XI The Defeat, Neglect and Revival of Scholasticism: Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

XI
THE DEFEAT, NEGLECT AND

REVIVAL OF SCHOLASTICISM
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42
THE ECLIPSE OF MEDIEVAL LOGIC
A revised dating of the eclipse

The view that the insights and developments of medieval logic were
eclipsed during the fifteenth century by a humanist, rhetorically-oriented
logic has long been popular, but it needs considerable revision and modi-
fication. In what follows I shall first give a brief account of what happened
to the writing, teaching, and publication of logical works in the medieval
style, by which I mean those which discuss such topics as consequences, in-
solubles, exponibles, and supposition. I shall then examine in more detail
what was actually said about certain medieval doctrines in the late fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries in order to indicate both where logicians of the
period had something new to contribute, and where there were departures
from medieval doctrines which cannot be attributed to new logical in-
sight.1 My conclusion will be that medieval logic as a living tradition did
largely disappear, but that the eclipse dates from about 1530 (in so far as a
specific date can ever sensibly be offered) rather than the mid fifteenth
century.
Fifteenth-century logicians
After the death of Paul of Venice in 1429, the fifteenth century did not give
rise to much important logical writing. There were various logicians in
Italy who deserve mention for their contributions to logic in the medieval
style, including Domenico Bianchelli (Menghus Blanchellus Faventinus),
who wrote a long commentary on Paul of Venice's Logica parva; Paul of
Pergula, who wrote on Ralph Strode's Consequentiae as well as producing
his own Logica; and Gaetano di Thiene, who wrote on Strode, William
Heytesbury, and Richard Ferrybridge. The latter thinkers all formed part
of the logic curriculum at Padua where both Paul of Pergula and Gaetano
I. For further details about the period as a whole, and for some of the doctrines mentioned below,
see Ashworth 1974a, and Risse 1964. For a bibliography of primary sources, see Rjsse 1965. For a
bibliography of secondary sources, see Ashworth 1978.
788 The defeat, neglect, and revival of scholasticism
taught. Outside Italy we find a few lesser figures such as John Heynlyn
(Johannes de Lapide), author of commentaries on Aristotle's logical works
and a treatise on exponibles, who between 1446 and 1478 studied and
taught at Heidelberg, Leipzig, Louvain, Basle, Paris, and Tubingen. Per-
haps the most successful commentator was the Thomist John Versor (d.
ca. 1480) whose commentary on Peter of Spain was first printed in 1473
and was reprinted in Cologne as late as 1622. There were many other
commentators on Aristotelian and scholastic logical writings, but their
work seems to have had little effect on subsequent developments.
The end of medieval logic outside France

In most European countries work on logic in the strictly medieval style
came to an end during the sixteenth century, though, as will be noted
below, medieval doctrines survived in textbooks. In Italy medieval texts
continued to be printed and read, but there was no important logician who
genuinely belongs to the medieval tradition. In Poland the tradition
produced its last original thinker with John of Glogow {ca. 1445-1507)
who taught at Cracow and wrote a commentary on Peter of Spain. There
were some good synthesisers in Germany in the early years of the sixteenth
century, notably Jodocus Trutvetter (Isenachensis) (d. 1519) who taught at
both Erfurt and Wittenberg, and Johann von Eck (1486-1543), a noted
humanist and theologian as well as a good logician. England presents a
particularly dreary picture. The 1483 Logici published in Oxford shows
some signs of having been organised by one man, though it is largely
composed of earlier writings. But the popular Libellus sophistarum ad usum
Cantabrigiensium, published four times between 1497 and 1524, and the
Libellus sophistarum ad usum Oxoniensium, published seven times between
1499 and 1530, were both unadorned reprints of early-fifteenth-century
manuscript collections, the actual writing having been done during the
fourteenth century.2 It is no wonder that humanism triumphed so easily in
the English universities.
2. Pollard and Redgrave 1976 give the title 'Logici' to a work which is in fact unfitted. It contains
much of Paul of Venice's Logica parva (without acknowledgement) together with treatises
relating to the separate parts of Aristotle's Organon. It has only two treatises - Swineshead's
Insolubilia and Bradwardine's Proportiones - in common with the Libelli sophistarum. Despite the
judgement of Pollard and Redgrave that the two Libelli have 'essentially the same text', the
Cambridge text contains six treatises which are not in the Oxford text, and the Oxford text
contains five treatises which are not in the Cambridge text. Nor are the ten treatises they have
(more or less) in common fully identical. James McConica has pointed out to me that at least one
of the surviving copies bears ownership marks which indicate use throughout the sixteenth
century. For further discussion and complete references, see Ashworth 1979. It should be noted
The eclipse of medieval logic 789
The resurgence of medieval logic in France and Spain

In France, however, we find a renaissance of medieval work which lasted
from about 1490 to about 1520 and which strongly influenced the Spanish
universities, where medieval logic flourished into the 1530s. A possible
starting point for this logical renaissance is the royal decree of 1474 which
forbade the study of nominalism at the University of Paris. So far from
crushing nominalism, the decree, which was rescinded in 1481, aroused
fresh interest in the writings of William Ockham, John Buridan, Albert of
Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, Peter of Ailly and John Dorp, and this led in
turn to a great increase in new writings on standard medieval topics. The
authors involved are far too numerous to list here; I will mention just a few
of the more outstanding names. The most distinguished of the earlier
writers were the Scotist Peter Tartaret and the nominalist Thomas Bricot
(d. 1516), both of whom completed their logical work before 1500. In the
sixteenth century the leading figure was the Scotsman John Major
(1469-1550), who attracted a brilliant and diverse group of men to the
college of Montaigu where he taught from 1505 to 1517. (He was in Paris
again from 1525101531, but the earlier period is the important one.) The
group included several Scotsmen, several Frenchmen, and a large number
of Spaniards, among whom were Gaspar Lax and Domingo Soto. Apart
from Pierre Crockaert (Peter of Brussels) (d. 1514), who became a leading
Thomist, and Soto, also a Thomist, though eclectic, they tended to be
nominalist in orientation. Other Spaniards working in Paris during this
period included Jeronimo Pardo (d. 1505), Juan Dolz and Fernando de
Enzinas. Most of the Spaniards returned to Spain, and under their leader-
ship the teaching of logic at Alcala and Salamanca reached great heights.
A study of the publication of logic texts in France and Spain provides
evidence of the richness of the logical work done in these countries in the
first decades of the sixteenth century, as well as revealing the sudden decline
which occurred after 1530. Leaving aside the publication of such medieval
authors as Buridan and Ailly, and leaving aside compendia of various sorts
including commentaries on the parva logicalia, I know of the following
texts. There are twenty separate treatises on terms, by well-known men
such as John Major as well as by such lesser figures as Gilbert Crab and
Gerard Columel. The only treatises on terms published after 1530 are by
that all my claims about the number of times logic texts were printed are subject to revision. On
the one hand, we know there were sixteenth-century editions of which no copies seem to have
survived; on the other hand, copies of hitherto unknown editions are frequently discovered.
Ferdinando de Enzinas (which first appeared in 1533) and Hermosilla

(I553)- There are nine treatises on exponibles; apart from Soto's treatise
(1529) the last is by George Lokert (ca. 1522). There are ten treatises on
insolubles; again, apart from Soto's (1529), the latest is by Celaya (ca. 1518),
and the same is true of the eight treatises I know of on obligations. Of the
five treatises on consequences, the latest is by Lax (1532). Various works by
Enzinas and Lax were reprinted in the 1530s, but only Soto was reprinted
after 1540. A much revised edition of his Introductiones dialecticae or Sum-
mulae, a collection of virtually independent treatises, appeared in 1547
and was reprinted several times.
The decline after 1530

The impression one gets of a sudden decline in medieval logic after 1530 is
considerably strengthened by an investigation of the publication of
medieval authors and of commentaries on Peter of Spain between 1530 and
1600. Authors who contributed most to the development of late medieval
logic —such men as Buridan, Strode, Heytesbury, Peter of Ailly, Albert of
Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen - drop out of the picture altogether.
Walter Burley's Super artem veterem expositio was published once during
this period (Venice 1541) as was Ockham's Summa logicae (Venice 1591).
John Duns Scotus' In universam Aristotelis logicam quaestiones was published
twice (Venice 1586 and 1600). The only popular work was the Logicaparva
of Paul of Venice, which was published at least eight times in Venice
between 1535 and 1580. Of the late fifteenth-century commentaries on
Peter of Spain, two appeared in print: Versor's once in Naples (1577) and at
least five times in Venice between 1550 and 1593, Tartaret's three times in
Venice, in 1571, 1591 and 1592. The only new commentaries on Peter
of Spain were those of Agostino Sbarroya (treatises 1 and 4, Seville
1533); Pedro Sanchez Ciruelo (Salamanca, 1537); Alphonso de Veracruz
(Mexico, 1554, 1562, Salamanca 1561, 1562, 1569, 1572, 1573, 1593); and
Thomas de Mercado (Salamanca 1571). In addition we find Peter of Spain's
Tractatus de locis dialecticis cum Versorii Parisiensis annotationibus included in
the works of Chrysostom Ja veil us (Lyon 1580). Somewhat later the
Gymnasium Speculativum edited by F. Augustinus Gothutius (Paris 1605)
included tracts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9 of Peter of Spain, together with such
works as Josse Clichtove (1472-1543) on terms, Tartaret on the Posterior
Analytics, and Thomas of Erfurt's Grammatica speculativa, which was attri-
buted to Duns Scotus.
The survival of medieval logic in sixteenth-century textbooks

Despite the enormous changes signalled by the record of publication in the
sixteenth century, medieval doctrines were to some extent retained in the
textbooks which were written during that period, particularly in Spain.
Two important Spanish authors, who appeared on thejesuit ratio studiorum
of 1595, were Francisco de Toledo whose Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis
(Rome 1561) was reprinted more than twenty times, and Pedro de Fonseca
whose Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo (Lisbon 1564) was printed at least
fifty-three times up to 1625. Both works included discussions of such
medieval elements as consequences and supposition, as well as the newly
emphasised traditional subject matter of categorical propositions, syllog-
isms, and fallacies. Similar authors are to be found in Italy, including the
Dominican Chrysostom Javellus (d. ca. 1538), and Ludovico Carbo, who
taught at Perugia in the second half of the century and published his
Introductiones in logicam in 1597. They both discussed consequences, sup-
position, and insolubles in their textbooks. Even in England echoes of
medieval doctrines are to be found in the works of John Seton (d. 1567) and
John Sanderson (d. 1602), though the level of discussion is much lower than
that prevailing on the continent then.
Non-scholastic sixteenth-century logic
Most sixteenth-century logical writings bear no trace of specifically

medieval doctrines and developments, however. They fall roughly into
four overlapping categories: humanist logic, Ramist logic, Aristotelian
textbooks, and commentaries on the Greek Aristotle. The figure most
directly responsible for the spread of humanist logic in the sixteenth
century was Rudolph Agricola (1444-85), whose De inventione dialectica
circulated in manuscript for many years before it was printed in 1515.
Agricola influenced Philip Melanchthon, who wrote a large number of
simplified textbooks, including at least three logic texts for use in German
schools; he also influenced Johann Sturm, Johannes Caesarius, and Bartho-
lomaeus Latomus, all of whom taught Agricola's work at Paris after it was
printed there in 1529. Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramee) developed this
tradition further. Francis Titelman's Compendium dialecticae (1535) is a good
example of the straightforward Aristotelian textbooks. Among the com-
mentators on Aristotle the three Italians, Agostino Nifo, J. F. Burana, and
Jacopo Zabarella are perhaps most noteworthy.
Late developments: the properties of terms

Against the background of this survey of authors and their works, I want
now to examine the fate of the medieval doctrines themselves during the
sixteenth century. About supposition and the distinctively medieval treat-
ment of terms there is little to say. In the first decades of the sixteenth
century these doctrines were discussed in great detail; in the later textbooks
they were merely summarised. Appellation as a property of terms either
ceased to be mentioned, or was mentioned only with scorn, as for instance
by Augustin Huens (1521-78),3 but otherwise there was no obvious
novelty in the nature of the theories presented. The one original develop-
ment found in the works of Parisian logicians and later satirised by Vives
concerned the use of'a' and 'b' as special signs of supposition, to be used
especially in the analysis of such propositions as 'Of every man some
donkey is running' and 'Every man has a head', which posed special
problems for the theory of supposition.4 A simple example of how the
signs were used is 'Every man is b animal' which, unlike 'Every man is
animal', signifies, by virtue of the special sign 'b', that every man is
identical to one and the same animal.
Exponibilia
The discussion of exponibles exhibits more significant advances.5 In the
first part of the century we find treatises which in their detail, organisation,
and clarity mark a great improvement over the rather muddled discussions
found in Paul of Venice. If we turn to the accounts presented by such later
authors as Francisco de Toledo and Pedro de Fonseca, however, we find
three great changes. First, among the exponibles only exclusive, exceptive,
and reduplicative propositions are discussed; propositions employing such
exponible terms as 'incipit' and 'desinit' are ignored. Second, the analyses
offered of these propositions are much simpler than those that had been
developed by medieval logicians. For instance, the reduplicative 'Every A.
inasmuch as it is B is C is no longer analysed as 'Every A is B, and every A is
C, and every B is C, and if something is B it is C but simply rewritten as
'Every A because it is B is C Third, there is none of the characteristic
concern of the scholastic logicians with especially difficult cases for the
suggested analysis, or with such issues as the relationship between spoken
or written exponibles and the corresponding mental propositions.
3. Ashworth 1974a, p. 97.
4. See Ashworth 1978a; Guerlac 1979.
5. See Ashworth 1973.
Consequences
The changes in the discussion of consequences follow a similar pattern. At
the beginning of the century we find not just detailed analyses of pro-
positions and arguments but also a discussion of wider issues such as the
definition of a valid inference. We also find some relatively original work,
particularly that concerned with the distinction between 'illative' con-
ditionals, in which it is impossible for the antecedent to be true when the
consequent is false, and 'promissory' conditionals, in which truth demands
only that the antecedent not be true when the consequent is false. In the
later textbooks, however, there is no discussion of wider issues, there is
nothing original, and there are clear classical influences. For instance, the
textbooks contain the five Stoic indemonstrables, two of which (modus
ponendo portens and modus tollendo tollens) were found in medieval works,
but three of which (two concerning strong disjunction and one concerning
negated conjunction) were not. The standard list of consequences narrows
to consist mainly of those concerned with truth and modality, and they are
presented without analysis or comment.
Obligationes and insolubilia

The treatises of the period have not yet been studied in sufficient depth to
say much about the theories of obligationes presented in them. In the latter
part of the century only Cardillo de Villalpandeo discussed obligationes in
his Summa Summularum (1557). The companion treatises on insolubilia are
better known, however, and here we can definitely say that at least one
original theory is to be found in the early period. Thomas Bricot took
Roger Swineshead's solution, which was adopted by Major and Soto
among others, and revised it in such a way as to avoid the consequences that
two contradictories can be false and that there can be valid inferences with a
true antecedent and a false consequent.6 His view was that an affirmative
proposition is true if and only if it meets both of two conditions, namely
that it signifies things to be as they are and does not falsify itself, whereas a
negative proposition is true if and only if it meets one of two conditions,
namely that it signifies things not to be as they are not, or that its
contradictory falsifies itself. Thus 'This is false' said of itself is false, but 'This
is not false', said of the first proposition, is true. Other popular solutions
were drawn from Ailly, Ockham, and Paul of Venice's Logicaparva. By the
second part of the century most writers on logic had ceased to refer to
6. See Ashworth 1977b.
insolubles at all, and significant chapters are to be found only in Cardillo de

Villalpandeo and in M. Doniensis Ormazius' De instrument instrumentorum
sive de dialectica (1569). What is most noteworthy is the sudden appearance
of classical influences. The term ' insolubilia' is replaced by 'inexplicabiles',
and the references are to Cicero and Aulus Gellius rather than to medieval
authors. Solutions were rarely offered by these authors, but Doniensis
Ormazius did argue that insolubles were not genuine propositions, but
orationes imperfectae.
The semantics of propositions

Semantic theory underwent some developments at Paris in the first three
decades of the sixteenth century which were not echoed at all in later
writings. The developments are of two sorts. In the first place we find
lengthy discussions of complexe significabilia, in which the views of Juan
Dolz and Fernando de Enzinas are particularly significant.7 They argued
that indicative sentences signified aliqualiter - in some way - rather than
aliquid - some thing. They explained this by arguing that propositions are
analogous to syncategorematic rather than to categorematic words in their
manner of signifying, performing a function other than that of naming.
To the question, 'What does this sentence signify?' one could reply only by
a paraphrase. In particular, questions about the dictum of a sentence were
answered by replacing the dictum with a that-phrase. For instance,' "Man is
an animal" signifies man being an animal (hominem esse animal)' was
rewritten as' "Man is an animal" signifies that man is an animal (quod homo
est animal)', thus removing the temptation to think that the dictum 'man
being an animal' functions as a name. However, they recognised that there
were some contexts in which the question. 'What is this sentence about?'
could be answered by naming or pointing to an object. On such occasions a
sentence was said to signify categorematically.
The semantics of terms

In the second place we find an interesting series of attempts to provide a
unified theory of the reference of general terms by arguing that the word
'horse' refers to actual objects both in intentional contexts, such as 'I
promise you a horse', and in modal contexts, such as 'For riding is required
a horse', and by arguing that the word 'chimera' could be taken to refer to
actual objects in order to save the truth of such propositions as 'A chimera is
7. See Ashworth forthcoming.
imagined.'8 The solution to the second problem proposed by Celaya and

Enzinas involved the claim that the sentence is a disguised conditional,
being more properly written as 'If an act of riding takes place, a horse is
ridden', so that the truth of the antecedent always involves successful
reference to a particular horse. The solution to the third problem proposed
by the same authors involved the postulation of imaginary objects to serve
as referents, but the universe was not thereby populated with extra entities,
for they explained that an imaginary chimera was just an actual object
which could be imagined to be a chimera. In the last analysis, however,
Enzinas and others were forced to admit that there were a few sentences
such as ' "Chimera" signifies a donkey' of whose general terms a purely
extensionalist account could not be given if one wished to prevent the
sentence containing them from being construed as true. The sentence in
question, said Enzinas, can be true only if the word 'chimera1 picks out
those donkeys which can be imagined to be chimeras by means of the
concept chimera, which in fact it does not.
Conclusion
Why did these interesting and varied treatments of medieval logical
themes cease so abruptly after 1530?9 Humanism alone cannot be the
answer, since it apparently triumphed only by default. Italian universities
continued to teach medieval logic long after the attacks on it by such men
as Lorenzo Valla; and Agricola's logic did not capture Paris until the
production of texts in the medieval style had already ceased.10 Humanism
certainly had a part to play in the process, however. Soto, for instance,
came to believe as a result of humanist influences that doctrines which were
difficult and not clearly expressed by Aristotle should be omitted from
logic, and that too much time was devoted to summulist doctrines in the
teaching of logic. Accordingly, the later editions of his Introductiones dia-
8. See Ashworth 1974b, 1976a, 1977a.
9. Schmitt 1975, p. 512, notes that certain branches of medieval physics also declined. He writes:
'... several fourteenth-century traditions - including nominalism, the logical traditions of
sophismata and insolubilia, and the Merton and Paris schools of philosophy of motion - continued
on into the first few decades of the sixteenth century and after that quickly lost ground to other
approaches and sets of problems. The printing-history of the medieval texts in question as well as
new commentaries being written on Aristotle indicate this. Why this happened is not clear.
Humanism had a strong impact, as did the reintroduction of the writings of the Greek commen-
tators on Aristotle, but neither of these facts explains why the calculators and writers on sophismata
lost out, while the commentaries of Averroes did not. In brief, certain medieval aspects of the
tradition expired in the early sixteenth century, while other equally medieval aspects continued to
play an important role.'
10. For a discussion of Valla, Agricola, and their influence, see Jardine 1977.
lecticae were very much altered and simplified. Another instructive ex-
ample is Agostino Nifo's Dialectka ludicra (1520). Here we have an intro-
ductory text written by a leading Aristotelian who had a good knowledge
of medieval doctrines, yet he distorts them completely by describing only
those parts of the scholastic theory of terms and supposition theory which
are directly applicable to standard categorical propositions.1' No one who
became acquainted with medieval logic through Nifo would understand
the function of the non-Aristotelian parts at all. A very plausible account of
the indirect effect of humanism on logic teaching is provided by Terrence
Heath, whose study of the teaching of grammar at three German uni-
versities at the end of the fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth
century shows that the change to non-medieval logic was preceded by the
change to humanistic grammar.' 2 The significance of this sequence of
changes is brought out in Heath's claim that medieval grammar prepared
the student for medieval logic, whereas humanist grammar did not. One
may also speculate that social changes were influential in creating a need for
men with a new style of education. The rise of modern physics has been
cited as a possible cause, but this suggestion cannot be accepted, given that
modern physics can hardly be said to have risen before the end of the
sixteenth century.13 The judgement of a contemporary logician might be
that medieval logic came to an end because no further progress was possible
without the concept of a formal system and without the development of a
logic of relations. This view is borne out by the desperate, complicated
attempts to analyse such propositions as 'Every man has a head' that are to
be found in the writings of the Parisian logicians. They certainly pushed
medieval logic to its limits, but whether they gave up in despair because
they realised that that was what they had done is another matter. For the
moment our question must remain without a fully satisfactory answer.
H. See Ashworth 1976b.

12. Heath 1971.
13. Kneale 1962, p. 307. It should be noted that the Kneales speak as if interest in formal logic declined
only during the seventeenth century, so that their reference to modern physics is not implausible in
its context.

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XI

THE DEFEAT, NEGLECT AND

A revised dating of the eclipse

The end of medieval logic outside France

The resurgence of medieval logic in France and Spain

Ferdinando de Enzinas (which first appeared in 1533) and Hermosilla

The decline after 1530

The survival of medieval logic in sixteenth-century textbooks

Non-scholastic sixteenth-century logic

Most sixteenth-century logical writings bear no trace of specifically

Late developments: the properties of terms

Obligationes and insolubilia

6. See Ashworth 1977b.

insolubles at all, and significant chapters are to be found only in Cardillo de

The semantics of propositions

The semantics of terms

7. See Ashworth forthcoming.

imagined.'8 The solution to the second problem proposed by Celaya and

H. See Ashworth 1976b.

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