Elliot (2020) - Advances in Motivation Science

VOLUME SEVEN
ADVANCES IN
MOTIVATION SCIENCE
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VOLUME SEVEN
ADVANCES IN
MOTIVATION SCIENCE
Series Editor
ANDREW J. ELLIOT
Department of Clinical & Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester, USA
Sponsored by the Society for the Science of Motivation

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Contents
List of Contributors vii
1. Metamotivation: Emerging research on the regulation

of motivational states 1
David B. Miele, Abigail A. Scholer, and Kentaro Fujita
1. Historical foundations 3
2. Metamotivational framework 7
3. Empirical studies of metamotivational knowledge 11
4. Implications 23
5. Future directions 26
6. Summary 35
Acknowledgments 35
References 35
2. Moving from research on message framing to principles of

message matching: The use of gain- and loss-framed messages
to promote healthy behavior 43
Alexander J. Rothman, Keven-Joyal Desmarais, and Richie L. Lenne
1. Introduction 44
2. How can gain- and loss-framed messages be used strategically to motivate
healthy behavior? 46
3. Looking ahead I: In pursuit of principles for message matching 53
4. Looking ahead II: Expanding our approach to message framing 63
5. Concluding remarks 68
References 69
3. The motivational potency of nostalgia: The future is called

yesterday 75
Constantine Sedikides and Tim Wildschut
1. An excursion into nostalgia's Past 76
2. Definition and properties of nostalgia 78
3. Nostalgia and approach motivation 80
4. Nostalgia and the many forms of approach motivation 81
5. Summary and conclusions 101
References 102
v
vi Contents
4. A development-in-sociocultural-context perspective on the

multiple pathways to youth's engagement in learning 113
Ming-Te Wang, Daphne A. Henry, and Jessica L. Degol
1. Introduction 114
2. Conceptualization of engagement 116
3. An integrative perspective on engagement 118
4. Multiple functions of engagement 122
5. Engagement as a pathway to or facilitator of resilience 124
6. Personal factors contributing to engagement 128
7. Contextual factors contributing to engagement 134
8. Implications for practice and research 146
9. Summary 148
Acknowledgments 149
References 149
5. 35 years of research on students' subjective task values

and motivation: A look back and a look forward 161
Allan Wigfield and Jacquelynne S. Eccles
1. Article overview 162
2. Defining expectancies and values in the psychology field 162
3. Eccles, Wigfield and colleagues' expectancy-value model (SEVT) 164
4. Development of individuals' STVs 172
5. From beliefs and values to action: Relations of students' STVs to their choices
and performance 180
6. Intervening to enhance students' STVs 184
7. A look forward 188
8. Conclusion 191
Acknowledgments 191
References 191
Further reading 198
6. Adaptive self-regulation, subjective well-being, and physical

health: The importance of goal adjustment capacities 199
Carsten Wrosch and Michael F. Scheier
1. Introduction 200
2. Goal adjustment capacities 206
3. Depressive mood, sadness, and goal adjustment 218
5. Conclusions 230
Acknowledgments 232
References 232
List of Contributors
Jessica L. Degol
Department of Human Development and Family Studies, Penn State Altoona, Altoona, PA,
United States
Keven-Joyal Desmarais
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, United States
Jacquelynne S. Eccles
University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, United States
Kentaro Fujita
The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States
Daphne A. Henry
Department of Counseling, Developmental, and Educational Psychology, Boston College,
Chestnut Hill, MA, United States
Richie L. Lenne
David B. Miele
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, United States
Alexander J. Rothman
Michael F. Scheier
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Abigail A. Scholer
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
Constantine Sedikides
University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
Ming-Te Wang
School of Education, Department of Psychology, and Learning Research and Development
Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Allan Wigfield
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, United States
Tim Wildschut
Carsten Wrosch
Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada
vii
CHAPTER ONE
Metamotivation: Emerging
research on the regulation
of motivational states
David B. Mielea,∗, Abigail A. Scholerb, Kentaro Fujitac
a
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, United States
b
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
c
The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States
∗
Corresponding author: e-mail address: d.miele@bc.edu
Contents
1. Historical foundations 3
2. Metamotivational framework 7
2.1 Motivational trade-offs 8
2.2 Metamotivational knowledge 9
3. Empirical studies of metamotivational knowledge 11
3.1 Metamotivational knowledge about promotion and prevention
motivations 11
3.2 Metamotivational knowledge about autonomous and controlled
motivations 15
3.3 Metamotivational knowledge about high- and low-level construal 18
4. Implications 23
4.1 Advancing motivation science research 23
4.2 Knowledge as a source of self-regulatory success vs. failure 23
4.3 The centrality of flexibility 25
5.1 Predicting real-world outcomes 26
5.2 Self-knowledge 27
5.3 Creating fit 28
5.4 Development and acquisition of knowledge 30
5.5 Linking metamotivation to general motivational competency 32
5.6 Toward a comprehensive mechanistic model of metamotivation 33
6. Summary 35
Acknowledgments 35
References 35
Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 7 # 2020 Elsevier Inc. 1

ISSN 2215-0919 All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.adms.2019.10.001
2 David B. Miele et al.
Abstract
Until recently, research examining the self-regulation of motivation focused primarily
on the strategies people use to bolster the amount of motivation they have for pur-
suing a task goal. In contrast, our metamotivational framework highlights the impor-
tance of also examining if people recognize which qualitatively distinct types of
motivation (e.g., promotion vs. prevention) are most helpful for achieving their goal,
given the demands of the task or situation. At the heart of this framework is the idea
that any given motivational state involves performance trade-offs, such that it may be
relatively beneficial for some tasks, but detrimental for others. In this article, we review
research suggesting that, on average, people (a) possess metamotivational knowl-
edge of such trade-offs (particularly those posited by regulatory focus theory, self-
determination theory, and construal level theory), (b) recognize strategies that could
be used to induce adaptive motivational states, and (c) implement this knowledge
(at times) to increase the likelihood of performance success. We also discuss future
directions for metamotivation research, including whether and when individual differ-
ences in metamotivational knowledge predict real-world outcomes, how such meta-
motivational knowledge develops, and whether there is a general metamotivational
competency that predicts people’s sensitivity to a broad range of motivationally-
relevant performance trade-offs.
Over the past century, motivation research has identified numerous contex-
tual and dispositional factors that influence people’s motivation to pursue
important goals across a number of domains, including school, work, health,
and romantic relationships. However, in much of this work, a primary
assumption is that people are passively shaped by these factors. In fact, sur-
prisingly little research has explored the ways in which individuals actively
modulate and shift their own motivational states. One potential explanation
for why researchers have tended to overlook the agentic role of individuals
in regulating their own motivation pertains to the ways in which these
researchers have characterized motivation in their work. That is, thinking
of motivation as an underlying force, as a set of inputs for rational choice,
or as an attributional response to the behavior of others (see Weiner,
1991) may lead researchers to view motivational states in a deterministic
manner and to assume implicitly that there is not much that people can
do to change them.
Regardless of why researchers have tended to overlook motivation regu-
lation as a topic of investigation, the little work that has been conducted on this
topic suggests that people can be effective at regulating their own motivation.
That is, some individuals possess strategies for enhancing particular types of
motivational states (see Wolters, 2003) and these strategies can bolster their task
engagement and performance (e.g., Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012).
Metamotivation 3
However, at this point, we understand relatively little about how and when
people come to realize that they should attempt to regulate their motivation
or how they decide which strategies to use. Thus, to develop a more com-
prehensive understanding of how people regulate their motivation and how
this regulation contributes to well-being and success across a broad number
of domains, we argue that researchers should begin to investigate more thor-
oughly the ways in which people think about, assess, and modulate their
own motivational states.
To aid researchers in this endeavor, the present paper describes a meta-
motivational approach to investigating motivation regulation. By “meta-
motivation,” we mean the processes and knowledge involved in regulating
one’s own motivational states. Drawing from the literatures on metacogni-
tion and behavioral self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Nelson &
Narens, 1990), we conceptualize metamotivation as consisting of two
reciprocal processes. The first process, which we refer to as metamotivational
monitoring, involves assessing both the quantity and quality of one’s motiva-
tion to pursue a particular goal. The second process, which we refer to as
metamotivational control, involves using the output of the monitoring process
to select and execute strategies for bolstering or maintaining particular moti-
vational states. Importantly, we argue that the effectiveness of both processes
depends, in part, on one’s beliefs about how motivation functions and how
it can be changed (i.e., one’s metamotivational knowledge; Miele & Scholer,
2018; Scholer & Miele, 2016; Scholer, Miele, Murayama, & Fujita, 2018).
In what follows, we describe our metamotivational approach to studying
motivation regulation in more detail, starting with a discussion of the histor-
ical antecedents of this approach. We then go on to describe some of
the key tenets of the framework that we have developed for studying
metamotivation, as well as to review recent research that has been guided
by this framework. Finally, we conclude by discussing the practical implica-
tions of this research and by considering some future directions for the
emerging field of metamotivation.
1. Historical foundations
Our metamotivational approach to investigating motivation regula-
tion is rooted in prior work on volition, metacognition, and emotion reg-
ulation. Theorizing about volition dates back hundreds of years (see Hilgard,
1980), and was empirically investigated in the late 18th century and early
19th century by psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt (Danziger, 2001)
and Narziss Ach. According to Ach, the role of volition in the motivational
system is to ensure that one’s goal or intention is not abandoned because of
some obstacle or competing impulse (see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985). This
conception of volition was reintroduced to the psychological literature by
Heckhausen (1991) and Kuhl (1984, 1985) toward the end of the last cen-
tury. Although many researchers may consider volition to be a component
of motivation, Kuhl’s (1984) theory of action control treats these constructs
as distinct and non-overlapping. For Kuhl, motivation encompasses the pro-
cesses by which individuals weigh expectancies and values in order to decide
what action to engage in (i.e., goal selection and intention formation),
whereas volition refers to the processes that ensure that individuals will
act on their intentions in the face of competing impulses or tendencies
and carry out these actions until their goals are completed.
An important aspect of Kuhl’s theory is its specification of six kinds of
strategies that people use to exert volitional control, including strategies that
target attention, emotion, motivation, and the environment—a list that was
later expanded and organized into a hierarchical taxonomy by Corno (1989,
2001). These strategies have, for the most part, been empirically investigated
as part of two separate, but overlapping literatures: the motivation regulation
literature from within educational psychology and the self-control literature
within social psychology. Whereas the motivation regulation literature has
tended to specifically focus on the strategies that students use to directly tar-
get their motivation in response to a broad range of motivational challenges,
the self-control literature has tended to focus on a broader range of volitional
strategies applied to a specific challenge (i.e., pursuing an important goal in
the face of competing impulses and temptations).
The motivation regulation literature draws on social cognitive theories
of self-regulated learning (see Wolters, 2003) and focuses primarily on
the strategies that students use to maintain or bolster their task motivation
in response to a variety of obstacles or challenges, such as trying to study
material that seems uninteresting or unimportant (Sansone & Thoman,
2005, 2006; Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012; Wolters, 2003, 2011).
Much of this literature is based on seminal work by Sansone (Sansone,
Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992) and Wolters (1998). Sansone and her col-
leagues observed that when asked to complete a monotonous matrix copying
task, participants exhibited a number of behaviors that appeared to be aimed at
making the task more engaging, such as varying their handwriting when
inputting letters/words (Sansone et al., 1992; Sansone, Wiebe, & Morgan,
1999). Notably, although these behaviors led participants to persist longer
Metamotivation 5
when the time for completing the task was open-ended (Sansone et al., 1999),
they led to poorer performance (i.e., copying fewer letters) when time was
limited (Sansone et al., 1992; see also Smith, Wagaman, & Handley, 2009).
This highlights an important insight about motivational trade-offs—although
these behaviors enhanced interest, they also slowed participants down; thus,
depending on how performance was assessed, the same strategy could facilitate
or hinder achievement.
Whereas Sansone’s work highlights how people attempt to regulate inter-
est and the consequences of this regulation for performance, Wolters’s work
(2003, 2011) examines how students think about managing their motiva-
tion more broadly and catalogs the strategies they report using in response
to a variety of motivational problems. Initially, Wolters (1998) asked stu-
dents to imagine encountering a particular motivational problem while
studying (e.g., boring material) and to then describe what they would do
in order to keep themselves motivated. Wolters then reviewed the students’
responses and identified 14 categories, many of which represent strategies
for targeting particular motivational constructs (e.g., efficacy, mastery goals,
interest). These categories served as the basis for a questionnaire measure of
students’ strategies that has been refined over the past two decades and
which now includes six to eight broad categories (depending on the ver-
sion; Schwinger, Steinmayr, & Spinath, 2009; Wolters & Benzon, 2013;
cf. Kim, Brady, & Wolters, 2018). A number of studies have examined
the extent to which the types of strategies assessed by such questionnaires
are associated with a range of motivational, cognitive, and metacognitive
variables, as well as with students’ academic achievement (e.g., Eckerlein
et al., 2019; Grunschel, Schwinger, Steinmayr, & Fries, 2016; Ljubin-Golub,
Petricevic, & Rovan, 2019; Schwinger & Otterpohl, 2017; Schwinger &
Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012; Wolters & Benzon, 2013; Wolters & Rosenthal,
2000). Some of this work suggests that certain strategies (e.g., mastery
self-talk) may work better than others in certain situations. However, there
is still much to learn about the effectiveness of these strategies across a wide
variety of contexts.
In contrast to the work on self-regulated learning, which has focused on
how students respond to a variety of motivational problems, the self-control
literature within social psychology has examined a broad range of volitional
strategies (i.e., strategies targeting beliefs, emotions, attention, and motiva-
tion) in response to a specific type of motivational problem. As Fujita (2011)
explains, this type of problem generally involves wanting to prioritize an
abstract, distal motivation over a competing concrete, proximal motivation.
A classic example of this kind of dual-motive conflict can be found in Mischel

and colleagues’ work on delay-of-gratification in children (see Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989, for a review). In these studies, children of vary-
ing ages were promised a large reward (e.g., two marshmallows) if they
could wait for a relatively long period (e.g., 15 min) without consuming
a smaller reward (e.g., a single marshmallow) that was placed in front of
them. Whereas 3-year-old children struggled, 5-year-old children were
increasingly able to delay gratification. Subsequent research revealed that
these age-related differences may be due to differences in children’s knowl-
edge of various strategies for “cooling” any impulsive “hot” cognitions
(Mischel & Mischel, 1983). For example, whereas many preschool children
mistakenly believed that attending to the immediate reward would assist in
delay of gratification, elementary school children increasingly understood
the benefits of not attending to the reward, focusing on the task, and think-
ing abstractly about the reward. Later research revealed that individual dif-
ferences in this sort of knowledge also predicted aggression among older
children with social adjustment problems (Mischel et al., 1989; cf. Watts,
Duncan, & Quan, 2018).
Traditionally, the “cooling” strategies used by the older children in these
studies have been interpreted as examples of cognitive control (Mischel &
Mischel, 1983). However, these strategies (along with other self-control
techniques that directly target cognitive states/processes) can also be viewed
as indirectly contributing to motivation regulation to the extent that they
involve deliberately disregarding “information that increases the motivation
underlying… competing tendencies” (Kuhl, 1984, p. 183). Furthermore,
by dampening or inhibiting the motivation associated with a proximal com-
peting goal, these strategies might also serve to preserve or even bolster the
motivation associated with the distal goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010).
Thus, although self-control research has typically not been framed in terms
of motivation regulation, much of the work in this literature is relevant for
understanding how people regulate their task motivation when faced with a
competing impulse or temptation.
Despite some clear differences in the ways that studies from the educa-
tional and social psychological literatures have investigated the topic of
motivation regulation, there are some important commonalities. First, both
literatures have primarily focused on identifying the strategies that people
use to overcome motivational problems and then assessing their effectiveness
(i.e., metamotivational control). Second, the types of motivational problems
Metamotivation 7
that these studies have examined generally involve perceived deficits in the
quantity or amount of one’s task motivation. In contrast to this work, the
metamotivational approach to motivation regulation that we discuss in
the next section places a strong emphasis on investigating the ways in which
people become aware of a particular motivational problem and then decide
which strategies would be most effective for addressing this problem (i.e.,
metamotivational monitoring). The metamotivational approach also stresses
the importance of examining motivational problems that involve a per-
ceived mismatch between the type of motivation one is experiencing and
the processing demands of the task at hand (i.e., problems of motivational
quality rather than quantity).
2. Metamotivational framework
In this section, we briefly review some of the key tenets of our
metamotivational framework; for a more detailed description, see Miele
and Scholer (2018) and Scholer and Miele (2016). At the core of our frame-
work is the idea that people monitor both the quantity and quality of their
motivation. By “quantity” we mean the extent to which an individual
desires to engage in a particular activity or task. Thus, our framework
attempts to explain how it is that people become aware that this desire is
waning and that they are in danger of quitting the task prematurely or of
not putting in the level of effort needed to achieve their goal. In contrast,
we use the word “quality” to refer to distinct types of motivation (e.g., pro-
motion vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control) that vary in terms of how
they are subjectively experienced and in the kinds of consequences they
have for goal pursuit and performance (see Miele & Wigfield, 2014;
Vansteenkiste, Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, & Lens, 2009). Thus, an addi-
tional aim of our framework is to explain how people come to realize that
they are not “motivated in the right way” for a given task, even when they
happen to believe that they are “motivated enough.” Much of the research
to-date testing our metamotivational framework has focused on regulation
of motivation quality rather than quantity. This is largely because a focus on
motivation quality is a particularly novel aspect of the framework. We have
provided a more complete analysis of how people might regulate both the
quantity and quality of motivation in other work (Miele & Scholer, 2018);
however, in what follows, we focus on the latter in order to adhere more
closely to empirical findings.
2.1 Motivational trade-offs

The idea that there is a “right” or appropriate type of motivation for certain
tasks is based on the assumption that tasks and situations differ in their moti-
vational demands or affordances. That is, any given motivational state involves
trade-offs—it will be beneficial in some circumstances, harmful in others, and
irrelevant in yet other situations (e.g., Sansone, 2009; Scholer & Higgins,
2012). This assumption is consistent with arguments that have been made
in the literatures on coping and emotion regulation. For instance, Bonanno
and Burton (2013) argued that researchers have often fallen prey to a fallacy
of uniform efficacy, assuming that certain emotion regulation strategies (e.g.,
reappraisal) are universally beneficial whereas others (e.g., suppression) are
universally maladaptive.
However, increasing evidence suggests that the ability to shift between
emotion regulation strategies—emotion regulation flexibility—is more crit-
ical for well-being than simply being skilled at reappraisal (Bonanno, Papa,
Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Cheng, 2003a; Chiu, Hong,
Mischel, & Shoda, 1995; Kobyli nska & Kusev, 2019). For example, although
frequent exposure to trauma often increases the incidence of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), the ability to flexibly regulate one’s emotions mod-
erates this link: Firefighters who scored high on a performance measure of
emotion regulation flexibility showed no association between trauma
exposure and PTSD, whereas firefighters who scored low on this measure
exhibited a positive association between trauma exposure and PTSD
(Levy-Gigi et al., 2016). Coping flexibility—the appropriate endorsement
of distinct coping strategies (e.g., active vs. avoidant strategies) in con-
fronting controllable vs. uncontrollable stressful situations—also leads to
better psychological adjustment (Cheng, 2003a, 2003b; Cheng et al.,
2012; Cheng, Chiu, Hong, & Cheung, 2001; Cheng, Lau, & Chan,
2014; Chiu et al., 1995).
Similarly, research in motivation science reveals that there are context-
specific trade-offs for qualitatively distinct motivation states. Regulatory
focus theory (Higgins, 1997), for example, posits two fundamental yet qual-
itatively distinct motivational orientations. People who pursue goals with a
promotion focus are generally concerned with fulfilling their need for growth
and, thus, value these goals as ideals that they hope to attain. In order to
achieve their ideals, promotion-focused individuals tend to adopt eager
strategies, which involve seeking opportunities for gain and processing
information in an associative, divergent, and flexible manner. People who
Metamotivation 9
pursue goals with a prevention focus, by contrast, are more concerned with
fulfilling their need for safety and security and, thus, value these goals as
responsibilities or duties that they feel obligated to fulfill. In order to uphold
their responsibilities, prevention-focused individuals tend to adopt vigilant
strategies, which involve protecting against potential threats and processing
information in an analytic, convergent, and careful manner (Scholer &
Higgins, 2012).
Importantly, research suggests that people perform well when their cur-
rent motivational orientation is aligned with the processing demands of the
task at hand (i.e., when they experience task-motivation fit). For example,
research suggests that individuals motivated by promotion concerns generally
perform well on creativity tasks—tasks that demand associative and divergent
thinking (e.g., Bittner, Bruena, & Rietzschel, 2016; Friedman & F€ orster,
2001)—though there are circumstances when prevention-focused individuals
behave as creatively (e.g., Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011). By contrast, indi-
viduals motivated by prevention concerns should generally perform well on
tasks that demand careful processing and convergent thinking (e.g., certain
types of logic problems; Seibt & F€ orster, 2004).
In contrast to past research in which task-motivation fit was experi-
mentally created by researchers, the metamotivation framework proposes
that people can strategically create this fit themselves to promote goal-
directed outcomes. That is, when people understand the affordances of dif-
ferent motivational states and are sensitive to the processing demands of
different tasks, they are able to shift themselves into promotion vs. preven-
tion orientations in order to perform tasks that require divergent vs. con-
vergent processing, respectively. People’s flexible modulation of their
motivational states in the service of establishing task-motivation fit is
the essence of what it means to regulate the quality of one’s motivation.
2.2 Metamotivational knowledge

Whether or not individuals are successful at regulating the quality of their
motivation should depend in part on whether they possess accurate beliefs
about how motivation functions (i.e., metamotivational knowledge).
Borrowing from research on metacognition (see Flavell, 1979; Pintrich,
2002; Wolters, 2003), our framework posits three general categories of
metamotivational knowledge. Strategy knowledge encompasses people’s
understanding of the kinds of strategies they can use to bolster specific aspects
of their motivation and to induce particular types of motivational states.
Until recently, most of the motivation regulation research in both educa-

tional and social psychology focused on assessing this knowledge and
examining the kinds of outcomes it predicts (see Miele & Scholer, 2018;
Mischel & Mischel, 1983; Mischel et al., 1989; Trope & Fishbach,
2000; Wolters, 2003). Less frequently studied, but equally important, is
people’s metamotivational task knowledge, which includes their beliefs about
which motivational states are most beneficial for performance on a particular
type of task. Finally, self-knowledge refers to people’s understanding of what
it feels like to experience particular types of motivational states and their
sense of efficacy for being able to modulate or sustain these states.
Our own metamotivation research, which we review in the next section,
has primarily focused on assessing whether people possess the task and strat-
egy knowledge needed to successfully regulate the quality of their motiva-
tion. More specifically, we are interested in whether people are generally
aware of the trade-offs associated with different types of motivations and
mindsets (promotion vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control, high- vs low-
level construal) and whether they have a sense of the strategies they can
use to take advantage of these trade-offs and maximize performance across
a broad range of contexts and tasks. We are also interested in whether indi-
vidual differences in this knowledge of task-motivation fit predict motiva-
tionally flexible behavior and important life outcomes (e.g., academic
achievement, health, well-being) over time.
Finally, it is important to note that research on metamotivation has gen-
erally assumed that the task and strategy knowledge people possess can be
tacit or implicit (e.g., Reber, 1989; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). The par-
adigm that we typically use to assess metamotivational knowledge accounts
for this possibility by presenting participants with scenarios or tasks that vary
in terms of their motivational demands and then asking them to indicate
which motivation-inducing activity they would prefer to engage in before
each task or which activity would lead them to perform optimally on the
task (e.g., MacGregor, Carnevale, Dusthimer, & Fujita, 2017; Nguyen,
Carnevale, Scholer, Miele, & Fujita, 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016).
Participants who demonstrate an understanding of task-motivation fit seem
to intuitively know which activities fit with which tasks, even when they
are not aware that they possess this knowledge or are unable to explicitly
articulate it. This does not preclude the possibility that some particularly
insightful individuals are able to explicitly articulate their metamotivational
knowledge; we simply adopt methods that do not require participants to
possess this ability in order to demonstrate their knowledge.
Metamotivation 11
3. Empirical studies of metamotivational knowledge

Research that we have conducted examining people’s metamo-
tivational knowledge of task-motivation fit has thus far drawn on three
prominent traditions within motivation science—regulatory focus theory
(Higgins, 1997), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), and con-
strual level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2000). In
the sections below, we review the sets of studies we have conducted that
align with each of these theories.
3.1 Metamotivational knowledge about promotion

and prevention motivations
As discussed earlier in the article, whether it is better to be promotion- or
prevention-focused depends on the nature of the task. Situations that are
typically best performed with promotion motivation may be characterized
by one or all of the following: associative, divergent, and flexible thinking
(e.g., a creative brainstorming task; Friedman & F€ orster, 2001); a focus on
the abstract or big picture (e.g., developing a company’s vision statement;
F€orster & Higgins, 2005); incentive structures in which gains are prevalent
and rewarded (e.g., bonuses based on bigger-than-expected profits; Higgins,
Shah, & Friedman, 1997); and times when leisure or indulgence is the
primary goal (e.g., a relaxing vacation; Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, &
Nataraajan, 2006). In contrast, situations that are typically best performed
with prevention motivation are characterized by convergent thinking
(e.g., certain types of logic problems; Seibt & F€orster, 2004); a focus on con-
crete details (e.g., quality control inspections; Semin, Higgins, de Montes,
Estourget, & Valencia, 2005); incentive structures in which potential losses
are prevalent and costly (e.g., military surveillance; Higgins et al., 1997); and
times when lapses in attention are problematic (e.g., avoiding temptations;
Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002).
From a metamotivational perspective, this suggests that people can
establish task-motivation fit by upregulating or maintaining promotion
motivation when presented with tasks and situations in which performance
benefits from eager strategies, and by upregulating or maintaining preven-
tion motivation when presented with tasks in which performance benefits
from vigilant strategies. Thus, from a regulatory focus perspective, creation
of task-motivation fit requires people to (a) recognize when tasks demand
eagerness vs. vigilance (task knowledge), (b) identify strategies that induce
promotion vs. prevention motivation (strategy knowledge), and (c) select

the strategy that targets the appropriate motivation and best promotes per-
formance on the anticipated task.
3.1.1 Initial studies

To assess whether people possess this metamotivational knowledge, our
initial research employed the paradigm briefly described in the previous sec-
tion, which we adapted from studies examining people’s understanding of
instrumental emotion regulation (Ford & Tamir, 2012; Tamir, 2009;
Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Specifically, partic-
ipants were presented with descriptions of tasks (e.g., “your goal is to be as
creative as possible by seizing opportunities to take the ordinary and inno-
vate” vs. “your goal is to be as accurate as possible by making sure to avoid
lurking errors and pitfalls”) that theory and prior research suggest are per-
formed best with eager or vigilant processing strategies. Participants were also
presented with activities or incentive structures that prior work has shown can
induce promotion or prevention motivations (e.g., “write about your hopes
and aspirations as a child” to induce promotion or “write about your duties
and obligations as a child” to induce prevention), as well as with neutral activ-
ities (e.g., “describe how you got to school today”). For each task-strategy
combination, participants were asked to indicate how well they thought they
would perform on these tasks when first engaging in a given activity or when
operating under a particular incentive structure (e.g., gaining points for cor-
rect responses vs. losing points for incorrect responses). In some cases, they
were also asked how much they preferred to engage in a particular activity.
Across five studies, Scholer and Miele (2016) found that North American
participants exhibited accurate knowledge regarding task-motivation fit,
such that they generally believed that prevention-inducing recall strategies
would lead to better performance for vigilant vs. eager tasks and at times rec-
ognized that promotion-inducing recall strategies would lead to better per-
formance for eager vs. vigilant tasks (participants’ expectations for neutral
strategies did not differ as a function of task). However, there was variability
in the accuracy of these beliefs, suggesting individual differences in this
metamotivational knowledge. In addition, although there was evidence that
participants had knowledge of task-motivation fit, there was also a strong
main effect of activity type, such that participants tended to endorse the
general utility of promotion states over prevention states. Indeed, when par-
ticipants had to make a consequential behavioral choice in two of the studies,
participants overwhelmingly chose the promotion-inducing activity or
incentive structure.
Metamotivation 13
Given this tension between participants’ awareness of task-motivation fit

and their general preference for promotion motivation, Scholer and Miele
(2016) posited that the structure of the decision might influence the impact
of participants’ metamotivational knowledge on their consequential choices.
The paradigm described thus far required participants to select a motivation-
inducing strategy in order to prepare for an upcoming task; however,
another type of self-regulatory challenge that people face is what task to
engage in given a particular motivational state (e.g., I am feeling particularly
eager and enthusiastic right now, so what task should I do first?). Scholer and
Miele (Study 5) explored whether this latter type of decision structure might
result in a choice pattern that is more consistent with participants’ under-
standing of task-motivation fit. As predicted, when participants were pres-
ented with a prevention-inducing preparatory activity and asked to choose a
task to engage in after this activity (with the goal of maximizing perfor-
mance), they were more likely to choose the task that required vigilant
processing than the task that required eager processing. However, when par-
ticipants were presented with a promotion-inducing activity, there was no
difference in their likelihood of choosing a vigilant vs. eager task.
3.1.2 Do individual differences in metamotivational knowledge

predict achievement?
This initial investigation of metamotivational knowledge suggested that, in
many ways, people were remarkably sensitive to task-motivation fit, both in
their recognition of what types of motivational states are optimal for a given
task and what strategies can be used to induce these states. However, there
was variation in this knowledge, and preliminary evidence from a pair of
recent studies suggests that this variability can predict performance (Ross,
Nguyen, Scholer, Fujita, & Miele, 2019). In a field study, participants com-
pleted a regulatory focus knowledge assessment (based on the paradigm from
our previous studies) at the beginning of the academic term. Differences in
metamotivational knowledge about regulatory focus predicted grades at
the end of the term. A second two-part study found a similar pattern of
results. Participants completed the regulatory focus knowledge measure in
Session 1; and, in a second session, they were randomly assigned to complete
either a creative brainstorming task or a proofreading task. As in the field
study, metamotivational knowledge about regulatory focus predicted per-
formance on both of these tasks, even when controlling for task enjoyment,
difficulty, and prior experience.
Initial investigations also suggest that people appear to have accurate
metamotivational knowledge about how to manage the promotion and
prevention motivations of others. Specifically, Jansen, Moore, Scholer,

Fujita, and Miele (2019) found that managers were more likely to select a
promotion-focused employee (e.g., “Ellen has accomplished a lot in her
time with the company, and can always be relied upon to spot new oppor-
tunities for company growth... She would like to one day lead the company
to fulfill her dream of running a business”) for tasks that require eager
processing (e.g., drafting alternatives for an innovative advertising cam-
paign), but were more likely to select a prevention-focused employee
(e.g., “Victoria has high standards that are in line with company values,
and can always be relied upon to uphold company policy... She would like
to one day lead the company so she can ensure financial stability for the com-
pany”) for tasks that require vigilant processing (e.g., editing and reviewing
advertisements to ensure they meet advertising regulations). Further, man-
agers also exhibited accurate knowledge of task-motivation fit when selecting
the strategies that they thought they could use to motivate employees for
particular kinds of tasks. For example, managers recognized that praising
employee accomplishment and progress (a promotion-inducing strategy)
would lead employees to perform better when engaged in eagerness tasks,
but that reminding employees to follow company rules and regulations
(a prevention-inducing strategy) would lead employees to perform better
when engaged in vigilance tasks. In addition, managers not only recognized
the effectiveness of these strategies, but spontaneously generated such strat-
egies when actually trying to motivate a subordinate in an experimental par-
adigm. Later in the article, we discuss the potential of our metamotivational
approach for generating new insights into the management of others’
motivations.
3.1.3 Are metamotivational beliefs about promotion and prevention

motivations culturally bound?
As previously mentioned, our initial investigations of metamotivational
knowledge (Scholer & Miele, 2016) suggested that participants might have
biased expectations in favor of promotion-inducing strategies. We initially
posited that this bias might have a cultural basis. The original studies were
conducted in the United States and Canada and prior work has shown that
North American participants tend to be predominantly promotion-focused;
further, this tends to be a cultural context in which “being motivated” is
often equated with being pumped up, eager, and enthusiastic. We speculated
that the bias might be eliminated or even reversed in countries where people
tend to be more prevention-focused, such as Japan (Higgins, 2008).
Metamotivation 15
However, our recent cross-cultural examination of this possibility sug-

gests that the story is not so simple (Nguyen, Togawa, Miele, Scholer, &
Fujita, 2019). Japanese participants, presented with the same materials as
those in Scholer and Miele (2016), also showed a bias toward promotion-
inducing strategies. Additional studies suggest that this bias may actually vary
more as a function of the salience of the motivational affordances of a given
task. As we discuss in more detail later in the article, it is possible that some
tasks, situations, and strategies vary in the strength of signals they convey
about motivational states. For example, although a challenging proofreading
task is optimally performed with a vigilant strategy, this task may not call for
as much vigilance as an air traffic control simulation does. In one case, a
comma may be missed; in another, a plane may crash. Similarly, some strat-
egies may be more clearly linked to a given motivational state than others.
It is important to note that, regardless of signal strength, the materials that
we used in our original studies focused on strategies participants could use
to motivate themselves in an independent manner (i.e., what can I do on my
own to motivate myself?). As mentioned above, these materials did not
reveal any differences in the metamotivational beliefs of Japanese and
American participants. However, when we presented people with materials
that focused on strategies that they could use to motivate themselves in a
more interdependent manner (e.g., what can I do for someone else in order
to motivate myself?), cross-cultural differences did emerge (Nguyen,
Togawa, Miele, et al., 2019). Specifically, when the means to induce a given
motivational state directly affected the outcomes of others (e.g., if I perform
well, my friend will gain vs. lose money), Japanese participants were more
sensitive to task-motivation fit than American participants. In sum, it
appeared that Japanese participants had more tools at their disposal for cre-
ating task-motivation fit (i.e., they believed they could draw on a variety of
independent and interdependent strategies).
3.2 Metamotivational knowledge about autonomous

and controlled motivations
Another well-established way of categorizing and conceptualizing distinct
motivations is on the basis of the autonomy-control continuum specified
by self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000). At one end of the con-
tinuum is the interest and enjoyment that individuals associate with engaging
in the task (i.e., intrinsic value). At the other end of the continuum is the extent
to which individuals feel compelled to engage in the task because of some
external force, such as perceived rewards or punishments (i.e., external value).
Finally, in the middle of the continuum is the degree to which individuals

value the task because they perceive it to be personally relevant or aligned
with some aspect of their identity (i.e., self-relevant value). Importantly, what
we refer to as “self-relevant value” is comparable to the two autonomous
types of regulation posited by self-determination theory (i.e., identified
and integrated regulation), whereas “external value” roughly corresponds
to the two controlled types of extrinsic regulation (i.e., external and
introjected regulation). Thus, although self-relevant value is in the middle
of the continuum, it is expected to elicit an autonomous form of motivation
that is qualitatively more similar to intrinsic motivation than to the
controlled form of motivation elicited by external value.
Few would dispute that autonomous forms of motivation are beneficial
in many situations. For instance, autonomous (relative to controlled) moti-
vation is typically associated with increased persistence (Thoman, Smith, &
Silvia, 2011) and greater psychological well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2012).
However, research suggests that using extrinsic incentives to increase
controlled motivation can lead to enhanced performance on tasks that have
strictly defined performance criteria and that demand a certain quantity of
output (i.e., on close-ended tasks; e.g., Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014;
Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971; Wimperis & Farr, 1979). These tasks
tend not to require high absorption or intricacy, but instead involve struc-
tured and often speeded responses; they are typically evaluated based on the
number of units produced, such as answering multiple choice questions,
copying number matrices, or detecting in-text errors while proofreading.
In contrast, research suggests that increasing autonomous forms of motiva-
tion enhance performance on tasks that have broader, quality-based perfor-
mance criteria (i.e., on open-ended tasks; e.g., Cerasoli et al., 2014; Kruglanski
et al., 1971). Such tasks typically require high levels of task-absorption and
complex skill demonstration, as well as greater personal involvement. In
addition, they are typically evaluated by comparing performance to a stan-
dard that is separate from the quantity produced, such as the depth of one’s
response to an essay question on an exam or the creativity of one’s problem
solution.
In order to examine whether people are sensitive to the performance
trade-offs that exist between autonomous and controlled forms of motivation,
we employed the same types of paradigm used in the earlier studies on pro-
motion and prevention motivations. Specifically, Hubley, Edwards, Scholer,
and Miele (2019) presented participants with descriptions of open-ended
tasks (e.g., developing an engaging presentation on a topic of your choice)
Metamotivation 17
and close-ended tasks (e.g., copying a series of letter matrices as quickly and
accurately as possible) and, for each of them, asked participants to rate how
helpful eight different motivation-enhancing strategies would be for motivat-
ing them on the task. In particular, two of the strategies targeted intrinsic value
and were thought to enhance intrinsic motivation (e.g., “Consider the aspects
of the task that make it interesting”), two targeted self-relevant value and were
thought to enhance an autonomous form of extrinsic motivation (e.g.,
“Consider the aspects of the task that make it important to you”), two targeted
external value and were thought to enhance a controlled form of extrinsic
motivation (e.g., “Consider the rewards you might receive from completing
this task”), and two were designed to be neutral (e.g., “Count to 10 before
starting the task”).
Consistent with our previous work, the results of the study showed that
participants did possess knowledge of task-motivation fit in this domain. On
average, participants reported that strategies targeting external value would
be more helpful than strategies targeting intrinsic value for close-ended tasks,
but that strategies targeting intrinsic value would be more helpful for open-
ended tasks. Interestingly, the perceived utility of the strategies targeting self-
relevant value fell somewhere in between the perceive utility of the other
two types of strategies for both kinds of tasks, though (overall) participants
tended to find the self-relevant strategies more helpful for the open-ended
tasks than for the close-ended tasks.
A similar pattern of results was observed in a subsequent study where, as
opposed to being presented with distinct tasks, participants were given a sin-
gle task that was framed as open-ended or close-ended based on how per-
formance was to be assessed (i.e., “focus on analyzing the validity of the
arguments in this text, while ignoring any spelling or grammatical errors”
vs. “focus on identifying spelling and grammatical errors in this text, while
ignoring the ideas that are expressed”). That is, participants who were asked
to imagine the open-ended version of the task rated the strategies targeting
intrinsic and self-relevant value as more helpful than did the participants who
imagined the close-ended version. In contrast, there was no significant dif-
ference between conditions in participants’ ratings of the strategies targeting
extrinsic value; though participants in the close-ended condition did rate
the strategies targeting extrinsic value as more helpful than the strategies
targeting intrinsic and self-relevant value. Participants in the open-ended
condition did not view the three types of strategies as differing in helpfulness.
Because only the focus of the task varied between conditions in this study,
these findings provide strong support for the idea that people are sensitive to
the fit between particular types of motivation and the processing demands of
certain tasks (rather than perceiving a match between the motivations and
some other aspect of the tasks).
Finally, in another study by Hubley et al. (2019), participants’ knowledge
of task-motivation fit was shown to predict their choices of which
motivation-inducing preparatory activities to engage in before two different
tasks (with the expectation that they may be asked to perform one of the
tasks). For the open-ended task, participants chose the activity targeting
intrinsic value significantly more often (62.2%) than the activity targeting
extrinsic value (37.8%). In contrast, for the close-ended task, the pattern
was reversed (46.0% vs. 54.0%); though this was not significantly different
from chance. Thus, it appears that people are not only aware of the perfor-
mance trade-offs associated with autonomous and controlled forms of moti-
vation, but that this awareness can influence their attempts to regulate their
motivation and maximize their performance.
It is particularly interesting that participants appear to have knowledge of
task-motivation fit in this domain given other work illustrating the biases
people often hold about some of these strategies. For example, relative to
other types of strategies (such as rewarding oneself ), participants in a study
by Sansone et al. (1992) believed that interest-enhancing strategies would be
particularly effective in getting them to perform three different types of
activities on a regular basis. At the same time, people often fail to recognize
how extrinsic rewards can actually hurt intrinsic motivation (Murayama,
Kitagami, Tanaka, & Raw, 2016) and do not seem to realize just how moti-
vating intrinsic motivation can actually be (Woolley & Fishbach, 2015). Thus,
an important direction for future research is to explore of how general beliefs
about intrinsic and extrinsic motivation influence people’s metamotivational
understanding of task-motivation fit in this domain.
3.3 Metamotivational knowledge about high- and

low-level construal
It is well understood that people’s motivations and goals are hierarchically
structured (see Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duckworth & Gross, 2014;
Elliot, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster,
2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010). At the highest levels of a hierarchy are
the broad and abstract motivations people have that transcend any given
set of circumstances. The lower levels of a hierarchy consist of the specific
goals that people pursue in the service of their broad motivations—these
goals are tailored to situations that are increasingly more distinctive and
Metamotivation 19
idiosyncratic as one moves down through the hierarchy. Thus, by focusing

on the higher levels of their goal hierarchies, people can remind themselves
of their underlying reasons for engaging in a particular task; whereas, by
focusing on the lower levels, they can become better attuned to the
affordances that are available in the present context.
Research suggests one factor that sensitizes people to higher vs. lower
levels of their goal hierarchies is construal level. The term “construal” refers
to people’s subjective understandings or interpretations of events. The notion
that people subjectively construe—and thus motivationally orient—to the
same task, object, or event in very different ways is central to construal level
theory (e.g., Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2000). Construal
level theory proposes that people can construe activities in terms of the
abstract, global, and essential features that disparate tasks share in common
(i.e., high-level construal), or in terms of the concrete, local, and idiosyncratic
features that distinguish similar tasks from one another (i.e., low-level construal).
For example, whereas construing an activity as “studying for an exam” high-
lights those features that all study activities share, such as acquiring infor-
mation, construing the same activity as “quizzing myself with flashcards”
highlights unique features that distinguish this activity from others forms of
studying. An extensive literature demonstrates that shifts in construal level sys-
tematically impact evaluation, judgment, decision-making, and behavior
(e.g., Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2015; Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Importantly, high-level vs. low-level construal is particularly beneficial
for performance on the kinds of self-control tasks where the value of a
long-term or superordinate goal is pitted against the opportunity costs of
having to forgo more immediate impulses or temptations (for a review,
see Fujita & Carnevale, 2012; Kalkstein, Fujita, & Trope, 2018). For exam-
ple, in a sample of participants concerned about weight-loss, those who were
induced to approach a decision task with a high-level construal were more
likely to choose an apple over a candy bar compared to those who were
induced to approach the task with a low-level construal (Fujita & Han,
2009). Presumably high-level construal made it easier to evaluate their
choices in light of their highly valued, superordinate goal of losing weight
and to perceive the passing temptation of the candy bar as inconsistent with
this goal (Carnevale, Fujita, Han, & Amit, 2015; see also Fujita, Trope,
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010).
Although high-level construal may be generally adaptive when it comes
to maintaining the strength of one’s task motivation, particularly in the
face of conflicting impulses or temptations, it tends to elicit a “global”
(vs. “local”) mode of information processing that may undermine perfor-

mance on certain kinds of tasks. For instance, research has shown that high-
level relative to low-level construal leads to worse performance on tasks
that require precision or sensitivity to contextual cues (e.g., Freund &
Hennecke, 2015; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Pham & Taylor, 1999;
Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). More specifically, consider the stop-
signal task (Logan, 1994)—a performance task requiring participants to inhibit
habitual responses in response to infrequent stop-cues. Participants who
approach this kind of task with a low-level construal perform relatively well,
presumably because their local mode of processing involves carefully moni-
toring their environment for these stop-cues, and modulating their behavior
in response to them as necessary (Schmeichel et al., 2011). Other research sug-
gests that low-level relative to high-level construal is beneficial for tasks that
require skilled motor behavior, such as throwing darts (e.g., Zimmerman &
Kitsantas, 1997). Thus, similar to the previously discussed trade-offs associated
with autonomy vs. control and promotion vs. prevention, research suggests
that high- and low-level construal are beneficial for different kinds of tasks.
Accordingly, another way for people to establish task-motivation fit is to
engage strategically in high-level construal when presented with tasks that
benefit from focusing on one’s more abstract, superordinate motivations
and goals (e.g., self-control tasks), but to engage in low-level construal when
faced with tasks that benefit from a focus on more local considerations (e.g.,
tasks requiring precision and contextual sensitivity). Initial work examining
this possibility focused solely on people’s knowledge of the benefits of high-
level construal for self-control (MacGregor et al., 2017). In one experiment,
participants were asked to imagine participating in a market research study
that entailed eating cookies that were tasty but not very healthy. To manip-
ulate the presence vs. absence of self-control conflict, half were asked to ima-
gine having the goal of refraining from eating too many cookies (self-control
condition); the other half were asked to imagine having the goal of enjoying
their eating (control condition). Participants then indicated how useful
it would be for achieving their respective goals to ask themselves “why”
(or “why not”) vs. “how” (or “how not”) they would engage in this cookie
eating task. Whereas asking the question “why” is associated with high-
level construal, asking the question “how” is associated with low-level con-
strual (e.g., Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; Liberman & Trope, 1998).
Participants correctly indicated that thinking about “why” relative to
“how” would be more useful in the restraint relative to control conditions.
In other experiments, participants reported that thinking about the event in
Metamotivation 21
more abstract vs. concrete language—another manifestation of high-

vs. low-level construal (e.g., Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman,
2006; Semin & Fiedler, 1988)—would similarly enhance restraint.
Collectively, these findings suggest that people do, at some level, understand
the self-control benefits of high- vs. low-level construal.
Subsequent research has explored people’s knowledge of the regulatory
benefits of both high- and low-level construal (Nguyen, Carnevale, et al.,
2019). In these studies, the tasks that benefited from high-level construal
all involved some type of self-control (such as choosing between smaller-
immediate vs. larger-delayed monetary outcomes); whereas the tasks that
benefited from low-level construal involved some element of precision
and/or contextual sensitivity (such as completing a stop-signal task or
throwing darts). As an exploratory control condition, participants were also
presented with tasks for which performance was not expected to benefit
more from high- or low-level construal (such as daydreaming on a bus or
going out to dinner with friends).
For each regulatory task, participants were asked to indicate which of two
preparatory exercises they would prefer to complete in order to “set their
mind.” These preparatory exercises were all inductions of high- vs. low-level
construal that had been validated in previous research. In one study, for
example, participants were told that the exercises would require engaging
in global vs. local visual processing, respectively (e.g., Kimchi & Palmer,
1982; Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008; Wakslak & Trope, 2009).
In another study, participants indicated preferences for exercises that
required engaging in superordinate category vs. subordinate exemplar gen-
eration (e.g., Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006). To correctly match the appropriate
preparatory exercise to the corresponding regulatory task, participants
needed to not only recognize which construal level would benefit task per-
formance, but to also identify which of the preparatory exercises would
best instantiate the preferred construal level. In this way, participants’
endorsement of one exercise over the other in response to each of the three
types of regulatory tasks (high-level vs. low-level vs. control) represented the
critical assessment of metamotivational task and strategy knowledge.
Results revealed that participants did correctly recognize the benefits
of a high- vs. low-level preparatory exercise when faced with tasks for which
performance benefits from high- vs. low-level construal, respectively. For
instance, before making decisions between smaller-immediate vs. larger-
delayed monetary rewards, participants indicated that they preferred the pre-
paratory exercise that entailed global vs. local visual processing. By contrast,
when completing a stop-signal task, participants indicated that they pre-

ferred the preparatory exercise that entailed subordinate exemplar vs. super-
ordinate category generation. The fact that participants were sensitive to
task-motivation fit across a broad range of tasks and preparatory exercises
suggests that people’s metamotivational knowledge about the functions of
high- and low-level construal may be fairly broad and sophisticated.
Importantly, this metamotivational knowledge (like knowledge about
promotion and prevention motivation) does not appear to be bound to a
specific culture. Cross-cultural tests comparing responses of American vs.
Japanese participants reveal similar patterns of results (Nguyen, Togawa,
Scholer, & Fujita, 2019). Specifically, when asked to indicate preferences
of preparatory exercises in response to high-level vs. low-level regulatory
tasks, Japanese participants showed the same ability to create task-motivation
fit as Americans—suggesting similar metamotivational task and strategy
knowledge.
Although research indicates that people are aware of the performance
trade-offs associated with high- vs. low-level construal, there was notable
individual-level variance in this awareness. For example, in one of the stud-
ies by Nguyen, Carnevale, et al. (2019; Study 6), only 40.6% of the sample
selected an appropriate preparatory exercise for both of the regulatory tasks,
whereas 12.5% selected an inappropriate exercise in both cases and 46.9%
overgeneralized their preference for a particular preparatory exercise across
both tasks. This individual-level variance in strategy preference should have
important consequences for how effective people are at regulating their
motivation and, consequently, how well they perform on tasks.
Preliminary evidence for this assertion comes from the studies by
MacGregor et al. (2017). For example, in one study, participants were asked
whether describing the act of eating cookies in more abstract vs. concrete
language would benefit restraint. Critically, participants also reported on their
degree of dieting motivation, as well as their height and weight (which was
used to calculate body mass index). Among participants who were higher in
dieting concerns, those who correctly reported that abstract language would
be more beneficial for restraint had lower body mass indices, suggesting
greater self-control. In another study, undergraduate students in an introduc-
tory social psychology course were asked to describe how they would over-
come temptations when preparing for their final exam. They also reported
how important and valuable they perceived the course to be and gave the
researchers permission to access their final grades in the course. Among
students who highly valued the course, those who described their willpower
Metamotivation 23
efforts in more abstract relative to concrete terms received higher grades

in the course, again suggesting enhanced self-control. Collectively, this
provides initial evidence that those with metamotivational knowledge
of the benefits of high-level construal experienced superior self-control
outcomes.
4. Implications
4.1 Advancing motivation science research
The metamotivation approach outlined in this article advances motivation
science in a number of ways. First, by suggesting that both the quantity and
quality of motivation can be the target of regulation, it helps to bridge exis-
ting research on motivation regulation (which tends to focus on motivation
quantity) with theories that posit qualitatively distinct types of motivation.
On the one hand, the fact that people seem to know about the performance
trade-offs associated with different types of motivation suggests that they can
regulate their motivation in ways that were not previously appreciated. For
example, rather than simply bolstering the overall strength of their motiva-
tion, people can also attempt to instantiate the particular motivational state
that best fits the demands of the current task (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2017;
Nguyen, Carnevale, et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016). In addition,
rather than trying to change their motivation in some way (whether it be
quantitatively or qualitatively), they can choose a particular task to engage
in that they think will benefit from the kind of motivation they are currently
experiencing (Scholer & Miele, 2016; see also Delose, vanDellen, & Hoyle,
2015). On the other hand, the fact that people know about the differential
benefits of promotion vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control, and high- vs
low-level construal helps to expand our understanding of regulatory focus
theory, self-determination theory, and construal level theory. For instance,
it suggests that people may have the capacity to use construal level strategi-
cally in their everyday lives. Thus, rather than serving as artificial lab-based
manipulations, construal level inductions can perhaps be used as regulatory
strategies in real-world contexts.
4.2 Knowledge as a source of self-regulatory success vs. failure

A second major advance of the metamotivational approach is spotlighting
the accuracy or inaccuracy of people’s task-specific beliefs about motivation
as a source of goal success vs. failure. Self-regulation research has traditionally
examined the ways in which people use strategies or exercise abilities

(e.g., inhibit undesired thoughts, emotions, and behavioral tendencies) to
broadly exert control over their motivation. For instance, educational psy-
chology studies of motivation regulation have often focused on how stu-
dents’ general use of regulation strategies (i.e., across the tasks within a
course/domain) predicts their academic achievement and other outcomes
(e.g., Grunschel et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2018; Schwinger et al., 2009).
Similarly, self-regulation research from the cognitive control tradition is
largely predicated on the idea that basic cognitive capacities such as exec-
utive attention, executive functioning, and working memory play central
roles in people’s goal pursuit efforts across contexts (e.g., Hofmann,
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Posner &
Rothbart, 1998).
In contrast, the metamotivational approach suggests that understanding
people’s strategies and abilities provides only partial insight into the self-
regulation puzzle—one still needs to know when to deploy these skills. Any
inaccurate or erroneous beliefs about when it is appropriate to apply these
skills (i.e., in what context and for which task) are likely to undermine
effective self-regulation. Thus, as opposed to focusing solely on how peo-
ple exert control, our framework also focuses on how people monitor the
situation and their internal states based on their metamotivational
knowledge.
Importantly, focusing on what people know about motivation, rather
than their general self-regulatory strategies and capacities, pushes researchers
to move beyond trying to account for who is “good” or “bad” at self-
regulating across tasks/contexts and to instead focus on what types of tasks
particular individuals are likely to struggle with. Consider, for example, the
self-regulatory efforts of concert pianists. To be successful, pianists must
overcome the drudgery and frustration of daily practice in favor of perfecting
their craft. They must also execute these learned skills and make appropriate
adjustments when performing on a specific piano in a particular concert hall
on any given day. Whereas high-level construal should promote the former
type of behavior, low-level construal should promote the latter. The pianist
who erroneously believes that engaging in high-level construal is always
beneficial for task performance can be expected to endure and persist in daily
practice, but may be insensitive to the subtle contextual cues that make for
successful recital performances. Conversely, the pianist who erroneously
believes that engaging in low-level construal is always beneficial for task
Metamotivation 25
performance is likely to exhibit the opposite pattern: regularly giving daily

practices short shrift, but being hyper-tuned to the subtle cues in the perfor-
mance environment. Both pianists are likely to struggle to attain their goals,
but for very different reasons.
The previous example highlights how differences in metamotivational
task knowledge can help explain why the same person might regulate her
motivation in an effective manner on one task, but not on another.
Further, in our framework, successful self-regulation also requires accurate
strategy knowledge and self-knowledge. Thus, even people with a sophis-
ticated understanding of the performance trade-offs associated with various
types of motivation may struggle to successfully regulate their motivation at
times. For instance, such a person may mistakenly believe that she is already
in a motivational state that is adaptive for the current task when she is in fact
not (poor self-knowledge); as a result, she may begin the task motivationally
unprepared and then perform in a suboptimal manner. Similarly, another
individual may possess accurate task and self-knowledge, but not know
how to shift herself into the motivational state that she believes will be more
adaptive for the task than the state she is currently experiencing (poor strat-
egy knowledge). Exploring each type of knowledge systematically will be
key to understanding who, when, and why some individuals succeed at reg-
ulating their motivational states, whereas others fail.
4.3 The centrality of flexibility

The previous example also highlights a third advance of the meta-
motivational approach, which is the importance of motivational flexibility
for self-regulatory success. In contrast to some other theories of motivation,
the metamotivational approach takes as a given that no single motivational ori-
entation or state ensures success. An orientation that is best suited for one task
may undermine performance on another. Successful self-regulation requires
people to be sensitive to the changing motivational demands across various
tasks and to shift their motivational orientation to match these changing
demands. If people are unable to shift their motivational states, optimal self-
regulation may require that they instead be more flexible in what tasks they
perform first. In either case, rather than insist on a one-size-fits-all approach,
the metamotivation approach suggests that effective self-regulation requires
tailoring one’s response to the motivational affordances of different situations
and tasks.
5. Future directions
5.1 Predicting real-world outcomes
Our metamotivational research to-date has largely focused on understanding
what people’s beliefs about motivation are and the extent to which they
are accurate vs. inaccurate. A central assertion of the metamotivational
approach, however, is that these beliefs guide people’s efforts at regulating
their motivation and should therefore impact performance and other out-
comes. Some work suggests that these beliefs impact which activities or tasks
people strategically choose to engage in (e.g., Hubley et al., 2019; Nguyen,
Carnevale, et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016)—an important component
of self-regulation (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999). Other work provides preliminary
evidence that people’s metamotivational knowledge may predict goal suc-
cess in domains such as weight-loss and academics (e.g., MacGregor et al.,
2017; Ross et al., 2019). This work notwithstanding, more research needs to
be conducted to establish and characterize the impact of metamotivational
knowledge on performance and other outcomes in real-world contexts.
The ability to predict important outcomes may require further develop-
ment and validation of diagnostic assessments of this knowledge. Research
to-date has largely adopted indirect measurement strategies in which partic-
ipants are presented with various scenarios and asked to select options based
on their preferences or expectations (e.g., Murayama et al., 2016; Nguyen,
Carnevale, et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016). An alternative strategy
has been to observe participants’ spontaneous responses in critical goal-
relevant contexts and to then code these responses as reflecting accurate
vs. inaccurate beliefs (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2017). An important question
that arises is whether one assessment approach is superior to the other in
predicting behavior. Similarly, it may also be possible that more direct mea-
surement approaches—such as directly asking participants what they think
the best response to a situation might be—may be equally or more valid for
prediction.
It is also important to note that the existing measurement approaches
involve coding responses as accurate or inaccurate depending on whether
they align with theoretical predictions and/or past empirical findings.
Thus, another important question is whether the accuracy of people’s meta-
motivational beliefs should instead be assessed based on how well each indi-
vidual performs a task when experiencing a particular motivational state
(rather than on how people perform more generally). For example, although
Metamotivation 27
individuals generally persist longer on open-ended tasks when experiencing

intrinsic motivation, a particular individual may find that she persists longer
on such tasks when motivated by extrinsic incentives. In this case, we would
not want to label the person’s beliefs about the utility of extrinsic motivation
to be inaccurate. Using a person’s own performance as the standard for
assessing the accuracy of her beliefs is an approach that is common in the
metacognition literature (see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Clearly, ques-
tions about how best to measure people’s metamotivational beliefs are ripe
for future research.
5.2 Self-knowledge
Most research on metamotivation has focused on whether people have
task and strategy knowledge concerning various motivational states, such
as promotion/prevention, autonomy/control, and high/low level construal
(Hubley et al., 2019; Nguyen, Carnevale, et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele,
2016). Almost no work to-date has examined the third type of knowledge
that we view as necessary for regulating one’s own motivation—i.e., insight
into one’s motivational states and tendencies (see Flavell, 1979; Pintrich,
2002, for discussions of self-knowledge in the metacognitive domain). In
our framework, self-knowledge is necessary for determining whether and
to what extent one needs to modulate one’s own motivation. For instance,
although a person may know that she should approach a particular task with a
prevention focus, she may not take steps to shift herself into this motivational
state unless she realizes that she is currently experiencing a promotion focus.
Our metamotivational framework highlights innovative directions that
research on self-knowledge might explore. Two important questions that
arise are what do particular motivational states subjectively feel like, and
what cues do people use to recognize that they are in these states.
Motivation science has traditionally taken for granted that people can iden-
tify the quantity of motivation that they are experiencing, but whether they
can accurately identify the quality of their motivation is unknown. The
ability to reliably respond to face valid items assessing intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation (e.g., Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994) may suggest
that people do have some insight into the quality of their motivational
states. What is perhaps less understood, however, is how people come to
realize that they are in a promotion vs. prevention focus or a high-level
vs. low-level construal state. In other work (Miele & Scholer, 2018), we
have suggested that people may monitor and manage their motivations
by attending to their metamotivational feelings. For instance, feelings such as

hope or excitement (as well as related thoughts and behaviors) may at times
serve as metamotivational cues that signal the presence of promotion
motivation.
As with the monitoring of any internal state, people may differ widely in
terms of how much self-insight about their motivation they possess. Thus,
research might also seek to explore predictors of individual or temporal
variation in people’s levels of self-insight (i.e., what makes some people
particularly good at detecting their motivational states?). Individual differ-
ences in interoception (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017) and mood awareness
(Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) seem like particularly strong candidates for such
exploration. In addition, it is possible that situational factors, such as objec-
tive self-awareness (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972), may also enhance the
perceptibility of motivational states.
Another aspect of self-knowledge that will be important to explore is
the implicit theories people use to interpret their motivational experiences
(including their metamotivational feelings). For instance, when people
feel bored during a task and are in danger of quitting, the likelihood they
will take steps to increase their motivation may depend on whether or not
they believe that their experiences of interest or boredom are changeable.
Consistent with this possibility, Thoman, Sansone, Robinson, and Helm
(in press) recently showed that participants’ implicit beliefs about interest
predicted their use of interest regulation strategies during a boring task.
Other researchers (King, 2019) have measured beliefs about the malleability
of motivation more broadly and found that they are associated with stu-
dents’ academic engagement. Future research should explore the extent
to which people’s beliefs about the malleability of specific motivational
constructs (e.g., interest, task value, self-efficacy) are associated with their
more general beliefs about motivation.
5.3 Creating fit

The extant metamotivation literature has generally focused on how people
create task-motivation fit by bolstering or shifting their motivational states.
Yet one can also create task-motivation fit by choosing tasks that fit one’s
current motivational states. Although the research we have reviewed indi-
cates that people create fit through both mechanisms (e.g., Scholer & Miele,
2016), the creation of fit via task selection represents an understudied area in
motivation research. This oversight is surprising, however, given that this is a
Metamotivation 29
critical problem for people attempting to balance the pursuit of multiple

goals. The exploration of this issue through the lens of metamotivation
may open new lines of inquiry that examine the question of when people
choose to pursue which goal.
In some cases, people may actively choose between modulating their
motivational states vs. strategically selecting the tasks they complete. Both
approaches can be used to optimize task performance, yet people may differ
in their ability and/or preference to regulate in each of these two ways.
Those who struggle to modify or modulate their internal states, for example,
may be unable to re-orient motivationally, and thus prefer to regulate the
order in which they complete certain tasks. By contrast, those who lack
independence or the authority to choose what to do may have to resort
to regulating their underlying motivational orientations. The metamoti-
vational approach thus proposes that future research should systematically
explore the questions of who, when, and why people create motivational
fit by modulating their motivational states vs. prioritizing some tasks over
others.
A third approach to regulating motivation (an approach originally
suggested by regulatory fit theory; Higgins, 2000) is to strategically approach
tasks in a manner that fits with one’s chronic and perhaps preferred orien-
tation, irrespective of task demands. Someone who is chronically motivated
by promotion, for example, may generally prefer eager information
processing strategies, even when task performance might benefit from pre-
vention. To the extent that it is uncomfortable or difficult for this person to
sustain the orientation demanded by the task (Lisjak, Molden, & Lee, 2012),
she may ultimately decide to abandon efforts to create task-motivation fit.
Instead, she may “double-down” on her preferred chronic motivational
state and amplify engagement by trying to establish what we have referred
to as orientation-strategy fit (Scholer & Miele, 2016).
A related question that future research should address is how people
choose between different motivational states when several might be adap-
tive. Consider, for example, tasks that require vigilance, such as proofread-
ing. The drive to ensure against losses that is elicited by a prevention
orientation should enhance performance. The orientation toward detail
and narrowed attentional focus of low-level construal, however, should
similarly promote performance. How people choose between multiple
adaptive orientations (or perhaps combine orientations) is an important
question to resolve, particularly if researchers hope to predict behavior.
Conversely, it is also important to consider how certain orientations might
be simultaneously adaptive and maladaptive for a particular task. For

instance, consider a task that requires precise motor control but also involves
a self-control conflict (such as trying to practice for your piano recital when
your brother wants you to come play video games). On the one hand,
adopting a high-level construal would help with inhibiting the impulse
to play video games; but, on the other hand, it would elicit a global atten-
tional focus that might undermine the quality of one’s practice. In such
cases, it could be beneficial to approach the task by engaging in low-level
construal and then selectively implement a regulation strategy that induces
a high-level construal each time the temptation to quit practicing becomes
salient.
5.4 Development and acquisition of knowledge

A critical question that we have only recently begun to address concerns the
development and acquisition of metamotivational beliefs. Recent evidence
suggests that children as young as seven appear to have some knowledge of
how promotion and prevention motivations fit with different tasks (i.e., task
knowledge; Scholer, Hartman, Hubley, Wilson, & Henderson, 2019),
though they do not appear to fully understand how to induce these states
in themselves (i.e., strategy knowledge). Specifically, children were told
about a Lego task in which they would have to use their imagination to con-
struct an original building that might exist in the future (i.e., a task that
required eager processing) or a Lego task in which they would have to con-
struct a building following very specific rules (i.e., a task that required vig-
ilant processing). They were also presented with descriptions of promotion
and prevention motivations. Similar to the college students in our original
studies (Scholer & Miele, 2016), children reported that they would perform
better on the eager vs. vigilant task when promotion-focused, but would
perform better on the vigilant vs. eager task when prevention-focused (task
knowledge). Children were also asked to report how particular strategies—
focusing on their strengths or focusing on their weaknesses—would affect
performance, given prior work linking these strategies to the upregulation
of promotion and prevention motivation, respectively (Scholer, Ozaki, &
Higgins, 2014). Although children exhibited accurate task knowledge, chil-
dren did not exhibit accurate strategy knowledge with these specific
strategies.
These findings suggest that children might acquire particular types of
metamotivational knowledge at different points in development. They also
Metamotivation 31
raise the question of where children acquire this knowledge and who they
acquire it from. One possibility is that caregivers teach children about the
nature of motivation as the latter encounter various motivational challenges.
For example, children may be taught to construe temptations in high-level
terms (e.g., focus on why it is important to wait until the morning to open
Christmas gifts) as a means of enhancing self-control. By contrast, when
learning precise performance skills such as playing the piano, children might
instead be taught to construe these challenges in low-level terms (e.g., focus
on playing this note with this finger in this way). These experiences may
teach children how to distinguish different types of regulatory demands
and help them identify the various ways to optimize their current motiva-
tional states. Alternatively, people may learn through trial-and-error. That
is, if a particular strategy for dealing with a given regulatory challenge has
worked in the past, people may continue to use it in similar situations; but
if it leads to poor outcomes, they may be more likely to test other strategies.
It is also possible that people logically deduce metamotivational knowledge,
much as researchers have done to develop theories of self-regulation and
motivation. Researchers should consider examining these possibilities devel-
opmentally, as people may acquire metamotivational beliefs via different
routes depending on age. For example, it might be unreasonable to expect
young children to acquire metamotivational knowledge via logical deduc-
tion given what we know about their cognitive development (Ricco, 2015).
A related question is how best to transmit metamotivational knowledge.
As noted earlier, existing research has assumed certain types of metamoti-
vational knowledge to be tacit or implicit. This might suggest that this
knowledge would be better acquired via experiential rather than didactic
mechanisms. For instance, teachers and experts might not be able to explain
how to respond to various regulatory challenges, but they may be able to
show students by repeatedly modeling behavior in a wide range of circum-
stances. Alternatively, to the extent that people do have insight into their
metamotivational knowledge, it may be possible to transmit this knowledge
to others through direct teaching. Addressing these questions will be neces-
sary for the development of interventions and instructional practices aimed
at increasing people’s metamotivational knowledge and improving their
self-regulation.
Another intriguing possibility is that people may learn to regulate their
own motivation through efforts to motivate others. Coaches, teachers, men-
tors, and employers must all exhort others to work harder and to achieve
ever higher levels of performance. It may be that the regulation of others’
motivations informs people about how best to regulate their own motiva-
tional states. The demands of the social roles people play (e.g., working as a
coach who is responsible for the performance of 50 athletes) may incentivize
and encourage them to attend to and study the co-variation between various
motivational states, tasks, and outcomes (e.g., promotion motivation leads to
more goals when the team is on offense). Conversely, possessing accurate
metamotivational knowledge about one’s own motivational states may
make one more effective in these high-responsibility social roles. For exam-
ple, someone who understands how to establish task-motivation fit for her-
self may be particularly good at assigning tasks to people based on their
motivational tendencies (i.e., at creating task-motivation fit for others; see
Jansen et al., 2019). In these ways, investigating the antecedents and conse-
quences of metamotivational knowledge in the interpersonal domain prom-
ises to be a generative and insightful extension of the present approach.
5.5 Linking metamotivation to general motivational

competency
Metamotivation research has largely examined people’s knowledge of moti-
vational orientations or states in isolation. That is, in separate lines of
research, investigators have examined what people know about promotion
vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control, and high-level vs. low-level construal.
Less has been done to examine the extent to which knowledge might be
correlated across these domains. It may be the case that those who are par-
ticularly motivationally skilled have high levels of knowledge across multiple
domains—a kind of motivational “g” that predicts success at securing desired
ends across a number of contexts. One might expect individuals high in this
general ability to evidence superior self-regulatory outcomes.
In keeping with this idea, future research might link metamotivational
knowledge to constructs such as grit. Grit is conceptualized as a trait that
allows people to pursue long-term goals with passion and perseverance
(e.g., Duckworth & Gross, 2014). From a metamotivational perspective, grit
entails maintaining one’s motivation over long durations of time and in the
face of challenges (see also Jachimowicz, Wihler, Bailey, & Galinsky, 2018).
Rather than conceptualize grit as a trait, however, the metamotivational
approach suggests that grit is a skill—the ability to implement strategies that
maintain the right amount and type of motivation to pursue a goal.
Critically, whereas a trait approach provides little insight into how best to
increase or improve grit, the metamotivational approach highlights the pos-
session of accurate knowledge and the appropriate implementation of this
Metamotivation 33
knowledge as key to improving self-regulation. Thus, whereas the trait

approach typically espoused by grit researchers may help identify individuals
likely to persist or not, the metamotivational approach not only identifies
these individuals but also provides concrete guidelines for intervention
and improvement. Empirical research is needed, however, to link meta-
motivational knowledge directly to grit and to other related constructs.
5.6 Toward a comprehensive mechanistic model

of metamotivation
Our review and discussion of the existing metamotivation literature has
focused on people’s regulation of the quality rather than the quantity of
motivation. As noted before, this emphasis reflects the fact that regulation
of quality is a key hallmark of our metamotivational framework. We do
not, however, suggest that the regulation of motivation quantity is a less crit-
ical metamotivational process; in fact, we argue that more research is needed
to understand how people monitor and control the degree to which they are
motivated to pursue their task goals. An important aim of future research
should therefore be to develop a comprehensive mechanistic framework
that models both the regulation of quantity and quality of motivation
(see Miele & Scholer, 2018, for an initial attempt at this).
One key question that a comprehensive mechanistic framework must
address is how people determine that they have the right amount and type
of motivation to achieve their goals. In a prior review (Miele & Scholer,
2018), we suggested that they accomplish this in part by monitoring and stra-
tegically modulating the specific components that underlie their motivation
(e.g., intrinsic value, self-relevant value, self-efficacy), rather than focusing
solely on some broad or holistic experience of motivation (see Engelschalk,
Steuer, & Dresel, 2016; Sansone et al., 1992; Wolters, 1998). In addition, we
posited several criteria for identifying the components that people target
when regulating their motivation, including the possibility that high levels
of such components are associated with unique sets of phenomenological
feelings or experiences. As discussed earlier, these metamotivational feelings
may play an important role in detecting the quality of one’s current moti-
vational states (e.g., whether one is promotion- or prevention-focused;
Miele & Scholer, 2018). Metamotivational feelings, however, may also serve
as important inputs for determining whether one is insufficiently motivated
(i.e., low quantity) or is not motivated to perform a task in the right way
(i.e., lack of task-motivation fit).
As an example of a feeling that signals a motivational deficit, consider

boredom. The experience of boredom may signal to an individual that
her initial interest in the task (which gave rise to an experience of intrinsic
motivation) is being undermined by the costs associated with performing
that task (e.g., when a textbook chapter is so dull that a student is no longer
interested in the material or does not want to continue reading). If the feel-
ing is strong enough and is accompanied by a desire to disengage from the
task, the individual may decide to implement a strategy that either bolsters
the motivation component in question (i.e., intrinsic value) or eliminate the
costs that are interfering with it. If the strategy is successful, the individual
may come to experience a renewed interest in the task. This interest signals
to the person that no further regulation is necessary. In this way,
metamotivational feelings may initiate and terminate metamotivational reg-
ulation in a bottom-up manner during task completion or goal pursuit.
To the extent that metamotivational feelings are like other types of meta-
cognitive and affective states that operate at the “fringe” of consciousness,
they are presumably capable of representing “large amounts of information
in a condensed format, to avoid exceeding the limited capacity of conscious-
ness” (Norman, Price, & Duff, 2010, p. 68). Thus, metamotivational feel-
ings may allow people to monitor their motivation in an efficient manner,
while maintaining their focus on the primary activity (e.g., learning the
material). That is, rather than having to continually interrupt their execution
of a task in order to check if they are sufficiently motivated to continue,
people can instead wait until their metamotivational feelings automatically
trigger the use of a particular regulation strategy.
In addition to signaling deficits in the quantity of motivation, meta-
motivational feelings may also signal a lack of compatibility between the
quality of one’s motivation and the demands of the current task (i.e., a lack
of task-motivation fit). This possibility is line with regulatory fit theory
(Higgins, 2000), which suggests that when individuals engage in strategies
(e.g., eager vs. vigilant information processing) that do not match their
underlying motivational orientation (e.g., promotion vs. prevention), they
experience a feeling of “nonfit” (of going about the task in the wrong
manner) that is demotivating (Higgins, 2000). If an individual responds to
this feeling by taking steps to shift herself into a type of motivation that is
more compatible with the task, she may come to experience a feeling of
“fit” (of going about the task in the right manner) that is energizing and that
is associated with improved performance, goal commitment, and task enjoy-
ment (Higgins, 2000).
Metamotivation 35
6. Summary
In this article, we have spotlighted an emerging area of motivation sci-
ence research—namely, metamotivation. This approach is novel in that it
suggests that people modulate both the quality and quantity of their motiva-
tional states in order to achieve desired ends. Given that motivational states
are often critical precursors to how people think, feel, and act—the targets of
traditional approaches to self-regulation—research on metamotivation may
reveal particularly efficient means by which people can regulate their goal
pursuit. We have reviewed research that indicates that people often have
the requisite metamotivational knowledge to leverage promotion vs. pre-
vention orientations, autonomous vs. controlled motivations, and high-
vs. low-level construals to enhance performance on goal-directed tasks. At
the same time, there is variability in the accuracy of these beliefs, suggesting
clear opportunities for intervention. We hope to inspire others to pursue the
many innovative and novel research questions that the metamotivational
framework raises, and look forward to the insights such work will provide.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by funding from the Buehler Sesquicentennial Assistant Professorship,
the James S. McDonnell Foundation (Collaborative Grant No. 220020483), the National
Science Foundation (Grant No. 1626733), and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 435-2017-0184). The opinions expressed here are
our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations
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CHAPTER TWO
Moving from research on message

framing to principles of message
matching: The use of gain- and
loss-framed messages to promote
healthy behavior
Alexander J. Rothman*, Keven-Joyal Desmarais, Richie L. Lenne
*Corresponding author: e-mail address: rothm001@umn.edu
Contents
1. Introduction 44
2. How can gain- and loss-framed messages be used strategically to motivate
healthy behavior? 46
2.1 In pursuit of moderators I: Matching frames to factors tied to concerns
about risk 47
2.2 In pursuit of moderators II: Matching frames to dispositions 49
2.3 In pursuit of moderators III: Initial steps toward synthesis 49
3. Looking ahead I: In pursuit of principles for message matching 53
3.1 Unpacking what it means to “match” a message 54
3.2 Expanding approaches to matching: Moving toward multi-matched
messages 58
3.3 Toward a conceptualization of the strength of a message match 60
3.4 Summary 62
4. Looking ahead II: Expanding our approach to message framing 63
4.1 The linguistic positivity bias 63
4.2 Self-presentation and impression management 65
4.3 Persuasive communication 66
4.4 Moving the research agenda forward 66
5. Concluding remarks 68
References 69
Abstract
For more than three decades, investigators have worked to generate an evidence
base that can guide the strategic use of gain- and loss-framed information to
promote healthy behavior. A key theme underlying these efforts has been the
identification of a set of moderators—constructs that represents aspects of a person

44 Alexander J. Rothman et al.
or of a situation—that regulate the effect of framed messages and enable investiga-

tors to deliver messages that are framed to match a person or situation and, thereby,
maximize its persuasive effect. In this article, we examine how the adoption of a
moderator-focused approach to message framing has shaped the evidence base that
has emerged and offer a series of recommendations for where research should head.
In particular, we consider two themes that offer opportunities to deepen our under-
standing of message framing effects. First, given that the effectiveness of message
framing rests on investigators’ ability to match a message to a person or a situation
strategically, we articulate a set of principles that could inform the optimal application
of message matching. Second, moving beyond the communication of framed infor-
mation in pamphlets or videos, we consider how the use and influence of gain- and
loss-framed statements unfolds within the context of interpersonal communication.
Moving forward, we believe that engagement with these issues will advance both our
understanding and use of message framing.
1. Introduction
“Getting an annual mammogram can save lives,” “Missing an annual
mammogram can cost lives,” “Not smoking ¼ Life,” “Smoking ¼ Death,”
“Want to decrease your chances of suffering with the flu this winter? Get
a flu shot,” “Want to increase your chances of suffering with the flu? Don’t
get a flu shot.” Throughout the day, people are directly or indirectly exposed
to messages such as these about their health. It might be a billboard that
catches the eye while riding the bus, a banner ad that appears on a website,
or a pamphlet distributed at work, school, or a community center. These
messages are displayed and distributed purposively to motivate people to
act to support their health and, in doing so, advance public health. Thus,
their value rests on their effectiveness—their ability to promote healthy
patterns of decisions and behavior.
What makes a message effective? Working across an array of research
traditions, researchers have actively pursued answers to this question—
some focusing on the source of the message, others on attributes of the
message recipient, and others on the content or construction of the mes-
sage (McGuire, 1985; Petty & Briñol, 2015; Rothman & Baldwin, 2019).
Research on message framing is situated in the last of these traditions and
is grounded on the premise that people respond differently to messages
that emphasize the benefits of a pattern of behavior (a gain-framed appeal)
compared to those that emphasize the costs of a pattern of behavior
Moving from research on message framing to principles of message matching 45
(a loss-framed appeal). As illustrated at the outset of this chapter, health

messages—whether they focus on, for example, screening behaviors,
substance use, or vaccines—can be crafted to adopt either frame. But, which
frame should be used?
Over the past 30 years, investigators have worked to develop an evidence
base that can guide decisions regarding which frame to use for whom and
under what conditions (Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Rothman, Wlaschin,
Bartels, Latimer, & Salovey, 2008; Updegraff & Rothman, 2013). These
efforts have been organized around a focus on moderators—constructs that
represents aspects of a person or of a situation—which regulate the observed
effect of gain and loss framed messages. The underlying expectation guiding
this work is that by identifying a set of moderators that operate in a predict-
able manner, investigators will be able to design and deliver messages framed
to match the person or situation and, thereby, maximize the ability of
messages to motivate healthy behavior. In this article, we look back at
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and consider how adopting
a moderator-focused approach to research on message framing has shaped
the questions investigators have pursued and, in turn, the evidence base that
has emerged. Moreover, we use this analysis to develop recommendations
for where research on message framing should head and, in particular,
engage with two themes regarding how framed information is utilized. First,
given that the effectiveness of message framing rests on investigators’ ability
to match a message to a person or a situation strategically, more careful con-
sideration needs to be given to the principles underlying message matching.
Although investigators routinely invoke the premise that a matched message
is more persuasive, the principles that underlie this premise are remarkably
underdeveloped. To what extent does the effectiveness of message matching
reflect people agreeing with positively matched message or resisting nega-
tively matched messages? Can a set of parameters be identified to guide
the design and delivery of matched messages? Second, message framing is
fundamentally about the communication of gain- and loss-framed messages,
but, to date, research has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of
people who engage with a set of pre-specified framed statements, whether
in a pamphlet or a video. What happens when gain- and loss-framed state-
ments are considered within the context of interpersonal communication?
What determines whether people choose to use gain- or loss-framed
language when communicating with another person and how does the
use of framing affect patterns of social influence?
2. How can gain- and loss-framed messages be used

strategically to motivate healthy behavior?
Although there had been a long-standing interest in motivating
healthy behavior with messages that evoke fear or threat (for reviews, see
McGuire, 1985; Rothman & Salovey, 2007; Tannenbaum et al., 2015),
research on message framing and health first emerged in the late 1980s with
a study conducted by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) that compared the
effectiveness of a gain- vs. loss-framed pamphlet promoting breast self-
examination (BSE). The investigators predicted and found that women
who read a loss-framed pamphlet subsequently reported performing BSE
more frequently than those who read a gain-framed pamphlet (as well as
those who read an unframed pamphlet or did not receive a pamphlet).
Yet, what was noteworthy about this study was it grounded its prediction
on the framing postulate specified by Prospect Theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). Prospect Theory proposes that people respond differ-
ently to information about losses or gains. Specifically, when people consider
potential gains, they tend to be risk-averse in their preferences, but are risk-
seeking in their preferences when they consider potential losses (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) argued that because
BSE is construed as a risky behavior, given that its primary function is to
detect breast cancer, women would be more willing to perform BSE when
contemplating potential losses than when contemplating potential gains. For
research on message framing, this descriptive framework set out a road map
for investigators as they strove to delineate the conditions under which
people did or did not construe health practices as risky (Rothman &
Salovey, 1997; Rothman et al., 2008).
The goal of identifying the conditions under which gain- and loss-framed
messages are most effective was also consistent with a broader approach
to research on communication strategies that emphasized matching facets
of a message to a person’s characteristics (Rothman & Baldwin, 2019).
Whether it involved tailoring messages so that they fit with a person’s inter-
ests or concerns (e.g., Noar, Benac, & Harris, 2007; Sohl & Moyer,
2007) or crafting arguments to address the function of a person’s attitude
(e.g., Carpenter, 2012; Lavine & Snyder, 2000), investigators sought to
optimize the conditions under which a given message strategy or structure
would be most effective. Thus, the emerging approach to research on
message framing fit within an overarching research strategy that focused
on specifying the conditions—features of a person, a behavior, or a

setting—that regulate a message’s effectiveness.
With this strategy in place, investigators engaged in a wide-ranging sea-
rch for factors that might moderate the effectiveness of gain- and loss-framed
messages. Even a cursory review of the literature reveals investigations of
a diverse array of potential moderators, including brain hemisphere (e.g.,
McCormick & Seta, 2016), culture (e.g., Uskul, Sherman, & Fitzgibbon,
2009), display color (e.g., Gerend & Sias, 2009), emotion (e.g., Gerend &
Maner, 2011), health behavior (e.g., Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler,
& Salovey, 1999), health beliefs (e.g., van0 t Riet, Ruiter, Werrij, & de
Vries, 2010), and personality (e.g., Orbell, Perugini, & Rakow, 2004). In each
case, investigators strove to demonstrate the conditions under which a gain- or
loss-framed message proved to be more effective.
Although a moderator-focused approach has been quite generative,
investigators have had to navigate the challenge of determining what con-
structs to focus on and prioritize as potential moderators. This has proven to
be particularly challenging because the prevailing theoretical models tied to
research on message framing, such as Prospect theory, are primarily descrip-
tive and, thus, offer limited guidance. Given this state of affairs, two broad
lines of research have emerged; each of which strived to leverage the defin-
ing feature of message frames—the communication of gains and losses. The
first line of research has focused on the moderating effect of factors associated
with risk, guided by the premise from Prospect theory that loss-framed
information would make people more willing to engage in actions that
involve risk or are construed as risky, whereas gain-framed information
would make people more willing to engage in actions that evoke safety
or are construed as safe. The second line of research has focused on individ-
ual differences in sensitivity to favorable and unfavorable outcomes, guided
by the premise that these dispositional tendencies modulate the degree
to which people are more attentive and responsive to either loss- or gain-
framed information (e.g., Cesario, Corker, & Jelinek, 2013; Covey, 2014;
Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004). We briefly considere the state of these
two lines of research.
2.1 In pursuit of moderators I: Matching frames to factors

tied to concerns about risk
The premise that people’s construal of a health behavior might moderate
responses to framed appeals was first noted by Meyerowitz and Chaiken
(1987), but was more fully articulated a decade later by Rothman and
Salovey (1997). Extending the principles of prospect theory to health

decision-making, Rothman and Salovey proposed that when behaviors
are construed in terms of the risk of unfavorable outcomes (e.g., behaviors
designed to detect illness such as an STD or cancer) people should be more
motivated to take action when presented with information framed in terms
of losses, but when behaviors are construed in terms of the provision of
favorable outcomes (e.g., behaviors designed to prevent illness such as reg-
ular exercise or a flu vaccine), people should be more motivated to take
action when presented with information framed in terms of gains.
Research on the moderating effects of risk has taken several forms
(Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin, & Salovey, 2006; Rothman & Updegraff,
2011; Rothman et al., 2008). Building on the initial work done by
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987), who had focused on a screening behavior,
investigators pursued the premise that the function of the health behavior—
i.e., detection vs. prevention—could serve as a heuristic for specifying
whether people construed a behavior as risky or safe; with comparisons typ-
ically made across studies targeting different behaviors (e.g., Banks et al.,
1995; Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 1999; Rothman,
Salovey, Antone, Keough, & Martin, 1993; but see Rothman et al., 1999
for an experimental manipulation of behavioral function). Although results
from several studies conformed with the predicted findings, there were also
inconsistencies across studies, particularly for those that focused on detection
behaviors (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012; see also, O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007,
2009). However, the distinction between classes of behaviors served as a
proxy for how people construed the behavior and comparisons across studies
or behaviors are vulnerable to variability in people’s construal. Measures or
manipulations of how people construed the behavior provided a more direct
test of this framework. Across several studies, investigators have found that the
effectiveness of gain- and loss-framed messages depended on manipulations of
the risk posed by the behavior (e.g., Bartels, Kelly, & Rothman, 2010),
people’s construal of different behaviors (e.g., Gerend & Shepherd, 2016),
or on variation in people’s pre-existing risk perceptions (e.g., Apanovitch,
McCarthy, & Salovey, 2003; Ferrer, Klein, Zajac, Land, & Ling, 2012;
Gallagher, Updegraff, Rothman, & Sims, 2011; Hull, 2012; Updegraff,
Brick, Emanuel, Mintzer, & Sherman, 2015). For example, women who
reported higher perceptions of risk for breast cancer were more likely to
obtain a mammogram after viewing a loss- than a gain-framed presentation
on breast cancer screening, whereas those who reported lower perceptions
of risk responded similarly to both presentations (Gallagher et al., 2011).
2.2 In pursuit of moderators II: Matching frames to dispositions

The second line of research striving to specify the conditions under which
gain- and loss-framed messages would be more effective focused its attention
on dispositional differences in people’s responsiveness to favorable and unfa-
vorable outcomes. Some investigators have focused on measures that reveal
differences in people’s motivations to approach favorable outcomes or avoid
unfavorable outcomes (i.e., approach and avoidance motivational orienta-
tion; [BIS/BAS, Carver & White, 1994]), whereas other investigators have
focused on measures that reveal differences in people’s sensitivity to the pres-
ence or absence of positive events (promotion regulatory focus) or sensitivity
to the presence or absence of negative events (i.e., prevention regulatory
focus; Higgins, 1998). Looking across studies that have utilized both types
of measures, gain-framed messages were hypothesized to be a better match
than loss-framed messages for people who tend to score high on approach-
motivation or promotion-focus, whereas loss-framed messages were
hypothesized to be a better match for people who tend to score high on
avoidance-motivation or prevention-focus. Evidence consistent with this
framework has been obtained across a range of behavioral domains including
physical activity (e.g., Latimer, Rench, et al., 2008; Latimer, Rivers, et al.,
2008), HPV vaccination (e.g., Gerend & Shepherd, 2007), and oral health
(e.g., Mann et al., 2004; Sherman, Mann, & Updegraff, 2006). For example,
young adults’ scores on the BIS/BAS moderated responses to gain- and
loss-framed messages about the role of flossing in promoting oral health.
People who tended to be more approach-oriented reported flossing more
frequently after exposure to gain-framed messages, whereas people who
tended to be more avoidance-oriented reported flossing more frequently
after exposure to loss-framed messages (Mann et al., 2004).
2.3 In pursuit of moderators III: Initial steps toward synthesis

One of the challenges posed by a research agenda that focuses on evidence
of moderation is drawing integrative conclusions from the on-going accu-
mulation of independent demonstrations of moderated effects. What con-
clusions should investigators draw from the research literature? Should
they concern themselves with all of the distinct constructs that have been
identified as moderators? If so, should each moderator be considered
equally? And, if not, what principles should be used to navigate through
the literature? For instance, one might consider the evidence in light of
the quality or rigor of the methodology that has been used. Alternatively,
a theoretical framework that delineates the processes that underlie the effect
of framed appeals could be helpful as different constructs may emerge as
moderators because they alter the same underlying process (Rothman,
2013). For example, evidence for a set of moderators may have emerged
because they all regulate the degree to which people attend to a loss- or
gain-framed message. Yet, the limited development of both theory and
evidence regarding mediating processes has proven to be a vexing challenge
and hindered progress in research on message framing (Updegraff &
Rothman, 2013; see Rothman & Baldwin, 2019 for a broader discussion
of this issue).
To date, one approach has been to examine the relative influence of
multiple moderators within a single study. Updegraff and colleagues have
led a series of studies designed to compare the moderating effects of the
two broad classes of moderators that have prevailed in research on message
framing: people’s construal regarding risk and their dispositional sensitivity
to favorable and unfavorable outcomes (Gallagher et al., 2011; Updegraff
et al., 2015). These studies thoughtfully extend prior work which had con-
sistently dealt with the two classes of moderators separately. The first study
examined whether these factors moderated women’s behavioral response to
gain- and loss-framed messages about breast cancer and mammography
(Gallagher et al., 2011). As noted earlier, women’s perceptions of risk for
breast cancer were found to moderate behavioral responses to the framed
message. However, their scores on BIS/BAS scales, which were used to
measure dispositional motivations, did not moderate response to the mes-
sages. A second study examined the same set of moderating constructs,
but this time in reference to framed messages regarding flossing and oral
health (Updegraff et al., 2015). Once again, perceptions of risk, in this case
for oral health problems, moderated people’s behavioral response to the
framed message and did so in the expected manner. Overall, people’s scores
on the BIS/BAS scales did not moderate responses to the framed message.
However, for a subsample of young adults ages 18–24, the predicted mod-
erating effect of BIS/BAS scores did emerge. This later finding is intriguing
given that the majority of studies that have reported moderating effects of
dispositions such as those measured with BIS/BAS scales have relied on sam-
ples of young adults. One potential inference from these findings is that there
may be a second set of factors that regulate the expression of these moderated
effects. For example, it could be the case that when people’s beliefs about
health issues are less well-developed, which might be true of young adults,
their dispositional tendencies have more opportunity to influence their
response to framed messages (Updegraff & Rothman, 2013). Although

examining the contributions of multiple moderators within a single study
is a clear step forward, the incremental benefits of this approach remain
modest at best. In particular, there is little guidance for how to decide
which moderators to compare within a given study or to determine whether
a given setting would provide a robust test for each hypothesized effect.
Moreover, these efforts are constrained by a number of issues that pose
challenges to research on the moderation of framing effects more broadly.
And it is to these issues that we turn.
Although research on message framing has produced a series of hypoth-
esized findings from well-powered studies using behavioral outcomes, it is
also the case that there has been considerable inconsistency in the magnitude
of these moderated effects across studies (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012;
Van’t Riet et al., 2016). If research in this area is to move forward, investi-
gators need to develop a better understanding of the sources of the observed
heterogeneity in moderated effects—strategies that might enable them to
disentangle the signal from noise. Given that research in this area has focused
on moderation, there are five issues worthy of further consideration. First,
studies need to be sufficiently powered to detect evidence for the statistical
interaction indicating moderation (Aiken & West, 1991). Thus, research is
this area should benefit from emerging initiatives that emphasize not only
the careful consideration of statistical power, but also the pre-specification
of hypotheses regarding moderation. Second, all tests of moderation depend
critically on the reliability and validity of the instrument used to assess the
moderating construct. Although measures of dispositional factors are typi-
cally products of a robust scale development process, measures of health
beliefs stand on a less secure base and are often developed specifically for
a given study. In the latter case, the psychometric properties of the available
measures may limit the ability of investigators to specify the construct
captured by the measure; leaving room for alternative interpretations regard-
ing the underlying construct. Third, because tests of moderation rely on
comparisons made between people who differ on the hypothesized con-
struct, studies need to include samples that offer sufficient variability on
the moderator. To date, few, if any, studies have been designed purposively
to recruit a sample of participants that vary along a targeted dimension.
In fact, even those studies that observed significant moderating effects have
relied on the variability that naturally emerged from a given sample.
Moreover, the measures used must be sensitive enough to detect meaningful
differences between people on the focal construct.
Fourth, empirical tests of moderation have tended to assume, implicitly,

that the hypothesized moderating effect is linear in form. For example,
Gallagher et al. (2011) assumed that with each incremental increase in
perceived risk, the relative advantage of a loss-framed appeal over a gain-
framed appeal would increase. Although this premise is plausible and may
provide an adequate description of the effect, it is also possible that the
observed effect is non-linear and regulated more by thresholds of risk.
For example, an alternative perspective might suggest that the hypothesized
advantage for a loss-framed message emerges only after people endorse a
specific degree of risk, and then the magnitude of this effect doesn’t change
as people’s risk beliefs continue to increase. If this alternative description is
considered plausible, it has important implications for how the data are
analyzed and for determining whether the study sample provides sufficient
variability across the hypothesized moderator to test this hypothesis.
Fifth, experimental tests of moderating effects on message framing
depend not only on properties of the moderator, but also on properties of
the framed message. Specifically, the message needs to provide a sufficient
amount of framed material to elicit a meaningful response. Yet, there are
no guidelines in place for investigators to determine what is a sufficient
amount of material or, even, to calculate the dose of framed information
provided. Is it sufficient to provide one framed argument or does there need
to be, at least, two? Does it matter how much additional, unframed material
is provided? To a meaningful degree, the development of framed materials is
presently as much an art as it is a science. Although investigators have
prioritized crafting gain- and loss-framed messages to be comparable, there
are often unavoidable differences between conditions in the language used
or the length of the message. Given the absence of a metric to assess the dose
of framed information provided, investigators are limited in their ability
to assess the implications of these differences and determine whether the
gain- and loss-framed messages are comparable in strength. The growing
availability of stimulus materials on platforms such as Open Science Frame-
work will allow investigators to more carefully consider these issues and may
facilitate the development of guidelines for constructing framed messages.
Despite considerable levels of activity and impact, advances in research
on the framing of health messages have been constrained, in part, by the
manner in which investigators have pursued this work. Investigators have
been motivated by the premise that gain- and loss-framed messages are each
effective under certain conditions—that a map can be developed which
delineates the characteristics of people, behaviors, or situations under which
a given frame is maximally persuasive. Although the notion that a given
message frame is a match or fit for a given person (or behavior or situation) is
intuitive and compelling, our understanding of the principles—theoretical
and practical—that underlie the operationalization of such a match is surpris-
ingly underdeveloped. Yet, if investigators are to make meaningful progress
in specifying the parameters that regulate the influence of gain- and loss-
framed messages, progress must first be made regarding what it means to
design and deliver a matched message. Moreover, because research on
message framing is not alone in its reliance on the principles underlying
message matching (Rothman & Baldwin, 2019), progress in this area has
implications for a rich array of research endeavors.
Research on message framing has also focused almost exclusively at how
people respond to framed messages that are communicated via structured
communication channels such as pamphlets, articles, audiotapes, or video
presentations. To a certain degree, this emphasis is appropriate as it reflects
the investigator’s desire to control the gain- or loss-framed content that is
communicated. It also is well aligned with the broader goal of developing
an evidence base regarding intervention strategies that could be readily trans-
lated into practice. However, the dominance of this approach has led to a
somewhat constrained view of how people engage with gain- and loss-
framed information. People also use framed information in conversations
with each other as they share their perspectives on issues and, directly or
indirectly, try to influence each other. Yet, remarkably little is known about
how gain- and loss-framed information operates within the context of inter-
personal communication. For example, are people willing to use loss-framed
statement when communicating with another person and, if so are there
interpersonal costs to doing so? To what extent are the conditions under
which people use loss-framing aligned with what is known about the factors
that have been shown to maximize its influence on others? Situating research
on message framing within the content of interpersonal communication has
the potential to provide a more comprehensive framework for under-
standing framing effects.
We now, in turn, consider the implications of advances in both these
areas for message framing.
3. Looking ahead I: In pursuit of principles for

message matching
Message framing relies on the assumption that individuals will be
differentially receptive to loss- and gain-framed messages depending on
personal characteristics (e.g., health beliefs, personality traits), situational
characteristics (e.g., the behaviors at play), or a combination thereof. When

the frame of a message aligns with these characteristics, communication
effectiveness is enhanced, and an individual is more likely to adhere to a
given behavioral recommendation. However, beyond the premise that
messages matched to a given characteristic are more influential than those
that are not matched, there are few, if any, principles in place to guide
how to maximize the efficacy of this strategy. In the following sections,
we lay out a series of key issues that would benefit from more careful
consideration. First, we unpack what it means to “match” a message and
describe different ways to distinguish between matched and mismatched
messages. Second, we explore the potential for messages to be designed
to match more than one characteristic at a time. Third, we discuss how
operationalizing the strength, or “dosage,” of the content of a message
(e.g., a message frame) may enable a more precise understanding of how
to optimally develop and use matched messages.
3.1 Unpacking what it means to “match” a message

What is a matched message? Typically, it is a message whose features (e.g.,
gain/loss frame) are congruent with a given targeted characteristic (e.g., a
relevant risk belief, a personal disposition). A matching effect is then the
(usually positive) effect on beliefs or behavior of delivering a matched
message, compared to a message that is not matched. The comparison
message is usually conceptualized as one which doesn’t correspond to a
particular characteristic (i.e., a message that is “mismatched”), but can also
represent other types of message conditions such as the use of a generic mes-
sage (that hasn’t been specifically crafted around a characteristic). Although
there is an implicit consensus as to what a matched message refers, there is
considerably more heterogeneity in how the alternative message is concep-
tualized. This can be problematic as the form a comparison condition takes
has implications for our interpretation of the presence, direction, and
magnitude of matching effects.
An underlying assumption regarding matching effects is that a targeted
characteristic is reflective of a particular motivational tendency. When a
message is designed to be in line with that tendency (e.g., a message about
desirable outcomes directed toward people who score high on promotion-
focus), message effectiveness should increase, and when a message is not in
line with that tendency (e.g., a message about undesirable outcomes directed
toward people who score high on promotion-focus), message effectiveness
should decrease. This statement can be further qualified if the underlying

construct is conceptualized dimensionally and individuals vary in the degree
to which they feel motivated to pursue or avoid an outcome (some having
especially strong inclinations, and other just weak inclinations), with some
individuals simply being indifferent to the outcome. Taking this into
account, a few elements will determine the degree to which a message
matches a characteristic for a given individual, at a given time.
First, the specific position along a motivational continuum on which
a given individual sits. Second, the specific segment of that continuum a
message feature such as its frame is designed to target. Taking both these
elements into account, a message matches a characteristic to the degree to
which a manipulated message feature correctly targets the segment of a moti-
vational continuum, underlying a given characteristic (for a given individual,
at a given time). For example, if a message is designed to provide loss-framed
statements, that feature will increasingly provide a match to the degree
that the characteristic it is matched to, facilitates the impact of that feature.
To the extent that the characteristic inhibits the impact of that feature, the
loss-framed statement will not provide a match (i.e., this will represent a
mismatch). This dynamic is captured by Fig. 1.
By placing message matching within this dimensional framework,
more precise distinctions can be made between different classes of messages:
positive matched messages and two types of mismatched messages—
negative matches and non-matches. A positively matched message is the
prototypical matched message described in the literature, by which the
features of a message are congruent with the characteristics to which it is
matched (e.g., a gain-framed message is a positive match if it is delivered
in the context of a behavior that is perceived as low in risk). A positively
Fig. 1 Conceptualizing different types of matching effects for a message promoting a

particular outcome.
matched message is expected to lead to the highest level of persuasion

on a given outcome, and the underlying goal of most research on message
framing, and message matching more broadly, is to identify the conditions
that afford this type of match.
Mismatched messages are messages whose features do not correspond to
the characteristics to which they are matched (e.g., a message that is not gain
framed when targeting a behavior perceived as low in risk). Mismatched
messages are thought to be less able to elicit persuasion (i.e., desired changes
in beliefs or behaviors) compared to positively matched messages. However,
care must be taken regarding what can be inferred based on this comparison.
Specifically, a message matching effect could emerge because the positively
matched message facilitates a given outcome (but the mismatched message
does not), because the mismatched message inhibits the outcome (but the
positively matched message does not), or a combination of these two types
of effects. To date, investigators typically assume that demonstrations of
message matching effects are due to positive matches making a message more
effective rather than a mismatch making the message less effective (e.g.,
Cesario et al., 2013; Updegraff & Rothman, 2013). Yet, there are circum-
stances that could potentially lead an alternative pattern of effects to emerge.
In order to disentangle these effects, it is helpful to break down mismatched
message conditions into two subcategories: non-matched and negative
matched messages.
A non-matched message is a message that adopts a feature (e.g., a gain-
framed statement), but is delivered to someone whose standing on a
characteristic leaves them relatively nonresponsive or neutral regarding that
feature. Because non-matched messages are delivered to theoretically inac-
tive characteristics, these messages should have relatively limited persuasive
effect, but they should also not inhibit persuasion. Within research on
message framing, efforts to match messages to individual differences in
regulatory focus (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) may afford comparisons
between positively matched and non-matched messages. Consider a
gain-framed message given to individuals who are either predominantly
promotion-focused or predominantly prevention-focused. For promotion-
focused individuals, the message represents a positive match, but for individ-
uals who are prevention-focused the message may take the form of a
non-matched message. This should occur for two reasons. First, the two
regulatory foci are typically construed as relatively independent of one another
(Higgins et al., 2001, 1997), and being highly prevention-focused is described
as influencing only inclinations toward the presence and/or absence of losses,
but not of gains. Second, being low in promotion focus is described as reduc-
ing the degree to which one is responsive to gain-framed statements, but isn’t
described as causing such frames to have an adverse effect on beliefs or behav-
ior. Therefore, giving a gain-framed message to a predominantly prevention
focused individual, or to someone who scores low in promotion focus,
should elicit reduced responsiveness to the message, rather than reversing
the direction of influence and making them less likely to comply with a
recommendation.
One of the interesting aspects of non-matched messages is that their
relatively neutral status could, under the right circumstances, potentially
provide benefits over matched messages. Some authors, for example, have
argued that because messages that are positively matched to a person’s
regulatory focus increase the intensity of the response to a message, this
can be problematic when the message involves information that a person
may find distressing (e.g., feedback from a diagnostic test; Fridman,
Scherr, Glare, & Higgins, 2016). The key to these benefits, however, is that
a mismatched message elicits less of an affective response than does a posi-
tively matched message. We expect this to be true of non-matched messages,
but not when mismatched messages take the form of negatively matched
messages.
The second class of mismatched messages is negatively matched mes-
sages. A message is considered to be negatively matched when the features
of the message appeal to a motivational tendency that is contrary to a person’s
own tendency. Imagine again a gain-framed message promoting a particular
behavior. When sent to an individual who construes the behavior as low
risk, such a message would represent a positive match. When sent to an indi-
vidual who has yet to form an opinion about the risk associated with the
behavior, the message would represent a non-match. However, when sent
to an individual who construes the behavior as high risk, the message would
be perceived as inappropriate and considered a negative match. In contrast to
non-matches, negative matches not only fail to improve persuasion, but may
actually backfire and make individuals less likely to adopt a particular recom-
mendation than if they had seen any other message, or even had they not
seen any message at all. The underlying premise here is that a negatively
matched message elicits some form of aversive experience; perhaps in line
with Reactance Theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). In the case
of persuasion, this dynamic may be more likely to emerge when a person
perceives the communicator as trying to actively influence her or his
decision. And when a negatively matched message comes from a trusted,
familiar source (e.g., one’s primary physician)—someone whom you believe

knows you—it may be particularly likely to elicit an adverse reaction.
One of the main reasons to pursue distinctions between these different
types of matching effects is that current research may be confounding
different types of message comparisons, which has important implications
for practice. When a message matching effect is observed, the prevailing
interpretation is that providing a positively matched message is beneficial
and, thus, interventionists should expend resources to design and deliver
matched message strategies. However, if evidence for a matching effect
came from a comparison between positively matched and negatively
matched messages, it could be the case that the effect is actually due an
adverse response to a negative match. In this case, the recommendation
would be for interventions to focus on avoiding negatively matched
messages rather than pursuing positively matched messages. In fact, it could
be the case that providing a neutral, non-matched message to everyone is
optimal. This conclusion has important practical implications because a
non-matched strategy, which would allow investigators to avoid negative
matches, requires considerably fewer resources than does implementing
an intervention that relies on positive matching.
3.2 Expanding approaches to matching: Moving toward

multi-matched messages
To date, research on message matching has focused on the correspondence
between a feature of a message (e.g., its frame) and a characteristic of a person
or a situation. Yet, messages could be designed to have features that match
more than one characteristic. Is there an incremental benefit to pursuing
a multi-matching strategy? Using a novel methodological paradigm,
Joyal-Desmarais, Rothman, and Snyder (2019) tested the effect of simulta-
neously matching message features to regulatory focus (by manipulating
message frames) and to independent or interdependent self-construal
(by manipulating the themes emphasized in a message). They found that
matching messages to both characteristics had an effect on behavioral inten-
tions that was twice the magnitude of the average effect of matching
messages to either characteristic alone.
Although the initial, favorable evidence regarding matching messages to
two distinct characteristics is promising, more thought needs to be given to
the parameters that may regulate the effect of multi-matching. For instance,
is there a similar incremental benefit to increasing the number of matched
features from two to three or three to four? The paradigm developed by
Joyal-Desmarais et al. (2019) can be modified to test the incremental benefits

of matching messages to an increasingly larger number of characteristics.
Although there may be added benefits to increasing the number of matches,
there is likely a point at which the amount of change levels off. Furthermore,
the optimal number of matches may vary depending on the status of other
factors. For example, interventions designed to motivate behaviors that are
familiar and readily endorsed (e.g., eating more fruits and vegetables) might
reach an optimal effect at a lower threshold (e.g., matching to two charac-
teristics), whereas interventions designed to motivate behaviors that are less
familiar and less readily endorsed (e.g., adopting a vegan diet) might reveal
an optimal effect at a higher threshold (e.g., matching to five characteristics).
It may also be the case that the effect of matching to additional charac-
teristics takes a curvilinear or quadratic form. People may find messages that
match a diverse array of personal characteristics to be suspicious or intrusive,
resulting in feelings of distrust or disengagement with the message. Finally,
attention should be paid to the resources needed to develop multi-matched
messages, as the cost/benefit ratio may shift considerably as one increases the
number of matches utilized.
In addition to considering the number of matches to include in a
message, researchers may benefit from considering which characteristics
to combine within a given set. Research on message framing has focused
on characteristics that are thought to influence the differential impact of
message frames. However, message framing manipulations may be particu-
larly well suited to be combined with other matching approaches. Most
other approaches to message matching have focused on altering the substan-
tive content of the message to match a particular characteristic (e.g., moti-
vations to volunteer; Clary et al., 1998; Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, &
Haugen, 1994). Because message framing manipulations typically focus
on how content is presented rather than on the specific content of the
message, message frames can theoretically be manipulated regardless of the
content used.
The specific combination of characteristics included in a matched message
may have implications for the nature of the effect observed. Joyal-Desmarais
et al. (2019) combined features that were expected to have an additive effect,
such that matching to a second characteristic provided a distinct additional
benefit to persuasion. However, there are likely to be combinations of
characteristics which, when targeted with message matching techniques,
elicit a synergistic effect that can either augment or attenuate the effect.
Matching to two characteristics can be said to have a favorable synergistic
effect if the effect of matching to one characteristic is increased by simul-

taneously matching to another. One reason this pattern might emerge is if
the two matching effects activate distinct psychological mechanisms that
strengthen one another. For example, matching a message to one charac-
teristic might increase the attention an individual pays to the message,
whereas matching to another characteristic activates a mindset that elicits
more favorable evaluations of the message. In this case, matching to either
characteristic on its own may not be especially effective (e.g., an individual
may pay insufficient attention to a message and, thus, not have a chance to
respond favorably to its content), but matching to both would be.
On the other hand, attenuated effects may emerge in cases when
matching to one characteristic interferes with or reduces the effectiveness
of matching to another characteristic. There are several scenarios that could
lead to this type of effect. For example, an attenuated effect might emerge
when the two characteristics attempt to activate the same underlying mech-
anism (e.g., increased attention) or to activate mechanisms that operate
in conflict with each other (e.g., one match may evoke a reliance on
heuristic processing, where the other match evokes a reliance on systematic
processing). Given the limited state of theory regarding the mediating
processes that underlie message matching effects (Rothman & Baldwin,
2019), investigators will likely find it difficult to make precise, a priori
predictions regarding when to expect additive, augmented, or attenuated
matching effects. However, as consideration of these issues grows, investi-
gators should begin to map out how to optimize both the number and kind
of matches included in a message.
3.3 Toward a conceptualization of the strength

of a message match
When developing a message that matches to a given characteristic,
investigators must decide how much information to provide to ensure they
have created a sufficient match. Yet, there are no principles to guide this
decision. To facilitate work in this area we introduce the notion of message
dosage, which is defined as the extent to which a given message feature
is being administered and manipulated to target a given characteristic.
Moreover, we propose that investigators examine the potential value of
three types of dosage: (1) dosage frequency; (2) dosage intensity, and (3)
dosage ratio.
Dosage frequency refers to the number of times a message feature is made
to match a given characteristic. For example, in designing a gain-framed
message, dosage frequency would be the number of gain-framed statements

included in the message. If statements are repeated within the message,
it may further describe the number of times an individual is exposed to
any gain-framed statement (e.g., if a message contains 10 gain-framed
statements, and the message is repeated 3 times, then it may be said to have
a dosage frequency of 30 framed statements).
Dosage intensity refers to the extent to which manipulated features are
more or less arousing. For example, a statement urging individuals to eat a
full array of fruits and vegetables to alter their chances of developing cancer
may be experienced as more intense than a statement urging individuals to
eat a full array of fruits and vegetables to alter their chances of experiencing
boredom while eating. A message that mentions an outcome that a person
has personal experience with may also lead to more intense responses than a
message that mentions an outcome a person does not have experience with.
Unlike dosage frequency, dosage intensity can be a property of either each
manipulated message element (e.g., each framed statement will have a
certain level of intensity), or the overall message itself.
Dosage ratio refers to the proportion of manipulated message features
that correspond to a given level of the manipulation, relative to one or more
of the other levels. For example, consider a message that contains 8 gain-
framed statements, 4 loss-framed statements, and 4 statements not containing
a frame (i.e., neutral frames). This message has a dosage ratio of 2:1 for gain
vs. loss frames, 2:1 for gain vs. neutral frames, and 1:1 for loss vs. neutral
frames. Unlike dosage frequency and dosage intensity, dosage ratio is a rel-
ative rather than absolute measure of message dosage. In research on message
framing, investigators have aimed for a 1:0 (or 0:1) gain vs. loss ratio, but
have not directly considered how the number of neutral frames might dilute
the power of a framed message. For example, a 2000 word message that
contains 2 gain-framed sentences, no loss-framed sentences, and a large
number of neutral statements, is unlikely to elicit the same response as a
message comprised of 30 words, made up of 3 ten-word sentences—2
of which are gain-framed, and 1 is a neutral frame (despite both messages
having equal ratios of gain- to loss-framed statements).
To date, the evaluation of message matching strategies, in general, and
message framing strategies, in particular, has not directly considered how
variability in message dose may affect study findings. The underlying
assumption has been that the provision of more matched content will
generally lead to an increase in effectiveness. However, little is known about
the dose-response relation between content and effectiveness and, in fact,
there may be reasons to expect a non-linear trend between dosage and

persuasion. For example, even if one assumes that dosage effects have a
unidirectional influence on effectiveness (i.e., as dosage increases, effective-
ness can only increase), there may be meaningful threshold effects, such that
low levels of message dosage have little to no impact on message effective-
ness, and that increasing dosage does not begin to have an impact until a
certain (larger) dosage threshold is crossed. It may also be the case that
the benefits afforded by increasing message dosage levels off at a certain
point. Developing an evidence base that would enable investigators to begin
to describe the dose-response relation between message content and message
effectiveness would be a valuable advance to research on message framing. In
particular, it would be important to determine whether there is a minimum
threshold for the amount of framed content to communicate and whether
there is a level at which providing additional content is no longer beneficial.
Once again, with the growing availability of stimulus materials, investigators
may be able to draw some initial inferences about dosage and message design
based on comparisons of messages across studies.
There is likely also value in exploring whether there are points at which
providing additional content has an adverse impact on effectiveness. For
example, there might be a curvilinear relation between dosage intensity
and message effectiveness. To the extent that taking action in response to
a framed message depends on experiencing at least some affective reaction
to the message, increasing dosage intensity should improve effectiveness.
However, once the affective reaction to the message becomes too intense,
individuals may feel overwhelmed by the experience and disengage from the
message. One challenge for research on message framing is that the threshold
at which this adverse effect emerges may prove to be lower for loss-framed
messages than for grain-framed messages (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Or,
consistent with research and theory regarding fear appeals (Tannenbaum
et al., 2015; Witte & Allen, 2000), people may need to have sufficient
confidence in their ability to deal with the issue at hand in order to respond
effectively to loss-framed messages with high dosage intensity (e.g., van0 t
Riet et al., 2010).
3.4 Summary
The premise that there are conditions that optimize the effect of gain- and
loss-framed message has guided research on message framing. Yet, efforts to
specify these conditions have been constrained by the fact that, although
investigators routinely formulate strategies that “match” aspects of a person

or a situation, they do so despite limited understanding of the principles that
underlie a match between a framed message and characteristics of a person or
a situation. We anticipate that a more careful examination of the factors that
regulate message matching—distinguishing between types of matches, the
number and content of potential matches, and the strength or dosage of each
match—will provide investigators with a framework, which will enable
them to generate and test more precise predictions regarding the conditions
under which gain- and loss-framed messages are maximally effective.
4. Looking ahead II: Expanding our approach

to message framing
Research on message framing and health has relied on the comparison
of messages that are constructed to differ only in how the information is
framed. Given the need to control how the health information is commu-
nicated, it is not surprising that investigators have focused on communica-
tion methods that allowed them to have complete control over the message
(e.g., gain- and loss-framed videos (Gallagher et al., 2011), pamphlets
(Rothman et al., 1999), or articles (Bartels et al., 2010). Yet, people also
obtain health information in conversation, talking with friends,
co-workers, and family members. Undoubtedly, much of this information
is communicated in the form of gain- and loss-framed statements. However,
remarkably little is known about people’s willingness to adopt different
frames and whether the frames they utilize have differential effects on the
people with whom they are speaking. Given that spoken, interpersonal
communication tends to be more intimate than print communication
and elicits more immediate consequences from the respondent, people
may prove to be particularly strategic in their use of gain- or loss-framed
language. In the following section, we identify several personal and
situational factors that may lead people to rely on one frame over the other
and the implications this may have for interpersonal influence.
4.1 The linguistic positivity bias

There is abundant evidence that positively valenced words appear in greater
frequency than their negative counterparts, across many dialects (Dodds
et al., 2015; Rozin, Berman, & Royzman, 2010), and in both written and
spoken communications (Augustine, Mehl, & Larsen, 2011). This linguistic
positivity bias may reflect an asymmetry in human experience—there
are simply more positive than negative events in the world (Benjafiel, 1983;
Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000; Rozin et al., 2010). Given this state of affairs,
it would not be surprising to find that those offering others behavioral advice
may also rely more heavily upon gain-framed (i.e., positive) language. In
fact, a recent study had undergraduates write to another student with advice
on what they could do to reduce their carbon footprint (Lenne, Dwyer,
Wlaschin, & Rothman, 2019). A majority of participants’ sentences were
gain- or positively-framed (54% on average), compared to 5% for loss- and
negatively-framed sentences, and 40% without any framing. Although the
emergence of a positivity bias in communication about behavioral advice is
interesting, we believe the more interesting question is not whether
gain-framed language is used with greater frequency, but rather, under what
conditions are people willing to shift away from a reliance on positively
valenced language?
The decision to use loss-framed statements in conversation may be
shaped by a key trade-off between the potency of the language used and
its effect on how a communicator is perceived. Although language use is
predominantly positive, negative statements tend to be perceived more
strongly than the comparative positive statement (Rozin et al., 2010);
perhaps because negative events are less common and thus carry more infor-
mational value (Peeters, 1971); or because there is an evolutionary advantage
to weighing negative—potentially life threatening—events more heavily
than positive events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Regardless, communica-
tors may choose to capitalize—intentionally or incidentally—on the
potency of negative language to attract attention or to persuade or motivate
their audience. However, in so doing they risk eliciting a negative response
from the recipient of their communication. Just as perceivers harshly judge
people who deviate from warm behavior (Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-
McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002), deviations from the expectation of positive
communication may damage one’s social image (Augustine et al., 2011;
Fiedler, 2008). In this way, communicators are faced with a trade-off:
utilizing gain-framed statements maintains positive social relations, but
may constrain one’s ability to captivate or motivate an audience; whereas,
utilizing loss-framed statements may effectively capture people’s attention
and motivate them to act, but at the risk of damaging one’s social relations.
In what follows we consider how people’s interpersonal motivations—to
appear likable; to be influential—may tip the balance for communicators—
leading to a greater emphasis on gain- or loss-framed language.
4.2 Self-presentation and impression management

People are often concerned with and attempt to manipulate the impres-
sion they make on others, particularly in interpersonal communication
( Jones & Pittman, 1982). Self-presentation can be used to achieve desired
goals (Leary & Allen, 2011), and it can also involve efforts to convey an
“accurate portrait of oneself” (Schlenker, 2012) or attempts to get along
with others and respect their “face” needs (Goffman, 1955). Motivations
to appear warm and competent have emerged as two critical factors guiding
self-presentation (Nezlek, Sch€ utz, & Sellin, 2007), perhaps because com-
municators are tacitly aware that people form impressions along these
dimensions (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).
So too may warmth and competence guide how people frame behavioral
advice to one another. In particular, a person’s motivation to come off
as warm may be especially relevant to the use of gain- and loss-framed
language, because warmth is diagnostic of impression valence (i.e.,
whether the communicator is perceived positively or negatively;
Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998;
Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). Because gain-framed language
emphasizes the benefits of action, and loss-framed language emphasizes
the costs of inaction, the greater use of a particular frame in one’s com-
munication may be a subtle means by which the valence of one’s character
(warm or cold, positive or negative) is conveyed. Furthermore, there
is evidence that communicators recognize that perceivers tend to rate
them higher in competence when they are being less warm, and thus
communicators strategically temper presentations of warmth to increase
perceptions of competence (Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). Perhaps then, communicators
who are motivated to appear competent strategically use framed language
that reduces perceptions of warmth, and thus increase perceptions of com-
petence. In an initial experimental test of this proposition, Lenne et al.
(2019) found that communicators who were motivated to appear warm
(as opposed to competent) used more gain-framed (relative to loss-framed)
language in communicating about the environmental consequences of
behavior. For example, communicators with warmth motives were more
likely to suggest that “installing efficient windows helps the environment”
(gain-framed), whereas those with competence motives were more likely
to suggest that “failing to weatherproof your windows harms the
environment” (loss-framed).
4.3 Persuasive communication

Communicators who are motivated to influence the beliefs and behavior
of others may try to increase perceptions of trustworthiness through the
content of their message (e.g., use of statistics, eloquent prose, or kind
language). A likely strategy, because message content is particularly revealing
of source credibility, a reliable and frequently attempted persuasion technique
(Albarracı́n & Vargas, 2010). One way in which communicators can establish
trustworthiness is through conveying warmth ( Jones & Pittman, 1982).
Thus, similar to our discussion of self-presentation motives, communicators
intent on persuading their audience may strategically use gain-framed language
as a means of swaying others with their warmth.
However, communicators can also signal trustworthiness by conveying
competence (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 1978). In this case, commu-
nicators may choose to increase their use of loss-framed language as a way of
tempering impressions of warmth and increasing impressions of competence
(Holoien & Fiske, 2013). Communicators may also try to leverage the
potency of negatively valenced language as a way to signal their status or
to evoke feelings of fear or insecurity in their audience. Because loss-framed
language highlights the negative consequences of inaction, communicators
may use it to evoke a greater sense of threat in their audience. If effective, this
may elicit a behavioral response similar to that observed by Gallagher et al.
(2011) and Updegraff et al. (2015), who found an advantage for loss-framed
messages when people reported greater perceptions of risk. Yet, message
dosage may prove to be a key factor in this context as loss-framed statements
communicated verbally in an interpersonal setting may elicit a stronger
affective response than if the same statements were embedded in a pamphlet
or a video presentation.
4.4 Moving the research agenda forward

Although we have considered the effect of people’s motivation to be liked
and to exert influence separately, more often than not people are juggling
multiple motivational concerns as they navigate through interpersonal inter-
actions. They want to be liked or perceived favorably by their friends or their
colleagues, but also believe they have the responsibility to shape their friends
and colleagues’ behavior. Thus, the trade-offs people weigh as they
communicate with gain- or loss-framed language are likely to be complex.
Moreover, the relative weighting of different outcomes may shift over time
and across contexts. For example, when initially interacting with others,
people may place a greater priority on the impression they convey, leading
to a stronger preference for gain-framed language. However, having engen-
dered a favorable impression, people may find they can shift their priorities
to exerting influence on others and, when appropriate, strategically use
loss-framed language. The notion that people might utilize a mix of gain-
and loss-framed statements over time is quite distinct from the gain- vs.
loss-framed approach that has been the focus of nearly all research on
message framing to date.
Situating the use of gain- and loss-framed language within an interper-
sonal interaction also brings to the fore the nature of the relationship
between the communicator and the respondent, a factor that has been gen-
erally absent from message framing research. When weighing the use of
gain- and loss-framed language, the communicator may be mindful of
whether the interaction is part of an on-going relationship. If it is, the quality
of the relationship may be a key determinant as to whether the communi-
cator believes she or he has the resources within the relationship to buffer
any adverse effects associated with using loss-framed language. For example,
people may construe loss-framed language as sanctimonious and harsh (e.g.,
“your failure to get a flu shot is going to get us both sick”). People who are in
relationships where they feel a greater sense of interdependence or more
securely attached may be more likely to infer that the longer term benefits
of modifying their partner’s behavior (e.g., getting her or him to get a
flu shot) outweighs any short-term distress the loss-framed arguments might
elicit. Over time, people may settle on an optimal dosage ratio of gain- and
loss-framed arguments used within and across interactions that promotes
behavior change while minimizing threats to the relationship.
Personality may also shape people’s willingness to use gain- and loss-
framed language (Pennebaker & King, 1999). Augustine et al. (2011)
observed that individuals who are high in extraversion or agreeableness tend
to use more positive language, whereas those who are in negative mood
states and neuroticism tend to use more negative language. Prior research
on how people respond to framed messages has focused on constructs such
as regulatory focus that capture people’s sensitivity to favorable and unfavor-
able information (e.g., Cesario et al., 2013; Gerend & Shepherd, 2007;
Mann et al., 2004). It is possible that these tendencies might similarly shape
the language they use to communicate with, but this issue has yet to be the
focus of research.
To the extent that communicators strategically use gain- and loss-framed
to influence the targets of their communication, attention should also be
paid to how people respond to the framed messages. In particular, is the

pattern of responses similar to what has been observed when people have
been provided with other forms of framed communications? For example,
will a communicator be more likely to persuade her partner to get a flu shot
if she uses gain-framed language, but more likely to persuade her partner
to get a colonoscopy if she uses loss-framed language? And because the
communication and response unfold within the context of an on-going,
close relationship, one can examine whether a partner’s response to a framed
statement, in turn, affects the communicator’s subsequent use of framed
language. Moreover, in cases that involve two people within a relationship,
these patterns of influence can be examined within a dyadic framework such
that one can test, for example, whether (and when) one person’s tendency to
use gain- or loss-framed language shapes the other person’s tendency to use
gain- or loss-framed language.
Finally, given that research on the use of gain- and loss-framed language
within interpersonal interaction is only beginning to take form, there is an
opportunity to be strategic in how this program of research develops. We
believe investigators should prioritize the use of research strategies that will
enable them to delineate (a) the influence of multiple motivational factors on
the use of framed language, (b) the individual and relational factors that shape
the use of framed language, and (c) the interplay, over time, in how people
within relationships use and respond to framed language.
5. Concluding remarks
For over three decades, research on message framing and health has
focused on identifying the factors that moderate people’s responses to
gain- and loss-framed messages. Guided by a desire to develop an evidence
base that could guide the design and dissemination of effective intervention
strategies, investigators hoped to identify the conditions under which
gain- and loss-framed messages are each maximally effective. Although
the motivation underlying these efforts is sound and it has launched several,
very generative programs of research, the return on these efforts have not
been as clear as one might have hoped. Despite numerous demonstrations
of moderated effects, including evidence from several large trials with
behavioral outcomes, the cumulative insights remain unclear.
Given the array of findings that have emerged across moderating factors,
including inconsistencies across studies of the same moderator, how should
investigators proceed as they strive to specify the optimal conditions for
using gain- and loss-framed information? Moving forward, we believe that

advances in our understanding of message framing will benefit from two
complementary efforts. First, we need to provide investigators with a more
detailed set of guidelines regarding how to leverage the principle of message
matching in the design and delivery of framed messages. The more precise
investigators can be regarding the dose of framing they have placed within a
message and the type of match they expect the message to generate, the
greater confidence we will have in the evidence base that emerges from this
work. Second, research on message framing will benefit from taking a more
expansive view of how and when framed messages are communicated. By
situating the use of gain- and loss-framed language within the context of
interpersonal communication, we can begin to delineate what motivates
people to use gain- or loss-framed language and the impact that their
language use has on other people’s beliefs and behavior. Moreover, it will
provide investigators with a way to examine how the effect of framed
language unfolds over time; including the opportunity to observe whether
there are situations in which the optimal strategy is to provide both gain- and
loss-framed information at key moments in time. As these efforts begin to
unfold, we look forward to the next generation of research on message
framing.
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CHAPTER THREE
The motivational potency

of nostalgia: The future is called
yesterday
Constantine Sedikides*, Tim Wildschut
*Corresponding author: e-mail address: cs2@soton.ac.uk
Contents
1. An excursion into nostalgia’s Past 76
1.1 A synopsis of 2800 years of history 76
1.2 An inferential error: Nostalgia as a coping mechanism 77
1.3 Nostalgia is for the future 78
2. Definition and properties of nostalgia 78
2.1 Prototype, content, and word-level text analyses 79
2.2 Appraisal techniques, multidimensional scaling analyses, and canonical
correlation analyses 79
3. Nostalgia and approach motivation 80
4. Nostalgia and the many forms of approach motivation 81
4.1 Generalized motivation 82
4.2 Localized motivation 88
4.3 Action-oriented motivation 95
5. Summary and conclusions 101
References 102
Abstract
The emotion of nostalgia, a sentimental longing for one’s personal past, has motiva-
tional implications. We outline these implications for various forms of approach
motivation. One such form is generalized motivation. In particular, nostalgia fosters
a sense of youthfulness (i.e., lower subjective age, feeling alert and energetic), boosts
inspiration (i.e., transcendence of mundane preoccupations and awareness of new
possibilities), and encourages (financial) risk-taking. Another form is localized motiva-
tion. In particular, nostalgia promotes a growth orientation (e.g., state authenticity or
intrinsic self-expression, growth-oriented self-perceptions and behavioral intentions),
galvanizes intrinsic motivation, and strengthens the pursuit of one’s important goals.
The final form is action-oriented motivation. In particular, nostalgia cements an
employee’s resolve to stay with the organization (i.e., weakens turnover intentions),
increases the propensity to help and actual helping, and contributes indirectly to

76 Constantine Sedikides and Tim Wildschut
behavior change (i.e., reduction of problematic behavior such as gambling and drink-
ing). When relevant, we discuss the processes through which nostalgia impacts on
motivation, and highlight downstream consequences.
This chapter is concerned with the interplay between emotion and motiva-
tion. The emotion in question is nostalgia. After a historical precis, we define
nostalgia, clarify its properties, and proceed to highlight how it affects
motivation.
1. An excursion into nostalgia’s Past

1.1 A synopsis of 2800 years of history
In his epic Odyssey, conceived approximately 2800 years ago, Homer
depicts the eponymous hero as often pining for his homeland and loved
ones during his 10-year sea voyage. This pining does not hold Odysseus
back; instead, it invigorates him to fend off angry Gods, monsters, and mot-
ley evil-doers, who conspire to obstruct his return to Ithaca. Hankering
for things past energizes the cunning itinerant to invent solutions to an
ever-changing and threatening landscape, making steady strides toward
his eventual homecoming.
The construct of yearning for the past all but disappeared from literary
and scholarly discourse, despite fleeting references to it by Hippocrates,
Cesar, and the psalms of the Bible. It was brought to the fore almost
2500 years after the Homeric epic by a medical student at the University
of Basel, Switzerland, who wrote his dissertation on nostalgia. The student
was Johannes Hofer, and the compound term he coined consisted of the
Greek words “nostos” (desire to return home) and algos (pain). So, nostalgia
was the psychological suffering levied by one’s desire to return home.
Hofer (1934) endeavored to catalogue the symptoms that Swiss merce-
naries were experiencing while stricken by nostalgia. These symptoms
included despondency, weeping, anorexia, and suicidal ideation, prompting
Hofer to conclude that nostalgia was a neurological or brain disease restricted
to the Swiss. Consensus was swiftly built around these notions, with only the
causes of disease being under debate. Hofer believed it was due to the
“continuous vibration of animal spirits through those fibers of the middle
brain in which impressed traces of ideas of the Fatherland still cling”
(p. 384). Scheuchzer (1732, cited in Davis, 1979), a physician, maintained
that the disease was inflicted by “a sharp differential in atmospheric pressure
causing excessive body pressurization, which in turn drove blood from the
Nostalgia motivates 77
heart to the brain, thereby producing the observed affliction of sentiment”

(cited in Davis, 1979, p. 2). Other physicians pontificated that the disease
originated in the incessant clanging of cowbells in the Alps, which wreaked
irreparable damage to the eardrum and brain cells. The view of nostalgia as a
neurological or brain disease lasted until the 19th century, although its
exclusivity to the Swiss was challenged: It had become clear that other
nationalities—French and American soldiers—were also susceptible to it.
The new wave of thinking in late 19th century and early 20th century
was equally damning of nostalgia. It was now considered a psychiatric dis-
order, marked by symptoms of anxiety, melancholia, loss of appetite, and
insomnia. The psychodynamic perspective, dominant in mid-20th century,
did not help, portraying nostalgia as a “monomaniacal obsessive mental state
causing intense unhappiness” that arises from a subconscious desire to rein-
state one’s fetal state (Fodor, 1950, p. 25). By the end of the 20th century,
nostalgia was still tainted by clinical connotations, but (mercifully!) con-
fined to four marginalized populations: soldiers, seamen, immigrants, and
first-year boarding or university students. Normal adults were shielded
from it (for historical overviews, see Batcho, 2013; Dodman, 2018;
Sedikides, Wildschut, & Baden, 2004.)
1.2 An inferential error: Nostalgia as a coping mechanism

From 1688 onward, nostalgia has been considered a medical disease, a psy-
chiatric disorder, a clinical condition, or, at best, a gloomy and defeatist
emotion. We suggest that these maligned characterizations of nostalgia
are due to an inferential error. Scholars, and assorted thinkers or commen-
tators, observed a co-occurrence of nostalgia and dysfunctional symptoms
(e.g., anxiety, depression, bouts of weeping, loss of appetite, insomnia,
anorexia, suicidal ideation). They rushed to conclude that nostalgia was
the cause of such symptoms. Yet, they could have as easily concluded that
the symptoms triggered the onset of nostalgia. After all, the selectively stud-
ied populations (e.g., mercenaries, soldiers, immigrants) were undergoing
considerable, if not extreme, stress in striving to overcome highly adverse,
and sometimes life-threatening, circumstances in unfamiliar or pugnacious
environments. Nostalgia for them was a safe heaven, a relief from psycho-
logical turbulence.
In the last few years, the idea that nostalgia acts as a coping resource in times
of adversity has gained considerable traction. Experiments have furnished the
decisive evidence. Inducing nostalgia (vs. control) does not engender negative
symptoms or states. However, inducing psychological discomfort evokes

nostalgia, which subsequently palliates the discomfort (Sedikides et al.,
2015; Wildschut, Sedikides, & Cordaro, 2011). Loneliness is a case in point.
Inducing loneliness (vs. control) elicits both lack of social support and nostal-
gia. Nostalgia, in turn, acts to replenish one’s reservoir of social support, thus
counteracting loneliness (Van Tilburg, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2018; Zhou,
Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao, 2008). Similar findings documenting the reg-
ulatory or homeostatic role of nostalgia have been obtained with discomforts
such as meaninglessness, death cognitions, self-discontinuity, boredom, and
even inclement weather (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2018; Sedikides,
Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015; Van Tilburg, Sedikides, &
Wildschut, 2018).
1.3 Nostalgia is for the future

The sociologist Fred Davis, in his (1979) treatise on nostalgia, pioneered
another utility of the emotion. In particular, he likened the cognitive storage
of nostalgic experiences with monetary deposits (p. 420):
“It (nostalgia) reassures us of past happiness and accomplishment; and,
since these still remain on deposit, as it were, in the bank of our memory,
it simultaneously bestows upon us a certain worth, irrespective of how pre-
sent circumstances may seem to question or obscure this. And current
worth, as our friendly bank loan officer assures us, is titled to at least some
claim on the future as well.”
In Davis’s (1979) opinion, then, nostalgic memories are not for the past;
they are for the future. The memories serve as a wellspring, a vitamin that
nourishes the individual toward grappling with the vagaries of the future.
We concur with Davis’s insight, an insight expressed also by literary figures
such as the poet Salinas (2010), who mused “The future is called yesterday.”
Nostalgia, we posit, cultivates a planful and future-oriented mindset. It
motivates and helps the individual to shape, in part, their destiny. We will
elaborate on the motivational vigor of nostalgia after we define and clarify
the emotion.
2. Definition and properties of nostalgia

The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998, p. 1266) labels nostal-
gia “a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past.” Other dictionary
definitions concur. For example, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2019)
labels it “a wistful or excessively sentimental yearning for return to or of
some past period or irrecoverable condition,” the English Language
Learners Dictionary (2019) labels it “pleasure and sadness that is caused by

remembering something from the past and wishing that you could experi-
ence it again,” and Dictionary.com (2019) labels it “a wistful desire to return
in thought or in fact to a former time in one’s life, to one’s home or home-
land, or to one’s family and friends; a sentimental longing or yearning, bit-
tersweetness, and the positivity to be found in the nostalgic episode.” These
definitions converge in highlighting sentimental longing, ambivalence, and
the desire for a fleeting retreat to one’s past. Empirical findings, reviewed
below, elucidate further the properties of the emotion.
2.1 Prototype, content, and word-level text analyses

The results of prototype analyses, in which lay persons were asked to sort out
the central features from the peripheral features of the construct “nostalgia,”
align with lexicographic wisdom (Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut,
2012), as do the results of content analyses (Abeyta, Routledge, Roylance,
Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2015; Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge,
2006) or word-level text analyses (i.e., the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count—Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzalez, & Booth, 2007; see
Wildschut, Sedikides, & Robertson, 2018) of nostalgic narratives. We note
several key findings below.
Nostalgia is an emotion (i.e., it is felt) involving high-level appraisal, as it
comprises fond or rose-colored recollections of one’s personal past. This past
is cherished: It entails social relationships (e.g., family, friends, partners) and
keepsakes, as well as momentous incidents (e.g., anniversaries, graduations,
holiday celebrations, vacations). The self (i.e., the narrator) is the protagonist
in those incidents (hence, nostalgia is an identity-based emotion), but close
others are almost always present occupying important roles (hence, nostalgia
is a social emotion). In addition, nostalgia is bittersweet, albeit predomi-
nantly positive: It is mostly characterized by warmth, happiness, and joy
for a meaningfully lived past, yet it is tinged with missing, sadness, and long-
ing for moments irredeemably gone. These properties of nostalgia transcend
age (Hepper, Wildschut, Sedikides, Robertson, & Routledge, 2019;
Madoglou, Gkinopoulos, Xanthopoulos, & Kalamaras, 2017) and cultural
(Hepper et al., 2014; Neto & Mullet, 2014) boundaries.
2.2 Appraisal techniques, multidimensional scaling analyses,

and canonical correlation analyses
Additional research, using varied methodological tools, explicates the char-
acter of nostalgia. The appraisal profile of nostalgia indicates that it is
elicited by events which are pleasant but contain an irrevocable loss,

are unique, and feel temporally or psychologically distant (Van Tilburg,
Bruder, Wildschut, Sedikides, & G€ oritz, 2019). Multidimensional scaling
analyses comparing and contrasting 11 self-relevant emotions document
that nostalgia is a positive, low-arousal emotion; for example, it is most similar
to pride, self-compassion, and gratitude, and is least similar to shame, guilt, and
embarrassment (Van Tilburg, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2018). Lastly, canon-
ical correlation analyses reveal that nostalgia serves different autobiographical
memory functions (Webster, 2003) compared to such reflections on one’s past
as rumination or counterfactual thinking. In particular, nostalgia involves
stronger identity (i.e., drawing on memories to illuminate and explicate one’s
selfhood), intimacy maintenance (i.e., relying on memories to attain sym-
bolic proximity to close others), and teach/inform (i.e., sharing memories
to communicate insights about the self or life), but weaker bitterness revival
(i.e., using memories to revive resentment and revenge; Cheung,
Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2018).
3. Nostalgia and approach motivation

Approach motivation is defined as “the impulse to go toward”
(Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 2013, p. 291) and, more specif-
ically, as “the energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior
toward, positive stimuli (objects, events, possibilities)” (Elliot, 2006,
p. 111). Approach motivation is fundamental in that it influences human
functioning across many life domains and is expressed in a multitude of goals
and behaviors (Elliot, 2008; Elliot & Friedman, 2007). Approach motiva-
tion can be instigated by internal, trait (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) or state
(Panksepp, 1998), processes. We turned to examining the link between the
emotion of nostalgia (experienced at the trait and state level) and approach
motivation (also at both levels), relying on the theoretical and empirical
tradition of capitalizing on emotions’ action tendencies (Fredrickson,
2001; Frijda, 1987; Russell, 2009).
We found such a link. For starters, in multidimensional space, nostalgia
emerges as an approach-oriented, rather than an avoidance-oriented, emo-
tion (Van Tilburg, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2018). Moreover, nostalgia
proneness is positively associated with approach motivation (Stephan
et al., 2014, Studies 1–2). Here, we operationalized nostalgia proneness
with the 7-item Southampton Nostalgia Scale (Barrett et al., 2010;
Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008), that is, as dispositional
frequency and subjective importance of nostalgic engagement, whereas we

operationalized approach motivation with the 13-item Behavioral Activa-
tion Scale (Carver & White, 1994), which consists of three dimensions:
Fun Seeking (four items; e.g., “I will often do things for no other reason
than that they might be fun”), Drive (four items; e.g., “I go out of my way
to get things I want”), and Reward Responsiveness (five items, e.g.,
“It would excite me to win a contest”). To be exact, the positive associ-
ation between nostalgia proneness and approach motivation only emerged
for the dimensions of Fun Seeking and Drive (which are negatively corre-
lated with avoidance orientation, whereas Reward Responsiveness is pos-
itively correlated with it; Carver & White, 1994), and above and beyond
the Big Five factors (assessed with the revised Ten Item Personality Inven-
tory; Denissen, Geenen, Selfhout, & Van Aken, 2008).
Having established the positive covariation of nostalgia and approach
motivation, we wondered if the former leads dynamically to the latter
(Stephan et al., 2014, Study 3). To address this question, we induced nos-
talgia experimentally (i.e., nostalgia as a state) via the Event Reflection Task
(Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, Arndt, Hepper, & Zhou, 2015). Partic-
ipants in the experimental condition visualized for a couple of minutes an
event that made them feel nostalgic, and then produced a written narrative
of this event in the next 5 min. Participants in the control condition visu-
alized an ordinary autobiographical event for 2 min and wrote about it for
5 min. A manipulation check (e.g., “How nostalgic do you feel right
now?”) testified to the effectiveness of the nostalgia induction (as it did
in all reported experiments). Following the Event Reflection Task, we
assessed approach motivation with the three Behavioral Activation System
dimensions by adding a stem to reflect a state level (i.e., “Right now …”).
Nostalgia increased Fun Seeking and Drive, but not Reward Responsive-
ness, and did so independently of affect, be it positive or negative. The
effects of nostalgia were independent of transient affect in all reported
experiments. On balance, then, nostalgia galvanizes approach motivation
(for a replication, see, Huang, Huang, & Wyer, 2016, Study 4).
4. Nostalgia and the many forms of approach

motivation
Encouraged by the finding that nostalgia boosts approach motivation,
we took steps to investigate whether and how nostalgia impacts on the many
forms of approach motivation, be it generalized motivation (i.e., sense of
youthfulness, inspiration, risk-taking), localized motivation (i.e., growth

orientation, intrinsic motivation, goals), or action-oriented motivation
(i.e., turnover intentions, helping, behavior change). In the experimental
portions of our research, we followed a standard methodological protocol:
We induced nostalgia, assessed the hypothesized mechanisms (i.e., media-
tors), if any, and measured the pertinent form of approach motivation.
4.1 Generalized motivation

Here, we address whether the discrete emotion of nostalgia strengthens
generalized motivation, and in particular youthfulness, inspiration, and
risk-taking.
4.1.1 Youthfulness
People desire to reclaim their youthfulness. This desire is reflected in folk-
lore about the “fountain of youth” (magical waters that heal ailments and
recaptures one’s youth; Peck, 1998) and in contemporary popular publi-
cations that promise a speedy return to one’s younger self via dubious
methods (Emling, 2013; Good Housekeeping, 2013). Other than conceit,
however, people have defensible reasons to wish to re-capture their youth-
fulness. Feeling younger than one’s chronological age is positively related
to psychological (Hubley & Russell, 2009; Infurna, Gerstorf, Robertson,
Berg, & Zarit, 2010) and physical (Boehmer, 2007; Kleinspehn-
Ammerlahn, Kotter-Gr€ uhn, & Smith, 2008) health, is linked to more
constructive attitudes toward aging (Kleinspehn-Ammerlahn, Kotter-
Gr€uhn, & Smith, 2008), and it improves task performance (Hughes,
Geraci, & De Forrest, 2013).
Abeyta and Routledge (2016, Study 1) reasoned that nostalgia is likely
to foster youthfulness. After all, not only do nostalgic reflections refer fre-
quently to one’s childhood, adolescence, or early adulthood (Hepper et al.,
2012; Wildschut et al., 2006), but, importantly, they increase a sense of
continuity between one’s past and one’s present (Sedikides et al., 2016).
These researchers induced nostalgia via music. Participants in the nostalgic
condition identified a nostalgic song on YouTube, whereas participants
in the control condition identified a song that they had discovered recently
and enjoyed. Then, all participants wrote about how the song made them
feel. Finally, they indicated their subjective age (“At times, people feel
older or younger than they actually are. At this moment, what age do
you feel?”). Nostalgic participants reported feeling younger than controls.
In a follow-up, Abeyta and Routledge (Study 2) replicated this finding

inducing nostalgia with the Event Reflection Task, and extended it by
showing that nostalgic participants also felt more youthful than controls.
In their final study, Abeyta and Routledge (2016, Study 3) set to show-
case the downstream implications of nostalgia-fostered youthfulness: Is it
also linked with perceived health, confidence in one’s physical abilities,
and health-related optimism? The researchers capitalized on findings that
individuals begin to feel subjectively younger as they enter middle adulthood
(Galambos, Turner, & Tilton-Weaver, 2005; Rubin & Berntsen, 2006). As
such, the study included only participants over the age of 40 (age range:
40–75 years).
First, Abeyta and Routledge (2016, Study 3) induced nostalgia with a
modification of the Event Reflection Task. Participants in both conditions
were instructed to recall memories from high school (either nostalgic or
ordinary ones), thus assuring that the findings were not merely due to nos-
talgic recall traveling further into the past than ordinary autobiographical
recall. Afterward, the researchers assessed a sense of youthfulness both with
the single-item measure of Study 2 and four adjectives (i.e., alert, energetic,
happy-go-lucky, rejuvenated). Next, they assessed perceived health, that is,
one’s appraisal of their general health status, with one item from Warner,
Schwarzaer, Sch€ uz, Wurn, and Tesch-R€ omer (2012; “If you compare your-
self with an average person of your sex and age, how healthy are you?”) and
three items from the RAND Health Survey v. 1.0 (Hays, Sherbourne, &
Mazel, 1993; “I am as healthy as anyone I know,” “I seem to get sick a
little easier than other people,” “My health is excellent”). Subsequently,
they assessed confidence in one’s physical abilities on seven items con-
structed for the purposes of this study (e.g., “Lift as much as an average
20 year old of your sex can,” “Run as long as an average 20 year old of
your sex can,” “Do as much physical activity as a 20 year old can do with-
out getting overly fatigued or sore.”). Finally, they assessed health-related
optimism with two items from Warner et al. (“How do you estimate the
likelihood that your health status will worsen in the near future?”, “If you
compare yourself with an average person of your sex and age, how likely is
it for you that your health will worsen in the near future?”) and one item
from the RAND Health Survey v. 1.0 (I expect my health to get worse).
Nostalgia (vs. control) fostered youthfulness, which in turn positively
predicted subjective health, confidence in one’s physical abilities, and
health-related optimism.
4.1.2 Inspiration
Inspiration entails transcendence of mundane preoccupations along with
awareness of new possibilities or ideas (inspired by) and a desire to enact
them (“inspired to”; Thrash & Elliot, 2004). In a preliminary investigation,
trait nostalgia was positively associated with both frequency and intensity of
inspiration (Stephan et al., 2015, Study 1). Here, we assessed nostalgia both
with the Southampton Nostalgia Scale and the Nostalgia Inventory (Batcho,
1995), where participants rated the degree to which they felt nostalgic for
each of 18 aspects of their past (e.g., “My family,” “My pets,” “My child-
hood toys”). We standardized and averaged the two nostalgia scales, given
their high inter-relation. We assessed inspiration with five items (e.g., “I feel
inspired,” “I am inspired to do something”; Thrash & Elliot, 2003) rated on
frequency and intensity.
We then went ahead with experimentation (Stephan et al., 2015, Study 2).
We induced nostalgia with the Event Reflection Task, and assessed state inspi-
ration (the “inspired by” component) with three items (e.g., “Thinking about
this event fills me with inspiration”) that were partly based on Thrash and
Elliot’s (2003) Inspiration Scale. Nostalgic participants reported being more
inspired than controls. We replicated conceptually this finding with the
“inspired to” component of inspiration, following a nostalgia induction with
the Event Reflection Task. We assessed state inspiration with five items that
accompanied the stem “Right now, I feel inspired to …,” with sample items
being “travel overseas this summer” and “try skydiving or some other adven-
turous activity” (Stephan et al., 2015, Study 3).
How does nostalgia evoke inspiration (“inspired by” component)? We
took our hint from theoretical proposals linking self-esteem with inspiration
(McAlpine, 2011; Thrash & Elliot, 2003), and in knowledge that nostalgia
elevates self-esteem (Hepper et al., 2012; Wildschut et al., 2006). Self-
esteem, then, may mediate the effect of nostalgia on inspiration. But where
does self-esteem come from? Theoretical accounts and empirical evidence
originate self-esteem in belongingness or social connectedness (Crocker &
Wolfe, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Mahadevan, Gregg, & Sedikides,
2019; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), and
social connectedness is a key outcome of nostalgia (Wildschut et al., 2006,
2018; Wildschut, Sedikides, Routledge, Arndt, & Cordaro, 2010; Zhou
et al., 2008). Consequently, we hypothesized the following mediational
path: Nostalgia will lead to higher inspiration sequentially via social connect-
edness and self-esteem (nostalgia ) social connectedness ) self-esteem )
inspiration). We obtained support for this mediational sequence in two studies.
In one (Stephan et al., 2015, Study 4), we induced nostalgia by exposing

participants to song lyrics (ones that they had previously identified as nos-
talgic vs. not), assessed social connectedness with four items (“feeling” …
“connected to loved one,” “protected,” “loved,” “I can trust others”)
and self-esteem with another four (“feeling” … “good about myself, “I like
myself better, “I value myself more,” “I have many positive qualities”)—
both from the State Functions of Nostalgia Scale (Hepper et al., 2012).
Finally, we assessed state inspiration with the items of Study 2. In the other
study (Stephan et al., 2015, Study 5), we first induced nostalgia with a variant of
the Event Reflection Task, in which the control condition involved a positive
(i.e., lucky) event in the participant’s life. Then, we assessed social connected-
ness and self-esteem as in Study 4 (i.e., with items from the State Functions of
Nostalgia Scale), and finally assessed inspiration as a mixture of “inspired by”
and “inspired to” (i.e., “Thinking about this event makes me feel” … “filled
with inspiration,” “inspired to do something,” “inspired to see things in new
and original ways,” “inspired with new ideas and insights”).
4.1.3 Risk-taking
Generally, people are risk averse (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964). In some cir-
cumstances, though, and especially in organizational contexts, risk-taking
can be beneficial, as it can lead to opportunities or necessary reform. We rea-
soned that nostalgia may encourage risk- taking (Zou, Lee, Wildschut, &
Sedikides, 2019). We were interested specifically in financial risk-taking,
defined as behavior that entails uncertainty or outcome variability
(Figner & Weber, 2011; Holton, 2004), that is, the possibility of gains as well
as losses ( Josef et al., 2016).
Initial findings were supportive of our reasoning (Zou, Lee,
Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2018, Preliminary Investigation). We administered
to a group of business owners the Southampton Nostalgia Scale and a three-
item risk-taking scale (Covin & Slevin, 1989), where each item comprised a
stem (e.g., “What is your preferred way of running your business?”) and
three response options ranging from low-risk (“explore potential opportu-
nities gradually through cautious, incremental behavior”) through a neutral
midpoint (“equally the same”) to high risk (“take bold, wide-ranging actions
to achieve the firm’s objectives”). Nostalgia proneness was positively asso-
ciated with risk-taking, controlling for business characteristics (e.g., number
of businesses owned, total size of business), demographics (e.g., age, gender,
ethnicity, education), and the Big Five (Ten-Item Personality Inventory;
Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).
We next examined the causal relation between nostalgia and risk-taking

(Zou et al., 2018, Study 1). We manipulated nostalgia with the Event
Reflection Task and measured risk-taking with the Automatic Balloon
Analogue Risk Task (Pleskac, Wallsten, Wang, & Lejuez, 2008). In this task,
participants are instructed to inflate 30 virtual balloons, and they choose in
advance the number of pumps for each of the 30 trials. Balloons are fixed to
pop at the 128th pump, although a given balloon may pop anywhere
between the 1st and 128th pump. Participants are awarded £0.005 for each
pump, although there is a catch: If a balloon pops, they lose all their earnings
for that trial. The total number of pumps that participants choose across the
30 trials constitutes the measure of risk-taking. In our experiment, nostalgic
participants chose a higher number of pumps than controls. Nostalgia begets
financial risk-taking.
Why would nostalgia precipitate risk-taking? We started by identifying a
key factor that fosters risk-taking, perceptions of family support. Family is
considered a most important source of meaning and predicts meaning in life
(Lambert et al., 2010). Moreover, family serves as a buffer against setbacks
(Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2013), perceptions of community members as fam-
ily is positively related to risky financial decisions (Zhu, Dholakia, Chen, &
Algesheimer, 2012), and perceived access to family financial support predicts
higher risk-taking (Hsee & Weber, 1999). Family, then, imparts the scaffold-
ing for financial risk-taking and cushions its downside. We further reasoned
that nostalgia would solidify perceptions of family support. Nostalgic expe-
riences feature, to a great extent, family moments (e.g., marriage, birth of a
child, vacations; Wildschut et al., 2006) and cultural life scripts (e.g.,
Thanksgiving meals, Christmas holidays, 4th of July picnics; Berntsen &
Rubin, 2004) involving family. In addition, nostalgia proneness is associated
with social connectedness (Seehusen et al., 2013), and experimental induc-
tions of nostalgia engender a sense of social connectedness (e.g., being
protected and loved; Hepper et al., 2012). In all, we hypothesized that nos-
talgia would be associated with, or lead to, perceptions of family support,
which in turn would be linked with risk-taking.
We proceeded to test this mediational model (Zou et al., 2018, Study 2)
with a measurement-of-mediation design (Hayes, 2018). We assessed nos-
talgia proneness with the Nostalgia Inventory (Batcho, 1995). We assessed
family support (e.g., “I get the emotional help and support I need from my
family”) with four items from the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived
Social Support (Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988). This 12-item scale
measures two other sources of perceived social support, which we tested as
alternative mediators: significant other (four items; e.g., “I have a special

person who is a real source of comfort to me”) and friends (four items;
e.g., “My friends really try to help me”). Finally, we assessed risk-taking with
an investment task. Participants were asked to make 12 investment decisions,
which would determine their chances of winning a $20 Amazon voucher.
Specifically, they received five starter tickets and were informed that the
more tickets they earned via their investment decisions, the greater their
chances would be for winning the voucher. For each decision, participants
chose between an option whose outcome was certain and an option whose
outcome had the same expected value but higher risk. Participants went over
12 investment scenarios, a third of which represented a loss domain (e.g.,
“sure loss of 6 tickets” vs. “25% chance to lose 12 tickets and 75% chance
to lose 4 tickets”), another third represented a gain domain (e.g., “sure gain
of 6 tickets” vs. “25% chance to gain 12 tickets and 75% chance to gain 4
tickets”), and the final third represented a mixed domain (combination of
losses and gains; e.g., “100% chance of no change” vs. “80% chance to lose
5 tickets and 20% chance to gain 20 tickets”). Given that domain did not
moderate the relation between nostalgia and risk-taking, we formed an over-
all risk-taking score by averaging across domains. Family support (but not
significant-other support or friend support) mediated the relation between
nostalgia and risk-taking (independently of age or gender).
This evidence, though, for the mediational role of family support was cor-
relational. We solicited experimental evidence through an experimental-
causal-chain design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). First, we manipulated
nostalgia and assessed its influence on family support (i.e., the putative medi-
ator; Zou et al., 2018, Study 3). We induced nostalgia with a variant of the
Event Reflection Task, where the experimental condition (nostalgic event)
was contrasted with two control conditions: an ordinary nostalgic event and
a positive (i.e., lucky) nostalgic event. We assessed family support with the
4-item family subscale of the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social
Support (Zimet et al., 1988). Nostalgia (compared to the two control con-
ditions) raised perceptions of family support. Second, we manipulated family
support and assessed its impact on risk taking (i.e., the putative outcome var-
iable; Zou et al., 2018, Study 4). We induced family support by randomly
assigning participants to the family-environment condition versus the own-
devices condition. In the former, they contemplated an interaction with
family members and briefly described it in writing, whereas, in the latter,
they did the same for an occasion when they had to fend for themselves.
Next, participants completed the investment decision task of Study 2
(i.e., earning tickets toward a $20 Amazon coupon). Participants in the

family-environment condition took greater risk than those in the own-
devices condition.
Having implemented a measurement-of-mediation design and an
experimental-causal-chain design, we put it all together in a full mediation
model (Zou et al., 2018, Study 5). We first manipulated nostalgia with the
Event Reflection Task. Then, we measured perceived family financial sup-
port with three bespoke items: “My family would help me if I suffered
a financial setback,” “My family would lend me money when needed,”
“I can count on my family for financial support, should I ever need it.”
Finally, we measured risk-taking with the 3-item Investment subscale of
the Domain Specific Risk-Taking scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002;
e.g., “Invest 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock”). Val-
idating the prior findings, perceived financial support transmitted the effect
of nostalgia on risk-taking.
4.2 Localized motivation

In this section, we report findings on how the emotion of nostalgia influ-
ences localized motivation (i.e., motivation in specific domains), and in
particular growth orientation, intrinsic motivation, and goal-pursuit.
4.2.1 Growth orientation

Growth is defined as “the potential to cultivate inner potentialities, seek out
optimal challenges, and integrate new experiences into the self-concept”
(Baldwin & Landau, 2014, p. 163). Stephan, Sedikides, and Wildschut
(2012, Study 2) addressed whether nostalgia increases state authenticity
(i.e., the sense of a true self; Sedikides, Slabu, Lenton, & Thomaes,
2017). State authenticity involves “inner personality” (Harter, 2002) as well
as acceptance and integration of one’s strengths and weaknesses (Kernis &
Goldman, 2006). We induced nostalgia with a variant of the Event Reflec-
tion Task that comprised two control conditions, an ordinary event and a
positive event from one’s life. Nostalgic (vs. control) participants reported
greater state authenticity.
Baldwin, Biernat, and Landau (2015) replicated and extended these find-
ings. They defined authenticity in terms of the intrinsic self (i.e., expression
of the individual’s true or core attributes) rather than the extrinsic self
(i.e., the persona presented to others or influenced by demands that contra-
dict values and goals of the intrinsic self; Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009;
Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). Baldwin et al. tested the
idea that nostalgia would be associated with and bolster the intrinsic, but not
the extrinsic, self. In a correlational investigation (Study 7), they measured dis-
positional nostalgia with the Nostalgia Inventory (Batcho, 1995) and intrinsic
self in two ways. One was a bespoke 12-item intrinsic self-expression scale
(e.g., “I feel like I am free to decide for myself how to live my life, “I feel like
I can pretty much be myself in my daily situations,” “I wish I could get my true
self back”—reverse-scored), and the other a modified version of the Measure
of Authenticity in Various Social Roles (Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, &
Ilardi, 1997) that assesses with five items (e.g., “I experience this aspect of
myself as an authentic part of who I am,” “This aspect of myself is meaningful
and valuable to me”) perceived authenticity in different roles (e.g., romantic
partner, friend, student). Dispositional nostalgia was positively associated with
intrinsic self-expression. The authors replicated these findings with state nos-
talgia, intrinsic self-expression, and extrinsic self-expression. Specifically, par-
ticipants brought to mind a personal memory, reflected on it, and provided
a written description of it. Next, they rated their memory for felt nostalgia
(i.e., “This memory makes me feel nostalgic/wistful/sentimental/a longing
for my past”), and completed in-the-moment measures of the intrinsic and
extrinsic self. The intrinsic self-measure was the 45-item Authenticity Inven-
tory (Kernis & Goldman, 2006), which assesses subjective authenticity in
one’s life (e.g., “For better or for worse I am aware of who I truly am”).
The extrinsic self-measure was the 20-item Extrinsic Contingency Focus
Scale (Williams, Schimel, Hayes, & Martens, 2010), which assesses an individ-
ual’s focus on meeting extrinsic demands (e.g., “I work hard at things because
of the social approval it provides”). Nostalgia was positively related to the
intrinsic self and negatively related to the extrinsic self.
Baldwin et al. (2015, Study 2) proceeded to examine the causal influence
of nostalgia on the intrinsic and extrinsic self. First, they induced nostalgia
with the Event Reflection Task. Then, they assessed the intrinsic self with
an adapted version of Kernis and Goldman’s (2006) Authenticity Inventory.
In both conditions, participant reflected on their described event, brought to
mind an image of themselves at event occurrence, and rated the authenticity
of that self (e.g., “For better or for worse I was aware of who I truly was”).
Finally the researchers assessed the current (e.g., “who you are today”)
extrinsic self via the Extrinsic Contingency Focus Scale (Williams et al.,
2010). Nostalgia (vs. control) bolstered the intrinsic self; that is, nostalgic
participants rated their past selves as more authentic. In addition, nostalgia
(vs. control) weakened the extrinsic self. In a conceptual replication
(Study 3), nostalgia (induced via the Event Reflection Task) increased the
accessibility of the intrinsic self-compared to control. In particular, nostalgic

participants evinced a higher word count and more writing time (Reber,
Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 2004), and also evinced a greater proportion of
cognitive words (e.g., descriptions (e.g., “know,” “think,” “because”);
Reber et al., 2004), in their intrinsic self-descriptions.
As a reminder, growth is also defined as “the potential to … seek out
optimal challenges” (Baldwin & Landau, 2014, p. 163). Laypersons use
growth-related words (e.g., change, future) to describe nostalgia (Hepper
et al., 2012, Studies 1–2), but such linguistic expressions may reflect norma-
tive expectations. Experimental tests are more compelling, and they were
provided by Baldwin and Landau (2014). In Study 1, they induced nostalgia
with the Event Reflection Task and then assessed, using the 10-item Curi-
osity and Exploration Inventory (Kashdan et al., 2009), growth-oriented
self-perceptions, that is, willingness to engage in general challenging and
novel experiences (e.g., “I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar
people, events, and places,” “I view challenging situations as an opportunity
to grow and learn”). They also assessed, using the 19-item Exploration
Inventory (Green & Campbell, 2000), growth-oriented behavioral inten-
tions, that is, willingness to engage in concrete challenging and novel expe-
riences (e.g., “I would like to spend a semester studying abroad,” “I would
like to try bungee jumping, skydiving, or other adventurous activities”).
Nostalgic (vs. control) participants manifested stronger growth-related
self-perceptions and behavioral intentions. Baldwin and Landau (2014)
replicated these results in Study 2.
4.2.2 Intrinsic motivation

The Oxford dictionary defines intrinsic motivation as “An incentive to do
something that arises from factors within the individual …”. (http://www.
oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100009153).
This “something” needs to be an activity that the individual finds inherently
interesting and enjoyable (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989). Intrinsic motiva-
tion has implications for exertion of effort toward a relevant activity or task,
and is a key construct in the scholarly tradition of achievement motivation
(Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996). Intrinsic motivation is boosted under chal-
lenging circumstances, that is, when the individual’s resources narrowly
outweigh task demands, given that such conditions allow for her or his
strengths to come to the fore (i.e., self-expression or past-self directedness).
Conversely, intrinsic motivation is undercut in threatening circumstances,
that is, when task demands outweigh the individual’s resources, given
that such conditions will hinder her or his strengths (Covington & M€ ueller,
2001; Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999).
We hypothesized that nostalgia kindles intrinsic motivation, as it facili-
tates past-self directedness, especially in challenging organizational settings
(Van Dijke, Leunissen, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2019). We defined past-self
directedness as the process of focusing on memories pertinent to the long-
term self (i.e., one’s meaningful and persistent goal-relevant activities) rather
than the episodic or working self (i.e., one’s momentary goals, such as taking
out the garbage; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). Memories pertinent to
the long-term self are particularly likely to be integrated and consolidated
into one’s self-concept. We defined challenging organizational settings
in terms of affording low (vs. high) interactional justice, that is, being the
victim of untruthful, impolite, or disrespectful treatment by organizational
authorities (e.g., managers; Colquitt, 2012). We tested and supported our
hypothesis in three studies.
In Study 1 (Van Dijke et al., 2019), an Experience Sampling Method
Study, we assessed interactional justice with a 9-item scale (Colquitt,
2001), where each item was preceded by the stem: “The following items
are about your supervisor.” A sample item is “Has he/she treated you in
a polite manner?”. Starting a week later, and for 10 consecutive workdays,
we texted employees at a random time, asking them to complete as soon as
possible two measures on their smartphones. One assessed nostalgia with
two items: “At this moment, I am having nostalgic feelings,” “At this
moment, I feel nostalgic” (Hepper et al., 2012). The other assessed intrinsic
motivation with three items, preceded by the stem: “Please, indicate for each
item to what extent it describes why you are doing this work.” The items
were: “Because I have fun doing this job,” “Because I enjoy this work very
much,” “For the moments of pleasure that this job brings me” (Gagne et al.,
2010). The relation between nostalgia and intrinsic motivation was height-
ened among employees who experienced low (vs. high) interactional justice.
Stated otherwise, high (vs. low) nostalgia predicted stronger intrinsic
motivation in employees who experienced low interactional justice.
In Study 2 (Van Dijke et al., 2019), a field experiment, we were
concerned with the causal influence of nostalgia on intrinsic motivation
and with the latter’s downstream consequences for work effort. At Time
1, we assessed interactional justice as in Study 1 (Colquitt, 2001). At a
later point, we manipulated nostalgia with the Event Reflection Task
every morning for five consecutive workdays. Then, at a random interval
during the workday, we assessed employees’ intrinsic motivation (as before;
Gagne et al., 2010) and work effort (“I strived as hard as I can to be successful
in my work,” “I really exerted myself to the fullest at work”; Brown &
Leigh, 1996). Nostalgia strengthened intrinsic motivation, which subse-
quently heightened work effort, in employees who experienced low (vs. high)
interactional justice.
In Study 3 (Van Dijke et al., 2019), an experiment, we aimed to examine
not only the causal role of nostalgia, but also the causal role of interactional
justice, on intrinsic motivation. In addition, we tested the replicability of
prior findings using a behavioral, rather than a self-report, measure of intrin-
sic motivation. Finally, we assessed the putative mechanism through which
nostalgia strengthens intrinsic motivation (when interactional justice is low),
namely, past-self directedness. We manipulated nostalgia with the Event
Reflection Task. Afterward, we manipulated interactional justice by ran-
domly assigning participants to conditions in which they learned that the
experimenter had not been candid (low interactional justice) vs. had been
candid (high interactional justice) in communicating with them about a
bonus (Colquitt, 2012). Then, we assessed intrinsic motivation with an ana-
gram task (Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt, Scott, & Livingston, 2009). This task,
for which participants did not receive a reward, resulted in four inter-related
indices (i.e., delay prior to task commencement, duration of task engage-
ment, number of anagrams participants attempted to solve, and number
of anagrams participants solved correctly) that we aggregated. Finally, we
indexed past self-directedness by coding participants’ autobiographical nar-
ratives. Nostalgia strengthened intrinsic motivation in the presence of low
(vs. high) interactional justice, and this effect was mediated by past-self
directedness.
High (vs. low) nostalgia predicts intrinsic motivation in educational
settings. Such settings often evoke threat appraisals, which are associated
not only with test anxiety, performance-avoidance goals, and lower perfor-
mance (McGregor & Elliot, 2002; Putwain & Symes, 2011), but also, and
importantly, with reduced intrinsic motivation (Kavussanu, Dewar, &
Boardley, 2014; Putwain & Remedios, 2014). Bialobrzeska, Elliot,
Wildschut, and Sedikides (2019) examined the regulatory role of nostalgia
in a sample of undergraduate students. We hypothesized that threat
appraisals are linked to lesser intrinsic motivation, but also to greater nos-
talgia, given that nostalgia often follows on the heels of psychological dis-
comfort, as we discussed in the beginning of this article (i.e., Hofer’s
[1688/1934] inferential blunder). Further, we capitalized on the palliative
function of nostalgia (Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, Arndt, et al., 2015;

Wildschut et al., 2011) in hypothesizing that greater nostalgia will coun-
teract the negative association between threat appraisals and intrinsic
motivation.
Students indicated on the Nostalgia Inventory (Batcho, 1995), admin-
istered at the beginning of an academic semester, how nostalgic they felt in
the last few days. This initial measure of nostalgia served as a baseline. Two
months later, students indicated threat appraisals for the class. We assessed
these appraisals with two items (“I view this class as a threat,” “I think this
class represents a threat to me”; McGregor & Elliot, 2002). One month
later, students indicated again how nostalgic they felt in the last few days
(also assessed with the Nostalgia Inventory). This time, nostalgia served as
the intervening variable, representing change in nostalgia over time. In the
same session, we assessed students’ intrinsic motivation for the class using
Elliot and Church’s (1997) eight-item Intrinsic Motivation Scale (e.g., “I
think this class is interesting,” “I’m glad I took this class”). The results were
consistent with the hypotheses. Students who appraised their class as a
threat reported lesser intrinsic motivation for the class 1 month later. They
also reported greater nostalgia over time. Nostalgia, in turn, offset the neg-
ative relation between threat appraisals and intrinsic motivation (Fig. 1).
T0 Nostalgia
.62*
T2 Nostalgia
.11* .13*
T1 Threat appraisal for class –.17* T2 Intrinsic motivation for class
Fig. 1 Intervening variable model from Bialobrzeska et al. (2019). T1 threat appraisal for
class predicts increased T2 nostalgia, above and beyond T0 (baseline) nostalgia. T2 nos-
talgia, in turn, predicts higher levels of T2 intrinsic motivation for class. The positive indi-
rect effect of T1 threat appraisals, via T2 nostalgia, on T2 intrinsic motivation offset the
negative direct effect of T1 threat appraisals on T2 intrinsic motivation. Path coefficients
are standardized beta weights from a multiple regression analysis. *P < 0.05.
4.2.3 Goal pursuit

Nostalgia strengthens intrinsic motivation, but does it potentiate specific
goals? Some theorists have linked goal-pursuit with meaning in life
(Emmons, 2003; Klinger, 1977; Ryff, 2012), but none have tested this link
directly. We wanted to know if meaning is associated with goal-pursuit, and,
more specifically, if it is associated with pursuit of a person’s more important
(than less important) goals. But how about antecedents of meaning? Empir-
ical research has established that nostalgia is a potent source or instigator of
meaning (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2018). As mentioned previously, nostalgic
narratives revolve around momentous life events or cultural scripts that
involve close others (e.g., family members, friends, partners), who are key
sources of meaning (Lambert et al., 2010; Stavrova & Luhmann, 2016).
We hypothesized, then, that nostalgia will potentiate goal-pursuit by
increasing meaning in life. We tested this hypothesis in two experiments.
In Experiment 1 (Sedikides et al., 2018), we manipulated nostalgia with
the Event Reflection Task and assessed meaning with four items from the
State Functions of Nostalgia Scale (Hepper et al., 2012). The items were:
“life is meaningful,” “life has a purpose,” “there is a greater purpose to
life,” and “life is worth living.” Finally, we assessed goal-pursuit by adapting
a measure introduced by Milyavskaya, Ianakieva, Foxen-Craft, Colantuoni,
and Koestner (2012). After writing down five personal goals, participants
identified their most important one. Then, they pondered the event (nos-
talgic vs. ordinary) that they had described at the start of the experiment,
and, with this event in mind, responded to five items (e.g., “I am motivated
to pursue this goal,” “I feel excited about pursuing this goal,” “I want to put
more time and effort into pursuing this goal”). As hypothesized, nostalgia
fortified intentions to pursue one’s most important goal by elevating mean-
ing in life.
Experiment 2 delimited the findings of Experiment 1 (Sedikides et al.,
2018). First, participants wrote down six personal goals that they considered
important, and, from this set, identified their most important and least
important goal. Subsequently, participant underwent a nostalgia manipula-
tion (the same as in Experiment 1) and completed a meaning scale (the same
as in Experiment 1). Finally, they reflected back on the relevant event
(i.e., nostalgic vs. ordinary) and, with this event in mind, responded to the
abovementioned five items (Milyavskaya et al., 2012) in reference to both
their most important and least important goal (presented in random order).
Nostalgia galvanized intentions to pursue one’s most important, but not least
important, goal by augmenting meaning in life. In all, nostalgia facilitates
pursuit of one’s most cherished goals.
We content-analyzed the goals that participants listed along three

themes: social (e.g., having good relationships with family and friends, hav-
ing a family), agentic (e.g., graduating with good grades, being successful),
and hedonic (e.g., enjoying life, being happy). Across experiments, most of
the goals were coded as social (37.9%), followed by agentic (36.2%) and
hedonic (25.9%). However, the theme of the goals did not vary as a function
of nostalgia. That is, nostalgia promotes goal-pursuit independently of goal
content. Yet, research focusing exclusively on social goals has indicated that
nostalgia enhances the importance of social goals and strengthens intentions
to re-connect with friends (Abeyta, Routledge, & Juhl, 2015).
4.3 Action-oriented motivation

We will detail three instances of action-oriented motivation: turnover
intentions, helping, and behavior change.
4.3.1 Turnover intentions

We have described above research demonstrating that nostalgia strengthens
intrinsic motivation (Van Dijke et al., 2019). Personal nostalgia, then, has
implications for employees and organizational processes. So, we reasoned,
does organizational nostalgia, which we defined as a sentimental longing
or wistful affection for past events and aspects of one’s organizational life
(e.g., colleagues, rules, norms, or practices, buildings; Gabriel, 1993). We
were concerned, in particular, with whether organizational nostalgia rein-
forces the desire to stay in one’s organization, or, alternatively, weakens
turnover intentions. Although we focused on intentions, meta-analyses have
indicated that turnover intentions are moderately correlated with turnover
behavior (with the correlation estimated at approximately 0.50; Steel &
Ovalle, 1984; Tett & Meyer, 1993). Turnover has serious organizational
costs, such as losses in trained and expert personnel (Ton & Huckman,
2008; Van Dick et al., 2004), productivity decreases (Argote, Insko,
Yovetich, & Romero, 1995), and falls in profits (Ton & Huckman, 2008).
We posited, as a mediating mechanism, work meaning (i.e., the extent
to which work affords a sense of personal significance, purpose, and
growth; Steger, Dik, & Duffy, 2012). Work meaning contributes to pos-
itive organizational outcomes, such as job satisfaction, unit cohesion, and
commitment (Kamdron, 2005; Steger et al., 2012). Importantly, work
meaning deficits conduce to higher turnover (Steger et al., 2012). Equally
important, organizational nostalgia is positively correlated with work
meaning, as we established in a preliminary investigation (Leunissen,
Sedikides, Wildschut, & Cohen, 2018, Study 1).
Next we addressed more systematically the relations among organiza-

tional nostalgia, work meaning, and turnover intentions (Leunissen et al.,
2018, Study 2). The manipulation of organizational nostalgia came first. Par-
ticipants in the organizational-nostalgia condition read (p. 47): “According
to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘nostalgia’ is defined as a ‘sentimental longing for
the past.’ Please bring to mind a nostalgic event that you have experienced in
your organization. Specifically, try to think of a past event you experienced
in your organization that makes you feel most nostalgic.” Participants in the
control condition read (p. 47): “Please bring to mind an ordinary event that
you have experienced in your organization. Specifically, try to think of a past
event you experienced in your organization that is ordinary.” Next, all
participants described the event that they had contemplated. The assessment
of the putative mediator followed. Participants completed the four-item
Positive Meaning (i.e., personal significance) subscale of the Work and
Meaning Inventory (Steger et al., 2012). Sample items are: “I have a good
sense of what makes my job meaningful” and “I have found a meaningful
career.” The assessment of the putative outcome came last. Participants
completed a five-item turnover intentions scale (Van Dick et al., 2004), with
sample items being “I think I should be checking out job adverts on the
daily media” and “I am thinking of quitting this job.” As hypothesized,
organizational nostalgia weakened turnover intentions, and it did so by
augmenting work meaning.
We wondered whether there are some employees for whom organiza-
tional nostalgia would be more beneficial (i.e., would attenuate turnover
intentions by increasing work meaning) than others. We focused on the
individual difference of burnout, defined as a state of physical and emotional
exhaustion (accompanied by disengagement and cynicism) due to excessive
job demands and depleted resources (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, &
Schaufeli, 2001; Schaufeli & Greenglass, 2001). Burnout, linked to job
dissatisfaction, absenteeism, and reduced productivity (Schaufeli & Bakker,
2004), can be present in virtually all occupations (Kristensen, Borritz,
Villadsen, & Christensen, 2005; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001), and,
in its severe form, afflicts up to 10% of the work force at any given time
(Schaufeli & Buunk, 2003). More relevant to our research objectives, sugges-
tive evidence indicates that burnout is negatively correlated with work mean-
ing (i.e., existential fulfillment; Loonstra, Brouwers, & Tomic, 2009). As such,
organizational nostalgia will be of benefit to psychologically taxed
employees, replenishing meaning for those with depleted psychological
resources (i.e., high burnout) compared to those with abundant psycholog-
ical resources (i.e., low burnout).
In Study 3 (Leunissen et al., 2018), we provided a test of the hypothesis

that organizational nostalgia raises work meaning among employees higher
(than lower) on burnout, with the downstream consequence of weaker
turnover intentions. We first assessed burnout with the 7-item Work Burn-
out subscale of the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory (Kristensen et al., 2005).
Sample items include “Do you feel burned out because of your work?” and
“Do you feel worn out at the end of the working day?” We then manipu-
lated organizational nostalgia as in Study 2 above. Subsequently, we assessed
work meaning with the full 10-item Work and Meaning Inventory (Steger
et al., 2012), which gauges not only personal significance (as the 4-item Pos-
itive Meaning subscale, used in Study 2, does), but also perceiving one’s
work as a path toward meaning making and as contributing to the greater
good. Finally, we assessed turnover intentions in the same manner as in
Study 2. The hypothesis was confirmed. Organizational nostalgia increased
work meaning among employees higher (than lower) on burnout, and this
increase in work meaning predicted weaker turnover intentions (Fig. 2).
4.3.2 Helping
Helping involves proximity (physical or interpersonal), which is a behavioral
indicator of approach motivation (Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977). Individ-
uals comfortable with proximity are increasingly likely to help (Mikulincer,
Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005); helping, then, is a sign of social approach
motivation (Snyder & Stuermer, 2009).
After inducing nostalgia with the Event Reflection Task, we informed
participants of an impending exchange with a co-participant who was
Burnout Work meaning
.19*
–.31*
(–.21*) –.17*
.28*
Organizational nostalgia (–.20*) –.12 Turnover intentions
Fig. 2 Moderated mediation model from Leunissen, Sedikides, Wildschut, and Cohen
(2018, Study 3), based on Hayes’ (2018) model 8. Increased work meaning mediates
the effect of organizational nostalgia on weaker turnover intentions. However, the indi-
rect effect of organizational nostalgia, via work meaning, on turnover intentions is
stronger—and significant only—among employees who experienced high (compared
to low) burnout. Path coefficients are standardized beta weights from a multiple regres-
sion analysis. Coefficients in parentheses are from an analysis that did not control for
work meaning (i.e., the mediator). *P < 0.05.
currently in another part of the building. In preparation for the exchange, they
would need to position two chairs (one for them, one for their prospective
interactant) in a designated area of the room (Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, & Jetten, 1994). At this point, the research assistant left the room,
ostensibly to summon the second interactant, marking the end of the exper-
imental procedure. The seating distance between chairs (center-to-center)
was the dependent measure. Nostalgic participants placed the chairs closer
together relative to controls (Stephan et al., 2014, Study 4). Nostalgia evokes
behavior indicative of a desire for interpersonal proximity.
Nostalgia also directly increases helping (Stephan et al., 2014, Study 5).
Participants underwent a nostalgia manipulation (Event Reflection Task).
Then, in a staged mishap, they watched a clumsy research assistant enter
the room and drop pencils on the floor. The number of pencils that partic-
ipants picked up and handed to the research assistant was the dependent
measure (as per Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). Nostalgic participants were
more helpful than controls.
How does nostalgia increase helping? We addressed this question in sam-
ples of Chinese participants (Zhou, Wildschut, Sedikides, Shi, & Feng,
2012). In a preliminary investigation (Study 1), we induced nostalgia with
the Event Reflection Task and then presented participants with a description
of an alleged nonprofit organization, whose mission was to help young vic-
tims of an earthquake. Afterward, we instructed participants to record the
number of hours they would plan to volunteer for this charity and the
amount of money that would intend to donate to the charity. Relative to
controls, nostalgic participants were prepared to spend more volunteering
time and donate more money.
Our main interest, though, was the mechanism that transmitted the effect
of nostalgia on helping. We focused, in Study 2, on two emotional responses
likely to be elicited by awareness of others’ misfortune or suffering: empathy
and personal distress (Batson, 1991). Empathy is other-oriented and there-
fore can lead to helping from an altruistic desire to lessen the needy person’s
suffering, whereas personal distress is self-oriented and therefore can lead
to helping from an egoistic desire to mitigate one’s own discomfort. Specif-
ically, we manipulated nostalgia (with the Event Reflection Task), assessed
empathy (“sympathetic,” “compassionate,” “softhearted,” “tender”) and
personal distress (“distressed,” “upset,” “perturbed,” “troubled”), and then
assessed volunteering and donation intentions. Nostalgic (relative to control)
participants expressed stronger volunteering intentions, which were medi-
ated by empathy rather than personal distress. We replicated these findings
with a different charity (Study 3), community adults rather than university
students (Study 4), and monetary donations rather than monetary intentions
(Study 5).
4.3.3 Behavior change

Can nostalgia contribute to behavioral change? We (Wohl et al., 2018)
focused on problematic behavior, and in particular addiction (i.e., gambling,
drinking), which is associated with physical, psychological, and interpersonal
consequences (Amato & Rogers, 1997; Hall & Solowij, 1998; Lesieur &
Custer, 1984). Most people who routinely exhibit such problematic behav-
ior are unmotivated to modify it. For example, only 15% of them take steps
to do so (Miller & Rollnick, 2002) and, when they do take steps (e.g., make
resolutions), they typically fail to make a single attempt at change
(DiClemente et al., 1991). As such, research needs to identify means that
will motivate people to overcome barriers to behavior change. We reasoned
that nostalgia may be such a means.
We proposed that individuals who realize that their problematic behav-
ior has negatively altered their sense of self would become motivated to
reclaim their positive past self. This proposal is based on the Motivational
Interviewing framework (Miller & Rollnick, 2013), according to which a
fruitful means to build momentum toward change is to render salient and
magnify self-relevant inconsistencies, including discontinuities in one’s life.
So, eliciting the subjective perception that one’s behavior has caused
self-discontinuity will motivate behavior change. But how? It will be via nos-
talgia, we argued. Indeed, the experience of self-discontinuity fosters nostalgia
(Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015), and nostalgia motivates a
desire to reclaim one’s past (i.e., addiction free) self (Kim & Wohl, 2015). In
all, we hypothesized that behavior change would occur by invoking nostalgia
for one’s past, non-addicted self through highlighting the self-discontinuity
that the addictive behavior has created. Yet, this behavior change would
be restricted to individuals high rather than low in addiction severity. Individ-
uals who engage in serious or disordered gambling report financial, physical,
psychological, and interpersonal problems (Lesieur & Custer, 1984; Petry,
2004), and so will feel nostalgic for their pre-addicted self; conversely, indi-
viduals who do not engage in gambling at a problematic level will not be
influenced by a message that addictive behavior engenders self-discontinuity,
as such a message will be largely inapplicable to them.
In Study 1 (Wohl et al., 2018), a longitudinal experiment, we distributed
the nine-item Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001) to
a sample of community gamblers. This scale assesses gambling (e.g., “Have

you bet more than you could really afford to lose?”) and its consequences
(e.g., “Has gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or
anxiety?”). We then randomly allocated participants to the self-discontinuity
or self-continuity condition. In the self-discontinuity condition, participants
read a (bogus) article that summarized the results of recent research findings.
It stated that heavy gambling not only has undesirable financial and interper-
sonal consequences, but also leads to loss of a sense of self. Individuals who
gamble heavily, for example, report that their mood and behavior had dras-
tically deteriorated, and end up disliking the person they had become com-
pared to the person they were before gambling. Participants then reflected
on the article and wrote a brief essay on how gambling has changed their
mood, attitudes, behavior, and sense of self. In the self-continuity condition,
the article stated that, although heavy gambling can have undesirable finan-
cial and interpersonal consequences, it does not alter personality and behav-
ior. Individuals who gamble heavily, for example, report that they are the
same person now compared to the person they were before gambling. Then,
participants reflected on the article and wrote a brief essay on how they were
the same person now as before they had started gambling.
Afterward, participants completed a continuous “readiness to change”
measure in the form of a single-item pictorial contemplation ladder
(Biener & Abrams, 1991). The measure ranged from 0 (no thought of changing)
to 10 (taking action to change). The scores corresponded to DiClemente et al.’s
(1991) stages of change. In particular, scores of 0–3 corresponded to the
pre-contemplation stage (i.e., not thinking about change), 4–6 to the con-
templation stage (i.e., thinking about change), 7–8 to the preparation stage
(i.e., preparing to change in the next 30 days), and 9–10 to action and main-
tenance (i.e., modifying problematic behavior). Thirty days later, we
re-contacted participants and asked them to report their attempts to quit
in the preceding month.
The results were consistent with our hypothesis. Participants who
reflected on the self-discontinuity (vs. self-continuity) caused by their gam-
bling felt nostalgic for their pre-addicted self. Nostalgia, in turn, precipitated
readiness to change and increased their attempts to quit. This was the case,
though, only among serious (vs. non-serious) gamblers. In all, nostalgia,
induced by self-discontinuity, influenced self-reported behavior change
among individuals living with disordered addiction. These results were rep-
licated in a second experiment with a community sample of problem
drinkers. Here, we verified self-reported attempts to quit with collateral
estimates (Borsari & Muellerleile, 2009), that is, reports of family members
or close friends who were familiar with the participant’s drinking activities.
Physical activity is another domain in which nostalgia can effect change.
Kersten, Cox, and Van Enkevort (2016, Study 3) induced nostalgia (with the
Event Reflection Task) three times in a period of 2 weeks. Then, they
assessed the putative mediator, health optimism, with a 16-item measure
(Aspinwall & Bruhnhart, 1996; e.g., “If I did get a serious illness, I would
recover from it sooner than most other people”). Lastly, they measured
physical activity in terms of the number of walking steps that participants
took (counted by the wireless fitness tracker Fitbit One), a valid index of
physical activity (Takacs et al., 2014). Nostalgic participants engaged in more
intense physical activity (i.e., walked more steps) than controls, and they did
so due to their higher health optimism.
5. Summary and conclusions

For 330 years, nostalgia has received a bad rap. Traditionally, it has
been equated with medical and psychiatric ailments (Sedikides et al.,
2004), and more recently it has been regarded “a regressive manifestation”
(Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1980, p. 110), a stagnation in one’s past (Best &
Nelson, 1985), and a futile utopia (Flinn, 1992). Accumulating evidence
over the last 15 years does not corroborate these labels. In accordance with
Davis’s (1979) pecuniary analogy, nostalgia draws on the past as scaffolding
for reaching the future. Nostalgia motivates. It strengthens generalized
motivation, such as youthfulness, inspiration, and risk-taking. It reinforces
localized motivation, such as growth orientation, intrinsic motivation, and
goal pursuit. And it buttresses action-oriented motivation, such as plans to
re-dedicate one’s self to the work organization, intention to help or actual
helping, and change of problematic behavior. Nostalgia is for planning
and doing.
Several items deserve to be ranked highly on the future research agenda.
For example, what are the neurological concomitants of nostalgia (Luo et al.,
2019; Tullett, Wildschut, Sedikides, & Inzlicht, 2015)? What are other
forms of motivation on which nostalgia impacts, and how does it do so?
What are key moderators of the effects of nostalgia on motivation (Iyer &
Jetten, 2011; Wildschut, Sedikides, & Alowidy, 2019)? Does nostalgia’s
motivational influence extend to populations such as persons living with
Alzheimer’s (Ismail et al., 2018)? Finally, is nostalgia’s motivational influence
lasting rather than fleeting? If emotions, in general, can have a lasting influ-
ence (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Rime, 2009), so can nostalgia, as Odys-
seus would testify.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A development-in-sociocultural-
context perspective on the
multiple pathways to youth’s
engagement in learning
Ming-Te Wanga,*, Daphne A. Henryb, Jessica L. Degolc
a
School of Education, Department of Psychology, and Learning Research and Development Center,
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
b
Department of Counseling, Developmental, and Educational Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
MA, United States
c
Department of Human Development and Family Studies, Penn State Altoona, Altoona, PA, United States
∗
Corresponding author: e-mail address: mtwang@pitt.edu
Contents
1. Introduction 114
2. Conceptualization of engagement 116
3. An integrative perspective on engagement 118
4. Multiple functions of engagement 122
5. Engagement as a pathway to or facilitator of resilience 124
5.1 Coping and appraisal 125
5.2 Social support 126
6. Personal factors contributing to engagement 128
6.1 Developmental competencies 128
6.2 Motivational beliefs and self-appraisals 132
7. Contextual factors contributing to engagement 134
7.1 Social contexts 135
7.2 Social positions and identities, and cultural contexts 139
8. Implications for practice and research 146
9. Summary 148
Acknowledgments 149
References 149
Abstract
For three decades, motivation researchers have used the construct of engagement as
a holistic lens for understanding how children interact with learning activities, high-
lighting that each child has a unique engagement profile comprised of behavioral,
emotional/affective, cognitive, and social dimensions. As researchers continue to piece
together the multifaceted nature of engagement, a pressing need has emerged for a

114 Ming-Te Wang et al.
synthetic, coherent review of the extant literature on engagement that clarifies its
conceptualization, identifies its key facilitators and consequences, and delineates its
functions. Using a developmental-contextual approach, this chapter presents an inte-
grative theoretical perspective on engagement, emphasizing that engagement is the
product of dynamic developmental and relational processes involving transactions
across multiple ecologies. The integrative model of engagement offers a nuanced
and comprehensive perspective on the multiple pathways—psychological, cognitive,
and sociocultural—underlying the development of youth’s engagement. The con-
ceptualization and study of engagement as a multidimensional construct produced
by an ongoing interaction between the individual and the environment informs
the identification of the particular personal, contextual, and sociocultural factors that
foster or undermine engagement, while increasing understanding of the psychosocial
mechanisms through which the learning environment influences engagement.
1. Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the study of engagement has burgeoned, largely
due to its potential for reducing school dropout rates and enhancing
youth academic achievement. Not surprisingly, questions such as “what
is engagement?” and “why are students engaged?” continue to spark the
interest and enthusiasm of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.
Engagement not only has an appealing holistic and unifying nature that
focuses on the quality of a child’s interaction with learning activities
but it also incorporates distinguishable behavioral, affective/emotional,
cognitive, and social features into multidimensional models (Skinner,
Kindermann, & Furrer, 2009; Wang & Degol, 2014). Furthermore,
research has shown that engaged children are more likely to cope effectively
with academic challenges and setbacks and accomplish their learning
goals (Fredricks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004). Moreover, engaged youth
tend to reap more enjoyment, energy, and purpose from learning activities
(Wang & Degol, 2014). By incorporating theories and concepts from
psychology, education, learning science, and public health, engagement
research has assumed a level of scientific rigor that its common-sense origin
lacked, a rigor attributable mainly to the many scholars that have endeav-
ored to understand it more completely.
Empirical studies of engagement that illustrate its complexity and mul-
tifaceted nature have abounded; however, as empirical research flourished,
engagement scholars too often lost sight of the overarching conceptual forest
for the sake of examining the many individual trees of which it is composed.
A developmental-contextual perspective on engagement 115
As such, studies have often lacked balance between a well-articulated

theoretical model and a grounded approach that incorporates widely
accepted concepts, resulting in considerable variability in definitions and
measures both within and across different types of engagement. To avoid
the jingle-jangle fallacy so common in the social sciences (Reschly &
Christenson, 2012; Wang, Degol, & Henry, 2019), researchers must now
commit to a clear conceptualization of the underlying assumptions to illu-
minate how engagement functions. Indeed, many motivation scholars have
called for a comprehensive theoretical integration that allows for the clear
operationalization of engagement and its processes, systematic classification
of essential engagement components, and identification of how engagement
operates for youth from diverse backgrounds across different developmental
settings and periods. We focus on youth engagement because a large body
of evidence indicates that learning experiences in primary and secondary
schools lay the foundation for adult cognitive performance and educational
attainments (Campbell et al., 2012; Entwisle, Alexander, & Olson, 2003;
Wang & Degol, 2016). Moreover, research shows that educational inter-
ventions deployed during the childhood and adolescence years yield larger
economic returns to society than interventions implemented during adult-
hood (Heckman, 2006), and increasing empirical support for developmental
continuity in learning outcomes across the life span suggests that later invest-
ments are less likely to be effective (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, &
Shonkoff, 2006).
The goal of this chapter is to present an integrative perspective on
engagement that uses a developmental-contextual approach to emphasize
the dynamic role engagement plays in shaping youth’s daily experiences
and learning processes. Our hope is that an integrative theoretical frame-
work will clarify the conceptualization of engagement; aid in organizing
theories and research; identify dynamic cycles of person, process, and con-
text; and eventually lead to less fragmentation and more synthesis in engage-
ment scholarship. To this end, this chapter is structured around four major
themes of engagement research: conceptualization, integration, delineation,
and implication. We first outline the interdisciplinary literature on the
conceptualization, features, and roles of engagement. Next, we posit that
engagement is a dynamic reciprocal process and delineate how engagement
serves as a developmental asset that bolsters resilience. Drawing from this
theoretical model, we then discuss what personal and sociocultural factors
may promote or undermine engagement, and we conclude with implica-
tions for future research and practice.
2. Conceptualization of engagement
Engagement can be broadly defined as the quality of youth’s interac-
tions or involvement with learning activities, processes, and contexts
(Skinner et al., 2009; Wang & Degol, 2014). To explain the engagement
process, some have likened engagement to where the proverbial racecar’s
rubber meets the road: The car’s wheels represent engagement’s multiple
components or markers and the road represents the activity or setting in
which the individual is engaged (Eccles, 2009). Engagement also encom-
passes a variety of goal-directed behaviors, thoughts, and affective states
(Fredricks et al., 2004). In other words, engagement can take the form of
observable behavior (e.g., on-task behavior), or it may manifest as internal
affective (e.g., positive feelings about the task) and cognitive (e.g., use of self-
regulatory learning strategies) states (Christenson, Reschly, & Wylie, 2012;
Wang & Degol, 2014). Although there has been substantial variation in how
engagement is defined and studied, we can identify four evidence-based
characteristics that make engagement a unique construct.
First, engagement is a multidimensional construct consisting of at least
four interrelated-yet-distinct dimensions: behavioral, emotional/affective,
cognitive, and social. Behavioral engagement encompasses participation,
persistence, and effort (Fredricks et al., 2004); emotional engagement
reflects emotional reactions to learning activities, such as enjoyment,
enthusiasm, and satisfaction (Finn, 1989); cognitive engagement refers to
attention, willingness to go beyond what is required, and employing the
necessary learning strategies for the comprehension of complex ideas
(Zimmerman, 2000); and social engagement includes the quality of social
interactions with others, as well as the act of forming, maintaining, and
enjoying relationships while learning (Rimm-Kaufman, Baroody, Larsen,
Curby, & Abry, 2016; Wang, Fredricks, Ye, Hofkens, & Schall, 2018).
Many empirical studies have validated the multifaceted nature of engage-
ment in school as a whole and within individual subject domains, thereby
demonstrating that these dimensions are differentially predictive of educa-
tional and developmental outcomes (Wang, Deng, & Du, 2018; Wang,
Fredricks, Ye, Hofkens, & Schall, 2016). Some scholars have also included
an academic or agentic dimension in their conceptualization of engagement,
though these dimensions are less widely studied (Reeve & Tseng,
2011; Reschly & Christenson, 2012). Regardless, the typical construct of
engagement entails behavioral, emotional/affective, cognitive, and social
dimensions within each individual, thus providing a rich characterization

of how children act, feel, think, and interact with others when learning.
In addition to forming a consensus that engagement is a multidimen-
sional construct, researchers have had ongoing discussions regarding
whether active engagement is distinct from disengagement and whether
these two concepts should be measured on the same continuum or as
separate continua. Early research typically placed engagement and disen-
gagement on the same continuum, with low engagement indicating
disengagement. Recently, however, researchers have begun to conceptual-
ize engagement and disengagement as distinct psychological processes
that operate on separate continua. In fact, several studies have provided psy-
chometric evidence to support that engagement and disengagement are
structurally independent constructs that make unique contributions to
youth learning outcomes (Skinner et al., 2009; Wang, Deng, et al.,
2018). Engagement is characterized by energized, sustained, and directed
action toward learning, while disengagement is indicative of withdrawal
from the learning process (Skinner et al., 2009). Moreover, engagement
appears to be more closely associated with academic achievement than does
disengagement, whereas engagement and disengagement are both linked to
negative behavioral outcomes, such as school dropout and suspensions.
These results support assertions that engagement is a protective factor,
whereas disengagement is associated with developmental risk (Wang &
Degol, 2014).
Another fundamental feature of the engagement construct is that its
components operate in multilevel contexts, including within the school set-
ting (e.g., involvement in school activities), classroom or subject domain
(e.g., interaction with math teachers in classrooms), and specific learning
activities (e.g., the moment-to-moment or situation-to-situation variations
in activity and experience) (Skinner & Pitzer, 2012; Wang & Degol, 2014).
Within each context, engagement can be studied in varying time frames,
ranging from moment-to-moment, day-to-day, to long-term engagement.
A growing body of research has revealed that the salience, manifestation, and
stability of various engagement components may differ across learning con-
texts and developmental periods. For example, while average declines in
adolescents’ engagement have been documented, not all adolescents decline
at the same rate or exhibit the same homogeneous learning trajectory.
Though most youth experience high-to-moderately stable trajectories of
engagement throughout adolescence, many experience linear or nonlinear
growth or declines ( Janosz, Archambault, Morizot, & Pagani, 2008).
Hence, engagement is a process (not an endpoint or benchmark) and it is

also a trajectory that reflects change over time and youth’s capacity to adapt
to change.
Finally, engagement is characterized as a malleable state that is context-
dependent and highly responsive to personal and sociocultural factors
(Reschly & Christenson, 2012). Engagement is one of the “proximal
processes” that ecological models (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998)
posit as the primary mechanisms for learning and development. Shaping
these proximal processes are children’s contexts and their individual charac-
teristics. A focus on developmental contexts highlights that engagement is
situated within a set of overlapping and multilayered environmental systems,
such as the home, school, and larger sociohistorical context that also interact
to shape engagement. A child’s characteristics (e.g., sociodemographic, self-
efficacy) can determine whether adaptive or maladaptive proximal processes
occur and how a child experiences their contexts. Indeed, research has
shown that when children have positive learning experiences, supportive
relationships with adults and peers, and reaffirmations of their psychological
needs in learning contexts, they are more likely to remain engaged in
learning (Wang & Eccles, 2013). Therefore, engagement is a product that
involves ongoing interaction between individuals and contexts.
Despite the fact that engagement is a complex system occurring between
individuals and contexts over time, most extant research has relied upon
static, cross-sectional studies to define what these developmental processes
look like. In other words, scholarship has yet to delineate and synthesize
the factors and processes that shape engagement across developmental
periods. To this end, we present the development-in-sociocultural-context
model to illustrate the multiple pathways to youth’s engagement in learning
(see Fig. 1).
3. An integrative perspective on engagement

Engagement is a dynamic and reciprocal developmental process
between context, self, and relevant outcomes that serves as a pathway to
learning. The integrative model posits that engagement is directly influenced
by youth’s developmental skills and self-appraisals. Developmental skills
(e.g., self-regulation, social, and cognitive skills) that capture biological
and physiological changes, cognitive advancements, and socioemotional
maturation inform how much and when youth engage in learning tasks.
For example, the social skills youth develop may determine how they
A Developmental-Contextual Perspective on Engagement
Fig. 1 Development-in-sociocultural context model of youth engagement in learning. Note: The integrative model operates in multilevel
contexts across different time scales. The items within each box are examples. Boxes represent large categories of constructs at the same
conceptual level. Constructs within the same column influence each other. Causal influences are assumed to go from left to right though
some relationships are reciprocal.
experience learning activities that involve interactions with others. In addi-

tion, youth’s self-appraisals or psychological beliefs (e.g., competence
beliefs, task value, and mindset beliefs) create a motivational context
that may influence their decisions about whether to engage in an activity
or whether to persist in the face of challenges and setbacks (Skinner &
Pitzer, 2012). To illustrate, when children feel confident in their ability
to be successful and attribute value to learning tasks, they are more likely
to persist in learning (Eccles, 2009; Wigfield, Byrnes, & Eccles, 2006).
Similarly, engaged children are better able to utilize adaptive coping
strategies and re-engage with challenging tasks. In contrast, children who
are less academically competent or view learning tasks as boring or irrelevant
to their daily lives are more likely to disengage from learning activities
(Skinner, 2016).
The integrative model also links youth’s developmental skills and
self-appraisals to their socialization experiences in school, family, and peer
contexts as well as to their interpretations of past learning experiences.
The socialization processes underlying the development of engagement
and disengagement are sequential and cumulative in nature. Teachers, par-
ents, and peers create opportunities for youth to engage in a variety of learn-
ing activities through the selection of tasks and instructional methods and the
provision of social support. The experiential quality of a learning activity
provides youth with information about themselves as being competent,
autonomous learners, capable of success, and connected to and supported
by others in these settings (Connell, 1990). This information and affective
memory cumulate to support or undermine youth’s self-appraisals and
developmental skills, which in turn influence their engagement across var-
ious learning contexts. Depending on youth’s developmental stage, social
settings differ in the extent to which they influence engagement directly
or indirectly.
Within these school, family, and peer contexts, engagement operates in
an intricate feedback cycle or bidirectional process between context, self,
and outcomes. Engaged students not only experience boons related to
learning outcomes, but they also benefit from the reinforcement of their
emerging self-perceptions and competencies through ongoing support from
adults and networks of similarly engaged peers. For example, teachers have
expressed that they are likely to change their instruction strategies, activities,
or interactions with a student based on that student’s behavioral and emo-
tional engagement profile (Ladd, Birch, & Buhs, 1999; Skinner & Belmont,
1993). Furthermore, adolescents tend to self-select into peer groups based on
that group’s level of engagement, meaning that highly engaged youth opt to
spend time around other highly engaged youth (Wang, Kiuru, Degol, &
Salmela-Aro, 2018). Ultimately, we end up in a reciprocal feedback loop
in which engagement begets future engagement by bolstering youth’s com-
petence, enthusiasm, and commitment to learning; influencing how they
approach learning under different circumstances; and promoting their ability
to reflect on the effectiveness of a given approach to solving similar problems
in the future (Cleary & Zimmerman, 2012; Skinner, 2016). Hence, the
development of engagement involves a reciprocal process between multiple
actors within multifaceted contexts that unfolds over time (Mahatmya,
Lohman, Matjasko, & Farb, 2012).
The influence of environmental contexts on engagement is further com-
pounded by various sociocultural factors (e.g., social stratification, social
identities, and cultural beliefs) that can alter learning environments and
youth’s expectations of performance in significant ways. These sociocultural
factors create differences in educational opportunities, disparities in access to
social resources, and barriers for different groups of people (Bingham &
Okagaki, 2012; Spencer et al., 2015). Throughout society, children are
not all afforded the same educational opportunities largely due to issues of
income inequality, cultural stereotypes/prejudice, and residential segrega-
tion that disproportionately place children from low-income families
in neighborhoods with low-performing schools. As a result, youth from
low-income families are disproportionately burdened by stressors at the fam-
ily, school, and community levels (Duncan, Magnuson, & Votruba-Drzal,
2015; Lawson & Lawson, 2013) and encumbered by differences in educa-
tional opportunities that impact these youth’s engagement. For example,
a youth who is struggling with limited financial resources to attend college
may question the value of devoting time and energy to his schoolwork,
thus prompting the youth to disengage (Hentges, Galla, & Wang, 2019).
Likewise, a young woman who has been exposed to cultural messages or
media portrayals of scientists as men (i.e., a lack of female scientist role
models) may struggle to identify with and remain engaged in science at
school.
Regardless of a learning environment’s quality or a child’s competence
level, it is possible for sociocultural factors in larger ecological contexts to
strongly influence engagement trajectories in positive and negative ways.
For example, research has revealed that experiences of racial discrimination
in school undermine engagement and foment disengagement among
youth of color (Baysu, Celeste, Brown, Verschueren, & Phalet, 2016).
While access to educational resources may be stifled or limited for some chil-
dren, culturally-specific developmental assets and protective factors have
been shown to act as a buffer for some sociocultural barriers facing at-risk
children (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001). For instance, parents can mitigate
against the detrimental effects of racial discrimination on affective and cog-
nitive engagement among African American adolescents through the use of
ethnic-racial socialization practices (Dotterer, McHale, & Crouter, 2009;
Wang & Huguley, 2012). Therefore, many ethnic-racial minority groups
have developed approaches for combatting the inequities of the dominant
culture through strengthening positive cultural identity and social bonds.
These parental practices can stave off declines in engagement for many
ethnic-racial minority children and adolescents.
Below, we use the integrative model as a guiding framework to elaborate
the role and function of engagement as a developmental asset in shaping
youth learning.
4. Multiple functions of engagement

Engagement plays many complex roles in a child’s learning experi-
ences. As the integrative model illustrates, engagement can often be con-
ceptualized and examined as a facilitator of learning, a pathway or process
channeling the effects of environmental and personal factors onto learning
outcomes, and an important outcome. In this sense, engagement is shaped
by sociocultural contexts, social agents, and personal competencies, feelings,
values, and interests. Engagement, then, operates to shape educational and
developmental outcomes while building upon processes central to learning
and achievement (Skinner, 2016; Skinner & Pitzer, 2012).
As a facilitator, engagement serves as an energetic force that drives
children’s interest, commitment, and devotion to learning (Skinner, 2016).
Indeed, research has indicated that children and adolescents’ concurrent
engagement levels as well as their longitudinal engagement trajectories
predict scholastic achievement, depression symptoms, delinquency, risk-
taking behaviors, and subjective happiness, with higher engagement showing
consistent associations with better outcomes (Appleton, Christenson, &
Furlong, 2008; Li & Lerner, 2011; Wang & Eccles, 2012; Wang &
Fredricks, 2014). For example, adolescents with more positive trajectories
of behavioral and emotional engagement were more likely to have higher
grades and fewer mental health issues (Li & Lerner, 2011). Furthermore, a
global construct of engagement—comprised of behavioral, emotional, and
cognitive engagement—predicted high-school graduation (Archambault,

Janosz, Fallu, & Pagani, 2009). Hence, engagement plays a critical role in
facilitating positive academic, socioemotional, and behavioral outcomes.
As a pathway or process, engagement is a key mechanism through which a
variety of internal (e.g., motivational beliefs) and external (e.g., social sup-
port) assets influence learning outcomes. Children’s engagement is heavily
shaped by their ability of self-appraisals, domain-specific beliefs or interest,
and the level of social support they receive from others (e.g., parents,
teachers, peers). These self-appraisals and contextual supports foster positive
development through engagement, thus creating an indirect pathway
wherein engagement operates as a mediating force. Researchers have docu-
mented this pathway in several longitudinal studies examining the media-
tional role of engagement (Li, Lerner, & Lerner, 2010; Reyes, Brackett,
Rivers, White, & Salovey, 2012; Wang, Deng, et al., 2018). For example,
Li et al. (2010) found that personal assets (e.g., high self-regulation and edu-
cational expectations) and environmental assets (e.g., parent involvement
and positive school climate) were linked to enhance academic competence
indirectly through emotional and behavioral engagement. In some path-
ways, behavioral engagement even operated as a mediator of the association
between emotional engagement and academic competence. Therefore,
when tracing how personal or environmental factors can influence learning
outcomes, it is critical to consider intermediary pathways that help children
achieve those ultimate goals.
As an outcome, engagement represents a measure of a child’s quality of
involvement with a particular learning task. Given that engagement is
closely intertwined with youth outcomes, many researchers view engage-
ment as an important indicator of school success and overall wellbeing.
Existing literature does highlight the concerns teachers face when children
struggle to remain engaged in learning while also suggesting methods to
increase children’s engagement at critical time points, such as during adoles-
cence when engagement is vulnerable to declines (Eccles et al., 1993;
Wang & Degol, 2014). Several factors, such as personal beliefs (e.g., expec-
tancies for success and task value; Wang & Eccles, 2013) and external
resources (e.g., supportive classroom environments; Lekwa, Reddy, &
Shernoff, 2019; Quin, 2017), have been established as antecedents of
engagement. For example, one study found that when adolescents reported
greater academic support/involvement from their parents and higher quality
relationships with their teachers, they were more likely to have higher
emotional engagement with school during the transition from middle to
high school (Quin, Hemphill, & Heerde, 2017).
This work reveals the research community’s general regard for engage-
ment and its role as a facilitator, process, and outcome of learning.
Sociocultural and internal factors influence engagement, which then
influences learning outcomes. Learning outcomes, in turn, feed back into
sociocultural and internal factors, thereby continuing to reinforce engage-
ment over time through a multidimensional, multi-contextual, reciprocal
cycle. The malleability of engagement and its triadic role in the learning
process demonstrate its potential as a viable target for interventions aimed
at improving children’s likelihood of educational success and psychological
wellbeing. Positive engagement may not only guard against detrimental
impacts in children’s environments, but it may also promote youth’s
resilience against adversity.
5. Engagement as a pathway to or facilitator

of resilience
A growing research base considers not only engagement’s contribu-
tion to normative learning development, but also highlights engagement’s
role as a resilience-promoting factor—particularly for racially marginalized
and socioeconomically disadvantaged children. Burgeoning evidence has
suggested that students with demographic profiles placing them at risk
for negative developmental outcomes demonstrate increased resilience—that
is, positive adjustment in the context of adversity—when they exhibit higher
engagement and more positive engagement profiles (Reschly &
Christenson, 2012). This work indicates that engagement is a central pro-
tective factor and developmental asset promoting resilience for vulnerable
children and youth; yet, only recently have scholars more explicitly outlined
how engagement works in concert with contextual influences to promote or
hinder developmental resilience (Pitzer & Skinner, 2017; Skinner & Pitzer,
2012). By examining engagement in context, we can begin to understand
how active engagement creates motivational feedback systems that shape
how children deal with everyday difficulties and obstacles in learning.
Like engagement, resilience is multidimensional: Youth can exhibit
varying degrees of engagement across specific subtypes of engagement
(i.e., cognitive, behavioral, social, and emotional), and they can also dem-
onstrate resilience in one domain but not others (e.g., academic performance
versus mental health) (Masten & Obradovic, 2006; Sameroff & Rosenblum,
2006). The most commonly investigated dimensions of resilience include
psychosocial and behavioral adjustment (i.e., enhanced psychological
wellbeing and reduced risky behaviors among vulnerable youth), which

have been the primary foci of developmental psychopathology literature
(Ager, 2013). Researchers have also directed their attention to academic
resilience under stressful circumstances or cumulative adversities that can
imperil academic functioning (Martin & Marsh, 2009; Wang, Degol, &
Henry, 2019). Moreover, just as children and youth can evince higher
and lower levels of engagement across development, they may also evidence
resilience at one developmental stage but not at another (e.g., middle child-
hood versus adolescence).
Rather than viewing engagement and resilience as static outcomes, a
scholarly consensus has emerged that both constructs are born out of a
dynamic process involving transactions across multiple levels of influence
(Bonanno & Diminich, 2013; Pitzer & Skinner, 2017). For these reasons,
it makes sense that engagement serves as a noteworthy pathway underlying
developmental resilience. Next, we synthesize relevant theoretical scholar-
ship and empirical evidence to identify several routes through which
engagement might promote everyday resilience and act as a motivational
factor that buttresses youth’s ability to handle typical challenges and stressors.
5.1 Coping and appraisal

Engagement buoys developmental resilience by buttressing children’s adap-
tive coping strategies in response to routine difficulties (Martin, 2013;
Skinner & Pitzer, 2012). As a process, coping involves optimal adaptation
or healthy functioning under conditions of environmental adversity, and
emerging evidence has unearthed ties between engagement and children’s
coping skills and styles (Skinner, Pitzer, & Steele, 2016). Children who
are highly behaviorally and emotionally engaged display more positive cop-
ing strategies, such as problem-solving, positive self-talk, help-seeking, and
inducement (Boekaerts, 2002; Dweck, 2006). In contrast, disengaged
children and adolescents tend to employ more maladaptive coping behav-
iors, including avoidance, denial, and projection (Lau & Nie, 2008).
Children’s emotion regulation also plays a prominent role in their coping
abilities, with some work indicating that more positive affect buffers against
the deleterious consequences of stress (Ong, Fuller-Rowell, Bonanno, &
Almeida, 2011). Notably, positive emotions are related to more adaptive
coping behaviors in the school context (Spangler, Pekrun, Kramer, &
Hofmann, 2002), and relatedly, studies have unearthed links between higher
emotional engagement and better grades, lower incidences of delinquency
and substance use, and fewer symptoms of depression (Li & Lerner, 2011).
Negative emotionality, by contrast, not only predicts less adaptive coping
strategies (Kaplan & Midgley, 1999; Spangler et al., 2002), but it also ham-
pers the quality of teacher-student relationships and foments patterns of
reduced teacher support. Poorer relationships with and diminished support
from teachers can provoke aversive interactional patterns that undermine
children’s engagement trajectories (Skinner & Belmont, 1993).
Children’s appraisal skills, in turn, inform their coping styles and skills by
shaping how they perceive and interpret negative events in their immediate
and future lives (Bonanno & Diminich, 2013). To illustrate, a child might per-
ceive an educational obstacle as an insurmountable barrier or as a momentary
challenge that, if overcome, offers a chance for learning, growth, and mastery.
Moreover, these dispositions toward stressors appear to shape long-term
adjustment (Bonanno, 2012; Kennedy, Lude, Elfstr€ om, & Smithson,
2011). When children adopt cognitive appraisal styles indicative of increased
self-efficacy and stronger internal locus of control, these adaptive behaviors
and attitudes might lay the groundwork for resilience in multiple domains
of development.
Youth’s learning-related beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are shaped by
self-perceptions of their individual skills (i.e., how capably they can succeed
in a given task) and social environments (i.e., how well their learning con-
texts address their intellectual, emotional, and relational needs). Students
who doubt their ability to master academic content may experience dimin-
ished engagement in the classroom, and researchers have reported that
more cognitively-engaged youth tend to be more invested in learning activ-
ities and more likely to persist in the face of everyday learning difficulties
(Lawson & Lawson, 2013). In contrast, poor self-perceptions can engender
a psychologically and emotionally enervating feedback loop of negative
affect and maladaptive coping behaviors (Friedel, Cortina, Turner, &
Midgley, 2007; Pitzer & Skinner, 2017). Ultimately, youth’s self-appraisals
may influence their level of investment in learning, reaction to constructive
feedback, and responses to adversity, meaning that children who adopt more
positive self-appraisals may cultivate more salutary learning-related tools that
buttress their engagement.
5.2 Social support

At each phase of development, children desire warm, close relationships
with peers and important adults in their lives. Not surprisingly, children
are more academically successful and psychologically well-adjusted when

they effectively garner social support and establish positive social connec-
tions (Pianta, Hamre, & Allen, 2012). As they mature and grow increasingly
independent, children must navigate complex, interconnected develop-
mental contexts and manage interpersonal relationships laden with diverse
socialization agents. As a result of bidirectional influences within these
systems, children’s long-term patterns of engagement are not only shaped
by but also influence social processes in their learning contexts (Buhs,
2005; Estell & Perdue, 2013; Perdue, Manzeske, & Estell, 2009; Wang &
Eccles, 2012). For example, multiple studies have revealed that higher
engagement is both a product and a key predictor of high-quality
teacher-student relationships (Hughes & Kwok, 2006; Hughes, Luo,
Kwok, & Loyd, 2008). Teachers respond more favorably to and establish
closer, more supportive relationships with highly engaged students, which
also buoys their academic engagement and performance. Additionally, chil-
dren often self-select into peer groups based on their shared behavioral,
social, and cognitive characteristics, with increasing evidence demonstrating
that youth’s peer groups exhibit similar levels of engagement (Wang,
Degol, & Amemiya, 2019; Wang, Degol, & Henry, 2019).
Importantly, engagement seems to represent one key element in chil-
dren’s ability to establish and maintain positive relationships with teachers
and peers, and this association may be especially salient for children at risk
for disengagement (Pitzer & Skinner, 2017). That is, at-risk youth who
are more consistently engaged in learning across multiple developmental
stages may be particularly adept at cultivating stronger bonds with teachers
and peers, thereby promoting their resilience in multiple areas (Bingham &
Okagaki, 2012; Hughes & Kwok, 2006). Indeed, highly engaged students
are more likely to evoke positive teacher behaviors and feedback, which
in turn supports enhanced engagement trajectories and buttresses academic
resilience (Pitzer & Skinner, 2017; Skinner & Belmont, 1993); yet, the
relative contribution of these processes to children’s long-term resilience
remains understudied. For example, can positive interactions with social
agents (e.g., parents, teachers, or peers) in one domain compensate for
more negative social relationships in another domain? Conversely, does
resilience require a constellation of positive feedback loops over time
for the most vulnerable students to exhibit academic and psychosocial
resilience?
The preceding section has served to unpack the role engagement plays in
development. In subsequent sections, we employ the integrative model as a
conceptual framework to delineate how personal characteristics shape

engagement and connect contextual and sociocultural factors to the individ-
ual factors that influence engagement.
6. Personal factors contributing to engagement

According to social-cognitive theories, developmental competencies
and motivational beliefs work together to shape engagement and achieve-
ment. These developmental competencies, such as cognitive strategies,
self-regulation, and social skills, have been identified as key assets and mile-
stones for learning across the lifespan (Mahatmya et al., 2012). Motivational
beliefs, on the other hand, envelop the processes and characteristics that
contribute to an individual’s sense of drive or initiative to participate in
learning tasks, including competence, autonomy, relatedness, mindsets
about intelligence, and beliefs about the value and relevance of a learning
task (Eccles, 2009; Skinner et al., 2009). Because engagement processes
involve both the skill to participate and the motivation to use that skill, it
would be erroneous to examine developmental competencies and motiva-
tional beliefs separately (Dweck, 2006; Wang & Degol, 2014). Instead, both
skill (e.g., developmental competencies) and will (e.g., motivational beliefs)
must be present for productive engagement to occur because they may
reinforce each other to facilitate learning.
With the increasing complexity of social networks and academic
demands, children need adequate skills to process learning tasks; however,
children are not always willing or able to re-engage with learning, especially
when faced with setbacks or adversity. Indeed, children’s attributions
regarding the causes of their failures and setbacks may influence their per-
sistence and willingness to use or strengthen their developmental competen-
cies in the future. By examining children’s developmental competencies and
motivational beliefs, we can disentangle the multiple internal determinants
of children’s engagement and persistence in learning.
6.1 Developmental competencies

Children’s developmental competencies and life experiences across multiple
contexts contribute to acquiring new and increasingly complex skills
(Mahatmya et al., 2012; Sabol & Pianta, 2012). These growing and expan-
ding capacities (e.g., cognitive and social skills) are cultivated within a child’s
daily experience and become refined over the course of the life span. As
children mature, these skill sets grow more advanced, mutually influencing
and reinforcing children’s burgeoning capacity to become engaged with

learning. It would be difficult, for example, for a child to be behaviorally
engaged during a challenging or uninteresting classroom lesson if the child
was having difficulty regulating her emotions or focusing her attention.
Likewise, children’s academic contexts change as they age, as educators
expect older youth to work more independently, practice personal respon-
sibility, and take greater initiative in their own learning.
Evolving learning environments and increasing developmental demands
indicate how imperative it is for children’s cognitive, emotional, social, and
behavioral capacities to match educators’ expectations so they can achieve a
high level of engagement in school. To illustrate how engagement changes
both as a function of youth’s maturing cognitive, emotional, social, and
behavioral skills as well as in response to increased academic and social
demands, we focus on four developmental competencies that underlie
youth’s long-term wellbeing: cognitive skills, emotion regulation, and social
skills.
6.1.1 Cognitive skills and engagement

Across childhood and adolescence, neurobiological maturation contributes
to both increased cognitive capacity and intellectual competence. During
the early childhood years, children’s ability to process challenging cognitive
tasks improves greatly. They are better able to focus their attention on
the important aspects of a problem while simultaneously ignoring irrelevant
or distracting features, hold contradictory information in their short-term
memories, and set goals and organize feedback to solve a given problem
(Diamond, 2000). In middle childhood, cognitive capacity continues to
advance with increases in working memory, attention, and self-evaluation
skills (Eccles & Roeser, 2011). Adolescents, compared to younger children,
are even better at planning and organizing their thoughts, anticipating the
consequences of their decisions, monitoring their own progress, and
adjusting their learning approaches based on performance goals or feedback
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). All of these skills are known to enhance
children’s cognitive learning and performance.
During each developmental phase, children’s cognitive skills impact their
ability to engage in learning (Zimmerman, 2000). Remaining engaged with
a task that is challenging or intrinsically uninteresting requires a great deal of
mental effort, stamina, and concentration. When children and adolescents
have greater cognitive capacity to regulate and monitor their learning, focus
their attention, and process necessary information, they are more likely to
stay engaged for the duration of the task. Enhanced cognitive abilities may
also allow children to benefit more from learning experiences. An increase in
the understanding of a difficult or complex topic, for example, is likely to
generate greater interest or enjoyment in learning activities centered on
that topic (Mahatmya et al., 2012). Consistent with these ideas, research
has shown that cognitive abilities are positively associated with engagement.
For example, children’s and adolescents’ metacognitive skills have been
linked to facets of behavioral and cognitive engagement, such as persis-
tence on difficult tasks and attention to detail (Brock, Rimm-Kaufman,
Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009). Additional research has indicated that general
cognitive ability and prior academic performance predict engagement across
elementary and secondary school (Lau & Roeser, 2002; Marks, 2000).
Therefore, children with better cognitive abilities are more likely to engage
with challenging materials.
6.1.2 Emotion regulation and engagement

In early childhood, one of the key developmental tasks that children must
accomplish is the recognition and regulation of their own emotions.
During this period, children’s emotional responses become more context-
or situation-specific, and they experience reductions in temper tantrums
and impulsive behaviors (Eisenberg, Valiente, & Eggum, 2010). These
changes coincide with the start of formal schooling, during which emotion
regulation will aid children in their adjustment to the demands of this
new environmental setting (i.e., sharing, waiting their turn, following
instructions). In adolescence, children face new challenges in identifying,
regulating, and coordinating their emotions due to changes in hormones
associated with puberty. Corresponding changes in the immediate environ-
ment, such as pressure to conform to peer norms, can result in difficulties
with regulating emotions, heightened impulsivity, or risk-taking behavior
(Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008). The ability to successfully regulate emotions
and impulses during adolescence can lead to more positive adjustment both
at home and at school.
Across childhood and adolescence, the ability to regulate emotions is
likely to support youth’s positive engagement in school. Preschool-aged
children are beginning a new chapter of formal schooling in their lives that
requires them to share and wait their turn, follow specific classroom rules
(i.e., stay seated and raise their hand to speak), and redirect their focus when
angry or frustrated by the actions of a teacher or peer. A child’s ability to
follow these behavioral expectations is likely to influence their engagement
with their learning environment (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000).

Research has demonstrated that children with a greater capacity to regulate
emotions have higher behavioral and emotional engagement (Eisenberg
et al., 2010; Valiente, Lemery-Chalfant, Swanson, & Reiser, 2008).
The transition to secondary school places a different set of emotion reg-
ulation demands on adolescents. During this transition, secondary school
students must navigate new school environments that are more structured,
less mastery-oriented, and more academically demanding than elementary
school. For example, secondary school environments are more subject-
centered than child-centered, resulting in exposure to multiple teachers
and different sets of rules or expectations for each classroom. Students with
poor emotion regulation skills may struggle to adapt to these changes and
feel isolated and disengaged as a result. Although the secondary school envi-
ronment may be taxing on children’s engagement, adolescents’ regulation
of their emotions, impulses, and behaviors may buoy their ability to forgo
immediate rewards in favor of pursuing effort in their schoolwork and
supporting their continued engagement.
6.1.3 Social competence/skills and engagement

In addition to cognitive skills, self-control, and emotion regulation, social
and interpersonal competence/skills develop significantly over the early
childhood and adolescent years. During the preschool years, children make
strides in the development of empathy and demonstrate a marked increase in
prosocial skills (Findlay, Girardi, & Coplan, 2006). Such changes can be
observed in the developmental progression of peer play, which morphs from
parallel play to more cooperative forms of play that involve rules, roles, and
turn-taking (Coplan & Arbeau, 2008). In middle childhood and adoles-
cence, social and interpersonal competence/skills continue to advance as
pressures to conform to peer norms to “fit in” (Wang, Deng, et al., 2018)
contribute to an increased understanding of others’ perspectives and views
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). Likewise, increased involvement in
sports and after-school activities can aid adolescents in developing the social
skills necessary to support their successful adjustment in school and eventual
transition into the workforce (Crocetti, Jahromi, & Meeus, 2012; Hansen,
Larson, & Dworkin, 2003).
Although research on the topic is scant, social and interpersonal com-
petence/skills are likely to influence youth’s engagement. As engagement
is shaped by interactions with social agents (Fredricks & Eccles, 2006;
Wang & Hofkens, 2019), it is clear that strong social and interpersonal
competence/skills should increase youth’s engagement by serving as the

tools needed for developing deeper, more positive relationships with their
parents, teachers, and peers (Allen et al., 2013). Indeed, preschool teachers
report that social competence is as important to school success as cognitive
ability (Blair & Raver, 2015), and third-grade students with better social
skills (as reported by teachers) had higher engagement in fifth grade
(Perdue et al., 2009). Although engagement is clearly fostered by positive
social interactions, more research is needed to delineate how children’s
social competence/skills may influence the long-term developmental pro-
gression of their engagement profiles.
6.2 Motivational beliefs and self-appraisals

Self-appraisals inform how children think about learning and learning-
related tasks, thus allowing for different motivational orientations. These
motivational orientations influence whether children are more likely to seek
out or avoid challenges and persist or give up following setbacks (Eccles,
2009). In our quest to highlight the motivational processes underlying
engagement, we call upon tenets of self-system theory (Skinner et al.,
2009), expectancy-value theory (Eccles, 2009), and mindset theory (Dweck,
2006). Although each of these theories has different foci, they both empha-
size the importance of self-appraisals and their affiliated benefits, including
perceived competence; malleability of intellectual ability; and beliefs about
the value, utility, and relevance of learning activities.
At the heart of self-system theory lies two main primary tenets: (a) children
can be motivated to learn and succeed and (b) children fulfill psychological
needs through engaging in a variety of learning activities and contexts
(Connell, 1990). These psychological needs refer to underlying motivational
processes that drive children toward participation and inform their beliefs
about how competent, autonomous, and related they feel within a given
context (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
According to self-system theory, a school context centered around the ful-
fillment of psychological needs creates an environment that is primed for
engagement; conversely, school environments that detract from or subvert
psychological needs undermine engagement. For instance, children develop
competence by engaging in challenging, meaningful work (Eccles & Roeser,
2011), pursue autonomy by forming opinions and making choices regarding
academic work (Niemiec & Ryan, 2009), and attain relatedness through
supportive interactions with peers and adults (Eccles & Roeser, 2011).
On the contrary, learning environments that are rigid or disorderly can under-
mine autonomy and threaten competence, just as competence and relatedness
can be thwarted by performance-based or socially comparative teaching
practices (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Wang & Holcombe, 2010). In sum,
engagement thrives in learning environments that support children’s psy-
chological needs and personal goals.
While self-system theory posits that children’s psychological needs drive
engagement, expectancy-value theory focuses on children’s navigation of
engagement across multiple contexts as well as their decisions surrounding
whether and how they engage in learning tasks. To do so, children make
engagement-related choices based on their expectations for success and
subjective task values—such as perceived interest, utility, and attainment
value—in conjunction with the cost of pursuing one choice over another
(Eccles, 2009; Wang & Degol, 2014). When children believe that they
can succeed, they are more likely to engage in deeper learning and use
advanced cognitive strategies, which in turn increases future academic
achievement (Wigfield & Eccles, 2002). However, engagement-related
decisions depend on more than just confidence, as evidenced by the finding
that confidence does not ensure a child will enjoy or choose to pursue an
activity (Wang & Degol, 2014). Rather, engagement requires that a child
attributes value to their current and future success in a given subject domain
or activity. Consequently, both competency beliefs and task values con-
tribute to levels, quality, and patterns of engagement.
In addition, expectancy-value theory explains why youth make decisions
to engage with learning to a higher degree or with more persistence in one
domain than another (Eccles, 2009). Simply stated, competence beliefs and
task values combine to influence youth choice: For a student to engage in
mathematics learning, for instance, they must believe they are math-capable
(i.e., expectations for success), and they must enjoy and recognize the
rewards of being good at mathematics (i.e., task values). Hence, engagement
hinges on youth’s perceptions of how enjoyable, useful, or important it is to
achieve a specific goal, but children may not necessarily pursue these goals if
they are incongruent with their perceived competence or personal values
(Wang & Hofkens, 2019).
In conjunction with self-systems and expectancy-value theories, mindset
theory explores how children cope with the adversity and frustration inherent
to the learning process. In other words, mindset theory focuses on children’s
interpretations and responses to setbacks and the ways in which children
re-engage with learning. Research has suggested that people’s subjective
perceptions and reactions to adversity often matter more than the objective
nature of adversity or stressors ( Jamieson & Harkins, 2010). Indeed, students
have been shown to maintain their working memory capacity when
they appraise a stressor or adversity as a challenge to be overcome rather
than a threat to be avoided (Mattarella-Micke, Mateo, Kozak, Foster, &
Beilock, 2011).
Mindset theory also posits that children’s judgments about the nature of
intelligence have important implications for engagement (Dweck, 2006). In
fact, researchers have consistently demonstrated that growth mindsets—or
the belief that intelligence is malleable—are optimal for promoting youth
engagement (e.g., Paunesku et al., 2015). Children with growth mindsets
have shown greater growth in their academic performance, more resilience
after failure, and an increased desire to re-engage in difficult tasks after
setbacks. These youth do not view failure as an indictment of their ability,
but rather as an indicator of the need for more effort and growth (Grant &
Dweck, 2003; Romero, Master, Paunesku, Dweck, & Gross, 2014).
Conversely, children with fixed mindsets—or the belief that intelligence
is an inherited and unchangeable quality—may interpret failure as an indi-
cation that they are not smart enough to succeed, resulting in disengagement
from learning.
7. Contextual factors contributing to engagement

Bronfenbrenner’s (2005) bioecological model of human development
postulates that children’s enduring interactions with the people, objects,
and symbols are embedded within varying spheres of influence (i.e., various
contexts) that strongly impact developmental outcomes. According to this
model, children are situated at the center of a series of concentric spheres
of contextual influences, ranging from individual microsystems (e.g., family,
peers, and school contexts) to the overarching macrostructural environ-
ment of the society (i.e., attitudes and ideologies of the current culture).
Depending on the child’s developmental stage, these settings vary in the
extent to which they exert direct or indirect influences on growth and
maturation. In infancy, for example, the home setting represents the most
immediate influence on development, with families serving as the key
socialization agents. As children age, they increasingly navigate out-of-
home contexts and interact with a growing array of socializing forces
(Bukowski, Castellanos, Vitaro, & Brendgen, 2015). Next, we discuss
how interactions between children and their environments and key
socializers influence engagement over time.
7.1 Social contexts

Environmental contexts shape engagement in multifaceted and complex
ways. Ample research has covered the three most salient avenues through
which engagement is undermined or supported: the family, the school,
and the peer group. Naturally, the level of support that youth feel in each
of these settings will have an effect on their engagement in learning.
7.1.1 Family
Given the hierarchical nature of the environment, multiple complex features
of the family and home environment influence engagement. In the home,
parents represent the single most salient socializing agent, a role that greatly
influences their children’s cognitive, emotional, and behavioral engage-
ment. As families are embedded within larger structural contexts (e.g.,
cultural values, sociodemographic factors), these varying contexts have
the opportunity to shape engagement both directly and indirectly through
parents’ beliefs and expectations for children’s success (Reschly &
Christenson, 2019; Wigfield et al., 2006) and involvement in their educa-
tion (Hill & Wang, 2015; Reschly, Appleton, & Pohl, 2014).
In particular, family SES has been strongly associated with parental
beliefs, expectations of child behaviors, and practices. Compared to their
higher-SES counterparts, parents in low-SES households are more likely
to adopt an authoritarian parenting style that prioritizes safety, obedience,
and natural development (Lareau, 2011). In contrast, higher-SES families
are more likely to provide educationally enriching activities for their chil-
dren and promote critical and independent thinking (Chin & Phillips,
2004). These differences likely stem from the fact that higher-SES
parents have more resources to provide their children with these enriching
experiences and are better able to navigate and intervene in their child’s
school system to ensure the provision of optimal learning experiences and
opportunities (Wang, Degol, & Henry, 2019).
Although sociodemographic factors, such as SES, are associated with
children’s engagement, researchers have noted that these status variables
(e.g., race, SES) are not as strongly linked to engagement and other impor-
tant achievement outcomes as process variables, which include parental
socialization, beliefs, and behaviors (Reschly & Christenson, 2019). By
focusing on both status and process variables, we can not only investigate
who families are (through status variables), but also how they function
(through process variables; Melby, Conger, Fang, Wickrama, & Conger,
2008; Reschly & Christenson, 2019).
For example, research has determined that parental involvement in edu-

cation matters for youth’s engagement, regardless of the family’s racial and
socioeconomic background (Murray, 2009); however, the impact of paren-
tal involvement on child outcomes varies as a function of the type of parental
involvement and their ability to meet the unique developmental and psy-
chological needs of children at different ages. As children age, parents
decrease their school-based (e.g., attending school events) and home-based
(e.g., homework help) involvement and increase their academic socializa-
tion (e.g., scaffolding independence, linking education to future success;
Wang, Chow, Hofkens, & Salmela-Aro, 2015). As research has indicated
that greater academic socialization is consistently linked to higher achieve-
ment and engagement in adolescence (Hill & Tyson, 2009; Wang, Hill, &
Hofkens, 2014), parental involvement must shift with children’s develop-
mental needs in order to be effective. Thus, parents of adolescents who
focus on achieving competence and autonomy promote positive outcomes
and healthy adjustment (Degol & Wang, 2017; Wang et al., 2014).
Interestingly, school-based contact and homework assistance have not
always been linked to positive outcomes for children, with many studies linking
these forms of involvement to disengagement (Cooper, Lindsay, & Nye, 2000;
Fan, 2001). These findings suggest that if parent involvement increases due to
children having difficulty in school, then it is likely to correlate with negative
outcomes. Once again, it is apparent that parental involvement is more effective
when it changes appropriately as children age, involves positive contact, and
fosters independence-scaffolding behaviors.
In addition to previously discussed family process factors (e.g., parental
involvement, authoritative parenting style, quality of parent-child relation-
ships), parental aspirations and expectations for student success and parental
attributions (e.g., beliefs about intelligence) have been strongly associated
with achievement outcomes (Hill & Wang, 2015). Furthermore, siblings
may impact youth’s engagement through their own learning-related behav-
iors and contact with engaged or disengaged peer groups (Wang, Degol, &
Amemiya, 2019). Despite the fact that these family process factors have been
related to achievement and school completion, little research has connected
these factors to actual indicators of engagement (Reschly & Christenson,
2019). More research is needed to fully understand the complex processes
through which families influence children’s engagement.
7.1.2 School
Much like the family environment, school settings have a multifaceted influ-
ence on engagement, and two of the most prominent of these influences
include structural characteristics and interactional processes. Structural charac-

teristics refer to features of any given environment that are experienced
by everyone in that environment, and in the case of the school setting,
structural features include elements such as class size, student demographics,
and learning resources. These factors are often completely static or not easily
amenable to change; however, interactional processes (Benner, Graham, &
Mistry, 2008) represent much more malleable features of the school envi-
ronment. In the school environment, interactional processes refer to teachers’
beliefs and expectations for student success, implicit views of intelligence,
and teachers’ instructional and emotional support, all of which are much
more flexible than typical structural characteristics.
Interestingly, structural features shape youth’s engagement both directly
and indirectly by influencing interactional processes (Benner et al., 2008).
For example, a large class size—a structural characteristic—can influence
the quality of teacher instruction or teacher-student relationships—both
interactional processes—by making it more difficult for teachers to deliver
personalized, developmentally appropriate instruction while building warm
relationships with each individual student (Wang & Degol, 2016). Given
the more amenable nature of interactional versus structural features, most
research examining school environments’ influence on engagement has
focused on interactional features. For instance, the extent to which students
and teachers share warm, supportive relationships has been linked to student
commitment, interest, and energy in learning (Pianta et al., 2012; Reyes
et al., 2012). Likewise, the quality of teacher-student interactions has
been shown to predict both the mean levels and trajectories of engagement,
offering evidence for longitudinal change in these skills over time (Hughes &
Cao, 2018; Wang & Eccles, 2012).
Another interactional feature of the school environment—the quality of
instruction and nature of the learning task—is known to shape engagement
over time. Students are more likely to be engaged (a) when the material they
are learning is rigorous, useful, and appropriately challenging (Curby,
Rudasill, Edwards, & Perez-Edgar, 2011; Shernoff, Csikszentmihalyi,
Schneider, & Shernoff, 2014) and (b) when teachers incorporate hands-
on activities that allow students to apply course material to their real lives
(Shernoff et al., 2014; Wang & Holcombe, 2010). Teachers’ expectations
and the quality of their instruction also go hand-in-hand, as teachers are
more likely to challenge students if they believe they are highly capable
of meeting that challenge (Wigfield et al., 2006). Therefore, teachers
who communicate clear expectations for student success are also likely to
foster more positive engagement in their classrooms.
Depending upon the level of support that students receive, school

transitions (i.e., moving from elementary-to-middle school and/or
middle-to-high school) may also impact youth’s engagement in positive
and negative ways. Youth primarily experience these school transitions dur-
ing adolescence, a developmental period characterized by natural declines in
academic engagement. Moreover, school transitions are typically marked by
a movement from a less rigid, mastery-oriented classroom environment to
those that are more structured, performance-oriented environments (Eccles
et al., 1993; Wang & Eccles, 2012). During these transitions, individual
teachers and the school at large provide adolescents with academic and
socioemotional supports in hopes of buffering adolescents’ relative decline
in engagement (Fredricks et al., 2004). When adolescents feel appropriately
supported and challenged, understand the relevance of their work, and have
positive relationships with their teachers, they are more likely to maintain
engagement.
Taken together, the research on school and classroom environments
illustrates the beneficial effects of developmentally appropriate school
climates and supportive classroom teachers across multiple indicators of
children’s engagement. However, more research is needed to better delin-
eate how changes in school or classroom quality are linked to changes in
engagement over time. Unfortunately, extant research has largely operated
under the assumption that measures of school quality and youth engagement
are stagnant or unchangeable, but if we truly seek to connect school factors
to engagement, it is essential to measure these shifts in contextual, dynamic
processes as children age.
7.1.3 Peers
Research on peer influences on engagement has primarily focused on the
roles of peer socialization and peer selection. As adolescents become increas-
ingly interested in fitting in with their peers, the peer group’s cultural values
become a significant part of their identity and sense of self. Studies have
largely confirmed this phenomenon, as adolescents tend to adjust their
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive engagement to the levels of their peer
group (Wang, Deng, et al., 2018). For example, if a peer group highly values
academic success, then it is likely that members of that group will become
and remain more engaged in school in order to conform to the norms of that
group. On the contrary, adolescents belonging to a peer group that does not
value academic work are more likely to disengage from their own learning in
order to fit in with their peers. Furthermore, adolescents often select peers
who share similar levels of behavioral engagement (Kindermann, 2016);

therefore, adolescents not only alter their engagement to conform to peer
norms, but they also self-select into peer groups with engagement profiles
similar to their own.
Although peer socialization and selection processes are key to explaining
why peer groups often have similar levels of engagement, peer acceptance
and rejection can also impact engagement. For example, social acceptance
predicts positive engagement (Buhs, 2005; Perdue et al., 2009), while social
exclusion or rejection place a student at increased risk for school disengage-
ment (Hawker & Boulton, 2000). In other words, adolescents are more
likely to experience positive adjustment during school transitions when they
feel valued by their peers. Interestingly, parents exercise great control over
peer groups and friends when children are young; however, this control
weakens as children age and start to spend more unsupervised time with fri-
ends. Future research should examine the relative overlap of the peer and
family context as children age and how much direct or indirect influence
families have over peer selection and socialization processes. Given the high
levels of turnover detected in peer group affiliation, it is also worth exam-
ining if peer influences on engagement are more short-term (i.e., continue
until the end of school year) or long-term (i.e., continue into college).
7.2 Social positions and identities, and cultural contexts

Sociocultural perspectives on development highlight the pathways by which
social positions and identities (versus personal identities) influence children’s
competencies, behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs, which in turn impact
their long-term adjustment (Garcı́a Coll et al., 1996; Swanson, Spencer,
Harpalani, & Spencer, 2002; Velez & Spencer, 2018). Social identities, cat-
egories, and positions—including race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status
(SES)—demarcate placement in the social hierarchy, thus bestowing
disparate degrees of status, privilege, and disadvantage on children and fam-
ilies (Destin, Rheinschmidt-Same, & Richeson, 2017).
Status-infused hierarchies are the product, in part, of social and racial
stratification processes that have unfolded across and within generations.
Consequently, these processes help foment the intergenerational transmis-
sion of inequality among marginalized (i.e., those relegated to a less powerful
or esteemed position in society) families of color and socioeconomically
disadvantaged families. As a result, social positions help mold developmental
contexts via three primary routes: families’ heterogeneous patterns of
childrearing and investment, disparate access to resources and exposure to

psychosocial and environmental stressors, and distinct culturally informed
beliefs and behaviors. The interplay of these processes differentially con-
figures the learning environments of racially, ethnically, and socioeconom-
ically diverse children. In turn, the mechanisms underlying the development
of engagement may differ substantively across key social identities and
positions, such as race/ethnicity, SES, and nativity (or immigrant) status.
Therefore, researchers must parse the multifaceted factors and processes that
give rise to variations in engagement levels, profiles, and trajectories among
children of diverse backgrounds.
Although considerable research has investigated patterns of engagement
among economically disadvantaged children, far less work has investigated
how children’s engagement differs by family SES. Scholars rarely assess
multiple markers of family SES (e.g., income, parental education, and
wealth) in studies of engagement. However, a wide array of evidence indi-
cates that SES is closely connected to children’s academic development, and
the strength of these associations differ by SES measure and level. For
instance, increases in family income are more tightly linked to develop-
mental gains among poor and low-income children than among their
middle-income and affluent peers (Duncan, Magnuson, & Votruba-Drzal,
2017; Mayer, 2002). For these reasons, researchers must both attend to
socioeconomic variation in youth’s engagement and delineate the factors
and mechanisms that support or undermine engagement among low-SES
children, a group that tends to experience low academic achievement
and disengagement at higher rates (Alexander, Entwisle, & Horsey, 1997;
Finn & Rock, 1997). Moreover, a growing body of research has docu-
mented the environmental stressors that hamper the healthy psychosocial
development of high-SES adolescents (Luthar & Barkin, 2012; Luthar &
Becker, 2002; Spencer et al., 2015). With SES-related developmental chal-
lenges occurring across the spectrum of wealth and privilege, researchers
need to better delineate the circumstances under which socioeconomically
disadvantaged youth display resilience and the conditions under which
seemingly advantaged youth exhibit vulnerability.
7.2.1 Resources and investments

Family SES (e.g., household income and parental educational attainment)
shapes childrearing practices, beliefs, and goals related to learning
(Lareau, 2011; Mistry, Biesanz, Chien, Howes, & Benner, 2008; Mistry,
Vandewater, Huston, & McLoyd, 2002). Compared to their more affluent
counterparts, poor and low-income families have less money to spend on

goods and experiences that foster the academic, socioemotional, and behav-
ioral skills underlying youth’s engagement profiles and trajectories. At the
same time, better-educated parents are not only more likely to earn higher
income, but they also are more likely to socialize children to internalize
cultural tool-kits and frames that buoy scholastic achievement (Calarco,
2011; Lareau, 2011). For instance, research shows that college-educated
and higher-earning parents engage in socialization practices that promote
positive approaches to learning, conjoin learning with recreation and play,
and strengthen emotional and cognitive engagement (Lareau, Weininger,
Conley, & Velez, 2011; Serpell, Sonnenschein, Baker, & Ganapathy, 2002).
Indeed, a large body of research has documented racial/ethnic variation
in childrearing styles and practices that influence engagement. Some
work has shown, for instance, that on average, African American parents
provide fewer cognitively stimulating materials and experiences, whereas
Chinese American parents practice at-home academic instruction more
often than White parents (Brooks-Gunn & Markman, 2005; Lareau,
2011). However, the extant literature has several major limitations, the first
of which being its tendency to conflate race/ethnicity with culture
(Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018). In other words, scholars have been more
likely to ascribe cultural explanations to findings drawn from ethnic-
minority samples or subgroups. Furthermore, extant literature has too oft
held White families and their children on an evaluative pedestal, using them
as a normative standard against which to judge others while simultaneously
stripping those families and children of their own cultural orientations (i.e.,
they are viewed as culture-free or their culture is perceived as reflecting the
normative dominant culture in all instances). Because too little research has
considered the roles of family resources, stress, or distinct cultural factors
and processes that shape engagement, the unique contributions of each cul-
tural or familial factor to engagement remains opaque. To address these
limitations, future research must shift attention toward investigating how
group-specific customs, family SES, and macrostructural factors can influ-
ence culturally informed socialization practices and beliefs.
These considerations also highlight the need to examine both within-
and between-group processes related to children’s engagement. Within-
group analyses can help identify sources of resilience among marginalized
children and youth (e.g., children of color, low-SES youth) while highlight-
ing the considerable heterogeneity in outcomes among at-risk youth and
facilitating a more strengths based approach to studying the development
of engagement among these children. Nevertheless, valuable insights can be

gained from between-group designs as well. For example, between-group
investigations can illuminate how children’s social contexts impact their
engagement profiles and trajectories, thus pinpointing areas wherein
targeted interventions may be most appropriate. Furthermore, between-
group analyses help shed light on whether important factors associated with
higher engagement operate similarly for more and less privileged children.
For example, higher SES has been shown to be correlated with enhanced
academic functioning (Duncan et al., 2015), but an increasing body of
theoretical and empirical scholarship has indicated that SES may not translate
similarly for Black and White children (Ferguson, 2007; Fryer & Levitt,
2004; Henry, Votruba-Drzal, & Miller, 2019). Specifically, for Black youth,
higher family SES is not as closely associated with better schooling environ-
ments as for their White peers (Pattillo, 2005; Pattillo-McCoy, 1999). By
failing to consider how important factors—such as SES, stress, and cultural
orientation and assets—may differentially relate to outcomes among chil-
dren of color and their White counterparts, we risk obscuring key insights
into the mechanisms that buoy or undermine children’s engagement.
7.2.2 Environmental and psychosocial stressors

Psychosocial and environmental stress vary by race/ethnicity and across
family SES levels (Evans, 2004, 2006; Evans, Eckenrode, & Marcynyszyn,
2010; Evans & Kim, 2013). Financial instability and material hardship
are facts of life for many economically disadvantaged families, and this eco-
nomic strain fuels family stress, thereby compromising parental mental
health, family functioning, and childrearing quality (McLoyd, 1990;
Mistry et al., 2002; Raver, Gershoff, & Aber, 2007). At the community
level, both low-SES children and youth of color, including African
American, Latinx American, and Native American children, tend to reside
in more impoverished communities with fewer institutional resources
and worse social relations (Pattillo-McCoy, 1999). Because school quality
often reflects community characteristics, the school contexts of socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged and racially/ethnically marginalized children often
offer fewer resources, including more inexperienced teachers and less sup-
portive school climates (Pattillo-McCoy, 1999; Thapa, Cohen, Guffey, &
Alessandro, 2013), both of which can undermine children’s engagement
across development.
For children and families of color, systemic racism, discrimination, and
interpersonal prejudice represent serious psychosocial and contextual
stressors (Spencer et al., 2015). Racial and social stratification are usually
interconnected in modern society, and these joint processes contribute to
greater socioeconomic disadvantage, social oppression, and exploitation
among people of color. Moreover, some populations of color (e.g.,
African Americans and Native Americans) have experienced patterns of
discrimination and marginalization that have led to a caste-like status and
increased intergenerational social inequalities and circumscribed life chances
(Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Feagin, 2006). Native-born African Americans, for
example, have a history that includes enslavement, pernicious de jure and
de facto segregation, racial terrorism, economic exploitation, and unfair
treatment in political, legal, and social systems. Stigmatizing and denigrating
stereotypes are a product of these stratification processes that carry implica-
tions for minority children’s psychosocial wellbeing and educational
outcomes. By middle childhood, children—particularly, children of
color—can identify and describe racial stereotypes, and many youth inter-
nalize such beliefs during the middle-school and early high-school years
(McKown & Strambler, 2009; McKown & Weinstein, 2003).
Troublingly, growing evidence has indicated that stereotype threat and
perceived discrimination undermine children of color’s cognitive and
behavioral engagement. Such findings highlight why it is imperative to
understand how patterns of stratification and experiences of marginalization
shape children’s engagement (Chavous, Rivas-Drake, Smalls, Griffin, &
Cogburn, 2008; Coutinho & Koinis-Mitchell, 2014; Dotterer et al., 2009).
7.2.3 Cultural factors and processes

Children occupy a unique developmental niche that is structured by their
social positions, identities, and contexts (Super & Harkness, 1986, 1997).
A child’s developmental niche is a complex system of interactions among
individual, family, community, and societal factors, with culture acting as
a primary developmental process in children’s micro- and macro-level set-
tings. In broader society, governing sociopolitical, economic, and cultural
systems lay the foundation for everyday life, but in children’s immediate
developmental settings, race/ethnicity, SES, and culture exert independent
and joint effects on social contexts, cultural orientations, and the psycholog-
ical characteristics of parents, teachers, and other important social agents
(Hoff, Laursen, & Tardif, 2002; Lareau, 2011). In her seminal ethnographic
study, Lareau et al. (2011) reported that socioeconomically advantaged par-
ents’ cultural outlook emphasized the development of children’s intellectual
competence and provision of learning opportunities, thus leading to the
practice of concerted cultivation in childrearing. By contrast, low-SES par-

ents’ childrearing reflected an emphasis on natural growth that attends to
children’s main material and emotional needs and granted children greater
purview over their free time. Yet, these low-SES households offered less
academic and recreational enrichment opportunities due to differences in
cultural perspectives and more limited economic resources.
Cultural capital, including cultural repertoires, tool-kits, and frames,
tend to vary by social position, and mainstream societal institutions—
including schools—value and reward the cultural repertoires that socioeco-
nomically advantaged parents tend to adopt and inculcate in their children
(Lareau, 2015; Small, Harding, & Lamont, 2010). Additionally, increasing
developmental scholarship has revealed that engagement patterns among
youth of color are shaped by culturally adaptive parenting practices (e.g.,
ethnic-racial socialization) and culturally based values (e.g., familism). For
instance, both cultural socialization (i.e., practices and messages emphasizing
racial/ethnic pride, cultural awareness, and understanding) and bias sociali-
zation (i.e., behaviors and messages centered on teaching children about the
existence of discrimination and how to cope with it) appear to contribute to
enhanced engagement across middle childhood and adolescence (Banerjee,
Rivas-Drake, & Smalls-Glover, 2017; Dotterer et al., 2009; Neblett Jr,
Philip, Cogburn, & Sellers, 2006; Smalls, 2009; Wang & Huguley, 2012).
Tellingly, the strength of ethnic-racial socialization’s links to engagement
varies by environmental setting, and this culturally responsive practice
may be particularly salient as a protective factor for positive engagement
when children face psychosocial or environmental stress (e.g., exposure
to discrimination; Wang & Huguley, 2012).
7.2.4 Intersections of social identities and positions

The advantages and disadvantages associated with different social identities
or positions exert independent and interactive effects on youth develop-
ment. Specifically, status-based identities (e.g., race/ethnicity, SES, and
gender) are mutually constitutive and shape developmental contexts in
complex and nuanced ways (Choo & Ferree, 2010; Cole, 2009;
Crenshaw, 1991; McCall, 2005; Roy, 2018; Velez & Spencer, 2018).
Indeed, substantive differences in childrearing behaviors, environmental
stressors, and cultural factors can emerge at the junctures between race/eth-
nicity, gender, and SES. For instance, boys growing up in low-SES families
appear to be at greater risk for developmental maladjustment and evince
less resilience than girls living in similar conditions (Autor, Figlio,
Karbownik, Roth, & Wasserman, 2016; Chetty, Hendren, Lin,

Majerovitz, & Scuderi, 2016; Cullen, Baiocchi, Eggleston, Loftus, &
Fuchs, 2016). Ultimately, the mechanisms by which SES relates to children’s
behavioral, cognitive, and emotional engagement and the ways in which
SES shapes children’s contexts may differ markedly because social identifies
intersect in complex ways. In turn, intersecting social identities can influence
developmental mechanisms (or proximal processes) in children’s homes,
schools, and communities in disparate ways.
Stratification-based processes might play a critical role at the macro-
structural level. Racist and denigrating societal beliefs about opportunity
structures can influence people’s attitudes toward those who are less socio-
economically privileged, suffering from social dislocation, or falling prey to
social ills, meaning African American and immigrant families of color living
in poverty are perceived less sympathetically than similarly disadvantaged
Whites (see, for example, how attitudes toward the social safety net differ
by the perceived beneficiary and differences in public policy responses to
the crack cocaine and opioid addiction crises) (Bobo & Smith, 1994;
Gilens, 1996; Murch, 2019; Netherland & Hansen, 2016). In the end, devel-
opmental pathways leading to engagement may differ dramatically at the
nexus of interlocking social identities that create complex webs of advantage
(or privilege) and disadvantage (or oppression).
In recent years, scholars have turned their attention to intersectionality as
a theoretical prism and how it applies to child development (Ghavami,
Katsiaficas, & Rogers, 2016; Henry et al., 2019; Syed & Ajayi, 2018).
Nonetheless, few studies have investigated how school engagement
develops at the nexus of multiple social identities. In one notable exception,
Harrison, Stevens, Monty, and Coakley (2006) revealed that for economi-
cally disadvantaged college students, being primed with negative stereotypes
about economic status did not decrease task effort (a marker of behavioral
engagement) among either low-SES Black or White youth. Yet, among
low-income White college students in particular, stereotype threat engen-
dered increased academic deidentification. Some evidence has also indicated
that African American girls surpass African American boys in behavioral and
emotional engagement (Sirin & Rogers-Sirin, 2005). This finding raises
concern because stronger school engagement has been associated with psy-
chosocial resilience among African American male adolescents (Voisin &
Elsaesser, 2014). Theoretical support for the importance of examining
how social identities interact to shape cognitions, behaviors, and emotions
continues to grow (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Cole, 2009; Ghavami
et al., 2016; Henry et al., 2019). At the same time, increasing amounts of
research have suggested that engagement is an important factor in promo-
ting the positive development of marginalized and disadvantaged students.
Consequently, future studies should adopt an intersectional lens when
investigating the development of school engagement.
8. Implications for practice and research

A wealth of developmental and motivational research has allowed us
to expand our view of engagement beyond a focus on children’s cognitive
processes and psychological traits to include their interactions with social
agents within broader sociocultural contexts. The integrative theoretical
model of engagement proffers a nuanced and comprehensive perspective
on the psychological, cognitive, and sociocultural pathways that lead to pos-
itive engagement. By conceptualizing engagement as a multidimensional
construct involving interactions between individuals and contexts, scholars
can more carefully delineate which environmental characteristics foster or
undermine engagement and which enable youth to overcome barriers in
their quest for school success (Wang & Degol, 2014).
Importantly, the integrative model asserts that interventions must take a
multifaceted approach to engagement that considers the interconnectedness
of children’s emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. Although behavioral
engagement is strongly linked to academic performance and school comple-
tion, our model suggests that positive outcomes are more probable when
interventions address multiple engagement dimensions (Christenson et al.,
2012). Moreover, self-appraisals and context are central to the integrative
model, as engagement and disengagement reflect the dynamic interplay of
internal and external factors. To capitalize on the engagement literature,
we task interventionists with using the integrative model to develop
holistic intervention approaches that target children’s varied developmental
contexts and learning-related self-appraisals (Fredricks, Reschly, &
Christenson, 2019).
Specifically, because early educational experiences contribute to later
learning trajectories, the next phase of innovative interventions may wish
to focus on children’s early care and education settings. More positive
approaches to learning in early childhood have been linked to better aca-
demic functioning across elementary school (Li-Grining, Votruba-Drzal,
Maldonado-Carreño, & Haas, 2010). Additionally, because a constellation
of contextual influences shape engagement, the best interventions will target
multiple environments and socialization agents, including family and school

settings. For example, child poverty and welfare scholars have conducted
pioneering work that adopts multipronged approaches aimed at improving
the life chances of poor and low-income children who are at heightened risk
for academic failure (Aber, Morris, & Raver, 2012; Chase-Lansdale &
Brooks-Gunn, 2014; Duncan, Morris, & Rodrigues, 2011; Huston et al.,
2001). These approaches have sought, for example, to increase parents’
human capital and children’s exposure to enriching learning environments.
Applied research centered on boosting engagement may wish to adopt
the best practices from this extensive body of research in order to design
effective tailored interventions.
Our model also presents engagement as a developmental process
involving transactions across multiple levels of influence rather than a static
outcome. Children’s emerging competencies and early formative experi-
ences lay the groundwork for future engagement trajectories, which carry
long-term implications for learning outcomes. Furthermore, children’s
interactions with socialization agents influence how their foundational com-
petencies cohere into recognizable and consistent patterns of thoughts,
actions, and feelings. It is our hope that the delineation of these complex
processes will help practitioners realize that children who struggle to attain
(or retain) the engagement necessary to succeed in school did not adopt a
cynical, disengaged attitude toward school in a vacuum. Additional work
is necessary to understand how parents and teachers conceive of engagement
and how they believe it is best fostered in youth. In general, parents and
teachers hope to positively influence the academic and behavioral develop-
ment of their children and students. However, both explicit and implicit
messages parents and teachers communicate to children about learning
can serve to promote or undermine engagement profiles and trajectories.
To know how best to intervene and disrupt maladaptive developmental
processes in children’s microsystems, it is critical to understand what factors
shape how parents and teachers socialize children about how to engage with
learning activities.
In addition, our theoretical perspective on disparate individual- and
group-level patterns of engagement provides insight into how to devise sup-
portive educational environments in which all children can learn. Children’s
social identities and positions structure their learning opportunities, which in
turn may shape their engagement trajectories. Racial/ethnic and socioeco-
nomic disparities in enrichment experiences, educational resources, and
exposure to stressors may determine the nature, frequency, and quality of
children’s learning-related socialization experiences. Likewise, cultural

practices, values, and beliefs may influence children’s attitudes toward
learning in ways that confer risk or promote resilience. Accordingly, our
conceptual approach implies that adopting an integrative perspective on
engagement will fuel researchers and practitioners to reflect on the social-
emotional, cognitive, and sociocultural foundations of engagement that
allow youth to achieve their full potential in academic settings.
To accomplish this feat, scholars must conduct more basic research
examining how race/ethnicity and SES, and the intersection thereof, relate
to engagement. Little work has systematically investigated how patterns of
engagement vary across the socioeconomic spectrum. Instead, most research
assumes children living in poverty or attending high-poverty schools are at
risk for diminished engagement and thus make them a focal point of
research, or conversely, simply treats family SES as a covariate. Going for-
ward, it is necessary to explore under which circumstances low family SES
confers risk for low engagement (or disengagement) as well as the conditions
under which socioeconomically disadvantaged children evince enhanced
engagement trajectories. Additionally, a growing body of evidence indicates
that affluent youth are not immune to environmental risk, and instead
can suffer maladaptive behavioral and psychosocial outcomes despite their
socioeconomic advantages (Luthar & Barkin, 2012; Luthar & Becker,
2002). Hence, in order to understand basic developmental processes, it is
imperative to adopt a nuanced perspective on vulnerability and resilience
and consider how risk for diminished engagement or disengagement varies
across the socioeconomic spectrum.
9. Summary
Over the past three decades, research has expanded the view of
engagement beyond youth’s cognitive processes and psychological traits
to include their interactions with social agents and broader ecological and
cultural contexts. The integrative model of engagement elucidates the mul-
tiple pathways through which youth engagement is psychologically, cogni-
tively, socially, and culturally situated within complex ecological settings.
Our theories about the origins of and influences on individual and group
differences in engagement shed light on how we can provide equitable
access and invest resources that support the development of engagement
and eliminate barriers to learning associated with youth’s sociocultural back-
grounds. These processes help us better understand which, when, and how
youth engage, making them fundamental to consider in accounts of engage-

ment. Our conceptual approach not only has significant implications for the
design of supportive learning environments, but it also elevates the standard
for the future study of engagement, as we now have a model that emphasizes
the importance of various intersecting effects on engagement for youth in
and across contexts and developmental periods.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by funding from the National Science Foundation (Grant Nos.
1315943 and 1561382). The opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the funding organizations.
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CHAPTER FIVE
35 years of research on students’

subjective task values and
motivation: A look back and
a look forward
Allan Wigfielda,*, Jacquelynne S. Ecclesb
a
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, United States
b
University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, United States
*Corresponding author: e-mail address: awigfiel@umd.edu
Contents
1. Article overview 162
2. Defining expectancies and values in the psychology field 162
3. Eccles, Wigfield and colleagues’ expectancy-value model (SEVT) 164
3.1 Defining the subjective task value construct in SEVT 166
4. Development of individuals’ STVs 172
4.1 When are children’s STVs and expectancies for success empirically distinct? 172
4.2 Change across age in children’s STVs 173
4.3 Relations among the components of STVs 174
4.4 Hierarchies of individuals’ STVs 176
4.5 Relations of individuals’ STVs to their expectancies for success 176
4.6 Processes and sources of information influencing the development of
individuals’ STVs 177
5. From beliefs and values to action: Relations of students’ STVs to their choices and
performance 180
5.1 The interactions of expectancies and subjective task values in predicting
outcomes 181
5.2 Person centered approaches to studying expectancies and STVs 182
6. Intervening to enhance students’ STVs 184
7. A look forward 188
8. Conclusion 191
Acknowledgments 191
References 191
Further reading 198
Abstract
We discuss the development of Eccles, Wigfield, and colleagues’ expectancy-value
model of achievement motivation (now called SEVT for situated expectancy value

162 Allan Wigfield and Jacquelynne S. Eccles
theory) and review the research on the part of the model that concerns the develop-
ment of children’s expectancies and values and their relations to performance and activ-
ity choice. We focus primarily on subjective task value (STV), first discussing the
definition of its different components (intrinsic value, attainment value, utility value,
and perceived cost) and how they develop across the childhood and adolescent years.
We discuss relations among these components and the notion of “hierarchies of values”
as being especially important for activity choice. We next turn to discussion of sources of
influences on task values and processes by which individuals’ STVs take shape. Next is a
discussion of how individuals’ values and expectancies relate to their activity choice; we
discuss both variable-centered and person centered research addressing this issue.
Then we discuss expectancy-value theory based interventions that have focused pri-
marily on enhancing individuals’ utility values. We close with suggestions for future
research.
1. Article overview
Eccles-Parsons and her colleagues’ (Eccles-Parsons et al., 1983)
expectancy-value model of achievement choice and performance has guided
much research over the past 35+ years. Researchers basing their work in
the model have studied the development of children’s expectancies and sub-
jective task values, their relations to performance and choice, and the impact
of different personal, social, cultural, and situational factors on children’s
developing expectancies and values. In this article, we first look back at
the development of the model and then provide a selective review of
research focused on the development of children’s expectancies and individ-
uals’ subjective task values. We focus on the work on individuals’ subjective
task values. Throughout the article and in our concluding section we take a
look forward to propose where we think work based in the model should go.
2. Defining expectancies and values in the

psychology field
The constructs of expectancy and value have a long history in the
study of motivation in different areas of psychology (Higgins, 2007;
Roese & Sherman, 2007; Weiner, 1992; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992;
Wigfield, Tonks, & Klauda, 2009, for more detailed reviews of this history).
Tolman (1932, 1948) did most of the initial work on how expectancies
influenced action. He studied how rats and humans reacted in different
learning situations and demonstrated that what they learned about those
Research on students’ subjective task values and motivation 163
situations guided their further actions in them. That is, they learned what to
expect and those expectations guided future purposive action in a given
learning situation.
Lewin (1938) was the first social psychologist to discuss how the value (or
valence) of an activity influenced whether individuals would engage in the
activity; thus he established conceptually the link between valence and
choice. He also discussed how valence can lead to both approach and avoid-
ance tendencies, thus establishing the important principle that motivation
can lead people both towards and away from different activities (see
Elliot, 1999, for further discussion of this distinction).
Atkinson (1957) built on Lewin (1938) and Tolman’s (1932) work, and
also Murray’s (1938) notion of the importance of psychological needs in
guiding human action, to develop the first formal, mathematical
expectancy-value model of achievement motivation. He posited that
individuals’ motivation to succeed in achievement settings was determined
by their disposition to succeed (or their achievement motive, Mas) which he
posited was a relatively stable disposition, along with their task specific
expectancies (or probability of success, Ps) for achieving success on the
activity and their incentive (Is) to do so. Importantly he also posited that
individuals have motives to avoid failure (Maf), and that the relative strength
of their Mas and Maf produced their overall motive to achieve (Mach). Thus
like Lewin Atkinson emphasized both approach-avoidance aspects of moti-
vation (see Elliot, 1999 for further discussion of this important distinction).
Thus for Atkinson, motivation was determined by both stable dispositions
and more situated or task specific beliefs and values regarding both the
tendencies to approach or avoid a given activity. Importantly he posited that
the relations among the terms in each equation were multiplicative, meaning
that if any one of them is zero so is motivation.
Another crucial aspect of his model is that he defined the incentive for
success as the inverse of the probability of success (expressed mathe-
matically as Is ¼ 1 Ps). The implication of this is that individuals value
more challenging tasks at which they have less chance of succeeding.
The highest motive for success occurs when they each equal 0.5.
Parsons and Goff (1980) argued that defining incentive value in this way
meant that researchers only had to understand individuals’ perceived
probabilities of success on a given task to understand how much they
valued it (see also Wigfield & Eccles, 1992); it is indeed the case that for
many years researchers focused more on expectancy-related beliefs than
they did on incentive values.
3. Eccles, Wigfield and colleagues’ expectancy-value

model (SEVT)
Like other theories of achievement motivation, Eccles, Wigfield, and
their colleagues’ model focuses on individuals’ motivations for doing activ-
ities in which there are standards for performance in place. Such activities
occur in a variety of areas but in this article we focus primarily on
school-based activities. The model is based in Atkinson’s (1957) work in that
Eccles and colleagues link achievement performance, persistence, and
choice most proximally to individuals’ expectancy-related and task value
beliefs. However, it differs from Atkinson’s model in that both the expec-
tancy and value components are defined in richer ways, and are linked to a
broader array of more distal psychological, social, situational, and cultural
determinants. We recently labeled the model the Situative Expectancy-
Value Model (SEVT; see Eccles & Wigfield, in press for further discussion
of this new label for the model). For discussions of different aspects of the
model and research on it see Eccles (1984, 2005, 2009), Eccles-Parsons
et al. (1983), Simpkins, Fredricks, and Eccles (2015), Wigfield and Eccles
(1992), Wigfield and Eccles (2000), Wigfield, Rosenzweig, and Eccles
(2017), and Wigfield, Tonks, and Klauda (2016).
The most recent version of the SEVT model is presented in Fig. 1.
Eccles-Parsons et al. (1983) initially developed the model to help understand
gender differences in adolescents’ achievement choices, such as why girls do
not take as many advanced high school math courses or pursue math and
science careers (see Eccles, 1984, 2005 for further discussion). They and
other researchers have built on this work by examining how students’ values
predict their choices in a variety of domains, and also looked at the devel-
opmental course of individuals’ expectancies and values (e.g., Durik,
Vida, & Eccles, 2006; Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, & Wigfield, 2002;
Simpkins, Davis-Kean, & Eccles, 2006). As can be seen by looking at the
right side of the model, they postulated that expectancies and values influ-
ence performance and task choice directly. Individuals’ expectancies and
values themselves are influenced by their task-specific beliefs such as their
self-concepts of ability and perceived task difficulty, and their goals, identi-
ties, and self-schema, along with their affective memories for different
achievement-related events. These beliefs, goals, and affective memories
are in turn influenced by individuals’ perceptions of other peoples’ attitudes
and expectations for them, and by their own interpretations of their
Cultural Milieu Perception of… Goals and General
Self-Schemata Expectation of Success
1. Gender and other 1. Socializer's beliefs
social role systems and behaviors 1. Self-concept of one's
2. Stereotypes of 2. Gender and other abilities
activities and the social roles 2. Self-schemata
nature of abilities 3. Activity characteristics 3. Personal and social
3. Family and demands identities
Demographics 4. Possible activities 4. Short-term goals
5. Long-term goals Achievement-Related
Choices and Performance
Socializer's Beliefs and

Behaviors
Person Characteristics
1. Aptitudes Subjective Task Value

Affective Reactions
2. Temperaments
and Memories
3. Sex 1. Interest -enjoyment value
4. Ethnic group 2. Attainment value
Interpretation of Experience 3. Utility value
4. Relative cost
Previous Achievement-
Related Experiences
Across Time
Fig. 1 Eccles, Wigfield, and colleagues’ expectancy-value theory (SEVT) of achievement performance and choice.
previous achievement outcomes. These perceptions and interpretations are

influenced by a broad array of social and cultural factors, which include
socializers’ (especially parents and teachers) beliefs and behaviors, children’s
prior achievement experiences and aptitudes, and the cultural milieu in
which they live. We do not review the “socialization” parts of the model
here; see Eccles (1993) and Simpkins et al. (2015) for extensive discussion
of this part of the model.
Linear, static-appearing models containing what appear to be mostly-
rational and conscious processes such as the one presented in Fig. 1 have
received criticism in the literature on motivation (e.g., see Kahneman,
2011; Kaplan, Katz, & Flum, 2012). We believe that “appearances can be
deceiving,” and that the characterization of the SEVT model using the
above descriptors (to the extent that they are used) is not accurate, for several
reasons. For instance, Eccles (2005) discussed how students’ choices based in
their values have some conscious and some unconscious aspects. That is,
they engage in rational decision-making about their choices based on
their conscious values, but there are many socialization, cultural, and
“information processing” influences that they are not always aware of that
also influence their decisions. Eccles (2005) and Wigfield (1994) argued
that the processes in the model are dynamic, and the relations among the
constructs in the model are both developmental (that is, they change over
time) and situationally sensitive (that is, influenced by the immediate situa-
tion). Second, we conceptualize the relations among the constructs and
processes by which they are related to be dynamic, situationally sensitive,
and ontological rather than static (see Wigfield, Eccles, & M€ oller, under
review, for further discussion). Third, the model includes connections
between performance and choice shown at the far right in the model, back
to beliefs and processes at the far left. That is, relations among the constructs
in different parts of the model are recursive rather than unidirectional and
linear. Eccles and Wigfield (in press) provide further discussion of the
dynamic aspects of the model that are difficult to capture in a two dimen-
sional representation.
How are values defined in the SEVT model? We consider this next.
3.1 Defining the subjective task value construct in SEVT

In the motivation field, researchers have defined values in both broad and
task-specific ways (see Higgins, 2007; Rohan, 2000; Wigfield & Eccles,
1992, for detailed discussion). Rokeach (1973, 1979) took a “broad”
approach to achievement values, distinguishing between terminal values or
desired end states (things such as wisdom, freedom, equality, and happiness),
and instrumental values, which are ways to attain the terminal values (things
such as honesty, responsibility, and independence). Feather (1988) found
that college students’ instrumental values as defined by Rokeach predicted
the value they attached to different college courses in math and English, and
that the course-specific values predicted choice of college major.
Other researchers have focused more on values related to specific tasks
than on overall values. Higgins (2007) defined values as the relative worth
of a commodity, activity, or person, and also as the psychological experience
of being attracted to (or repulsed by) an object or activity. Similarly, Eccles
and her colleagues define values with respect to the qualities of different
achievement tasks and how those qualities influence the individual’s desire
to do the tasks (Eccles, 2005; Eccles-Parsons et al., 1983; Wigfield &
Eccles, 1992). Like Higgins’ (2007) definition, their definition stresses the
motivational aspects of task value. Further, values in the SEVT model are
subjective because various individuals assign different values to the same activ-
ity; math achievement is valuable to some students but not to others. We
therefore use the label subjective task values (STVS) in discussing them
throughout this article. As we discuss in more detail later, individuals not
only value particular activities but also develop STV hierarchies across
various activities. We propose that it is these hierarchies that ultimately
influence choice or level of engagement.
Eccles-Parsons et al. (1983) initially proposed that “the overall value of
any specific task is a function of three major components: (1) the attainment
value of the task, (2) the intrinsic or interest value of the task, and (3) the
utility value of the task for future goals” (p. 89). Eccles-Parsons et al. defined
attainment value as the personal importance of doing well on a given task.
Attainment value derives from the fit of perceived task characteristics with
the individual’s core self schema, social and personal identities, and ought
selves, that is, the extent to which tasks allow or not the person to the
manifest those behaviors that they view as central to their own sense of
themselves, or allow them to express or confirm important aspects of self.
For example, if high school athletes have high attainment value in sports,
that means they define themselves at least in part in terms of their success
at sports, see sports as an important part of who they will be in the future,
and feel that sport success is very important to them. In contrast, if a
person highly values not being seen as competitive, then participating
in competitive sports or intellectual games would have negative
attainment value and would thus lead to decreased motivation to engage
in such tasks (see Eccles & Wigfield, in press, for further discussion of the
links of attainment value to identity).
Intrinsic value is the enjoyment one gains from doing the task. This com-
ponent is similar in certain respects to notions of intrinsic motivation and
interest (see Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2009, 2016;
Schiefele, 2009), but it is important to acknowledge that these constructs
come from different theoretical traditions. Eccles (2005) discusses in some
detail the similarities but also distinctions between intrinsic value, intrinsic
motivation as defined by Ryan and Deci, and interest as defined by
researchers such as Hidi and Schiefele. When children intrinsically value
an activity they often become deeply engaged in it and can persist at it
for a long time. This characteristic of engagement also typifies engagement
in tasks with high positive attainment value.
Utility value or usefulness refers to how a task fits into an individual’s
present or future plans, for instance, taking a math class to fulfill a require-
ment for a science degree. In certain respects utility value is similar to
extrinsic motivation, because when doing an activity out of utility value,
the activity is a means to an end rather than an end in itself (see Ryan &
Deci, 2016). However, the activity also can reflect some important goals that
the person holds deeply, such as attaining a certain occupation. In this sense,
utility value also connects to personal goals and sense of self, and so has some
ties to attainment value. Thus the distinction between attainment value and
utility value can be quite subtle, depending on how central the goals are
to one’s sense of identity or most core values; this likely is why the two cor-
relate highly in most empirical work examining their relations (e.g., Eccles &
Wigfield, 1995; see Wigfield et al., 2009, for review).
Researchers are beginning to expand the attainment and utility value con-
structs in interesting ways. Gaspard et al. (2015) proposed and found that the
attainment and utility components of task value can be differentiated further
both theoretically and empirically. They proposed that attainment value consists
of the overall importance of achieving good grades, and personal importance, or
the importance of mastering the material and how it relates to one’s identity.
They further proposed five components of utility: utility for school, or the
usefulness of one’s education; utility for job, or future career opportunities;
utility of math for different parts of one’s daily life; social utility, or how being
knowledgeable in math impacted being accepted by one’s peers; and general
utility for the future, and they developed questionnaire measures to assess each.
They found that the various subcomponents formed separate but relatively
highly correlated factors; we return to this point later.
3.1.1 Perceived cost: Original discussion and current work

Eccles-Parsons et al. (1983) also described several other influences on overall
task value; one of these was the individuals’ perceptions of the “cost” of the
activity. Eccles and colleagues conceptualized cost as what is lost or given up
or suffered when doing any particular task. Engaging in any specific task or
activity has costs as well as benefits. If an activity “costs” too much the
individual won’t do it (see also Eccles, 1984, 2005). Eccles and colleagues
described different kinds or types of costs: Individuals’ perceptions of
how much effort they would need to exert to complete a task and whether
it is worth doing so (effort cost), how much engaging in one activity means
that other valued activities can’t be done (e.g., Do I do my math homework
or check Instagram?), and the emotional or psychological costs of pursuing
the task, particularly the cost of failure (e.g., Will taking this advanced course
make me feel emotionally drained?).
Subsequently (as early as 1984) Eccles, Wigfield, and others began
describing cost as one of four components of task value (along with the three
just mentioned), with the four influencing individuals’ overall valuing of a
given task (e.g., Eccles, 1984, 2005; Wigfield, 1994; Wigfield & Eccles,
1992; see also Wigfield et al., 2017). Indeed, most visual representations
of the model like that in Fig. 1 include cost in the values “box.” For
many years, they also stated that cost has been studied less than intrinsic,
attainment, and utility value but that has changed in the last few years
(see also Barron & Hulleman, 2015).
Research on cost has burgeoned in the last several years, and researchers
have both proposed new dimensions of cost and developed new measures of
it (see also Eccles & Wigfield, in press, for discussion other aspects of the
work on cost). Perez, Cromley, and Kaplan (2014) adapted Battle and
Wigfield’s (2003) measure of cost and developed questions to assess effort
cost, opportunity cost, and psychological cost in the domain of college sci-
ence. The items in their scale to measure effort cost focus on a broader set of
these costs (e.g., repaying student loans; wasting money pursuing a science
major) rather than the cost of one activity on the effort needed to do other
ones. Perez et al. also defined opportunity cost as how much schoolwork
interfered with students’ relationships with family and friends. Perez
et al.’s psychological cost subscale included concerns about a number of
issues, including not having the ability to do science majors, that one’s
self-esteem would suffer, and that science is too difficult; in our view some
of these items could be considered the “negative” pole of ability beliefs. The
authors found that these three aspects of cost were empirically distinct, and
that students’ ratings of opportunity cost and (especially) effort cost were the
strongest predictors of their intentions to leave a science major.
As noted earlier Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Schreier, et al. (2015)
expanded the operationalization of the task importance and utility value
components; they also proposed subdividing cost into opportunity cost,
effort cost, and psychological cost. They included items measuring these
in their new measure of values and their confirmatory factor analyses of their
9th grade respondents to these items supported the separation of cost into the
separate (but highly correlated) components they defined. In a subsequent
article Gaspard, H€afner, Parrisius, Trautwein, and Nagengast (2017) found
that the proposed emotional and effort required aspects of cost were so
highly correlated that they combined them.
Flake, Barron, Hulleman, McCoach, and Welsh (2015) also developed a
new measure of cost that was intended to apply to a broader variety of
students than the Perez et al. (2014) scale, such as college or non-college
students, and students who were studying a particular class instead of pursu-
ing a specific major. Opportunity and psychological cost in these models
were defined similarly to Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Schreier, et al.’s
(2015) definitions, but Flake et al.’s (2015) measure separated effort cost into
two aspects, related and unrelated effort. They found that these four com-
ponents of cost formed separate factors empirically. However, they were
highly correlated and a higher order model of “overall” cost also fit the data
well. They also reported that cost correlated moderately with over all task
value and also with expectancies, with expectancies and cost more strongly
(negatively) related than cost and their overall task value measure. Trautwein
et al. (2012), using a two-item measure of cost, found that their measure’s
attainment and intrinsic value related slightly more strongly to cost than did
expectancies; the correlation of students’ utility values and cost were higher
than utility values and expectancies.
Finally, Kosovich, Hulleman, Barron, and Getty (2015) developed a
brief 10-item questionnaire measuring expectancies (three items), values
(three items), and cost (four items) of math and science classes. They admin-
istered the survey to 6th, 7th, and 8th grade students; about 400 of them
completed the measure two, three, or four times over the course of the
study. They tested four different models of the factor structure of students’
responses: a one factor model with all items, a two factor model with expec-
tancies forming one factor and values and cost forming a second, another
two factor model with expectancies and values forming one factor and cost
forming a second factor, and a three factor model with expectancy, value,
and cost forming separate factors. Fit indices supported the three factor
models; the correlations among the latent factors in this model were quite
strong and positive for expectancies and values, and negative and moderate
to strong for cost and value and cost and expectancies.
We are excited that researchers have done this important work on cost
and like Barron and Hulleman (2015), we urge researchers to include
measures of cost in their studies based in expectancy-value theory.
However, we also believe that at this point the new measures of cost raise
as many questions about the nature of cost as they provide answers. In
particular, the new measures just described use similar terms (e.g., opportu-
nity cost) in defining what cost is, but then measure it with quite different
items. Thus we do not yet have a clear understanding of what the different
dimensions of cost are, and comparing findings across studies becomes very
difficult. This issue of course plagues many measures in the field, but given
the (laudable) efforts to define more clearly what cost comprises both
theoretically and empirically we need studies comparing these different
measures and (if possible) arriving at an agreed upon set of items to assess
the different proposed dimensions of cost. Second, in some of the studies
looking at cost in relation to the other aspects of values, the measurement
of the latter have been limited (sometimes) in terms of number of items
measuring each. Further, the extant measures (including our own) assess
expectancies and also attainment, usefulness, and intrinsic value that have
been used in most of the work in EVT only in positive terms, rather than
looking at the “negative” pole (e.g., How much do you dislike math?). Thus
some current measures of cost may be capturing the negative side of such
constructs as attainment value and utility value; the very high correlations
among the components is further evidence for this. Rosenzweig and
Wigfield (2016) and Wigfield, Cambria, and Ho (2012) provide examples
of scales measuring competence beliefs and interest that include both the
positive and negative aspects of each.
Flake et al.’s (2015) results showing that cost relates more strongly to
individuals’ expectancies rather than their values could also be due to
how they measured cost, with costs going up as expectancies go down in
terms of the amount of effort needed to succeed and the increased likelihood
of failure. Clearly more measurement work is needed before we have a
comprehensive set of indicators of all aspects of both expectancies and
STV components.
Barron and Hulleman (2015), based on the factor analytic work showing
that cost factors separately from overall value and also that it relates to
different outcomes, proposed that expectancy value models be called expec-

tancy value cost models, to denote cost’s growing importance in research in
EVT and separate role in predicting outcomes. We think this proposal is not
warranted, primarily because (in studies measuring them with enough items,
such as Eccles & Wigfield, 1995, and Gaspard et al., 2017) intrinsic, utility
and attainment value also form separate factors. That each set of items
assessing these components form separate factors does not mean they should
be separated out and each given their own name in the label for the overall
model given their theoretical definition as influences on overall subjective
task value. In our view the same point applies to cost. Instead, we think
the more interesting theoretical and methodological questions concern
how the various value components combine to influence overall task value,
and then predict performance and choice. Eccles and Wigfield (in press)
provide further discussion of these and other points around the conceptual-
ization and measurement of cost.
4. Development of individuals’ STVs

4.1 When are children’s STVs and expectancies for success
empirically distinct?
There are several critical findings with respect to the development of
students’ STVs and expectancies for success. The first set concerns the
“distinctiveness” of children’s STVs across activity domains, or to put it
differently, when children have a differentiated sense of how much they
value math, English, sports, music, and so on. Eccles, Wigfield, Harold,
and Blumenfeld (1993) showed (using confirmatory factor analysis) that
children’s responses to questions about their valuing of different school sub-
ject areas formed distinct factors even among 1st grade children (the same
was true for children’s expectancies for success/ability beliefs). Thus, quite
early on children distinguish how they value different domains. Second,
children’s STVs and expectancies for success/ability beliefs formed distinct
factors within a given domain, even in 1st grade children. This finding
means that even during the early elementary school years children under-
stand that their beliefs about competence are not the same as their STVs.
Marsh and colleagues’ work on children’s self-concepts of ability with
preschool children showed evidence of distinct ability beliefs even amongst
preschool age children. Finally, as just noted Eccles and Wigfield (1995)
showed that the attainment, interest, and utility components of task value
formed separate but related factors at least by the late elementary school
years. We discuss relations among the value components in more

detail below.
4.2 Change across age in children’s STVs

Wigfield (1994) discussed how the different components of value may
develop at different time points across the childhood years. He concluded
that the components of task value are not clearly differentiated until the mid-
dle childhood years. With respect to which subcomponents develop first,
Wigfield argued that subjective task value likely appears first in the form
of interest in different kinds of activities, toys, and other experiences.
Specific interests may be quite transitory at first, but over time they can
develop into stable, longer lasting interests (see Guthrie et al., 2007;
Hidi & Renninger, 2006, for discussion of how immediate or situated inter-
ests in specific activities can develop into long-term personal interests).
Wigfield (1994) suggested that usefulness and importance likely develop
through middle childhood and into adolescence. However, scholarship
focused on culturally prescribed social roles such as gender-roles suggests
that the activities and tasks associated with such roles may also be influenced
by differential attainment value from quite early in life. We know, for exam-
ple, that many children evidence a strong preference for toys, clothes and
activities consistent with their culture’s gender role norms by 3 years of
age (Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). Similarly, processes linked to
observational learning (Bandura, 1986) are evident during the preschool
years. Such processes likely influence the differential utility value and cost
of various activities, tasks, toys, etc. even for preschool age children. None-
theless, it seems likely that these processes become much more sophisticated,
conscious, and stable as children mature and develop more conscious and
reasoned personal identities, goals, and worldviews. It also seems quite likely
that the relatively weighting of the various components of subjective value
and the sensitivity of these cognitive weighting processes to situational
demands and characteristics will increase with increasing social and cognitive
maturity. These suggestions should be explored in future research on STVs.
Initial research on how children’s STVs (and expectancies for success)
change across age showed a normative pattern of decline across different
school subjects across the elementary school years and into the high school
years (Eccles et al., 1993; Jacobs et al., 2002; Wigfield et al., 1997). Many
young children are quite optimistic about their competencies in different
areas and value them highly (although see Cimpian, 2017, for discussion
of how young children’s views of their ability are not overly optimistic but
instead are more realistic). However, this optimism about competence and
valuing of school achievement can change during middle childhood to
greater realism and (sometimes) pessimism for some children. Moreover,
research by Dweck, Heyman and their colleagues (e.g., Dweck, 1999;
Heyman, Dweck, & Cain, 1992) showed that some young children already
do not have positive self-perceptions and believe themselves to be “bad
people” when they fail; Heyman et al. stated that this likely was due to
parents being overly critical and also having unrealistically high expectations
for their children with respect to educational attainment and other
outcomes.
More recently, researchers have shown that there are a variety of pat-
terns of change in children’s STVs and expectancy beliefs (see Wigfield
et al., 2015 for a review). Archambault, Eccles, and Vida (2010) found
seven different trajectories of change in students’ competence beliefs in
reading. Although these trajectories generally indicated decline in chil-
dren’s competence beliefs, they were markedly different and some showed
increases across the high school years. Students whose literacy competence
beliefs declined most strongly included boys and lower-SES students.
Musu-Gillette, Wigfield, Harring, and Eccles (2015) also found different
trajectories of change from fourth grade through high school in children’s
mathematics competence beliefs and values; several trajectories showed
decline but some were flat. Gaspard et al. (2017) looked at age differences
in 5th through 12th grade students’ valuing of German, English, math,
biology, and physics. In general older students had less positive STVs than
younger students, although there were differences across the subject areas
and in the different facets of values.
There also are cultural differences in change in children’s competence
beliefs (see Tonks, Wigfield, & Eccles, in press). For example, looking across
the middle-school transition, Wang and Pomerantz (2009) found declines in
early adolescent American students’ but not in Chinese students’ beliefs.
Finally, Eccles (2014) reported that recent re-analyses of the changes found
in different longitudinal studies of different achievement domains show many
different patterns, including increases for some children. Thus we have learned
much about the complexities of changes in students’ expectancies and values.
4.3 Relations among the components of STVs

As discussed above, Eccles, Wigfield, et al. (1993) showed that children’s
values are differentiated across domain quite early in development, and
Eccles and Wigfield (1995) showed (in a study done in the mathematics
domain) that the three different aspects of task value were factorially distinct;
the sample included students from 5th to 12th grade. The correlations
among the three different aspects ranged from 0.55 (perceived importance
and usefulness) to 0.78 (interest and importance), supporting Eccles-Parsons
et al. and others’ view that importance and interest are the more “intrinsic”
aspect of value (Eccles, 2005; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Gaspard, Dicke,
Flunger, Brisson, et al. (2015), Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Schreier, et al.
(2015) examined the factor structure and intercorrelations of German 9th
grade student’ responses to their mathematics task value measure that
included several new components of attainment and utility value. Their
confirmatory factor analyses showed that the dimensions formed separate
factors. The intrinsic, attainment, and utility value components all related
positively to one another (with factor correlations ranging from 0.27 to
0.56 across the different aspects of value and higher within a given dimen-
sion. Like Eccles and Wigfield they found the correlations for the intrinsic
and attainment dimensions higher than those of utility and the other dimen-
sions. Students’ intrinsic, attainment, and utility values all correlated nega-
tively with the three cost dimensions. In a different study utilizing the new
measure to assess 5th through 12th grade students’ valuing of several
academic domains (math, German, and physics), Gaspard et al. (2017) found
mostly similar patterns of correlations of the different value components
they assessed.
In studies of college students both Battle and Wigfield (2003) and Perez
et al. (2019) showed that students’ intrinsic, attainment, and utility values
all correlated positively with one another and negatively with their percep-
tions of the cost of graduate school (in Battle and Wigfield) or STEM classes
(Perez et al.). Taken together, these findings show that components of
students’ task values (at least from grade five on) are empirically distinguis-
hable, but that they relate to one another, with some of the correlations
being quite high. Interestingly, based on these results Trautwein et al.
(2013) proposed that expectancy-value theory be renamed expectancy-
value S theory.
A methodological issue in regards to these high correlations is
multicollinearity, which makes it difficult to include all of the value
components in predictive analyses. Along with considering how the
components of children’s task values relate to one another it also is
critical to address their relative ordering within different individuals;
Eccles (2005) refers to these relative orderings as hierarchies of task values.
4.4 Hierarchies of individuals’ STVs

A critical point often discussed by Eccles and her colleagues (e.g., Eccles,
2005; Eccles & Wigfield, in press) is that students’ STVs for different activ-
ities do not operate in isolation or independently of each other. Rather, the
differentiation of individuals’ valuing of various tasks and activities will lead
to hierarchies of STVs. Eccles has argued that at the individual level, it is the
relative placement of various tasks in an individual’s hierarchy of STVs that is
the important predictor of their task and activity choices, rather than the val-
uing of the activity itself. That is, people should prefer tasks that are relatively
higher in their own hierarchy over tasks lower in their hierarchy. These
hierarchies likely are formed by factors ranging from individuals’ experi-
ences with different tasks, their success or failure on them, messages from
parents and teachers about what are important things to do, and the appro-
priateness of doing different tasks depending on individuals’ biological and
social group memberships (see Eccles, 2005; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele,
1998; and Wigfield et al., 2015, for further discussion). As mentioned earlier
Eccles, Wigfield, and colleagues have focused on how gender impacts indi-
viduals’ valuing of different activities.
To date there is very little work assessing how individuals’ STV hierar-
chies relate to choice and most extant measures of them do not allow for the
creation of hierarchies because the items assess individuals’ valuing of each
activity separately. One way to begin to assess such hierarchies would be to
include comparative items on scales measuring STVs; for example, individ-
uals could be asked whether they value math or English more. A rank-
ordering method also could be used. We believe these would be important
additions to the current well-validated measures of STVs.
4.5 Relations of individuals’ STVs to their expectancies for

success
From early in the school year children’s STVs and expectancy/ability beliefs
relate positively to each other. There are three fundamental findings regard-
ing these relations ( Jacobs et al., 2002; Wigfield et al., 1997). First, Wigfield
found that for children’s STVs and expectancies in math and reading, across
the elementary school years the relations of children’s intrinsic value to their
expectancy/ability belief were stronger than the relations of a combined
usefulness-importance variable to competence beliefs. Second, they also
found that the strength of these relations increase over time; for instance,
for 1st graders the correlation of their expectancies and expressed interest
in math was 0.23; at 6th grade it was 0.52. Third, Jacobs et al. found that
changes in children’s competence-related beliefs drove changes in their sub-
jective valuing of both math and reading/language arts.
In addition, researchers have found that having ability beliefs and values
in synchrony results in healthy psychological outcomes. Harter (1990), fol-
lowing James ( James, 1892/1963), proposed and found that when children
have low expectancies of success for activities that they continue to value
they are at risk for low self-esteem and even depression. Individuals can
accomplish this in at least two ways. One is to strengthen the value they hold
for activities at which they are competent (see Eccles, 2009). The second is
to devalue activities for which they have low expectancies for success. Harter
(1990) and Eccles (2009) both discuss how having low expectancies for and
doing poorly on academic areas that individuals devalue does not lower their
self-esteem.
4.6 Processes and sources of information influencing the

development of individuals’ STVs
We have discussed various processes that influence individuals’ developing
STVs in a variety of articles and chapters (see in particular Eccles, 2005,
2009; Wigfield et al., 2017, 2009). These include social and cultural influ-
ences, processes related to the development of identity, and more basic psy-
chological processes concerning how individuals interpret information they
receive about outcomes and their affective reactions to them. In her initial
writings, Eccles (Eccles, 1984; Eccles-Parsons et al., 1983) discussed how
characteristics of the tasks with which individuals engage can influence their
valuing of them. For example, is the task extremely difficult? Does it allow
for collaboration with others, or perhaps competition against them? She and
her colleagues also discussed how different tasks fit in to the ways in which
individuals see themselves more broadly; that is, in terms of their emerging
and then realized identities. Does the task “fit” with one’s self-image (see
Eccles, 2009, for extended discussion of this point). Here is where broader
aspects of individuals’ self-perceptions and identity can impact the ways in
which different tasks or activities are values; Eccles and colleagues focused on
gender roles (e.g., does engaging in this kind of task or activity fit with what
the individual thinks is appropriate to do depending upon whether the indi-
vidual is male or female. The same analysis can be applied to other broad
identity categories such as race and ethnicity, and the corresponding stereo-
types of the kinds of activities that it is accepted for members of different
groups to do. It is important to note that Eccles, Wigfield and colleagues
have talked about these influences as especially influencing attainment value

as this is the aspect of value most related to broader identity issues.
Eccles and colleagues (e.g., Eccles, 1984; Eccles-Parsons et al., 1983;
Wigfield et al., 2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 1989, 1992) also posited that
how individuals interpret the outcomes that occur when they engage in dif-
ferent tasks, and then react to them affectively are important influences on
individuals’ developing task values. They utilized Weiner’s (1979, 1985)
attributional framework as a way to interpret how individuals’ explain the
outcomes that occur in their lives and their affective reactions to them.
Did the individual fail the test because he lacks ability; if so he likely will
feel shameful about that, which likely could ultimately lead him to devalue
the task. The main affective reaction that Eccles and colleagues have dis-
cussed is anxiety, which (through classical conditioning and other processes)
can make some tasks very unappealing to different individuals, so that they
likely will reduce the value they have for them and ultimately withdraw their
participation in them.
Higgins (2007) described other processes affecting individuals develop-
ing task values, focusing on the different sources of information that individ-
uals use in forming their values (see Wigfield et al., 2009, for more detailed
discussion of these sources in relation to SEVT). Higgins suggested the fol-
lowing sources: biological needs, shared beliefs in what is desirable, relations
of one’s current state to what one wants to become (akin to Eccles’ (2009)
discussion of attainment value and identity development), evaluative infer-
ences about one’s activities with respect to their worth, the kinds of expe-
riences children have with different activities (related to Eccles (1984, 2005)
discussion of how characteristics of tasks and activities themselves impact
individuals’ developing task values, and (relatedly) hedonic experiences
when individuals engage in different activities. Given that we have discussed
both the identity related and task characteristic sources earlier we focus here
on shared beliefs about what is desirable and use of information gained from
doing activities as a way to judge oneself accurately.
From a developmental perspective shared beliefs about what is desirable
concern children’s understanding and acceptance of what important adults
value, primarily their parents and teachers. Because school success is very
important to many parents and certainly to teachers, children learn to value
achievement in part to gain approval from adults. As children get older the
desire to please parents and teachers may wane to a degree, and the desire to
please peers may become more important (Wigfield et al., 2015). Further,
although they may continue to share beliefs about the importance of school
success with parents and teachers, they may do so more for their own rea-
sons, as self-determination theorists suggest (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2016).
Again thinking developmentally making, evaluative inferences about the
worth or value of different activities requires relatively complex cognitive
judgments (see Higgins, 2007), including both accurate perceptions of the
outcomes and explanations of them. The low correlations of young chil-
dren’s task values to their outcomes discussed earlier reflect this (although
see Cimpian, 2017 for an interesting discussion of different sources of evi-
dence showing that children’s inferences about their outcomes are more
accurate than once believed). Interestingly, however, even many adults
do not appear to make accurate assessments of their performance (e.g.,
Dunning, 2011) and some have suggested that having an overly optimistic
view of one’s abilities and other characteristics actually is healthier than hav-
ing a more realistic view (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Recently Wigfield et al. (under review) discussed another set of processes
that impact individuals’ developing task values, dimensional comparison
processes (see M€ oller & Marsh, 2013, for detailed discussion of these pro-
cesses). Dimensional comparisons refer to individuals’ comparisons of their
performance in one domain with that in another, and they relate to the well-
known Big Fish Little Pond Effect (BFLPE) discovered by Marsh and col-
leagues and discussed in their Internal/External frame of reference model
(e.g., Marsh, 1986; Marsh, Kong, & Hau, 2001). The BFLPE is the
often-observed finding that even though individuals’ performance in differ-
ent subject areas (e.g., math and English) relate positively to one another
their corresponding self-concepts of ability relate weakly or not at all. In
their dimensional comparison theory M€ oller and Marsh (2013) extended
the I/E model by discussing different influences on dimensional compari-
sons, such as whether the two domains individuals are comparing are
“near” (e.g., math and physics) or “far” (e.g., history and physics).
Researchers have studied the BFLPE primarily in terms of self-concepts
of ability; Wigfield et al. (under review) extend the analysis of these effects to
individuals’ STVs. They reviewed evidence that although there is similarity
in the patterns of correlations for the two constructs, there are differences in
the strength of the correlations for individuals’ self-concepts of ability com-
pared to their STVs. The correlations of individuals’ STVs across domains
were significantly higher (0.23) than were the corresponding self-concept
of ability correlations (0.11), indicating (perhaps) less domain-specificity
of individuals’ STVs. Additionally, the path coefficients from achievement
in a domain to students’ valuing of that domain are much smaller (in the 0.20
range) than for ability self-concepts (in the 0.50 range), indicating that (as
found in other SEVT based studies) that individuals’ expectancies for success
and ability beliefs relate more closely to their performance or achievement
than do their STVs. The implications of the latter finding for this article (and
SEVT more generally) are that individuals use other information sources
besides their performance in determining how much they value different
activities.
5. From beliefs and values to action: Relations of

students’ STVs to their choices and performance
Eccles-Parsons et al. (1983) proposed that individuals’ expectancies
and values are the strongest direct predictors of different achievement out-
comes, performance and choice in particular. A number of researchers have
found support for these predictions. Students’ STVs predict both intentions
and actual decisions to persist at different activities, such as taking mathemat-
ics and English courses and engaging in sports. For instance, Meece,
Wigfield, and Eccles (1990) looked at the longitudinal relations of students’
expectancies for success at math and the importance of math to their subse-
quent performance and intentions to continue taking math courses. Stu-
dents’ expectancies were the strongest direct predictor of performance,
whereas their math importance ratings were the strongest predictors of their
intentions to keep taking math when the option to stop became available.
Importantly, because expectancies and values related positively to one
another, each also had indirect effects on both performance and intentions.
The relations of children’s STVs to their activity choice extend over
time. Durik et al. (2006) found that the importance children gave to reading
in 4th grade predicted the number of English classes they took in high
school. Also, children’s interest in reading measured in 4th grade indirectly
predicted (through interest measured in 10th grade) high school leisure time
reading, career aspirations, and course selections. Simpkins et al. (2006)
found that children’s participation in math and science activities in late ele-
mentary school related to their subsequent expectancies and values in these
subjects, which in turn predicted the number of math and science courses
they took through high school. Interestingly, in this study children’s
ability-related beliefs in high schools predicted choice more strongly than
did students’ values; Simpkins et al. speculated that this may have occurred
because students know the importance of such courses for college entrance,
and are more likely to take them when they expect to do well in them.
Finally, Musu-Gillette et al. (2015) found that students’ valuing of math

measured in high school predicted their college major choice.
5.1 The interactions of expectancies and subjective task values

in predicting outcomes
Much of the work looking at how expectancies and values predict outcomes
has addressed direct and indirect effects of each but has not examined the
potential interactions between the two, despite Atkinson’s (1957) view that
expectancies and values interact to determine resultant motivation (see
Trautwein et al., 2013, for discussion of this issue). Researchers now are
examining such interactions. Trautwein et al. (2012) tested the main effects
of expectancies, different aspects of values, and their interaction on the math
and English performance of a large sample of German high school students,
They found that participants’ expectancies and the different aspects of value
(interest, attainment, and utility) predicted performance. When students’
values were entered into the model after expectancies, values were no longer
a significant predictor of performance. However, the expectancies by values
interaction term was a significant predictor in both models with value
increasing the positive effect of expectancies. Nagengast et al. (2011) found
this same interaction in studies of high school students’ engagement in sci-
ence and intentions to pursue science careers, in a sample of nearly 400,000
students from 57 countries. The findings generalized across the countries.
However, the overall the amount of variance explained by the interactions
in these two studies was small, and likely detected because of the very large
samples.
Other researchers have found interaction effects suggesting that the STV
students have for some achievement activities predicts their achievement
behavior more strongly when their self-concepts of ability for that activity
are low. Lee, Bong, and Kim (2014) found that Korean middle school stu-
dents with high intrinsic or utility value for learning English were more
likely to procrastinate and cheat in their English as a foreign language class
as their self-efficacy decreased. Hensley (2014) found a similar interaction for
procrastination among undergraduate anatomy students, and Lee, Lee, and
Bong (2013) also found this effect among Korean 8th and 9th grade students
on test stress and academic self-handicapping. Guo, Parker, Marsh, and
Morin (2015) found that utility value predicted students’ scores on an inter-
national standardized math exam and their intentions to pursue advanced
education more strongly when their self-concepts were low.
The interaction effect found by Lee et al. (2014) provides some support
for the inverse relation of expectancies and values; at least on maladaptive
achievement behaviors: middle students who valued English were more
likely to cheat if their self-efficacy was low rather than high. It is important
to note, however, that the researchers studying how expectancies and values
interact do not assume, as Atkinson (1957) did, that the two are inversely
related; indeed, all of the correlational work to date shows that students’
interest, attainment, and utility values relate positively to their expectancies
for success. Wigfield and Eccles (1992) discuss in detail reasons why we
should expect positive relations of expectancies and values in “real-world”
situations in which most individuals likely value tasks at which they have a
much higher probability of succeeding than the “optimum” 0.50 in
Atkinson’s model.
Researchers have examined how strongly cost predicts outcomes in dif-
ferent academic domains. Battle and Wigfield (2003), Kirkpatrick, Chang,
Lee, Tas, and Anderman (2013), Perez et al. (2014), Safavian, Conley, and
Karabenick (2013), and others have found that cost negatively predicts ado-
lescents’ and college students’ achievement, plans to take AP courses, and
plans to pursue science careers or graduate school in general. Some work
suggests that students’ perceptions of cost may be an especially important
predictor of adaptive academic achievement. Barron and Hulleman
(2015) reported that students’ expectations predicted their grades in biology,
their values predicted their interest in the subject, but their perceptions of
cost predicted both outcomes. Thus taken together these findings suggest
that cost should be included in studies exploring the effects of students’ STVs
on their achievement outcomes.
5.2 Person centered approaches to studying expectancies

and STVs
Most of the researchers examining the relations of the different components
of individuals’ STVs to each other as well as their relations to performance
and choice took variable centered approaches to examining these relation-
ships. Over the last several years there have been a number of interesting
studies of both the relations of individuals’ expectancies and values to each
other as well as to different outcomes. We briefly review some of this work
in this section.
Conley (2012) looked at patterns of relations in individuals’ expectan-
cies, values, and achievement goals and their relations to their affect and
achievement outcomes. She sampled a large group of primarily Vietnamese
and Hispanic 7th grade students. She identified seven different patterns or
clusters of students, labeling them as low, average, and high motivation clus-
ters. Interestingly, Conley found that perceived cost was the variable that
most differentiated the clusters with more positive beliefs, values, and goals
from those with the least positive beliefs, values, and goals. The low moti-
vation cluster had the poorest achievement and affect.
Wang, Eccles, and Kenny (2013), utilizing a nationally representative
sample, did latent profile analyses of high school students’ math and verbal
achievement, and their corresponding self-concepts of ability and interest in
those subject areas, among other things. They identified seven profiles rang-
ing from high math—high verbal achievement to low math—low verbal
achievement, and found that the profiles varied with respect to their choice
of STEM careers. 49% of the high math—moderate verbal group chose
STEM careers, whereas no one in the low math groups did. Interestingly,
34% of the high math—high verbal group chose STEM careers and this
group had a higher proportion of females (63%). Wang et al. suggested that
this group likely has many career options but chooses math related ones less
than the high math—moderate verbal achieving group. This finding is an
important one with respect to understanding why fewer females go into
math related careers. Another interesting finding was that self-concept of
ability in math had more impact on career choice for the high math-
moderate verbal group than it did for the high achieving group in both sub-
jects. Wang et al. suggested that this might be due to the internal—external
frame of reference effects we discussed earlier when presenting findings
regarding the BFLPE and dimensional comparisons.
Anderson and Chen (2016) also studied profiles of motivational beliefs
and values in STEM, using a different nationally representative data set,
the High School Longitudinal Study. They found four profiles of students’
ability beliefs and task values; the cluster with the highest utility value for
science had the highest percentage of students in it saying that they intended
to be in a STEM career later. This is powerful evidence from a different kind
of data analysis approach showing how individuals’ task values relate to their
intended choices of a major aspect of their lives, their careers.
Recently Perez et al. (2019) examined profiles of college students’ com-
petence beliefs and STVs (including perceived cost) measured in the first
semester of college and how these profiles related to STEM course choice
and grades in STEM courses. They identified three groups, labeling them
“moderate all,” very high competence/value and low effort cost, and high
competence/values-moderate low costs. The moderate all group chose
fewer STEM courses during their college years and did less well in the ones
they did complete; this group also had the largest proportion of underrep-
resented minorities.
As mentioned in our discussion of the Anderson and Chen (2016) study,
the results from the studies utilizing different kinds of profile analyses
provide additional support for the SEVT prediction that task value is the
strongest direct and proximal predictor of choice. These studies add infor-
mation concerning these relations that variable centered approaches cannot
provide, particularly the nature of profiles of beliefs and values rather than
looking at them separately or even their interactions. They also provide
an overall sense of different levels of motivation within different groups
and the consequences of that for their affective and achievement outcomes.
There remain questions about why and how the numbers of profiles that
emerge in different studies do so: Is it the number of variables included as
well as how strongly they relate to each other conceptually and empirically,
the size of the sample, and/or other factors? (Perez, personal communica-
tion, January 2019). In terms of theoretical issues regarding SEVT Eccles
and colleagues’ point discussed above that it is more important to examine
hierarchies of the values individuals have for different activities in conjunc-
tion with their expectancy hierarchy (e.g., Eccles, 2005; Eccles-Parsons
et al., 1983) is something that profile centered analyses can address in ways
that variable centered approaches cannot.
6. Intervening to enhance students’ STVs

Over the last 10 years a growing number of researchers have devel-
oped EVT-based interventions to enhance students’ motivation and
achievement (see Harackiewicz & Priniski, 2018, and Rosenzweig &
Wigfield, 2016, for systematic reviews). Most of these interventions have
focused on attempting to enhance students’ utility value in order to enhance
their motivation and achievement. Harackiewicz and others have focused
on utility value because they argue it is the most “modifiable” of the different
aspects of task value (e.g., Harackiewicz, Tibbetts, Canning, & Hyde, 2014).
We discuss the intervention work here briefly (see Harackiewicz & Priniski,
2018; Rosenzweig, Wigfield, & Eccles, 2019; Wigfield et al., 2017, for more
detailed discussion of the EVT-based intervention studies).
These intervention studies based in EVT are in the “wise” social psycho-
logical intervention tradition discussed by Yeager and Walton (2011)
and Walton (2014). For example, Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2009) and
Hulleman, Godes, Hendricks, and Harackiewicz’s (2010) intervention stud-
ies had one group of high school or college students write a brief essay, either
once in the lab or in class every 3 or 4 weeks, about the relevance of what
they were learning to their lives. Results showed that (relative to a control
group) the intervention boosted interest in the topics they were learning, as
well as their achievement. The effects were stronger for initially low-
performing students. Hulleman et al. stated that the intervention impacted
interest through its impact on perceived utility of the course.
Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Brisson, et al.’s (2015) utility value interven-
tion implemented in 82 9th grade German classrooms had students either
write a brief essay connecting math to their lives, or read and respond to
quotations from fellow students about the relevance of math. Students in
both intervention conditions reported (relative to a control group) higher
utility value for math, but effects were stronger in the quotation condition
than the essay condition. In a follow up study looking at outcomes 5 months
after the intervention Brisson et al. (2017) found that compared to the con-
trol group students in the quotation condition had higher math test scores,
math self-concept of ability, self-efficacy for competing homework, and
teachers’ ratings of their effort in math. The only significant effect for the
writing condition was on homework self-efficacy. So brief interventions
can have relatively long lasting effects.
In Harackiewicz, Canning, Tibbetts, Priniski, and Hyde (2015) majority
and minority college students whose families had attended college, first
generation majority and minority college students, and first generation-
underrepresented minority students were in a utility value intervention that
focused on enhancing students’ sense of the relevance of the subject matter
by having them write about the course’s relevance to their goals. The utility
value intervention positively impacted students’ grades relative to students in
the control group or in a values affirmation group. A particularly important
finding was that the combined first generation-underrepresented group’s
performance increased the most, meaning that the achievement gap
between the other students in the class and this group was reduced the most.
Harackiewicz et al. suggested that the UV intervention worked because it
helped connect students’ values and goals, such as wanting to help others,
to the course material. They concluded that brief UV interventions may
be effective ways to reduce the achievement gap in STEM courses.
In one of the few studies targeting different components of students’
task values Acee and Weinstein (2010) had college students in two college
statistics classes do to a set of online activities designed to enhance their

attainment, utility, and intrinsic value of statistics. Students in the inter-
vention group reported valuing statistics more than did control group
students, and they were more likely to access a website providing additional
information about statistics that instructors sent several weeks after the inter-
vention was completed. Intervention students’ grades were significantly
higher than those of control group students in one of the two class sections
that participated in the intervention.
What about cost? Rosenzweig, Wigfield, and Hulleman (in press) con-
ducted the first intervention study focused on reducing students’ perceptions
of the cost of introductory college physics. Introductory physics is an impor-
tant “gateway” course to many STEM majors and one that many students
find to be challenging and time-consuming. The cost intervention consisted
of two sessions. In the first session, students read quotes from former physics
students about how they handled the challenges of the class well an also
wrote their own cost-reducing quote for future students. The second session
was a “booster” session in which students wrote about overcoming chal-
lenge in physics. Rosenzweig et al. also implemented a utility value inter-
vention that mirrored Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Brisson, et al.’s (2015,
Gaspard, Dicke, Flunger, Schreier, et al. 2015) utility value intervention.
Results showed that students in both conditions (especially lower achieving
students) had higher grades and examination scores than did students in the
control group, and also had more positive competence beliefs. Interestingly
neither intervention impacted students’ perception of the utility value of
physics. The cost reduction intervention reduced initially lower achieving
students’ perceptions of the cost of physics.
An important question regarding these interventions is at what ages can
utility value interventions first be implemented. Researchers to date have
examined their effectiveness in 9th grade through college students. Recently
Shin et al. (2019) reported a study of a utility value intervention done with
5th and 6th grade students in Korean science classrooms. They had students
read quotes from professionals about the usefulness (to themselves and to
their communities) of scientific knowledge in their careers, and also had
students write letters to younger students telling the how the professionals
they heard from utilized scientific knowledge. They found that intervention
group students’ perceptions that science was useful (both personally and
communally) and intentions to continue to engage in science activities
increased, whereas those in the control decreased. The intervention had
the same effects for both boys and girls, and higher and lower achieving
students. There were no direct effects on achievement but the intervention

had a positive indirect effect through students’ own math utility value.
Taken together, it is encouraging to see that relatively brief interventions
based in EVT have positive effects on different aged students’ motivation
and achievement in a variety of subject areas. There are many important
issues to address as this literature continues to grow. One is the issue noted
in the previous paragraph; how early can such intervention be implemented
successfully? The youngest children included in this research so far are 5th
graders. Given Wigfield’s (1994) discussion of when the different value
components emerge utility value interventions may be able to be extended
to younger children but probably not too much younger children likely
don’t understand what “usefulness” means in a broader sense. We think that
interventions to promote intrinsic value likely could be implemented with
younger children. Hidi and Renninger (2006) have done some intervention
work focused on enhancing students’ interest; these studies are based in their
four phase model of interest development rather than EVT but are germane
to the discuss here because the two constructs overlap. Guthrie and
Wigfield’s reading intervention work (called Concept Oriented Reading
Instruction or CORI) includes fostering interest as a key aspect of the inter-
vention (Guthrie, Wigfield, & Klauda, 2012; Guthrie, Wigfield, &
Perencevich, 2004). Guthrie et al. (2004) showed that 3rd grade students
in CORI had higher motivation and better achievement (measured by
project-specific reading comprehension measures and a standardized reading
tests) compared to other students in the participating schools. Perhaps there
could be a developmental sequence in EVT based interventions, starting
with interest, and then moving to attainment value, utility value, and cost
reduction.
Turning to attainment value, it is intriguing that to date no EVT based
interventions have focused on it. This is especially the case because
researchers implementing utility value interventions often state that they
impact students by increasing their sense that what they are learning is rel-
evant to them. We would argue that interventions designed to enhance
attainment value may be more likely to impact the “relevance” students
see in what they are learning (see Albrecht & Karabenick, 2017, for articles
focused on interventions designed to increase students’ sense that what they
are learning is relevant). Priniski, Hecht, and Harackiewicz (2017) provide
an interesting analysis of the construct of relevance, defining it as “a person-
ally meaningful connection to the individual” (p. 12). They propose a three-
part continuum of relevance from least to most meaningfully connected:
personal association, personal usefulness, and identification. They also dis-

cuss which type of relevance is most likely to be enhanced by different kinds
of interventions, proposing that utility value interventions most impact per-
sonal usefulness. They also propose that attainment value is most clearly con-
nected to identification, a point that Eccles (2009) also made, but also note
that to date there have not been EVT based intervention studies focused on
enhancing attainment value.
We close this section with two other points. The first concerns moder-
ators of the effects of utility value interventions (see Rosenzweig & Wigfield,
2016, for detailed discussion). Utility value interventions and now the one
cost intervention have different effects for different students (e.g.,
Harackiewicz et al., 2015; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009; Hulleman
et al., 2010). Interestingly, Durik, Shechter, Noh, Rozek, and
Harackiewicz (2014) found that the utility value intervention they
implemented in college math classes was more effective for students with
initially high expectancies. Canning and Harackiewicz (2015) discussed
how and why such differences arise, focusing in particular on different ways
in which the interventions are delivered and the fact that they have been
done in a variety of different subject areas.
Second, researchers should examine whether multifaceted EVT based
interventions are more effective than interventions focused solely on one
component of value such as utility value. Rosenzweig and Wigfield
(2016) discuss how intervention researchers have not examined systemati-
cally whether intervening on two or three task value components would
be more effective than intervening on just one, and if multifaceted interven-
tions were more effective, how much more so? In other words, does the cost
of implementing more complicated and likely more time-consuming inter-
ventions result in strong enough benefits with respect to outcomes to justify
the additional costs of implementation?
7. A look forward
We have provided suggestions for future research throughout the arti-
cle so we will just add some broad suggestions for areas of research we
believe should be priorities for work based in SEVT. First, it is important
to do more work on information sources individuals use as well as the pro-
cesses by which they come to value some activities and devalue others, both
specific activities such as math homework and broader ones like deciding to
major or not major in math. Beginning with the foundational 1983 and 1984
chapters (Eccles, 1984; Eccles-Parsons et al., 1983) up through our paper

discussing how dimensional comparisons influence expectancies and values
(Wigfield et al., under review) we have discussed different influences and
processes (see also Trautwein et al., 2013), from task-specific ones such as
interpretations of outcomes on different achievement tasks and affective
reactions to them, to broader ones like the impact of gender and gender role
stereotypes. Because much of the research looking at different parts of the
theory has relied on survey methodology, we have clear ideas about how
different constructs and proposed influences in the model connect, but (with
few exceptions; see Freedman-Doan et al., 2000 for one example) we and
others have not looked more closely at process. In doing such work we think
it essential to focus on developmental and contextual influences, both on the
sources of information individuals of different ages use, and the processes by
which they form their beliefs and values.
Second, we need continuing investigations of the relations among the
intrinsic, attainment, utility and cost components of task value, both in
determining individuals’ overall valuing of a given task, as well as their rela-
tions to activity choice in the short and long term. From the research
reviewed earlier we know that these components can be empirically distin-
guished, but we also know that they are correlated, with many of the cor-
relations being quite high. What has not been done, however, is to examine
the “relative weighting” of the different components of task value in for-
ming individuals’ overall valuing of a given activity. For instance, is individ-
uals’ overall valuing of some activities more strongly influenced by the
activity’s utility and others more influenced by intrinsic value? The purposes
for which the individual is engaging in the activity clearly will impact this
weighting; am I doing this activity in order to accomplish something else
(e.g., taking a required course that is not of great interest in order to meet
the requirements for my major), or am I doing it because it fits with my iden-
tity/broader sense of self? The nature of the activity itself, or in school set-
tings how activities are introduced and presented to students, will impact
how much students value the activity as well as the relative weighting of
the different value components. Eccles and Midgley (1989), Eccles,
Midgley, et al. (1993), Eccles, Wigfield, et al. (1993), Wigfield, Eccles,
and Rodriguez (1998) and Wigfield et al. (2015) discuss the impact of dif-
ferent aspects of schooling on children’s developing expectancies and STVs.
Work on these questions and issues will provide a much more nuanced
understanding of the nature of individuals’ overall values and their relations
to important outcomes. Incorporating individuals’ expectancies for success
into analyses looking at these relations then will provide a clearer picture of
the relations of both to performance and choice. As noted earlier, different
kinds of “comparative” survey questions are needed to get at the relative
value individuals attach to different activities, and person-centered analyses
may be a particularly informative approach for assessing the complex inter-
play of individuals’ expectancies and values.
Third, SEVT has been the theoretical basis for much work on gender
differences in motivation and an increasing amount of work on ethnic group
differences in motivation (e.g., Diemer, Marchand, Mckellar, & Malanchuk,
2016; Peck, Brodish, Malanchuk, Banerjee, & Eccles, 2014), but more work
needs to be done on how culture, ethnicity, gender, and (more importantly)
their interactions impact the development of individuals’ expectancies and
values. Both Tonks et al. (in press) and Wigfield, Gladstone, and Eccles
(2019) discuss culture and ethnicity’s impact on the development of chil-
dren’s expectancies and values; we refer readers to those chapters for detailed
discussion of that research.
We close this section with two other points. SEVT focuses on task or
activity specific values. In earlier articles (e.g., Wigfield & Eccles, 1992)
we discussed work on broader values individuals hold for different areas
of their lives, including achievement; Rokeach (1973) did the seminal work
on these kinds of values and created a taxonomy of them. Feather (1988) did
some initial work on the ties of these broader values to college students’ val-
uing of particular tasks. It may be time to revisit that work and explore these
relations in different groups, such as males and females, and younger and
older individuals, in order to connect the work on these two kinds of values
that impact activity choice and achievement.
Second, given that this article is being published in the Advances in Moti-
vation series that covers motivation from many different perspectives and dis-
ciplinary areas we hope that it might make motivation scholars in other fields
such as social psychology and economics more aware of the work on
expectancy-value models that has occurred and continues to flourish in devel-
opmental and educational psychology. When we read work on value in the
two literatures just mentioned, with the exception of Harackiewicz and col-
leagues there rarely are cites to the work we and others are doing in expec-
tancy value theory, despite the common roots of our work in Lewin, Tolman,
and Atkinson’s seminal work. As the timely and insightful “Motivation
Manifesto” published by the Society for the Science of Motivation states, it
is time to move past our traditional silos and one way to do so is to connect
and integrate the work on SEVT and other motivation theories.
8. Conclusion
Eccles, Wigfield, and colleagues’ SEVT continues to guide much
work in the motivation field, particularly in work that occurs in develop-
mental and educational psychology, something that is satisfying and gratify-
ing to the authors of this article. We are encouraged by the depth and
breadth of that work, and also are quite pleased that it is occurring in coun-
tries around the world. We look forward to the next decade of work based
in SEVT.
Acknowledgments
Much of the research on the development of children’s STVs done by Eccles, Wigfield, and
their colleagues discussed in this article was supported by Grant HD-17553 from the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). Other research of ours
discussed in this article was supported by Grant MH-31724 from the National Institute
for Mental Health, HD-17296 from NICHD, Grant BNS-8510504 from the National
Science Foundation, and grants from the Spencer Foundation. We would like to thank
Emily Rosenzweig for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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CHAPTER SIX
Adaptive self-regulation,
subjective well-being, and
physical health: The importance
of goal adjustment capacities☆
Carsten Wroscha,*, Michael F. Scheierb
a
Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada
b
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
*Corresponding author: e-mail address: carsten.wrosch@concordia.ca
Contents
1. Introduction 200
1.1 Importance of personal goals 200
1.2 Experience of unattainable goals and quality of life 202
1.3 Self-regulation of unattainable goals 205
2. Goal adjustment capacities 206
2.1 Goal adjustment and subjective well-being 208
2.2 Goal adjustment and physical health 214
3. Depressive mood, sadness, and goal adjustment 218
4.1 Tension between persistence and disengagement 224
4.2 How to improve goal reengagement capacity? 225
4.3 Stability of goal adjustment capacities 226
4.4 Goal adjustment capacities and other individual differences 227
5. Conclusions 230
Acknowledgments 232
References 232
Abstract
This chapter addresses how people manage the experience of unattainable goals and
protect their subjective well-being and physical health. It is argued that goals provide
structure and meaning to a person’s life and that goal attainment contributes to pat-
terns of successful development by facilitating subjective well-being and physical
health. However, when goals become unattainable, people need to disengage from
☆
We are saddened to report that Charles S. Carver passed away on June 22, 2019. He was involved in the
original development of the ideas that are reviewed in this chapter, the initial research that was conducted
in the area, as well as early reviews of this research domain. We and the field will miss him.

200 Carsten Wrosch and Michael F. Scheier
desired goals and pursue other, meaningful goals. Theoretical considerations and
empirical research associated with the concept of goal adjustment capacities are dis-
cussed. The reviewed literature leads to the conclusion that goal disengagement
and goal reengagement capacities represent adaptive self-regulation factors that ben-
efit subjective well-being and physical health. In addition, emotional responses to
emerging problems and intractable losses, such as depressive mood and sadness,
are identified as psychological factors that can facilitate goal disengagement. This chap-
ter concludes by highlighting some remaining questions and suggesting avenues for
future research.
1. Introduction
1.1 Importance of personal goals
Motivational theories postulate that goals are mental representations of
desired outcomes that constitute the building blocks of effective self-
regulation. Goals contribute to life-long patterns of successful development
and facilitate subjective well-being and physical health (Carver & Scheier,
1998; Emmons, 1986; Freund & Baltes, 2002; Heckhausen, Wrosch, &
Schulz, 2010, 2019). From this perspective, goals provide purpose for living
as they are frequently related to valued aspects of a person’s life that are
deemed to be potentially attainable (see expectancy-value models of moti-
vation, Atkinson & Birch, 1970). In addition, goals motivate concrete behav-
iors aimed at achieving progress toward desired outcomes. These behaviors
can play an important adaptive role in the short-term moment-to-moment
regulation of action (e.g., catching a bus to make an appointment on time)
and in the long-term regulation of self-relevant developmental goals
(e.g., achieving good grades in college to be accepted into a prestigious
graduate program). Thus, goals facilitate planning and goal-related behav-
iors, and enhance the likelihood of achieving developmental outcomes
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gollwitzer, 1999; Heckhausen, 1999). In addi-
tion, goals become important when people experience obstacles and prob-
lems in the pursuit of their goals. In such circumstances, goals may promote
effective coping and help people overcome goal-related barriers (Carver,
Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984).
Self-regulation theories have further conceptualized the processes by
which personal goals exert their adaptive functions. This perspective assumes
that goals form negative feedback loops, in which a person’s perception is
Adaptive self-regulation and health 201
compared to a reference value (i.e., a goal, Miller, Galanter, & Pribram,

1960). If such a comparison process yields a negative discrepancy (i.e., a dif-
ference between where the person is and where the person wants to be), it
typically motivates a person to engage in approach-oriented behaviors aimed
at reducing this discrepancy. The perceived consequences of the ensuing
behavioral response are subsequently re-compared to the reference value,
resulting in a continuous process of goal regulation that moves a person
closer to the achievement of desired outcomes (Carver & Scheier,
1981, 1998).
From a personality perspective, the likelihood of success in goal attain-
ment (i.e., of reducing a negative discrepancy) can vary from person to per-
son. This may be the case because there are important individual differences
that determine the duration and type of goal-related behavioral responses.
To identify such variables, research on the self-regulation of behavior has
focused on psychological factors that foster goal regulation and enhance
the likelihood of success in achieving a desired goal. This line of research
has shown, for example, that people who are optimistic, perceive high levels
of self-efficacy or self-mastery, are better able to control the environment, or
have more grit, are particularly likely to achieve their goals by reducing the
discrepancy between a desired outcome and their current goal-related status
(Bandura, 1997; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007;
Heckhausen et al., 2010; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978; Scheier & Carver,
1985). Consequently, they may also experience a good quality of life, asso-
ciated with subjective well-being and physical health (Carver &
Scheier, 1998).
Considering the importance of goal attainment and its beneficial conse-
quences on a person’s quality of life, it is not surprising that much of the lit-
erature on motivation and self-regulation has focused on understanding how
people can successfully pursue personal goals and overcome obstacles in their
attainment. Although we concur that processes resulting in persistence and
goal attainment are important for achieving a good quality of life, we would
argue that a very a different set of self-regulation processes are also needed in
order to engage in adaptive behavioral self-regulation. More specifically, we
believe that self-regulation processes associated with giving-up on desired
goals and engaging in alternative goals are also essential and necessary com-
ponents of adaptive self-regulation (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, &
Schulz, 2003).
The processes involved in the abandonment of goals historically have
received far less attention in the literature on adaptive self-regulation or have
been treated as undesired concomitants of goal failure (Seligman, 1975;

Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Over the past decades, however, a growing
body of theory and research from personality and lifespan developmental
psychology has begun to document that the adjustment of unattainable goals
can be an adaptive self-regulation process (Brandtst€adter & Renner, 1990;
Carver & Scheier, 1999; Heckhausen et al., 2010; Wrosch, Scheier,
Carver, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003).
From this perspective, the adaptive consequences of goal disengagement
and the pursuit of alternative goals may emerge because sometimes there is
no behavior that can secure the attainment of a desired goal. In such circum-
stances, a person who persistently pursues a threatened goal is unable to
make progress toward the goal and may suffer the adverse consequences
of continued goal failure on her or his subjective well-being and physical
health. To avoid these negative effects of goal failure, people who confront
unattainable goals need to disengage from the goal and reengage in other
meaningful goals. The enactment of such goal-adjustment processes is pre-
sumed to protect a person’s well-being and health. These are the nature of
the processes that provide the focus of this article.
1.2 Experience of unattainable goals and quality of life

In many circumstances, people encounter relatively favorable opportunities
to attain their goals. Even if they confront obstacles, they may be able to
overcome difficulty in goal pursuit by investing more time and energy, rec-
ruiting help and advice from other people, or choosing a different path
toward a desired goal (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Heckhausen, 1999;
Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996). At times, however, people face circum-
stances, in which the attainment of a desired goal is not possible.
Theory and research examining the experience of unattainable goals sug-
gests that such severe goal constraints are a relatively common phenomenon
(Bauer, 2004; Brandtst€adter & Renner, 1990; Heckhausen et al., 2010;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). This is the case because people can
experience unattainable goals for a number of different reasons. For exam-
ple, they may choose an unrealistic goal in the first place (e.g., being admit-
ted to a prestigious graduate program, but not having a sufficiently high
GPA). In addition, people may encounter adverse life events that render
the attainment of a desired goal unattainable (e.g., developing a disease or
having an accident and not being able to work any longer). Moreover, there
are life circumstances that require people to focus all their time and energy
on a threatened goal or on managing a pressing stressor (e.g., accomplishing

time-consuming work projects or recovering from a health problem), which
may make it impossible to pursue other valued goals (e.g., travelling or
enjoyable leisure activities). Finally, goals may also become unattainable
for age-normative reasons. To this end, lifespan developmental theories sug-
gest that biological, sociocultural, and age-normative factors can reduce the
opportunities people have to produce desired outcomes (Baltes, 1987;
Heckhausen, 1999). As people advance in age, they typically have fewer
internal resources available to attain their goals and confront increasing con-
straints on the pursuit of their goals, which enhances the likelihood of
experiencing a larger number of unattainable goals in older adulthood
(Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996).
Regardless of the reasons for experiencing an unattainable goal, the con-
tinued pursuit of a goal that cannot be attained creates a problem for a per-
son’s quality of life (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). People who pursue
unattainable goals will, by definition, encounter stagnation in goal progress
and repeated failure. To this end, Fig. 1 depicts a simplified model, concep-
tualizing how unattainable goals can influence psychological well-being and
physical health. It postulates that the experience of unattainable goals and
associated goal failure can adversely affect a person’s subjective well-being
(Fig. 1, path a-b), resulting, for example, in increased levels of depressive
symptoms or a lack of purpose in life (Carver & Scheier, 1999). People
Unattainable goals (a)
Goal adjustment
Reduced psychological well-being (b)
Physiological and behavioral

dysregulation (c)
Physical illness (d)
Fig. 1 Theoretical model addressing the importance of goal adjustment in the associ-
ations between unattainable goals (a), reduced psychological well-being (b), physiolog-
ical and behavioral dysregulation (c), and physical illness (d).
who pursue unattainable goals are also likely to engage in maladaptive

cognitive processes, such as rumination and the maintenance of improba-
ble intentions, which may further deteriorate their psychological well-being
(Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Kuhl & Helle, 1986;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994).
Given that the resources people have available for goal pursuit are limited
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, & Muraven, 2018; Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996),
people who keep pursuing unattainable goals may also be less likely to invest
time and energy in the pursuit of other important and potentially feasible
goals (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003). As such, they may not expe-
rience the positive psychological consequences deriving from the attainment
of goals in other areas of life (e.g., purpose or positive emotions, Wrosch,
Scheier, & Miller, 2013), which could compensate for the adverse effects
of failure in the attainment of an important goal on their psychological
well-being (Carver & Scheier, 1999; Wrosch, 2011).
The psychological distress and emotional turmoil resulting from the pur-
suit of unattainable goals may further impact a person’s physical health
(Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller, 2007). Such an effect can occur if
psychological distress disturbs important physiological processes in the endo-
crine and immune systems or triggers maladaptive health behaviors (Fig. 1,
path b-c). Disturbances in these physiological and behavioral processes, in
turn, may increase a person’s likelihood of developing clinical disease
(Fig. 1, path c-d).
In support of these assumptions, distress has been associated with
adverse changes in cortisol regulation and chronic inflammation (Heim,
Ehlert, & Hellhammer, 2000; Segerstrom & Miller, 2004), health-
compromising behaviors (e.g., reduced physical activity, Roshanaei-
Moghaddam, Katon, & Russo, 2009), self-reported health problems
(e.g., asthma; Afari, Schmaling, Barnhart, & Buchwald, 2001), and clinical
illness (e.g., common cold; Cohen, Doyle, Turner, Alper, & Skoner,
2003). Note that the development of physical disease is likely to further
constrain a person’s opportunities for pursuing other important goals,
enhance psychological distress, and disturb a person’s physiological and
behavioral functions (Fig. 1, paths d-a, d-b, and d-c; Barlow, Wrosch,
Heckhausen, & Schulz, 2017; Heckhausen et al., 2019). The result is a
downward spiral characterized by increases in psychological distress along
with further dysregulation of health relevant physiological and behavioral
processes.
1.3 Self-regulation of unattainable goals

Given the impact of experiencing unattainable goals on a person’s quality of
life, the identification of adaptive self-regulation processes that can mitigate
these negative consequences is of primary importance. To this end, different
researchers have pointed to the possibility that adaptive goal adjustment pro-
cesses, enacted when unattainable goals are encountered, can critically protect
a person’s quality of life (see moderation path in Fig. 1). These theoretical
accounts assume that goal disengagement is an important process in the successful
management of unattainable goals, and suggest a number of different self-
regulation processes that could be associated with goal disengagement
(Carver & Scheier, 1999; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Wrosch, Scheier,
Carver, et al., 2003). For example, it has been proposed that people can main-
tain their subjective well-being if they psychologically accommodate to the
inability to reach a goal by flexibly adjusting to unattainable goals
(Brandtst€adter & Renner, 1990). In addition, people may protect their quality
of life if they reprioritize certain goals by redefining an unattainable goal as not
necessary for achieving a satisfied life (Sprangers & Schwartz, 1999) or accept a
less stringent standard for the goal being pursued (Carver & Scheier, 1999).
Research from the motivational theory of lifespan development further
suggests that people need to engage in certain self-protective, secondary
control strategies in the context of goal failure. Such control strategies relate
to downward social comparisons, self-protective attributions, or positive
reappraisals, which can protect self-related perceptions and psychological
well-being and foster disengagement by making it easier for a person to
accept that a certain goal is out of reach (Heckhausen et al., 2010, 2019).
Similarly, Folkman (1997) postulated that meaning-based coping processes
can contribute to improved levels of emotional well-being among people
who confront stressful situations that cannot be resolved. Such meaning-
based coping tactics involve, among other things, a positive reframing of
stressful encounters, which may help some people to adapt to the experience
of goal-related constraints (Folkman, 1997).
In addition to pointing to the importance of goal disengagement, many
of the latter theoretical accounts address the importance of goal reengagement
when people cannot make progress toward a desired goal (Brandtst€adter &
Renner, 1990; Folkman, 1997; Heckhausen et al., 2010). From this perspec-
tive, people who confront an unattainable goal need to identify and pursue
other, feasible goals. Note that these approaches further consider that goal
disengagement may not only protect subjective well-being and physical
health directly in the context of unattainable goals, but it also frees up

resources that can be used elsewhere (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
If the resources available to a person do get reallocated to the pursuit of an
alternative and valued activity or goal, the person’s life can continue with
purpose. Such feelings could prevent the experience of the aimlessness asso-
ciated with goal failure or lack of goal progress toward a particular goal, as
well as contribute to an increase in the positivity of the person’s emotional
state (Carver & Scheier, 1999; Ryff, 1989). In this regard, the pursuit of new
meaningful goals may promote a sense of coherence and feelings of control
(Antonovsky, 1987; Kobasa, 1979; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). These ideas are
consistent with action-phase models of motivation, which propose that
the pursuit of new goals is associated with a change in focus of a person’s
thought content toward the newly adopted goal (e.g., after crossing the
Rubicon, Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Heckhausen, 1999).
As such, the engagement with new goals may shift negative thought content
and attention away from an unattainable goal, which could reduce adverse
psychological states associated with the inability to attain a desired goal
(Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
2. Goal adjustment capacities

The previous discussion suggests that there are different specific self-
regulation processes that people can use to manage the experience of
unattainable goals. Our theoretical model assumes that many of these pro-
cesses are functionally associated with two broader self-regulation capacities,
which we address in our research. These capacities reflect the extent to
which (1) people are capable of disengaging from an unattainable goal
(i.e., goal disengagement capacities) and to which (2) they are capable of
pursuing alternative goals if they encounter an unattainable goal (i.e., goal
reengagement capacities, Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003, Wrosch,
Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
Regardless of the specific self-regulation tactics employed by different
people in different situations, our model takes a broader individual differ-
ence perspective. It assumes that people differ in their general tendencies
to engage in adaptive self-regulation processes across different goals, life cir-
cumstances, and time. As such, it suggests the presence of individual differ-
ences in general goal disengagement capacities and goal reengagement
capacities (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Said differently, we have pro-
posed that some people generally have a difficult time disengaging from
Prevents accumulated
Goal disengagement failure experience
capacities
• Reduction of effort
Provides resources
• Withdrawal of commitment
for other activities
Goal reengagement Creates

capacities purpose in life
• Identification of new goals
• Commitment to new goals Reduces thoughts and
• Pursuit of new goals feelings about failure
Fig. 2 Motivational components and main functions of goal disengagement and goal
reengagement capacities.
unattainable goals or reengaging in new goals, irrespective of the specific

unattainable goal encountered. Other people, by contrast, may adjust to
the experience of unattainable goals relatively easily (Wrosch, Scheier, &
Miller, 2013).
Our theoretical model has defined the basic motivational processes that
reflect the capacities people have to disengage from unattainable goals and to
reengage in alternative goals. To this end, Fig. 2 shows that goal disengage-
ment capacities involve the tendency to withdraw commitment and effort from
an unattainable goal. Goal reengagement capacities, by contrast, relate to the
tendency to identify, commit to, and pursue new or alternative goals when
unattainable goals are encountered (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). We assume that goal disengagement
and goal reengagement capacities are adaptive personality dimensions that
can facilitate psychological well-being and physical health. In addition, these
capacities have been conceptualized as independent dimensions that can sep-
arately influence subjective well-being and physical health by serving dis-
tinct functions in the self-regulation of behavior (Wrosch, Miller,
Scheier, & de Brun, 2007; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
Fig. 2 illustrates some of the main mechanisms linking goal adjustment
capacities with quality of life outcomes. The primary function of goal dis-
engagement capacities is thought to relate to the avoidance of repeated fail-
ure experiences and an associated reduction of emotional distress deriving
from the pursuit of unattainable goals. As noted, there may also be other
benefits of goal disengagement capacities, related to the preservation of emo-
tional and motivational resources, which could be reallocated to the
effective pursuit of other important goals (Wrosch et al., 2007; Wrosch,

Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Goal
reengagement capacities, by contrast, may mainly contribute to quality of
life because the pursuit of other important goals provides purpose for living
and their attainment can increase positive aspects of well-being. In addition,
these psychological benefits of goal reengagement capacities may reduce
negative thoughts associated with the inability to further pursue an impor-
tant goal and thus could also buffer some of the adverse emotional conse-
quences of goal failure (see Fig. 2; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003).
To start examining these propositions empirically, we have developed the
Goal Adjustment Scale (GAS; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003), which
represents a self-report instrument that measures individual differences in
general goal disengagement and goal reengagement capacities. This scale asks
people to report how they usually react if they cannot make further progress
toward an important goal in their lives. The GAS includes two subscales,
with four items measuring goal disengagement capacities (two items for
measuring withdrawal of effort and commitment, respectively) and six items
measuring goal reengagement capacities (two items for measuring the iden-
tification, commitment to, and pursuit of alternative goals, respectively).
A recently conducted meta-analysis showed that goal disengagement and
goal reengagement capacities are correlated positively, but only to a modest
extent (average r ¼ 0.17, p < 0.01, Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019),
pointing to the relative independence of both capacities. In addition, this
meta-analysis showed satisfactory internal consistencies of the goal disen-
gagement scale (average α ¼ 0.76) and of the goal reengagement scale (aver-
age α ¼ 0.86, Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019) across studies. These data
suggest that the GAS is an appropriate and reliable measurement instrument
that can be used to study how people manage unattainable goals and protect
their subjective well-being and physical health.
2.1 Goal adjustment and subjective well-being

Research using the GAS has examined the associations between goal adjust-
ment capacities and indicators of subjective well-being. This line of work
provided evidence for the adaptive functions of goal adjustment capacities
in several cross-sectional studies. For example, positive associations between
goal disengagement capacities and lower levels of perceived stress, depressive
symptoms, and intrusive thoughts have been shown in samples of colleague
students and community-dwelling adults (Wrosch et al., 2007; Wrosch,
Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
Research has also examined the effects of goal disengagement capacities

among people who confront particularly severe and pressing goal-related
stressors. These studies suggest that goal disengagement capacities can
become paramount for predicting reduced levels of psychological distress
in populations that experience stressors that render the attainment of desired
goals unattainable. For example, one study compared groups of parents
whose children had cancer with parents of medically healthy children.
The study showed that goal disengagement capacities had a stronger associ-
ation with reduced levels of depressive symptoms among parents of children
with cancer, as compared to parents of healthy children (Wrosch, Scheier,
Carver, et al., 2003). Another study examined emotional well-being among
a group of women with breast cancer. Results from this study documented
that goal disengagement was associated with lower levels of daily negative
affect (Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). Such effects of goal disengagement capac-
ities on reduced levels of psychological distress may be observed in the con-
text of intractable goal-related stressors because goal disengagement prevents
a person from experiencing repeated failure and allows the person to
reallocate time and energy to the pursuit of important and pressing goals
(Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
Longitudinal studies have substantiated the pattern of results obtained in
the latter studies by providing evidence that goal disengagement capacities
are also associated with reduced levels of psychological distress over time.
One study followed a group of community-dwelling older adults over
6 years (Dunne, Wrosch, & Miller, 2011). This study demonstrated that
levels of depressive symptoms remained stable and low among those older
adults who reported high levels of goal disengagement capacities. Among
their counterparts, however, who reported low levels of goal disengagement
capacities, depressive symptoms linearly increased over time and their levels
reached the cut-off for clinical depression after 6 years of study. In addition,
this study showed that the observed increase in older adults’ depressive
symptoms was particularly pronounced among those older adults who
had difficulty disengaging from unattainable goals and experienced the onset
of functional limitations during the study period (e.g., not being able to go
out or wash themselves, Dunne et al., 2011).
Another study examined indicators of psychological well-being among
people who underwent lower limb amputation. This study showed that goal
disengagement capacities were associated with a reduction of depressive
symptoms over 6 months of study (Coffey, Gallagher, & Desmond,
2014). Finally, data from a longitudinal study of caregivers of mentally ill
family members documented that caregiver burden was associated with
an increase in participants’ depressive symptomatology over 17 months.

Again, however, such an effect was observed only among caregivers with
low levels of goal disengagement capacities, and not among their counter-
parts who had an easier time disengaging from unattainable goals (Wrosch,
Amir, & Miller, 2011).
The findings from these studies suggest that goal disengagement can
buffer the emotional distress deriving from stressful life circumstances that
are likely to constrain the pursuit of desired goals. Of note, these reported
studies also concurrently examined the influence of goal reengagement capac-
ities. Interestingly, in some of these studies, goal reengagement was not asso-
ciated with a reduction of psychological distress. For example, goal
reengagement was not related to psychological distress among colleague stu-
dents, it did not predict reductions in depressive symptoms among older
adults, and it was not associated with daily negative affect among women
with breast cancer (Dunne et al., 2011; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013;
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
Not all studies have shown such differential effects of goal disengagement
and goal reengagement capacities. Other, and more recently conducted
studies have linked goal reengagement with reduced levels of psychological
distress. For example, the previously reported study on parents of children
with cancer documented that in addition to goal disengagement, goal
reengagement capacities were an independent predictor of reduced levels
of depressive symptoms among parents whose children had cancer
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003). In a similar vein, the above-reported
study among caregivers of family members with mental illness indicated that
goal reengagement buffered the cross-sectional association between care-
giver burden and depressive symptomatology (Wrosch et al., 2011). In addi-
tion, a study of women with breast cancer showed that goal reengagement
capacity was associated prospectively with reduced levels of negative affect
(Mens & Scheier, 2016). As a consequence, it seems likely that not only goal
disengagement capacities, but also goal reengagement capacities, have the
potential to ameliorate levels of psychological distress in populations that
confront unattainable goals (Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019).
There is also evidence that goal reengagement capacities are reliably asso-
ciated with positive indicators of psychological well-being. For example, a
number of cross-sectional studies are consistent with the conclusion that
goal reengagement can facilitate purpose in life. These studies included sam-
ples of college students, family caregivers, and people with suicidal ideation
(O’Connor & Forgan, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2011; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller,
et al., 2003). Moreover, cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have shown
that goal reengagement can predict high levels of positive emotions in
community-dwelling adults and women with breast cancer (Bauer, 2004;
Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). One study of women with breast cancer exam-
ined the effects of goal reengagement capacities on both purpose in life
and positive emotions (Mens & Scheier, 2016). This study showed prospec-
tive effects of goal reengagement capacities on increased levels of purpose
in life and positive emotions. In addition, it documented indirect effects,
suggesting that increases in purpose in life can mediate the benefits of goal
disengagement capacities on increased levels of positive affect, and vice versa
(Mens & Scheier, 2016). Note that the former effect is consistent with our
theoretical framework, since it suggests that the pursuit of new goals may
provide purpose for living, which could trigger increases in positive emo-
tional states if people make progress toward their newly adopted goals
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
Of importance, a substantial number of studies suggest that effects of goal
disengagement capacities on positive indicators of subjective well-being are
generally weak or absent (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). For example,
goal disengagement was not associated with purpose in life in the above-
reported studies including colleague students, family caregivers, and people
with suicidal ideation (O’Connor & Forgan, 2007; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller,
et al., 2003; Wrosch et al., 2011). In a similar vein, goal disengagement
did not predict positive emotions in samples of community-dwelling adults
and women with breast cancer (Bauer, 2004; Mens & Scheier, 2016;
Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). Although this pattern of findings suggests that
goal reengagement, but not goal disengagement, could facilitate positive
aspects of subjective well-being, note that not all studies are consistent with
this conclusion. For example, one study among older adults, showed that
levels of goal disengagement (but not goal reengagement) were associated
with higher levels of social support satisfaction, and buffered the adverse
effect of social support declines on older adults’ social support satisfaction
(Wrosch, Rueggeberg, & Hoppmann, 2013).
Together, the reviewed literature suggests that both goal disengagement
and goal reengagement capacities can facilitate subjective well-being when
people confront constraints on the pursuit of their personal goals. In addition,
the findings indicate that there may be some differential patterns with respect
to predicting positive versus negative indicators of subjective well-being.
That is, results from some earlier studies suggested that goal disengage-
ment might be more strongly related to negative (as compared to positive)
aspects of subjective well-being, whereas goal reengagement might be a
stronger predictor of positive (as compared to negative) aspects of subjective
well-being (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from a narrative review of differ-
ent single studies. Fortunately, a recently conducted meta-analysis tested
empirically whether goal disengagement and goal reengagement capacities
are differentially related to positive and negative aspects of subjective
well-being. The meta-analysis included 421 effect sizes from 31 indepen-
dent samples, reporting associations between goal adjustment capacities and
different indicators of subjective well-being (Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath,
2019). It further grouped different facets of psychological well-being into
categories of indicators of positive well-being (e.g., positive affect, purpose in
life, or life satisfaction) and indicators of negative well-being (e.g., depressive
symptoms, perceived stress, or intrusions).
Fig. 3 illustrates the pattern of obtained meta-analytic effects. The anal-
ysis showed that the valence of the well-being indicators moderated the
effect of goal disengagement capacities on subjective well-being. However,
the valence of the well-being indicators did not moderate the effect of goal
reengagement capacities on subjective well-being (Barlow, Wrosch, &
McGrath, 2019). While goal disengagement capacities were not associated
0.3
**
subjective well-being
0.2
Associations with
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2 **
**
-0.3 Goal disengagement Goal reengagement
Positive well-being indicators

Negative well-being indicators
Fig. 3 Meta-analytic associations between goal disengagement and goal

reengagement capacities and positive and negative indicators of subjective well-being.
Adapted from Barlow, M. A., Wrosch, C., & McGrath, J. J. (2019). Goal adjustment capacities
and quality of life: A meta-analytic review. Published online first. Journal of Personality.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12492.
with positive indicators of subjective well-being across studies, they signif-

icantly predicted lower levels of negative indicators of subjective well-being.
Goal reengagement capacities, by contrast, were associated with both higher
levels of positive indicators of subjective well-being and lower levels of neg-
ative indicators of subjective well-being across the observed studies (Barlow,
Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019).
The observed meta-analytic results are consistent with the theoretical
postulate that goal disengagement capacities exert their beneficial function
primarily by preventing the repeated experience of goal failure and reduc-
ing associated psychological distress (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, et al., 2003;
Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). In addition, they support the notion
that goal reengagement capacities provide purpose for living when people
confront unattainable goals and that the successful pursuit of new and pur-
poseful goals can increase positive aspects of psychological well-being.
Finally, the meta-analytic findings are consistent with the idea that goal
reengagement capacities can reduce negative psychological states associ-
ated with the inability to make progress toward the attainment of a
personal goal.
Nonetheless, the meta-analytic results did not provide support for the
theoretical claim that goal disengagement can provide resources that can
be reallocated to the pursuits of other valuable goals and thus may also pre-
dict positive emotional consequences of new goal pursuits. One possible
explanation contributing to the absence of such an effect is that the provision
of resources may not always lead to positive outcomes. This assumption is
consistent with studies examining vulnerable populations who may not have
many options for alternative goal pursuits, which could make it difficult for
them to engage in new goals when a valuable goal becomes unattainable
(e.g., older adults or suicidal people, O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte,
MacHale, & Masterton, 2009; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003).
Research from these studies suggests that in circumstances when alternative
options for goal pursuit are scarce, goal disengagement may not be adaptive,
or may even reduce purpose for living and emotional well-being, unless
people are able to engage in new goals. In such circumstances, people
who abandon desired goals and do not engage in new goals may have noth-
ing left to pursue in life and are therefore unlikely to experience the positive
psychological effects typically associated with the pursuit of new goals
(Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Clearly, more research is needed to clar-
ify the conditions under which goal disengagement might enhance positive
affect and not just diminish negative affect.
2.2 Goal adjustment and physical health

Our theoretical model assumes that enhanced subjective well-being, which
derives from adaptive goal adjustment capacities, can further facilitate
health-relevant processes associated with physiological regulation and phys-
ical disease (for emotions, physiological functioning, and disease, see Cohen
et al., 2007; Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Miller,
Chen, & Zhou, 2007). Empirical evidence for beneficial effects of goal dis-
engagement capacities on physical health has been reported in cross-
sectional and longitudinal research (Wrosch et al., 2007). For example, a
cross-sectional study of community-dwelling adults showed that goal disen-
gagement capacities were associated with the experience of fewer health symp-
toms, such as eczema or constipation. In addition, this study indicated that
the effect of goal disengagement on reduced levels of physical health symp-
toms was statistically mediated by lower levels of depressive symptoms
(Wrosch et al., 2007).
The latter pattern of findings was replicated in two longitudinal studies
among university students and older adults. The study of university students
documented that goal disengagement capacities, measured at the beginning
of a semester, predicted fewer physical health symptoms and improved sleep
quality toward the end of the semester. Again, the beneficial effects of goal
disengagement capacities on these health-related indicators were mediated
by a reduction of emotional distress experienced during the course of the
semester (Wrosch et al., 2007). In a similar vein, the study of older adults
showed that goal disengagement capacities predicted a reduced incidence
of the common cold over 6 years, particularly among persons in advanced
old age who are likely to encounter a larger number of unattainable goals.
Consistent with the previous research, this association was mediated by the
effect that goal disengagement exerted on a reduction of older adults’
depressive symptoms ( Jobin & Wrosch, 2016). Together, these findings
support the theoretical claim that the emotional consequences of goal dis-
engagement capacities could further affect a person’s physical health.
Research has also begun to identify the underlying physiological processes
that could link goal adjustment capacities with clinical health outcomes. Such
physiological processes may be associated with a dysregulation of endocrine
(e.g., cortisol output) and immune systems (e.g., chronic inflammation),
which have been observed frequently in the context of stress and emotional
turmoil, and shown to predict declines in physical health (Allin &
Nordestgaard, 2011; Cohen et al., 2007; Danesh et al., 2004; Kiecolt-
Glaser et al., 2002; Miller & Blackwell, 2006).
A cross-sectional study of adults examined this possibility by measuring

participants’ diurnal cortisol rhythms on four typical days. The results of the
study showed that goal disengagement capacities were associated with a
steeper daily slope of cortisol secretion. In particular, adults who reported high
levels of goal disengagement capacities secreted less cortisol during the day and
evening hours than their counterparts who reported lower levels of goal
disengagement capacities (Wrosch et al., 2007). These findings suggest that
goal disengagement capacity may affect the output of a hormone that regulates
other bodily systems and is thought to link stress experiences and clinical
disease (Cohen et al., 2007; Sephton, Sapolsky, Kraemer, & Spiegel, 2000).
Research has also examined the associations between goal adjustment
capacities and mild, chronic inflammation, which represents another major
pathway to a number of age-related diseases that are associated with dys-
regulation of a person’s immune system (for inflammation and illness, see
Dandona, Aljada, Chaudhuri, Mohanty, & Garg, 2005; Willerson &
Ridker, 2004). In this regard, a cross-sectional study of women with breast
cancer documented that goal disengagement capacity was negatively associ-
ated with the pro-inflammatory cytokine C-reactive protein (CRP;
Castonguay, Wrosch, & Sabiston, 2014). The latter finding was substanti-
ated in longitudinal research, examining adolescent women at risk of devel-
oping an affective disorder. Results from this study indicated that CRP levels
linearly increased over time among those adolescents who were not able to
disengage from unattainable goals. Among their counterparts, however,
who reported comparatively higher levels of goal disengagement capacities,
levels of CRP remained low and stable over the study period (Miller &
Wrosch, 2007). These findings suggest that goal disengagement capacities
may not only reduce cortisol production, but can also be associated with
another physiological process that is partially regulated by cortisol
(Heffner, 2011)—the dysregulation of immune function and associated
increases in mild, chronic inflammation. To the extent that levels of inflam-
mation remain chronically high in the observed populations, they may rep-
resent early risk factors of a number of clinical diseases that typically emerge
later in life.
Note that the reported studies also examined the health effects of goal
reengagement capacities. To this end, the previously addressed studies showed
that only goal disengagement, and not goal reengagement, were associated
with endocrine and immune function and predicted health behaviors and
physical illness (Castonguay et al., 2014; Jobin & Wrosch, 2016; Miller &
Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2007). Although this pattern of findings
had led us in the past to speculate that goal reengagement capacities may be
less important for preventing physical illness (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller,
2013), more recent studies with clinical populations provided new evidence,
suggesting that goal reengagement capacities can also predict a variety of
indicators of physical health.
These studies examined populations that underwent the diagnosis and
treatment for cancer (Castonguay, Wrosch, & Sabiston, 2017; Mens &
Scheier, 2016; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). One study of women with breast
cancer showed that goal reengagement capacities predicted fewer physical
symptoms over the course of 1 week. In addition, this study documented
that the effect of goal reengagement on reduced physical symptoms was
mediated by high levels of physical activity (Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). This
finding may imply that goal reengagement can facilitate physical health if it
fosters specific health-promoting behaviors. Since women with breast can-
cer are frequently encouraged to change their life-style and engage in more
physical activity (Schmitz et al., 2010), increased levels of physical activity
may be observed because some women pursue new activity-related goals,
a process that could be supported by their goal reengagement capacities.
Consistent with the previous findings, another study of women with
breast cancer documented that goal reengagement capacity was prospec-
tively associated with increased levels of physical activity and more efficient
sleep. In addition, this study showed that the effect of goal reengagement on
high levels of physical activity was mediated by increased levels of positive
emotions (Mens & Scheier, 2016). Since positive emotions may motivate a
wide range of goal-related behaviors in stressful life circumstances (Folkman,
1997; Fredrickson, 2001), the latter finding points to another, related mech-
anism linking goal reengagement capacities and health-facilitating behaviors.
In this regard, some people may capitalize on the emotional benefits deriving
from goal reengagement capacities, and engage in a number of different
activities that promote their physical health.
Moreover, a longitudinal study of women with breast cancer showed
that goal reengagement can predict cortisol functioning and physical
activity in the context of high levels of negative affect (Castonguay
et al., 2017). This study examined the effects of goal adjustment capacities
on the within-person associations between high-arousal negative emo-
tions (e.g., feeling afraid or guilty), cortisol output, and physical activity.
The results of the study showed that low levels of goal reengagement
capacities predicted increased diurnal cortisol output when women expe-
rienced higher-than-normal levels of negative affect. High levels of goal
reengagement capacities, by contrast, were associated with increased levels of

physical activity when women with cancer experienced higher-than-normal
levels of negative affect.
We think that the latter results point to additional mechanisms that might
potentially link goal adjustment capacities with physical health. To this end,
a high level of goal reengagement capacity may not only buffer the link
between the experience of unattainable goals and reduced psychological
well-being (as suggested in Fig. 1, path a-b), but it may also reduce the effect
of emotional distress on patterns of physiological dysregulation (see Fig. 1,
path b-c). The latter effect may occur if people face existential stressors, such
as the diagnosis of cancer. In such circumstances, even those persons who
successfully coped with past stressors might not be able to avoid the emo-
tional turmoil deriving from the threat of cancer. Here, goal reengagement
may provide purpose for living and trigger positive emotions, which could
counteract the adverse effect of emotional distress on cortisol regulation
(Castonguay et al., 2017).
A second implication of the latter study is that negative emotions may not
always jeopardize health, and could be adaptive at times, if they motivate
health-facilitating behaviors (Kunzmann & Wrosch, 2018). For example,
since breast cancer populations are frequently overweight or obese
(Courneya, Katzmarzyk, & Bacon, 2008), feelings of guilt and fear could
trigger necessary and adaptive behavioral changes, such as increased physical
activity. However, such changes may only be implemented successfully if
people have the capacity to identify and engage in the pursuit of new goals
(Castonguay et al., 2017).
Together, the reported studies suggest that both goal disengagement and
goal reengagement capacities can be conducive to enhanced physical health.
Goal disengagement capacities were shown to reduce physiological dys-
regulation in endocrine and immune systems, and predicted adaptive health
behaviors and lower levels of clinical issues. In addition, the effects of goal
disengagement on clinical disease outcomes were mediated by reduced
levels of psychological distress. Goal reengagement capacities were also
shown to predict health-facilitating behaviors and reduced levels of physical
symptoms, and moderated the effects of emotional distress on cortisol dys-
regulation and physical activity. In addition, some of the effects of goal
reengagement on physical health outcomes were mediated by health-
promoting behaviors, such as physical activity.
Note, however, that goal disengagement and goal reengagement capac-
ities did not consistently predict health-related processes and outcomes
across all reviewed studies. To shed light on these partially inconsistent find-
ings, a recent meta-analysis attempted to identify health-related variables
that are most reliably associated with goal adjustment capacities (Barlow,
Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019). This meta-analysis concluded that both
goal disengagement and goal reengagement capacities are associated with
certain health-related outcomes. While goal disengagement capacities
predicted reduced levels of physical symptoms and more efficient sleep,
goal reengagement capacities were associated with reduced levels of phys-
ical symptoms and chronic disease, and with increased levels of physical
activity (Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019). Although these findings
support the theoretical idea that goal adjustment capacities can foster phys-
ical health, it is important to note that more research is needed. Some of the
estimates in the reported meta-analysis were based on a small number of
independent samples, which makes is difficult to determine the true effects
of goal adjustment capacities on different indicators of physical well-being
(Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019).
3. Depressive mood, sadness, and goal adjustment

The documented associations between individual differences in goal
adjustment capacities, subjective well-being, and physical health call for the-
ory and research identifying potential psychological processes that could
make it easier for a person to adjust to the experience of unattainable goals.
While there may be a host of potential factors, research on the predictors of
goal adjustment capacity is scarce. To start addressing this question, we focus
here on the roles that sadness and depressive mood could play in facilitating
goal disengagement.
The idea that certain negative emotions could support disengagement
from unattainable goals is grounded in functional accounts of emotion.
These theories assume that different negative emotions can serve unique
roles in signaling and addressing imbalances between people and their envi-
ronments (e.g., Ekman, 1999; Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991). As such, specific
negative emotions may have evolved in phylogenesis to link problematic life
circumstances with adaptive motivational responses (Heckhausen, 2000).
For example, while anger has been conceptualized as an approach-oriented
affect that could promote overcoming surmountable obstacles or reversing
injustice (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Lazarus, 1991), sadness and
depressive mood may enable people to disengage from goals that have
become unattainable or too costly to pursue (Klinger, 1975).
The latter assumption has been elaborated in theories derived from evo-
lutionary, personality, and lifespan developmental psychology (Andrews &
Thomson, 2009; Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000; Kunzmann, Kappes, &
Wrosch, 2014). For example, Klinger (1975) posited that people first mobi-
lize efforts if they confront obstacles in the pursuit of important goals. When
these efforts turn out to be insufficient and unsuccessful, however, depres-
sive mood arises to facilitate de-commitment from an improbable incentive
(Klinger, 1975; see also Carver & Scheier, 2017). In a similar vein, Nesse
(2000) postulated that depressive mood may confer an evolutionary advan-
tage by facilitating the abandonment of goals whose pursuit is likely to result
in danger, loss, or wasted effort. Note that there may also be other, indirect
mechanisms that could link depressive mood and goal disengagement capac-
ity. For example, if sadness is communicated to family members or friends, a
person may elicit emotional support, which could make it easier for the per-
son to accept that certain goals can no longer be pursued (Andrews &
Thomson, 2009; Heckhausen et al., 2019).
The idea that sadness could facilitate adaptive goal disengagement has
also been addressed in the discrete emotion theory to affective aging
(Kunzmann et al., 2014). This theory qualifies general accounts of emotion
and adaptation by providing an adult lifespan perspective. It postulates that
the salience and adaptive value of specific emotions can change across the
lifespan, based on age-normative changes in opportunities and constraints
for attaining desired goals and overcoming goal-related problems. Since
aging is frequently characterized by a loss of resources, increasing develop-
mental constraints, and a more frequent experience of unattainable goals
(Baltes, 1987; Heckhausen et al., 2010, 2019), certain emotions, such as sad-
ness, may become more salient and adaptive in older adulthood because they
could promote adaptive goal disengagement. Other emotions, by contrast,
that exert opposing motivational functions, such as anger, may show
reversed age effects. Research has supported these ideas by documenting that
although sadness increases as people advance in age, particularly when a per-
son experiences a loss of control toward the end of life, anger typically
declines across the adult lifespan (Kunzmann & Wrosch, 2017; Wrosch,
Barlow, & Kunzmann, 2018). In addition, this line of work has shown that
sadness may not exert the same adverse health effects as anger in predicting
older adults’ immune dysregulation and chronic disease (Barlow, Wrosch,
Gouin, & Kunzmann, 2019; Kunzmann & Wrosch, 2018).
To date, however, there are only few studies that have investigated the
proposition that sadness and depressive mood could foster adaptive goal
disengagement processes. One experimental study examined how fast clin-

ically depressed versus non-clinically depressed participants would disengage
from working on solvable and unsolvable computer tasks. This study
showed that depressed people disengaged faster from unsolvable, but not
solvable, tasks, as compared to their less depressed counterparts (Koppe &
Rothermund, 2017).
Another study, using the GAS, examined whether depressive symptoms
can improve goal disengagement capacity over time, and if such increases in
goal disengagement capacities would contribute to later emotional well-
being (Wrosch & Miller, 2009). This study sampled a group of adolescent
girls who were at risk of developing an affective disorder. The results of
the study showed that baseline levels of depressive symptoms predicted an
accelerated increase in adolescents’ goal disengagement capacities over
approximately 1 year of study. In addition, larger increases in goal disengage-
ment capacities forecasted reduced levels of depressive symptoms over the
subsequent 6 months (Wrosch & Miller, 2009). Note that this study also
examined adolescents’ goal reengagement capacities. However, associations
between depressive mood and changes in goal reengagement were not
observed, suggesting that the observed effects of depressive mood were
uniquely related to facilitating goal disengagement.
The latter findings are important for two reasons. First, they show that
depressive mood may not only make it easier for a person to disengage from
unattainable goals, but that such improvements in goal disengagement
capacity could contribute to further emotional benefits. The identification
of such an adaptive process contradicts previous theoretical arguments,
which assume that goal disengagement is a maladaptive consequence of goal
failure and a mere concomitant of depression (Seligman, 1975; Wortman &
Brehm, 1975).
Second, these findings may shed some light on the development of goal
disengagement capacities. Since adolescence can represent a life period
during which many young people adopt “lofty” goals that are unlikely
to be attained (e.g., playing quarterback in the NFL or having a date with
the most popular person, Reynolds, Steward, MacDonald, & Sischo,
2006), the depressive mood associated with such goal failures may trigger
repeated goal disengagement processes in this period of life. Considering
that such age-normative failure experiences are less consequential in ado-
lescence than in other periods of life (e.g., if a marriage does not work
out or work-related skills are no longer needed), and that adolescents typ-
ically have numerous options for alternative goal pursuits, they may learn
over time that life continues with purpose despite goal failures. Such an
experience and outlook could improve their general goal disengagement
capacities (Wrosch & Miller, 2009).
There are also some preliminary data from our ongoing research that
examine associations between discrete negative emotions and goal disen-
gagement capacities (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al., 2019). This research
builds on the idea that the effects of sadness (but not anger) on improved
goal disengagement capacity could become paramount in old age, when
people typically experience a larger number of unattainable goals
(Barlow, Wrosch, Gouin, & Kunzmann, 2019; Kunzmann et al., 2014).
More specifically, the study examined the presence of within-person effects
of sadness on older adults’ goal disengagement capacities, and whether such a
process can be associated with high levels of emotional well-being. In addi-
tion, it investigated whether effects of sadness on goal disengagement and
emotional well-being would be observable particularly among older adults
who encounter high levels of psychological or biological stress.
The results showed that higher within-person levels of sadness (but not
anger) predicted increases in goal disengagement capacities among older
adults who encountered high (but not low) levels of biological stress (as
reflected in diurnal cortisol levels). In addition, the findings indicated that
to the extent sadness was associated with improved goal disengagement
capacities, older adults experienced higher levels of emotional well-being
in specific circumstances that involved high (but not low) levels of biological
stress (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al., 2019). The findings of this study are
conceptually consistent with the pattern observed in adolescence. They doc-
ument that functional associations between sadness and improved goal dis-
engagement capacity can also be observed in older adulthood, and suggest
that this process can predict improved levels of emotional well-being. In
addition, they show that such effects may become paramount in the context
of high levels of biological stress.
Although we expected to observe comparable effects as a consequence of
psychological stress, the results did not support this idea. One explanation
could relate to meta-analytic findings documenting that high cortisol levels
are particularly observed in those stressful encounters that involve intractable
losses and uncontrollable circumstances (Miller et al., 2007). Thus, high cor-
tisol levels could represent an indicator of the experience of unattainable
goals in older adulthood, while psychological stress may relate to both
potentially controllable and uncontrollable problems (Barlow, Wrosch,
Hamm, et al., 2019). Although we feel that this possibility would contribute
to a more comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that allow spe-

cific emotions to facilitate adaptive motivational processes, more research is
clearly needed to substantiate this conclusion.
The reviewed studies provide evidence that sadness and depressive mood
can facilitate goal disengagement (but not goal reengagement) and contrib-
ute to a person’s quality of life. Depressive mood may foster the develop-
ment of goal disengagement capacity in adolescence and sadness may
make it easier to disengage from unattainable goals in older adulthood. In
addition, the studies provide preliminary evidence for the possibility that
such a process is particularly like to occur when people confront stressors
that involve intractable losses and uncontrollable circumstances.
The intertwining of sadness or depressive mood with goal disengage-
ment capacities can create difficulties for interpreting findings from studies.
The problem is that the association between these emotions and disengage-
ment appears to be bidirectional. That is, although goal disengagement
capacities can reduce levels of depressive symptoms or sadness, the same
emotional responses may also make it easier for a person to disengage from
unattainable goals. As a consequence, it is difficult to interpret any associa-
tion obtained between depressive mood or sadness with goal disengagement
capacities. Associations observed could either be due to disengagement
capacity influencing emotion or emotion influencing disengagement capac-
ity (or both processes influencing each other).
A recently conducted meta-analysis attempted to shed light on this prob-
lem by hypothesizing that goal disengagement capacity would be associated
with reduced levels of depressive symptoms in most populations, but that
this association may be reduced or even reversed in samples that are
at-risk of experiencing depression (e.g., high-risk for first onset of depressive
episode, diagnosis of major depressive disorder or dysthymia, or suicidal ide-
ation, Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019). Such differential effects could
occur because at-risk populations may experience more frequently intracta-
ble goal-related struggles and subsequent depressive mood, which may trig-
ger repeated cycles of disengagement from specific unattainable goals, and
through this process could reinforce an association between depressive
mood and goal disengagement capacities (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al.,
2019; Wrosch & Miller, 2009).
The results of the study supported this hypothesis and are illustrated in
Fig. 4. They showed that depression-risk status did not affect the association
between goal reengagement capacities and depressive symptoms. In both
groups, goal reengagement capacities were reliably associated with lower
levels of depressive symptoms. However, with respect to goal disengagement
0.3
depressive symptoms
0.2
Associations with
0.1 **
0
-0.1
-0.2
**
** **
-0.3 Goal disengagement Goal reengagement
At-risk samples Other samples
Fig. 4 Meta-analytic associations between goal disengagement and goal

reengagement capacities and depressive symptoms in samples at-risk for depression
and in other samples. Adapted from Barlow, M. A., Wrosch, C., & McGrath, J. J. (2019). Goal
adjustment capacities and quality of life: A meta-analytic review. Published online first.
Journal of Personality. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12492.
capacity, depression risk status moderated the association with depressive

symptoms. While goal disengagement capacity was associated with reduced
levels of depressive symptom in samples not at risk for depression, a reversed
association was observed in at-risk samples (see Fig. 4; Barlow, Wrosch, &
McGrath, 2019).
We think that these results may increase confidence in theories
suggesting that sadness or depressive symptoms could play an important role
in facilitating disengagement from unattainable goals (Klinger, 1975;
Kunzmann et al., 2014; Nesse, 2000). In populations that are at risk of
experiencing depression, the emergence of depressive mood could make
it easier to disengage from unattainable goals. As a consequence, we suggest
that more process-oriented research is needed to examine in fine-grained
analyses how goal adjustment capacities and indicators of subjective well-
being influence each other over time (Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath,
2019). In addition, such research should examine a person’s context more
comprehensively and distinguish those people who experience intractable
stressors or irrecoverable losses from their counterparts who confront poten-
tially addressable or only minor goal constraints. We feel that research along
these lines has great potential to illuminate how persons can successfully
adjust to the experience of unattainable goals.
4. Future directions
The discussed theoretical accounts and empirical literature provide
consistent evidence that goal disengagement and goal reengagement
capacities represent essential and necessary self-regulation factors that facil-

itate subjective well-being and physical health when people experience
unattainable goals. Nonetheless, we feel that more research is needed that
could expand the current knowledge base, and further illuminate how peo-
ple can adapt to the experience of unattainable goals. Some of such
remaining issues are addressed in subsequent sections.
4.1 Tension between persistence and disengagement

When people confront problems in the pursuit of their goals, there is often
tension between two opposing motivational forces. People either may want
to push through and overcome goal-related obstacles by investing more time
and energy, or they may feel inclined to abandon the goal and move on to
other goals or activities. For people who are caught in this goal-related strug-
gle, there is no easy answer. Sometimes, they may give up too early, and an
important goal could have been attained if they only would have persisted a
bit longer. At other times, they may try for too long, and keep pursuing a
goal that will never be attained.
A process that could promote maladaptive goal persistence has been
identified in psychological theories, which note that a person’s goal pursuits
are typically shielded against temptations and competing options. Such a
process likely prevents a person from processing contradictory information
or considering the pursuit of alternative goals, and could result in the con-
tinued pursuit of a previously adopted goal (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski,
2002; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). The latter psychological phenomenon
has also been described as an implemental mindset (Gollwitzer et al.,
1990), which supports the attainment of important goals after people have
adopted a goal, but could also enhance a person’s risk of pursuing goals that
are no longer attainable.
In order to avoid the continued pursuit of futile goals, Brandst€atter and
colleagues have proposed that repeated failure of goal-related progress can
give rise to an action crisis. The experience of such an action crisis may break
a person’s positively biased mind-set and trigger a new evaluation process
about whether or not the pursuit of a goal should be continued
(Brandst€atter, Herrmann, & Sch€ uler, 2013; Brandst€atter & Sch€ uler, 2013).
Pending the outcome of the evaluation, this process could play an important
role in preventing people from the continued pursuit of unattainable goals.
Our research would suggest that there may be additional psychological
factors that could elicit an action crisis and support adaptive goal
disengagement. Specifically, the previously reported findings on the effects

of sadness and depressive mood on improvements in goal disengagement
capacity may imply that specific negative emotions could be involved in
the emergence of an action crisis and an associated change of mind-sets.
In particular, sadness or depressive mood may result in a more realistic per-
ception of reality (Dykman, Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989) or elicit
support and new insights from significant others (Andrews & Thomson,
2009), and thus could trigger an action crisis by counteracting goal-
shielding. We feel that research examining these possibilities may contribute
to our understanding of how people successfully shift from active goal pur-
suits to goal disengagement.
4.2 How to improve goal reengagement capacity?

Our review concluded that certain negative emotions, such as sadness and
depressive mood, could facilitate disengagement from unattainable goals.
These emotions, however, did not predict changes in goal reengagement
capacities (Wrosch & Miller, 2009). As such, there is a paucity of empirical
evidence pointing to psychological factors that could make it easier for a
person to pursue new and feasible goals. Given the documented effects
of goal reengagement capacities on indicators of subjective well-being
and physical health (Barlow, Wrosch, & McGrath, 2019), however, such
knowledge could be used to help people manage the experience of
unattainable goals.
Taking a functional emotion perspective (Ekman, 1999; Frijda, 1988;
Lazarus, 1991), we would not exclude the possibility that certain emotions
may improve goal reengagement capacities. If specific emotions have
evolved in phylogenesis to link problematic life circumstances with effective
motivational responses (Heckhausen, 2000), some emotions could also fos-
ter the adoption of new goals. These emotions, however, may be completely
unrelated to sadness or depressive mood. Instead, it would be possible that
certain positive emotions, such as excitement or interest, motivate people to
pursue alternative goals when they can no longer make progress toward an
important goal.
This idea is consistent with theory and research that point to the motivat-
ing consequences of positive emotions among people who experience stress-
ful life circumstances (Folkman, 1997; Fredrickson, 2001; see also, Carver,
Scheier, & Johnson, 2014). Evidence supporting this possibility was reported
by Haase, Aviram, Wrosch, Silbereisen, and Heckhausen (2013) who showed
in two longitudinal studies that high-arousal positive affect (e.g., feeling

excited, interested, or enthusiastic) was associated with an increase in
participants’ goal reengagement capacities, but it did not predict an increase
in their goal disengagement capacities. We think that more research on
the psychological processes that promote adaptive goal adjustment is
needed. Such research may discover how people can improve their self-
regulation capacities and learn to effectively manage the experience of
unattainable goals.
4.3 Stability of goal adjustment capacities

Research suggests that goal adjustment capacities can develop in adolescence
and may be influenced by psychological and contextual factors in older
adulthood (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al., 2019; Wrosch & Miller,
2009). These findings imply that goal adjustment capacities are subject to
change. Just how stable are goal adjustment capacities? Research shows that
goal disengagement and goal reengagement capacities have only a moderate
amount of stability (1 year: rs ¼ 0.45–0.47; 2 years: rs ¼ 0.30–0.46, Dunne
et al., 2011; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). These data suggest that goal
adjustment capacities might not be as stable as other personality constructs,
such as the Big 5 personality factors or dispositional optimism (Carver &
Scheier, 2014; Costa Jr & McCrae, 1992).
It is important to note, however, that even personality factors that appear
generally stable can appear unstable at times. For example, test-retest corre-
lations for dispositional optimism typically range between the upper 0.50’s
to the lower 0.70’s, even when assessed over very long periods of time
(Scheier & Carver, 2018). Yet, the test-retest correlation for dispositional
optimism in a group of people undergoing a life transition (graduating
law school) was only in the low 0.30’s (Segerstrom, 2007). Consistent with
these findings, personality research has come to recognize that relatively sta-
ble individual difference variables can change or develop over time (e.g.,
personality development, Mroczek & Little, 2014; Renaud, Wrosch, &
Scheier, 2018).
Building on the latter idea, we think that the observed, more moderate
stability coefficients for goal adjustment capacities may suggest that some
people change their levels of goal adjustment capacities over time. Although
this process could be related to either improvement or deterioration of peo-
ple’s goal adjustment capacities, we note that lifespan developmental
research has documented consistently higher levels of goal adjustment
capacities and related constructs in older, as compared to young, adulthood
(Brandtst€adter & Renner, 1990; Heckhausen, 1997, 1999; Wrosch et al.,

2007). As such, it seems more likely that people experience an increase in
their goal adjustment capacities during their lives.
We suggest that such a process may occur if critical life events or tran-
sitions provide a context for changes in goal adjustment capacities. Here, the
experience of an unattainable goal may elicit certain psychological responses
(e.g., sadness or depressive mood) that are likely to support disengagement
from the respective goal (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al., 2019; Wrosch &
Miller, 2009). Considering that some people are able to replace such
unattainable goals with other meaningful activities, they may learn over time
that life continues with purpose despite major goal constraints, and develop
their general capacities to adjust to the experience of unattainable goals
(Wrosch & Miller, 2009).
Although this possibility suggests that goal adjustment capacities might
be at times less stable than some other personality factors because these
capacities can change as people experience repeated cycles of goal manage-
ment, more research is needed to determine the specific life circumstances
during which goal adjustment capacities remain stable as well as those events
and circumstances that contribute to less stability and provide a context for
potential improvements or declines in people’s self-regulation capacities.
4.4 Goal adjustment capacities and other individual

differences
Our approach has focused on the psychological and physical health effects of
goal disengagement and goal reengagement capacities (Wrosch, Scheier,
Miller, et al., 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). However, there
are other individual difference variables that serve important functions in
the self-regulation of behavior. In this regard, it would be interesting to
investigate how other personality factors relate to goal adjustment capacities
or work together with these capacities to foster effective self-regulation and
quality of life.
We approach this issue here by addressing some of our own research,
related to dispositional optimism, which has been defined as the extent to
which people expect positive versus negative outcomes to occur in their future
(Scheier & Carver, 1985). Different from goal adjustment capacities, optimism
supports adaptive self-regulation by fostering effective approach- and problem-
oriented coping in stressful life circumstances (Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). This
function of optimism increases the likelihood of overcoming goal-related
problems and attaining threatened goals (for a more comprehensive discussion,
see Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2017; Segerstrom, Carver & Scheier, 2017).
Data from a population of college students suggested that dispositional opti-

mism is positively associated with goal reengagement capacities, but unrelated
to their goal disengagement capacities (Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, &
Carver, 2006). Another study of caregivers of mentally ill family members
showed positive correlations between optimism and both goal adjustment
capacities. The association between optimism and goal reengagement, how-
ever, was considerably stronger than the association between optimism and
goal disengagement (Amir, 2012). In addition, two studies including older
adults, and people with chronic musculoskeletal pain, documented a pos-
itive association between optimism and goal reengagement, but a negative
association between optimism and goal disengagement. In both studies, the
positive association between optimism and goal reengagement was stronger
than the negative association between optimism and goal disengagement
(Ramı́rez-Maestre et al., 2019; Smagula et al., 2016).
These data document a reliable positive association between optimism
and goal reengagement capacities across studies. This overlap between both
constructs could further imply that they are functionally associated and share
some of the variance with indicators of quality of life. In support of this pos-
sibility, the reported studies of college students, and of people with muscu-
loskeletal pain, showed that part of the effect of goal reengagement capacities
on subjective well-being was associated with individual differences in opti-
mism (Ramı́rez-Maestre et al., 2019; Rasmussen et al., 2006). In addition,
the study of family caregivers indicated that the positive association between
goal reengagement and purpose in life was rendered non-significant if opti-
mism was controlled for, while goal reengagement capacities were uniquely
related to other indicators of well-being (e.g., positive affect, Amir, 2012).
Similarly, the study of older adults documented that some health benefits
(e.g., reduced functional disability) associated with goal reengagement
capacities were no longer significant when optimism (and conscientiousness)
were statistically considered, whereas other effects of goal reengagement on
health-related processes (e.g., increased physical activity) remained signifi-
cant (Smagula et al., 2016).
The reported data suggest functional and overlapping associations
between optimism, goal reengagement capacity, and indicators of quality
of life. Such effects may occur, for example, if optimism affects self-
regulation processes that facilitate the engagement with specific new goals.
In this regard, the positive outcome expectancies of optimists could result in
an increased perception of alternative and feasible goals that are available to
draw upon when they experience an unattainable goal. As a consequence,
different from their pessimistic counterparts, optimists may shift more rap-
idly toward an alternative goal when an important goal has become
unattainable (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). If such a process occurs repeat-
edly over time, it may contribute to improvements in general goal
reengagement capacity.
We recognize, however, that it is difficult to arrive at conclusions about
the direction of the latter process because it could be bidirectional. It is also
possible that people who have an easier time engaging in new goals become
more optimistic over time, if their new goals are being pursued successfully
(for change in optimism, see Renaud et al., 2018). Irrespective of the direc-
tion of this process, we would like to make the point that personality factors
that facilitate the regulation of specific goals may play a role in the develop-
ment of individual differences in goal reengagement capacities or optimism.
Over time, such a process may result in the emergence of an adaptive system
of different personality factors that are functionally associated with each
other, synergistically promote effective self-regulation, and foster subjective
well-being and physical health.
The reported data also suggested that optimism and goal disengagement
capacities may not share as much of the variance with indicators of quality of
life as optimism and goal reengagement. That is, the observed associations
between optimism and goal disengagement were generally smaller, or the
constructs were unrelated, and when they were related, the associations
ran in both directions, (Amir, 2012; Rasmussen et al., 2006; Smagula
et al., 2016). These findings suggest that associations between optimism
and goal disengagement capacities appear to be more complex, and that
additional research is needed to understand these associations.
The fact that optimism and goal disengagement capacity appear essen-
tially unrelated allows for the possibility that the two variables could interact
in predicting subjective well-being and physical health. Consider the four
quadrants formed by crossing high/low optimism with high/low goal dis-
engagement capacity. Perhaps some of these combinations serve more adap-
tive functioning in some life circumstances than others. For example,
research has shown that some of the emotional benefits of optimism can
become smaller during older adulthood when many people experience a
reduction in their ability to attain important goals (Wrosch, Jobin, &
Scheier, 2017), while the adaptive value of goal disengagement capacities
becomes paramount during this phase of life (Barlow, Wrosch, &
McGrath, 2019). In such circumstances, a combination of both high opti-
mism and high goal disengagement capacity could help people to realize
those goals that are still attainable, and effectively adjust to other goals that
can no longer be pursued. Research on the interactive effects of optimism
and goal adjustment capacities is scarce. We believe that future research
examining such possibilities could contribute to a better understanding of
how different personality factors work together in promoting effective goal
regulation and quality of life.
Optimism is not the only personality factor that promotes attainment of
desired goals. Other factors would include constructs such as self-efficacy,
self-mastery, conscientiousness, grit, and the use of certain control strategies
(Bandura, 1997; Duckworth et al., 2007; Heckhausen et al., 2010; Pearlin &
Schooler, 1978; Roberts, Walton, & Bogg, 2005). The mechanisms by
which these individual difference variables support the self-regulation of
behavior are likely somewhat different from optimism. For example, they
might work by enhancing a person’s confidence in his or her ability to
engage in a behavior, or by influencing a desired outcome, or by directly
affecting goal-related progress. Regardless of how they work, these factors
would seem to play an important role in the self-regulation of action.
We think that it would be interesting to examine the associations of these
constructs with each other and with individual differences in goal adjust-
ment capacities, optimism, and quality of life. Some of these variables
may be functionally and reciprocally associated with each other and could
be involved in the emergence of individual differences in a broader system
of adaptive personality functioning. Other variables may be less associated
with each other, but could combine to create different personality profiles,
allowing some people to adjust their goal striving effectively across different
and changing contexts.
We feel that research on the associations and effects of different individ-
ual difference variables is warranted. Such research may also consider the
development and sequencing of personality factors across the lifespan, and
examine the specific self-regulation responses these factors elicit across dif-
ferent contexts (Renaud, Barker, Hendricks, Putnick, & Bornstein, 2019).
Research along these lines may contribute to a more comprehensive under-
standing of personality functioning and how people can successfully manage
both the attainment of important and feasible life goals as well as the adjust-
ment to goals that can no longer be attained.
5. Conclusions
This article addressed how people can manage the experience of
unattainable goals and protect their psychological well-being and physical
health. We have proposed that people who confront an unattainable goal

need to be able to disengage from the respective goal and engage in the pur-
suit of alternative goals. In this regard, high levels of goal disengage-
ment capacities may serve an adaptive function by avoiding the repeated
experience of goal failure and associated psychological distress, and provid-
ing resources that can be invested in other goals. High levels of goal
reengagement capacities, by contrast, should enhance purpose for living
and increase positive emotional states associated with the successful pursuit
of new goals. In addition, goal reengagement may prevent the occurrence
of negative thoughts associated with the experience of goal failure. These
psychological benefits of goal disengagement and goal reengagement
capacities may further reduce a dysregulation of health-relevant physiolog-
ical and behavioral processes and contribute to physical health (Wrosch,
Scheier, & Miller, 2013).
In support of these assumptions, the reviewed literature showed that goal
disengagement and goal reengagement capacities are associated with
reduced levels of psychological distress (e.g., negative affect, perceived stress,
and intrusions). In addition, goal reengagement capacities predicted
increased levels of positive indicators of psychological well-being (e.g., pur-
pose in life, positive emotions, and life satisfaction, Barlow, Wrosch, &
McGrath, 2019). Moreover, goal disengagement and goal reengagement
capacities were associated with more normative physiological processes in
endocrine or immune systems, and predicted improved levels of physical
health (Castonguay et al., 2017; Mens & Scheier, 2016; Miller &
Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2007). These studies also suggested that the
beneficial health effects of goal disengagement capacities can be mediated
by reduced levels of psychological distress (Wrosch et al., 2007), while
the positive health effects of goal reengagement capacities may be explained
by engagement in health-facilitating behaviors (Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013).
This chapter further addressed some of the emotional processes that
could facilitate the adjustment to unattainable goals. To this end, the dis-
cussed research lends support to theories suggesting that sadness and depres-
sive mood can promote adaptive goal disengagement (Klinger, 1975;
Kunzmann et al., 2014; Nesse, 2000). Depressive mood was shown to facil-
itate the development of goal disengagement capacity in adolescence
(Wrosch & Miller, 2009), and sadness predicted increases in goal disengage-
ment capacities in older adulthood when many people experience intracta-
ble stressors and unattainable goals (Barlow, Wrosch, Hamm, et al., 2019).
Finally, these studies showed that people experienced improvements to their
emotional well-being to the extent sadness or depressive symptoms were
associated with an increase of goal disengagement capacity. These results

contribute to the development of a comprehensive theoretical model that
addresses both how persons can manage the experience of unattainable goals
and how they may improve their goal adjustment capacities to protect their
quality of life.
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported by grants from Canadian Institutes of Health
Research and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to Carsten
Wrosch.
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VOLUME SEVEN

Sponsored by the Society for the Science of Motivation

First edition 2020

Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

For information on all Academic Press publications

Publisher: Zoe Kruze

List of Contributors vii

1. Metamotivation: Emerging research on the regulation

2. Moving from research on message framing to principles of

3. The motivational potency of nostalgia: The future is called

4. A development-in-sociocultural-context perspective on the

5. 35 years of research on students' subjective task values

6. Adaptive self-regulation, subjective well-being, and physical

Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 7 # 2020 Elsevier Inc. 1

A classic example of this kind of dual-motive conflict can be found in Mischel

2.1 Motivational trade-offs

2.2 Metamotivational knowledge

Until recently, most of the motivation regulation research in both educa-

3. Empirical studies of metamotivational knowledge

3.1 Metamotivational knowledge about promotion

promotion vs. prevention motivation (strategy knowledge), and (c) select

3.1.1 Initial studies

Given this tension between participants’ awareness of task-motivation fit

3.1.2 Do individual differences in metamotivational knowledge

prevention motivations of others. Specifically, Jansen, Moore, Scholer,

3.1.3 Are metamotivational beliefs about promotion and prevention

However, our recent cross-cultural examination of this possibility sug-

3.2 Metamotivational knowledge about autonomous

Finally, in the middle of the continuum is the degree to which individuals

3.3 Metamotivational knowledge about high- and

idiosyncratic as one moves down through the hierarchy. Thus, by focusing

(vs. “local”) mode of information processing that may undermine perfor-

more abstract vs. concrete language—another manifestation of high-

when completing a stop-signal task, participants indicated that they pre-

efforts in more abstract relative to concrete terms received higher grades

4.2 Knowledge as a source of self-regulatory success vs. failure

examined the ways in which people use strategies or exercise abilities

performance is likely to exhibit the opposite pattern: regularly giving daily

4.3 The centrality of flexibility

individuals generally persist longer on open-ended tasks when experiencing

by attending to their metamotivational feelings. For instance, feelings such as

5.3 Creating fit

critical problem for people attempting to balance the pursuit of multiple

be simultaneously adaptive and maladaptive for a particular task. For

5.4 Development and acquisition of knowledge

5.5 Linking metamotivation to general motivational

knowledge as key to improving self-regulation. Thus, whereas the trait

5.6 Toward a comprehensive mechanistic model

As an example of a feeling that signals a motivational deficit, consider

Kuhl, J. (1984). Volitional aspects of achievement motivation and learned helplessness:

(pp. 65–84). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/

Moving from research on message

Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 7 # 2020 Elsevier Inc. 43

or of a situation—that regulate the effect of framed messages and enable investiga-

(a loss-framed appeal). As illustrated at the outset of this chapter, health

2. How can gain- and loss-framed messages be used

on specifying the conditions—features of a person, a behavior, or a

2.1 In pursuit of moderators I: Matching frames to factors

Salovey (1997). Extending the principles of prospect theory to health

2.2 In pursuit of moderators II: Matching frames to dispositions

2.3 In pursuit of moderators III: Initial steps toward synthesis

response to framed messages (Updegraff & Rothman, 2013). Although

Fourth, empirical tests of moderation have tended to assume, implicitly,

3. Looking ahead I: In pursuit of principles for