Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government

Author(s): Michael Morfit

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (Aug., 1981), pp. 838-851
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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE
IDEOLOGYACCORDINGTO THE
NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT

Michael Morfit

OVER THE PAST two years, Indonesia has witnessed the

implementation of an extraordinary government policy that is all the
more unusual because it has aroused little attention on the part of
political analysts. In accordance with a 1978 decision of the People's
Consultative Assembly (nominally the highest political body under the
present Indonesian constitution), a series of workshops or upgrading
courses have been organized throughout the archipelago. Under this
program all civil servants below the rank of cabinet minister are re-
quired to attend two-week upgrading courses whose sole preoccupation
is Pancasila, the Indonesian state ideology. More recently other groups
of citizens have found it advisable or prudent to organize their own
Pancasila courses, and the government has made it known that it in-
tends to extend the courses to "diverse functional and political groups
of the society."'
What is remarkable about these courses is first and foremost the
sheer cost involved. Called P4 courses (a contraction of the full Indo-
nesian name, which can be translated as Upgrading Course on the Di-
rectives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila), these
two-week seminars have been noticeably disruptive to the normal flow
of government business. The courses first involved the most senior of
civil servants. At one point in the past year it seemed as if virtually all
government business in Jakarta came to a standstill. Because of P4, key
figures were often absent from their offices and unable to make required
decisions. Where more than one ministry or department was involved,
1 Abdulgani H. Roeslan, "Some Thoughts About Pancasila: Its Basic Theory and
Practice," Indonesia Times (December 12, 1980), p. 3.
838

e 1981 by The Regents of 'the University of California

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 839

delays were compounded. In terms of simply carrying out normal duties,

then, P4 has been a costly policy to implement. In addition, there are
the direct costs involved in providing teachers, seminar rooms, materials,
and amenities such as accommodations or meals for up to two million
civil servants and their instructors during the time that they are re-
quired to attend the course.
If the costs were not enough to convince one of the seriousness with
which the government views P4, the manner of conducting the courses
offers further evidence that this is not viewed as a trivial endeavor. At-
tendance at all sessions is absolutely compulsory. If a civil servant misses
one day of the upgrading course, he is required to repeat the entire
course from the beginning. No excuses, not even illness or a death in
the family, are acceptable dispensations from the requirement of atten-
dance at every session. Classes generally begin at 8 A.M. and continue
through the day until 6 P.M., and participants are penalized for tardi-
ness. They are given assignments to complete in the evening and are
graded on their performance. A final test is also given, and marks are
awarded for overall performance. These marks are recorded in a civil
servant's personal dossier and are felt to be important in the consider-
ation for promotion.
In a nation where civil servants are not noted for their diligence
or eagerness to work beyond normal office hours, such stringent enforce-
ment of a course of study must stand out as unique in the history of
Indonesia. Surely it is difficult to cite another instance of a government
program that has been implemented with such uncompromising effi-
ciency and determination. Apparently no exceptions to the P4 policies
are tolerated, and even students going abroad for study are often re-
quired to complete P4 courses before being given exit visas.
All the evidence suggests that the New Order government sees P4
as providing an important ideological justification for its policies, and
that it wishes the claims and prescriptions of P4 to be examined with
some care. Certainly the costs involved, both direct and indirect, as
well as the manner of implementation of the P4 courses indicates that
this is a program strongly supported by the government at the highest
levels. An examination of those responsible for drafting the P4 materials
and implementing the program confirms this view. They include such
senior political figures as the Coordinating Minister for Economics,
Finance and Industrial Affairs, Widjojo; Coordinating Minister for
State Security, Panggabean; and State Minister for Administrative Re-
form, Sumarlin. The key figure in articulating the P4 doctrine is Dr. H.
Roeslan Abdulgani, formerly Minister of Information and Foreign Af-
fairs under Sukarno, and one time Ambassador to the United Nations
under the New Order. Interestingly, it was Roeslan Abdulgani who
played a key role in the only experiment similar to P4 that Indonesia
has witnessed, Manipol-USDEK.
The purpose of this article is to attempt to examine P4 and its im-
plications for Indonesia's development strategy, the government's po-

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840 ASIANSURVEY,Vol. XXI,No. 8, August 1981
litical thinking about its present situation, and its future plans. The
article begins with an examination of Pancasila as a political ideology-
or with the version of Pancasila that has the official approval of the
present regime and is given in the P4 upgrading course. This is briefly
contrasted with the understanding of Pancasila propagated under the
Guided Democracy of Sukarno. Next, the implications of this ideology
for the development strategy of the government are examined. Finally,
consideration is given to P4 as part of the government's political strategy,
especially with regard to the forthcoming general election in 1982.

The Five Principles

"Pancasila" consists of five principles, succinctly stated in Indo-
nesian but often rather ambiguous when subjected to close analysis and
certainly less suggestive when translated into English. The first prin-
ciple (or sila) is a belief in one supreme being (Sila Ketuhanan yang
Maha Esa). Thus the Indonesian state is not secular in the Western
sense. However, the belief in a supreme being is left as a general state-
ment, broad enough to encompass a wide variety of religions including
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism-those "great" religions
officially recognized by the state and dealt with by the Department of
Religion. This Sila is the source of considerable controversy. More
orthodox Muslims have frequently favored an explicit commitment to
Islam as the state religion and have felt some dissatisfaction at the gen-
eral phrasing of this Sila. They have also resisted what they see as an
attempt on the part of the government to equate mere belief or faith
(kepercayaan) with a true religion (agama). This objection is aimed at
many of the traditional and pre-Islamic beliefs of the Javanese, which
are seen as corruptions or denials of the true faith of Islam. This in-
cludes both the animistic beliefs of the rural population as well as the
more sophisticated version (kebathinan) of the aristocratic priyayi class.
The second principle is variously described as a commitment either
to internationalism or more literally to a just and civilized humanitari-
anism (Sila Kemanusian yang Adil dan Beradab). The two interpreta-
tions are not as divergent as they might seem at first. A commitment to
just and civilized humanitarianism entails a willingness to treat with
others, even foreigners, in a fair manner, free from suspicion, exploita-
tion, and oppression. When viewed from the perspective of state rela-
tions, this becomes a commitment to internationalism in the sense that
it rejects adherence to one of two (or more) opposing political blocs or
support for an international order which is exploitative and divisive.
The third Sila expresses a commitment to the unity of Indonesia
(Sila Persatuan Indonesia). In a vast archipelago stretching 5,000 kilo-
meters across the sea, with 13,000 islands and about 350 distinct ethnic
groups, an emphasis on the unity of the state is understandable. The
attempts of the Dutch to create semi-autonomous states during the 1947-

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 841
1950 period, and subsequent intermittent regional rebellions since that
time, underline the extent to which this Sila, too, has been a point of
some controversy in the past.
The fourth Sila emphasizes the idea of a people led or governed by
wise policies arrived at through a process of consultation and consensus
(Sila Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam
Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan). It would be a great mistake simply to
translate this as a commitment to Western liberal democracy, especially
since the rejection of Western liberalism (or at least some parts of it)
has been a continuing theme of Indonesian political discourse since be-
fore the birth of the nation.2 The word mnusyawarahis one connoting
discussion and deliberation amongst members of a society, but it does
not suggest such ideas as majority rule and minority rights.3
The fifth Sila expresses a commitment to social justice for all the
Indonesian people (Sila Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia).
This is generally regarded as a relatively unexceptional principle, al-
though it can be asked to what extent the implicit commitment to
equity has an important place in the understanding of Pancasila.

Pancasila as a Political Ideology

There are several interesting features of Pancasila as an ideology,
particularly as it is presented within the P4 courses. In this section, the
character of Pancasila as an ideology will be discussed, with a view in
later sections to showing how certain government policies are legit-
imized by the interpretation of Pancasila given in P4. In later sections,
as well, it will be suggested that some of the inherent contradictions in
Pancasila as an ideology are also reflected in contradictions in the gov-
ernment's development policies.
One important characteristic of Pancasila is its orientation toward
time and its assessment of the significance of the past. The material
produced by the government in connection with P4 stresses the extent
to which Pancasila is to be seen as an articulation of the historical ex-
perience of the Indonesian people.4 According to this interpretation,
Pancasila becomes the formulation of a traditional philosophy of life
rather than the imposition of an alien doctrine. In this sense, P4 claims
to draw out what is already immanent within Indonesian society rather
than indoctrinating the people, and the charge that P4 constitutes state
indoctrination is rejected.5 Nonetheless, P4 provides a formulation

2 Herbert Feitth and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political

Thinking: 1945-1965
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 19ff.
3 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 35, 41-43.
4 Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan-bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik In-
donesia, Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Buku I
(Jakarta, no date), pp. 2-5 (hereafter cited as Bahan Penataran).
5 Bahan Penataran, Buku I, ii.

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842 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981

(rumusan) in the sense of an authoritative account of Pancasila and

not a mere interpretation (tafsir) of it.6
However, Pancasila is not merely a crystallization of past experi-
ence and an expression of present perceptions. It is also an aspiration
for the future. Part of the justification for P4 lies in the claim that a
correct understanding of Pancasila is required for the future develop-
ment of the nation. It provides the criteria by which the value of poli-
cies are to be judged by providing a traditional vision of the good so-
ciety that is to be achieved.7
By embracing the past, present, and future, Pancasila becomes the
basis for all legitimate political activity. Indeed, P4 is at pains to point
out that the 1945 Constitution, providing the framework for the present
political system, is in harmony with Pancasila and can be understood as
an expression of the five principles.8 Similarly, the established Broad
Outlines of State Policy (Garis-garisBesar Haluan Negara) are defended
in terms of the extent to which they further the goals enshrined in the
state ideology.9 By achieving a status of articulating both the historical
essence and the future aspirations of the Indonesian nation, and also of
determining the framework for all acceptable political action, P4
emerges as an important basis for the government's development stra-
tegy.
Despite the overarching character of Pancasila, spanning past, pres-
ent, and future, another striking characteristic of the ideology (at least
as expressed in P4) is its lack of specificity. Each of the five principles
is on the surface a statement long on rhetoric and sentiment but short
on specific prescriptions. Yet prescriptions are precisely the business of
political ideologies. They are invoked not simply to express vague hopes,
but also to map out policies and chart the directions in which a society
should move. Ideologies also serve to locate its adherents in time, giving
them a sense of how they should relate to a world of dynamic social
forces and change.
In Pancasila, however, fundamental social change and historical
development are singularly absent, and P4 presents an extraordinarily
static ideology. Ironically, despite its invocation of the past and hopes
for the future, P4 seems to rob Pancasila of all sense of historical dyna-
mism. For example, there is no account of the past as the triumph of
reason over superstition, as in the Enlightenment and in the political
thinking of men such as Montesquieu at that time. There is no rejec-
tion of the past as a record of oppression and exploitation, as in Marx.
Instead, the past is invoked only in the most general form and never
with a sense of change or development.
Similarly, the vision of the future propounded by P4 is also impre-
cise and vague, with little by way of prescription. The good society en-

6 Pasal I, Ketetapan MPR Nomor II/MPR/1978.

7 Bahan Penataran, Buku I, pp. iii-v.
8 Bahan Penataran, Buku II, pp. 53ff.
9 Bahan Penataran, Buku III.

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 843

visioned by P4 can as easily accommodate hierarchy as equality, and

private ownership of the means of production as collective ownership.
Abrupt revolutionary upheaval, incremental change, or no change at
all are all consistent with the five principles.

Pancasila and Sukarno's Guided Democracy

To gain a clearer appreciation of the character of the state ideology
as it is now propagated by the New Order government, it is instructive
to contrast P4 with Sukarno's attempt to instill a similar ideological
commitment in the Indonesian nation during the Guided Democracy
period. In his Independence Day speech of 1959, Sukarno articulated
five principles later designated as the Political Manifesto of the Indo-
nesian nation. Together with the five principles of Pancasila, these
constituted the ideological basis of the regime.
The five principles of the Manifesto Politik included a return to
the 1945 Constitution as the most appropriate constitution for Indo-
nesia; socialism 'a la Indonesia; guided democracy; guided economy;
and Indonesian national identity. These principles were held to be in
harmony with Pancasila, and indeed their implementation was asserted
to be the means of achieving the just and humane society envisioned by
Pancasila. Guided democracy was particularly defended as necessary to
the realization of the aspirations of Pancasila.10
As with P4, there were strenuous efforts to ensure that the ideology
was studied and examined by the civil service. "Retooling" of the gov-
ernment apparatus was the phrase used to refer to the instillation of
ideologically correct views and behavior. However, the Manipol-USDEK
courses stretched beyond the civil service to embrace primary and secon-
dary school students as well as university students. The press was a
particular object of attention, with cultural activities being seen as in-
struments for furthering the realization of the ideological aspirations
of the regime."
In common with P4, there is in Sukarno's formulation the same
emphasis on the moral aspects of the ideology. It is not enough merely
to understand the precepts of Pancasila and Manipol-USDEK. These
must become a fundamental part of the soul and spirit of the Indo-
nesian people. "Inner changes . . . will automatically bring about
changes and improvements as regards physical and material affairs."'2
In contrast with P4, however, there is in Sukarno's discussions of
Manipol-USDEK a strong sense of the dynamism of history and social
change. While making references to Indonesian traditions, and claim-
l0 Roeslan H. Abdulgani, "Pantja Sila Sebagai Landasan Demokrasi Terpimpin"
in Prasaran-prasaran Pada Seminar Pantjasila Ke I (Yogyakarta: Panitia Seminar
Panitjasila, 1959), esp. pp. 148ff., 159.
11 Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in McVey, ed., In-
donesia (New Haven: Yale University with HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 368-372ff.
12 Sukarno, "Returning to the Rails of the Revolution," in Feith and Castles,
Indonesian Political Thinking, p. 101.

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844 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981

ing to be in harmony with the ancient (almost primordial) Indonesian

national spirit, Sukarno also stressed the concept of revolution.'8 In
his 1959 and 1960 Independence Day speeches, Sukarno urged the
Indonesian nation to abandon the past, meaning specifically the period
of 1949-1959.14 Throughout his speeches of this period there was an
emphasis on what Sukarno refers to as the "Romanticism of Revolu-
tion" and the need for fundamental change, which he saw in terms of a
continuing struggle against the forces of colonialism and imperialism.15
There were frequent references to the historical experiences of other
nations such as France, China, and the United States, which gave an
air of cosmopolitanism and international significance to the Indonesian
national revolution.16
Despite these significant differences, which gave Manipol-USDEK
and Sukarno's interpretation of Pancasila a sense of movement and his-
torical destiny that is entirely absent from P4, both Sukarno and the
New Order government used Pancasila to attack or contain rival po-
litical ideologies. As Feith remarks with regard to Manipol-USDEK, it
was "not an attempt to synthesize all the main patterns of political
orientation in Indonesia, for it contains virtually no element of the
political outlook characteristic of Islam. It is doubtful whether any state
ideology could bridge the gap between the Javanese-aristocratic pole of
political orientations and the Islamic-entrepreneurial pole, but cer-
tainly Manipol-USDEK does not."17
There may be some question about Feith's linking the Islamic
political movement with an entrepreneurial orientation, but there is
no doubt that the efforts to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state were
a specific target of attack for Sukarno. Since the first articulation of the
five principles, there has been a fundamental tension between Pancasila
and Islam.18 The doctrine was specifically put forward by Sukarno in
1945 in opposition to the demand that the independent Indonesian Re-
public be an Islamic State, and he continued to use it in the same way
during the period of Guided Democracy. As will be discussed below,
the New Order government has maintained this traditional use of Pan-
casila in P4 and in the period leading up to the 1982 elections. In par-
ticular, the first Sila has been employed both to exclude an Islamic state
and to include traditional Javanese mystical beliefs. By doing so, Pan-
casila has been aligned with the abangan or syncretic Javanese tradition
in opposition to the santri or more orthodox Islamic one.
13 Sukarno, Tjamkan Pantja Sila! (Jakarta: Panitia Nasional Pengingatan La-
hirnya Pantja Sila, 1964), pp. 78ff.
14Sukarno, as quoted in Feith and Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking, pp.
101, 105, 106ff., 111, 113ff.
15Feith and Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking, pp. 101-109, 111-116.
16Cf. Sukarno, Tjamhan Pantja Sila!
17 Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," p. 368.
18Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-
59 (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), pp. 31, 128, 231.

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 845

P4 and Development Strategies of the New OrderGovernment

An explicit and major rationale for P4 is the need to explain the
third Five-Year Plan (Repelita III), which officially began in 1978 and
is to run to 1983. The decision of the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR), which established the legal authority for P4, stressed the need
for all civil servants to undergo P4 so that they can better understand
the various programs with which they are involved and so that they will
become motivated to implement and administer those programs with
greater commitment and enthusiasm. Thus the first two volumes of the
P4 material produced by the government discuss first Pancasila and
second the 1945 Constitution, while the third volume (the longest) turns
its attention to an examination of the Broad Outlines of State Policy.
In this final volume, P4 attempts to clarify the government's objectives
and policies and to show how they can be understood (and legitimized)
within the context of Pancasila. It is precisely at this level that the in-
tellectual dissatisfactions with the static and vague character of Pan-
casila as an ideology also suggest difficulties for the development strategy
of the New Order government.
A key word in Repelita III is "pemerataan," which literally means
making flat or equalizing. It is used to highlight a professed concern
with equity and with ensuring that the benefits of development do not
simply accrue to privileged groups. The P4 materials, especially in the
third volume, are designed to provide the ideological justification for
this goal and an explanation of the government's strategy to achieve it.
However, what emerges is little of either. There is discussion of the
"trilogy of development" trilogyi pembangunan), which includes spread-
ing the benefits of development, increasing economic growth, and secur-
ing national stability.'9 Similarly, there is considerable discussion of
the "eight paths of equalization" (delapan jalur pemerataan), but this
consists of little more than the presentation of a list of possible areas
with which any government program might concern itself. These in-
clude basic needs (food, clothing, housing); educational opportunities
and health services; income and employment; entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities for women and youth; justice; and geographic distribution.
Nothing is said that either suggests specific policies or indicates strate-
gies for realizing these general aspirations.20Not only is one tempted to
see in such formulations an echo of Indonesia's eclectic past (the eight
paths of truth in Buddhism for example), but there is also the tradition-
al emphasis on formulae that both encapsulate knowledge and are the
key to changes- especially moral changes in the social order.21 Such

19 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 21-22.

20Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 81ff.
21 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" in
Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1972), pp. 43ff.

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846 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981

formulations, however, evoke a picture of the good society rather than

articulating strategies for its achievement.
The closest one gets to an articulation of a more prescriptive and
specific ideological position with regard to economics is the statement
that the correct path is one lying somewhere between capitalism and
socialism. Such a path is one that stresses the interests of the whole so-
ciety over those of any individual, but at the same time avoids a state
domination of the economy. In this regard three sectors of the economy
must work together, namely the state sector, the private sector, and the
cooperative section.22 However, this economic doctrine does not con-
template fundamental social change. There is no discussion of ways in
which the economy and various social relationships might have to be
restructured in order to achieve better equity in the development pro-
cess. The discussion of the government's economic policies remains at
the same level of generality as the discussion of Pancasila, and the same
emphasis on order, unity, continuity, and stability as key features re-
mains.
The only additional factor that appears in this part of P4 is ref-
erence to the role of the Indonesian military (ABRI) in national de-
velopment ("ABRI segagai modal dasar pembangunan nasional").23
Security as a guiding principle, encompassing ideological security, po-
litical stability, economic justice, and social and cultural harmony, is a
primary responsibility of ABRI and a basic precondition for develop-
ment.24
An examination of P4, then, leads one to conclude that the New
Order government is committed to a concept of national development
that envisions no fundamental change in the social order and that this
preservation of the existing order is to be guaranteed by the military.
Nothing in the political style of the New Order government or the
policies it has pursued suggest anything to the contrary. In short, P4
makes explicit the New Order government's commitment to the "trickle
down" strategy of development, "permerataan" not withstanding. Just
as the vision of the future projected by Pancasila is an echo of the past,
so also the New Order does not contemplate policies that will result in
a future social order markedly different from the present, although it
hopes that this society will be more prosperous.
In this sense, it might be said that Pancasila, according to the New
Order government, is an ideology of containment rather than one of
mobilization. That is, it is conceived in such broad and general terms
that it can embrace the wide cultural and religious diversities of the
Indonesian nation. While it provides an encompassing umbrella of uni-
ty, it is not designed to excite mass participation in the development
process or galvanize the nation into action. The Pancasila of P4 thus
22 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 33ff.
23 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, p. 76.
24 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 14ff.

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 847
stands in dramatic contrast to the radical communism of Mao during
the Great Leap Forward or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
What Pancasila offers as a political ideology is unity rather than direc-
tion.
The capacity to embrace seemingly opposed social currents and po-
litical aspirations is seen as a testimony to the strength and validity of
the ruler, argues Anderson in his classic essay on power in Javanese
culture.25 In this sense, what is seen in Western eyes as the vagueness
and imprecision of Pancasila may be interpreted by the Javanese, at
least, as proof of its wisdom. Similarly, Anderson claims that unity is
perceived both as a primary political goal and the criterion of a power-
ful (and hence successful) state.26 Therefore, in order to blur social
cleavages, instead of sharpening them, the Pancasila of P4 emphasizes
the unity and cohesion of society. Again, in this respect it stands in
sharp contrast to communism, which makes class conflict the corner-
stone of its political prescriptions.
There is a fundamental sense in which this strategy that focuses
on economic change without social change must fail over the long term.
Profound social changes must inevitably come about as economic changes
occur. The increase in manufacturing, the rise in the number of chil-
dren in schools, the continued pressure on landin Java are all examples
of the forces that must alter the basic character of Indonesian society
one way or another. The attempt to encourage economic productivity
on the one hand and to restrain social change on the other cannot suc-
ceed. The question is only one of how and when such a policy will fail
and what the likely consequences are.

P4 and Contemporary Indonesian Politics

President Suharto, who is considered to be the initiating force be-
hind the P4 program, has publicly never given more than a convention-
al explanation of the purpose of the training courses. Echoing P4 ma-
terials, he has stated that the intention is to "understand again, pene-
trate, realize and implement our ideas concerning the society to which
we aspire."27Furthermore, there has been no official pronouncement of
why the government felt the launching of the Third Five-Year Plan
(Repelita III) was an appropriate occasion for such ideological indoc-
trination, while the previous two Plans were not.
Despite the lack of a clear and authoritative explanation for the
timing of P4, Suharto has lost no opportunity to emphasize the close
alliance between the New Order regime and the army (ABRI) under
the banner of Pancasila. Permissible political activity is that which is
consistent with the state ideology. Political movements that are con-
25 Anderson, "Idea of Power," pp. 13ff.
26 Ibid., pp. 23ff.
27 Quoted in Tempo, VIII: 39 (November 25,
1978), p. 6.

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 848 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981

trary to Pancasila are viewed as a fundamental threat to the stability

and development of the Indonesian state. In his March 27, 1980, ad-
dress to an ABRI gathering in the central Sumatran city of Pakanbaru,
Suharto stated that ABRI cannot stand idle in the face of any threat to
Pancasila, now or in the future. ABRI must "choose a partner and
friend who fully supports Pancasila" in order to maintain the suprem-
acy of the state ideology.28
This speech was widely interpreted to mean that in the forth-
coming general election, ABRI can be expected to continue its strong
support for Golkar, the government party that presently dominates the
national parliament (DPR). This statement came as a disappointment
to many, including some within Golkar, who had hoped that in this
election, in contrast to the two previous elections under the New Order,
ABRI would remain somewhat aloof from election politics and allow a
relatively free rein to the political process. In part, hopes for this neu-
trality rested upon the recognition that the president is constitutionally
authorized to appoint 100 members of the DPR, and about 60% of the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which formally selects the pres-
ident. Therefore the chance of Golkar finding itself in the minority in
either house was almost nonexistent. However, while some expressed
the view that "it is time for Golkar to grow up" and fight the election
without ABRI assistance, Suharto appears to have decided otherwise.
The ABRI's continued support for Golkar is not surprising, given
the close identification of the military with Pancasila and the opposi-
tion parties that Golkar faces in the national elections. The PPP (Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) is particularly
important in this regard and was seen as a specific target of attack in
the Pakanbaru speech. United more by government decree than by com-
mon sentiment, the PPP is an amalgam of Islamic political groups re-
quired to join together under the government-directed program of sim-
plifying the political system. (The other opposition party is the PDI,
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democracy Party.) In re-
affirming an alliance between ABRI and Golkar under the banner of
Pancasila, therefore, Suharto was giving advance warning that the gov-
ernment intends to keep the activities of Islamic political groups under
close control. To this extent Suharto's use of Pancasila follows in the
footsteps of Sukarno.
On the face of it, the government would seem to have little to fear
from the two opposition parties. They are firmly in the minority with-
in the present parliament and are ridden by internal divisions and fac-
tions. While the national press is somewhat free to offer criticism and
political comment, there is no doubt about the government's ability
and willingness to control the flow of information when it decides to.
With political activity at a village level banned, neither of the opposi-
tion parties has any formal popular organization. Although the in-

28 Quoted in Asia Week, 6:18 (May 9, 1980).

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATEIDEOLOGY 849

formal network of local religious leaders ;(kiyayi)probably works to the

advantage of the PPP, it is difficult to know the extent to which the
kiyayi can effectively mobilize political support at the village level. In
any case, few suggest that the New Order should be swept away, and in
their adherence to the basic structure of the New Order most of the
government's critics form a kind of loyal opposition.
However, the possibility of a resurgence of Islam in the political
arena clearly remains a concern of the present regime. Some suggest that
events in Iran and the movement toward Islamic legal systems and eco-
nomic arrangements in the Middle East are a source of continuing con-
cern to the government. However, the parallel between Iran and Indo-
nesia is probably more rhetorical than useful in understanding how the
government sees its position. Of more fundamental importance is the
continuing importance of Islam at the village level. Despite ABRI sup-
port for Golkar, the groups comprising PPP won 27% of the popular
vote in the 1971 election, and as a single party this was increased to
29%0in 1977. In addition, there are other indications of support for
Islamic organizations apart from political parties. For example, al-
though no reliable data is available, it is estimated that somewhere
around 20-25% of Indonesia's school age children currently attend
Islamic schools, even though parents incur direct financial costs be-
cause Islamic schools receive only marginal assistance from government
agencies and must charge tuition fees. In contrast, state schools are
supposed to be free.29Little is known about the character of this system
of religious education and the reasons why parents support these insti-
tutions, but it is clear that this must indicate a significant attachment
to the values of Islamic education in contrast to the government's non-
Islamic, almost secular, system. Similarly, Islamic institutions have
aroused some popular support in vocally opposing the government's
decision not to close schools during the long fasting month of Ramadan
(Puasa). In past years, Islamic groups have forced the government to
abandon its plans to revise the legal code governing marriage, a move
seen as "secular" in intention and diminishing to the status of the re-
ligious courts.
In this context, P4 has been seen by Islamic groups as an attempt
to indoctrinate the people with a new ideology, contrary to the true
faith. This is specifically denied by the government in the P4 materials,
which argue that Pancasila is compatible with all religions.30 However,
29 "Islamic schools" here is used to include primary and secondary institutions
such as pesantren and various types of madrasah. A comparison of figures from the
Department of Religion and those from the Department of Education and Culture
indicate a somewhat lower percentage than that cited here. However, sources in the
Department of Religion suggest that the figures for Islamic schools are almost cer-
tainly higher than indicated in the official statistics. Cf. Rangkunan Statistik Per-
sekolahan, 1979/80 (Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan, De-
partemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1981), and Data Keagamaan di Indonesia
Dalant Angka, 1979/80 (Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama, De-
partemen Agama, 1981).
30Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 51-52.

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850 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981

this attempt at reassuring Islamic groups somewhat misfires because it

is also argued that according to Pancasila only a faith in a Supreme
Being is posited as essential. The word "belief" (kepercayaan) has a
special significance in that it is generally understood in this context to
mean traditional Javanese mystical beliefs, which are strongly resisted
by orthodox Muslims who see these as either a corruption of the true
faith or (in its manifestation as kebathinan) as an alternative to Islam.
While P4 does not seek to establish either Pancasila as the state re-
ligion or traditional mystical beliefs as an officially recognized religion,
it does seem clear that such traditional beliefs are compatible with the
state ideology and Islam can claim no special place.3' Thus the original
tension between Pancasila and Islam is sustained in P4, and the use of
the state ideology to contain the political appeal of the santri tradition
is continued.
The president's speech in Pakanbaru, along with P4, are two major
indications of the government's interest in the use of Pancasila to estab-
lish a firm political basis for the New Order. There is also further evi-
dence for this interest. Shortly after P4 was instituted, the president
approached the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) to ask for its
assistance with the problem of ensuring that Pancasila is understood
and accepted at a village level. The request was for a research project
aimed at investigating the present values and aspirations of village
communities and ways that Pancasila could be more effectively spread
among the population. Recent speeches and articles in the national
press have stressed the importance of ensuring that the values of the
revolutionary generation are passed along to succeeding generations-a
familiar issue for post-revolutionary societies and also a concern of P4
itself.
Taken together, such indications suggest that it will be some time
before the New Order government is prepared to permit free political
activity. The clear and conscious attempt of P4 and other government
activities is to provide an accepted framework to contain politics with-
in defined boundaries. Pancasila, as expounded by P4, is the clearest
and most self-conscious articulation of this ideological vision and, by
implication, of the competing visions that the government is not pre-
pared to tolerate.

Conclusion
It is impossible now to determine to what extent P4 has succeeded
in achieving the objectives set by the government. At the end of 1980,
Pancasila courses have in general moved from the central government
level in Jakarta to provincial level government offices and universities.
The process can be expected to continue for about another year, es-
pecially if sections of the population outside the civil service either or-

81 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 57-58.

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 PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE IDEOLOGY 851

ganize Pancasila courses or are required to join P4. Even in the short
run, therefore, it is too early to come to firm conclusions about the suc-
cess or failure of the New Order government's efforts to establish Pan-
casila as the accepted basis of political order and the justification for
development plans.
The above discussion suggests, however, that there are fundamental
problems in the formulation of Pancasila by the present regime, and
with the way it seeks to propagate its views through P4. While there is
little doubt that the regime will prevail through the forthcoming na-
tional elections, only time will tell if elements of social change and his-
torical dynamics are infused into its presently static ideology.
What is perhaps most disappointing about P4 is that it reveals the
extent to which the New Order regime has failed to project a future
that is clearly defined and likely to be realized. Over the past two years
there has been discussion of the apparent loss of elan within the gov-
ernment and a growing sense that it has somehow lost both its way and
its confidence in its own capabilities. This assessment of the govern-
ment's concern and uncertainty has been confirmed by its handling of
a variety of events from the June 1980 Petition of Fifty, to anti-Chinese
riots in central Java in November of that year, to the April 1981 hijack-
ing of a Garuda airliner. The decision to pursue a nationwide program
of political indoctrination may be viewed in this light as a symptom of
growing insecurity on the part of the present regime and of an attempt
to rekindle a sense of its own purpose. If so, the above discussion sug-
gests that this is an effort that must ultimately fail. The failure, if it
occurs, may be one of imagination because the New Order government
has been unable to develop within the doctrine of Pancasila develop-
ment strategies capable of addressing the inevitability of profound so-
cial change or of generating a new, ideological vision for Indonesia.

MICHAEL MORFIT is a Program Officer with the Ford Foundation in Jakarta,

Indonesia.

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