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Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–44527–8
© Tony Saich 2001, 2004, 2011, 2015

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Contents
List of Maps, Boxes, Figures and Tables x

Preface to the Fourth Edition xii
Romanization, Chinese Units of Measurement and Statistics xvi
List of Abbreviations xvii
Introduction xix
1 Diversity within Unity 1

A land of diversity 2
The impact of CCP policy 16
2 Political History: 1949–2012 29

Parameters of policy debate 29
Leaning to one side – China and the Soviet model: 1949–55 32
The origins of a Chinese path to socialism: 1955–62 36
The radicalization of politics and the resurrection of class
struggle: 1962–78 40
The Third Plenum and the initial reform agenda: 1978–84 44
Economic troubles and political instability: 1985–91 49
Return to economic reform, boom and moderation: 1992–97 54
Managing reform without Deng: 1997–2002 56
Attempting to balance growth with social equity: 2002–12 58
3 China’s New Leaders and Their Challenges: 2012–Present 65

Succession and the purge of Bo Xilai 65
CCP and NPC congresses: November 2012–March 2013 69
Political priorities 74
Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee
(November 2013): outlining a platform for action 81
4 The Chinese Communist Party 85

Party organization and membership 85
The political culture of the CCP 104
The role of the CCP in the political system 109
5 The Central Governing Apparatus 116

Evaluation and perception of government performance 119
Central government 123
The legal system, coercive control and rights 137
The military and the political system 146
vii
viii Contents
6 Governance Beyond the Centre 154

The organization of local government 154
The province as a unit of analysis 158
Regional inequality 167
Relations between the centre and the localities:
the fiscal picture 172
The consequences for local governance 176
Perceptions of local government performance 184
Analysing the local state: corporatism, predation
and negotiation 187
7 The Chinese State and Society 191

The Maoist period: an autonomous state and
a state-dominated society 191
State–society relations under reforms: a negotiated state 198
Impact on the sanctioned organizational structure of
representation 204
Participation at the grassroots and the role of elections 211
Non-sanctioned participation 217
8 Urbanization and Rural–Urban Relations 224

Rural–urban relations 224
Migration 229
Urbanization 235
9 Economic Policy 244

Policy-making and implementation 245
General outline of economic policy 249
A Chinese model of development? 253
Industrial policy 257
Rural policy 267
10 Social Policy 276

Family planning: problems of policy coordination
and policy evasion 277
Social policy and the transition in China 282
Key features of China’s welfare system 285
Pension reform in the urban areas: cutting the Gordian
knot of the SOEs 292
Healthcare in rural China 298
Poverty alleviation and social assistance 303
11 Foreign Policy 313

China and globalization 314
China and the region 321

Contents ix
China and the United States 327

China’s foreign economic relations 338
12 China’s Future Challenges 344

The challenge of constraints: environmental degradation
and resource shortages 344
The internal challenge: corruption 354
The information challenge: blogs, tweets and the Internet 364
The final challenge: good governance and political reform 368
Further Reading 375

Bibliography 381
Index 403

Chapter 1
Diversity within Unity
Some years ago, I was in a jeep driving down a mountain road in

rural Sichuan and was held up by a long queue of traffic meandering
down the hill to a new bridge that was being dedicated. Getting out
of the jeep I wandered down to the bridge to witness an elaborate
ceremony complete with the lighting of incense and various actions to
ward off the evil spirits. Somewhat facetiously, I began to ask those
waiting what the Communist Party must think about this ceremony
as it clearly represented an example of ‘superstitious practice’ so
soundly denounced during the Cultural Revolution (1976–77) and still
denounced today, albeit with less severity. I was greeted with puzzled
faces before one person replied that the man in the exotic robes leading
the ceremony was the party secretary. As the most important person in
the village, he had no choice but to dedicate a new bridge that would
link it to the world outside and bring greater wealth.
The event set me thinking about the relationship between the party,
the state and society and between China’s tradition and modernity. Did
the party secretary believe in the ceremony and its power to conjure
up good spirits to protect the bridge or was he simply going through
the motions to increase credibility among the local population? Was
the party secretary importing the power of the party into the village
community or bringing heterodox beliefs into the party or both? The
traditional nature of the ceremony contrasted with the objective of
building the bridge that would integrate the local community with the
world outside. The bridge provided the link to the market that is the
driving force for development in the post-Mao years. Such small events
are daily occurrences throughout rural and urban China and they
cause us to question any notion of the country as a monolith. China
comprises a patchwork of local cultures and histories that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and its nationalist and imperial predecessors
have tried to weld into a unitary entity. While the CCP may have tried
to penetrate society more thoroughly than its predecessors, the last 35
years have revealed the residual power of local cultures.
More recently, I was walking out of the tranquillity of the cradle of
the communist revolution in Yan’an, where Mao had moved his Red
Army in the mid-1930s, only to be besieged by the trinket sellers who
are the products of China’s economic reform – from Mao Zedong’s
1
2 Governance and Politics of China
China to Deng Xiaoping’s within a few paces. The market responds

to the desires of consumers rather than to those of communist ideo-
logues, something clearly seen by the books on sale. While those sold
inside Yan’an, such as Mao Zedong Enters Yan’an, tell the official
story of the revolution, the books on sale outside, often under the
counter, tell a different tale. They range from Mao Zedong’s notori-
ous womanizing, through the inner secrets of who destroyed whom in
the party’s new headquarters (Zhongnanhai in Beijing), the corruption
of former leaders of Beijing and Shanghai, to unofficial biographies of
former general secretaries, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. These are
the CCP’s hidden histories, those the conservative party veterans do
not want their people to know about – yet they are the ones that the
people with interest and money want to buy. Rather than a revolution-
ary world full of selfless heroes, they tell stories of betrayal, corruption
and greed. Whose history, whose politics? This warns us not to take
official pronouncements at face value but to peer behind the public
facade to discover the reality of how the Chinese polity really works.
This chapter and subsequent ones seek to introduce the reader to the
diversity of China, its land and its peoples, and how CCP policy since
1949 has affected them.
A land of diversity
As the two anecdotes reveal, China is a very complex land where mul-
tiple realities are operating beneath a facade of a unitary nation-state.
However, this does not mean, as some have claimed, that China may
fall apart into its regional components as a result of the reforms (Segal,
1994) or that a de facto federalist structure is emerging (Wang, 1995).
Rather we should be careful about any generalization we make and be
aware that the same policy will impact on different areas and different
groups in China in a variety of ways, sometimes with unexpected results.
China’s land, climate and peoples exhibit a broad diversity. The
country’s land mass is roughly equal to that of the USA (9.6 million sq.
km) but is home to a population of around 1.36 billion (just over four
times that of the USA). Every fifth child is born in China. However,
this population is not spread evenly across the land and, while the
images of teeming cities full to bursting are correct, there are massive
expanses of China where one can roam the hills or deserts for days and
barely see a soul. While the population density is 144 per sq. km for
the country as a whole, the figure is 2,747 per sq. km for Shanghai and
only 2.23 per sq. km for Tibet. In general, the density of the western
provinces is under 100, while it is over 600 in the wealthier eastern
coastal provinces.

Diversity within Unity 3
This population spread has always been the case, with the pre-
dominantly peasant population concentrated along the river deltas
and basins of the east, providing the bodies for the development of the
mega-cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and, further west, Chongqing
(see map). By contrast, the high Tibetan–Qinghai plateau is home to a
sparse, scattered population engaged in pastoral activities. The plateau
lies some 4,000 metres above sea level and occupies a full 20 per cent
of China’s land mass. Radiating out from the plateau are the major
rivers of China, South East Asia and the Asian sub-continent. The
Yangzi, Yellow, Mekong, Red, Ganges and the Brahmaputra all find
their sources here on this desolate plateau. Beyond it there is a series
of smaller descending plateaus and basins that eventually give way to
the major plains of the east, such as the Yangzi Delta, the North China
Plain and the Northeast (Manchuria) Plain.
The huge oceans to the east, the plateau to the west and the sur-
rounding mountain ranges have protected China throughout its
history. This, combined with the continuation of some form of the
Chinese state over two millennia, contributed to an insular attitude to
alternative modes of thought and an ethnocentrism that the dominant
Han Chinese felt was justified by the heritage to which they were the
unique heirs. This insularity is reflected by the name of China itself,
Zhongguo, which literally means the middle or ‘central’ kingdom. Yet
even here there have been variations. China has witnessed periods of
extensive dealings with foreigners, such as in the Han (205 bc–ad
220) and the Tang (ad 618–907) dynasties. These were periods of
extensive trading when foreign products were well received in China
and when Chinese goods reached far-flung corners of the globe.
This trade was even accompanied by the influx of foreign systems of
thought. Most noticeable was the increasing influence of Buddhism,
which arrived from India beginning in the late Han period. The later
Qing period (ad 1644–1911), despite some attempts to keep foreign-
ers out, and the Republican period (1911–49), were both influenced
by foreign trade and the influx of new ideas. The Taiping Rebellion
(1850–64), with its strange mix of half-baked Christianity, icono-
clasm and traditional notions of peasant rebellion, mounted a major
challenge to Confucian orthodoxy (Spence, 1996). The May Fourth
Movement (1915–19), in part a response to the decision to cede the
German concession of Shandong to Japan following the First World
War, also witnessed a major attack on the Confucian tradition and
revealed an intellectual fascination with a whole host of foreign ideas
ranging from liberalism to Marxism to anarchism (Chow, 1960).
Indeed, during the reform period from the late 1970s, the CCP has
tried to make use of the more cosmopolitan trading of China’s coastal
regions as a key element in its economic programmes. Policy has

favoured a development strategy that relies heavily on coastal trade

and investment by revitalizing historic links with the overseas Chinese
communities in South East Asia and beyond.
Given that China has such an expansive and varied landmass, it will
come as no surprise that there is enormous climatic variation, much
more so in the winters than the summers. While most of the country
lies in the temperate zone, the north-east freezes, with temperatures
dropping as low as minus 25–30 degrees Celsius, and even the capi-
tal of Beijing can still get the occasional winter day of minus 10–15
degrees, although the average temperature in January hovers just a
few degrees below zero. By contrast, Kunming in the south-west prov-
ince of Yunnan is known as the city of eternal spring, Guangzhou (in
Guangdong Province) enjoys winters at around 15 degrees and the
island of Hainan has a balmy tropical climate. This north–south cli-
matic divide led the CCP to decree that south of the Yangzi River pub-
lic buildings would not be heated in winter. I have never been so cold
in my life as during the winter of 1976–77 when studying at Nanjing
University just south of the Yangzi River. We used to look forward to
occasional trips across the Yangzi by ferry to sit in the local post office
north of the river that was allowed to provide heating. Rising affluence
has changed this, with those who now can afford heating able to pur-
chase it as they please, as long as supplies are available.
The forces of nature have not been tamed as fully as in the more
advanced countries, and this has resulted in different problems.
Rainfall is variable and each summer one is treated to the news that
while certain areas have been subjected to flooding (Jiangxi, Zhejiang,
Hunan, Jiangsu), other areas are suffering from severe drought (Hebei,
Henan, Shanxi); people refer to ‘north – drought, south – floods’.
South China depends on the vagaries of the monsoon for its rainfall
whereas most of the north and west of China do not receive its effects.
The severity and diversity of these problems may be illustrated by the
fact that in 1981 millions of people in north-central China faced quite
severe food shortages because of extensive drought; in the western
province of Sichuan, 1.5 million people lost their homes because of
floods. The water shortages in the north have been exaggerated by the
industrial development and urbanization of recent years and the water
table of the North China Plain has been dropping precipitously. This
has led to the ambitious government programme to divert water from
the abundant rivers of the south to the north. This will provide some
relief but not enough, and China needs to adopt policies that will price
water more realistically and will promote water conservation.
These climatic and topographic variations have caused a rather
varied environment for agricultural production. It is only in the areas
around the Yangzi River and the south that the flooded paddy fields

are commonplace. In fact, most of China is dependent on dry-field

cropping of wheat and millet. The staple for most in the north is noo-
dles and steamed bread rather than the rice that many associate with
being Chinese. This dependence on staple grains has meant that tradi-
tionally the overwhelming majority of China’s population has settled
along the fertile plains and basins that provide suitable arable land.
By contrast, the grasslands of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, the far
north-west and Tibet are home to livestock with vast stretches of land
for grazing. The periphery in the north-east and south-west is home
to China’s principal remaining forest cover. This forest cover has been
declining rapidly, now covering only 18 per cent of the landmass (in
the US it is 30 per cent), and perhaps as much as 90 per cent of the
remaining coverage is threatened. The current coverage is considered
insufficient for economic needs and everyday use. While the govern-
ment often blames local practices, such as swidden (slash and burn)
agriculture in the south-west, for the decline in the remaining forests
and the subsequent soil erosion and flooding, it is clear that the major
culprit in recent times has been the government itself through its mas-
sive forestry industry. Although the authorities have moved aggres-
sively to cut down on illegal logging, the practice continues but on a
much smaller scale. One unexpected consequence of the crackdown
has been the intensification of logging in neighbouring countries in
order to meet Chinese demand. With the decline of forest cover and
the expansion of arable land and urbanization, there has been a decline
in China’s great biodiversity and wildlife. Animals such as elephants,
tigers and the golden monkey are to be found only in small parts of
remote Yunnan, while the giant panda can be found only in declining
numbers in a few Sichuan reserves.
These more remote areas are home to most of China’s 55 recognized
national minorities (there were 400 to 500 applications from such minor-
ities to be recognized, Blum, 2000, p. 74). While these minorities com-
prise less than 10 per cent of China’s total population (still around 105
million), with the remaining Han Chinese they occupy over 60 per cent of
the total landmass. This includes the very sensitive autonomous regions
of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi Zhuang that border
Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Vietnam. Yunnan, home
to 25 minorities, borders on Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Over time,
China has had difficult relations with virtually all of these countries.
These peripheral areas have always been important to Chinese security
concerns and have provided a buffer zone to protect the ‘Han-core’ from
possible invaders. Beijing’s concern about these areas is increased by the
fact that they possess vital natural resources and are the last areas into
which China’s growing population can expand (Grunfeld, 1985).

This concern with security from external threat explains in part

why Beijing is so concerned with consolidating its rule over the bor-
der areas and has adopted various policies to encourage more Han to
move into them so that they will form the majority population group
in many such areas. However, regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang
have also been the site of considerable domestic opposition to CCP
rule and tensions have increased because of the settlement policies.
Both have experienced sporadic resistance to Beijing’s rule and both
are viewed with suspicion by the centre. In Tibet, many still pledge
their allegiance to the exiled Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959
after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crushed the Tibetan revolt.
In March 2008, on the 49th anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising
against CCP rule, a major riot broke out in Tibet with much of the vio-
lence directed against Han people. While the CCP blamed the unrest
on the exiled supporters of the Dalai Lama, it seemed to be sparked
by the economic inequality that has developed under reforms between
local Tibetans and Han and other outsiders. Similar tensions exist in
Xinjiang, and Beijing fears that people might forge links with radical
Islamic groups that have been more active since the break-up of the
Soviet Union. July 2009 again witnessed ethnic unrest in Xinjiang,
and again Beijing blamed the situation on groups in exile. In 2013 and
2014, sporadic attacks occurred both within the province and outside,
including in Beijing, which the authorities blamed on ‘separatists’ (see
Box 1.1). Until the CCP develops policies that allow greater religious
freedom and permit the spoils of economic growth to be distributed
more equitably to local communities, the threat of unrest will persist.
The CCP has adopted a paternalistic, not to say patronizing, attitude
towards these communities. Before the 2008 demonstrations in Tibet,
at the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting, the party
secretary of Tibet stated that ‘the Communist Party is like the parent
to the Tibetan people, and it is always considerate about what the chil-
dren need’. He also noted that the central party committee is the ‘real
Buddha for Tibetans’ (Reuters, 2 March 2007).
Box 1.1 Beijing’s Xinjiang Problem

On taking power in 1949, the CCP adapted the Stalinist notion of national
or ethnic minorities and created an institutional infrastructure to deal
with them that included the State Nationalities Affairs Commission with
sub-national branches and a university and college system. The adapta-
tion separated the idea of nation and ethnicity and simply falling under
Beijing’s jurisdiction did not mean that one was counted as being Chinese,
or more correctly as being Han Chinese. The idea that the ‘minorities’ had



a common language, culture and lived within the same geographical space
led to the establishment of autonomous regions (the equivalent of a prov-
ince) and autonomous counties, cities, etc. The fiction is that they enjoy a
certain level of autonomy from Beijing. In addition to the dominant Han
Chinese, 55 national minorities were recognized by the central state. The
break-up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia created
a problem for China with the fear that its ‘national minorities’ might seek
independence. As a result, the English term ‘ethnic minority’ was preferred
and some began to change the Chinese usage (Bulag, 2000).
As noted in the text, the two autonomous regions that have presented
the greatest challenge are Tibet and Xinjiang. Both enjoy a distinct culture
and history with an external point of reference. Frictions will not go away
and opposition in Xinjiang has turned violent, with the latest incident in
September 2014 resulting in the deaths of some 50 people. The fear in
Beijing is that domestic opposition will link up with radical Islamic groups
in the Central Asian region and beyond. The CCP has found it difficult to
respond, resorting to a mixture of repression, suppression of traditional
culture, blaming ‘outside entities’ for stirring up trouble and hoping that
greater investment will ‘develop’ the problem away. After a May 2014
attack in Urumqi, over 300 people were arrested and the authorities
claimed that 23 extremist groups had been broken up. The repression has
not been limited to groups that have carried out violent attacks and pro-
posed independence but has also included moderate critics such as the aca-
demic Ilham Tohti. In September 2014, he was handed a life sentence for
his criticism of Beijing’s policies towards Xinjiang. He has argued consist-
ently against ‘separatism’ and tried to present a more moderate critique of
Beijing’s policies. Instead, the leadership clings to the belief that the ‘ethnic
minorities’ are in some way inferior to the Han Chinese and that invest-
ment in education and higher living standards will ameliorate the problem.
For example, in May 2014, it was announced that free secondary-school
education would be granted to those living in southern Xinjiang and
one member of each household would be guaranteed employment (The
Guardian, 30 May 2014). Bilingual education will also be promoted.
Beijing has also moved to undermine cultural practices. In July 2014,
the government banned staff from fasting during Ramadan and beards
and veils have been discouraged. Limits have been imposed on Uighur
traditional weddings and funerals as well as stricter reviews of who may
go on the hajj pilgrimage. Control has included a long-term policy of in-
migration of Han Chinese so that they make up around 40 per cent of the
population. In a more recent move, officials in southern Xinjiang began
to offer cash and other incentives to promote intermarriages between the
communities. Qimao (Cherchen) County officials offered a payment of
10,000 yuan per year for five years to newly weds if one was Han and the
other a member of an ethnic minority. The households would also receive
priority for housing and employment, better support for their children’s
education and healthcare. The local county head said that such marriages



produced ‘positive energy’ through which Xinjiang could realize Xi
Jinping’s calls for a ‘China Dream’. Xi had called for more Uighurs to be
moved to Han-dominated parts of China. He called on the party to ensure
that ‘correct views about the motherland and the nation’ be established
among China’s ethnic groups so that all would recognize the ‘great moth-
erland’ (New York Times, 2 September 2014).
Such approaches are unlikely to resolve the problem and, while repres-
sion may work over the short term, it and the suppression of Uighur cul-
ture and identity will create the ground for unrest and resentment over the
long term.
However, the Tibetans (6.3 million) and the Uighurs (10.1 million),
the main ethnic groups in Xinjiang, are not united groups internally.
With respect to Tibet, the CCP has had some success in trying to cir-
cumvent the authority of the Dalai Lama by developing local Buddhist
leaders more sympathetic to Beijing. The Panchen Lama, the second
most important religious leader, did not flee to India and was used by
Beijing to mediate with Buddhist groups domestically. However, the
former Panchen’s death in 1989 and the debacle of finding a successor,
combined with the heavy hand of repression from the late 1980s, seem
to have undermined Beijing’s attempts to build Tibetan loyalty. A fur-
ther blow to Beijing came in December 1999 when the young religious
leader, whom the CCP was grooming to mediate on its behalf with the
Tibetan community, fled to join the Dalai Lama in India.
The tension between Han and non-Han peoples is a legitimate
topic for discussion in China; indeed it was legitimated by Mao in
1956 when he referred to it as one of the Ten Great Relationships that
marked the post-1949 political landscape. However, in some cases
it is the tensions between different minorities with their own unique
cultural and historical origins that are more important. In the border
areas of Yunnan, some villagers never met any Han Chinese. In fact,
many minorities in Yunnan (constituting 33.4 per cent of the provin-
cial population in 2012), such as the Bai (3.4 per cent), Miao (2.6 per
cent) and Hani (3.6 per cent), are more likely to complain about the
way the Yi (10.6 per cent) dominate the ethnic minorities’ administra-
tive networks in the province. This, they feel, enables the Yi to dis-
pense a disproportionate amount of largesse to their own group.
Many of the ethnic groups living in the Yunnan border region are
closely related to groups in Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, and indeed
the border is quite porous and seems to have become more so since
the reforms began. Cross-border trade and work is common. While the
main roads have border posts and each village has a border office, there
is little attempt to stop this casual movement. In the village of Mengla

one can see the hills of Myanmar across the fields and for many the
border is secondary to economic activity. I met a former local head of
the village driving a four-wheel drive Toyota jeep with Thai number
plates, indicating the extent of his business travels. When asked about
whether he needed to affix Yunnan plates to the car, he replied that as
he had been head of the border patrols and knew the local police he
could drive wherever he needed to go in Yunnan with the Thai plates
and, besides, much of his work was across the border. His optimism
was not entirely justified as at least once he was stopped by the police
on his way to the provincial capital of Kunming.
Many of the minorities, despite their special status, are for all intents
and purposes assimilated. This is the case with China’s two largest
minorities in 2010, the Zhuang (16.9 million) and the Manchu (10.4
million) and to a lesser extent with the Muslim Hui (10.6 million). The
Zhuang live primarily in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
that borders on Vietnam. Despite their distinctive Dai language,
a language common to a number of other groups in the south-west,
they have effectively adopted a Han lifestyle. It was the Manchus
who established the Qing dynasty (ad 1644–1911) and were the last
imperial rulers before the Republic was established in 1911. Many
have suggested that their survival as imperial rulers derived from the
Sinification of their practices. While a Manchu language survives, it
is used by very few. The Hui are an interesting group, with the larg-
est concentration in the north-west (the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous
Region) but they also live in many cities such as Xi’an (Shaanxi),
Kunming (Yunnan) and even in Beijing. They speak the national lan-
guage (Mandarin, or guoyu) and are indistinguishable from their Han
neighbours except for their cuisine and worship in mosques.
Last but not least, we should note that the broad classification of
Han Chinese conceals great diversity within the group itself. Even the
national language is a fairly recent construct and many of the Han
Chinese actually speak other languages. These are more commonly
referred to as dialects because the written script is the same. In reality,
they can be as different as English and German. The national language is
derived from the language spoken around Beijing. As a part of its drive
to bring unity and to increase literacy, the CCP both simplified the writ-
ten characters and promoted the use of the national language in schools
and through radio and television. As a result, those who have enjoyed
basic schooling can speak some of the national language. Whenever I am
in non-Han villages one of the easiest ways to communicate is to seek
out school-age children and to ask them to act as interpreters for their
parents and grandparents, many of whom may speak only a few words
of the national language at best. In one village, a couple of hours’ bike
ride from the tourist destination of Yangshuo, I chatted with one of the
village elders through his grandson who served as interpreter. He was

particularly interested in trying foreign cigarettes. My colleague offered

him one that he finished in one puff and dismissively discarded: not a
patch on his home-grown tobacco, a whiff of which would seriously
damage your health. He seemed blasé in the presence of foreigners, unu-
sual at the time. I asked him if many foreigners came to the village. He
thought for a second, drew on his cigarette and replied in a matter-of-
fact tone, ‘Oh yes, one came here about 40 years ago’.
The home language, even for many Han, is quite distinct, with about
30 per cent (some 350 million) speaking something other than the
national language at home. In Guangdong the language is Cantonese
(Yue), while various dialects of Minnan are spoken throughout Fujian;
Gan is spoken in Jiangxi and Wu in Shanghai. Before communications
improved it is said that travelling up the Yangzi Valley one would have
to change languages at each county town. This may be apocryphal but
it indicates how fragmented local Chinese society was until the 20th
century. An important part of the nation-building process for the CCP
has therefore been to build a common language. In this it has been
fairly successful with, at least, the written script which is understood
by all those who are literate. The official figures for 2012 claim that
only 4.96 per cent of the population is illiterate (persons over 15 years
of age), with Beijing leading the way in terms of illiteracy at 1.46
per cent and Tibet bringing up the rear at 34.81 per cent. Nationally,
the illiteracy rate among men is 2.67 per cent and among women 7.32
per cent. For those who cannot read there has been a continual bom-
bardment of officially approved news through radio and television,
although now, with other outlets, official news can often be ignored. In
the Cultural Revolution, there were even communal loudspeakers that
dictated the pace of one’s life from when one woke up until one went
to sleep. I remember lying in bed one morning trying to work out what
was different and why I felt so relaxed before I realized that someone
had cut the wires on the campus speakers. It was bliss to lie in bed and
not listen to the blare of early morning wake-up routines and homage
to the ‘Great Leader’, Mao Zedong.
So long as the leadership speaks with one voice this system has
been remarkably successful in providing acceptance for the official
narrative. In 1991 I was visiting relatives in Shashi, a town of some
3 million inhabitants, a few hours up the Yangzi from Wuhan. They
were considered free-thinking liberals in Shashi and I was surprised
when we talked of the 1989 student-led demonstrations in Beijing and
they referred to them as chaos and a counter-revolutionary uprising
rather than using the milder phrases used by liberals in Beijing. When
I asked them how they knew this, they replied that it was true because
they had read about it in the People’s Daily, the official media organ
of the CCP, and seen it on Central Television. In the same way, the

CCP was successful in getting most of its citizens to believe that the
NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999
had been a deliberate act of provocation by the USA. The use of the
media to build up patriotic sentiment at the time of the Olympics in
the summer of 2008 is another example of how effective the media
can be. However, the rise of the new media provides China’s citizens
with alternative information sources and presents the old propaganda
system with a new challenge (see Box 1.2). Blogs and instant messag-
ing have become commonplace, with many not carrying approved
information or analysis. Nationalists have used the new media to push
the leadership to undertake sterner policy positions towards Japan
and the US than it may have done otherwise. In response, the CCP
has employed an army of people to monitor the Internet and also to
write pro-party messages and to attempt to guide discussion. This lat-
ter group has been ridiculed as the ‘50-cent party’ for the payment they
receive for each pro-government posting. Under Xi Jinping, there has
been a more concerted crackdown on Internet opinion leaders.
Box 1.2 SARS and the Media

The outbreak of SARS in 2002–03 reveals the problems that the CCP has
in controlling the message but also how quickly the propaganda system
can adapt to new challenges. While some thought that the experience
might lead to a shift in official reporting, as it did when the major Sichuan
earthquake struck in 2008, there is little evidence of a systemic shift. In
January 2003, initial reporting of a new disease by Guangdong authori-
ties ridiculed the idea that there was a problem; and a February press
conference took the same view. Earlier, provincial health authorities in
Guangzhou had informed doctors of a new disease but requested that the
public not be informed. It was instant messaging that forced the provincial
leadership to make some kind of public acknowledgement. According to
Guangdong Mobile the message ‘There is a fatal flu in Guangzhou’ was
sent over 120 million times in the space of three days. Officials responded
that there was indeed a disease but that it was completely under control.
It wasn’t. This was the regular pattern. Eventually, a retired army doctor,
irate at the cover-up, tried to notify the Chinese press of the problem and,
when unsuccessful, passed the information to foreign outlets. The inter-
national coverage made it impossible for the government to maintain the
stance that there was only a small problem and that basically everything
was under control. Belatedly on 20 April a press conference was held
that appeared to signal a significant change in government attitude and
openness. However, the traditional propaganda system soon moved into
gear with a new campaign to mobilize people’s support for the struggle



against SARS while introducing restrictions on reporting. This was more
familiar ground and the media was filled with patriotic accounts of indi-
viduals struggling against heroic odds and making personal sacrifices to
defeat SARS, including patriotic ditties such as ‘Angels in White Coats’.
Traditional CCP language now took over and, sure enough, on 1 May, Hu
Jintao declared that China was engaged in a ‘people’s war’ against SARS
for which the ‘masses’ should be mobilized. Constraints on the media
were soon put back in place and the limited openness about SARS did
not spread to other areas. Publications were requested to stop reporting
on sensitive issues and media outlets and academics were warned not to
analyse how the government had dealt with the virus. Some of those who
had reported honestly came in for criticism and official rebuke.
Source: Saich, 2006.
The aforementioned linguistic affiliations and local ties have, if

anything, strengthened with the reforms. Within the localities, these
ties are reinforced by various local festivities and deities and even, for
many, by the local cuisine. There is a clear cultural divide between the
north of the country and the south. The southern parts were effectively
integrated into China only in the later part of the Song dynasty (ad
960–1279) (Blum, 2000, p. 82). The north is the political capital and
operates under a more bureaucratic culture while the south represents
the more open, cosmopolitan trading culture. The rise of a national-
ist discourse in the mid-1990s and anti-American tracts such as The
China That Can Say No (Song et al., 1996) and Behind the Scene of
Demonizing China (Li et al., 1996) also led to a rise in publications that
stressed local identity and cultural essence. Books appeared on what it
is to be Shanghainese or Sichuanese and even related local cooking to
identity. The spicy food of Sichuan and the chilli tastes of Hunan cook-
ing contrast markedly with the fish and steamed food of Guangdong
or Shanghai, or the noodle soups of Shaanxi. Hunan even had Mao
Zedong patronize the phrase that you could not be a revolutionary if
you could not eat peppery food.
It is also in the south that lineage and clan play an important role
in rural life, much more than in the north. In many villages I have vis-
ited in the south, large lineage halls have been restored or built anew
and clearly form the most important organizing point for political and
socio-economic exchange. This re-emergence of more overt traditional
power structures has made the implementation of party rule more diffi-
cult. In many villages the party group is ineffective and often, where it
is effective, the party secretary and lineage head are one and the same
(see Box 1.3). A number of officials involved with the programme to

introduce direct elections into China’s villages complained that the

elections are decided by the most important lineage and that there is
little the party or the higher-level administrative authorities can do to
alter this.
Box 1.3 Village Leadership and Clans

Yantian Village lies just over the border from Shenzhen and has become
a key part of the global production chain, having been home at its
peak to over 400 foreign-invested enterprises and 150,000 migrant
workers. Village life, economics and politics are dominated by the Deng
clan. Their ancestral hall has pride of place in the village, listing all the
Dengs in China over the last 1,000 years, with a special room for Deng
Xiaoping, who they count as one of their own. A Deng has always been
party secretary and, in 2014, six out of the seven village party committee
members were surnamed Deng, as were four out of the five villagers’ com-
mittee members and six out of the seven members of the village economic
shareholding cooperatives that oversee the wealth of the village and its
distribution.
Source: Saich and Hu, 2012.
These local identities are reinforced by religious practices and cus-

toms. While China is officially an atheist country, the CCP has had no
choice but to tolerate religious practice so long as it is not seen as a chal-
lenge to state power. The CCP has adopted a series of secular official cel-
ebrations that mark key dates of the revolution or communist tradition
(such as 1 October – National Day; or 1 May – International Labour
Day), but the most important festivals have to do with Chinese tradi-
tion (Chinese New Year – a week in January or February; or Qing Ming,
grave sweeping – early April) and local customs. Local religious worship
and traditional practices have blossomed since the reforms began but
organized religion that stresses an allegiance beyond the CCP is viewed
with suspicion and usually repressed. This is the case not only with
Tibetan Buddhism, because of the presence of the Tibetan government-
in-exile under the spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama, but also with
Christianity. Not surprisingly it is difficult to get a number of how many
people practise these religions. Official statistics estimate around 100
million religious believers, but a 2007 survey led by Fenggang Yang of
Purdue University suggested that only 15 per cent of the Chinese people
were actually ‘atheists’. Even 17 per cent of the CCP or Youth League
members identified themselves with a specific religion, with 65 per cent
claiming to have engaged in religious practices during the previous year.
Buddhism dominates with 185 million self-identified followers (and 12

per cent of CCP members!), while a much lower 33 million identify as

Christian, although a further 40 per cent said they either believe Jesus
existed or they had participated in Christian activities. Most, however,
followed traditional practices with 754 million engaging in ancestor
worship. Fully 175 million adopted Daoist practices, while 23 million
identified themselves as Muslim (Yang and Hu, 2012).
As noted, Buddhism is widespread across three main branches:
Tibetan Buddhism (with four major sects), Theravada Buddhism and
a mixture of Chinese folk traditions and Buddhism. However, practi-
tioners may also follow another religion, such as Daoism, thus making
it difficult to assess the true numbers (Blum, 2000, p. 88). Figures are
similarly imprecise concerning followers of Daoism and folk religion but
are in the realm of 250 million (Donald and Benewick, 2005, p. 84). The
CCP’s attitude towards local religion is also ambivalent. It denounces
what it sees as ‘superstitious’ practices and in the Cultural Revolution it
destroyed not only places of worship but also sought to stamp out prac-
tices such as ancestor worship and fortune telling. However, unless there
is a perceived political threat, it now tolerates a wide range of locally
based religious worship. In fact, there has been a debate about the value
of belief within the CCP and in recent years a more positive view has
been apparent.
Some of these local practices can be quite striking. In Yunnan,
I watched a video of the exorcism of spirits that had possessed the body
of a young, female researcher from the Yunnan Academy of Social
Sciences; I have also witnessed traditional ceremonies to welcome young
men into manhood, overseen by local party officials. The young anthro-
pologist in the video had been carrying out research in a remote moun-
tain area and the village elder took pity on her when she was about to
return to the city possessed by an evil spirit. Normally, he did not care
about city folk and did not care whether they carried away evil spirits.
But he felt that she was a good person and as a result he was personally
willing to oversee the lengthy process to exorcise the evil spirits before
allowing her departure.
The local and national CCP has to make accommodation for these
religious practices. Generally, worship of local deities and ancestors is
tolerated but organized religion or beliefs that have external connections
are monitored more closely. However, should a belief system develop an
extensive following that crosses administrative jurisdictions, it may come
in for harsher treatment. The Central Party School has set up a research
group in recent years to study belief and moved towards the conclu-
sion that it could play a positive role in providing social cohesion. The
consensus view was that individuals could decide on their own spiritual
beliefs but that it was the role of the state (read CCP) that would define
the moral direction for society as a whole.

The CCP refuses to recognize the authority of the Catholic Church

and cracks down hard on those who profess allegiance, often arresting
priests who accept the Vatican’s authority. Instead, practising Catholics
are required to belong to the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, an
organization that follows the ranks and salary scales of the state admin-
istrative system. CCP suspicion of Christianity is compounded by the
association of missionaries with imperialism before 1949. As a result, all
missionary activity is banned in China, though it is not very difficult to
find active missionaries in both the cities and the countryside. The num-
ber may exceed 10,000 and there is a large underground trade in Bibles.
Some missionaries have been involved in rural development projects and
the local authorities have tolerated their work as long as they do not
become too public with their beliefs.
Accommodation is seen best in those areas where overseas Chinese
investment has been vital to local economic health and where these
investors have allied with the local population to demand the restoration
of local lineage houses or temples (see Box 1.4). Should traditional prac-
tices link up across localities and be perceived as a threat, the CCP will
move swiftly to crack down. This was the case with a qigong-related sect
(a type of exercise and breathing regime) called the Falun Gong (Skills
of the Wheel of Law) that came to prominence after a large gathering of
its followers surrounded party headquarters in Beijing in April 1999 fol-
lowing criticism of its organization. This woke up China’s senior leaders
to the potential of such faith-based movements to inspire loyalty. This
concern and the humiliation that senior leaders felt at being caught by
surprise led to a draconian crackdown on the organization and a subse-
quent campaign to discredit it as a superstitious cult. Thousands of its
members have been arrested and it has also led to the investigation of a
number of similar organizations.
Box 1.4 A Tale of Two Religions – Buddhism

and Christianity
In Wuxi, overseas Chinese have donated money to erect an enormous gold
leaf Buddha that overlooks the local lake. It is the dominant site in the
locality. However, it was not constructed without controversy. The local
propaganda bureau set the building of the Buddha as one of the three
great tasks for completion in 1997, one of the other tasks being to strive
to ensure the successful return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. This
caused an uproar when reported to the Propaganda Department in Beijing,
which claimed that the erection of a Buddha representing a backward



superstition could in no way be equated with the ‘glorious task’ of regain-
ing sovereignty over Hong Kong. The Wuxi party authorities were forced
to withdraw it from the glorious three tasks for 1997, yet the Buddha was
finished the next year!
Source: Field visit, 1999.
In Wenzhou, there was a more complex outcome surrounding the demoli-

tion of the Sanjiang Church that was constructed after US$3.2 million had
been raised and the local government had described it as a ‘model project’.
Wenzhou is home to a large Christian community, with claims that 15 per
cent of the 7 million inhabitants attend church. The church as constructed
was around five times the original plan that was approved, and in 2013
and 2014, as local governments were instructed to crackdown on illegal
structures, it became a focus of attention. Despite a reported compromise
and attempts by local worshippers to protect the church it was bulldozed
and demolished entirely. Perhaps out-of-plan party and government build-
ings will receive similar treatment!
Source: Kate Tray, Christianity Today, 2 May 2014.
The impact of CCP policy
The CCP’s vision of a modern state and its policies have had a marked
impact on the physical structure of towns and countryside as well as
on people’s lives. The CCP came to power in 1949 with a vision of
the future that was inspired by the Soviet Union. To be modern was to
be urban, industrial and with production socialized. The CCP despised
the private sphere, and policy during the early1950s sought to eradi-
cate what remained of private industry in the urban areas. Yet, at the
same time, there was a suspicion of the cities as carriers of indolence,
corruption and other traits that ran counter to the perceived revolu-
tionary heritage. The urbanization rate was only 17.9 per cent in 1978
and, although it has risen to 52.6 per cent in 2012, it is still relatively
low in terms of the level of economic development.
The effects of post-1949 CCP policy produced a uniform, drab
urban environment. With the exception of a few cities, such as Beijing,
Xi’an and Pingyao that have an imperial heritage, or Shanghai with
its confluence of colonial styles, virtually all other cities adopted the
dour, grey architecture of the Soviet era. Many city walls, even includ-
ing much of Beijing, were ripped down to make way for the new,
wider roads and work-unit apartment blocks. Those who favoured
urban planning that would have afforded greater protection to China’s

historical heritage were often drowned out by those who favoured the
Soviet-style plan. During the anti-rightist campaign of the 1950s and
the Cultural Revolution, defenders were denounced for their bourgeois
and/or feudal thinking. Much of what remained of the old cities was
torn down to accommodate the building boom of the 1990s. Some
even calculated that more of old Beijing was lost to real estate devel-
opers in the 1990s than in any other decade during the 20th century,
which included the Cultural Revolution, the Japanese invasion and the
civil war.
The post-1949 desire to build up rapidly the industrial base also had
a major impact on the urban landscape as the CCP sought to develop
the heavy industrial sector. Smokestack factories became a familiar
part of many cities, with little notion of zoning and protection of green
areas. Scenes of the new urban industrial China were proudly dis-
played on the propaganda posters of the time. Even depictions of rural
China would include a smoking chimneystack or a hanging power line.
In part, the industrialization of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) was
built on the legacy of the past. The north-east became the industrial
powerhouse with its legacy from the Japanese control of Manchuria
that featured the chemical, steel and coal industries. This made the
urban north-east one of the privileged areas of the Maoist period, a
privilege that has steadily eroded since the reforms were introduced in
1978, so much so that in 2003 a ‘Revive the North-east’ programme
was introduced (Chung et al., 2009).
The second main area for heavy industrial development was Sichuan,
especially Chongqing. This had two origins. First, the Guomindang
(GMD; Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party with which the CCP fought
two civil wars to gain power) that retreated to Chongqing after the
Japanese invasion of 1937 moved significant industry to the south-
west. This inheritance was built upon by the CCP with the post-1949
policy to industrialize the hinterland as well as to protect security
concerns. Following the Sino-Soviet split (1960), Mao became increas-
ingly concerned about the potential of war with the Soviets and even
the possibility of nuclear conflict. This led to the policy to develop
the industrial ‘third front’, that was based in Sichuan and further in
the south-west, and that built on earlier investment in the north-west
(Naughton, 1988, pp. 351–86). There was a massive redeployment of
investment, almost 50 per cent, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s
to build an industrial base and nuclear facility that could resist a Soviet
attack. By the 1990s it presented Sichuan and Chongqing with signifi-
cant problems of outdated industry.
In the countryside the CCP first abolished the old landlord sys-
tem and, as a result of peasant expectations and the pre-1949 policy,
carried out land reform by way of redistribution to the household.

However, by the mid-1950s steps were taken towards collectiviza-

tion in order for the state to extract the funds necessary to feed its
industrialization programme. The division of China into 50,000 rural
communes brought uniformity to political administration in the coun-
tryside that lasted until the early 1980s when the communes were
dismantled and a return of household farming was promoted. The pro-
motion of the communes brought a far greater uniformity to the visual
impression of rural life than the varied topography would suggest. It
also allowed the CCP to push nationwide policies while ignoring the
law of comparative economic advantage. The most damaging of such
policies was the promotion of ‘taking grain as the key link’ to accom-
pany the industrial policy of ‘taking steel as the key link’. The former
led many communes to turn over ill-suited land to grain production.
Slopes were cleared of tree cover and grazing land was ploughed
under to meet mandatory grain production targets. Not only did this
depress local incomes, it also caused significant environmental damage
(Shapiro, 2001).
The other major policy that transformed the physical image of the
countryside was the promotion of small-scale industry during the
Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1958–60) as a concerted programme for
rural industrialization. The most notorious result was the ‘backyard
steel furnaces’ that produced a huge volume of useless steel that con-
sumed scarce resources. Other experiments such as the creation of
small electric power generators and chemical fertilizer plants provided
the legacy for an equally dramatic transformation of the countryside in
the 1980s and 1990s with the massive growth of township and village
enterprises (TVEs).
The Maoist lack of concern and the privileging of production over
all other factors enhanced the degradation of the environment. This
perspective was enthusiastically adopted by Mao Zedong, who saw
nature as something to be conquered and tamed and who did not
appreciate that there are natural limits that resource endowments place
on growth. Not only did the development strategy favour rapid exploi-
tation of natural resources to build up the heavy industrial base, but
the associated policy of below-cost pricing for water, coal and other
inputs contributed further to such exploitation. Walking by office
buildings with lights burning during the weekends and past bathrooms
with constantly running taps that could not be turned off even if one
tried revealed the irrelevance of water or electricity prices to workplace
and domestic budgets.
The rapid economic growth and urbanization in the years after 1975
have come at the cost of enormous environmental damage – and natu-
ral resource constraints are a potential brake on China’s future devel-
opment. The political economy of the reforms has in many ways been

inimical to the development of an effective policy to control environ-

mental pollution (for a critical analysis, see Economy, 2004). In 2010,
an official report estimated the cost of environmental degradation was
roughly US$230 billion, 3.5 per cent of GDP, a three-fold increase
from 2004 (New York Times, 29 March 2013).
The economic reforms introduced since 1978 have also had a signifi-
cant impact on the physical look of both urban and rural China while
binding the two closer together than during the Mao years. The reforms
have released the tight grip of the party and state over local society and
have allowed space for the return of local enterprise and even private
entrepreneurship. Cities in contemporary China are certainly live-
lier and less homogeneous than they were in Mao’s China. The drab
Stalinesque town centres have been transformed in many cities with
the rise of gleaming, glass-fronted skyscrapers housing luxury offices,
shopping malls and the ubiquitous McDonald’s. These new symbols of
modernization have been brought about by the bulldozing of much of
the old architecture and housing that survived the Maoist blitz. While
it is true that much of the housing was sub-standard, the redevelopment
and loss of family homes to relocate to sterile new apartments far from
the city centre have met with resistance and sit-ins.
The historical heritage has often been bulldozed away in the
name of a new concept of progress. Kunming was chosen to host
the International Flower Exhibition in the late 1990s and this led
to a frenzy of development and demolition. As a result, many of the
charming old lanes around the Cuihu Lake area were demolished to
make way for new buildings. When I asked a local official why they
preferred demolition to restoration, he replied that the old lanes repre-
sented the past and backwardness and the foreigners who would come
to the Exhibition would think of China as a poor country if they were
to see them. As a result, communities were broken up and dispersed in
the name of modernity. The new buildings represented the future and
the modern. Unfortunately, to Western eyes, the building material of
choice in south-west China is white tile, making most buildings look
like inverted public lavatories covered with opaque deep-sea-blue glass.
In hosting the World Expo in 2010, the Shanghai authorities organized
neighbourhood training sessions on correct behaviour. They were par-
ticularly concerned about laundry, especially underwear, hanging out on
the streets to dry and the habit of old men to roll up their undershirts
in the hot weather to reveal their torsos. These were explained as things
that would give a bad impression to foreigners and might be interpreted
as ‘backward’ habits.
China’s cities are now playgrounds for the world’s major and most
adventurous architects. The vision of downtown Manhattan has
replaced that of the Soviet Union for what a modern city should look

like. The array and design of skyscrapers are impressive and lax con-
trols over building codes has meant that designs that might require
extensive review in the West can be developed and constructed in
record time in China. It is not surprising that many foreigners have
joked that the crane is the national bird of China.
However, the rush to urbanize has also led to speculation, the con-
struction of ‘ghost towns’ and citizens who have tried to resist forced
removals, living on in their ‘nail houses’, while demolition goes on
around them. The poster child for a ‘ghost city’ has been Ordos in
Inner Mongolia. The city is in the coal-rich area of the province that
contains almost one-sixth of the nation’s reserves. Within Ordos,
Kangbashi New District was planned to house 1 million residents by
2010 but today it has a population of only 30,000 to 50,000. The
urbanization drive pushed by the national government has led some
local governments to boost GDP rates by building empty urban areas.
This latent rush to urbanize has caused many forced relocations and
every now and then pictures have been posted of individuals who
have tried to hold out and hope for better compensation or housing or
merely to preserve their traditional homes.
This new architecture also reinforces the view of state power as
being reified in the many new gleaming, marble-decked buildings
constructed to house the local party, government and judicial authori-
ties. In Wuxi, an affluent reform-minded city in Jiangsu several hours
from Shanghai, I asked local officials about this phenomenon. I won-
dered aloud whether they thought that such ostentatious signs of state
power and public spending were appropriate in the modern world
and whether local citizens felt disturbed to see so much spending on
civic buildings. The local officials were dumbfounded and amused by
my question. It had never occurred to them to think about this, and
when they did, they replied that it was indeed appropriate as it was
the party that had provided the correct guidance and policies for
China’s take-off. They may be correct, and such graphic demonstra-
tions of state power are a universal phenomenon. Interestingly, sitting
on the hills overlooking the famous lake of Wuxi is not only the Gold
Buddha, representing the return of belief, but also the enormous villa
that belonged to one of China’s top capitalists, Rong Yiren, who also
served as president of China, representing the return of the legitimacy
of private capital in China. So there in one city, the architecture rep-
resents three facets of modern China that have to find a new modus
vivendi – state power, popular religion and private capital. Even in poorer
provinces such ostentatious buildings for party and state are common.
This is changing. Slowly but surely, citizens and Netizens, those
who are active online, have become more critical of lavish spending
on government and party facilities. Certainly Xi Jinping has sought

to control the construction of lavish government and party buildings.

In 2012, it was announced that China’s largest government building,
indeed one of the largest buildings in the world, in Shandong’s capital
of Ji’nan had been completed at a cost of a cool $641 million, causing
much outrage. The People’s Daily (13 May 2013), the CCP’s official
mouthpiece, noted that ‘luxury buildings are built to satisfy the pomp-
ous selfish desires of certain people, but have hurt the feelings of the
common people’. The article criticized offices built in the fashion of
the White House and local squares bigger than Tiananmen in the heart
of Beijing.
The new icons of urban modernity tower above a more varied urban
environment that is a product of the reforms. I remember in 1976 the
delight with which we greeted a street vendor in central Beijing who
was selling homemade toys for a few cents. Now the streets teem with
so many vendors that one is more likely to run away and seek refuge
from the hawkers and traders. The gradual release first of rural mar-
kets and later of rural produce to be sold in the cities has led to a much
more diverse urban street life. The markets, restaurants and discos are
signs of the new entrepreneurship or official organizations moonlight-
ing to make a bit of extra money. The restaurants and nightclubs are
filled with the beneficiaries of reform: the private entrepreneurs, those
involved in the new economy, the managerial elites and the politically
well connected. Periodic curbs on government entertaining are met
with horror by the owners of these establishments. When Xi Jinping
took power he launched an austerity campaign on government spend-
ing. As a result, in 2012 money spent on meetings, international trips
and vehicles fell by 53, 39 and 10 per cent respectively. In the first nine
months of 2013, sales of Remy Martin fell 12 per cent. Cunning man-
agers of five-star hotels scrambled to downgrade their ratings so that
officials could still wine and dine there.
The reforms have also changed what is for sale in stores. During the
Cultural Revolution by and large one bought what one could get if
one had the money and the correct ration coupons. Entering a depart-
ment store was not a particularly energizing experience as choice was
limited, quality was poor and service distinctly surly. Two phrases that
you quickly became acquainted with were mei youle (don’t have it)
and mai wanle (sold out). Now film and rock stars are used to pro-
mote new products and open stores. Competition has caused even
state-run stores to become more entrepreneurial and to offer services
with grudging smiles rather than scowls. Most of the luxury goods that
were kept in special stores for senior officials and foreigners are now
generally available for anyone who has the money.
Chinese consumers are now major buyers of luxury products, repre-
senting 29 per cent of the global total. However, many of these purchases

are made outside of China, making the Chinese the global leaders (The
Economist, 25 January 2014). In 2013, there were 93.7 million foreign
journeys from China, and Chinese tourists are now the biggest global
spenders (US$129 billion in 2013, The Economist, 19 April 2014).
Reform has even changed the content of official bookstores such as
the Foreign Languages Bookstore on Beijing’s main shopping street.
Its transformation has been a bellwether of the reforms. In the 1970s
and 1980s its main stock was the collected works in foreign languages
of China’s leaders, posters of revolutionary icons such as Stalin and
Enver Hoxha, and English-language textbooks that carried revolu-
tionary parables or stories of friendship between Chinese and foreign
citizens. When I have visited in recent years, there was barely a col-
lected work in sight and no revolutionary icon to be found. In their
place were Harvard Business School textbooks and manuals on how
to make money or manage financial transactions. The posters had
been replaced by a wide choice of Western novels, cassettes and DVDs
introducing the latest sounds and fashions. Learning English by revolu-
tionary parable has been replaced by learning English through business
management.
The urban one-child per couple policy, now being relaxed, has
affected shopping. Toy shops and department stores are now the icons
of a happy family life, with parents lavishing relatively large sums to
pamper the ‘new little emperors’ of modern China. As one old party
wag commented, they are the hope for greater party accountability in
the future. In his view they have been so spoilt and they so dominate
household spending and priorities that there is no way that they will
listen passively and unquestioningly to party directives when they grow
older! They will be more likely to demand results to improve the qual-
ity of their lives and to provide greater accountability.
Not all have money to spend in this new urban China. There have
been beneficiaries but there have also been losers – workers in ineffi-
cient state-owned enterprises, the aged with no family dependents and
some migrants and farmers engaged exclusively in grain production.
The increasing pressure of marketization and the need to cut costs and
increase profits have led to a rapid increase in lay-offs from the old SOEs
in the 1990s. While the worst effects for many were cushioned either
through supplemental income from the state or the retention of low-
cost housing and medical provisions, there is no doubt that for some
it has been a hard transition. The favoured north-east and Sichuan of
the Maoist period have become the rust-belts of the early 21st century.
It is noticeable that provinces such as Liaoning and Jilin that used to
be among the wealthiest during the Mao years have become relatively
poorer in the reform period. By contrast, Guangdong, one of the poorest
provinces under Mao, has become the wealthiest under reform.

The impact of restructuring has fallen unduly heavily on women.

In most SOEs, they were the first to be laid off and were the last to
be rehired. In many state organizations, women are being persuaded
to take early retirement – usually around age 45 and, on occasion,
even earlier. The chances of finding new, legal employment are slim.
The elderly and the single have also been vulnerable. With workplaces
shedding their social welfare responsibilities and a new system only
slowly coming into place, old age or divorce are much more threaten-
ing than in the days of cradle-to-grave socialist care for the elite of the
urban industrial working class.
A rise in the divorce rate has been a by-product of reforms and there
has been much hand-wringing in the Chinese press. While some see
it as a breakdown of social mores, others have heralded it as a posi-
tive sign of modernization, pointing to the higher divorce rates in the
‘developed West’. The divorce rate rose from 0.44 per 1,000 marriages
in 1985 to a high of 2.29 in 2012, with extra-marital affairs being the
main cause of divorce. The north-east provinces and Chongqing have
comparatively high divorce numbers and Sichuan (250,984 in 2012)
has the highest, perhaps reflecting the economic distress of those areas.
Tibet has the lowest rate (1,339 in 2012). The rates might seem low
but, for a society coming out of the Mao years of enforced social con-
formity and repression of sexual desire (unless you happened to be
Mao himself), it is still seen as a disturbing increase. The early rise in
divorce rates was related to people shaking off political marriages that
they undertook during the Cultural Revolution. In those years, rather
than feelings of love, correct class background and political stance
were more important for finding urban marriage partners. This led to
many loveless marriages in urban areas for the now 60-somethings,
leading not only to rising divorce rates but also to increases in extra-
marital affairs as well as the enormous popularity of books and films
like The Bridges of Madison County.
I have sat through many discussions with older urban residents
about nostalgia for the old days. Forgetting the famine of the Great
Leap Forward and the chaos and violence of the Cultural Revolution,
they reminisce about the ‘golden days’ when life was secure, there was
basic healthcare and the streets were safe. For many, reforms have
meant bewildering choices, loss of security, rising crime and declining
personal safety, and a younger generation who treat their elders with
less respect. Many such people have been attracted by the ‘leftist’ mani-
festos published by former Maoist party veterans. These criticize the
‘capitalism’ and ‘materialism’ and new inequalities of current policy
and call for a return to stricter discipline, party control and central
state planning. Others have been attracted to a variety of religious and
popular movements such as the Falun Gong. This is just the tip of the

iceberg as many seek to find something that brings meaning to their

life in such a turbulent world.
It is the migrants who have received popular and official blame
for the increase in crime, dirt and disease in urban China. While such
hyperbole is usually unjustified, migrants are a feature of the post-
Mao reforms. There have been previous waves of migration post-1949
but, at the end of 2012, the migrant population was estimated at over
262.6 million. The decline in farming incomes and the pull of better-
paid work in the cities have led many young men, and increasingly
women, to abandon the harsh conditions of rural labour for higher
wages in the cities. The construction boom starting in the mid-1990s
was a major source of employment as was the expansion of township
and village enterprises and the foreign-invested manufacturing enter-
prises that have mushroomed in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
However, life in the cities, while perhaps not as harsh as that in the
countryside, has not been easy. Migrants tend to live in sub-standard
or shanty-housing or in dormitories provided by their employers. In
the former, they often live together in native-place villages. A major
problem for the migrants is that their place of registration is still
considered to be in the countryside and thus they have been frus-
trated with respect to receiving medical care or access to education,
despite the policy reforms. One development has been the growth of
‘urban villages’ in major cities, which are low-cost, illegal settlements.
Another has been the development of ‘ant tribes’, communities of uni-
versity graduates who have not yet found decent jobs and live in small
communities, often underground, where rent is cheap.
As noted, the migrants have been important to the growth of not
only the non-state sector but also to the development of new growth
areas along the coast. The CCP has promoted a strategy of coastal
growth while allowing a progressive running down of the old indus-
trial areas. This began with the promotion of trade as a key compo-
nent of the new policy and the licensing of the four SEZs in 1980
that provided a series of incentives for foreign enterprises and joint
ventures. They were set up primarily to absorb overseas Chinese
investment, thus turning Hong Kong millionaires into billionaires. The
programme expanded from the four zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou
and Xiamen) under Zhao Ziyang by the late 1980s to a coastal zone
development strategy. Shenzhen, the first major zone over the border
from Hong Kong, was just a small, sleepy village when I first passed
through in 1976. On the train ride from the border with Hong Kong
to Guangzhou one passed endless rice paddies, small clustered village
hamlets and the occasional water buffalo pulling a plough or swish-
ing their tails while bathing lazily in the river. A decade later, Shenzhen
was Asia’s newest metropolis with an urban centre full of towering

skyscrapers rising from the former paddies. It is now the most crowded
city in China with around 14 million residents in 2012 (of whom only
30 per cent have permanent resident status). In 1979, the population
was only 30,000. Interestingly, it is said to be home to 20 per cent of
China’s PhDs (Shenzhen Daily, 13 June 2007).
Very few rural areas have undergone such a dramatic transforma-
tion but official figures show a dramatic decline in the percentage of
those living in extreme poverty from over 80 per cent when reforms
began to just 12 per cent in 2010. It should be noted that there is the
emergence of an urban poor, with 21.43 million in 2012 receiving the
minimum living support. As these figures suggest, the reforms have
been equally dramatic in their effect on rural China. The communes
have been abandoned and farming returned to a household basis. As a
result, the wide fields and expanses of land have been divided up into
small parcels that are often guarded as crops ripen. The breakdown
of communal farming has led to an increase in theft of crops in the
countryside.
Migration has also affected the demographics of many rural vil-
lages and many who have remained behind have pulled out of farming
where there is a viable alternative. For the first time, in 2011 the num-
ber of those registered as living in the countryside fell below 50 per
cent. Those still farming are increasingly reliant on non-farm sources
of income such as remittances from migrants or wage labour in TVEs
or household businesses. Even for those who remain in agricultural
production there has been a shift away from the Maoist obsession
with grain production to other products that fetch a higher price in the
urban markets. Generally, with the low returns for grain production,
most only keep fields to fulfill their quotas. For a country that has
such a heavy pressure on the available land, it is disconcerting to see so
much good agricultural land being abandoned either because families
do not want to farm it or cannot because of migration or redeploy-
ment to more profitable non-agricultural work.
The composition of those farming has also changed. In many vil-
lages, males have moved in search of off-farm employment as have
many women of pre-marriage age. This has left farming in many areas
to the elderly and married women. Because of the low status and
income from these activities, there has been discussion as to whether
we are witnessing the ‘feminization’ of not just agriculture but also
poverty. Many villages seem to comprise only the elderly, children, the
sick and married women, who have to deal with all the household and
production affairs.
Migration and other social changes have also led to the increase
of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. For example, the
incidence of syphilis has increased from 0.17 per 100,000 in 1989 to

30.44 in 2012. Viral hepatitis and pulmonary tuberculosis remain,

however, the most prevalent communicable diseases (102.48 and 70.62
per 100,000 respectively). The figures for HIV/AIDS are not especially
high, with a prevalence of only 2.93 per 100,000, with the highest
mortality rate at 0.8591; but the disease has spread from original at-
risk populations (intravenous drug users and commercial sex workers)
to the population at large. Migrant male workers who have contracted
sexually transmitted diseases have brought them back to the village
where there may be no adequate healthcare. The spread of HIV/AIDS
has also been linked to poverty. Ethnic minorities represent 9 per cent
of the population but 40 per cent of the absolute poor and 36 per cent
of reported HIV/AIDS cases (information from Joan Kaufman). While
HIV/AIDS is now spreading among the heterosexual community and
from sexual activity with prostitutes, much of the spread has come
from needle sharing by drug addicts and earlier from the poor who
had to sell their blood to ‘blood snakes’ and to the government. The
mortality profile is changing as lifestyles change and, increasingly,
resembles that of urban, wealthier societies. In 2012, heart disease
(11.8 per cent of deaths), malignant tumours (22.96 per cent) and cer-
ebrovascular disease (20.61 per cent) were the main causes of death in
the rural areas.
With reforms rural China has become more varied than in the
past, with greater freedom for households to decide on what to pro-
duce, where to sell it and how to deploy their labour force. However,
reforms have not favoured all in the rural areas and the extension of
household-based farming and markets to areas where they are inap-
propriate has had adverse effects. For the absolute poor, many of
whom live in remote mountainous areas, liberalization and the
increased use of market forces have been of little benefit as they have
little if anything to sell. In fact, with increased prices for agricultural
inputs and the collapse of medical access, their living standards have
almost certainly declined. In addition, with financial pressures increas-
ing on local authorities, many have resorted to raising illegal fees and
levies that fall on the poor disproportionately.
The CCP’s vision of modernity has also intruded into rural life.
Clearly, the CCP still sees the future as urban and industrial. Policy
has always privileged these areas but other policies have also impacted
on rural life. In particular, the CCP sees nomadic or other traditional
farming practices as ‘backward’. As a result, CCP policy has tried to
organize nomadic and shifting cultivators into more permanent habi-
tats. More permanent settlements, of course, make it easier to control
activities and to pursue unpopular policies such as family planning.
In addition, policies have been pursued to bring urbanization to the
countryside.

The CCP has to rule over this increasingly diverse society while try-
ing to guide China into further integration with the world economy.
This is a daunting challenge. The CCP has also to provide an explana-
tion to its people of where the country is heading and offer some kind
of a moral compass. This is hard to do not only because of the diver-
sity but also because ideological orthodoxy appears to run counter to
the direction in which the economy and society are heading. It is hard
for General Secretary Xi Jinping, or any other senior leader, to provide
a genuine vision of China’s future as at best it would suggest a radi-
cally transformed role for the CCP and at worst perhaps no role at all.
If the future is an economy increasingly dominated by market forces
and integrated with the world economy, is a CCP that still professes
commitment to socialism and the state-owned sector, while harbouring
suspicion of foreign motives, the most effective organization to man-
age this? However much practice may move away from Marxism, the
ideology remains a crucial component of the CCP’s self-legitimation
(Kelly, 1991, p. 23). To abandon adherence would be impossible.
The gap between official rhetoric and social practice has widened
significantly under the reforms and is perhaps even greater than in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. While China’s
leaders claim ‘only socialism can save China’, students laugh that ‘only
China can save socialism’. The leadership has adopted a number of
linguistic phrases that seek to explain current reality while retaining
allegiance to socialism. The latest is that China is a ‘socialist market
economy’, while the phrase ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has
been used to cover a multitude of policies that are difficult to describe
as being conventionally socialist. This leads the CCP to think up
snappy phrases to encapsulate how they see the present and future. Hu
Jintao’s ‘scientific outlook on development’ is probably not as catchy
as Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’.
While Chinese society has become less ideological and even more
pluralistic, CCP ideology sets limits to how far reform can go. Party
leadership has retained its commitment throughout to socialism, how-
ever much the definition of its content may have changed. The reforms
have not been intended to introduce either democracy or a capitalist
economic system but rather to find a way for socialism to survive (on
this point see Huang, 2008), or perhaps more correctly for the CCP
to stay in power. This explains the residual commitment to the SOE
sector, the slow, grudging approval given to the private sector and the
attempts to make foreign investment support the CCP’s policy objec-
tives. Whether such an approach to development is still tenable is one
of the major challenges the CCP faces in the 21st century. In a pres-
cient observation, Kelly has remarked that one outcome of transition
may be the ‘installation of a New Authoritarian regime that dispenses

with Marxist state ownership and its attendant social welfare functions
but retains the self-legitimating apparatus of Marxist ideology’ (Kelly,
1991, p. 34).
Certainly, within society and even among party members there
is little faith that traditional socialism can provide a guiding light
for China. Socialism is very rarely raised these days in discussions
with foreigners and when mentioned is usually met with an embar-
rassed giggle by those sitting around the table. When bored listening
to the development plans of local officials, I often ask them about the
relevance of socialism to their plans. They usually pull up short and
mutter something about social stability, party guidance and that the
kind of socialism being pursued is one with Chinese characteristics.
The appeal to the primacy of social stability and the appellation of
Chinese characteristics seem to justify most things one wants to do.
Whether such linguistic conundrums can suffice in the future is hard
to say. It is clear that many party members and citizens have a highly
instrumental view of the party. As long as it has sufficient patronage
to deploy and continues to deliver the economic goods there is little
incentive to seek alternatives or to rock the boat. This makes legiti-
macy highly conditional, and the party has struggled to provide deeper
reasons for attachment, best seen in its promotion of nationalism. One
significant legacy of Deng’s reforms is that the overwhelming major-
ity of people do not have to worry about the CCP anymore and it
does not interfere directly in their lives. This is an important advance
from the Mao years and even from the 1980s when political cam-
paigns in which all were supposed to participate were commonplace.
Withdrawal could be interpreted as lack of support and punishment
could be harsh. Now campaigns generally only affect the 86.7 million
party members (as of July 2014) and even then many do not have to
take them seriously. This is something Xi seems dedicated to changing
and certainly the campaign against corruption has caught the attention
of party members.
Some citizens have not been willing to withdraw into a private realm
of activity but have joined a variety of religious and spiritual organiz-
ations. A very small number have even joined underground political
and labour organizations. Such individuals have clearly transgressed
the limits of the permissible and such organizations are broken up and
key individuals arrested as soon as they are discovered. Many more
inhabit a grey zone of local religious organizations, clans, lineages,
gangs or social organizations that operate at the margins of the politi-
cally acceptable. Providing governance over this diverse people and ter-
ritory is an increasingly complex challenge.

Index
Abdullah Mansour, 221–2 Central Military Affairs Commission

Abe Shinzo, 324, 328 (CMAC), 54, 71, 74, 95, 100
Afghanistan, 332 Central Organization Department, 96
Africa, 342–3 Central Party School, 14, 97–8
Agricultural Bank of China, 306 Charter 08, 60, 110, 144
Agricultural Development Bank, 271, 306 Chen Boda, 41, 107
Ai Qing, 201 Chen Duxiu, 105
Ai Weiwei, 144, 201 Chen Guangcheng, 144, 364
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 205–6 Chen Liangyu, 69, 71, 139, 296
All-China Women’s Federation, 205–6 Chen Shui-bian, 360
Angola, 343 Chen Tonghai, 360
Anhui, 165, 231–2, 272 Chen Xiwen, 234
‘ant tribes’, 24 Chen Xitong, 69, 354
Anti-Rightist Campaign, 17, 339–40 Chen Yun, 37, 45, 50, 90, 172, 354
APEC, 322 Chi Haotian, 150
Arab Spring, 63, 110 Chile, 329
ARF, 322 China Banking Regulatory Commission,
ASEAN, 252, 319–20, 322 134, 239
Australia, 328 China Charity Federation, 207
Authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism; China Democracy Party, 57, 110, 144
authoritarian xxv China Development Bank, 341
‘China Dream’, 8, 27, 73, 76–7, 81, 105,
Bai nationality, 8 191, 200–01, 292
Bale, Christian, 364 China Export and Import Bank, 341
bankruptcy, 258 China Family Planning Association, 207
base areas, see revolutionary base areas China Investment Corporation, 341
Beijing, 3, 4, 10, 179, 181, 240, 299, 341 China Railway Corporation, 135
‘Beijing Consensus’, 253–5, 372 Chinese Academy of Governance, 97
Beijing Summer Olympics (2008), xix, Chinese Communist Party, 22–7, 85–115
61–3, 185 Central Committee, 90–3
Berlin Wall, 329 membership, 85, 100–04
Bhutan, 5 Party Congresses: 8th Congress, 119; 9th
birth rate, see family planning Congress, 41; 10th Congress, 41; 12th
Bismark, 283 Congress, 92; 13th Congress, 50, 51,
Bo Yibo, 52 55, 93, 111; 14th Congress, 55–6; 15th
Bo Xilai, 65–9, 70, 72, 77, 95, 98–9, 139, Congress, 56–7, 71, 95; 16th Congress,
354, 360 92, 95, 208; 17th Congress, 60–1, 71,
Brazil, 249, 370 88–9; 18th Congress, xxii, 69, 87,
Brezhnev doctrine, 41 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 112–13, 137,
BRICS, 317 208, 323
Buddhism, 3, 13–14, 15–16 Plenums: 3rd Plenum of 8th CC, 37; 3rd
Budget Law (1994), 173 Plenum of 11th CC, 44–6, 110, 124;
Burma, see Myanmar 5th Plenum of 11th CC, 49; 6th Plenum
Bush, George W./ Bush administration, of the 12th CC, 50–1; 1st Plenum of the
331–3, 336 13th CC, 86–7; 4th Plenum of 13th CC,
53; 3rd Plenum of 14th CC, 556, 259;
Cambodia, see Kampuchea 4th Plenum of 16th CC, 60; 6th Plenum
car ownership, 349–50 of 16th CC, 59, 285; 3rd Plenum of the
Carter, Jimmy, 370 17th CC, 241; 4th Plenum of 17th CC,
Central Advisory Commission, 51 60; 3rd Plenum of the 18th CC, 72–3,
Central Discipline Inspection Commission, 81–4, 96, 144, 166–7, 208, 233, 239,
98–9 241–2, 244, 257, 348; 4th Plenum of
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively the 18th CC, 80–1, 143;
Deepening Reforms, 74, 83–4, 96, see also Politburo; Standing Committee of
172, 245–6 the Politburo
403
404 Index
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Falun Gong, 15, 23, 57–8, 220
Conference, 125–6 family planning, 22, 277–82
Chinese politics, study of, xii-xiii, xxi-xxii see also China Family Planning
Chongqing, 3, 17, 23, 65–8, 164, 167, 240 Association; State Family Planning
corruption scandal, 361–2 Commission
Christianity, 15–16 ‘fifty-cent party’, 11, 367
civil society, xxii, xxiii foreign direct investment (FDI), 338–40
see also mass organizations; non- ‘Four Basic Principles’, 48, 111, 125, 199
governmental organizations ‘Four Bigs’, 145
Clinton, Hillary, 315, 320 ‘Four Modernizations’, 41–2, 149
Clinton, William, 330–1 Friends of Nature, 207
Cold War, 313 Fujian, 9
collectivization/communes, 18, 35–6,
38, 268 ‘Gang of Four’, 42–3, 49, 98, 101, 104, 105,
‘colour revolutions’, 108–10 148, 197, 222, 318
Comintern, 108 General Administration of Food and Drugs,
community construction, 212–13 135–6
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 85, General Administration of Press, Publishing,
108, 109, 110, 329 Radio, Film and Television, 136
Confucianism and neo-Confucianism, 74–5, General Audit Office, 163
191, 203, 288, 291–2 Germany, 315
corporatism, 188–9 ghost towns, 20
corruption, xxiii, xxv, 28, 77–9, 117, 151, global financial crisis (2008–9), xix, 61–2,
261, 296, 354–64 185
Criminal Code, 141–2 ‘Go Global’, 241–2
Criminal Procedure Law, 141–3 government organized non-governmental
Cuba, 60 organizations (GONGOs), see
Cultural Revolution, xx, 1, 14, 17, 21, 23, non-governmental organizations
29, 40–3, 49, 66–7, 75, 96, 98–9, 101, Gorbachev, Mikhail, 54–5
104, 106–7, 108, 124, 137, 140, 145, gradualism, 254–5
147, 157, 195, 197, 201, 226, 268, Great Leap Forward (GLF), 18, 23, 29,
286, 345, 363 37–9, 49, 119, 193, 225, 226, 268, 345
Czech Republic, 370 Green Earth Volunteers, 209
Czechoslavakia, 41 Green Han River, 210
Gu Junshan, 152
Dalai Lama, 6, 8, 13, 160, 221–2 Gu Kailai, 68
Democracy Wall Movement, 48–9 Guangdong, 4, 9, 11–12, 22, 162–3, 165,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 343 166, 167, 179, 189, 209, 230, 240
Democratic Progressive Party, 325 Guangzhou, 4
demonstrations, see social unrest Guangxi, 5, 214
Deng Xiaoping, 2, 38, 40–1, 43, 44–5, 48–9, Guizhou, 168, 170, 179
51, 54–5, 57, 71, 74, 86–8, 90, 92, 93, Gulf War (1991), 330
95, 97, 100, 104, 109–10, 111, 147, Guomindang (GMD), 17, 34, 225
149–50, 164, 165–6, 197–8, 199, 249,
254–5, 273, 314, 318, 330, 354, 370 Han Han, 201, 367
‘Develop the West’, xxiv, 168–9, 302, 306 Han dynasty, 3
divorce, 23 Hani nationality, 5, 6, 8
Document Number Nine (April 2013), ‘harmonious society’, 59, 61, 284, 292, 300
79–80, 220 Harvard Kennedy School, 76
dossier (dang’an), 194 Hebei, 4, 243
Du Qinglin, 94 Heilongjiang, 165, 167, 272
Henan, 4
East China Sea, xix, 83, 108, 136, 147, 313, Highway Law, 131
325, 328 HIV/AIDS, 25–6, 207
see also village elections Hong Kong, xii, 155–6, 250, 352–3
elections, 211, 213–17 household registration (hukou), 82, 193–4,
environment, xxiii, 19, 344–54 227, 231, 233–4, 285
European Union, xx, 321 household responsibility system, 268–9
extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), 173–4, Hoxha, Enver, 22
180–1, 183 Hu Chunhua, 71–2, 92, 96

Index 405
Hu Jintao, xxiv, 12, 27, 56, 58–64, 69, 71, Korea, North, see North Korea
76, 78, 81, 84, 87–9, 94, 95, 100, 104, Korea, South, see South Korea
112–13, 121, 137, 147, 151, 163, 164, Kunming, 5, 9, 19
166, 169, 208, 220, 228, 231, 233, Kyrgyzstan, 12, 100
244, 252–3, 261, 269, 284, 285, 287,
299, 300, 314, 316, 322–3, 337, 354, Lai Changxing, 355
325, 358, 363, 369 Land Contract Law, 241
Hu Qili, 53 Land Management Law, 241
Hu Yaobang, 2, 49, 50–2, 53, 88, 94, 109 land reform, 35, 225
Hua Guofeng, 43–5 land rights, 240–3
Hubei, 210 Laos, 5, 8, 319
Hui nationality, 9 Leading Group for Poverty Alleviation, 306
human rights, 333–4 Lee Teng-hui, 331
Human Rights in China (NGO), 334 Lei Feng, 148
Human Rights Watch, 334 legal system, 137–46
Hunan, 4, 165–6 ‘Legislation Law’, 129
Hundred Flowers’ Campaign, 39,49, 198 Li Jianguo, 162
Hungary, 39, 370 Li Keqiang, 64, 70–71, 73, 82, 83, 84, 106,
131, 162, 166, 233, 237, 244, 253,
Ilham Tohti, 7 270, 287, 326, 345
illegal taxes, levies and fees, see taxes Li Lanqing, 162
India, 5, 6, 8, 249, 287, 321, 370 Li Lisan, 105
Indonesia, 173, 249, 287, 322, 370 Li Peng, 59, 71, 87–88, 118, 129–31
industrial policy, 257–67 Li Yuanchao, 70, 73, 99, 162
inequality, xxiv Liaoning, 167
information revolution, 364–8 Lin Biao, 40, 88, 149
see also internet; telecommunications Liu Junning, 202
Inner Mongolia, 5, 20 Liu Shaoqi, 38, 40–1, 49, 86, 98, 105, 106
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 315, Liu Xiaobo, 60
339, 320 Liu Yunshan, 94, 96, 161
internet, 364–8 Liu Zhijun, 60
see also information revolution; Lou Jiwei, 73
telecommunications
Iraq, 313, 330, 332 Ma Ying-jeou, 325
Iran, 321, 330 Malaysia, 286
Manchuria; Manchus, 9
Japan, xix, xx, xxiv, 3, 11, 121, 260, 315, Mao Zedong, xiii, 1–2, 8, 10, 17, 18, 30–1,
318, 322, 323, 326–327, 328, 333, 32, 36–40, 65, 86–7, 93, 95, 104, 105,
334–5, 352 108, 116, 171, 195–197, 316–17, 347,
Jia Qinglin, 162 348
Jiang Qing, 40, 43 Marx/Marxism, 75
Jiang Zemin, 53–4, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, mass organizations, 205–6
71, 76, 78. 79, 80, 81, 87–9, 92, 94, May Fourth Movement, 3
100, 102–3, 104, 112–13, 130–1, 147, Meng Jianzhu, 95
150–1, 162, 168–9, 253, 267, 302, Miao nationality, 8
305–6, 314, 316, 330–1, 354–5, 358 middle class, 370–1
Jiangsu, 4, 167, 266, 274 middle income trap, xxiv
Jiangxi, 4, 169, 240 Middle East, 371
Jilin, 22, 167, 272 migration/migrants, 24–5, 229–35, 284–5,
Jin-Cha-Ji, see revolutionary base areas 295
Jiusan Society, 205 minimum living support scheme, 284–5,
Joint Venture Law, 338–9 304, 310–12
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 209
Kampuchea (Cambodia), 319, 322 Ministry of Commerce, 134
Kazakhstan, 5 Ministry of Environmental Protection, 346
Keating, Admiral, 147 Ministry of Finance, 240
Kerry, John, 315, 328, 336 Ministry of Justice, 141
Khrushchev, Nikita, 48, 130 Ministry of Labour and Social Security,
Kim Jung-un, 326 230–1, 295, 298
Kissinger, Henry, 327 Ministry of Land and Resources, 269, 346

406 Index
Ministry of Railways, 135, 355, 365 poverty, 303–12

Ministry of Supervision, 163 private sector, xxiv, 265–7
Ministry of Transport, 135 Property Law (2006), 131–2
Modi, 147 protests, 52–3, 217–23, 371,
Mongolia, 5 Pu Zhiqiang, 144
Mubarak, 109, 218 Putin, 338, 374
municipal bonds, 239–40 ‘Putting People First’, 61, 284, 292, 369
Myanmar (Burma), 5, 8–9
Qian Qichen, 331
‘nail houses’, 20 Qiao Shi, 130
National Audit Office, 166, 239, 296 Qing dynasty, 3, 9, 191
National Bureau of Corruption Prevention, Qinghai, 179
355 Qu Qiubai, 105
National Council for Social Security, 295–6,
298 Red Guards, 40–1, 197
National Development and Reform regional inequalities, 167–72
Commission (NDRC), 134–5, 167, 306, Rejuvenate the Central Region (Rise of
341 Central China), xxiv, 169–70
National Health and Family Planning Remy Martin, 21
Commission, 136 Renewable Energy Law, 352
National People’s Congress, xxii, 6, 56–7, Revive the Northeast, xxiv, 17, 169, 170
60, 72–3, 125–33 revolutionary base areas, 46; Jin-Cha-Ji,
National Security Commission, 72, 74, 83, 130, 214–15; Shaan-Gan-Ning, 193
96, 100, 109 Rong Yiren, 20
Nationalities Affairs Commission, 6 rule of law, 80–6
NATO, 11 see also legal system
Nepal, 5 rural healthcare, 298–303
New Citizens’ Movement, 80, 110, 144, rural policy, 267–75
209, 219–20 Russia, xxiii, 5, 249, 254, 317, 321, 338,
Ningxia, 5, 9, 240 369, 374
Nixon, Richard, 327 see also Soviet Union
Noda, 324
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Saudi Arabia, 330
112–13, 207–11, 312 ‘scientific outlook on development’, 27, 58,
see also civil society 61, 76, 81, 87
North Korea, 60, 321, 325–326, 331, 333 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),
Nu river, 209 11–12, 59, 83, 147, 300, 365
Shaanxi, 9, 165, 181–8
Obama, Barack, Obama administration, Shandong, 3, 21
314–15, 328, 343 Shanghai, 2, 3, 9, 162, 167–8, 179, 207,
one-child policy, see family planning 213, 240, 266, 274, 283, 296–7, 299,
340
Pakistan, 5 Shanghai Free Trade Zone, 336
Panchen Lama. 8 Shantou SEZ, 24, 158
Paris Commune, 40–1 Shanxi, 4, 361
Parties, 204–5 Shenzhen SEZ, 13, 24, 25, 158, 166, 230
see also China Democracy Party; Jiusan ‘shock therapy’, 254–5
Society Shuanggui, 139, 143
Party School, see Central Party School Sichuan, 1, 5, 17, 22, 23, 165, 170
Peng Zhen, 129–30 Sichuan Earthquake (2008), 185
pension system, 292–8 Sina Weibo, 367
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 6, 40–1, Singapore, 286
51, 146–53 Sino–Soviet split (1960), 17, 38
‘permanent revolution’, 37 sixtieth anniversary of the PRC, xix, 61–2
Philippines, xix, 323, 328, 333 Social Insurance Law, 285, 295
Pinochet, 329 social organizations, 28, 56, 112, 134, 137,
Politburo, 92, 93–6, 162–3 189, 204, 207–9, 351
Politburo Standing Committee, see Standing ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’,
Committee of the Politburo 27–8, 105
population, xx, xxiv, 2–3, 280–2, 348 see Solidarity (Poland), 49, 142
also family planning Song dynasty, 18

Index 407
South Africa, 249, 342, 370 unions, see All-China Federation of Trade
South China Sea, xix, 83, 108, 136, 147, Unions
153, 313, 319, 320, 321, 322–3, 325, UNITA, 329
328 United States of America, xx, 11, 147, 249,
South Korea, xxiv, 121, 260, 286, 287 313, 318, 321, 322, 325–6, 327–8, 342,
South–North Water Diversion Project, 347–8 353–4
Soviet Union, xii, 6, 7, 27, 31–2, 35, 40–1, urban residents’ committees (jumin
54, 146, 151–2, 154, 268 weiyuanhui), 212–13
see also Russia urban villages, 24
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 24–5, 53, urbanization, xxiv, 20, 24, 224–43
158, 165–6, 167–8, 339
see also Shantou; Shenzhen; Xiamen; Vatican, 15
Zhuhai ‘vested interests’, 256
Stalin, Joseph, 39, 195 Vietnam, xix, 5, 8, 9, 172, 321,
Standing Committee of the Politburo, 93–6 323–4, 360
see also Politburo village committees, 211–17
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, village elections, 211–17
336, 341
State Asset Supervision and Administration Wan Li, 130–2, 165
Commission, 134, 261, 262–3, 341 Wang Dongxing, 149
State Development and Planning Wang Hui, 202
Commission, 134 Wang Huning, 202
State Economic and Trade Commission, 134 Wang Lijun, 67
State Family Planning Commission, 136, Wang Qishan, 77, 98, 162, 354, 357
278–9 Wang Shan, 202
State Food and Drug Administration, 134–5 Wang Shiwei, 107, 193
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), xx, 292–8 Wang Xiaodong, 202
stimulus package, 62, 170–1 Wang Yang, 70. 71–72
stock market, xxiii Wang Yongchen, 209
Sudan, 321, 343 Washington Consensus, 255–7
Suharto, 109–110 Wen Hui, 200
Sun Chunlan, 96 Wen Jiabao, xxiv, 58–64, 66, 68, 73, 81, 84,
Sun Zhengcai, 71–72, 92, 96 103, 121, 131, 176, 209–10, 228, 231,
233, 244, 246, 252–3, 269, 272, 284,
Taiping Rebellion, 3 285, 287, 299, 300, 316, 343, 355, 369
Taiwan, xxiv, 32, 121, 147, 153, 252, 318, Wenzhou, 16, 135, 187, 365, 367
321, 325, 331, 334–5, 343, 370 workplace (danwei), 194–5
Tajikistan, 5 World Bank, 315, 317, 339
Tang Dynasty, 3 World Expo, Shanghai (2010), 19
taxes, 178–80 World Trade Organization (WTO), 29, 30,
‘Ten Great Relationships’, 8, 39 137, 228, 254, 313, 314, 316, 318,
Thailand, 173, 249, 287, 360 320, 330, 334, 338, 340, 369
‘Third Front’, 170 Wu Bangguo, 162
Three Gorges Dam, 347 Wuhan, 169
‘Three Represents’, 58, 61, 76, 81, 87, 101, Wuxi, 15–16, 20
102–3
‘Thucydides Trap’, 327 Xiamen SEZ, 24, 158
Tiananmen Square demonstration (1989), Xi’an, 9
52–3, 89–90,147, 329 Xi Jinping, xiii, xix, xxv, 8, 11, 20–1, 27,
Tianjin, 3 28, 56, 56, 60–1, 62, 64, 65, 66–7,
Tian Jiyun, 97 70–81, 88–9, 94, 95, 100, 103, 104,
Tibet, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 23, 60, 61, 108, 154–5, 105, 113, 115, 117, 131, 140–1, 147,
160, 161, 179, 182, 195, 221–2, 315, 151–2, 162, 172, 200–01, 203, 220,
327, 334, see also Dalai Lama 233, 244, 245–6, 248, 256, 270, 287,
township and village enterprises (TVEs), 25, 292, 310, 314, 315–16, 323, 326, 328,
180, 267, 273–5 329, 337–8, 354, 355, 357–8, 368,
367–8
Uighurs, 8 Xiao Gongqin, 202
see also Xinjiang Xiao Yang, 138
Ukraine, 317 Xinjiang, 5, 6–8, 108, 154–5, 160, 161,
UN Commission on Human Rights, 334 221–2

408 Index
Xinjiang village, 231 Zeng Qinghong, 71, 131, 162

Xu Guangya, 152 Zhang Chunqiao, 42
Xu Zhiyang, 80, 219–20 Zhang Dejiang, 83, 127
Zhao Leji, 99, 162
Yan’an, 1–2, 107–9, 201 Zhao Ziyang, 2, 24, 49, 50–4, 55, 87, 88,
Yang Jiechi, 320 93–4, 104, 106, 109, 111–12, 118, 164,
Yang Jing, 94 165, 339, 373
Yangzi River, 4 Zhejiang, 4, 166, 167, 242, 243, 266
Yantian Village, 13, 189, 216–17, 242–3 Zhejiang village, 231–2
Yao Wenyuan, 42 Zhou Enlai, 41, 43, 45
Ye Jianying, 149, 222 Zhou Qiang, 132, 143
Yi nationality, 8 Zhou Xiaochuan, 73
Yu Dan, 203 Zhou Yongkang, 66–8, 72, 77, 95, 355–7
Yu Keping, 202 Zhu Rongji, 56, 57, 59, 88, 131, 137, 162,
Yu Zhengsheng, 72, 162 246, 253, 258, 293–4, 305–6, 316, 318,
Yuan Dynasty, 159 330–1, 354–5
Yugoslavia, 7, 11, 40 Zhuang nationality, 9
Yunnan, 4, 5, 8–9, 14, 167, 170, Zhuhai SEZ, 24, 158
188–9 Zoellick, Robert, 328, 332

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© Tony Saich 2001, 2004, 2011, 2015

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List of Maps, Boxes, Figures and Tables x

1 Diversity within Unity 1

2 Political History: 1949–2012 29

3 China’s New Leaders and Their Challenges: 2012–Present 65

4 The Chinese Communist Party 85

5 The Central Governing Apparatus 116

6 Governance Beyond the Centre 154

7 The Chinese State and Society 191

8 Urbanization and Rural–Urban Relations 224

9 Economic Policy 244

10 Social Policy 276

11 Foreign Policy 313

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China and the United States 327

12 China’s Future Challenges 344

Further Reading 375

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Diversity within Unity

Some years ago, I was in a jeep driving down a mountain road in

China to Deng Xiaoping’s within a few paces. The market responds

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favoured a development strategy that relies heavily on coastal trade

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are commonplace. In fact, most of China is dependent on dry-field

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This concern with security from external threat explains in part

Box 1.1 Beijing’s Xinjiang Problem

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particularly interested in trying foreign cigarettes. My colleague offered

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Box 1.2 SARS and the Media

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The aforementioned linguistic affiliations and local ties have, if

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introduce direct elections into China’s villages complained that the

Box 1.3 Village Leadership and Clans

These local identities are reinforced by religious practices and cus-

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per cent of CCP members!), while a much lower 33 million identify as

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The CCP refuses to recognize the authority of the Catholic Church

Box 1.4 A Tale of Two Religions – Buddhism

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In Wenzhou, there was a more complex outcome surrounding the demoli-

The impact of CCP policy

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However, by the mid-1950s steps were taken towards collectiviza-

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inimical to the development of an effective policy to control environ-

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to control the construction of lavish government and party buildings.

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