ARTICLES OF THE DAY

October 7th, 2021

SLAVOJ ZIZEK, RUSSIA TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 2

CHAD P. BOWN & CECILIA MALMSTRÖM, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ........................................................................... 7

MOEED YUSUF, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................................................. 11

SHANNON TIEZZI, DIPLOMAT ......................................................................................................................... 16

UZAIR M. YOUNUS, DAWN ............................................................................................................................ 19

BELEN FERNANDEZ, ALJAZEERA ..................................................................................................................... 21

PULKIT MOHAN, SOUTH ASIAN VOICES ......................................................................................................... 23

Slavoj Žižek: Debating whether the Holocaust or colonialism was
worse is obscene… both were unspeakable monstrosities
Slavoj Zizek, Russia Today
I
n the last months, a new
‘historikerstreit’ – a (together with other Western
debate between historians
– has exploded in Europe over
the relative horrors of the
Holocaust and colonialism. In
my opinion, it is an argument
where there can be no winner.
On one side, Achille Mbembe,
Dirk Moses, and some others
argue that distinguishing the
Holocaust from other violent
crimes in human history is
Eurocentric, and neglects the
horror of colonialist crimes.
On the other side, Saul
Friedlander, Juergen
Habermas, and others insist on
the unique character of the
Holocaust. I think that both
sides are, in some sense, right
and wrong. One cannot help
but repeat here Stalin’s
answer to the question of
which deviation is worse,
leftist or rightist: “They are
both worse.”
It is unquestionably true that
the wider public in the
developed West is not fully
aware of the breathtaking
horrors of colonialism and its
by-products. Just remember
the horror of the two Opium
Wars fought by the British
Empire (and others) against
China. Statistics show that,
until 1820, China was the
strongest economy in the
world. From the late 18th
century, the British were
exporting enormous amounts
of opium into China, turning
millions of people there into
addicts and causing great
damage. The Chinese emperor
tried to prevent this,
prohibiting the import of
opium, and the British
forces) intervened militarily.
The result was catastrophic:
soon after, China’s economy
shrank by half. But what
should interest us is the
legitimization of this brutal
military intervention; free
trade is the basis of
civilization, and thus the
Chinese prohibition of
importing opium was a
barbarian threat to
civilization… It’s hard to
refrain from imagining a
similar act today: Mexico and
Colombia acting to defend
their drug cartels and
declaring war on the US for
behaving in a non-civilized
way by preventing free opium
trade.
The colonial list of horrors is
long… very long: Belgian
Congo, regular famines with
millions of dead in British
India, the devastation in both
Americas. The cruel irony is
that, with European
modernization, slavery
reemerged at the very moment
when, in our ideology, the
central topic was freedom –
the fight against the slavery of
women, of workers, of
citizens in authoritarian
regimes. Slavery was
discovered everywhere, in all
metaphorical senses, but
ignored where it existed in its
literal sense.
Colonialism brings out what
can only be designated as the
catastrophe of modernity: the
often terrifying impact of
modernization on pre-modern
communal life. Recall, for
example, the fate of
Attawapiskat, a remote
Aboriginal community in
northern Ontario, which drew
the attention of the media in
early 2016. A report in the
Guardian exemplified the way
the Canadian Aboriginal
people remain a broken
nation, unable to find the
minimal stability of a life
pattern.
“Since autumn there have
been more than 100 suicide
attempts in Attawapiskat,
which has a population of just
2000. The youngest person to
attempt suicide was 11 years
old, the oldest 71. After 11
people tried to take their own
lives on Saturday evening,
exhausted leaders declared a
state of emergency. On
Monday, as officials
scrambled to send crisis
counsellors to the community,
20 people – including a nine-
year-old – were taken to
hospital after they were
overheard making a suicide
pact. ‘We’re crying out for
help,’ said Attawapiskat chief
Bruce Shisheesh. ‘Just about
every night there is a suicide
attempt.’”
In searching for the reasons
for this toll, one should look
beyond the obvious –
overcrowded houses riddled
with mould, drug abuse,
alcoholism, etc. Foremost
among the systemic reasons is
the devastating legacy of the
residential school system
which disrupted continuity
between generations:
“For decades, more than
150,000 Aboriginal children
were carted off in an attempt
to forcibly assimilate them
into Canadian society. Rife
with abuse, the schools aimed
to ‘kill the Indian in the child’,
as documented by a recent
truth commission. Thousands
of children died at these
schools – the absence of
dietary standards in the
schools left many
undernourished and
vulnerable to diseases such as
smallpox, measles and
tuberculosis – with hundreds
of them hastily buried in
unmarked graves next to the
institutions. In nearly a third
of the deaths, the government
and schools did not even
record the names of the
students who had died.”
In the last months, a new
‘historikerstreit’ – a debate
between historians – has
exploded in Europe over the
relative horrors of the
Holocaust and colonialism. In
my opinion, it is an argument
where there can be no winner.
On one side, Achille Mbembe,
Dirk Moses, and some others
argue that distinguishing the
Holocaust from other violent
crimes in human history is
Eurocentric, and neglects the
horror of colonialist crimes.
On the other side, Saul
Friedlander, Juergen
Habermas, and others insist on
the unique character of the
Holocaust. I think that both
sides are, in some sense, right
and wrong. One cannot help
but repeat here Stalin’s
answer to the question of
which deviation is worse,
leftist or rightist: “They are
both worse.”
It is unquestionably true that
the wider public in the
developed West is not fully
aware of the breathtaking
horrors of colonialism and its
by-products. Just remember
the horror of the two Opium
Wars fought by the British
Empire (and others) against
China. Statistics show that,
until 1820, China was the
strongest economy in the
world. From the late 18th
century, the British were
exporting enormous amounts
of opium into China, turning
millions of people there into
addicts and causing great
damage. The Chinese emperor
tried to prevent this,
prohibiting the import of
opium, and the British
(together with other Western
forces) intervened militarily.
The result was catastrophic:
soon after, China’s economy
shrank by half. But what
should interest us is the
legitimization of this brutal
military intervention; free
trade is the basis of
civilization, and thus the
Chinese prohibition of
importing opium was a
barbarian threat to
civilization… It’s hard to
refrain from imagining a
similar act today: Mexico and
Colombia acting to defend
their drug cartels and
declaring war on the US for
behaving in a non-civilized
way by preventing free opium
trade.
The colonial list of horrors is
long… very long: Belgian
Congo, regular famines with
millions of dead in British
India, the devastation in both
Americas. The cruel irony is
that, with European
modernization, slavery
reemerged at the very moment
when, in our ideology, the
central topic was freedom –
the fight against the slavery of
women, of workers, of
citizens in authoritarian
regimes. Slavery was
discovered everywhere, in all
metaphorical senses, but
ignored where it existed in its
literal sense.
Colonialism brings out what
can only be designated as the
catastrophe of modernity: the
often terrifying impact of
modernization on pre-modern
communal life. Recall, for
example, the fate of
Attawapiskat, a remote
Aboriginal community in
northern Ontario, which drew
the attention of the media in
early 2016. A report in the
Guardian exemplified the way
the Canadian Aboriginal
people remain a broken
nation, unable to find the
minimal stability of a life
pattern.
“Since autumn there have
been more than 100 suicide
attempts in Attawapiskat,
which has a population of just
2000. The youngest person to
attempt suicide was 11 years
old, the oldest 71. After 11
people tried to take their own
lives on Saturday evening,
exhausted leaders declared a
state of emergency. On
Monday, as officials
scrambled to send crisis
counsellors to the community,
20 people – including a nine-
year-old – were taken to
hospital after they were
overheard making a suicide
pact. ‘We’re crying out for
help,’ said Attawapiskat chief
Bruce Shisheesh. ‘Just about
every night there is a suicide
attempt.’”
In searching for the reasons
for this toll, one should look
beyond the obvious –
overcrowded houses riddled
with mould, drug abuse,
alcoholism, etc. Foremost
among the systemic reasons is
the devastating legacy of the
residential school system
which disrupted continuity
between generations:
“For decades, more than
150,000 Aboriginal children
were carted off in an attempt
to forcibly assimilate them
into Canadian society. Rife
with abuse, the schools aimed
to ‘kill the Indian in the child’,
as documented by a recent
truth commission. Thousands
of children died at these
schools – the absence of
dietary standards in the
schools left many
undernourished and
vulnerable to diseases such as
smallpox, measles and
tuberculosis – with hundreds
of them hastily buried in
unmarked graves next to the
institutions. In nearly a third
of the deaths, the government
and schools did not even
record the names of the
students who had died.”
No wonder, then, that we are
slowly learning the true story
of the residential schools – we
now regularly get news like
the following, reported by
CBS in June: “A Canadian
Indigenous group said
Wednesday that a search
using ground-penetrating
radar has found 182 human
remains in unmarked graves at
a site near a former Catholic
Church-run residential school
that housed Indigenous
children taken from their
families.”
To this, we should add
massive sexual exploitation in
residential schools run by the
Church – in some cases, up to
80% of the children were
abused. What adds insult to
injury is that the very
institution which pretends to
embody morality performs
such crimes, as has been found
to also be the case in France.
As CNN reported this week,
“Members of the Catholic
clergy in France sexually
abused an estimated 216,000
minors over the past seven
decades, according to a
damning report … that said
the Church had prioritized the
protection of the institution
over victims who were urged
to stay silent.” The truly
shocking aspect here is that,
since many of these crimes
concern paedophilic
homosexuality, the very
institution responsible for
them is the same institution
which presents itself as the
harbinger of morality and
leads the public campaign
against homosexuality. And
the sad thing is that there is no
return to pre-modern
normality: it is easy to
discover in pre-modern
societies what appears to our
modern sensitivity as brutal
abuses of human rights, of the
rights of women and children
etc.
While admitting all this, the
other side emphasizes the
uniqueness of the Holocaust:
its goal was not just the
submission of the Jews but
their total annihilation, in a
well-planned, modern
industrial way. Jews were not
a lower race in a hierarchy of
races, they were seen as the
absolute Other, the principle
of corruption embodied. They
were not an external threat,
they were – to use the
neologism of Jacques Lacan –
ex-timate, a foreign intruder in
the very heart of our
civilization. That’s why they
have to be annihilated, the
thinking goes, if one wants to
re-establish the proper order
of civilizations.
But here comes my first
hesitation: years ago, Etienne
Balibar pointed out that, in
today’s global world, the
distinction between inner and
external gets blurred, which is
why all racisms more and
more resemble anti-Semitism.
Half a century ago, Huey
Newton, the founder and
theorist of the Black Panther
Party, saw clearly the
limitation of local – or
national – resistance to the
global reign of capital. He
even made a key step further
and rejected the term
“decolonization” as
inappropriate – one cannot
fight global capitalism from
the position of national
unities.
Here are his statements from a
unique dialogue with the
Freudian psychoanalyst Erik
Erikson from the 1973 book
‘In Search of Common
Ground’. “We in the Black
Panther Party saw that the
United States was no longer a
nation. It was something else;
it was more than a nation. It
had not only expanded its
territorial boundaries, but it
had expanded all of its
controls as well. We called it
an empire. We believe that
there are no more colonies or
neocolonies. If a people is
colonized, it must be possible
for them to decolonize and
become what they formerly
were."
“But what happens when the
raw materials are extracted
and labor is exploited within a
territory dispersed over the
entire globe? When the riches
of the whole earth are depleted
and used to feed a gigantic
industrial machine in the
imperialists’ home? Then the
people and the economy are so
integrated into the imperialist
empire that it’s impossible to
‘decolonize,’ to return to the
former conditions of
existence. If colonies cannot
‘decolonize’ and return to
their original existence as
nations, then nations no longer
exist. Nor, we believe, will
they ever exist again.”
Is this not our predicament
today, much more than in
Newton’s time? Furthermore,
the difference between
justified critique of Israel and
anti-Semitism is very
ambiguous and open to
manipulation. Bernard Henri-
Levy claimed that the anti-
Semitism of the 21st century
would be “progressive” or
there would be none. Brought
to the end, this thesis compels
us to turn around the old
Marxist interpretation of anti-
Semitism as a mystified or
displaced anti-capitalism
(instead of blaming the
capitalist system, the rage is
focused on a specific ethnic
group accused of corrupting
the system). For Henri-Levy
and his partisans, today’s anti-
capitalism is a disguised form
of anti-Semitism. Can one
imagine a more dangerous
way of inciting anti-Semitism
among today’s critics of
capitalism?
But what we are witnessing
today is a weird reversal: not
an anti-Semitic critique of
Israel, but anti-Semitic
support of Israel. Some
rightist anti-Semites support
the State of Israel for three
obvious reasons: if Jews go to
Israel, there will be fewer
Jews here in the West; in
Israel, Jews will no longer be
a homeless foreign group
whom we cannot fully trust,
they will become a normal
nation-state grounded in their
earth; and, last but not least,
they will function there as
representatives of highly
developed Western values
against the oriental barbarism
– in short, with regard to the
local Palestinian population,
they will do the work of
colonization. In order to get
the support of Western states,
Zionists themselves
sometimes presented
themselves as colonizers.
Derek Penslar, a former
professor of Israel studies at
Oxford University, points out
there are multiple – careful about dismissing every
sometimes contradictory –
ideological and political
issues embedded within
Zionism and Israel: “The
Zionist project combines
colonialism, anti-colonialism,
and postcolonial state-
building. The entire twentieth
century, wrapped up in one
small state.”
In 1896, Theodor Herzl wrote
in Der Judenstaat, the
founding text of Zionism:
“For Europe, we will build
there (in Palestine) a part of
the wall against Asia, we will
provide ramparts against
barbarism.” Even the term
“colonization” was used by
early Zionists. Unfortunately,
this stance rhymes strangely
with a series of anti-Semites,
from Reinhard Heydrich to
Anders Breivik and Donald
Trump. While Trump
recognized Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel, some of his
supporters are openly anti-
Semitic – but is this really an
inconsistent stance? I often
reflect on a caricature
published back in July 2008 in
the Viennese daily Die Presse:
two stocky Nazi-looking
Austrians sit at a table, one of
them holding in his hands a
newspaper and commenting to
his friend: “Here you can see
again how a totally justified
anti-Semitism is being
misused for a cheap critique of
Israel!” This caricature turns
around the standard argument
against the critics of the
policies of the State of Israel,
and when today’s Christian
fundamentalist supporters of
Israeli politics reject leftist
critiques of Israeli policies, is
their implicit line of
argumentation not uncannily
close to its reasoning?
Remember Anders Breivik,
the Norwegian anti-immigrant
mass murderer: he was anti-
Semitic, but pro-Israel, since
he saw in the State of Israel
the first line of defense against
the Muslim expansion. He
even wants to see the
Jerusalem Temple rebuilt, but
he wrote in his ‘Manifesto’:
“There is no Jewish problem
in Western Europe (with the
exception of the UK and
France) as we only have 1
million in Western Europe,
whereas 800 000 out of these
1 million live in France and
the UK. The US on the other
hand, with more than 6 million
Jews (600% more than
Europe) actually has a
considerable Jewish
problem.” His figure thus
realizes the ultimate paradox
of the Zionist anti-Semite –
and we find the traces of this
weird stance more often than
one would expect. Reinhard
Heydrich himself, the
mastermind of the Holocaust,
is quoted in ‘The Order of the
Death’s Head: The Story of
Hitler’s SS’, as writing in
1935, “We must separate the
Jews into two categories, the
Zionists and the partisans of
assimilation. The Zionists
profess a strictly racial
concept and, through
emigration to Palestine, they
help to build their own Jewish
State… our good wishes and
our official goodwill go with
them.”
The clear division between the
uniqueness of Jews and
European colonialism thus
gets complicated: Zionists
themselves flirted with
colonialism to gain support in
the West, and anti-colonial
struggle itself sometimes gets
dangerously close to anti-
Semitism. Enough is being
written about anti-Semitism in
Arab countries and among
Muslims – although I support
Palestinian resistance on the
West Bank, I am fully aware
of this fact. One should also be
call to throw the Muslims out
of one’s country as a case of
racist Islamophobia. In
Slovenia, my own country,
many of the surviving folk
songs talk about the horrors
inflicted by Turkish invasions,
and throwing the Turks out
seems to me a quite legitimate
endeavor.
For all these reasons, I think
the entire debate about the
Holocaust versus colonialism
should be rejected as
something profoundly
obscene. The Holocaust was a
unique, terrifying, mega-
crime; colonialism caused an
unimaginable amount of death
and suffering. The only
correct way to approach these
two horrors is to see the fights
against anti-Semitism and
against colonialism as two
aspects of one and the same
struggle. Those who dismiss
colonialism as a lesser evil are
an insult to the victims of the
Holocaust themselves,
reducing an unheard-of horror
into a bargaining chip for
geopolitical games. Those
who relativize the uniqueness
of the Holocaust are an insult
to the victims of colonization
themselves. The Holocaust is
not one in a series of crimes –
it was unique in its own way,
in the same way that modern
colonization was a unique
breathtaking horror done on
behalf of civilizing others.
They are all incomparable
monstrosities that cannot and
should not be reduced to mere
examples.
 A Chance to Preserve the World They Made
Chad P. Bown & Cecilia Malmström, Foreign Affairs
O
n their face,
transatlantic relations
over trade,
investment, and technology
seem sturdy. The United
States and the European
Union are among each other’s
largest trading partners, as
well as the largest source and
destination for their
companies’ foreign
investments. Decades of
policy cooperation have
resulted in remarkable
economic interdependence,
job growth, and expanding
investment.
Take, for example, the
successful rollout of COVID-
19 vaccines on either side of
the Atlantic. Hundreds of
millions of Americans have
received doses of the Pfizer-
BioNTech jab, a vaccine
based on European innovation
and made at Pfizer’s plants in
Massachusetts, Michigan, and
Missouri; a similar number of
Europeans have received the
same vaccine made at Pfizer’s
facility in Belgium.
Moderna’s messenger RNA
(mRNA) vaccine was
invented in the United States;
it is also being bottled for
distribution in plants in France
and Spain and has become
increasingly essential for the
EU’s response to the
coronavirus pandemic. The
Johnson & Johnson vaccine
was co-developed at the
Janssen R & D lab in the
Netherlands and a hospital in
Boston and is also produced
on both sides of the ocean.
Unfortunately, the success
stories of interdependence
don’t get the same attention as
the friction. The imperatives
of domestic politics encourage
leaders to assail foreign
targets and dwell on
asymmetries. European
officials bristle at the actions
of U.S. technology giants
Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google (there are no
comparable European
companies), while their U.S.
counterparts worry that
Americans are buying too
many German cars and that
Europe refuses to accept
genetically modified farm
products from the Midwest.
The inordinate focus on such
bilateral irritants has had
damaging consequences. The
United States and the EU have
ignored the decline in their
combined influence over
global trade. The two made up
over 50 percent of global
exports in 1990; by 2020, that
had fallen to roughly 40
percent. Such a decline need
not be a bad thing, except that
it largely reflects the growing
economic power of China,
which does not share their
transparent, rules-based,
nondiscriminatory, and
market-oriented approach to
international commerce.
Beijing’s increasingly opaque,
nonmarket, and economically
coercive style is mounting a
challenge to the trading
system and multilateral order
that the United States and
Europe developed together
over the last 75 years.
This concern should motivate
Americans and Europeans to
get out of their own way. In
late September, U.S. and
European Union officials met
in Pittsburgh to try to patch up
their differences on trade.
Four years of Trump
administration policy had left
ties strained and in need of
restoration. Both the
administration of U.S.
President Joe Biden and the
European Commission under
its current president, Ursula
von der Leyen, hope to rebuild
transatlantic cooperation in
areas as varied as climate
change, digital
transformation, workers,
technology, supply chain
resilience, and human rights,
all under the rubric of trade.
But as the uncertain outcome
of the Pittsburgh summit
suggests, strengthening
transatlantic ties in the age of
an assertive China could be
the most difficult trade task
these two longtime
collaborators have ever taken
on.
TROUBLED WATERS
The recent struggles in U.S.-
EU trade go back at least as far
as the second term of the
Obama administration. At the
time, the United States and the
EU attempted to circumvent
an insurmountable impasse in
global talks under the auspices
of the World Trade
Organization. In early 2013,
they launched the ambitious
bilateral initiative known as
the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership.
The TTIP aimed not just to
strengthen transatlantic trade
ties but also to encourage
greater foreign direct
investment and regulatory
cooperation. But it foundered
in the rocky shoals of politics.
The revelations in 2013 that
the United States had
allegedly been spying on
German Chancellor Angela
Merkel had devastating
consequences for U.S.
relations with Germany, a
necessary trade advocate.
Separately, European civil
society quickly mobilized
against the TTIP itself.
Hundreds of thousands of
protesters took to the streets of
Berlin and other European
capitals, stoking fears that
giant U.S. corporations would
use the agreement to gut
Europe’s hard-fought
consumer and environmental
protections. Negotiations
never reached the finish line,
and the deal died quietly under
its own weight.
The United States and the EU
have ignored the decline in
their combined influence over
global trade.
Transatlantic trade relations
deteriorated further under the
administration of President
Donald Trump. Its “America
first” policies prioritized
attacking partners with whom
the United States “suffered”
bilateral trade deficits. Less
than 100 days into his
administration, Trump kicked
off an investigation into steel
imports under a Korean War–
era law that allowed the
government to impose import
tariffs in the name of
defending national security.
NATO allies warned
Washington of the
consequences of such a move,
but Trump nevertheless
imposed duties on European
steel and aluminum in June
2018. (Brussels immediately
retaliated, as promised.) The
tariffs in and of themselves
were not new—European
companies had dealt with U.S.
steel protections for
decades—but their imposition
under a national security law
rankled the Europeans. How
could Washington treat its
NATO allies as security threaten tariffs in response to
threats? France’s imposition of a
digital services tax on U.S.
Trump quickly used the same
technology firms in December
law to threaten even more
2019. The Europeans
duties on billions of dollars of
suddenly felt the need for
BMWs, Mercedes-Benzes,
protection not just from the
and Volkswagens. In July,
likes of China and Russia—
tensions reached such a pitch
but also from the United
that European Commission
States.
President Jean-Claude
Juncker rushed to A FRESH START?
Washington, and both parties
Trump’s defeat in the
agreed to launch negotiations
November 2020 U.S. election
over what could have turned
offered a fresh start. Brussels
into another one of Trump’s
quickly sought to capitalize on
minor trade deals. The EU
Joe Biden’s campaign pledge
also promised to buy more
to “work with allies.” In early
American soybeans and
December, the EU offered up
liquefied natural gas, allowing
a new and detailed blueprint
Trump to claim a political
for transatlantic trade and
victory. But by the time his
technology cooperation that
administration got around to
also signaled it was coming
asking Congress for formal
around on some of
permission to negotiate with
Washington’s key concerns,
Brussels, it was clear these
including those regarding
talks would go nowhere.
China.
Congress wanted the
negotiations to include But then Brussels
European restrictions on U.S. miscalculated. Later that
farm exports, but the month, the European
commission had no mandate Commission surprised the
from member states to world by announcing a
negotiate over agriculture, let bilateral investment
alone the political appetite to agreement with Beijing. The
engage with Trump. There Biden team—now in
were talks for almost a year, transition mode and unable to
but nothing was agreed apart speak directly to their
from a very modest deal to European counterparts until it
abolish tariffs on lobsters and assumed power on January
ceramics. 20—was left furious. All that
Jake Sullivan, Biden’s choice
The Trump administration
for national security adviser,
also hurt EU and U.S. interests
could do was tweet, and the
by dismantling the World
Americans were left
Trade Organization’s system
wondering: Was Europe a
for resolving disputes by
willing partner after all?
refusing to appoint arbitrators
to a key appeals body. Since Americans were left
the mid-1990s, Brussels and wondering: Was Europe a
Washington had leaned willing partner after all?
heavily on the WTO to
To be sure, there have been
manage their bilateral trade
some positive signs since
tensions. Brussels decided it
Biden assumed office. In
had had enough when the
March, the United States and
Trump administration went
the EU implemented
around the WTO process for
coordinated sanctions over
the first time in decades to
China’s alleged human rights
abuses in Xinjiang. Janet
Yellen, Biden’s choice for
Treasury secretary, has
shepherded discussions
surrounding global corporate
tax reform to wide applause in
many European capitals. (The
progress on this front has
allowed the United States to
back off from imposing
retaliatory tariffs on European
digital services taxes.) The
two sides also decided to settle
the decades-long rancor over
their respective subsidies to
aeronautics firms Boeing and
Airbus. Finally, Brussels
delayed imposing a scheduled
round of retaliatory tariffs
against Trump’s steel tariffs
until December, with recent
reports suggesting a more
durable negotiated settlement
to the problem may be in the
offing.
But the biggest boost was the
announcement made during
Biden’s June visit to Europe
of a summit that would
establish the U.S.-EU Trade
and Technology Council, or
TTC. This council would
serve as the means to launch a
new era of transatlantic policy
cooperation.
THE PITTSBURGH
SUMMIT
The TTC remains inchoate
even after the recent summit
in Pittsburgh, but both sides
agree that it will not be a
rehash of the failed Obama-
era TTIP. Officials steered
clear of controversial topics,
such as investor-state dispute
settlement—the controversial
special court proposed in the
TTIP that sparked protests
across Europe—the United
States’ genetically modified
foods, or even tariff
reductions. Instead, they were
intent on prioritizing new and
immediate areas for
collaboration. Ten working
groups covered a range of
important topics, including
artificial intelligence, 5G, and
pharmaceutical supply chains.
One area of particular concern
to both sides is the current
global shortage of
semiconductors, which has
badly affected automobile
industries. The United States
and the EU are both now
attempting to direct tens of
billions of dollars to boost
domestic production of these
chips to better compete with
the likes of South Korea and
Taiwan, as well as with China,
which is also ramping up
funding of this sector. The
United States and the EU
agreed to coordinate their
semiconductor subsidies so
that they don’t simply drive up
the bill for American and
European taxpayers by
chasing the same firms and
segments of the market.
The United States would do
well to heed the European
view that obsession with
China will lead to policy
mistakes.
On artificial intelligence, the
United States and the EU
committed to work together to
develop guardrails that
promote innovation but also
make sure the technology is
used responsibly, with respect
for shared values and human
rights. But this agreement
went only so far. Both sides
may be concerned that
authoritarian regimes might
abuse artificial intelligence by
using it for unlawful
surveillance and “social
scoring” of individuals, but
they are yet to agree to any
sort of joint framework or
common standards to regulate
the technology. The risk is that
these discussions about
artificial intelligence turn into
exchanges of ideas bereft of
any concrete commitments,
even as both the United States
and the EU fall behind a China
that has made significant
investments in the field.
Trade ties will also need to
accommodate climate policy
now that the Biden
administration has rejoined
the Paris agreement. Brussels
rolled out a carbon border
adjustment mechanism in July
that would tax foreign exports
of carbon-intensive products
from countries that
themselves do not implement
a domestic carbon tax. This
current proposal could hurt
U.S. exports to Europe,
simply because the United
States may choose to reach its
climate objectives through a
mix of regulations and
subsidies and not through
carbon taxation. U.S. and EU
officials can use the new trade
council to better understand
and support each other’s
approaches to meeting their
overall carbon-reduction
targets and not let minor
differences in strategy
mushroom into trade
conflicts.
A FLEXIBLE
RELATIONSHIP
The Pittsburgh summit did not
produce many immediate
results, but that was to be
expected. The two sides did
commit to set up routine
meetings for ministers and a
framework for staff to tackle
issues before they escalate
into larger political problems.
Policy mistakes happen in the
absence of communication.
During the Trump
administration, senior U.S.
officials were so fixated on the
trade war with China that they
often stood up visiting EU
trade delegations. As a
refreshing contrast, Katherine
Tai, Biden’s U.S. trade
representative, has famously
emphasized the need for U.S.
policymakers “to walk, chew
gum, and play chess at the
same time.”
China did come up in
Pittsburgh, of course, albeit
obliquely. The 6,000-word
joint statement released after
the summit was largely about
China but did not mention the
country once. Brussels had
been worried the council
would turn into an
unproductive, China-bashing
exercise, simply another plank
of the U.S. trade war. For its
part, Washington had been
concerned that the EU may
still be refusing to treat
seriously the threat posed by
China. The United States
would do well to heed the
European view that obsession
with China will lead to policy
mistakes. Many European
countries have navigated the
pitfalls of state-centered
capitalism; European
policymakers may have a
finer sense of which Chinese
policies will be better off left
to fail on their own rather than
provoke overreaction in
Washington and Brussels to
the detriment of the
transatlantic alliance.
The United States and Europe
will not always see eye to eye.
Tensions in other areas flared
after the June announcement
of the TTC, with transatlantic
disagreements over the
handling of the U.S. pullout
from Afghanistan, travel
restrictions due to the
pandemic, and the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, which
brings Russian gas to
Germany. A September spat
between Washington and
Paris over the United States’
submarine deal with Australia
nearly scuttled the Pittsburgh
meeting altogether. The
council needs to become a
flexible institution that can
manage these sorts of
transatlantic strains. In so
doing, it can provide the
United States and the EU with
the impetus to collaborate on
shared global challenges that
neither can tackle alone.
 How Pakistan Sees Afghanistan
Moeed Yusuf, Foreign Affairs
R
esident Joe Biden was
right to end the U.S.
military mission in
Afghanistan. The regime in
Kabul was clearly unable to
sustain itself, and propping it
up with billions more dollars
would have only delayed its
inevitable collapse. In fact,
given the Afghan society’s
historical aversion to foreign
occupations, there was never
going to be a military solution
to the conflict that was in the
United States’ favor. That is
why Pakistan had been
advocating for an inclusive
diplomatic settlement ever
since the negotiations known
as the “Bonn process” began
following the U.S. invasion in
2001.
Today, Afghanistan faces a
choice: it can either walk the
arduous path of peace or
revert to civil unrest. The
latter will have catastrophic
repercussions for the Afghan
people and spillover effects
for the neighborhood and
beyond. The spread of
refugees, drugs, weapons, and
transnational terrorism from a
destabilized Afghanistan does
not serve the interests of the
Afghan people or the rest of
the world, most of all
Pakistan. Which of the two
outcomes materializes will
have as much to do with how
the international community
engages with Afghanistan’s
new political reality as it does
with how the Taliban choose
to rule their country.
WHAT PAKISTAN WENT
THROUGH
Apart from the Afghan
people, Pakistan has been the
greatest victim of the wars in
Afghanistan. The Soviet
invasion in 1979 and the
subsequent U.S.-led military
campaign after 9/11 were not
of Pakistan’s making. Yet our
society, polity, and economy
have borne the brunt of the
conflict over the last four
decades.
In 2001, Pakistan joined the
U.S. war on terrorism against
the very same actors who were
hailed as freedom fighters
when Washington and
Islamabad together trained
and backed them to defeat the
Soviets in the 1980s. After the
9/11 attacks, American
leaders issued an ultimatum to
Pakistan’s military dictator,
General Pervez Musharraf,
that he was either “with us or
against us.” Under pressure,
Musharraf provided the
United States and its partners
with virtually unconditional
support, including access to
Pakistan’s air bases and
ground and air supply routes,
and helped arrest hundreds of
members of al Qaeda.
Musharraf’s post-9/11
decision to launch an internal
military campaign against
Afghanistan’s erstwhile
freedom fighters, many of
whom had deep cultural and
ethnic affiliations with
tribesmen in the Pakistani-
Afghan border regions,
resulted in a massive
insurgency against the
Pakistani state. Over 50
militant groups sprang up,
seeking to punish Pakistan for
collaborating with the United
States. They targeted our
cities and massacred our
children; 3.5 million civilians
were displaced from their
homes at the height of this
onslaught. In the last 20 years,
Pakistan has suffered over
80,000 casualties as a result of
terrorist attacks and over $150
billion in economic losses.
The cost of providing for
Afghan civilians fleeing war
in their home country has also
largely fallen on Pakistan. We
host approximately four
million Afghan refugees even
today; this is down from a
peak of well over five million
in the 1980s. Furthermore,
Afghanistan’s chaos brought a
“Kalashnikov culture” and
narcotrafficking to Pakistan:
our country’s addiction rates
rose nearly 50 times during
the 1980s.
Apart from the Afghan
people, Pakistan has been the
greatest victim of the wars in
Afghanistan.
Yet Western governments
continued to accuse the
Pakistani state of being
duplicitous and asked us to
“do more” to turn the tide of
the war in Afghanistan. Given
the sacrifices Pakistan was
making on a daily basis,
Pakistanis found the Western
stance preposterous—they
believed we could do no more
without risking our very
survival as a modern nation-
state.
This disconnect colored the
Pakistani-U.S. partnership for
the better part of the last two
decades. At its core, the divide
stemmed from a divergence of
views on how to end the war
and bring peace to
Afghanistan. The United
States’ solution was to
achieve a total victory over the
Taliban. Even when
Washington began
considering negotiations with
the group, many American
officials saw it as a means of
creating internal fractures
within the Taliban rather than
negotiating an evenhanded
deal.
The Pakistani government
spoke hard truths to the United
States about the folly of its
plans. Our position was driven
by our deep understanding of
the local context and the
antipathy among Afghans
regarding the foreign
occupation of their country,
which made it impossible for
them to see the post-9/11
nation-building enterprise as
indigenous. As early as 2002,
Pakistan urged the United
States and its NATO allies to
recognize that al Qaeda had
been dealt a severe blow and
that, even as the Western
powers continued their
mission against international
terrorist groups, they needed
to recognize that the Taliban
were a political reality in
Afghanistan. A decade ago,
when U.S. troop numbers
were at their peak, Pakistan
counseled using this leverage
to negotiate an acceptable
political settlement to the war.
Washington ignored this
advice, and talks never
became the principal pillar of
U.S. strategy.
Many Western governments
turned a blind eye to their and
the Afghan government’s
failures, which were helping
resuscitate the Taliban.
Nevertheless, Pakistan
engaged with the government
in Kabul with sincerity of
purpose. For instance, in
response to complaints from
the U.S. and Afghan
governments that Taliban
fighters were able to cross the
Afghan-Pakistani border
freely and find sanctuary in
our country, Pakistan
repeatedly offered the most
logical solution: coordinated
border management and
visibility. Our proposals
ranged from formal standard
operating procedures and
military liaisons for border
management, fencing the
entire border, and working
together to block more than 60
informal border crossings to
installing biometric controls
to keep track of all cross-
border movement. Pakistan
later advocated a formal visa
regime, moving away from
the thousands of daily
informal crossings that are
customary for tribes and
families who have members
on both sides of the border or
livelihoods that transcend the
border.
All of Pakistan’s requests
were turned down, ignored, or
actively resisted. For instance,
as early as 2007, Afghan
authorities physically tore
down border biometric
systems that Pakistan was
installing; the flimsy pretext
given was that Afghanistan
did not recognize the
international border and was
therefore opposed to physical
controls.
We have lost much in blood
and treasure to support the war
next door.
It stands to reason that if the
porousness of the border was
really the Afghan
government’s chief concern, it
would have moved swiftly to
help Pakistan monitor it
effectively. The reason this
did not happen was because—
as the collapse of the
government of former
President Ashraf Ghani has
now proved—Kabul knew
that the real reasons it was
losing ground to the Taliban
were its own governance
failures, its massive
corruption, and the
consequent lack of credibility
of the post-9/11 Afghan state
structure in the eyes of the
average Afghan. The
government in Kabul was
unwilling or unable to fix
these internal failures, so it
shifted attention and blame
onto Pakistan. This also suited
countries that were pouring
billions of dollars into
Afghanistan with little to
show for it in terms of
defeating the Taliban.
The focus on the border also
masked the reality that
terrorists based in Afghanistan
were collaborating with our
archrival, India, and with
elements in the Afghan
intelligence services to
regularly carry out attacks
inside Pakistan. As Pakistan
publicly detailed in a report
released last year, India ran as
many as 66 training camps in
Afghanistan for groups such
as the Pakistani Taliban and
other militant organizations
active in our western province
of Baluchistan. With Indian
support, these groups
conducted targeted killings
across Pakistan and high-
profile attacks on Pakistan’s
largest stock exchange, a
major university, and a luxury
hotel in the port city of
Gwadar, among many others.
Simultaneously, India worked
to taint Pakistan’s reputation
through an orchestrated
propaganda campaign, using
fake news networks to
perpetuate a diversionary
narrative that sought to blame
Pakistan for Afghanistan’s
failings.
Meanwhile, the United States
kept pressing for Pakistan to
further escalate its own
military campaign against the
Afghan Taliban. The truth,
however, is that the group had
no organized presence in
Pakistan and military action
against a few dispersed
individuals—who may from
time to time have managed to
melt away among the
thousands of Afghan
refugees—would not have
changed the outcome in
Afghanistan but would have
left thousands more Pakistanis
martyred. An escalation was
therefore unacceptable to us,
as we repeatedly conveyed to
the United States for over a
decade. Our alternative of
leading with a political
dialogue that would have
forced all sides to
compromise, supplemented
by military and other tools as
needed, would have produced
a naturally inclusive
government while ending the
conflict years earlier. And yet
every time we raised this, we
were seen as insincere.
The rapid collapse of Ghani’s
administration has left no
doubt that the government’s
failures were not of Pakistan’s
making. Corruption, bad
governance, the refusal of
Afghans to stand behind their
government and state, and the
choice of the 300,000-strong
Afghan National Security
Forces not to fight against a
lightly armed insurgency lie at
the heart of the return of the
Taliban. Shockingly, some
voices in Washington and
other Western capitals
continue to scapegoat
Pakistan for this failure. But
blaming Pakistan is not only
factually incorrect—it also
undermines the spirit of
international cooperation
necessary to end the cycle of
violence that has devastated
Afghanistan.
THE WAY FORWARD
Afghanistan deserves peace
and prosperity, and a blame
game among international
actors will not get us there.
Nor will a repeat of the
mistakes of the 1990s, when
the United States abandoned
Afghanistan and sanctioned
Pakistan, its close ally
throughout the 1980s, once
the Soviets had been driven
from Kabul. This isolated the
region as international
assistance and attention
disappeared, placed
Afghanistan on a path to civil
war and economic meltdown,
and strengthened international
terrorist outfits—eventually
culminating in the 9/11
attacks. Although ordinary
Afghans and Pakistanis will
always face the greatest risks
from instability inside
Afghanistan, mass migration
flows and terrorism threaten
the entire world. It is therefore
in every country’s interest to
prevent history from repeating
itself.
The prudent way forward is
for the international
community to engage
constructively with the new
government in Kabul. The
goal must be to create the
conditions for Afghan
civilians to earn a respectable
livelihood and to live in peace.
This will require the
international community,
especially the countries that
were present in Afghanistan
for two decades, to play a
positive role in leveraging its
influence to further the cause
of peace and stability.
Pakistan has been at the
forefront of international
humanitarian efforts since the
fall of Kabul. It has helped
evacuate approximately
20,000 foreign citizens and
Afghans from the country and
has created an air and land
bridge to channel emergency
supplies to the country. These
efforts are important, but
diplomatic engagement with
Afghanistan must go much
further. Afghanistan does not
have the resources or the
institutional capacity to stave
off economic disaster on its
own. In order to ensure a
durable peace, the
international community must
determine the means through
which development assistance
can be provided while
ensuring that its concerns
about the situation in the
country are addressed. But
given the precarious
humanitarian and economic
situation in Afghanistan, time
is of the essence. A wait-and-
see approach, although more
politically tenable for many
countries, would be
tantamount to abandonment.
Many Western governments
turned a blind eye to their and
the Afghan government’s
failures.
Pakistan’s expectations of the
new government are no
different than those of
Western governments:
Pakistan wants a state that is
inclusive, respects the rights
of all Afghans, and ensures
that Afghan soil is not used for
terrorism against any country.
Unlike in the 1990s, the
Taliban have repeatedly stated
their interest in continued
engagement with the world.
This is an opportunity for the
international community. The
leverage generated through
assistance and the legitimacy
the Taliban will derive from it
can be used to secure inclusive
governance from the new
administration.
Over the past month, Pakistan
has led diplomatic initiatives
with Afghanistan’s immediate
neighbors and other countries
in the region to discuss the
way forward. We will
continue these efforts.
However, Western diplomacy
needs to be better connected
with regional initiatives to
forge a common agenda for
engagement and decide on the
multilateral and bilateral
avenues available to channel
assistance. A starting point
could be a major donor
conference where regional
players and Western countries
sit down together and draw up
specific plans for
humanitarian and economic
relief. An understanding is
also required on the terms of
the release of the Afghan
central bank’s reserves, most
of which are held by the
United States. Such a forum
could also be used to
encourage countries that have
unfinished development
projects in Afghanistan to
consider completing them for
the benefit of the Afghan
people.
A coordinated global
approach will reduce the risks
of international divisions over
how best to engage the
Taliban. Although it is
important to remain realistic
about what is achievable in the
present context, this approach
will improve the prospects for
an outcome that benefits the
average Afghan and is
acceptable to the international
community.
As Pakistan’s national
security adviser, my job is to
advocate policy options that
will protect my country. The
position I have articulated
here is informed by the
fundamental reality that for
Pakistan, disengaging from
Afghanistan is not an option.
The two countries share a
more than 1,600-mile border
and cultural links that stretch
back centuries. These
geographical and societal
connections compel Pakistan
to advocate for peace in
Afghanistan, as instability
there risks spilling over into
our country. The Pakistani
Taliban, the Islamic State, and
other anti-Pakistani groups in
Afghanistan cannot be
allowed to harm Pakistan. Nor
are we in a position to accept
more Afghan refugees, who
will inevitably be driven onto
our soil by another spasm of
violence in their home
country.
Afghanistan deserves peace
and prosperity, and a blame
game among international
actors will not get us there.We
are also acutely sensitive to
the fact that the livelihoods of
millions of Afghans are linked
to Pakistan. Being landlocked,
Afghanistan depends on
Pakistan for trade and transit.
The country’s geographical
position could become an
advantage if it transforms
itself into a transit hub that
connects Central Asia to
Pakistan’s warm waters. The
Ghani government had stalled
these possibilities, snubbing
Pakistan’s offers of more
streamlined trade and
economic cooperation and the
fast-tracking of connectivity
projects with Central Asia.
Such connectivity is not only
key to Pakistan’s
geoeconomic vision; it also
corresponds with the U.S.-led
regional vision of establishing
economic linkages among
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Uzbekistan. Multiple
connectivity projects are
already underway, including
plans to establish energy and
electricity inflows from
Central Asia, a trans-
Afghanistan rail project from
Uzbekistan, and projects to
upgrade the road
infrastructure to create a
viable corridor of
connectivity. U.S. and other
international and regional
investments in energy,
minerals, and infrastructure
could potentially herald a new
era of cooperation in the
region and buttress peace
efforts.
While Pakistan can and will
assist in pushing Afghanistan
in a positive direction, it alone
cannot guarantee the
outcomes we all desire.
Pakistan does not wield any
extraordinary influence over
the new rulers in Kabul, as
both monetary assistance and
legitimacy for the Taliban can
come (or not) only from the
world’s major powers.
Coordinated engagement
involving the Western
powers, China, Russia,
Middle Eastern countries, and
Afghanistan’s immediate
neighbors, however, would
maximize the chances of
realizing our common
objectives in Afghanistan.
A LASTING PEACE
Pakistan is committed to
peace in Afghanistan and in
the region. We have lost much
in blood and treasure to
support the war next door and
have repeatedly demonstrated
our commitment to ensuring
our neighbor’s stability and
economic prosperity. We
worked with the United States
to facilitate the peace process
in Afghanistan, confronted the
menace of terrorism at home,
hosted millions of Afghans for
over four decades, and
pursued a policy of strategic
restraint despite aggressive
provocations from spoilers
such as India. Today, Pakistan
is seeking to foster economic
interdependence through
regional connectivity and
development partnerships
while settling political
disputes amicably.
Afghanistan could serve as a
model for this regional vision,
but the international
community must also play its
part. By engaging with the
new Afghan authorities now,
the United States and other
global powers can avert a
humanitarian crisis, help
Afghans live in peace, and
ensure that the threat of
terrorism emanating from
Afghan soil is ended once and
for all. This is not only their
collective responsibility; it is environment possible to push
also in their self-interest. them in a healthy direction—
for the collective benefit of
Of course, the new Taliban
Afghans and the world.
authorities will ultimately
Failure to do so will leave
have to prove that they intend
Pakistan to bear the brunt of
to govern Afghanistan in a
any negative spillover from
more inclusive manner.
Afghanistan. We have already
However, history will judge
carried more than our share of
us very poorly if we do not
the burden.
create the most conducive
 Taiwan and the UN: On the Outside Looking in
O
n October 25, 1971,
the 26th Session of
the General Assembly
of the United Nations adopted
Resolution 2758 by a vote of
76 to 35 (with 17 states
abstaining). In that resolution,
the U.N. decided:
...to restore all its rights to the
People’s Republic of China
[PRC] and to recognize the
representatives of
Government as the only
legitimate representatives of
China to the United Nations,
and to expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-
shek from the place which
they unlawfully occupied at
the United Nations and it all
the organizations related to it.
With that, the Republic of
China (ROC) government on
Taiwan, then led by Chiang,
was kicked out of the U.N.
seat it had occupied since the
body’s founding. With a roar
of cheering from the PRC’s
supporters, Taiwan was shut
out of the United Nations and
all its constituent bodies.
In our cover story, Rosemary
Foot describes how Beijing’s
approach to the U.N. has
evolved in the 50 years since
that historic vote. I’ll take up
the inverse question: How the
ROC lost its U.N.
representation and its many
attempts to work its way back
in.
Taiwan’s U.N. Banishment
Taiwan didn’t leave the U.N.
without a fight. ROC Foreign
Minister Chou Shu-kai, who
led his government’s
delegation to that pivotal
UNGA session in October
1971, argued that “my country
Shannon Tiezzi, Diplomat
had earned its place in the
United Nations by virtue of its
contribution to peace and
freedom during the Second
World War.” He also accused
the “Chinese communist
regime” of having “negated
all the basic [U.N.] Charter
principles” and warned that
Beijing’s “interest in the
United Nations stemmed
primarily from a desire to
its
broaden the scope of its
aggressive activity and to
transform the organization
into an instrument of its own
policy” (both complaints, as
Foot notes in our cover story,
that continue to be voiced
today).
To admit the PRC, Chou said,
“would be a tragic and
irreparable mistake” that
“could wreck the United
Nations.”
Despite Chou’s passionate
plea, by October 1971 the
writing was on the wall: The
PRC was joining the United
Nations. Henry Kissinger,
U.S. President Richard
Nixon’s influential national
security advisor, had been to
China twice that year, a clear
sign of the thaw in PRC-U.S.
relations. With its courtship of
Beijing in full swing,
Washington was no longer
willing to actively prevent the
PRC from being represented
in the Untied Nations.
However, that doesn’t mean
the United States wanted
Taiwan pushed out.
Washington worked hard to
keep the ROC inside the
United Nations in some
capacity. Leading up to the
1971 General Assembly
session, the Nixon
administration tried to
advance a rival U.N.
resolution that would grant the
PRC the “China” seat at the
U.N., but also “ensure that the
Republic of China was not
deprived of its
representation.”
Washington argued that,
whatever arrangement the
U.N. came to, it needed to
reflect the “incontestable
reality” of “the existence of
both the People’s Republic of
China and the Republic of
China.” That language still
echoes today, for example, in
President Tsai Ing-wen’s
comment to the BBC in 2020
that Taiwan is “an
independent country already”
and China should “face
reality.”
The PRC, however, soundly
rejected Washington’s
alternative proposal on the
grounds that Taiwan was “an
inalienable part of Chinese
territory and a province of
China.” To offer the ROC a
separate U.N. seat would be
tantamount to recognizing
Taiwan’s independence,
Beijing argued, and PRC
representatives made clear
that they “would have
absolutely nothing to do with
the United Nations” if such an
arrangement was put in place.
In the end, the U.S.-backed
resolution was rejected by a
vote of 61 to 51 at the same
session where Resolution
2758 later passed. George
H.W. Bush, then the U.S.
ambassador to the United
Nations, noted that the United
States “took a great deal of
abuse” for its position during
the debate.
Bush also warned that “the
United Nations today crossed
a very dangerous bridge” by
expelling the ROC. He
acknowledged the jubilation
of the PRC’s supporters, but
opined that “in calm
reflection, I think we’re going
to recognize that there’s been
a very serious mistake.”
Rebuking those who were
rejoicing in a perceived defeat
of the U.S., Bush retorted,
“The United Nations lost by
commanding the expulsion of
a decent member nation.
That’s what this battle was
about.”
The ROC delegation did not
stay to see its final defeat, but
left after the U.S. proposal
was voted down. After the
ultimate passage of
Resolution 2758, Chou
declared, “We shall continue
to struggle, with like-minded
governments, for the
realization of the ideals upon
which the United Nations was
founded, but which the
General Assembly has now
betrayed.”
With the vote, Taiwan was
suddenly shut out of the entire
U.N. system – not only the
General Assembly and
Security Council, but all of the
United Nations’ subsidiary
organs, including specialized
agencies like the International
Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), International Labor
Organization (ILO), and the
World Health Organization
(WHO), as well as the U.N.
climate change process.
Taiwan has been excluded
from these bodies even though
they arguably cannot fulfill
their stated functions without
Taiwan’s participation.
Further complicating
Taiwan’s position, in 2007
then-U.N. Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon affirmed that
the United Nations recognized
Taiwan “to be an integral part
of the People’s Republic of
China.” Ban’s comment
attracted controversy, as that
position is not explicitly stated
in the text of Resolution 2758.
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s status
as a “province of China” has
been enshrined in official
U.N. policy ever since.
As China’s clout in the U.N.
grew, Taiwan’s banishment
became ever-more complete.
In recent years, there has been
an uptick in reports of
Taiwanese not being allowed
to visit U.N. buildings – a ban
that even applies to Taiwanese
journalists seeking to report
on U.N. activities. As the Wall
Street Journal reported in
September, China even uses
its position at the U.N. to
implement a de facto ban on
organizations that use
“incorrect terminology for
Taiwan.” According to the
WSJ, a Colorado high school
had to change an old article on
their website to refer to
“Taiwan, Province of China”
before they were granted
credentials to attend a U.N.
meting.
Finding a Way Back?
Originally, the ROC clung fast
to its right to represent all of
China at the United Nations,
which severely limited its
prospects for rejoining the
body. But over time,
particularly after Taiwan’s
democratization, Taipei began
to pursue ways to be
represented in the U.N.
separately from – and
alongside – the PRC. While
Resolution 2758 is clear that
Taiwan’s government cannot
claim to represent “China,”
Taiwanese officials – gaining
including Foreign Minister
Joseph Wu – argue that it does
not preclude Taiwan’s
participation in the U.N.
outside of holding the China
seat. In essence, this brings us
back to the same argument
made in the unsuccessful
U.S.-backed resolution of
1971.
China’s position is blunt:
“The United Nations is an
international organization
composed of sovereign states.
Taiwan as a province of China
is completely not qualified
and has no right to participate
in it
However, statehood is not
necessarily a requirement for
participation in U.N. bodies.
Palestine, for example, has
permanent observer status at
the United Nations despite not
being a member state. The
shift to pursue a different form
of representation, below the
level of full membership,
allowed for more flexibility in
Taiwan’s approach.
But the result remained
largely the same.
Taiwan has made many
efforts to rejoin the United
Nations in some capacity.
From 1993 to 2008, the ROC
submitted 16 requests for
participation in the United
Nations, starting with bids for
full membership in the early
1990s and finally just asking
“to take part in unspecified
U.N. ‘activities’,” as Reuters
described a 2008 request. The
U.N. has rejected every one of
these requests.
Under President Ma Ying-
jeou (2008-2016), Taiwan
moved to a different tactic:
trying to ensure “meaningful
participation” in technical
organizations like ICAO and
the WHO. Here Ma scored a
major success, with Taiwan
a long-coveted
invitation to participate in the
World Health Assembly
(WHA) as an observer in
2009. Taiwan received
follow-up invitations every
year through 2016.
Even this achievement,
however, was based on a
Memorandum of
Understanding secretly
negotiated in 2005 between
the WHO and Beijing. The
MoU, according to an outline
that later leaked, strictly
limited the body’s interactions
with Taiwan. Most notably,
the WHO agreed to submit
any proposed contact with
Taiwan for approval from
Beijing, granting the PRC
effective veto power over
Taiwan’s engagement with
the world’s top health body.
In other words, Taiwan’s
participation in the WHO was
subject to Beijing’s whim, and
China used such invitations as
a reward for “good behavior”
from Taipei. That wasn’t a
problem under the Ma
administration, which was
intent on smoothing out cross-
strait relations. But then Tsai
Ing-wen assumed the
presidency in 2016, with a
mandate to put the brakes on late August, Taiwan’s Foreign
what her supporters saw as Minister Joseph Wu argued
moves toward unification. that “Barring members of
Unsurprisingly, under Tsai, Taiwan’s civil society from
Taiwan’s invitations to the the U.N. defeats the ideal of
WHA stopped coming. multilateralism, contravenes
the U.N.’s founding principles
The COVID-19 pandemic
of promoting respect for
resulted in the most vocal
human rights and fundamental
push yet for Taipei to have a
freedoms, and hampers the
seat at the WHO table, with
U.N.’s overall efforts.”
explicit backing from
Australia, Canada, France, “Taiwan is a force for good.
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Now is the time to bring
United Kingdom, and the Taiwan to the table and let
United States. It wasn’t Taiwan help,” Wu wrote.
enough. Taiwan was forced to
In holding up the U.N.’s
drop its request to attend the
founding principles and
World Health Assembly’s
pointing to Taiwan’s record
2020 meeting after realizing it
“for good,” Wu echoed –
still would not make the cut.
perhaps unintentionally – the
Even the global health
laments of the ROC and U.S.
emergency of COVID-19 was
ambassadors to the U.N. on
not enough to budge the WHO
October 25, 1971. The
– and Beijing – on the issue of
problems that would come
Taiwan’s participation. A
with excluding the ROC from
return to the U.N. proper,
the U.N. entirely were clear 50
then, seems less likely than
years ago, but in the decades
ever.
since no one has managed to
Still, Taiwan is determined to solve them.
keep trying. In an op-ed
published in The Diplomat in
 Choppy economic waters
Uzair M. Younus, Dawn
A
VISIT to Karachi
after almost two years
creates both a sense of
nostalgia and déjà-vu, the
former caused by memories of
what this city once was and
the latter due to a sense of
imminent danger presented by
torrential rains. These feelings
can be figuratively extended
to the emerging situation in
Pakistan, which is facing
severe near-term economic
challenges – capable of
unleashing immense pain and
suffering on a citizenry
teetering on the edge — and
increasing casualties from
attacks carried out by the
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
The economic situation was
nothing to write home about at
the beginning of 2020 and the
onset of the Covid-19
pandemic dealt an immediate
body blow to an economy
already on its knees. But credit
must be given where it is due:
the government, in
collaboration with the State
Bank of Pakistan, stepped up
its game, providing a stimulus
that minimised the economic
shock of the pandemic.
Timely and effective public
health interventions meant
that Pakistan did not
experience the trauma that
citizens in India, for example,
went through. This meant that
as lockdowns eased,
Pakistan’s economy kicked
into high gear.
Under the hood, however,
many of the structural
inadequacies that have
plagued Pakistan’s economy
for the entirety of the 21st
century remain in place: the
circular debt in the energy
sector, a lack of
diversification in exports,
rent-seeking across industries,
and a continued dependency
on consumption-led imports,
to name a few. These issues
have been exacerbated by
what is now the longest-ever
amnesty scheme in the
country’s history that has
diverted scarce capital into
largely unproductive and
speculative real estate
investments. It is also worth
mentioning the irony of this
amnesty given the decades-
long anti-corruption rhetoric
of the ruling party.
What ought to concern people
is the fact that over the last 18-
24 months, Pakistan’s
economy has become even
more exposed to external
shocks, largely in the form of
rising costs of essential
commodities. There have now
gathered in the form of dark
clouds over the horizon and
are threatening to wash away
the little gains that have been
made in recent months.
If global commodity prices
remain high, Pakistani
citizens are going to feel a lot
more pain.
It is true that there is little
Imran Khan and his advisers
can do about sky-high palm
oil, crude oil, coal and natural
gas prices. However, the sheer
inability of the Pakistani state
and its bureaucratic
machinery to engage in half-
decent scenario planning
exercises has only
compounded problems.
During the 2007-08 global
financial crisis, countries like
Pakistan found themselves
helpless in front of booming
commodity prices. While peer
economies implemented
policies to reduce their
exposure to such risks,
successive governments
kicked the can down the road
while also doubling down on
hare-brained policies that kept
an overvalued exchange rate
and further increased
dependency on imports.
There was an initial
expectation that this
government would engage in
some sort of long-term
thinking, but those hopes were
quickly dashed. The most
recent example of a complete
lack of foresight was a report
highlighting how the average
of imports over the last three
years was used to forecast
upcoming imports, with the
result being that the expected
number was way off the mark.
This was akin to measuring
the blood pressure of a patient
during sleep hours and using
the data to prove that the
patient had no blood pressure
issues!
There is now a growing
recognition that the wheels of
the economy need to be
slowed down. Some financial
analysts believe that interest
rates may go up by another
100 basis points, if not more.
The 100 per cent cash margin
requirement on imported
goods and the change in
policy to curb auto purchases
are also indicative that the
ground is being prepared for a
soft landing to stem the slide
in rupee, which is having
second-order inflationary
effects. Interest rate hikes,
however, will do little to stem
rising imports and inflation,
which is currently being
primarily driven by rising
commodity prices.
The next few months leading
up to the end of the year are
going to be crucial. If global
commodity prices remain
high, Pakistani citizens are
going to feel a lot more pain.
This may create a near-term
wave of unrest, angering a
broad segment of society:
while elites have realised
significant gains through
investments in “Plotistan” and
purchased new vehicles, these
ordinary citizens are
struggling to put food on the
table.
These economic issues are
being compounded by a
resurgent TTP in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa that is
beginning to inflict casualties
on Pakistani forces on a
weekly basis. If left
unchecked, these groups may
soon begin to conduct terror
attacks in urban Pakistan,
threatening hard-fought gains
achieved through immense
sacrifices.
Detractors will argue that this
time is different, and they
have some merit: the central
bank is letting the market
determine its value, loose
monetary policies across the
developed world means that
money is cheap and flowing,
and Pakistan has a friendlier
regime in Kabul that is
unlikely to allow the TTP to
regroup and create havoc
across the border.
Successfully navigating these
choppy waters requires the
government’s machinery to
operate with immense focus,
discipline, and synergy under
extreme stress, a quality that
has been a long-standing
weakness. It will also require
external events to move in its
favour in the form of declining
commodity prices and a
Taliban regime that can
squeeze the TTP.
If the government falters in
the coming weeks, things will
begin to feel like déjà-vu and
history may begin to rhyme.
After all, a little over a decade
ago, Pakistan was facing
similar crises where its cities
were under attack, prices of
essential commodities were
going through the roof, and
many political leaders,
including the current prime
minister, were making the
case for peace talks with
terrorists.
 The social media blackout: What has the world come to?
Belen Fernandez, Aljazeera
W hen the great social
media blackout of
October 4, 2021,
struck, I was in the
picturesque village of Himarë
in southern Albania with my
feet propped up on a balcony
railing, half-gazing at the
Ionian Sea, while impatiently
awaiting Al Jazeera’s
publication of my latest article
on New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman.
As the blackout happened to
coincide with a local internet
outage, I first dedicated
myself to cursing the
Albanian networks and
manically refreshing all open
tabs on my laptop.
When the internet returned but
the components of Mark
Zuckerberg’s digital empire –
Facebook, Instagram, and
WhatsApp – still failed to
load, I sped over to Twitter to
see what was wrong with the
world.
And much, it seemed, was
wrong with the world.
Swarms of people were
inundating Twitter with
commentary on how swarms
of people were inundating
Twitter.
Some tweets also specified the
lack of an ETA for the
restoration of the other social
media services. Feeling
myself in an astronaut-
without-oxygen moment, I
despaired over what to do not
only about my inability to post
the now-published Friedman
article to Facebook but also
how to attend to some pending
Very Important WhatsApp
Correspondence with no
credit on my Mexican mobile
phone.
In a flashback to a previous
technological era, I recalled a
thing known as Skype, which
I then used to send a text
message to the phone of my
Very Important
Correspondent notifying him
of my Gmail address.
Following a bit more
pathological refreshing of
WhatsApp and Facebook tabs
and viewing the same Twitter
memes over and over, I closed
my laptop and phone, sat
back, and dove headlong into
an existential crisis about
being that person who cares
about any of this when she
could just be looking at the
sea.
I went to bed, awaking at one
o’clock in the morning to find
that all had returned to normal
and that I could at long last
post my article to Facebook,
where I also found a message
from my WhatsApp
correspondent from hours
before informing me that he
could not access WhatsApp.
But while the effective
substitution of social media
for life has certainly become
normalised – and even more
so courtesy of the coronavirus
pandemic and the need for
social distancing – there is
nothing really normal about it
at all.
I myself, obviously, am
speaking from a position of
immense privilege; after all,
many inhabitants of this earth
do not have the time or
resources to be able to engage
in such vacuous pursuits as
clicking eternally between
different social media
platforms on a screen.
The privilege, however, is
ultimately a dubious one – as
swathes of humanity forsake
reality for an artificial
technological realm in which
we often promote carefully
cultivated images of ourselves
in order to accrue the most
“likes” and other digital
manifestations of approval
and admiration.
In marketing our own brand of
“self”, we essentially chip
away at the “self” itself, which
can progressively disintegrate
and evaporate into the online
world.
Meanwhile, pervasive
technological distraction fuels
a sort of collective case of
attention deficit disorder – not
to mention the other negative
mental health repercussions of
online existence – all of which
constitute a clear boon for an
abusive and profit-driven
pharmaceutical industry.
And in countries such as my
homeland, the United States,
the mass distraction helps to
thwart the kind of collective
focus required to effect
systemic change.
Of course, social media also
offers a platform to criticise
and agitate against a US
corporate plutocracy that
specialises in militarily and
economically devastating
other nations – a subject that I
have written about at length
over the years.
Unfortunately, posting a
bikini picture on Facebook
will get me more “likes” any
day – which, truth be told,
does not stop me from doing
it.
Call it normalised addiction.
Without degenerating into
trite nostalgia for the good old
days, I will say that I do
regularly fondly recall sitting
in the grass in my parents’
backyard in Texas circa 25
years ago – and doing nothing
but that: sitting in the grass in
my parents’ backyard.
I miss, in other words, doing
something (or nothing) in the
moment itself without feeling
the need to digitally transmit
an image of me or my
surroundings to an online
audience – thereby
annihilating that very moment
via the logistics of
transmission.
But back to the present.
On October 5, after the
apocalyptic six-hour social
media outage had come to an
end, Bloomberg reported that
Mark Zuckerberg had suffered
“a terrible week” (even
though it was “only
Tuesday”).
And yet the real victim,
whether social media is on or
off, is a human society that is
being hollowed out by screen-
time and where solidarity
takes the form of, for example,
commiseration on Twitter
about Facebook and
WhatsApp being down.
This may be life as we know
it, but we no longer really
know life at all.
The views expressed in this
article are the author’s own
and do not necessarily reflect
Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
 Can India Address the Growing Cybersecurity Challenges in the
Nuclear Domain?
Pulkit Mohan, South Asian Voices
A
cross the world,
cybersecurity
architecture is
becoming more complex and
increasingly requiring
advanced safety mechanisms
to protect against system
vulnerabilities and potential
crises. Cyber threats are one of
the greatest challenges in
terms of security. This is
particularly crucial in the case
of nuclear systems as cyber
infiltration can render safety
and security mechanisms
ineffective. This is no
different in the case of India,
as the country has an
extensive and growing nuclear
program. Over the years,
countries, including India
have heavily invested in
building robust physical
protection mechanisms in the
nuclear sector and this has
made the likelihood of a cyber
or blended attack more likely
given the rapid technological
advancements in the field. As
nuclear infrastructure
becomes increasingly more
integrated with cyber
technologies, the risks of its
hacking, disruption, and
potential for sabotage also
increase. The adversarial goal
for any cyber attack is to
exploit a system’s
vulnerabilities and then
control, execute, and maintain
a presence. Cyber attacks may
result in theft of
nuclear/radioactive materials,
radiation release due to
malicious intent of
adversaries, theft of sensitive
information about nuclear
facilities, reactor designs etc.
Access to nuclear facilities
through cyber attacks can
result in direct physical access nuclear security and safety
to the facility, materials and infrastructure incorporates
information which adds to cyber technologies, it is
challenges of essential for policymakers and
interconnectedness of cyber the industry to engage more
and physical nuclear security. deeply with international
India’s civilian and military cyber security practices,
nuclear programs have collaborate on improving
varying security procedures cyber-nuclear security
with different priorities and mechanisms with like-minded
levels of secrecy. However, countries and actively work
given the sensitive nature of on building a more robust
nuclear materials in general, cyber-nuclear security
cybersecurity must be an framework for the country.
integral part of the country’s
The Cyber-Nuclear Security
nuclear security
Nexus in India
infrastructure.
Cybersecurity gained greater
To adequately address the
salience in India after the
cybersecurity challenges
Snowden leaks in June 2013
faced in the context of India’s
revealed surveillance by the
nuclear program, it is vital to
U.S. National Security
analyze the current policy
Agency (NSA) on multiple
framework as well as identify
countries including India.
vulnerabilities that the
Since the Snowden leaks and
systems protecting the
the release of its 2013
country’s nuclear facilities
Cybersecurity Policy, India
may be susceptible to.
has taken steps toward
Additionally, looking at
improving its cybersecurity
notable incidents of cyber
architecture and safeguards.
breaches at nuclear systems
Although cybersecurity does
and the lessons learned would
factor into India’s nuclear
provide useful insights to
security architecture, it can be
avoid similar threats for India.
argued that there is limited
India can also learn from best
emphasis on building and
practices developed by
strengthening the
countries leading the effort
infrastructure to respond to
such as United States and
the rapidly growing and
Japan. Furthermore, engaging
evolving cyber threats. India’s
with international
overall cybersecurity policy
organizations such as the
has remained inadequate in
IAEA and relevant literature
responding to the risks of
emerging from such
cyber attacks and infiltration.
institutions is essential to
Cyber attacks in India
strengthen cybersecurity in
reportedly rose by 300 percent
nuclear systems. The growing
in 2020, and in February 2021,
cyber security challenges for
India made headlines after
India’s nuclear facilities
power outages across Mumbai
require a multi-faceted
in the summer of 2020 were
approach. As the Indian
linked to a possible hacking of
its power grid by China at the
onset of the Ladakh standoff.
In 2013, the Indian
government released a first-
of-its-kind national
cybersecurity policy.
However, eight years later,
this policy has yet to be
updated. Although India’s
Prime Minister Modi
announced that there would be
a new national policy outline
in 2020 this policy has yet to
be released. Additionally, the
fact that India’s nuclear
domain and its security
architecture is shrouded in
secrecy means that there is no
explicit mention or focus on
the nuclear domain in the
2013 policy. Like nuclear
policies, cybersecurity
practices remain under-
discussed in the public
domain. It would be
disingenuous to suggest that
India’s nuclear policy does
not have cybersecurity
mechanisms in place that are
involved in protecting its
nuclear systems. India has a
Defence Cyber Agency and a
National Technical Research
Organisation, which are
responsible for mechanisms
that work to counter cyber
risks and threats to the
country. Additionally, India
has Computer Emergency
Response Teams that work
with agencies such as the
National Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection
Centre and the National
Disaster Management
Authority to protect critical
cyber infrastructures. The
National Cyber Coordination
Centre (NCCC) is India’s
operational cybersecurity and
e-surveillance agency, its
main role is in screening
communications metadata and
coordinating intelligence
collection among agencies.
Further, India has a Computer
& Information Security
Advisory Group (CISAG) acknowledging the
which is responsible “for importance of cyber-nuclear
conducting periodic audits on security is essential in the
information systems as well as Indian context. To address the
provide guidelines for aforementioned challenges
countering cyber attacks and and requirements, a cyber-
mitigating the impact on nuclear policy must take
India’s nuclear shape and clearly identify
infrastructure.”1 roles and responsibilities
across agencies as well as
To adequately address the
create frameworks to address
cybersecurity challenges
cyber risks and
faced in the context of India’s
vulnerabilities, build
nuclear program, it is vital to
resilience measures, and
analyze the current policy
contribute to robust
framework as well as identify
contingency planning.
vulnerabilities that the
systems protecting the The Dangers of Cyber Attacks
country’s nuclear facilities in the Nuclear Domain
may be susceptible to.
Cyber threats in the nuclear
India has established several domain present a unique
key agencies to counter the challenge that require
growing challenges on adaptive and sustainable
cybersecurity. However, the mechanisms to mitigate the
effectiveness of its ever-changing risks. There are
cybersecurity policies in the several instances of cyber
nuclear domain lies with the attacks on nuclear systems
ability to effectively that allow for countries like
incorporate cybersecurity, India to learn and better
cyber infrastructure, and its prepare the security
operating agencies into the infrastructure for the rising
larger nuclear security cyber threats in the nuclear
framework. Efficient and domain.
effective cybersecurity
The instance of cyber threats
mechanisms require cohesive
and attacks in Iran,
inter-agency coordination to
particularly the 2010 Stuxnet
strengthen said mechanisms.
attack on the country’s Natanz
It is also essential for
uranium enrichment plant,
government authorities to
highlight the dangers of cyber
acknowledge, interact with,
attacks and cyber warfare for
and evolve cybersecurity
a country with nuclear
protocols and procedures
systems. Stuxnet emerged as
regularly to reflect a rapidly
an extremely sophisticated
changing security
and dangerous malware and
environment. An effective
deeply impacted the security
cybersecurity policy also
mechanisms of several
requires clear demarcation of
countries. More recently, the
roles, responsibilities, and
attack on the Natanz facility in
contingency plans for short
2021, which targeted the
and long-term implementation
industrial control systems and
and altering based on
destroyed the power supply to
circumstances and
centrifuges used to create
technological advancements.
enriched uranium,
Additionally, and most
underscored the sophistication
importantly, a renewed
and capabilities of the cyber
emphasis on understanding
domain. Keeping the political
cyber risks and
considerations and
implications of these cyber
attacks aside, the security
implications for such breaches
are worrying on their own. It
would be in India’s best
interest to actively address the
imminent risks, drawing from
global incidents and using
them to further strengthen the
country’s security
mechanisms and improve or
replace outdated and
vulnerable cybersecurity
technologies, whether it may
be administrative computer
networks (as witnessed by the
Kudankulam incident) or
security mechanisms that
employ identified risky
technologies at nuclear
facilities.
As India’s nuclear ambitions
expand, so does the possibility
of gaps and vulnerabilities
emerging in the cyber domain.
These vulnerabilities were
most notably shown in the
2019 malware attack at the
Kudankulum nuclear power
plant in Tamil Nadu and on
the Indian Space Research
Organisation headquarters in
Karnataka. The cyber breach
was an infection of a
modification of a malware
known as Dtrack, which has
been used to attack financial
institutions in India in the past
and made by to the North
Korea-linked Lazarus group.
The incident is a prime
example of why countries
cannot and must not become
complacent with their cyber-
nuclear security
infrastructure.
Fortunately, the malware was
limited to the administrative
systems. The failure of the
malware to permeate into the
plant control or
instrumentation is attributed
to the preventive access tool
known as air gaps. Air gaps
refer to “computers or
networks that are not
connected directly to the
internet or to any other
computers that are connected
to the internet.” However,
while air gaps helped prevent
a more severe breach in the
Kundankulam incident,
experts have noted that “many
of the traditional methods of
cyber defense at nuclear
facilities—including
firewalls, antivirus
technology, and air gaps—are
no longer enough to match
today’s dynamic threats.”
After the incident, CISAG
recommended measures for
immediate and short-term
implementation such as
“hardening of internet and
administrative intranet
connectivity, restriction on
removable media, blocking of
websites & IPs which have
been identified with malicious
activity, etc.”
While it is reassuring to note
that the critical nuclear system
was not breached, the incident
raises serious concerns about
the vulnerabilities exposed in
the attack and possibly lessens
the already-limited
confidence in nuclear power
within the public. Short-term
measures, although necessary,
do little to increase the overall
effectiveness of cybersecurity
if not matched with larger
longer-term policy changes.
These short-terms measures,
as recommended by CISAG,
are important but reactive. A
national cyber-nuclear policy
can proactively increase
resilience of nuclear
infrastructure by updating
traditional methods—such as
air gaps and firewalls—into a
more dynamic cyber-security
strategy that engages with the
rapidly evolving technology
environment.
Cyber-Nuclear Security in the
Global Context: Lessons and
Recommendations for India
Cybersecurity is not just a
national challenge. It impacts
countries globally and
therefore requires global
solutions. In the nuclear
context, it is imperative that
similar, like-minded nations
collaborate, exchange useful
information, and share best
practices to combat the rising
threat of cyber attacks. There
are several countries, like the
United States and Japan, with
highly advanced and robust
cybersecurity systems in place
for their nuclear systems.
Such countries actively
engage with the developments
and advancements in the
cyber domain in order to
continuously build resilience
measures and contingency
planning to address the
associated risks.
Collaboration with such
international actors would
provide India with the
opportunity to learn and
incorporate the learnings and
best practices into the context
of the country’s cyber-nuclear
infrastructure.
In addition to collaborating
with the aforementioned
countries, with whom India
has signed civil nuclear
cooperation agreements, India
can also collaborate with
partners such as the United
Kingdom and Russia to better
equip its cyber-nuclear
infrastructure. These
agreements cover several
areas of cooperation such as
exchange of information,
expertise on reactor designs,
nuclear safety etc. Given the
increasing importance of
cybersecurity in the current
global nuclear context, India
should extend collaboration
through these agreements to
the cyber-nuclear domain.
This can be conducted
through technology exchange,
exchange of experts,
information-sharing
agreements, as well as joint
exercises and workshops to
better equip the security
infrastructure at nuclear
systems to counter cyber
challenges.
Additionally, it would be
worthwhile for India to
engage more deeply with the
private sector in the cyber
domain. India has generally
limited the involvement of the
private sector in the nuclear
domain. India’s largely
indigenously developed
nuclear weapons program and
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities
for civilian use are wholly
controlled by the government.
Similarly, the nuclear safety
and security framework of the
country is entirely under
governmental agencies.
However, in the case of
cybersecurity challenges
specifically, there is a lot to
learn and adapt into the cyber-
nuclear security culture.
Private actors—whether it is
firms or individual actors—
are consistently challenging
the notions of cybersecurity
due to both malicious and
ethical intents. Bringing in
industry experts from the field
has been a part of
cybersecurity policies for
countries like the United
Kingdom, and India should
similarly incorporate their
involvement into the
country’s cybersecurity
policy.
India’s nuclear infrastructure,
through a cyber-nuclear
policy, must engage in
periodic assessments of its
cybersecurity mechanisms
and its effectiveness in order
to better equip nuclear
infrastructure against these
threats.
Finally, the primary point of
concern for India’s nuclear
systems in terms of cyber risks
and threats remains the lack of
importance given to a clear,
concise, and robust policy
framework. The lack of a
cyber-nuclear policy for India
exacerbates issues of
vulnerability, lack of
education and awareness as
well as enhanced inter-agency
coordination and response to
cyber threats. Cyber threats
are constantly evolving, and
the dynamic nature of the
cyber domain dictates the
need for prioritization of
cybersecurity in the nuclear
security architecture.
Cybersecurity requires similar
levels of focus and interest
within the nuclear domain as
issues of insider threat and
physical protection.
The Kudankulam incident
brought in short-term
measures to deal with the
problems highlighted by the
incident. However, it is
imperative that a successful
cybersecurity policy works to
continually address
cybersecurity challenges in a
much more dynamic manner
which works towards long-
term sustainability of said
policy to counter cyber risks.
India’s current cyber-nuclear
set-up does not adequately
accord importance to a larger
policy framework in order to
protect against cyber threats.
In this regard, India’s nuclear
infrastructure, through a
cyber-nuclear policy, must
engage in periodic
assessments of its
cybersecurity mechanisms
and its effectiveness in order
to better equip nuclear
infrastructure against these
threats. Given the sensitive
nature of nuclear materials
and infrastructures, it is
important to create policies
that offer both short-term and
long-term solutions and
accommodate change with
changing security needs and
contexts. Further,
collaboration with allies in the
field is key opportunity for
India to build, improve and
evolve its ability to actively
respond to emerging threats
and risks that are an
unavoidable part of the world.