LABOR LAW I

Case Digest Compilation

I. LABOR STANDARDS

01 PASEI VS. DRILON

[163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working
abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question
that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between
sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among
all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as
may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as
been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

02 AGUSTIN CHU vs. NLRC

FACTS: Chu retired from the service of the private respondent upon reaching the age of 65 under its regular program. he
was granted an extension under special contract of employment. Later on private respondent Milling Co. issued
memorandum providing for a rotation of the personnel that and other organisational changes. pursuant to the memoranda
Agustin was transferred to sugar department. hands he protested his transfer arguing that the management prerogative to
transfer him is limited by special contract of employment which is the law between the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special contract of employment serve as limit the transfer Agustin Chu.

HELD: special contract of employment cannot override the fact that the rotational and was making good faith and was not
discriminatory, and that there was no demotion in rank or diminution of salary benefits and privileges. and employee's
right to security of tenure doesn't give him such a vested right in position as would deprive the company of its prerogatives
to change his assignments are transferred him where he will be most useful.

03 PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. vs. NLRC COMMISSION and EDILBERTO M. ALVAREZ

G.R. No. 106370, September 8, 1994

FACTS:
Alvarez having recovered from a work-related accident, failed to report to work for a total of eighteen (18) working days
with three (3) days off. Under petitioner’s company rules, employees who incur unauthorized absences of six (6) days or
more are subject to dismissal. After the fourth warning, he was then terminated. Private respondent filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal and the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding private respondent’s termination from employment as
valid and justified.On appeal, NLRC, reserved and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner was ordered to
reinstate Edilberto M. Alvarez to his former position without loss of seniority rights but without backwages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC abused its discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction by entertaining an appeal that was filed out of
time.

HELD:
On the issue of whether or not the appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC was filed within the ten (10)
day reglementary period, it is undisputed that private respondent received a copy of the labor arbiter’s decision on 5
September 1991. Alvarez thus had up to 15 September 1991 to perfect his appeal. Since this last mentioned date was a
Sunday, private respondent had to file his appeal on the next business day, 16 September 1991. Petitioner contends that
the appeal was filed only on 20 September 1991. Respondent NLRC however found that private respondent filed his
appeal by registered mail on 16 September 1991, the same day that petitioner’s counsel was furnished copies of said
appeal.
The contention that even assuming arguendo that the appeal was filed on time, the appeal fee was paid four (4) days late
(and, therefore, the appeal to the NLRC should be dismissed) likewise fails to entirely empress us. In C.W. Tan
Manufacturing v. NLRC, we held that “the broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the
merits demand that the appeal be given due course.”
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Pantranco North Express vs NLRC

(1996) 259 SCRA 161

Facts: Private respondent was hired by petitioner in 1964 as a bus conductor. He eventually joined the Pantranco
Employees Association-PTGWO. He continued inpetitioner's emplay until August 12, 1989, when he was retired at the
age of fifty-two (52) after having rendered twenty five years service. The basis of his retirement was the compulsory
retirement provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the forenamed union. On February
1990. private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with NLRC. The complaint was
consolidated with two other cases of illegal dismissal having similar facts and issues, filed by other employees, non-union
members

Issue: WON the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable

The CBA stipulation is legal and enforceable. The bone of contention in this case is the provision on compulsory
retirement after 25years of service Article XI. Section 1(e) (5) of the May 2, 1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement
between petitioner
company and the union states:

Section 1. The COMPANY shall formulate a retirement plan with the following main features (e) The COMPANY agrees to
grant the retirement benefits herein provided to regular employees who may be separated from the COMPANY for any of
the following reasons: (5) Upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or upon completing twenty-five (25) years of service
to the COMPANY whichever comes first, and the employee shall be compulsory retired and paid the retirement benefits
herein
Provided

The said Code provides. Art. 287

Retirement

- Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or
other applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement
enefits as he may have eamed under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement. The Court agrees
with petitioner and the Solicitor General. Art. 287 of the Labor Code as worded permits employers and employees to fix
the
applicable retirement age at below 60 years Moreover, providing for early retirement does not constitute diminution of
benefits. In almost all countries today, early retirement, i.e., before age 60, is considered a reward for services rendered
since it enables an employee to reap the fruits of his labor-particularly retirement benefits, whether lump-sum or otherwise
at an earlier age, when said employee, in presumably better physical and mental condition, can enjoy them better and
longer. As a matter of fact, one of the advantages of early retirement is that the corresponding retirement benefits, usually
consisting of a substantial cash windfall. can early on be put to productive and profitable uses by way of income-
generating
investments, thereby affording a more significant measure of financial security and independence for the retiree who, up
till then, had to contend with life's vicissitudes within the parameters of his fortnightly or weekly wages. Thus we are now
seeing
many CEAS with such early retirement provisions And the same cannot be considered a diminution of employment
benefits Being a product of negotiation, the CEA between the petitioner and the union intended the provision on
compulsory retirement to be beneficial to the employees-union members including herein private respondent When
private respondent ratified the CBA with the union, he not only agreed to the CEA but also agreed to conform to and abide
by its provisions
Thus, it cannot be said that he was legally dismissed when the CBA provision on compulsory retirement was applied to
his case Incidentally we call attention to Republic Act No. 7641, known as "The Retirement Pay Law, which went into
effect on January 7, 1993. Although passed many years after the compulsory retirement of herein private respondent,
nevertheless, the said statute sheds light on the present discussion when it amended Art. 287 of the Labor Code, to make
it read as follows:

Retirement

Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age establish in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65)
years which is hereby declared the sixty (50) compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment may retire The afore quoted provision makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give employers and
employees a free hand to determine and agree upon the terms and conditions of retirement. Providing in a CBA for
compulsory retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties
agree to be governed by such CBA. The law presumes that employees know what they want and what is good for them
absent any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure their consent thereto