practice,
procedure and evidence govern, x x x A fortiori, Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
operates ex proprio vigore in cadastral appeals.

MARTIN, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari an April 2, 1973 Resolution of the respondent

Court of Appeals, dismissing petitioners’ appeal against private respondents in C.A.-G.R. No.
52127-R, with the petitioners urging Us to give meaning and substance to a trial court
order approving, after no objection has been interposed by the opposing party, a record on
appeal which was later discovered to be lacking in some material data.

Below, in the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental (Mati, Davao Oriental), private
respondents filed a petition on May 27, 1973 against petitioners herein, the heirs of one
Ceferino Morales, seeking the review of a decree of registration in favor of Ceferino Morales
of a 220, 261-square meter land.

The land was previously owned by the late Graciana Morales, the predecessor-in-interest of
private respondents. During his lifetime, Ceferino Morales was appointed by the same court
as an administrator of the estate of Graciana Morales; however, when cadastral
proceedings were initiated in 1959 at Mati, Davao Oriental, Ceferino Morales claimed
absolute ownership of the same parcel of land. As a result, the land was adjudicated to him
and registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental held that Ceferino Morales’s
acquisition of the disputed land was fraudulent and prohibited under civil law. It declared
decree of Registration No. N-389174 and Original Certificate of Title No. C-1716 in the
name of Ceferino Morales null and void and ordered the registration of the controverted
land in the name of private respondents.

Forthwith, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and sought a review of the
unfavorable judgment, but the appeal was dismissed in this wise:

“RESOLVED: There being really nothing in the original Record on Appeal that shows when
appellant received copy of the decision therefore, the Record on Appeal was fatally
defective; note that decision was dated 1 August 72 while Record on Appeal is dated 13
Sept. 72. In view whereof, appeal dismissed.”

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in the Appellate Court
resolution of May 30, 1973.

Pertinently, petitioners’ printed record on appeal shows:1

“XX

“That on August 1, 1972, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer issued a Decision which reads as follows:

(contents omitted)

“Given in chambers, this 1st day of August, 1972 at Mati, Davao Oriental, Philippines.

“XXI

“That a Notice of Appeal was sent to petitioners and filed with this Hon. Court, pursuant to
the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, within the reglementary (sic) period.

“XXII
“That on September 11, 1972, the sum of P120.00 was deposited with the Clerk of Court,
per Sec. 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as APPEAL BOND, under Official Receipt No.
00579052 in the herein case.”

It is obvious that the central issue in this case is whether petitioners’ record on appeal
sufficiently complies with the “material data rule” under Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

The adjective law on the matter provides that if an appeal is pursued to the Appellate
Tribunal from the judgment or order of a Court of First Instance, a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond, and a record on appeal must be served upon the adverse party or filed with
the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment.2 The record on
appeal must contain “such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.”3

The main purpose of the requirement is to enable the appellate court to determine on the
basis of the record on appeal itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that
the appeal has been made on time,4 because in cases appealed by forwarded to the
reviewing tribunal and for the appellate court to examine the respective proofs of the
parties on the due perfection of the appeal would delay the speedy administration of
justice.5 It is principally intended for the benefit of appellate courts in order that they can
speedily facilitate appeal and may not be invoked by the trial court which has before it the
complete records and data for such a determination.6

In the case before Us, it is readily noticeable that petitioners’ record on appeal failed to
indicate the date when they (petitioners) received a copy of the trial court decision of
August 1, 1972, thus embarrasing the respondent Court of Appeals in determining with
ease the timely perfection of their appeal. The mere statement that they sent to the private
respondents and filed with the trial court their Notice of Appeal “within the reglementary
(sic) period” affords no accurate relief to the Appellate Court to determine the timeliness of
petitioners’ appeal. Such quoted phrases, according to previous decisions of this Court, is
“not a fact but a mere conclusion”7 which does not indicate the seasonable perfection of the
appeal.8 The subsequent attempt to show the missing data cannot cure the prior
omission,9 since, for such allegation to merit any consideration, it should be so stated in the
record on appeal.10
But, there is an inescapable feature that redeems petitioners’ record on appeal from its
apparent deficiency. It is a fact of record that the trial court approved petitioners’ record
on appeal in an Order, dated November 9, 1972,11 which materially reads:

“It was shown by movants-counsel [petitioners’ counsel] that the notice of appeal and the
posting of a cash bond, as required by the Rules of Court for appeals, were made within the
reglementary period. Likewise, the record on appeal was filed on time. However,
petitioners’ counsel [respondents’ counsel] pointed out that there were some
typographical errors in the record on appeal. It was agreed upon by movants’ counsel to
have such errors corrected and in fact they have already been corrected. No objection was
interposed for the approval of the record on appeal.

“WHEREFORE, finding that the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal were all
filed within the reglementary period, and finding further that the herein appeal is deemed
perfected, the record on appeal is hereby approved.” (p. 112, Original Record on Appeal)

Since the validity and accuracy of this approval order of the trial court has not been
questioned by private respondents,12 respondent Appellate Court should have relied
thereon and held that the petitioners’ appeal had been made on time. Thus, in the recent
case of Pimentel v. Honorable Court of Appeals,13 We ruled:

“But the herein private respondents do not question the correctness of the order of the trial
court dated January 24, 1974 approving the records on appeal on the ground that “there
being no more objections to the corrected records on appeal x x x and it appearing that the
notice of appeal, records on appeal and appeal bonds have been filed within the
reglementary period, x x x.” Inevitably, they admit the facts stated in said order. Hence,
implicit in the said order are the data required to show the fact that the appeal was
perfected within the reglementary period. Because the said order approving the records on
appeal is part of both the original and printed records on appeal and the accuracy and truth
of the factual statements therein are not impugned by herein private respondents, the
respondent Appellate Court should have relied on the same and could have determined
therefrom that the appeal in both cases was perfected on time.

“The reason for Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court in requiring that the record
on appeal shall include such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time, was to
obviate and eliminate waste of time that would be incurred by the Appellate Tribunal in
requiring the lower court to forward the original record and in examining such records to
determine the timeliness of the appeal (Araneta vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., L-26227-28, Oct.
25, 1966, 18 SCRA 446, 449-50; Government vs. Antonio, L-23735, Oct. 19, 1965, 15 SCRA
119). With the existence of the aforementioned order of

_______________

Heirs of Ceferino Morales vs. Court of Appeals

January 24, 1974 approving the records on appeal because the trial court found that the
notice of appeal, the records on appeal and appeal bonds were all filed within the
reglementary period and because of the absence of further objections to the corrected
records on appeal, the veracity of the grounds stated in said order, not being disputed by
herein private respondents, the reason for the rule ceases; because thereby the Appellate
Court can rely thereon without need of sending for, and of any further examination of, the
original records of the case.” (Emphasis supplied)

And rightly so, because, as pointed out Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals,14 “(n)o trial Judge
in his right mind and who is aware of the serious responsibilities of his office, would
approve a record on appeal that was not timely filed. “

The intent is thus clear that every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities. At length, the ruling in Valera v. Court of Appeals 15 that the theory of
estoppel does not operate against a party who interposed no objection to the approval of
the record on appeal in the court below as well as the holding in Director, Bureau of
Printing & Real Property Management v. Court of Appeals 16 that the mere statement that
the record on appeal, notice of appeal, or appeal bond had been filed “within the period” or
“within the reglementary period” is a “mere conclusion, not a fact indicative of the
seasonable perfection of the appeal,” despite the non-objection on the part of the opposing
party to the approval of the record on appeal by the trial court as filed on time, have
therefore lost what appears to be their “ephemereal vitality.”

Finally, We cannot entertain the view of petitioners that the requirements of Section 6, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court should not operate in cadastral cases. The trial of a contested case
in a cadastral court is the same as that in a court of first instance, and the usual rules of
practice, procedure and evidence govern.17 In Sinbengco v. Arellano, et al.,18 the Court
held that “the requirements of our Rules of Court relative to the perfection of an appeal in
an ordinary case apply in the same manner and with equal force and effect on appeals from
a decision of a court of first instance in registration and cadastral proceedings.” A fortiori,
Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court operates ex propio vigore in cadastral appeals.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 2, 1973, dismissing
petitioners’ appeal, and the subsequent resolution, dated May 30, 1973, denying their
motion for reconsideration, are hereby reversed and set aside. Case remanded to the Court
of Appeals for decision on the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

     Teehankee (Actg. Chairman), Makasiar, Muñ oz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

     Esguerra, J., on leave.

Resolution reversed and set aside. Case remanded to the Court of Appeals for decision on
the merits.

Notes.—The mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed
within the requested period was approved by the trial court. (Berkenkotter vs. Court of
Appeals, 53 SCRA 228) The approval thereof carries with it the approval of the motion for
extension and the mere failure of the record on appeal to show such approval should not
defeat the right to appeal. (Ibid.)

Failure to state in the record on appeal that the appeal bond was filed is not fatal to the
appeal where the fact of filing said bond can be taken judicial notice of having been
judicially admitted by the adverse party and confirmed by the court in a certiorari case
involving the same dispute. (Marcelo Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 60 SCRA 167).
Where there are sufficient data showing that the Government’s appeal was perfected on
time, the mere absence in the record on appeal of any statement of the date of the receipt of
the order in question of the trial court will not be considered fatal to the appeal. (Republic
vs. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 196).

——o0o—— Heirs of Ceferino Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 304, No. L-37229
October 21, 1975

Go Occo & Co., petitioner, vs. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, and
ALEJANDRO S. REYES, as administrator of the estate of Laureana Antonio,
respondents.
PLEADING; CERTIORARI; VAGUE AND INDEFINITE PETITION.—The petition in this case is
vague and indefinite. The administration of justice is not a matter of guess work, While
pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the
parties, courts should not be left to conjectures in the determination of issues submitted by
the parties litigant or their attorneys. Where, therefore, the pleading is, as in this case,
vague and uncertain, courts will not allow themselves to be led to the commission of error
or injustice by exploring in the midst of uncertainty and divining the intention of the
parties or their counsel.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Savellon & Estenzo and Manuel A. Zosa for petitioner.
Vicente Zacarias and Tomas L. Borromeo f or the respondent Reyes.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.

LAUREL, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed with this court by Go Occo & Co. against Sixto
de la Costa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The complaint recites the
following':
"That the plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with domicile at Cebu, Cebu, and the defendant is a Judge of the Court of First
Instance for the Province of Cebu;
"For its cause of action, the plaintiff alleges:

"1. That, on March 25, 1935, plaintiff Go Occo & Co. filed an action with the justice of the
peace court of Cebu, Cebu, to recover the amount of P467.25 against People's Bazar
representing the purchase price of goods taken on credit. A writ of preliminary
attachment was issued on the same against the defendant, and same was levied upon
merchandise belonging to the defendant and taken possession of by the provincial sheriff
of Cebu. On March 29, 1935, the estate of Laureana Antonio, through its administrator
Alejandro S. Reyes, filed an intervention complaint claiming the sum of P1,380 representing
unpaid rent of a house occupied by the defendant's store in Cebu, Cebu.

Over the verbal objection of the plaintiff to the admission of the intervenor's intervention
complaint on the ground that intervention complaint cannot be filed in the justice of the
peace court and that intervenor's intervention complaint claimed the amount of P1,380
which was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, the justice of the peace
court of Cebu tried the case and rendered judgment declaring plaintiff's claim preferred to
that of intervenor's. On May 4, 1935, the intervenor appealed from the judgment of the
justice of the peace court, paying the amount of P16 for docket fee on that same day. On
June 28, 1935, the clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu addressed a letter to the
intervenor informing him that he had to pay still the amount of P4 as the docket fee on that
appeal was P20. Up to the present time the said intervenor has not made good the payment
of the said P4.
"2.That, intervention complaint filed in the justice of the peace court was not reproduced
by the intervenor on appeal in the Court of First Instance.
"3.That, for non-payment of the full docket fees, the case was not ready for trial, even if
initiated originally in the Court of First Instance.

"4.That, on January 18, 1936, the defendant judge entered an order declaring the plaintiff
Go Occo & Co., in default on the intervenor's intervention complaint. On that same date the
said defendant judge entered a judgment declaring that the said defendant People's Bazar
was in debt to the said intervenor's estate in the amount of P1,380 and that the said
intervenor estate's claim was superior to any other credit. Upon being notified of the order
of default and of the judgment, plaintiff Go Occo & Co. filed a motion on February 5, 1936,
asking for the reinstatement of the case and for the dismissal of the intervenor's appeal.
(Here motion is reproduced in full.)
"5.That, on motion by the attorney for the intervenor, the hearing of the aforesaid plaintiff's
motion which was set for February 11, 1936, was postponed by defendant judge to
February 25, 1936, over the objection of the plaintiff's attorneys, the objection being for the
reason that plaintiff's right to appeal might lapse. To assure plaintiff's right of appeal,
plaintiff filed an amended motion for reconsideration and for dismissal of intervenor's
appeal on February 12, 1936. (Here motion is also reproduced in full.)
"6.On March 2, 1936, the defendant judge entered an order denying the motion for
reconsideration and ordering the execution of the judgment. (Here order is reproduced.)
"7.That, as aforesaid, the defendant judge has ordered the execution of the judgment in the
said case, and that unless enjoined not to do so, the said judge will proceed to have his
order executed.
"8.That, there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the
plaintiff.
"Wherefore, this Honorable Court is respectfully prayed to order the defendant judge to
certify the records of this case for a review by that Honorable Court and to issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the said judge to recall the order of execution
of the judgment aforesaid."

It will be observed that, according to the foregoing petition, the court below issued various
orders in civil case No. 10606, Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Go Occo & Co.,
plaintiff, vs. People's Bazar, defendant, versus Alejandro S. Reyes, administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Laureana Antonio, intervenor." Among these orders are: The order
of January 18, 1936, declaring the plaintiff therein in default, that of the same date in favor
of the intervenor's claim, and that of March 2, 1936, disallowing the motion for
reconsideration presented by the plaintiff therein and ordering the issuance of a writ of
execution. The petition does not state which of these orders is assailed or was issued by the
inferior court in excess or extralimitation of its jurisdiction or with manifest abuse of its
discretion. Worse than this, the petition does not even contain a general averment that the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in taking cognizance of the civil case aforementioned acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It simply alleges in paragraph 8 thereof that "there is
no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the plaintiff."

The petition in this case is vague and indefinite. The administration of justice is not a
matter of guess work. While pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to
substantial justice between the parties, courts should not be left. to conjectures in the
determination of issues submitted by the parties litigant or their attorneys. Where,
therefore, the pleading is, as in this case, vague and uncertain, courts will not allow
themselves to be led to the commission of error or injustice by exploring in the midst of
uncertainty and divining the intention of the parties or their counsel.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceñ a, C. /., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed. Go Occo & Co. vs. De la Costa and Reyes, 63 Phil. 445, No. 45116
September 17, 1936