PUBLICATIONS IN MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

THE imrvEBsrrv or NOTBE DAME

EDTTOB: PHILIP S. MOORE, C.S.C.
VIII

THE SUMMULAE LOGICALES

OF
PETER OF SPAIN
BY JOSEPH P. MULLALLY, PHJ).
NOTBE DAME. INDIANA IMS
COPYRIGHT. 1945 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME REPRINTED
1960
PREFACE
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the discussion of
philosophical and theological questions was characterized by
the use of a concise and highly technical logical method. The
formalized syllogistic procedure, peculiar to that method, was
admirably adapted to precision of thought development and to
the vigorous fixation of expression. It was not conducive to the
development of style and imaginative insight. Its scientific virtues
are as manifest as its literary limitations appear unavoidable.
In large measure, the propagation and the popularity of this
method was due to the compendia of Logic which appeared at
the end of the twelfth century and during the first half of the
thirteenth century. Indeed, the mastery of one of these
compendia, the Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain, formed a
necessary part of the formal education of many of the
Scholastics who used the method. The Summulae Logicales
sheds much light on the intellectual background and life of the
middle ages for the text was used throughout the length and
breadth of the continent, was commented on by numerous
medieval authors of all shades of opinion, and fixed the outlines
of Logic for the centuries which followed. Yet scholars who have
devoted themselves to medieval thought have been so taken up
with the preeminent figures of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure
and have so tended to neglect the mass of dialectical literature at
the basis of the thirteenth century mentality that not even an
edition of the seventh tract of the Summulae which contributed
much that was not traditional in Logic to that mentality has been
published in modern times. Furthermore, an edition of the
Summulae may prove of interest to exponents of modern
logistic, for Heinrich Scholz and Jan Lukasiewicz have already
perceived a harmonious relation between the medieval Logic
which is exemplified in the Summulae and modern logistic.
v SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Desirable as a critical edition of the Summulae may be, its
preparation is a practical impossibility in view of the very many
editions of the work and their inaccessibility at present. It is
hoped that this study, in laying much of the necessary
groundwork for a critical edition of the Summulae and including,
as it does, a practical edition of the seventh tract, will facilitate
the completion of such an edition. At the same time, the study
is designed to allocate the text to its proper place in medieval
philosophy by determining the antecedents and influence of the
Summulae more specifically.
This study, which is now offered as a volume of the Publications
in Medieval Studies sponsored by the University of Notre Dame,
was presented in June 1944, to the faculty of the Graduate
School of Philosophy of Columbia University as a dissertation in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.
My indebtedness to Dr. Ernest A. Moody of Columbia University
for his counsel and aid which were ever at my disposal is hereby
acknowledged with the deepest gratitude. To Dr. Paul Oskar
Kristeller and Dr. Daniel Walsh of Columbia University I am
grateful for many valuable suggestions and patient hours of
reviewing the manuscript in preparation. I also wish to thank
Professor Jacques Mari-tain and all others who have
contributed in any way to the completion of this work. A
particular expression of thanks is due to Mr. John McDowell and
Miss Patricia O’Shea for their aid in the typing of the original
draft of the manuscript and in the tedious task of proof-reading
the completed manuscript. And for their boundless patience,
encouragement, and faith which were indispensable for the
completion of this book, I thank my wife, my father, and my
mother.
J. P. M.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAOB
Preface
I Introduction
1. The Problem of the Authenticity of the
Summulae Logicales ix
2. The Life of Peter of Spain xviii
3. A Survey of Tracts I-VI of the
Summulae Logicales xxi
4. Antecedents and Nature of the
Logiea Moderna—Tract VII
A. A Theory of Supposition xxxviii
B. Appellation Iviii
C. Relatives lx
D. Quantification lxviii
E. Exponibles lxxiii
5. Influence of the Summulae Logical** on
Subsequent Logical Theory lxxvii
6. Sources of Present Practical Edition of
Tract VII ci
II A Practical Edition and a Translation of Tract VII De
Proprietatibus Terminorum
Tractatus Suppositionum 2
Tractatus Relativorum 20
Tractatus Ampliationum 88
Tractatus Appellationum 44
Tractatus Restrictionum 46
Tractatus Distributionum 62
Tractatus Exponibilium 104
Appendix. Bibliography of Editions of the Sum mulae Logical** of
Peter of Spain and of Com mentaries on the Summulae LogicaUs
132
Bibliography 159
Index of Names and Subjects 166
rii
I INTRODUCTION
1. THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUMMULAE
LOGICALES
For two and a half centuries, prevailing scholarly opinion—as
represented by Keckerman, Placcius, J. A. Fabri-cius, Brucker and
others—followed the capricious lead of Elie Ehinger who held
without any authority that the Synopsis attributed to Michael
Psellus was an original Greek textbook of which the Summulae
Logieaies was merely a Latin translation. About the middle of the
nineteenth century, M. Daunou and Sir William Hamilton
questioned the uncritical acceptance of this opinion, maintaining
that the Summvlae Logieaies was the original work and the
Synopsis only a translation. Carl Prantl attacked their position
and advocated the view previously held by Ehinger, for he was
convinced that the Logiea Moderna, the subject matter of the
seventh tract of the Summulae, owed its origin to Byzantine
sources. In support of his view that the Synopsis was the original
work, Prantl cited a fifteenth century Greek manuscript which had
been found by Ehinger in 1597.’ This manuscript corresponded
word for word with the greater part of the Summulae and had an
inscription at the beginning which ascribed the work to Michael
Psellus. However, the position of Prantl is untenable in the light
of later criticism.’ The arguments which critics of Prantl’s position
» M. Daunoa, “Pierre d*Espagne on le Pape Jean XXI”, JKstotrv
litUrmir* ds la Frwu*, XIX (Paris, 1895), p. 381; 8ir William
Hamilton. DueuMtUm* on Philfopky and LUtmturt (London,
1863), p. 126, note.
L Hardt, “Nora appendix mas. Graeoomm Augusta
Vindetteormn in HbL refiam Manac. tranaUtonnn*’, in J. C.
Freiherrn von Aretin’s Bntrgge ntr G—ciuehU und biterntur, IX
(1807), p. 861f.
»Charles Thurot, “De la loffiqne de Pierre d’Espagne” in Revue
ArcMoUtgivu (Paris, 1864), pp. 867-281; and fUvu* eritiqu*
(fkistoirt •( &, UtUntmi*, II (Paris, 1867), pp. 184-103. Valentin
Hose, “Pseodo-Psellus and Pctras Hispenas” and “Paendo-
Patllvs and Grcgorius Monaehu.” in Hermes, n (Berlin, 1867), pp.
146-147 and
x SUMMULAE LOGICALES
propose in support of their view that the Summulae Logieales is
an original composition of Peter of Spain are gen-erically the
same, although emphasis and detail vary from critic to critic.
The direct ascription of the Synopsis to Michael Psellus, which is
found in the Greek manuscript cited by Prantl, is an isolated
instance. All other manuscripts which contain the text of the
Synapsis ascribe the work to Peter of Spain as author or to
Georgius Scholarios as translator. On the other hand, as far as is
known, no Latin manuscripts specify the Summulae to be a
translation, nor has any chronicler mentioned it as such.* The
unique attribution of the Synopsis to Michael Psellus can
probably be explained as a copyist’s error* or as a later addition
which is traceable to Psellus’ being famed as a paraphraser and
synopsist.
In the genuine works of Psellus, he quotes Ammonius and
Philoponus in logic and Dionysius Thrax in grammar, all
recognized Greek sources. On the other hand, the Synopsis
which is ascribed to him quotes Boethius in logic and Pris-cian in
grammar, both of whom are recognized Latin sources.’
Furthermore, Psellus was unaware of the five Theophrastic
modes of the first figure which are found in the Synopsis.’
The Synopsis is isolated in Byzantine literature whereas
pp. 465-467. R. Stapper, “Die Summulae LogieaUs des Petros
Hiapa-nus und ihr Verhaltnis xu Michael Psellua”, Festschrift
sum elf-hundertjahrigen Jubilaum des Deutsche*. Campo Santo
m Bom (Freiburg, 1897); and Papst Johannes XXI, (Freiburg
Studien), Kfrchen-gsiohichtlich* Studien, TV (1898).
 Cf.: R. SUpper, “Die Summulae LogieaUs etc.”, op. at., pp.
131IT.; V. Rose, op. eit., p. 146.
 Cf.: R. SUpper, “Die Summulae LogieaUs etc”, op. eiU, p. 132;
R. SUpper, Papst Johannes XXI, op. eit., p. 18.
 Cf.: R. SUpper, “Die Summulae LogieaUs etc”, op. eiL, p. 138;
V. Rose, op. eit., p. 466.
» Cf. Ibidem,
 Cf.: C. Thurot, Revue critique etc., op. eit.. p. 199; and “De la
logique etc.”, op. eiU, p. 269. Also cf. R. SUpper. Papst Johannes
XXI, op. ciL, p. 17; “Die Summulae Logieales etc.”, op. eit, p.
136.
 Cf. R. SUpper, “Die Summulae Logieales etc”, op.ait^ p. 136.
INTRODUCTION *’
the Sumtnuiae Logioales is not isolated in Western literature, but
belongs to a group of similar treatises (Svmmulae Logioales of
William Shyreswood, Lambert of Auxerre, etc.) all of which are
associated with the University of Paris. Neither before nor after
the time in which the Synopsis is supposed to have been written
by Psellus, nor even in the authentic works of Psellus himself,
can there be found the terminology which is characteristic of the
Synopsis. Furthermore, if the Synopsis was the original work and
the Svmmulae Logioales merely a translation, one would expect
to discover grecisms in the Svmmulae inasmuch as translators
contemporaneous with Peter of Spain did not concern
themselves with seeking Latin equivalents for Greek technical
terms and often took over Greek terms. However, the converse is
true.” The new terminology which is found in the Svmmulae
(supposiUo, restrietio, etc) cannot be referred to anything in
Greek or Byzantine tradition, but it can be referred to Occidental
tradition.
Finally, it is highly improbable that anyone would attempt the
translation of such a technical treatise as the Synopsis, if his
knowledge of the Greek language was as inadequate as that
evidenced by the author of the Svmmulae in his etymological
derivation of dialectioa and amphibologia.
While one might reject one or the other of these arguments, their
cumulative effect removes any lingering doubts as to the
authenticity of the Svmmulae Logicales as an original Latin
composition by Peter of Spam.
The question now arises as to the identity of this Peter of Spain,
that is, Petrus Hispanus. At the end of the seven-
“Cf. C. Thurot, R*vu4 criti^u* etc, opxiU, p. 199; “De 1A logiqoe
etc.”, op. eft., p. 269. Ako ef. R. Stepper, Pop* Jotuuuut XXI, •p.
oft., p. 17.
Cf. C. Than*. Rmu eritiqtu etc., op. eiL, pp. 200-20L
»IbitUm, p. tOOII.
“ Cf. 8cctkm 4 of the Introduction.
“Cf. U. Dunon, op. oft. p. Miff. Alao cf. C. Thurot, Aetwo criti-on*
etc, op. ciU. pp. 199-200 and p. 200, n. 1; “De hi htgiqae etc.”.
•p. eit.. p. 269.
™ SUMMULAE LOGICALES
teenth century, Nicolas Antonio, in his Bibliotheea Hispa-ntca
Vetus,” and, a few decades later, Quetif-Echard in their
Scriptores Ordinis Proedieatorum* criticized the generally held
opinion which identified the Petrus Hispanus who composed
the Summulae Logicales with the Petrus Juliani who became
Pope John XXI. They denied that John XXI wrote that logical
text-book, basing their opinion on the silence of Ptolemy
(Bartholomew) of Lucca and the medical character of the works
which are attributed to John XXI who even had served as a
professor of medicine at the University of Siena.
Their opinion was not accepted by authors of the late
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries who interested
themselves in John XXI. However, in 1886, H. Denifle published
a catalogue of Dominican writers which he had discovered at
the Abbey of Stams. This catalogue, the Tabula scriptorum
ordinis Proedieatorum, which was composed between
November 3, 1310 and the year 1312, contained the following
notation: “Fr. Petrus Alfonsi hyspa-nus scripsit summulas (sic)
logicales.”” Despite this explicit attribution of the authorship of
the Summulae Logicales to Petrus Alfonsi which he had
discovered, a few years later Denifle rejected Petrus Alfonsi as
the author of that work.” At the turn of the century, R. Stepper”
and G. Petella, both of whom studied the career of John XXI,
likewise rejected the attribution of the Summulae to Petrus
“Nicolas Antonio, Bibliotheea Hispaniea Vetua (Rome, 1696), II,
pp. 52-54.
>• Quetif-Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Proedieatorum (Paria,
1719), I, p. 485f.
“ See H. Denifle, “Quellen rur Gelehrtengeachichte dea
Prediger-ordens”, Arehiv fur Literatur und KirehsngesehiekU, II
(1886), p. 233.
“H. Denifle-E. Chatelain, Chartularium Univerritatis Pansiensis
(Paris. 1889), I, p. 541, note.
»• R. Stapper, Papst Johannes XXI (Kirchsnglschiehtlieh*
Studien, IV, faae. 4), Miknater, 1898, pp. 9-20.
»G. Petella, “Sail’ identita di Pietro Iipano medico di Siena poi
papa col filosofo danteaco”, BulUttmo Sensse di Storia Patria, VI
(1899), pp. 277-329.
INTRODUCTION*i”
Alfonsi. The opinion to which Stopper, Petella, and Denifle
adhered for different reasons, that Petrus Juliani or John XXI
was the author of the Summulae, was accepted by historians of
medieval philosophy, encyclopedists, and authors who studied
the life or the works of Petrus Hispa-nus.”
In 1930 and again in 1935 H. D. Simonin” contested this view and
maintained “with all confidence” that Petrus Alfonsi was the
author of the Summulae. He based his position on the explicit
attribution to Petrus Alfonsi which is found in the Tabula of
Stains. Since the Tabula stopped at the year 1311, that is the
last possible year in which Petrus Alfonsi could have written the
Summulae. And inasmuch as it is likely that he was a “son of the
Navarre convent of EsteUa”, which did not exist until after 1260,
he would have had to write the Summulae at a date subsequent
to 1260. Consequently, Simonin believes that Petrus Alfonsi
wrote the Summulae at the end of the thirteenth century or at
the beginning of the fourteenth century.
The testimony of the Tabula cannot be taken lightly for its date
of composition is a scant thirty odd years after the death of John
XXI. However, the researches of M.-H. Laurent, M. Grabmann,
and B. Geyer have nullified the cogency of the Tabula ascription,
rendering the position of Simonin untenable and establishing
the traditional view more firmly than ever.
M.-H. Laurent** rejected the opinion of Simonin on the basis of
chronicles which antedate the Tabula of Stoma. Ptolemy of
Lucca, who would not be sympathetic towards John XXI because
of his attitude toward the mendicants, remarked of the Pope in
his Aimales** that he was “magnus
Cf. M.-H. Lraent, “lUltre Pierre d*Bipagiic fot-fl DaminkainT”,
Dim* TkmmmM, XXXIX (PiMcnia, 1M6). p. 88. not*. 88, 84. 16.
« H. D. StmoBlii, -In ‘SMMWIH LngW.i’ de P*ru Hbpuras”, An+it*,
fBirtmir* dKtrwiafc ei Wtfrotr. <fe Mfn-Ap* V (1880), pp. 287-
878; “MifteUr Pttnu Hiapanw OJ».”, Arttmmm Frmtnmi
Prmtdimfrmmi, V (1885), pp. 840-848.
» M.-H. Lramt, «p. eiL, p. 40 8?.
 Ammlm. «L Montori, Script****, XI. eoL 1191.
«v SUMMULAE LOGICALES
in philosophia”. The anonymous author of the Annates of
Piacenza stated that Gregory X elevated to the rank of cardinal
“magistrum Petrum de Yspani, qui habetur pro philo-sopho”.”
In his Cronica, Salimbene did not even mention the medical
renown of John XXI but referred to him as “magnus sophysta,
loycus et disputator atque theologus”.** This opinion of
Ptolemy of Lucca, the anonymous chronicler, and Salimbene,
which regarded John XXI as a philosopher and a logician,
became a common one even before the Tabula of Stams was
composed. Although none of these testimonials constitute an
apodictic proof that John XXI was the author of the Summuiae
Logicales, nevertheless, they carry weight in support of the
traditional view that he was the author. They assume a
greater importance when taken in conjunction with an explicit
assertion of Riccobaldo of Ferrara, which antedates the
attribution in the Tabula of Stams by more than a decade, that
John XXI composed a logical text: “Johannes XXI natione
Hispanus... Hie magnus magister Petrus Hispanus, qui tractatus
in Logica composuit... “” This categorical assertion of
Riccobaldo of Ferrara must be opposed to the silence of
Ptolemy of Lucca who makes no mention of the Summuiae in
the notice devoted to John XXI in his Historia Ecclesiastica,
which fact constitutes a negative argument advanced by
Simonin” (in common with Antonio and Echard) against the
traditional thesis. Furthermore, on this point, Simonin
overlooked the fact that at the time Ptolemy of Lucca finished
the first part of his Historia Ecclesiastica, the Summuiae
Logicales had not yet acquired the fame it was to enjoy later
and that Ptolemy of Lucca was not attempting to give an
exhaustive list of the works which John XXI wrote in-
“ Annates Placentini Gibsflini, ed. Monumenta Germanias histn
Seriptores, XVIII, p. 558.
»• Cronica, ed. Monumenta Germamae hi*tn SeriptortB, XXXII,
p. 304.
“Historia Pontifieum Romanorum, ed. Mnratori, Scriptorts, DC,
col. 181.
«• H. D. Simonin O.P., “Lea ‘Summuiae Logical**’ de Petrus
Hispanus”, op. tit., p. 268.
INTRODUCTION **
asmuch as he also omitted his De Oculo” which is admittedly
authentic.
MsgT. Grabmann rejects the opinion of Simonin on the ground
that in the manuscripts Petrus Hispanus is always referred to as
“magister” and not “frater”. This is important in view of the fact
that the members of religious orders, even when active
“magistn”, were always referred to as “frater” and not
“magister”. Msgr. Grabmann also quotes from the preface to a
thirteenth century commentary on the Summulae attributed to
Robert Kilwardby which designates “Magister Petrus Hispanus” as
the author of the Summulae: “causa efficiens huius libri...
magister Petrus Hispanus, qui quorumdam nobilium precibus
condescen-dens ad maiorem loyce intelligentiam edidit hunc
tractatum” (Cod. Vat lat 3049 fol. l) Relative to this, it is very
likely that if Robert Kilwardby wrote this commentary, he wrote it
during his teaching career which dates from about 1248 to about
1261 rather than later during his career as a member of the
hierarchy. On this basis, the Summulae would have had to be
written prior to 1261. This would date its composition close to
the time in which Peter of Spain most likely would have written
the Summulae Logi-eales, namely, at sometime antecedent to
1246 while he was still at the University of Paris.” The date is far
too early for the work to have been written by Petrus Alfonsi, if
Simonin’s dates are to stand.
The difficulty of proving positively that John XXI wrote the
Summulae Logical** lies precisely in the fact that “Petrus
Hispanus” is a name which is applicable to more than one
person. Consequently, contemporaneous evidence is needed to
prove that the Petrus Hispanus who wrote the
“A critical edition of this haa been pnbliahed: A. at Berger, Dk
Ophthcimologii (Ub*r <U OAMJO) OW Petnu ffwpomu (Munich,
1899).
M. Grabmann, MtttoJotteriidtoa Gefrfeaboew (Munich, 1936),
II. p. 126, note 46.
■> R. Stopper beUerae that Petma Hlapnnna anlahed the
TMMIIIIBI Lopurim at the Untondty of Siena eometime between
1*4S and 1160. R. Stopper, Pmptt Johamne* XXI. op. eiL. p. 9.
xvi SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Summulae is to be identified with John XXI. B. Geyer
recognized this need and found the evidence in a Madrid
manuscript, Bibl. Nac. 4008, which has as its subject matter the
Quaeationes of Nicolas of Pressorio.” In the Quod-libet which
has the Incipit: “Anno Domini MCC septua-gesimo tertio
imminente solemnitate paschali [i.e. March 1274] ...” the
following passage is found on f. 42 v b: “Verumtamen
communiter tenetur quod Christus in triduo non fuit homo,
quamvis aliqui philosophi dixerunt quod ista est vera:
‘Caesar est homo’ Caesare etiam non existente, ut dicatur:
Caesar semper est homo propter habitudinem necessariam
huius ad hoc, sicut ista semper est vera: ‘Caesar est Caesar’
ipso etiam non existente. Verumtamen tusculanus cardinalis qui
modo est, deter-minavit quod ista: ‘Caesar est Caesar’ ipso non
existente non est vera, nisi quia praedicatur nomen de nomine,
‘strictius de strictiore’”. In the Troctotus Appellationum of the
Summulae the following passage is found: “Ap-pellatio est
acceptio termini pro re existente. Dico autem “pro re
existente”, quia terminus significans “non—ens” non appellat,
ut “Caesar” vel “Anti-chriatus” vel “chimaera” et cetera.” The
agreement between these passages is sufficiently clear. And
since the first passage is directly attributed to the man who was
Cardinal of Tusculum, the man who occupied that position in
March 1274 may justly be regarded as the author of the
Summulae. Inasmuch as the Petrus Hispanus or Petrus Juliani
who later became John XXI was the Cardinal of Tusculum at the
time specified, he should be regarded as the author of the
Summulae and not Petrus Alfonsi Hispanus.
The preponderant weight of the evidence adduced in support of
the authorship of John XXI is such as to shade the testimony of
the Tabula of Staras. Nevertheless, there must be some
explanation of the aacription which is found
»» B. Geyer, “Zu den Summula* Logiadu des Petru Hispanoa
and Lambert von Atuerre”, Phtiomphuclua JaJirbucti (1987), p.
611f. » See p. 44.
INTRODUCTION xvii
in the Tabula. Laurent, Grabmann,” and Geyer” have each
advanced a hypothesis to explain the attribution.
One of the first biographers of St. Dominic was a Spanish
religious called Petrus Ferrandi or Petrus Ferrkndi Hispanus or
Petrus Hispanus. His work on St Dominic, the Legenda «.
Daminici, was widely known among the Dominicans. Hence,
according to Laurent, it is quite possible that the Summulae
Logicales was attributed to Petrus Ferrandi Hispanus as a result of
a transposition on the part of the anonymous author of the
Tabula.
On the other hand, Msgr. Grabmann proposes to let Petrus
Alfonsi Hispanus stand as author but suggests that the
Summulae mentioned in the Tabula designates the Summa
totius logieae which is numbered among the Opus-cula of St.
Thomas but is believed to have been written by another author.
However, the criticism of this position by B. Geyer” is justified,
for the title Summulae Logicales is too unequivocal in its usage to
be taken for the title Summa totius logieae inasmuch as the
former designates a textbook for neophytes in logic whereas the
latter designates a scientific treatise on logic
Geyer proposes a third thesis, that the Summulae Logicales
referred to in the Tabula might be the Summulae Logicales of the
Dominican Lambert of Auxerre which is erroneously attributed to
another. If the author of the Tabula knew that a Dominican had
written a Summulae Logicales and he identified this Summulae
Logicales with that written by Petrus Hispanus, he might then
have identified the author of the Summulae with a Spanish
Dominican whom he could have known from other sources as
Petrus Alfonsi Hispanus. At any rate, whatever be the
explanation of the reference of the Tabula of Stains to the
contrary, the
1L-H. LMZcnt, «p. «t, p. 4Sf.
“M. GnbomiB. “HaadKhriftUd* Fonchangen aid Fwndc so dco
pnikMophiacacn 8ebriftat dm Petnu Hitpanas dca •pitavn
Puwto Johanna XXr, Sitrnt^whtriuku dmRnptrmeittm Umtiwiii
4m Wi*-mmmAafUm, PML-M*. Abtrnhmg, DC (1986), p. 14.
» B. Gcyv, •p.dL.p. Bltf.
 ’ B. Gcyv. «p. «tt, p. 6141
**•”SUMMULAE LOGICALES
fact still remains that the traditional view which considers the
Petrus Hispanus who became John XXI as the author of the
Summulae Logicales is far more plausible and is supported by
much stronger evidence.”
2. THE LIFE OF PETER OF SPAIN The author of the Summulae
Logicales was born some time during the decade 1210 to 1220
in Lisbon, Portugal. He was baptized Petrus Juliani after his
father. Little is known about his family or his early career. After
he completed his studies at the Cathedral school of his natal
city, he pursued his higher studies at the outstanding center of
logical and theological learning of his day, the University of
Paris. There he studied logic, Aristotelian physics and
metaphysics under Albertus Magnus; and medicine and
theology under John of Parma. He acquired a reputation as a
logician, for, as has already been mentioned, Salira-bene praises
him as “magnus sophista, loycus et di&putator atque
theologus”. It is possible that while at Paris he studied under
William of Shyreswood who wrote a compendium of logic
similar to the Summulae Logicales, for the latter taught at Paris
about 1240. Peter of Spain successfully completed his studies at
several faculties of the University. It was during his stay at Paris
that he acquired the cognomen Petrus Hispanus (Peter of Spain)
by which he has been known to history.
When he left Paris is not known, but he was in Siena, Italy, as
early as January 11, 1245.’ A year later, he was a
*• For additional evidence in support of the authorship of John
XXI, see Nos. 9, 25-27 of the editions which are listed in the
Bibliography of Editions of the Summulae in the Appendix.
These editions identify the author of the Summulae with John
XXI, quoting Platina and in some cases Trithemius as well.
See p. xiv.
R. SUpper, Popst Jokannee XXI, Kitrthengeechichtliche Stvdien,
IV (1898), p. 6.
 A document which is contained in the inventory of the State
Archives by A. Lisini fixes the date of January 11, 1246 (1244
Siena time), for on this day Peter of Spain took an oath before
four wit-
INTRODUCTION***
teacher of medicine at the University of Siena. He remained at
Siena until May, 1250, at least; but whether he remained longer
is not definitely known.’
There is a hiatus in our knowledge of his Whereabouts from 1250
until about the year 1261 when he appeared in the retinue of
Cardinal Ottobono Fieschi (later Pope Adrian V). In 1261 he
became dean of the Church of Lisbon, a position he later
relinquished to become archdeacon of Vermy in the diocese of
Braga, It was probably at Braga that he became acquainted with
Teobaldo Visconti. When the latter became Pope Gregory X in
1272, he summoned Peter of Spain to become his physician in
ordinary at Viter-bo. While occupying this position, Peter of
Spain composed the Thesaurus Pauperum, a medical text which
was to enjoy a wide circulation and a place of authority.
At the end of March or the beginning of April, 1273, he was
selected by the Cathedral Chapter as the Archbishop of Braga. On
June 5,1273, he was referred to as the Cardinal Archbishop of
Tuaculum. His appointment to this position was made by bis
friend Pope Gregory X. Despite his elevation to the Cardinalship
of Tusculum, he continued to govern the See of Braga until May
23, 1275. In June, 1273, he accompanied Pope Gregory to the
General Council of Lyons.
nesses in Siena. This is the oldest testimony which is had of hi*
presence in Siena. Cf. M.-H. Laurent, “H soggiorno di Pietro
Ispano a Siena”, BullsUin* Sen*** o» Stcria Patria. Noova Serie,
IX (XLV), 1988, p. 48.
 The dty of 8iena issued circular* in 1246 and in 1248 which
announced the courses to be given at the University. Both
areolars listed Peter of Spain as a teacher of medicine. Cf. L.
Zdekaner, SuUe OTVCM d*Uo Stmdio 5sn«ss (Siena, 1898), p. 16ff.
 Cf. R. 8tapper, Popst SeAomus XXL op. ctt„ p. 2«. In company
with another physician, Peter of Spain submitted to the city of
8i«na in 1260 a medical statement relative to contagious
diseases. He most have been in the employ of the dty. for the
dty statutes of 1250 contain a paragraph on salaries for Jurists
and a doctor of medicine, Petros Hispanas. A spedic statute
which is dated June 1260 mentions a payment to be made to
Petros Hispanas. Cf. L, Zdekauer. sp. oil, p. 17; p. 82, a. 19.
» SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Gregory X died in January, 1276. The reigns of his two
successors, Innocent V and Adrian V, were shortlived. Adrian V
died on August 18, 1276, and after an interregnum of twenty-six
days, Peter of Spain was elected Pope on September 13, 1276.
He was crowned John XXI instead of John XX, as he should
rightly have been crowned. His reign as Pope was too brief to
contain any major events which might serve as reliable
indications of any exceptional ability on his part or cause his
Papacy to stand out as a period of unusual accomplishment. The
two major tasks of his Papacy, the undertaking of a Crusade
and, above all, the restoration of the Eastern Church to the
Mother Church of Rome, were uncompleted at the time of his
death.
{
As far as the history of philosophy is concerned, the most
important act of his Papacy is his bull of January 18, 1277, to the
Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier. In it, he commissioned Bishop
Tempier to launch an inquiry into the errors which were then
being propagated at the Univer-versity of Paris. The results of
the inquiry were to be transcribed faithfully and forwarded to
the Pope.* In executing his commission. Bishop Tempier drew
up a list of two hundred nineteen propositions which were then
being taught in the faculty of arts. However, having done this,
Bishop Tempier thereupon proceeded to exceed the powers
which were granted to him by the Papal commission. On March
7, he condemned the two hundred nineteen propositions which
he had catalogued and he excommunicated anyone who should
attempt to defend them. Latin Averroism and its teachings, for
example, the theory of the double truth, were among the
philosophical trends which were hit by this con-
demnation. On April 28, the Pope issued another bull which can
be taken as approving this action of Bishop Tempier, for in this
bull the Pope ordered him to undertake a purification of the
doctrines of the Paris masters, both in the arts and in
theology@}/
Despite the responsibilities of the Papacy, Peter of Spain never
relinquished his pursuit of scientific studies. To insure the
tranquillity necessary to such endeavors, he had a private
apartment added to the Papal palace at Viterbo. The roof of this
apartment collapsed while he was in it, and fatally injured him on
May 14, 1277. He died less than a week later, on May 20, 1277.
His fame as a doctor rests securely on the Thesaurus Pauperum
and as a logician on the Summulae Logicales.
3. A SURVEY OF TRACTS I-VI OF THE SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Peter of Spain appears to identify dialectic with the art of
thinking, logic In common with the other schoolmen, he
evidences a definite attitude towards the aim, object, and
position of logic in relation to all the arts and all the sciences. An
art is a body of precepts through the observance of which a
human act is directed to its due end. The Summulae is a body of
rules by which human reason is directed towards the attainment
of its due end, truth. Therefore, the subject matter of the
Summulae, logic, constitutes an art Since logic has significant
speech for its object and significant speech is a necessary
prerequisite for the formulation of any rules whatsoever, logic is
prior to all the arts. It may truly be called the “art of arts”.’
 This ball it found in iU entirety in the ArvMvum Fnmeiteamm
Hirtoriew*, 1926, p. 469.
“Dialectic* eat an artfom, edentia adentiannn, ad omnium me-
thodoran prtndpia riam habena. Sola entm dialectic*
probabittter diapvtat de prtndpiia omnium aUaraa adentianim.
Et idee in ae-<priaHioae amnhna atiamm adentianim rtlelnrtke
didtar eaat prior” *””■■■”’”’ l*9**lm. Tractate. L Thia quotation
and all avhaaaaaot quotationa from the flnt aix tract, of the Sew
—fat are dtad from
“» SUMMULAE LOGICALES
It is also the “science of sciences”. A practical science deals with
things which are or can be done by us and the knowledge which
we acquire about them is sought for some practical end,
regardless of what that end might be.

The Summulae deals with things which are done by us because

its object is to specify rules of correct reasoning and reasoning is
a mental operation of ours. In short, the Summulae is a detailed
analysis of terms, the logical characteristics of terms, the
combinations of terms into significant discourse, the conditions
required for legitimate combinations of terms, and the
constitutive elements of terms with the formal properties of
these elements being distinctly labeled. All this is related to the
legitimate mental processes of discursive thinking. The end of
this methodology is definitely practical because in resolving the
principles which govern our rational procedure the principles
which must be obeyed in developing all other sciences,
speculative or practical, are determined.
From the very nature of things, the study of logic should be
prior to the study of the other sciences and not concomitant
with them, since the rules of logic involve the primary principles
of all reasoning. This agrees perfectly with Aristotle who says:
“...one must be already trained to know how to take each sort
of argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same time
knowledge and the way of obtaining knowledge”.* The same
view of the importance of logic and its position in relation to the
other sciences was widely held during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries.
In developing his analysis of the forms of propositions, Peter did
not follow the technique of the De Interpret*-Hone of Aristitle.
He used a method of analysis quite foreign to Aristotle,
emphasizing the structural elements of the proposition and
using a technique of expression, a definite terminology in
connection with his analysis which Aristotle did not use.
Whereas Aristotle developed his analysis of the
the Summulas as it is found in the Logiea MagiaUi, Nieotai d*
Orbil-IXM una cum Uxtu Petri Hitpam: see p. di. ■ Aristotle,
Mrtapkvnea, D, 2. 996a, 12.
INTRODUCTION xxiii
forms of propositions from illustrative examples, Peter analyzed
propositions in terms of the traditional “quae”, “qvaUt”,
“quanta”, using examples as illustrative of his analysis.*
There are two possible ways of approaching the proposition in
order to classify the kind, quality, and quantity of propositions
and to determine the ways in which the different types of
propositions can be constructed of the different materials
available. One method studies examples of the multiform types
constructed of the available materials, notes the different
constructions and designates each type by a distinct name. The
second method studies the logical characteristics of the
elements of propositions which flow from the diverse possible
combinations of these principles; then it designates these
properties by specific names and assigns a distinct nomenclature
for the propositions which result from various combinations of
the possible constitutive elements of terms. Aristotle used the
first method almost exclusively, though even he found it
expedient to define the significant elements of the proposition,
the noun and the verb. On the other hand, Peter of Spain, in
common with the other terminist logicians of the thirteenth
century, employed the second method.
Pursuant to this method of integral analysis, {
Peter of Spain makes a threefold distinction in the matter of
propositions which is based upon the nature of the predicate. A
natural matter proposition is one in which the
predicate belongs to the essence of the subject or is a property
of the subject, as in the case of “Every man is an animal” or
“Man is risible”. A contingent matter proposition is one in which
the predicate accidentally belongs to the subject, that is, it can
be present in it or not, as “ Every man is white”. A repugnant
matter proposition is one in which the predicate cannot be
attributed to the subject, as “Every man is a stone”.@}
This distinction in the matter of propositions can be applied to
the analysis of the nature of the opposition which exists
between contrary propositions and between sub-contrary
propositions. With regard to contrary propositions whose
matter is natural or repugnant, the one must be
qaando dividunt verum vel falsam, sicat in natnreli et remota
materia, aliquando simul sunt verae, sicut (in) contingent. Est
autem con-tingens materia categoricarum propositionum,
qaando praedicatum partim convenit subiecto, partim non
convenit, at ‘omnis homo est albas’ vel ‘omne corpus est
album’ ... Sic lege: Earum propositionum (eontradictoriarum)
quaecunque proferuntar in aniversalibus termini* in neatra
universaliter enuntiantes, non semper altera vera est et altera
falsa. ‘Non semper* dieit, quia in naturali vel in remota, altera
vera est, altera falsa”. Peter Abaelard, Logiea Ingredientibua, ed.
by B. Geyer in the Beitrage zwr GeaehiehU der PhUoaophie tuuf
Theologie dea MittelalUra, XXI (1933), Gloasa super Peri
ermeneiaa, pp. 404-405. Also cf. ibidem, p. 456.
“ ‘Homo eat rotionalis’: rebus ezistentibus ut nunc sunt, hec
quodam-modo necessaria est. ‘Homo eat riaibUia’: hec probabilis
est. ‘Homo eat olbua’: hec quidem possibilis, dubia tamen, eo
quod aeque vera potest esse et falsa. ‘Homo eat rudibUia’: hec
quidem impossibilis est, ut omnino vera esse non possit”. John
of Salisbury, Metologioon, ed. C.C.I. Webb (Oxford, 1929), I, 15,
844d. The terminology of the Summulo* agrees with that of
Abaelard. It is interesting to note that St. Thomas, in mentioning
these distinctions, combines the terminology used by John of
Salisbury and that used by Abaelard and Peter of Spain. “... si
praedicatum per se insit subiecto, dicetur esse
enuntiatio in materia necessaria vel naturali Si vero
praedicatum
per se repugnet subiecto, quasi excludens rationem ipsius
dicitur enuntiatio esae in materia impossibili sive remota... Si
vero medio modo se habeat praedicatum ad subiectum, ut scilicet
nee per se repugnet subiecto, nee per se insit; dicetur enuntiatio
ease in materia pos-sibili sive eontingenti”. St. Thomas,
Commentaria tn de Interpret*-tione. I. lect 13.
INTRODUCTION«v
true and the other must be false, because the predicate belongs
essentially to or is convertible with the subject taken in its whole
extension. {
Contingent matter contrary propositions cannot both be true
when the predicate belongs to the subject taken in its whole
extension; one must be true and the other must be false.
However, contingent matter contrary propositions can both be
false when the predicate does not belong to the subject taken in
its whole extension. With regard to subcontrary propositions
whose matter is natural or repugnant, the one must be false
and the other must be true. In the case of subcontrary
contingent matter propositions, both cannot be false but both
can be true.@} This distinction of the matter of propositions is
an aid to the understanding of the opposition of propositions.
In his examination of the proposition, Peter of Spain outlines a
theory of statement composition which analyzes the nature of
the logical structures resulting from the connection of simple
statements by the logical connectives “and”, “or”, and “if...
then”. A simple statement is a sentence which signifies the true
or the false by declaring something. Only those sentences which
are declarative (that ia, are in the indicative mood) have truth
value and are propositions.’
{
Propositions are categorical or hypothetical, depending upon
the constituent elements of their logical structures. The
categorical proposition is denned traditionally as composed of
subject, predicate, and copula.@} The copula is the basic
locution upon which the logical structure rests for it joins the
predicate to the subject and only through this junction can a
statement, in which truth or falsity resides, «xist
Peter of Spain’s theory of statement composition parallels to a
certain extent that of modern logic insofar as it concerns itself
with the truth functional analysis of logical structures which
contain the bask logical connectives “and”, “or”, and “if... then”.
The truth value of the components
xxvi SUMMULAE LOGICALES
of the compound statement which contains these logical
connectives determines the truth value of the compound or
hypothetical statement The compound or hypothetical
statement which always has two categorical propositions as its
constituent elements is termed copulative, disjunctive, or
conditional depending upon whether the connective used is
“and”, “or”, “if... then”.
The copulative proposition which is formed from the junction of
two categorical propositions by the logical connective “and” is
true when, and only when, the two component categorical
propositions are true. For its falsity it is sufficient that only one
of its components be false.* Thus, the truth value of the
copulative depends on the truth value of the components. The
extralogical content of the copulative does not affect its truth
value provided only that the components retain like truth value.
“New York is a city and Columbia is a university” is a true
statement simply because of the fact that “New York is a city”
and “Columbia is a university” are true statements. Reversal of
the order of the components or conversion within the
components themselves in no way affects the truth value of the
compound. The statement “Columbia is a university and New
York is a city” is still true as is the statement “A university is
Columbia and a city is New York”. In like manner, substitution
for either or both of these components does not affect the truth
value of the compound as long as the components substituted
have like truth value. Substituting the statement “The Hudson
is a river” for either of the components in no way affects the
truth of the compound for both “New York is a city and the
Hudson is a river” and “The Hudson is a river and Columbia is a
university” are true statements. However, if the statement
“The Hudson is an ocean” were substituted for either of the
components, the resulting compound would obviously be false.
 ”Copolativa est ilia in qua coniunguntur dose cathegorieae per
H+iw eonionctienera ‘et’... Ad veriUtem eopulativae erigitur
utram-qoe partem ene veram... Ad f alaitatem eiu rameit
alteram partem ease falaam”. Summmlae LogieaUs, Tractates
I.
INTRODUCTION“vii
The disjunctive proposition joins two categorical propositions by
the logical connective “or”. The disjunctive proposition is true
provided that at least one component is true; it is also true when
both components are true, but this, strictly speaking, is not as
property a disjunction. For the disjunctive to be false, both
components must be false.’{
It follows from this statement of the nature of disjunctive
propositions that Peter of Spain is aware of the modern
distinction between the exclusive and the inclusive sense of the
connective “or”. If, in the more proper disjunctive proposition,
at least one component is true but not both, then one component
is true and the other is false, as in the statement “Paper is made
from wood pulp or it is made from iron ore”. The first
component is true and the second is false. There is a real
disjunction. The connective “or” is used in the exclusive sense.
However, in the less proper disjunctive proposition, both
components are true, as in the statement “Brass is made from
copper or it is made from zinc”. This constitutes a disjunction in
the inclusive sense.@} Some modern logicians adopt the
expedient of appending the phrase “or both” to circumvent the
difficulty of distinguishing the inclusive sense from the exclusive
sense of the connective “or”, but there is no hint of such a
development in the Summuiae.
The conditional proposition joins two categorical propositions by
the logical connective “if... then”. For the truth of the
conditional it is required that the antecedent (or first component)
cannot be true without the consequent (or second component)
being true. For the falsity of the conditional proposition it suffices
that the antecedent can be true, the consequent being false.*
These rules which are

’ SUMMULAE LOGICALES
cited by Peter of Spain as governing the truth or falsity of a
conditional proposition, apply only to fonnal implication. If the
antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true,
then a necessary relationship must exist between the
antecedent and the consequent. The statement “Man exists”
necessarily implies the statement “Animal exists”. If “Man
exists” is true, then “Animal exists” is true and the conditional
“If man exists, then animal exists” is true. However, the
necessary relationship which must exist between an antecedent
and its consequent is unilateral, for the truth of the consequent
does not imply the truth of the antecedent. The statement
“Animal exists” does not imply the statement “Man exists”.
Even if “Animal exists” is true, it does not follow that “Man
exists” is true. Hence, the conditional “If animal exists, then
man exists” is not necessary.
{
If every true conditional is necessary, then every false
conditional must be impossible. A true conditional implies a
necessary relationship which actually exists between an
antecedent and its consequent. A false conditional likewise
implies a necessary relationship between an antecedent and its
consequent, but the relationship does not actually exist.
Therefore, a false conditional implies the existence of
something which does not exist. But this is an impossible
condition, for it violates the law of contradiction. Consequently,
all false conditionals are impossible.@}
Since the Summulae was probably intended as a compendium
of practical rules for students of elementary logic and as an aid
for scholars participating in the disputationes in the schools, the
interest of Peter of Spain was in establishing a practical rule
relative to the falsity of the conditional proposition. To all
practical intents and purposes, the necessity of the conditional
proposition is destroyed if the antecedent can be true, the
consequent being false. If the mere possibility of the
antecedent’s being true with the con-
conditionalis vera eat neceaaaria et omnia falsa eat imposribilia. Ad
falsitatem eiaa suffldt quod antecedena poasit ease veram,
consequent* e falao “ Summulat Logical*; Trmctatos I.
INTRODUCTIONxxix
sequent being false is sufficient to render the conditional
statement false, it is obvious that the antecedent’s actually being
true with the consequent being false renders the conditional
false.
The treatment which Peter of Spain accords the connectives
“and”, “or”, “if... then”, can thus be said to parallel to some
extent the truth functional analysis embodied in the modern
theory of statement composition, for both regard the truth value
of the hypothetical or compound statement as depending upon
the truth value of its components.
The focal point of the Summuiae is the Topics of Aristotle. And
inasmuch as the topical analysis of dialectical argumentation is
probably the ultimate aim of the Summu* toe, {
Peter of Spain avails himself of the traditional Por-phyrian
analysis of the predicables in terms of which he believed the
categories are to be undestood. This procedure tends to restore
dialectic to the primary position in the field of logic. In the
Organon, the Aristotelian Categoriae classifies the various
modes of signification according to which significant incomplex
terms can be allocated.@} It establishes a basis for scientific
analysis antecedent to the complex significations embodied in
the proposition, for in the traditional arrangement of the
Organon the categories receive treatment prior to the
proposition in the De Interpretatione and prior to scientific
analysis as such in the Posterior Analytics.
The traditional Porphyrian view which is found in the Isagoge of
Porphyry and in the Commentary of Boethius on the Isagoge,
assumes that a knowledge of the predicables is antecedent to and
useful for an understanding of the categories.* Consistent with
this view of the primary importance of the predicables, Peter of
Spain first considers the predicables and then the categories. In so
doing, he follows the medieval Corpus of Aristotelian logic,
which includes Porphyry.
The treatment of the predicables in Peter of Spain is bat a more
concise statement of the Isagoge of Porphyry. One
 Boathhm, C»—iiiKiifa Mana, eoL T7-T8 D (J. P. ]
* SUMMULAE LOGICALES
might say that it is almost a verbatim repetition of the classical
definitions assigned to the predicates with an epitomized
exposition of their essential elements and their interrelations.
However, a notable feature of the De Prae-dicabilibus of the
Summuiae is his definition of a “predi-cable” and his definition
of a “universal” which gives us an inkling of his conception of
the universal.*
The term “predicable” in its generic application is such as to
include within its comprehension every significant term’which
can function as predicate in relation to any subject whatsoever.
So construed, “predicable” comprehends transcendental as well
as generic terms, analogical as well as univocal and equivocal
terms. “Predicable”, in its proper application, comprehends
significant terms which are predicated uni-vocally of many, that
is, terms which function as genus, species, differentia, property
and accident. {
Predicable and universal are essentially the same from the point
of view of the thing concerned; the universal is the objective
reality and the predicable is the linguistic expression which is
designative of that reality.@}
Although the De Praedicabilibus of the Summuiae closely
adheres to the Isagoge of Porphyry, Peter of Spain in no wise
takes cognizance of the posing of the problem of the universal
by Porphyry” despite the fact that this fundamental problem
was of paramount importance not only among his predecessors
but also among his contemporaries.”
“”Genus est quod praedicatur de pturibus differentibus specie in
eo quod quid”... “Species est quod praedicatur de pluribus
differentibus numero in eo quod quid”... “Differentia est quod
praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale”...
“PToprium est quod eonvenit omni et soli et semper et conversim
praedicatur de re et non indicat quod est ease rei”... “Accidens est
quod adest vel abest subiecto praeter subiecti eorruptionem”.
Summuiae Logical**, Trae-tus II.
“Est autem praedicabile quod aptum natum est dici de pluribus.
Universale autem quod aptum natum est esse in pluribus”.
Summuiae Logical**, Tractatus II.
“ Cf. Boethius, Commentaha in Porphyrxum a «e Tranalatum,
col. 82 (J. P. Migne, P. L., LXIV).
“”It has often been said by historians, and not without good
INTRODUCTION ««i
The probability that the Swnmulae was intended as a
compendium for beginners offers a possible explanation for this
omission. Peter’s own conception of the universal is deduced
from an examination of the context of the Summuku. “The
doctrine of the universal which Abaelard finally states in his
commentary on Porphyry may be said to be the solution with
which the twelfth century closed its acute and isolated discussion
of the problem ... Universals are words, not voces... but nemina.
There are, strictly, no universal things, for only individual things
exist”.* {
Despite the fact that Abaelard compelled William of Champeaux
to modify, to a great extent, his theory of exaggerated realism*
which held that universals existed prior to and independent of
their particulars with the individuals in a single species or genus
being determined by accidental forms, Peter of Spain reverted to
a position of realism. For him the universal existed as a thing
outside the mind.* The human nature
which is found alike in Peter, James, and John has an existence
of its own apart from the individuals in which it exists and apart
from the human mind. But, as has been said, nowhere in the
Summulae is there any substantiation of this position or any
mention of contrary theories.@}
Since to every predicable there exists a corresponding universal
in the real order, or a one to one relation, each to each, it
follows that in developing a logic, one is, at the same time,
developing a metaphysics. Logic is thereby raised to the status
of a dialectical metaphysics, what might be called a metalogic.
Insofar as it is significant, language relates to things, and insofar
as it relates to things as they are in themselves, language is a
metaphysics. This realism of Peter of Spain explains why he is
not interested in metaphysical questions as such and why he
needs no clear-cut distinction between the ontological and the
logical domains.
{
In the Categariae, significant words are divided into uni-vocal,
equivocal, and derivative prior to their being divided according
to the ten modes of signification, the categories.”@} This
trichotomy is antecedent to their functioning as terms in the
proposition. In common with Boethius,” Peter of Spain avails
himself of this tripartite distinction but relates it to the
predicates in propositions and asserts that a knowledge of it is
necessary for an understanding of the categories.** Again,
attribution becomes prior to signification thereby restoring
dialectic to primacy in the field of logic The consequence of such
a position, whether or not Peter
re nniversali gignificata per ipsum tenninum...” Ibid., p. 4, L 58.
“Appellatio e«t acceptio termini pro re existent*... Item,
appellatknram termini commnniB, alia est termini comnnmis pro
re in communi “ Troctatua d* AppellationibuM, p. 44, 1. 1 and 1. 15.
*’ Aristotle, CaUgoriae, eh. L
“ BoethioB, In Categories Aristotslu, Liber PrimoB, eoL 16S et teq. (J. P.
Migne, P.L., LXIV).
>• “Ad cognoacendam praedieamenta qoaedam sunt neeewrio prae-
mittenda sine quorum oognitione nequaqoam potest haberi cognitio
praedicamentorum. Eornm ergo quae praedicantor qoaedam rent
onivoca, qoaedam aequiwca, et qoaedam denominatJY*”. Summufat
Logical**, Traetatos IIL
INTRODUCTION “Mii
of Spain was conscious of it, is an infinite regression of
propositions, for each proposition in turn requires another
proposition to determine the signification of its terms.
Because of his position with relation to the nature of the
universal, Peter of Spain next discusses the various forms of
“being in” which Aristotle treated in the Physics.* Thereafter, the
treatment of the categories in the Sumrmdae is a formalized
paraphrase of the key-points of the Aristotelian Categoriae, with
the exception of actio and passio which are defined and
categorized in terms of each other in practically verbatim
agreement with the analysis of Gilbert de la Por-ree in the Liber
de sex principiis.
The Tract on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle which constitutes
the fourth Tract of the Sumrmdae is a formalized exposition of
the nature and the content of the categorical syllogism. The
analysis is in terms of the Aristotelian three figures as they are
found in Boethiua. It includes, in the first figure, the five modes of
Theophrastus, as did Boethiua, but it omits the seventh mode of
the third figure which is found in Boethiua. The point which is
worthy of note is the incorporation of the mnemonical scheme
for the reduction of the syllogism which is first found in William of
Shyreswood.** The subsequent popularity of this mnemonical
scheme is probably due, in great measure, to the widespread
influence and authority of the SummulaeV
The number and types of examination which were specified by
the University of Paris at different periods of the
«• Aristotle, Phytic*, IV, 3.
“Boethiua, Dt SyOoffitmc CaUgorioo, Liber II, d. 821 «t ««o. (J.
P. Mi«M, P. L, LXIV). “ “Modi antem et coram redaction*,
retaaeatw biia ▼eraibiu: Barbara celareat darii ferio baralipton
Celantet dabitii fapeamo frieaeumuiimi Ceaare campeatrei
feetiao banco Darapti felapton diaatnis datial bocardo feriaon”.
William of Shyraiwood. Intro******* fa hpitmm, ed. by Martin
Grabmann in the SiUtmotberMtU <Ur Rm^rttehtn Akatiewm,
rfar TOeamaafce/taa, Haft 10 (1M7), p. 66.
»Cf. George Hayward Joyce, Frftwfafat of Le*w (New York.
1919), p. 181, n. 1.
«xiv SUMMULAE LOGICALES
thirteenth century for candidates aspiring to the baccalaureate
varied, but {
the Topics of Boethius was frequently included among the
works which had to be known.” Consequently, among the
books which the masters explained in the “ordinariae lectiones”
were the first three books of the De differentiis topicis of
Boethius.” The fifth tract of the Summulae, which is entitled
“Super libro topicorum Aristo-telis”,@} is very probably drawn
directly from Book I and Book II, especially the latter, of the De
differentiis topicis. {
From Book I, Peter of Spain abstracts almost verbatim the
definitions of “argumentum”, “conclusio”, “quaestio”, and
“maxima”.” He eliminates the Boethian analysis of the types of
propositions and of the relationships which exist between the
predicables because he discussed them previously in the first
two tracts of the Summulae. The rest of the fifth tract of the
Summulae is a scholastic paraphrase of Book II of the De
differentiis topicis.@} An “argumentatio” is defined as discourse
explaining an argument. Whereupon {
the four species of “argumentatio” are distinguished, namely,
sophism, induction, enthymeme, and example. The
definition of a topic (locus), a topic as a principle (locus
maxima), and a topic as differentia of a principle (locus
differentia maximae) then follow in the same order as in
Boethius.@} However, it is the distinction of the various types
of topical arguments which furnishes strong evidence that the
Summulae borrows directly from Boethius.
The fundamental division of dialectical principles or
»« Cf. H. Denifle-E. Chatelain, Chortularium Universitatia
Porieien-aie (Paris, 1889), no. 201, pp. 227ff. (1252) and no. 246,
pp. 2771T. (1255). Also cf. Charles Thurot, De I’Orgonieation de
VEneeignement dans rUnivernU de Pane au Moyen Age (Paris,
1850), pp. 42-45.
« Cf. Charles Thurot, op. ciL, pp. 71-72.
“”Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem... Est autem
conclusio argumento et arguments probata propositio...
Quaestio est dutntabilis propositio.. .Maxima est propositio qua
non est altera prior neque notior”. Summulae Logiealee,
Traetatua V. Cf. Boethius, De different™ topicie, Liber Primus,
eol. 1180C. col. 1180C, coL 1177C, and col. 1176D (J. P. Migne,
P. L., LXIV). Boethius’ definition of “argumentum” agrees
verbatim with that of Cicero. (Topiea II, 8).
INTRODUCTION nn
topics is into intrinsic, extrinsic, and medial topics.
 An intrinsic topic (locus intrinsecus) is involved when the
argument is taken from that which belongs to the substance of a
thing. It may be based either on the substance of a thing (locus
substantia) or on the concomitants of the substance (locus a
concomitantibus substantiam). The former is involved when the
argument is taken from that which belongs to the substance of
the terms which are posited in the question, as in the case of a
topic based on a definition; the latter is involved when the
argument is taken from those things which follow from the terms
which are posited in the question, as a topic based on efficient
causality. On the other hand, an extrinsic topic (locus
extrinsecus) is comprehended when the argument is taken from
that which is altogether distinct from the substance of a thing, as
in the case of a topic based on authority. Finally,
a medial topic (locus medium) is involved when the argument is
taken from that which partly agrees with and partly differs from
the terms which are posited in the question, as in the case of the
topic of co-ordinates and inflections.” Each of these major
divisions is subdivided exhaustively and the analysis closely
“ “Locos intrinsecus est quando sumitur argumentum ab his
quae sunt de substantia m ... Locus extrinsecus eat quando
sumitur argumentum ab his quae omnino separate sunt a
substantia rei... Locus medius est quando sumitur argumentum ab
his quae partim conveniunt cum terminis in quaestione positas et
partim diiTerunt ab eis ... Item hwus intrinsecus dividitur per
locum a substantia et per locum a con-osmitantibus substantiam.
Locus a substantia est quando sumitur argumentum ab his quae
sunt de substantia terminorum in quaestione positorum...
Sequitur de tods a concomitantibus substantiam quae sunt
quando sumitur argumentum ab his quae consequuntur terminos
in quaestione positos”. SIHMMUM Logiadn, Tractatus V. Cf.
“Omnes igttur tod, id est maximarum differentiae
propositionum, aut ab his ducantur neeesse est terminis qui in
quaeataone sunt positi, praedkato scilicet atque subjecto, aut
extrinsecus aaramantur, aut horum medii qui inter utrosque
versantur. Barum vero locorum qui ab his ducun-tur termini* de
quibus in quaestione dubitatur, duplex est modus: onus quidem
ab eorum substantia, alter TWO ab his quae substantiam eorum
consequuntur”. Boethru, Dt Mfimtiu topiem. Liber IL eoL 1186D
(J. P. Wgne, p. U Lxm.
«*▼* SUMMULAE LOGICALES
parallels that of Bothius.” The treatment which is accorded each
subdivision is generally the same: a statement of the nature of
the topic; an assertion of the constructive, destructive, or dual
nature of the topic; an appropriate example; and a statement of
the dialectical principle which is involved in each case.” Even
this formalized procedure is exemplified in Boethius. Hence, all
the evidence points to the De differentia topieis of Boethius as
the direct source of the treatment of the Topics in the
Summulae.”’

The sixth tract of the Summulae Logicales is a scholastic

paraphrase of the De Sophisticia Elenehis of Aristotle. Prantl”
remarks that the tract is limited to the first fifteen chapters of
the Sophistics, but it really appears to be a paraphrase of the
first six chapters. Any relationship which may exist between the
Summulae and any chapter which follows the sixth is merely
incidental.
The principal departure from the Aristotelian text is in the
division of the sophisms which arise from language into
Peter of Spain’s subdivision of intrinsic topics, with the
exception of the “loeus a definite” and the “locus a descripta”, is
based on the De differentus topieis, cols. 1186D-1190B; of
extrinsic topics, cols. 1190B-1192B; and of medial topics, cols.
U92B-1194A (J. P. Migne, P. L., LXIV).
‘•The topic of efficient causality is a typical example of this
procedure: “Locus a causa efficient* est habitudo ipsius causae
efflcien-tis ad suum effectum. Et est constructivus et
deatructivus. Constructive tenet sic: ‘Domiflcator est bonus;
ergo, domus est bona*. Maxima: Si causa efficiens est bona,
ipsum quod fit bonum est De-strutive sic: ‘Domiflcator non est
bonus; ergo, domus non est bona’. Maxima: Cuius causa
efficiens non est bona, ipsum quod fit non est bonum”.
Summulae Logicales, Tractatus V.
Many of the examples which are used by Boethius to illustrate
specific topics are duplicated in the Summulae, for instance,
those which are used in connection with the “locus a
corruption*”, “locus ab usibus”, “locus a. transumptione”,
“locus ab auctoritate”, etc
In Book III of the De differeniiis topieis, Boethius attributes the
differentiation of Topics, which is conUined in Book II, to
Themistius and compares this classification with that of Cicero.
Consistent with his general approach to logic as a practical tool,
Peter of Spain omits all mention of Book III of the De differentiis
topieis. »» Carl Prantl. GeschichU der Log* tm Abendlande, Vol.
Ill, p. 60.
INTRODUCTION xxxvi.
actual multiple (multiplex actuate), potential multiple (multiplex
potentiate), and fantastic multiple (multiplex fantastieum)
sophisms. An actual multiple sophism is one in which a word in
the sophism or the very expression which constitutes the sophism,
while remaining substantially the same, and being proffered in
exactly the same manner, signifies diverse things, as in the
fallacies of equivocation and amphibology respectively. A
potential multiple sophism is one in which a word in the sophism
or the very expression which constitutes the sophism, while
remaining substantially the same, is proffered in a different
manner and signifies diverse things. In the case of a word, there
is the fallacy of accent, while in the case of the expression, there
is the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division. A fantastic
multiple sophism is one in which a word signifies one thing yet
seems to signify another because of a partial resemblance which
it has to another word, as in the fallacy of figure of speech.” The
source of this classification of fallacies which arise from language
is Alexander of Aphro-disias.” Peter of Spain is explicitly referring
to him when he attributes this division of fallacies to “Alexander
in his commentary on the book of the elenehi”.**
In the thirteenth century, a distinction was made between the
logiea antiqua and the logiea moderna. The logica anti-
“Sciendum mvtcm ut volt Alexander in eommento supra libnnn
elenchorum triplex est multiplex. AHud est enim multiplex
actuate, aliud potentiate, et aliud fantastieum. Multiplex
actuate est quando dictio vol oratfo, eadem secundum
substantiam et secundum modum proferendi, diverse signincat.
Dictio in equlvocatione... Oratio in amphifaologia... Multiplex
potentiate est quando dictio Tel oratio, eadem secundum
substantiam, diverse tamen secundum modum proferendi,
diverse stgniflcat Dictio in aceentu... oratio in compositioiie Td
diristane... De multiplid fantastico vWeWtur in fallada fsjurae
dktionis... Est astern multiplex fantasticum quando aliqua dictio
signiftcat unum et videtur signincare aliud propter shnilirndlnem
quam habet in parte cum alia dietione...” Simmudas Loeiealm,
Tractatus VI.
“ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cnmmtutarium m AriitoUUi Sopkitti-
•w Elmehm, ed. MsThnfflsn Wellies, Commentary* m AriwUUUm
Greeoa (Berlin. 1898). n, Part m, p. B, tS-tt.
“Ctnotatt.
“*™ SUMMULAE LOGICALES
qua embraced the logica vetus and the logica nova. The logica
vetus included the Isagoge of Porphyry, the Cate-goriae and the
De Interpretatione of Aristotle, and sometimes Boethius’
Divisions and Topics. The logica nova consisted of the Isagoge of
Porphyry, the Organon of Aristotle and the Liber de sex
principiis of Gilbert de la Porree. Thus the first six tracts of the
Summutae represent a thorough, practical synopsis of the
content of the logica antiqua with one very important omission.
Peter of Spain omits any treatment of the Posterior Analytics,
ignoring the Aristotelian analysis of the nature of scientific
investigation.
In the first six tracts, which constitute approximately half of the
Summulae Logicales, Peter of Spain treats none of the
philosophical problems which arise in connection with the
traditional matter contained therein, accepting it uncritically
without regard to its implications. It is only in the seventh and
final tract of the Summulae, which is devoted to an analysis of
the properties of terms, that Peter begins to philosophize. This
tract, which consists of treatises on “supposition”, “relatives”,
“amplification”, “appela-tion”, “restriction”, “distribution”, and
“exponibles”, is known variously as the logica moderna, the
parva logicalia, the tract de proprietatibus terminorurn.
4. ANTECEDENTS AND NATURE OF THE LOGICA MODERNA A.
A Theory of Supposition. The historical continuity in the
development of human thought is such that the entire
succession of men may be regarded as if only one man has
always existed and is continually learning. If one subscribes to
this opinion, then the tract De Proprietatibus Terminorurn of
the Summulae, which will be regarded as a sample of similar
tracts written by tenninist logicians of the thirteenth century,
should not prove to be as radical an innovation as it appears at
first sight. There should be historical antecedents to which it
>The considerable literal resemblance between the SummuLu of
Peter of Spain and thoee of William Shyreewood (t 124»> •»*»
Lam*
INTRODUCTIONnra
could be related either as to terminology or content or both. At
present, due to the vast amount of research which remains to be
undertaken by medieval scholars, the authentic originality of
the tract is a moot question. If it is not original, an important gap
exists in our knowledge of the history of logic. A genetic study
which contributes to the solution of the question of originality
will assist in arriving at an evaluation of the historical
significance of the tract and will be an aid in placing it in its
proper position in the historical development of logical theory.
A. Trendelenburg has pointed out a striking analogy between
the syntactical analysis of the grammatical sentence and the
schematic arrangement of significant words into the logical
categories. He maintains that it is very probable that the
Aristotelian ten categories are derived from such an analysis.
The evidence is even more compelling that the theory of
supposition, which is superimposed
bert of Auerre (fl. c 1250) pose the question of the
interdependence of then texts. The question is not treated here.
The Summulae of Peter of Spain it considered as a model of
these and any such similar text with a view to determining the
sources from which they, as a group, ultimately stem. Relative to
the question of dependency, Magr. Grabmann has made a
comparison of the texts of these three Sum-muta* and has
advanced the thesis that, contrary to popular opinion, Lambert of
Auxerre has made use of Peter of 8pain rather than the . (Cf.
“Handschriftliehe Forschungen und Funde ru den philo-s Petms
Hispanus, des spiteren Papstes XXI” in SitnmgtbmriekU der
Bayoriadum AkatUmU dtr Wiutntehaftcn, PhiL-HuL AbUQng. IX
(1986), pp. 26-58; p. 42.) B. Oeyer has produced evidence which
tends to establish 1258 as the latest possible date for the writing
of the Svmmmlat of Lambert of Auxerre, an interesting fact in
the tight of Msgr. Grabmann’s thesis, for 1268 is yean later than
the probable date of the writing of the
Siiwwfsi of Peter of Spain. (CI B. Geyor, “Zu den Sn Isi
Lofficais* des Petrus Hispanus und Lambert von Auxerre” in
Philotopkitektt Jmkrbuek (1987), p. 612.) Msgr. Grabmann has
also pre pared an edition of the Sim fst of William Shyreswood
under the
title of the “Introduction** in, lofitnm” which has been
published in the SitmmgtbtwitkU dtr flay rteaam Akadtmit dor
Wimtnteknfton, PhiL-HuL AbtoUmng. X (1987).
 Adolf Trendelenburg, -Geschlchte der btegorlealefcre-. Bittori-
sofce Bottrdgt «r PMIosopMs. I (Berlin, 1846) p. €8 ot so*; 144.
«1 SUMMULAE LOGICALES
by Peter of Spain upon signification and is a logical synopsis of
the actual determinations of the possible extension of a
substantive term, is likewise grammatical in origin. It utilizes
many technical grammatical terms and studies the extensional
effects of various grammatical adjuncts upon substantives. In
great measure it appears to be a reformulation and a
restatement of many already existing concepts in terms of a
unifying concept which is derived from the grammarians. It uses
a precise terminology which seems to be derived in part from
grammar. Finally, it carries on the trend toward the synthesis of
grammar and logic which is so evident in the Logica
Ingredientitws of Abaelard and the Metalogicon of John of
Salisbury, and it emphasizes the close relationship which exists
between the linguistic structure of grammar and the logical
content of thought
According to Peter of Spain, signification is the representation
of a thing through the imposition of a word (per impositionem
vocis*). It is a property of words and not of things, for words
signify whereas things are signified. This notion of signification
has been a part of logical tradition from the time of its
development by Stoic logicians.

The conception of imposition, which Peter of Spain uses in his

statement of the nature of signification, is met with in
Boethius,’ Abaelard* and John of Salisbury.
 Traetatua de Supporitionibua, p. 1, 1. 26.
« Cf. “Signiflcare autem vel monstrare vocum est, signifleari
vero rerum”. Peter Abaelard, Logica Ingredientibut, ed. by B.
Geyer in Beitr&ge xur GesehiehU dor PhUoeophie und Theologie
dee MitUt-aUere, XXI (1919-1927), Gloesa euper Porphyrium, p.
10.
» “... omne vocabulum non propriom solum, ant appellativum,
quod ad illad Untum nomen pertinet quod caribua infleeti
potest, sed ad rnnnffm rerum signiflcationem, qua rebus
imposita vocabula praedica-mus”. Boethius, In CaUgoriat
Ariatotelie, Liber I, col. 164 (J. P. Migne, P.L., LXIV).
 Peter Abaelard: Diabetica in Ouvragee Inddite (TAbelard,
Victor Cousin (Paris, 1836), pp. 360, 351, 487; Login
Ingredientibue, op. eit.. Glossa super Porphyrmm, p. 30 and
Glossa super Praeduamenta Ariatotelie, p. 112.
»John of Salisbury. Metalogicon, ed. by C. C. I. Webb (Oxford,
1929),!, 15, 841a; 1,16.
INTRODUCTION xU
Both Abaelard* and John of Salisbury* even speak of “secunda
imporitio” which was to be designated later as “secunda
intentio”. In addition, John of Salisbury makes mention of
“materialiter imposita” , a conception which was to be termed
“materialis suppositio” when the theory of supposition was
more fully developed.
Signification is prior to supposition because a term must have
meaning, that is, it must represent something before it can
enter into significant speech and denote anything. The
relationship which exists for Peter of Spain between signification
and supposition appears to be analogous to that which exists
between an instrumental and a formal sign. An instrumental
sign is one which is first known as an object itself and then
makes another thing known, e.g., if I see smoke, I know the
smoke first and then the fire of which the smoke is an effect;
the word “house” first must be known as a sign before that
which is designated by “house”, functioning as a sign, may be
known. Inasmuch as signification is “the relation of a sign to the
signified”, a word viewed as having the property of signification is
an instrumental sign. On the other hand, a formal sign is an
object by which something else is known primarily and then only
later is the formal sign itself known. In the statement “Every man
iB mortal”, we do not advert to the sign “man” or its meaning
but to the things in the objective order which are designated by
“man”, that is, to the specific things to which mortality is
attributed. It is only by an act of reflection that we advert to the
sign “man” and its meaning. {
The sign “man” in the above statement functions as a formal sign
and exhibits the property of supposition which is “the relation of
that which denotes to that which is denoted”.” Consequently,
any word viewed
as having the property of supposition in a statement is
functioning as a formal sign. This distinction of signification and
supposition is basic and fundamental in any analysis of language
for it defines the difference between the meaning and
application, intension and extension, connotation and
denotation of a term.
The exposition of the notion of “aignifieatio” which is found in
Peter of Spain, though it may be brief, nevertheless reveals an
awareness of the logical import of the distinction between
“significatio” and a “modum significandi”. Signification is the
meaning of a word,@} the representation of the substantial or
accidental thing which is signified by the word. {
A substantial thing is expressed through the medium of a
substantive, whereas an accidental thing is expressed through
the medium of an adjective or a verb. However, these latter
two parts of speech may signify a thing substantively or
adjectivally, according to the mode of signification involved. In
the statement “The man is running”, the verb is predicated
adjectively of the substantive “man”; running is signified as an
accident proper to the substance. In the statement “Running is
injurious to a weak heart”, “running” is used substantively; in
this case, running is signified as if it were a substance capable of
existing by itself.@} The signification of things substantively
and adjectivally is purely linguistic for it involves only modes of
words. On the other hand, substantivity and adjectivity are
modes of things. In this respect, a parallelism of grammar and
reality is apparent
Three factors of interest, which are involved in this
presentation, are the appearance of the grammatical terms
“rubsUmtivum nomen” and “adieetivum rumen”, the signifying
of something substantively or adjectivally, and the recognition
that a parallelism of grammar and reality exists to some degree.
{
The terms “substantivum nomen”” and “adieetivum nomen”*
are found in Priscian. When he used the term “svb-ttantivum”
alone, he referred to the pronoun.”@} Whenever he referred to
the equivalent of our subsUntive, he used the term “nomen”. In
distinguishing adjectives from substantives, he cited the
property of comparison as a distinctive feature of adjectives.• {
Abaelard incorporated into logic this differentiation of the
“substantivum nomen” from the “adieetivum nomen” on the
basis of grammatical comparison.” A logical text, the “De
Generibus et Speciebus”, which was written by an unknown
author in the twelfth century, also includes the differentiation
of the “substan-Hvum nomen” from the “adieetivum nomen”.@}
Thus, it appears that the terms were derived from Priscian and
definitely were employed in logic in the twelfth century.
The reference of Peter of Spain to the possibility of signifying
the same thing substantively and adjectively is merely a passing
indication of his appreciation of the interconnection of grammar
and logic. Yet it serves as still another link between the
Summulae, the logical works of Abaelard, and the Metalogicon of
John of Salisbury. Both
“/K&,m,2.
“/Ki.XVII.44.
“ “... adiectiva autem ideo Toeantur, quod alii* appeUativia,
quae rabatantiam significant, vel etiam propriis adiri sotent ad
manifeatan-dam eonnn qualitatem Tel quantitatem, quae
augeri Tel minoi sine substantiae eonsumptiane poesunt, at
0*000111 animal’...” Priadan, op. cii^ H 25.
“ Scd we etiam eamparari poesunt substantiae, quippe
eomparatio eecundum adjacentiam, non secundum rabatantiam
aedpitur, quod etiam ex nominibus substantrris eomm qaoque
aeddenthim quae ad eomparatMnam reniunt, ostenditur.
Neque m*ffu albedo aicut magi* •Urns didmus. Undo et multo
magi* substantiae, quae nullam habent adjacentiam, a
comparatione aunt tmmunes, nee eorum nomina sub-■tantira
quae rabatantiaa voeamus, cum magi* et minus praedieantuT.
Non enfan «vii vel minua homo didtuT, dcut ma*u rel minus
atSum. 8ed nee istud aubatantiae proprium case potest, cum in
quantitatlbus muhiaqae aliis eonTeniat.” Peter Abaelard,
Dialeetaea, op. eiL, p. 175. BeJerant to this differentiation, ef.
ibia\ pp. 189, 2S1.
»• [Author unknown], D* gmurikuM «t Sp*cUbus. in 0*vru*«e
InddiU dMoeferd. Victor Cousin (Paria. 18M), p. 62*.
“ SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Abaelard’ and John of Salisbury” incorporated this grammatical
topic into logic.
{
In the Metalogicon, John of Salisbury clearly believes that a
parallelism exists between grammar and logic from the point oT
view of signification and he develops the point in a more
detailed and explicit fashion than Peter of Spain did in the
Summulae. For him, grammar forms a part of logic. In grammar,
substantives correspond to substances and adjectives or verbs
correspond to accidents, for just as substances are limited by
accidents, so substantives are limited or modified by adjectives
or verbs.”@}
The Summulae states that adjectives and verbs limit or
characterize (copulare). Characterization (copulatio), which is a
property of these parts of speech, is the acceptance of an
adjectival term for something. Peter of Spain merely mentions
this property of terms while William of Shyreswood treats it in
detail in his Introductiones in Logicam.
The conceptions of substantivity (substantivatio) and adject ivity
(adiectivatio) correspond to the modes of being of things in
objective reality. Things qua things, literally speaking, cannot
enter into a statement. However, things qua things, figuratively
speaking, can enter into a statement by virtue of the
substitutive value of terms.” The
“ Peter Abaelard, Logiea Jnortdtentibue, op. eit., Gtoeea super
Peri ermeneias, p. 360.
John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, op. eit., I, 15, 842a.
”... et sic substantiis omnibus sua quasi impressa sunt nomina.
Sed quoniam ipsarum multe sunt differentie; alie quidem a
quanti-tate, alie a qualitate, alie a varus accidentium formis,
item alie ab his que familiariora sunt et adesse conducunt;
idciroo quibus hoc designaretur nomina sunt invents que
possunt adiici substantivis et eorum vim et naturam
quodammodo depingerent... Sieut enim accidentia substantiam
vestiunt et informant; sic quadam proportione rationis ab
adiectivis substantia infonnarantur... Pro eo quod substantia,
que sensui aut rationi obiicitur, sine motu, quo agendo vel
patiendo aliquid temporaliter movetur, esse non potest, ideo ad
desig-nandos motus temporales agentis aut patientis excogitata
sunt verba.” John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, op. ett, 1,14, 841b-
841d.
“ Cf. “Nee erubesco eonflteri quod res de re predicetur in
proposi-
INTRODUCTION «!▼
substitutive value of a term is called characterization (copulatio)
when the term stands for an accident and supposition
(suppontio) when the term stands for a substance.
Adjectives and verbs are said to characterize (copulare). The use
of “copulare” might almost be termed commonplace in
Abaelard.” {
The term “copulatio”, from which “copulare” is derived, is used
by Boethius in a suggestive manner but not with the exact
meaning it has in terminist logic.” Abaelard also uses
“copulatio” and in the same manner that Boethius does.**
Neither includes the conception of substitution which is
characteristic of the terminist use of the word as stated in the
Summulae. Nevertheless, the usage of the term probably stems
from Boethius and Abaelard.@}
Just as there is substitutive value involved in the use of an
adjectival term, so also is there a substitutive value involved in
the use of a substantive term. This latter value is termed
supposition (suppositio). Supposition denotes the acceptance of
a term in place of some thing or things. A substantive term
possesses this property when it is used either alone or in
conjunction with other words. The classification of supposition
into specific types constitutes an analysis of precise, determined
extensional values.
Three of the seven treatises which enter into the composition of
the De Proprietatibtu Terminorum are express-
tkne, etui res in propoaftkme non sit; cam hoc in mente miehi
ver-setur qnod res siffnifleetur predicate termino vers
sAnnattanis, cuius subject© aliqua d« re agitur aut res aJiqua
signirkatur.” John of Salisbury, Motalogieon, op. <AL, 888a.
«• Peter AhaeJard: DiaUetua, op. efe, pp. 288, 244, 248. 248,
252, 276, 848; Logic*. IngrodmOOnu, op. eiL, Giosso super
Porphyrinic, pp. 18-17, 69, 80; Gleam super Prandioammta
AriitotoiiM, pp. 124, 187 and Gfosea super Port ermeneia*. pp.
881, 839-840, 889-890.
“ “Sine eompladotte ▼ero dicuntur (ut dictum sat) quaecunque
singular! inteflectu et TOCC proferuntur: secundum
compkxionsni vero quaecunque aliqua eonjunetione *el
aeddentis copulatione miscentur.” Boethius, /« Cmfportao
ArirtoUtu, Liber I, coL 180 (J. P. Migne, P. L.. LXrV).
« P«er Abaelard, Logim IngrodiomUbuM, op. eiu, Giossa super
Port
 t. p. 827.
«vi SUMMULAE LOGICALES
ly dedicated to a categorizing treatment of supposition—the
treatises on Suppositions, Amplifications and Restrictions. A
fourth treatise, that on Relatives, is so integrally bound up with
the conception of supposition that it is practically impossible to
regard it as other than a further application of the conception.
Indeed, {
it is from the conception of the supposition of relatives which is
held by the grammarians that the logicians derived the concept
of supposition in the first place.
The first problem in connection with “suppositio” is the genesis
of the term and the evolution, if any, of the conception. In
classical Latin, “suppono” is commonly used in the sense of
“substitute”. @} Cicero uses it in a very suggestive manner
when he says “...non esset difficile alium in sup-positi locum
supponere.”* It is probably from the classical usage of the
term “supponere” that “suppositio” originally stems. The
conception of a term substituting for or standing for something
other than itself occurs frequently in Priscian but it is always in
relation to the pronoun.” The same conception is met with in a
grammarian of the twelfth century, Alexander de Villa Dei, who
furnishes what might be regarded as a conclusive step in the
evolution of the idea toward the precise formulation of the
conception which is found in the Summulae. Above all, he
provides us with strong evidence that the conception stems
from the grammarians when he states that “the relative often
stands for the word alone, although the antecedent may stand
for by signifying.”” {
Peter of Spain is saying the same thing when he states that
“supposition is the acceptance of a term, already significant, as
denoting something.””@}
*• Cicero Actionis in C. Verrem Secundae 6, 30.
“ “... pronomina loco propriornm accipiuntur nominum...” Pris-
cian, op. eit.. XIII, 31. Also ef. ibid., II, 18; XVII, 13; XVII, 34; XVII,
54; XVIII, 32.
»• “pro sola voce supponit saepe relatnm,
quamvis praecedens supponat Bignifleando:” Alexander de Villa
Dei, Doctrinale puerorwn, ed. by D. Reichling (Berlin, 1893), II, 9,
1467-1468.
»• Treatise on Suppositions, p. 3.
INTRODUCTION*lvii
Having once been coined, the term “suppositio” remained static
thereafter. However, the conception of supposition proved to be
dynamic and underwent a still further evolution. {
For Peter of Spain, supposition was the property of any
substitutive term in virtue of which the term could substitute for
a thing or things, regardless of whether it was a component part
of a statement or not.@} Later, William of Ockham attributed the
property of supposition to a term but only when the term
functioned as part of a statement* His conception of
supposition was adopted by many logicians, among them John
Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, Nicholas de Gielczow” and John of
St. Thomas.” It has persisted until modern times and is found
among modern scholastics, for instance, Jacques Maritain.
The originality which may be ascribed to the treatise on
suppositions seems to consist of three factors: first, the
reformulation of already existing ideas in terms of this
conception; secondly, the affixing of a precise terminology, which
is derived from antecedent sources, to denote both the various
types of supposition and the effects of grammatical adjuncts
upon supposition; and thirdly, the extensive use of an extremely
scholastic manner of treatment which is conducive to easy
memorization of practical rules.

“General supposition (suppositio communis) is that which is

accomplished by means of a general term.”” The term
“communis” which is utilized here may have been derived from
“terminus communis” which is the technical expression for the
universal found in Boethius.” Abaelard
est proprietas conveniens William of Ockham, SUWM totuu
login*. I, 68, 24V (Cited by Ernest A. Moody in Tk* Logic o/
WUHom of Oekhmn. New York, 1985).
“ CI Konstantjrn Michalaki, “Le Criticisme et le Scepticism* dans la
Philosophic da XlVe node” in BuIUtin IntomoUonai do rimdtmit
Pmvmaim dm Soionom «t dm Lottrm (1926), Part I, p. 118.
“ John of St Thomas, An Ugiea, Part i, Titus Smmm,dt» »m, II,
11, 81.
“ Treatise on 8appoatttau, p. 6.
“ Boethius, Priorwm AnaiyMoomm Ariotoioko /nferprvtatio. coL
648; eoL 646 (J. P. Iflfna, P. L.. LXIV).
*lviii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
furnishes evidence in support of this opinion when he states:
“Et ne rem acciperemus quae eadem est cum rebus
individuorum, Boethius addit ‘communis’, hoc est universalis
nominis, quod est homo.””
The term “discrete,” which Peter of Spain used to categorize
discrete supposition* is consistently used by Abaelard to
designate any individual thing. Abaelard even used the term in
relation to the modes of denoting the individual thing which are
cited by Peter of Spain.” The modes of limiting the individual
subject of discussion with such precision as to exclude all other
things are constant throughout the history of formal logic.
They consist of either a proper name or the addition of a
limiting particle to a general term in such fashion as to restrict
the application of that term to a particular individual. Speaking
analogously, the substance or nature of a general term is that
which is essential to it, viz. to be predicable of many.” That the
term be actually predicated of one or of many is purely
accidental depending as it does upon chance grammatical
adjuncts. Such is the basis of the distinction of general
supposition into natural and accidental supposition. A
substantive term possesses natural supposition when it is taken
by itself.’* It is only when the term enters into a statement that
it has accidental supposition.
“ Peter Abaelard, Logioa Ingreduntibua, opeit., Gloaaa auper
Por-pkyrium, p. 65.
»• Treatise on Suppositions, p. 4, L 40.
“”Haec itaqne sola et omnia numero sunt differentia, quae tota
quantitate suae essentia* discreta sunt, give solo nomero ab
invicem distent, at Socrates et Plato, sive etiam specie, ut hie
homo et ille equus, seu genere qaoque, nt hie homo et haec
albedo, sen quacunque forma ab invicem differant.” Peter
Abaelard, Theologiea Christiana, III, p. 1280 (Cited by Carl Prantl
in Geaehichte der LogA «m Abend-lande, II, p. 180, n. 304). Also
cf. Peter Abaelard, Logiea Ingre-dientibua, op. eiL, Gloaea super
Porphyrnm, pp. 14, 19, 21, 27, 46, 49, 64 and 104; Gloaaa auper
Praadieamenta ArtatoUlia, pp. 124, 167, 160 and 172.
“ Aristotle, De Interpretations, 7,17a, 88-40.
»• Treatise on Suppositions, p. 6.
«° Ibid., p. 6.
INTRODUCTION««
{
The basic distinction of accidental supposition is into simple and
personal supposition, depending upon whether the substantive
term denotes the universal thing signified by the term or the
particular included under the extension of that term.@}*’ The
terminology “simplex” and “personalis” which specifies this
differentiation was already in use in the twelfth century. In the
anonymous text “De InteUecti-bus”,* conceptions which
correspond to but are not identical with those of simple and
personal supposition are explicitly stated in conjunction with
terminology similar to that of Peter of Spain. It is likely that
Abaelard” derived his usage of “personalis” from the use of
“persona” in Quin-tillian, Boethius, and Priscian.” They used it to
designate any individual being.
{
Personal supposition is subdivided into determinate,
indeterminate, amplified, and restricted supposition.
Determinate supposition (determinata suppositio) is “the ac-
ceptance of a general term taken indefinitely or taken with a
sign of particularity.@}”” It is designated as determined because
although the subject term in all such cases may denote all the
particulars included under its extension, the predicate is
asserted as true of only a determined part of that extension. {
In indeterminate supposition (cvnfusa suppositio) a general
term is distributed by means of a universal sign so that it
denotes all the particulars included under the extension of that
term. However the particulars are not definitely distinguished
from each other but rather are left indeterminate and
confused.@} The use of “cor^ fusa” to designate this type of
supposition appears to be derived from the use of that term
and a related term by Priscian* and Abaelard” to signify that
particular cases are not distinguished.
Three factors make it very probable that Priscian and Abaelard
are the sources of much of the terminology of Peter of Spain.
First, Peter’s terminology is constantly referable to the
employment of terms in Priscian and in Abaelard, particularly
the latter. Secondly, Peter continues the process of
incorporating grammar into logic and thus follows the
precedent of Abaelard, who, in his development of logic, relies
in great measure upon Priscian. Finally, Peter’s own
development of logic depends to a marked degree upon
Priscian as is evidenced in the Treatise on Relatives in particular.
This background of the develop-
♦• Treatise on Suppositions, p. 9.
«• “cum supra dicta generalis notnina (signifleantia vel
substantias vel qualitatem vel quantitatem vel numerum, quae
necessario et in-Anita sunt, quippe cum omnia suarum
generaliter speeierum compre-hendant in se nomina) penitus
Bint inflnita confusione omnium sub se speeierum.” Priscian,
op. eit., XVII, 37. Alao cf. ibid., IV. 1; XVII, 15.
«t “Similiter ‘omnia homo est albas’ non proponit et Soeratem
esse album et Platonem esse album, quia licet dicat singulos
ease alboa, non distinguit, qui sint ilb, sed ‘Quicunque’
indiscrete dicit quod omnes sunt albi.” Peter Abaelard, Logiea
Ingreduntibut, op. eiU, Glosta tuper Peri emeneioM, p. 414.
“ de quibusdam copulativis quae sunt tertiae peraonae quae
con-fusa est.” Peter Abaelard, ibid,, p. 858. Also cf. ibid., p.
397.
INTRODUCTION «
ment of the terminology of the Summuiae ia worth noting for a
knowledge of it leada to a better underatanding of the
terminology. It warranta stressing, for the underatanding of the
terminology of any logic is a long atep’ on the road to mastery of
that logic.
The aubatitutive value of a subatantive term may be amplified or
restricted, depending upon its grammatical adjuncts, except in
the caae of restriction by usage.** {
A singular term may be neither amplified nor restricted for the
substitutive value must always remain the same, the individual
subject of discussion. It is only the universal which can be
amplified from the leas extended to the more extended and
restricted from the more extended to the less extended. The
universal alone may include a plurality of particulars under its
extension which is capable of being increased or decreased. This
increase or decrease, which is necessarily limited to personal
supposition, is designated as amplification (ampliatio) or
restriction (restrictio) respectively.@}
The Treatises on Amplifications and on Restrictions center around
two basic points: what grammatical adjuncts effect amplification
and restriction and with respect to what are they accomplished.
Amplification and restriction are effected by different grammatical
adjuncts, but both occur with respect to time and to the
particulars which are included under the substantive term which
denotes the subject of discussion in any statement
The Treatise on Amplifications is a brief statement of the effects
which modal words functioning as nouns, verba, participles, and
adverbs, have upon the extension of the substantives functioning
aa subjects in the statements which contain the modal words. Its
development is a logical consequence of the extension of the
notion of supposition. The usual sources to which the content of
the Summvlae can be related do not appear even to hint at such a
development. The opposite is true in the caae of the Treatise on
Restrictions, for there is convincing evidence that the conception
«• Cf. Treatise on Restrictions, p. 61.
1” SUMMULAE LOGICALES
of restriction, the possible ways of accomplishing it, and the
term utilized to designate it are derived from the usual
antecedent sources of the content of the Summulae.
Restriction is effected by means of a noun, in the loose sense, in
three ways. A less extended term, in apposition to a more
extended term, limits or restricts the more extended term to
the denotation of the individual or individuals included under
the less extended term. In the statement “An animal, man, is
rational”, the substantive “man” so qualifies “animal” that it
restricts it to the denotation of man and excludes all other
animals. This conception of apposition is derived from the
grammarians, for in his Doctrinale puerorum Alexander de Villa
Dei specifically mentions the grammatical construction in which
one substantive qualifies another by being placed in apposition
to it, and he uses the term “opponire” in his discussion of this
construction.*
A generic general term is restricted by the addition of an
essential differentia. The term “substance”, which, by itself,
denotes both animate and inanimate bodies, is restricted by the
addition of “animate” to the denotation of living organisms. The
discernment of this sort of restriction, expressed as such, is
apparent in Martianus Capella and in Abaelard.* Indeed, in
Abaelard, even the basis for the
«• Treatise on Restrictions, p. 47. “apponens duplices
substantivos sibi iunges in caso simili, poteritque genas variari.
tunc illos ad rem spectare decebit eandem, et plus communis
praecedere debet in istis, sicut homo Sortes, animal eapra
consimilesqne.” Alexander de Villa Dei, Doctrinal* jnurorum,
op. eit., II, 8, 1088-1087.
“Dividere usque eo debemus, donee ad individuum veniatur, et
hoc fit, quum per differentias ad paudtatem genera redigimus,
et eis ita formas subiicimus, ut et ipsae singula* aliis sub se
podtis etiam genera ease posdnt.” Martianus Capdla, Artet
Liberate, ed. by A. Dick (Lriprig, 1924) IV, 352.
“[Differentiarum aliae sunt] ...ex quibus componimus
defimtiones •peciemm podtas in divinone generis pro
spedebus, [aliae] sunt, per quas dbi copulatas diversum
vocabulum cum ds in rigniflcationem specialero trandt, ut haec
dellnitio ‘animal rationale mortale’ per dif-
INTRODUCTION Mi
derivation of the terra “restrictio” may be found.”
A general term may also be restricted by an adjective which
expresses an accidental qualification of. that which is denoted by
the term (per adiectivum accidentia). In this instance, the use of
the phrase “adiectivum accidentis” furnishes additional evidence
that Peter of Spain agrees with Peter Abaelard” and John of
Salisbury that a parallelism exists between grammar and logic.
The various tenses of the verb, present, past and future,
determine or restrict the supposition of both the subject and
predicate of the statements in which they occur. Consequently,
the verb restricts from the point of view of its temporal
consignincation. However, regardless of the change in tense, the
principal signification or meaning of the verb remains the same.*
The rules which specify the
ferentiam adiunctam, quae propria easel specialig nominis, in
signifiea-tionem spetiei redigitur... eadem sint differentiae
divieae et coasti-tativae... quia videlicet alterius diviaae sunt,
scilicet generis, aherins constitutivae, scilicet speeieL” Peter
Abaelard, Logifn, IngrtdientibuM, op. eiL, GU>»aa super
Porpkyrmm, pp. 72-73.
**... consideravit, qood in definitkmibus saepe contingit largiores
praemitti differentiae et eas per minores restringi et
determinari, sicnt in hac definitione: rationalis substantia
senaibilis; minus est enim sensibflis qoam rationalis.” Peter
Abaelard, Login Ingrrdbr*-tibus, op. dL, Glona super Pert
ermeneioM, p. 345.
“Et attende qood ‘signifies rivum’, hoc nomen, determinatur vel
re-stringitar per ‘ad placitum’ secundum signiflcationem i qoia
ilia qoae nominantur a significative, ab it significant, alia per
inatitutionem hominum.” Ibid., p. 840.
 CI “Et qnare non sint unum [*masiciim album’], supponit, quia
accidentia, id est adiectiva voeabula,... pro-B ita quod utrumque
est secundum aeddena, id , stent si dtemm ‘borne albas’ ‘homo
musi-cus’.” Logic* IngrtdientibuM, op. eiL. GUmea emper Peri
trmeneiam, pp. 47S-477.
** Many elements of a speculative grammar are found in the
Stmv MUIOA but Peter of 8pain makes no mention of the
problem of the eonsigniflcatien of the verb which is at the very
center of all speculative grammar: whether the element of tanse
is an essential factor m the meaning and truth of a proposition
to such an extent that the ■ value according to tense variations.
Cf. M. D.
Iw SUMMULAE LOGICALES
restrictive values of the verb together with the corollary rule
that the verb only restricts in its temporal consignifica-tion and
not in its principal signification, appear to be rooted in
Abaelard. They constitute a formalized elaboration of what is
implicitly present in him.”
Restriction may also be effected by a participle, a subordinate
clause, and the transitive property of the verb.* This analysis of
possible means of restricting the supposition of a substantive
term appears to be explicable only on the basis of a syntactical
review of the force of the modifiers which may affect the
subject of any statement. It is grammatical in pattern and
expression, though logical in intent.
The treatises which have been discussed were characterized to
some extent by the multiplicity of the technical grammatical
terms which they contained. Relative to parts of speech, they
contained the terms “nomen”, “substantivum nomen”,
“adiectivum nomen”, “adieetivum”, verbum”, “par-ttcipium”,
and “adverbium”. Most of these terms, if not all, as we have
seen, had already been incorporated into logic by Abaelard and
John of Salisbury who probably derived them from Priscian.
Furthermore the employment of “ad-iungere” and “conivngere”
by Peter of Spain was typically grammatical. Consequently, he
probably borrowed these terms from Priscian.”
Chenu, “Graznmaire et Tbeologie aux Xlle et XIHe siecle” in
Archive* tThistoire doetrxnaU et littfraire du moyen Age (Paris,
1936) p. 9.
»* “NoUndum quoque, quod verba quae temporibus differont,
semper in principali signiflcatione uniuntur, ut ‘currit’ et ‘curret’
et ‘cur-rebat’ cursum significant, a quo sumpta sunt... Sed
sciendum est, quod cum ‘curret’ significet eos in quibus
nondum cursus est vel fuit, et cursum determinet tamquam in
fnturo adhaerentem eis, imago tamen sive cursus sive
fundamenti quae per ‘curret’ accipunus, nondum similitudo est
quae conveniat quae cursuris, sed quae in fnturo eis conveniat.
Sed nunc similitudo eristentibus attenditur, ut in ea futurum
statum coram speculemur.” Ibid., p. 367.
»• Treatise on Restrictions, p. 47; p. 51; p. 61.
» “Adiungere”: Priscian, op. eit., V, 48; VIII, 9; XIII, 19, 26; XV. 1;
XVIII, 10, 18, 27. “Comungere”: ibid., VIII, 9, 41, 42; XVIII, 8,127.
INTRODUCTION lv
The use of “eupponere” to denote that a word is functioning as
subject of a verb** and “apponere” to denote that a word is
functioning as predicate of a verb or as an attribute** finds
analogues in logic prior to the thirteenth century. It may or may
not be that the terms ultimately stem from the grammarians.
Certainly, the terms were used with this connotation by
Alexander de Villa Dei,** but whether or not the grammarians,
who antedated him, used the terms in this fashion is
problematical.
Another grammatical term which is employed in the Sum-mulae is
“transitio”. Priscian* uses this term to signify the transitive
property of the verb. It preserves the same meaning when Peter
of Spain uses it in specifying one of the modes of restriction.**
As far as the enunciation of a theory of supposition in the
Summulae of Peter of Spain is concerned, it is merely a stage in
the development of possible applications of the conception of
supposition. {
Later, the conception (supposition) finds a much more rigorous
development, a finer precision of thought, and a more extended
application in John of St Thomas who even specifies many of the
ideas which are
found in the Summulae in terms of “suppositio” V For instance,
he designates the distributive and collective use of “all”” when
it is taken in conjunction with a substantive term, as “suppositio
distributa” and “suppositio copukUa” respectively.@}**
While the theory of supposition is developed in relation to the
substitutive value of the subject of the statement, it readily
admits of extension to the predicate, for the predicate has a
substitutive value of its own. The substitutive value of the
predicate as well as that of the subject must be determined
before any coherent theory of conversion may be developed.
Peter of Spain affirms that in the case of the universal
affirmative proposition, the predicate has simple supposition
and is not immovably distributed. In adopting this position, he is
guilty of an internal inconsistency in his theory of logic. He
makes the conversion per accidens of a universal affirmative
proposition impossible in the light of own principles and he
thereby destroys the scheme of conversion which he outlined in
the first tract of the Summulae.
{
In the statement “Every man is an animal”, the term “animal”,
according to Peter, has simple supposition.** But the universal
sign “every” distributes the subject “man” in relation to the
predicate “animal”.*’ Therefore, it is a legitimate inference from
“Every man is an animal” to “This or that man is an animal”.
However, if “animal” has simple supposition, it stands for the
universal thing, the generic nature of animal itself. Then the
statement “This or that man is an animal” is equivalent to “This
or that man is the universal generic nature animal”. But this is
impossible because this or that man is not the universal generic
nature
animal.@} Each is a thing in which the universal nature is
multiplied.
Again, if either this or that man ceased to exist, the universal
nature animal would not cease to exist,’ for it would still exist in
other men. But if the nature is asserted to be identical with this
or that man who ceased to exist—and this would be the case if
“animal” had simple supposition—then the universal nature
would have ceased to exist simultaneously with the man with
whom it was identical. But this also is impossible by Peter’s own
principles for even though ail men ceased to exist, the universal
generic nature, being a thing by itself, apart from the things in
which it is multiplied, would still continue to exist.
Furthermore, the statement “Every man is an animal” can be
converted per accident, giving us the converse “Some animals are
men”. The statements are equivalent and of equivalent truth
value. But the term “animal” in the con-vertend is asserted to
have simple supposition. In the converse, on the other hand,
some particulars in which the generic nature animal is realized
constitute the subject. Thus, there is a passage from simple
supposition to personal supposition and more is asserted in the
converse than was asserted in the convertend. Such a procedure
in a mediate inference would render the syllogism false and
constitute a fallacy of figure of speech.” The procedure is just as
fallacious in immediate inference. Hence, if “animal” has simple
supposition in the convertend, the converse is false. But the
converse is known to be true from the facts of the case and the
conversion is legitimate. Consequently, the term “animal” in the
original statement cannot have simple supposition. It must be
distributed and thus it necessarily has personal supposition.
However, since one cannot infer “Every man is this or that
animal” from “Every man is animal”, “animal”, properly speaking,
should be said to be immovably distributed (eonfuta
immobUUer). Once this position is assumed, conversion per
accident of a uni-
“D* falUeU Agon* diction!* ... tertlui modna provwilt ex dtana
W» SUMMULAE LOGICALES
versal affirmative proposition is legitimate and the facts of the
case demand that it be legitimate.
Our examination of the theory of supposition, which is found in
the Surpmulae, reveals then that the conception of “suppositio”
is grammatical in origin and that the theory avails itself of many
technical grammatical terms. In fact, the theory is to a large
extent neither original in terminology nor in content but relies,
in great measure, upon the grammarians, Priscian and
Alexander de Villa Dei, and upon the philosophers, Boethius,
Abaelard, and John of Salisbury. It follows the trend toward a
synthesis of grammar and of logic which is very evident in the
latter two philosophers. However, it is original in the extension
of the conception of supposition which it employs as a unifying
concept with respect to many pre-existing concepts. Yet it
constitutes only a stage in the development of the possible
applications of the conception.
B. Appellation
{
Appellation (appellatio) is the acceptance of a terra for an
existing thing in contra-distinction to supposition which is the
acceptance of a term for both existing and non-existing things.
The terra “appellation is probably derived originally from the
grammarians who utilized it to signify the naming of things.@}
Boethius incorporated the term into logic and John of Salisbury
reserved it to the designation of the eternally existing ideas of
the Plato of the Platonists.*
 “sin hac appelatione verba ipsa signifleari putamoa, nihil haec
sine rerum substantia faciunt,” Quintillian, Inttitutunu; II, 21, 1.
Alaocf. ibid., I, 4, 19; 1,4,20.
“Proprium est nominia substantiam et qualitatem signiflcare.
hoe habet etiam appelatio et vocabalom: ergo tria ana pars eat
ora-tionis.” Priscian, op. dL, IL 18.
» “Constat ergo quoniam et genera et species de individuis, et
genera de speciebus univoce praedicantnr, id est in omni
praedieatione secun-dae substantia* onivoca appelatione de
subjectis dienntar, qood his cam differentia commune est”
Boethius, In CaUgorias AristoUto, Liber I, col. 193 (J. P. Migne,
P.L., LXIV).
»”Plato quoque eorum que vere sunt et eorum que non sunt
sed
INTRODUCTION li*
It is probably from John of Salisbury that Peter of Spain’s
conception of denomination stems.
The Treatise on Appellations furnishes the evidence which
establishes Peter of Spain as an adherent of the realist position
with regard to the nature of the universal. Appellation is the
acceptance of a term for an existing thing. One type of
appellation by a general term occurs when the general term has
simple supposition. But simple supposition is the acceptance of a
“general term for the universal thing signified by that term.”
Consequently, the universal must really exist as a universal for
the general terra to have the property of appellation when it has
simple supposition. Moreover, the language of Peter of Spain
throughout the Summulae is consistent with the realist view of
the nature of the universal. Yet there is one passage in the
Treatise on Suppositions which indicates either that he was guilty
of an inconsistency in his thinking or that he was not as much a
realist as his statement about the appellation of a general term
and his language throughout the rest of the work unmistakeably
suggest: “... in this statement: “Every man is an animal”, the term
“man” is taken for every man, and not only for man but also for
every animal that is a man; and on that account as many
animalities are understood as humanities, naturally speaking,
because it is only according to the viewpoint of logic, and not
according to the way of nature, that the humanity in each
individual man is the same humanity; in this manner “man in
general” is the same.”* However, inasmuch as this is an isolat-
es Tidentnr, differential!) doeens, intdlifibtlia Tore et
Undeet eu post easentiam primam recte eompetet caw; id eat
flnmu
tivnm; temporalia TCTO vidantnr qnidem case, to quod
intdUfibilinm pretendont imaginem. Bed appellation* verbi
snbstajithri non eatia digna aunt que com tempore transeunt,
nt nnnqnam in eodem statu permaneant, aad at fauna
evaaeeeant; fnginnt enlm, nt idem alt in Thimeo, n«c expectant
appellationem.” John of Salisbury, MrtoJo-Ptoon, op. ott, rv, 86,
»38a-93gb. Abo cf. ibid^ II, IT, 876b; I, 16,
 TraatiM on Suppositions, p. 6. • /Wi, p. 19.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
ed passage in the Summulae, Peter of Spain ought to be
regarded as a realist until more evidence establishes the
contrary.
C. Relatives
For the most part the three treatises which are explicitly
dedicated to the study of supposition have revealed themselves
to be natural summations of pre-existent ideas. The ideas are
unified in terms of a conception which is derived from the
grammarians. The grammatical and summary nature of the
Treatise on Relatives is even more evident. It is more readily
traceable and can be allocated with an even greater degree of
probability. The treatise is characterized by an assignation of a
precise descriptive nomenclature for the designation of the
sentential functioning of diverse relatives.
John of Salisbury had already incorporated an analysis of the
nature of relatives into logic, a procedure which is entirely
consistent with his view of grammar as constituting a part of
logic. For him, grammar does not permit relatives to be vague
or indeterminate. Unless a relative has that to which it may be
referred, it is used improperly, inasmuch as it is thereby
deprived of its natural function of referring back to something
previously mentioned or thought. Relatives, like
demonstratives, function in the service of knowledge. When
they are properly used, they effect a primary and a secondary
knowledge. Consequently, they need a definite subject, for
knowledge is impossible if the thing in question is
undetermined. This conception which John of Salisbury has of
the nature of relatives
“Haruro autem omnium [artium liberalium] prima eat logic*; ab
ea tamen sui parte, que in prima sermonum institutions
▼ersatur; ut nomen logiees, sicut iam dictum est, quam
latisaime pateat, et non modo ad diaserendi scientiam
contrahatur. Est enim Grammatiea scientia recte loquendi
scribendiqae et origo omnium libenlium dis-ciplinarum.” John of
Salisbury, Uttalogieen, op. eiL, I, 13, 840a. Relevant to this, ef.
ibid,, II, praef.
*”... et (ad) artis gramatice subtilitatem, que ex sui nature, nisi
venia lieentia imoetrata. demonstrativas didtiones inflnitas esse
non
INTRODUCTION Ixi
stems from Priscian.
The treatment of relatives by John of Salisbury probably
furnished the motivation for a classification and designation of
the relatives which were mentioned by Priscian. In all likelihood,
the gradual formalization of logical treatises, which had already
begun in the time of John of Salisbury,lent further impetus to
the classification.
patitur; sed non relativas vagas esse permittit, quin earum
signifies-tio aut detenninatione peraone aut actus aut actioius
alterius coarte-tur; siquidem relativa dictio est que significat
rem, ut de qua processit aermo vel cogitatio... Nam ut nichil
certum et finitum ait in quod cadat relatio, non contingit sine
vitio aut figura... si vero discretio-nem quaerit, forte non palam
est quod disceroat. Regulariter prodi-tum est quia demonstratio
primam, relatio secundum facit eognitio-nem... nee prima nee
secunda possit proeedere cognitio, si res usque-quaque occurrat
animo infinita ... Omnia itaque dictio, que demonstrative aut
relative significat, aut non satis proprie ponitur aut eerto et ma
ratione definite innititur subiecto; alioquin rao privabuntur
officio... Ergo sicut cognitio eertitudinem querit, sic
demonstrativa et innituntur subiecto, et illud, si proprie fuerint
posits animo sin-gulariter ostendunt” John of Salisbury,
Metatogieon, op. ciL, II, 20,
■”aceidit pronomini relatio in tenia persona, per quam
praedieta nomina per recordationem pranominantur...” Ptiacian,
op. eit^ XVII, 66.
“Interest inter demonstrationem et relationem hoe, quod
demonstrate InterrogBTero awwndam cognitionem aigniflcat:
is’, de quo iam dud, hue igitur ‘hie’, quod primam cognitionem
indicat, praepo-nitur, unde et ‘praepositivum’ nominatur, is*
autem, quod aecundam eognitkmem aigniflcat, snbungfoir...”
CI toicbm, XII. 4.
« “Infinitum eat interrogatl vui um contrarioram, ut ‘quia’,
‘qoaUa’, •quanta*’, ‘qoof, ‘quotas’, cum in lectkne gravi aeeenta
pronundantur.
Poasunt tamen haec eadam et relativa esse et similitadJnis sicut
etiam talis’, tantus’, tof: haec tamen etiam redditiva dkuntar. et
animadvertendum, quod huhucemodi nomina vel substantiae
aunt mflnitae atque communis, ut “quis’, “qui’; vel qualitatis, ut
‘quails’, tabs’; vel quantitatis, ut ‘quantus*. tantus’; vel numeri,
ut “quotf tot’.” Prisrfan. op. etL, II, 80. Also ef. Ondim, II, 18; II,
80; XII. 1-8; Xm, 82-84; XVII. M.
 “Csterum [ut paes omnhan fequar] quiequid in lato doeetw
tfbro, [Peri enneneias] eompendkwus et manifaatros potent
quUfbet docto-rum, [quod et muki fadunt] «xespta reverentia
verborum in doetri-aalibus parare rudimentis, quae
Introduction* vacant. Vix eat cairn
™» SUMMULAE LOGICALES
In commenting on Aristotle, Boethius asserted that the smallest
possible division of words is fourfold, namely, into those which
signify a substance or an accident, a universal or a particular.”
Cognizant of this and desirous of specifying the various types of
relatives in terms of the grammatical conceptions of reference
and supposition, the authors of the tracts De Proprietatibus
Terminorum utilized Boethius’ fundamental dichotomy of words
into those which signify substance and those which signify
accident as a basic divisive principle. Consequently, the primary
distinction of relatives is into relatives of substance and
relatives of accident.
In the first book of the Topics, Aristotle asserts that things are
said to be numerically, specifically, or generically the same.’ The
same division holds true in the case of things which are said to
be different.” The distinction between things numerically the
same and numerically different and between things specifically
the same and specifically different furnishes the basis for a
differentiation of relatives which is internal to the fundamental
dichotomy of relatives into relatives of substance and relatives
of accidents.
When relatives of identity of substance and relatives of diversity
of substance are surveyed from the point of view of their
referring to that which is signified by their antecedent, they are
indistinguishable for both refer to the same thing in number,
that is, to the same substance which the antecedent signifies. It
is only when one considers the substitutive values of such
relatives that one can differentiate between them. A relative of
identity of substance refers to and stands for the same thing in
number which its antecedent stands for. In the statement “The
man who volun-
aliquis qui hec ipsa non doceat, adiectis aliis non minus
necessariis...” Metalogieon, op. cit., III, 4, 899d.
 “... parvissima [omnium sermonum divisio] vero est quae fit in
quatuor, in substantias! et accidens, et universale et
particulare.” Boethius, In CaUgoria* AristoteK*, Liber I, eol. 169
(J. P. Migne, P. L., LXIV).
»Aristotle, Topiea, I, 7, 103a, 8-10.
 Cf. Summtdae Logical**, Tractatua II.
INTRODUCTION lxiU
tarily embraces poverty covets sanctity”, the relative pronoun
“who” refers to and denotes the same thing in number, that is, the
same man which its antecedent, “man”, denotes. On the other
hand, a relative of diversity of, substance refers to the same
thing in number but denotes another thing different in number
from that which its antecedent denotes. In the statement: “St
Thomas christianized Aristotle but the other embraced Aristotle
without reservation”, the relative “other” refers to St. Thomas for
“other” is only used in contra-distinction of one thing from
another thing. Consequently, it must connote both that which
differs, a person different in number from and therefore distinct
from St Thomas, namely the person “embracing Aristotle without
reservation”. Yet, at the same time, it refers to that from which
this person differs, namely, St Thomas. This distinction which
Peter of Spain makes between relatives of identity of substance
and relatives of diversity of substance is clearly presented in
Priscian.*
{
Relatives of identity of substance are either nouns or pronouns,
both reciprocal and non-reciprocal. A distinctive feature of a
reciprocal pronoun is that it posits a mode of passivity over and
above the acting substance.@} Consequently, it cannot have a
nominative case inasmuch as the nominative, from the very
nature of a sentence, may be either active or passive, but may
not signify a mode of passivity. One may say “Man deceives
himself in denying the super-
 Cf. “pronomina loco nomiomn accipiuntur proprionun. at ‘Cicero
•eribit, idem redtef, «t unam et idem signHkeat; ‘Cicero •dibit
«t alias reciter, nan eadem est i op. oiL, Xm, 86.
“Unam sohtm pronomen eompositam invenitur apud nos, T*
qaod secundum notitiam dasdem personae signiflcat...” XVII,
27.
John of Salisbury mentions the opinion that the relatrre \.
folnHs the function of a proper noon in his treatment of the
rela-a quoque asseruut, auctions pnmominis At ad nomen appeW
itio, eo st, proi II. ». ttld-atta.
l*iv SUMMULAE LOGICALES
natural” or “Man is deceived by man” but one cannot say
“Himself deceived man in denying the supernatural.” This
grammatical consideration of the sentential functioning of the
reciprocal by Peter of Spain is derived terminologically and
conceptually from Priscian.”
Again, a reciprocal relative may not licitly be supplanted by its
antecedent. However, a non-reciprocal relative which has the
same substitutive value as its antecedent may be replaced by its
antecedent. In the statement “Every true Christian humbles
himself and he is thereby exalted”, we may substitute the
phrase “Every true Christian” for the relative of identity “he”,
thereby obtaining the equivalent statement “Every true
Christian humbles himself and every true Christian is thereby
exalted”. But the reciprocal “himself cannot be replaced by the
phrase “Every true Christian” for this would give us the non-
equipollent statement “Every true Christian humbles every true
Christian and he is thereby exalted”. In the case of the latter
two statements, an inference from the universal to the
particular also cogently illustrates and justifies this position, for
we can say “This true Christian humbles himself and this true
Christian is thereby exalted”, but we cannot say “This true
Christian humbles every true Christian and he is thereby
exalted.” This differentia of the reciprocal pronoun had
io”’stti’ solum apud Latinos reciprocum fit in eadem tertia persona
... id est qaando ipsa in se actum reflectit persona, at eadem sit et
agens et patiens potest significare iaxrrov ‘sui’... Nominativum
autem ideo non habet hoc pronomen (id est ‘sui’ ‘sibi’ ‘se’ ‘a se’)
quia Decease est, qaando TO ‘iavrov signiflcat tam actionem qoam
passio-nem, in eadem intellegi persona, non ab’ter igitur potest
proferri is, in quem aliquid agitur, nisi per obliquos casus, evenit
enim ut a nomina-tivis actus proflscentes ad obliquos sive in
transitione personarum in-tellegantur sive in una eademque
persona.” Priacian, op. eft., XIII, 22-23.
“omnis autem obliquus nominativo adiungitur transitionem
personae ad personam signifleans vel verbo in se nominativum
demonstranti... nominativus enim per se positus transitionem non
signiflcat... una enim eademque persona intellegitur, nee potest
esse nominativus, cuius etiam obliquus eidem verbo possit sine
transitione vel redproeatione adiungi...” Ibidem, XIII, 26. Also ef.
tMi, VIII, 3; XIII, 29.
INTRODUCTION I”
been indicated previously by John of Salisbury” who is probably
the source of this conception of Peter of Spain.
The non-reciprocal relative of identity refers to the same thing
in number that its antecedent denotes and £t the same time it has
the identical substitutive value of the antecedent The meaning
of a statement is more obvious and certain when a relative of
identity is employed in place of the repeated antecedent. This is
due to the property which the relative has of referring to its
antecedent The meaning is less clear when the antecedent is
repeated because the repeated antecedent refers to nothing
else and may denote a different entity. Peter of Spain directly
attributes the basis for this exposition to Priscian.”
{
The entire discussion concerning the rule that no proposition,
which begins with a relative of identity, has a contradictory is
based on the application and misapplication of principles which
are laid down in the De Interpretatione of Aristotle. In the
statement “Every man loves wisdom and he is right in so doing”,
the relative “he” refers to and is dependent upon the
antecedent “man”. However, since the denial of “he is right in so
doing” does not deny the relation of “he” to its antecedent “man”,
it does not deny all that the affirmation affirms. Consequently, a
proposition beginning with a relative has no contradictory. This
argument as it is presented in Peter of Spain, implicates a
misapplication of the Aristotelian principle that the “denial must
deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same
subject”.” While it is true that the denial muat deny just that
which the affirmation affirms, it is not true that the denial must
deny the relation of the relative to its antecedent. An
affirmation is only concerned with the assertion of something
about something,” that is, with the relation between the
predicate and the subject. It is concerned in no way with the
relation of the relative to its antecedent. In order to constitute a
legitimate denial, the denial of an affirmation need only deny
the relation of the predicate to the subject.@} Furthermore,
whatever can be affirmed of any subject can be denied of it, for
there is no affirmation which does not have a corresponding
affirmation.”
Relatives of identity of accident and relatives of diversity of
accident are similar to the corresponding relatives of substance
in that they are indistinguishable from the point of view of their
referring to that which their antecedents denote. They are
differentiated soley by virtue of their distinct substitutive
values. A relative of identity of accident refers to and denotes
the same specific accident which its antecedent denotes.
However, the same accident may be referred to in a
denominative manner (per modum denomi-nationis) or
according to the mode of its essential being (per modum quod
quid est): for instance, the same thing is signified by “white” and
“whiteness” but the mode of signification is different.* A
relative of accident must refer
“ Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 7, 17b, 38-42.
“ Ibid., 6, 17a, 26-26.
“ Ibid., 6, 17a, 31-32.
“ Cf. “Unde ex opinion* plnrinm idem priseipaliter significant
de-nominativa et ea a quibus denominantnr, aed conaigniflcatione
di versa. Aiebat Bernardo* Carnotensis, quia albedo signifieat
virginem incor-ruptam, albtt eandem introenntem thalamnm ant
cobantem in thoro, album vero eandem, aed corraptam. Hoc
qmdem quoniam albedo ex aasertione eios aimpliciter et sine omid
partieipatione subiecti ipaam signifieat qnalitatem... Albet autem
eandem principaliter, etai pax-tiripationem peraone admittat. Si
enim fllud excntias, quod verbum hoc pro substantia signifieat,
qnalitas albedinia ocenmt, sed in aeri-dentibiis verbi personam
reperies. Album vero eandem signineat qnalitatem, sed infosam
conunixtamqoe snbstantie et iam qoodammodo . MnlU qooqoe
proferebat undiqoe oonqulsita, qui-
INTRODUCTION hnrU
to a thing in the denominative maner for any accident which is
considered essentially, cannot be regarded as an accident. It can
only be comprehended as if it were a substance. Consequently,
a relative which refers to a thing in the denominative manner,
refers to an accident qua accident and is aptly termed a relative
of accident A relative which refers to that same accident
considered essentially, refers to it comprehended as a substance.
It functions intelligibly as a relative of substance and is so
designated. Peter of Spain’s treatment of relatives of accident
consists in his using the more precise terminology of philosophy
to classify the various types of relatives which are mentioned by
Pria-cian.”
{
A relative of diversity of accident, as opposed to a relative of
identity of accident, refers to the same specific accident which
its antecedent signifies but denotes another. In the statement
“Man is warlike but a dove is otherwise”, the relative “otherwise”
refers to the same specific quality “warlike” does, but denotes a
contrary quality.
The concluding observation of the treatise on relatives which
assert that relatives like “such”, “so great”, “as many as” etc can
be designated as relative, responsive and demonstrative,
depending upon their sentential functioning, is derived from
Priscian.@}”
The grammatical contents of the treatise on relatives is
enhanced by the incorporation of additional technical grammatical
terms and phrases drawn from Quintillian and Pris-cian= “agens
et patient”, “comparatio,” “construetic”, “or-dtaotfo”, “m quern
actus transtre”.” These are worth not-
JohB of Safidmry, Mtmlogieon, op. ciL. m, 2, ttSb-ftvSd. “ Cf.
Priadan. op. e< II, SO. (Cited p. In. n. 4.) “”Ktoxtam turn, quod
taMe’ et tantae’ «t tof, *i ad |
dkantor, etfam dcmoiutntfoi cant, da aotem ad ehatntw,
d ledoitfcra tartnm. at <qaaHo Hemic, telle Theeeae feif /Wt,
XIII, M. Aleo ef. tttt, U, 18; XII, 1-4; XIII, 8S-S4. J?**— « **”»”
****** •• «*. VIII. l, 8; XITJ, tt. Job* of Salisbury atfflaed theee
tenaa ae well ea Peter of Spain; ef.
I*™*SUMMULAE LOGICALES
ing because they furnish additional evidence to bolster the
theory that the Summulae Logicales is a work of Latin origin and
not merely a translation of the Greek Synopsis of Michael
Psellus.
The treatise on relatives then is an analysis of the logical
implications of grammatical relatives. It is an analysis which is
predominantly based upon Priscian and John of Salisbury who
may have motivated it in the first place. Its development is in
keeping with the tendency towards and the drift to the merging
of grammar and logic into a speculative grammar which is so
evident in Abaelard and John of Salisbury. Furthermore, it is in
harmonious agreement with the evolution of a formalized logic
which had acquired new momentum in the twelfth century.
Finally, it is characterized by a precise nomenclature which is
descriptive of a dichotomous analysis of relatives and which is
grounded upon an application of Aristotelian distinctions.
D. Quantification
The analysis of propositions may take either of two forms. They
can be viewed as integral wholes which can be allocated to
types from the standpoint of their quantitative and qualitative
opposition as statemental units. On the other hand, they can be
analyzed from the point of view of their component elements
and the properties which charac-
Metalogiam, op. eit., I, 15, 842b.
“Comparatio”: Quintillian, Institution**, III, 6.
“Constructio”: Priscian, op. eit., XVII, (De constructione). This
term is met with in various logical works of Abaelard: cf.
Dialeetiea, op. at., pp. 227, 231, 285; Logic* Jngredientibua, op.
eit., Gloua super Porphyrium, p. 17.
“Ordinatio”: Priscian, op. eit., II, 15; XVII, 1, 3.
“In quern actus transire”: ibid., VIII, 9.
> Abaelard cited rules which govern the equipollence of modal
propositions and even provided mnemonic verses whieh should
serve as an aid in committing them to memory. Cf. Peter
Abaelard. Lo^ieo IngredieMtibuM, op. eit., Gloua euper Peri
ermetma, p. 498. Relevant to this, cf. ibidem, pp. 477. 494; John
of Salisbury, Metalogwon, op. eft, III, 4, 899d.
INTRODUCTION lxix
terize these elements. The adoption of this latter method
results in a theory of quantification which makes explicit what is
implicit in the results of the first method. Inasmuch as explicit
knowledge is always preferabk* to implicit knowledge, that
method of analyzing propositions which proceeds by studying
the component elements of propositions and their properties is
the one which is preferable. Peter of Spain used this method in
analyzing propositions and in the process formulates precisely
the basic locutions which are necessary to any theory of
quantification. He does this in Tract I, which is based on the De
Interpretaiione of Aristotle, and in the Treatise on Distributions
which is found in Tract VII. The Treatise on Distributions is largely
a development of material contained in Tract I. Because of this,
the following exposition of Peter of Spain’s theory of
quantification rests conjointly on Tract I and the Treatise on
Distributions.
The importance of a theory of quantification lies in its being such
an essential part of language which is practically the sole mode
of communication available to man. The theory revolves about
basic locutions whose function it is to limit or define the
extension of the subject of discussion in relation to that which is
predicated of it and to limit or define the extension of that which
is predicated in relation to that of which it is predicated.
Quantification has been an integral part of logic throughout the
known history of that science though its emphasis has varied.
After being relegated to the background during the almost
isolated devotion of the twelfth century to the problem of the
nature of the universal, quantification was restored to a position
of prime importance in the logical compendia of the thirteenth
century.
The Svmmutae studies the basic locutions which appear
everywhere in statements related to all sorts of subjects. It
examines the indigenous use of syncategorematic words such as
“all”, “every”, “any”, “some” etc in such a way as to clear away
a frustrating maze of ambiguities and uncertainties. Also, the
Summulae specifies the various quan-
ax SUMMULAE LOGICALES
tificational idioms which can be used interchangeably because
their signification is equivalent inasmuch as the substitution of
one for the other in no way affects the truth or falsity of any
judgment in which the substitution occurs. The entire analysis
of quantification in the Summulae is carried on apart from any
question of truth or falsity. No attempt is made to isolate logical
structures whose natures would be such as to insure the truth
or falsity of the statements containing them regardless of the
extralogical ingredients which might be inserted to make them
meaningful.
For the most part, Peter of Spain centers his investigation of the
component expressions, which enter into but never constitute
statements by themselves, on the general term functioning as a
substantive in a statement. When a substantive such as “man”
is taken by itself, it can stand for any man or all men, past,
present or future. It is when “man” enters into a statement that
a precise determination of its extension is necessary, for here
are found logical operators which define the extension of the
subject term “man”, either through distribution, restriction, or
amplification. Peter of Spain indicates the nature of restriction
and amplification and the logical operators which effect them in
the Treatises on Restrictions and Amplifications, as has already
been shown. In the Treatise on Distributions, he undertakes the
analysis of the basic generalizing particles, as such, in order to
eliminate the obscurities surrounding their use; and in the
Treatise on Equipollents in the first tract of the Summulae, he
indicates the possible variants of these particles. While
knowledge of all of these possible variants or equivalents is
useful, a knowledge of some of them is an absolute necessity,
for even a logical vocabulary which is reduced to the barest
essentials requires the usage of a word corresponding to
“every”.
The basic particle “every” distributes the subject in relation to
the predicate. Consequently, the predicate can be asserted of
each and every thing which the subject denotes; for example,
given the statement “Every man loves wis-
 Cf. p. li «t sqq.
INTRODUCTION tod
dom”, it is a legitimate deduction to say “This or that man loves
wisdom”. The same deduction could be made if “No (one)—
not” or “Not any (one)—not” were substituted in place of
“every”—granting that certain grammatical changes were made
which in no way affect the meaning of the statement: “No
(man) does not love wisdom” or “Not any (man) does not love
wisdom”. Consequently, all three basic locutions are equivalent
in meaning and in no way affect the truth value of the statement.
{
The plural of “every” is “all”. While “every” is not ambiguous,
“all” is, since it can be taken collectively or distri-butively. When
“all” is taken distributively, as in the statement “All men love
wisdom”, it does not differ in meaning from the aingnlur
“every”. However, when “all” is taken collectively ,it differs in
meaning from “every”, for it is not a legitimate deduction from
“All men constitute mankind” to “This or that man constitutes
mankind.”@}
Not only are possible variants of the basic particles “some”,
“neither”, “no”, and so forth, to be found in the treatise De
EquipollentHs of the Summulae, but the denials which are
proper to many of these may also be gathered from a careful
examination of the treatise. It summarizes the quanti-ficational
equivalents for the most part in the following verse: “Not every;
some not: every not; no one: not no one; some: no one not;
every: not any one; no one: not anyone not; all: not one of the
two; neither: neither not; both.” An exhaustive list of the
equivalents which are found in the treatise would include “Not
every not; some: not no one not; some not: nothing not;
anything; everything: not nothing; something.”
{
The denial of “some” cannot be formed by adding “not” because
“some not” is equivalent to “not every” which is clearly not the
denial of “some”. The equivalent of “some” is “not no one”. If a
negation is added to “not no one”, we obtain the expression
“not not no one”.@} In this case, the first two negatives cancel
each other and “no one” is left as the denial of “some”. Thus
the statement “Someone is de-
™qi summulae logicales
ceiving me” is denied by the statement “No one is deceiving
me” and not by the statement “Someone is not deceiving me.”

Another aberration of the basic particles is to be noted in

connection with the negation of “every” and “any”. {
In the positive, “every” and “any” perform the same function,
for statements such as “Every animal is sentient” and “Any
animal is sentient” do not differ in meaning. However, when a
negation is attached to “every” and “any”, such statements
convey radically different meanings. “Not every animal is
sentient” is equivalent to “Some animals are not sentient”
whereas “Not any animal is sentient” is equivalent to “No
animal is sentient.”@}
The Summulae expressly recognizes that the rendering explicit
of what is implicit in a statement is an objective of logic. Upon
examination, many ostensibly simple statements reveal
themselves to be compound due to the presence of
syncategorematic words such as “with the exception of”,
“alone” and so forth. The Treatise on Exponibles in the
Summulae is devoted to the analysis of classes of such words. It
formulates rules which will govern the resolution of apparently
simple statements, which contain such words, into composite
statements which will provide a clear conception of what is only
confusedly and obscurely comprehended in the original
statement. For the most part, the resultant composites reveal
themselves to be conjunctive and disjunctive statements whose
truth values are determinable by the application of the truth
conditions of the hypothetical proposition.’
A close relationship exists between exponibles, quantification
and statemental composition in many cases as is cogently
demonstrated in the case of exceptive words such as “except”,
“apart from”, “other than” and so forth. This class of words is
always used in connection with extensional wholes whether the
whole be that of the individual members of a class or species, or
that of the different species of a
 Cf. p. zxv et »qq.
INTRODUCTIONlniii
genus or of the classes contained in a higher class. As a
consequence, the term from which the exception is made is
always accompanied by a generalizing particle or universal sign
such as “every”, “any” or “all”.
{
An affirmative proposition, which includes an exceptive word,
implicitly contains three simple propositions and its truth value
depends upon the truth value of the conjunctive statement which
is formed from the three simple propositions. The statement,
“Every man, with the exception of an anarchist, believes that
some form of government is useful if not necessary” implicitly
affirms that “Every man, other than an anarchist, believes that
some form of government is useful if not necessary; and, an
anarchist is a man; and, an anarchist does not believe that some
form of government is useful if not necessary.”@} The
statement is true if, and only if, each of the simple statements
contained in the explicit compound is true. In the case of all such
propositions, the technical procedure which is to be followed in
the transition from the implicit to the explicit, from the implied
to the definite, admits of ready formalization. As a matter of
fact, the same proves to be the case with regard to the structural
functioning of all the syncategorematic words which are analyzed
as significative operators in the Treatise on Exponiblea.
E. Exponibles
{
Inasmuch as logic is intended to be a tool in the acquisition of
knowledge and a means of insuring correct communication of
thought, it is a task of logic to study ambiguities of expression. It
is an essential task, for such ambiguities present obstacles both to
the acquisition of knowledge and to the correct communication of
thought. It is an obstacle to acquiring knowledge, for when
anyone is confronted with an ambiguous expression, he will most
likely either not know what the expression is meant to convey or
he will misinterpret it If, by chance, he happens to interpret it
correctly, it will not be because of the expression but in spite of
it@} It is also an obstacle to the communication of
Irav SUMMULAE LOGICALES
thought, for unless the ambiguous nature of the expression is
known, the speaker and listener may not be addressing
themselves to the same thing. The task of removing these
obstacles has been consistently recognized throughout the
history of logic. An analysis of the Treatise on Exponibles will
reveal that it is in keeping with the tradition and at the same
time it will furnish additional evidence of the nature of the
Logica Moderna.
 Cicero regarded the interpretation of the obscure ao aa to
remove the possibility of misconception as an integral part of
dialectic: “nisi earn praeterea dididaset artem, quae doceret
rem oniveraam tribnere in partes, latentem explicare
deftniendo, obaeuram explanare inter-pretando; ambigua
primum videre, deinde distinguere; P»«I.IWM> habere regnlam,
qua vera aut falsa iudicarentur, et quae quibus positis,
omnium artium maTimam, quasi lueem, ad ea, quae confuse ab
aliis aut respondebantur aut agebantur. Dialecticam mini videris
dicere, inquit.” Cicero, Brutus, ch. XLI-XLII.
The language of Peter of Spain is reminiscent of Cicero:
“Dialectics est an artium...” Summulae Logical**, Tractatua I;
‘Propositi© ezponibilis est propositio habens obseurum —w«im
expositione indigen-tem...” Tractatua de Exponibiliuro, p. 104.
In the third book of the De DocVrina Christiana, St Augustine
dealt with the means of setting aside verbal ambiguities through
the application of grammatical rules. He discussed the seven
rules of Ticho-nius the Donatist and commended them to the
attention of students of the Holy Scriptures. (Apropos of this,
fitienne Gilaon included an acute analysis of the relation of
language to thought in his “Introduction a Vttude de Saint
Auffustin”).
In commenting on the controversy as to whether prepositions
and conjunctions should or should not be considered as parts of
speech, Abaelard asserted that prepositions and conjunctions
have an imperfect signification which contributed to the
meaning of the terms to which they are attached. Hence, for
him, syncategorematie words must occupy a position in the
domain of logic. “Sic quoque et prae-positiones et
coniunctionea de rebus eorum quibus apponuntur quos-Amwn
intellectus facere videntur, atque in hoc imperfecta earum sig-
niftcatio dicitur quod cum omnia intellectus ex alio quod
intelligitur, precedat, ipsa quoque res de qua intellectus
habetor, in huiusmodl dictionibus non tenetur aicut in
nominibus et verbis, quae sural et res demonstrant ac de ipsis
quoque intellectus generant.” Peter Abaelard, DiaUetiea, op.
eU., p. 216. Also ef. ibid., p. 218; Logic* IngredUnU-bus, op. eit.,
Glossa super Fori ormsneias, pp. 807, 887-340.
INTRODUCTION K*v
Peter of Spain’s formalized treatment of the nature of exclusive
signs is most probably derived from the analysis of the
significative value of the term “alone” ($ohu) which is found in
Abaelard. According to Abaelard, if we take the statement “Man
alone is risible”, the term “man” and not either “man alone” or
“alone” is the subject Nor is “alone” to be taken as a
determination of the subject; rather, it functions in relation to
the predicate inasmuch as it denies the predicate of all who are
not men. Therefore, {
the meaning of the proposition “Man alone is risible” is that
“Man is risible in such a way that nothing other than man is
risible.@}”* Abaelard even noted the different meanings modal
propositions have when they are used in conjunction with
“alone”, taken by itself or with a negative particle.Though Peter
of Spain did not concern himself with modal propositions in this
relation, his analysis of the functioning of exclusive signs in
exponible propositions is based upon the divergent effects of
“only” when it occurs in propositions with and without a
negative particle attached.*
The exposition of “beginning” and “ending” in the Sum-mulae is
based to some extent upon Aristotle. In the fifth book of the
Metaphysics which is devoted to the study of the philosophical
lexicon, Aristotle examined the conceptions of “beginning” and
•’limit”.• Insofar as they apply to time, they can only be
understood in terms of the conceptions involved in the
understanding of time. Therefore, they must be explained in
terms of “before”, “now” and “after” for, as Aristotle asserts in
the Physics, “we apprehend time onry when we have marked
motion, marking it by ‘before’ and ‘after’... and ‘now’ measures
time, insofar as time involves the “before and after’ “.• Hence,
when Peter of Spain at-
■ “cum dkitar.. ‘Sohn bono eat rislbilit’... aeliu’ non ad sofctoc
ton refertnr... «ed mafii ‘aolaa’ ad praadicatkmam apponitvr rlai-
bfli ranovcndam ab omnibus non-baminftnu. me a dkatvr: heme
cat riaibilia ita, quod nil attnd cat riaibue.” Pater Abaehud, Ugim
In-ffrvtUntibu*, op. eiU, GJOMO. mpcr Ptri mmtmrna; p. 48*.
• JWA, pp. 601-602. * TraaUac en Bxpoafblca, p. 106 at toe.
• Aristotle, Jfftapftyeiea. V, ch. 1; ch. 17.
• Arietetle, PAfafae, IV, 11,119a, 2S-»: 219b. 11.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
tempts to make explicit what is implicit in statements asserting
the “beginning” or “ending” of things whose being is acquired
or lost simultaneously or successively, he does so through the
judicious utilization of “before”, “now” and “after”. Also, the
examination of the term “infinite” appears to have been
suggested by Aristotle’s distinguishing the various senses of
“infinite’ ‘in the Physics.
Finally, Peter of Spain’s exposition of the comparatives and
superlatives offers additional evidence that the Logica Moderna
is a natural growth out of an earlier tradition and is grammatical
in bent. In his discussion of the categories, Abaelard often treats
of comparison, asserting that it can only take place between
things which agree in some respect and that it is characterized
by the use of the adverbs of degree “more” and “less” (magis et
minus)* This treatment of comparison is based on Priscian.’
Thus, even if Peter of Spain derived his analysis of comparatives
directly from the treatment of comparatives by Abaelard, the
analysis must be said to stem ultimately from Priscian. There is
little doubt that the exposition of superlatives which is found in
the Summulae likewise stems ultimately from Priscian.
According to Priscian, all superlatives relate to things of the
same genus and they function as distributive signs because the
general term which follows them is always taken in extension.”
Both of these factors are integral parts of
‘ Ibid., Ill, 4, 204a, 1-8.
• Cf. Peter Abaelard, Login Ingredientibut, op. dt., Gloua super
Praedieamenta Aristoteli*, pp. 160, 200, 209, 223, 243-248.
“Quippe comparatio non fit nisi inter participantia...” Ibid., p.
245. “Sed quantum ad rignificationem adverbiorum magis et
minus, secundum quam vis comparationis consistit...” Ibid., p.
209.
• Cf. “Comparativum est quod cum positivi intellectu vel cum
aliquo participe sensu positivi ‘magis’ adverbium signifieat”.
Priscian, op. eiU HI, 1. “plerique assumunt igitur ‘magis’
adverbium et usum comparativi complent, ut ‘magis pius hie
quam ills’...” Ibid., Ill, 8.
>° “... sicut omnes superlativi ad multos sui generis
coniungitur...’ Priscian, op. cit., Ill, 13.
“Superlativum est, quod vel ad plures sui generis comparatum
super-ponitur omnibus vel per se prolatum intellectum habet
cum «valde’ adverbio positivi, ut ‘fortissimus Graecorom
Achilles id est form
INTRODUCTION l«m<
the analysis of the implications of superlatives which is
presented in the Summulae.”
Thus, the Treatise on Exponibles reveals itself to be of the same
nature as the other treatises in the tract De Pro-prietatibus
Terminomtn. It proceeds from some of the same sources that
the other treatises do and adds to the cumulative evidence
which makes it certain that the Summulae is a work of Latin
origin.
5. INFLUENCE OF THE SUMMULAE LOGICALES ON
SUBSEQUENT LOGICAL THEORY
Consistent with our belief that there is an historical continuity in
the development of human thought, it has been shown that the
logiea modema of the terminist logic was not a sudden growth
or a spontaneous development in the thirteenth century; rather
it was a natural growth out of an earlier medieval tradition. The
probable sources to which it has been traced consist either of
texts which were part of the prescribed curriculum of the faculty
of arts at Paris, which was the place of origin of the logiea
modema, or of works written by outstanding dialecticians,
grammarians, and teachers of the twelfth century. The logiea
veins and the logiea nova, as set forth in the Summulae, do not
have the striking appearance of originality of the logiea
modema and they have revealed themselves, with slight
exceptions, to be mere summations of works which were
prescribed by the University of Paris. However, since any
historical study which stops at the determination of the natural
growth of the Summulae from an earlier tradition could not
possibly provide a proper perspective as to the position of the
Summulae in the history of logic, we must consider the
Summulae not only as a terminus ad quern but also as a terminus
a quo. The germs, if any, of future developments must be
isolated, and the effect*,if any, on subsequent works must be
ascertained.
i”viu SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Certain factors have to be considered in estimating the
influence of the Summulae upon medieval logic. Strictly
speaking, the Summulae is not a manual of logic but a manual
of dialectic* Its object was to prepare the minds of beginners
for the dialectical tournaments and disputa-tional examinations
of university life. {
The Summulae and other manuals of a similar nature were the
expression of the disputes that were held in the schools. At the
same time, they exercised a great influence on the disputes
themselves.* Although the Summulae was no more worthy
intrinsically than any of the other manuals, it soon displaced the
others by virtue of the esteem in which its author was held.*
The extent of the influence of the text may be gauged from the
numerous editions which came from the presses of the
printing centers of Europe, from the many universities and
schools which used the text,@} from the nature of the
commentaries on it, and from the adoption of the terminist
terminology of the text by such outstanding philosophers as
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. {
There were at least one hundred and sixty-six editions of the
work.@} The main centers of publication were Cologne,
Deventer, Leipzig,
1 aay “strictly speaking” for it may well be that Peter of Spain,
like John Bnridan in his re-edition of the Summulae (Tract I,
Chapter I) identifies logic with dialectic; in which ease, this
would be a manna) of logic for Peter. Apropos of Buridan’s re-
edition of the Summulae, Buridan adds an eighth tract on exact
knowledge which is based partly on the Posterior Analytic* of
Aristotle and partly on the De Dwisione of Boethius.
Cf. Konstantyn Micbalski, “Le Critisisme et le Scepticisme dans
le Pluloaophie do XlVe aecle”, Bulletin International d*
VAoadtmia Polonaise des Sciences st de* Lett/re* (1925), part I,
p. 63.
 Cf. Carl Prantl, GesehiehU dor Log* tm AbendUtmde, IIL p. 34.
Also cf. Konstantyn Miehalaki, *Le Criticume et le Scepticisme
etc”. op. ciL, p. 58. The curriculum of the University of Paris
which was preparatory to the study of the superior sciences of
theology, law, and medicine, even entailed committing the
Summulae to memory. “Apud logicos summulae Petri Hispani
traduntur ab initio, novis pueris ad memoriter reeolendnm, etai
non statim intelligant.” John Gerson, Opera Omnia, ed. by M. L.
E. Du Pin (Antwerp, 1706), I. 21.
♦ Cf. the Bibliography of Editions of the Summula* Logical* and
s on the Summulae Logicales which is in the Appendix.
INTRODUCTION Inii
Lyons, Paris, and Venice, where a minimum of ninety-three and a
possible one hundred and fourteen editions were printed. Among
the universities and schools which used the text were the
Universities of Paris, Vienna, Cologne, Freiburg, Leipzig,
Ingolstadt, and Tubingen; and the schools of De-venter and Delft
Possibly the most notable fact of all with regard to the influence
of the Summulae is that its use did not depend on any particular
school of thought, for the appended commentaries were written
by Thomists like Johannes Versor and the masters of the bursa
Montis of Cologne University, and by their arch-rivals, the
Albertists Gerardus de Harderwijck and Arnoldus de Tungris of the
bursa Lau-rentiana of the same university ;* as well as by such a
nominalist as Georgius Bruxellensis and the Scotistic opponents
of nominalism, Johannes de Monte, Nicholas de OrbeUis, Petrus
Tartaretus, and Nicholas Tinctor. Furthermore, the distinctions
of the terminist logic—suppositio, eopulatio, reiatio, ampUatio,
appeUatio, restrietio, dietributio—which are found in the
Summulae, were used to a great extent by Duns Scotus himself
in the logical works which are attributed to him and to a lesser
extent by the foremost nominalist of medieval times, William of
Ockham, who used and developed terminist logic in his
restatement of the Aristotelian OrganonS Indeed, one may
safely say that because of its more widespread use, the
Summulae contributed to the popularization of the terminist
logic more than any other terminist manual of logic.
Another factor which must be considered in estimating the
influence of the Summulae is that the technique of teaching in
the medieval university was such that what might only receive
very brief mention in the Summulae, could de-
 For the conteorerey betwi “Der Aristoteusam in der
Artistonfakuhat der alien Unr» Kola” in Fufebrift ntr Krimmtnm§
mm dU Qrundkmg dor ait** Uwi-wrrtAt i J. 1M» (Cologne.
19S8), pp. 288-S16. The commentary of AnoUnsde TunfrU may
only be tmlikm of that of Gcrardos de Harderwijck.
 CI Erne* A. Moody. Tks Ugia •/ WOiam of Odthmm (New
York. 1986), p. 24.
!*** SUMMULAE LOGICALES
velop, in the course of time, far beyond the original statement
of a point by Peter of Spain and yet be only the logical extension
of what was implicit in his treatment. The technique of
teaching had a double aspect in the thirteenth century. There
was the lecture (lectio) and the exercise (exer-citium). During
the lecture, the professor commented upon the text of the
author by analyzing its thought content. The ideas which he
developed during his exposition were the ideas which were
explicitly or implicitly contained in the text. It was only during
the exercise that the professor posed the problems which arose
in connection with his expositions of the text in the form of
questions and then gave his own answers. Faculty members
and students engaged in periodic disputes in which the
questions were thrashed out. Such a method of disputation
could not help but bring out what was only suggested by way of
implication in the text and lead to the extended employment of
what originally might have been a fundamental notion of
relatively limited application.
{
According to Peter of Spain,’ every significant word muBt signify
some thing whether that thing be a universal thing or a
particular thing. If it does not signify some thing, then it does
not signify any thing, that is, it signifies no thing. But the
syncategorematic word “every” signifies no thing.@}
Nevertheless, it must be significant inasmuch as it affects the
meaning and hence the truth condition of any statement. The
statement “Man is humble” is true but the statement “Every
man is humble” is obviously false. “Every” is a sign distributive
of the subject, insofar as it is the subject, in relation to the
predicate. It has the potency to distribute any subject to which
it is attached and the potency is actualized when “every” is
attached to a subject and actually distributes it. This ascription
of physical properties to
terms* by Peter of Spain presaged a practise which was to
become popular among the modernL The Pseudo-Thomas and
most of the minor Thomists and Scotists of the early fourteenth
century treated terms like substances, endowing them with
material and formal causes. The result was the development of a
realism based on logic, which might be called a metalogic. This
seems to be a logical, inevitable outcome of the philosophical
views of John of Salisbury who asserted that grammar imitated
nature, that there was a parallelism of grammar and logic in
reality, and that, figuratively speaking, things qua things could
enter into a proposition. This was accomplished through the
medium of words. The moderni, maintaining what was
equivalently the same opinion in their theory of the “suppoaitio”,
extended the attribution of the physical characteristics of thingB
to the words substituting for things and to the properties of
words functioning as units of the composite whole, the
proposition. This development may well have received its
initial impulse from the treatment of “every” by Peter of Spain.
The practice was to become a constant subject of attack by
William of Ockham who employed his “razor” against it.”

{
One of the most important and influential products of the
middle ages, which has thus far received little attention from
historians of philosophy, was the development of a
philosophical grammar by the so-called Modistae. The oldest
known example of it is the Summa Grammatica of Roger Bacon;
the most widely known is the Grammatica Specie lativa (also
known as the Tractatus de Modis Signifieandi) of Thomas of
Erfurt, which was formerly attributed to Duns Scotus.”@} The
speculative grammar, which was fabricated in tracts of this
nature, is important because scholastic theologians made
copious use of its fixed precise terminology and because it was
the subject of attack by the Ockhamists who wrote tracts
“Destructiones modorum signifieandi.””
been created. That may be left as it was. But this remains.
Whether or not they were once evoked by epeeeh in the
beginning, in the end and alwayt they are evoked by nothing
else.” (Nature and Mind, pp. 204-205). Professor Woodbridge
believes that by this dualism of ideas and things “one can make
sense out of the claim of Spinoza that the “substance” of
knowledge and the “substance” of nature are the same
substance. Ordo et eonneetio ideantm idem eet ae ordo et
eonnectio rerum. And ideo vera cum suo ideato convenire
debet, not in the sense that ideas in our heads agree with
objects outside them, but in the sense that ideas and their
objects go along together and make the purging of this jointure
from confusion and absurdity imperative.” (An Eteay on
Nature, p. 252.)
11 Ernest A. Moody, op. eit., p. 188, n. 1.
“ R. Steele dates the Summa Grammatica of Roger Bacon about
the year 1250. (Cf. Opera haetenu* inedita Rogeri Baevm, ed. by
Robert Steele (Oxford, 1940), Introduction, p. XIV.) The
Grammatica Sptulativa is attributed by its editor to have been
written in 1293. However, inasmuch as the researches of Msgr.
Grabmann have revealed that Thomas of Erfurt is the author of
the Grammatiea Specu~ lativa and not Duns Scotus, the work
was probably written during the flnt half of the fourteenth
century, for its author, Master Thomas of Erfurt, was an active
master of art* at Erfurt during this period. Cf Martin Grabmann,
“Die Entwicklung der mittelalterlichen Sprach-los-ik” in
MitUhUtertiehe* Geit-leben, VoL I, pp. 120-121, 124.
>» A review of the historical import of speculative grammar is to
be
INTRODUCTION lmriii
Abaelard and of course John of Salisbury, who actually
considers grammar as the cradle of all philosophy, are
particularly rich in hints as to the possibility of the development
of a speculative grammar. Petrus Heliae outlines an entire
technique of meaning and its modes in his Commentary on
Priscian,* Peter of Spain represents still another, later,
transitional stage in its evolution. An analysis of the Summuiae
reveals how close a relationship exists between the theory of
signification as it is found in the Summuiae and speculative
grammar as it is synthesized in the Grammatical Specuiativa,
which may be taken as representative of the movement* Much
that is explicit in the latter may be only implicitly contained in the
Summuiae, but it is none the less there. The indication of the
elements of speculative grammar which are to be found in the
Summuiae and the relating of the theory of signification to
speculative grammar which follows, will supplement, it is hoped,
the research of Grabmann” on the development of speculative
grammar and at the same time will present a picture of the
status of speculative grammar in the first half of the thirteenth
century.
The Grammatiea Specuiativa readily admits of a tripartite
division. An introductory section discusses the
found on pp. 141-146 in the monograph by Grabmann cited abort.
The monograph also contains a brief historical resume of the
background of speculative grammar, pp. 108-116.
>* Of. Charles Thurot, “Notices et Extrahs de Divers Manoscrits
Latins poor serrir a l*Histoire des doctrines Grammaticales an
Moyen Age” in Nonas* «t Estreat* <f* Mamutwif <U la
iKMfetasou* /«*• penoie, Vol 22» (Paris, 1868). pp. 117-118.
According to G. WaDerand, Petrus Heliae timidly initiated
speculative grammar. CI G. Waller-and, “Let Oeuvres de Siger de
Courtrai”, in Let PkOmpke* Safes*. V (Lourain, 1913). p. 60.
»G. WaDerand list. Robert Kilwardby, Jean Le Dace, Jean Le Rns,
Michael de Marhaia. Siger de Courtrai and Duns Scotns as the
principal representatives of the movement. Cf. G. WaDerand,
“Las Oeurres de Siger de Courtrai”, op. etc, p. 60. In mentioning
Duns Scotua, he was undoubtedly referring to the author of the
Cmmtmatium Iptrntu Cfoa who is in reality Thomas of Erfurt and
not Duns Scotua.
“ Cf. p. boDdi, n. 12.
Irmv SUMMULAE LOGICALES
forms of signification (modi significandi) in general. The major
section of the work is then devoted to a determination of what
the precise function of the various parts of speech are in terms
of the forms of signification involved in each case. The
concluding section first analyzes the possible combinations of
constructions (constructiones) of the various parts of speech,
then the congruency (congmitas) of constructions ,and finally
the perfection (perfectio) of constructions. In the process of
disclosing the seeds of a speculative grammar as they are found
in the Summulae, the close relationship of the theory of
signification to each of these sections will become apparent.
The expression “modus significandi” which is utilized in relation
to the functioning of a part of speech in discourse is found in
Boethius” and probably originally stems from him. In developing
a theory of signification which includes the use of the term
“modus significandi” to designate what the ancient
grammarians called the accidents of the parts of speech,
Abaelard affirms that it is the property of a word to signify or to
indicate and the property of a thing to be signified.* Peter of
Spain injects a grammatical note and uses the term “modus” in
making the same distinction when he says “To signify something
substantively or adjectivally are modes (modi) of words, while
adjectivity and sub-stantivity are modes (modi) and differences
of the things which are signified and which do not signify.”” The
word (vox) has the property of signification (significatio), that
“ “Aliud eat enim signiflcare tempos, aliud consigniflcare.
Verbum enim com aliquo proprio modo tempus quoque
signifieat, ut cum agen-tis vel patientis modum demonstrat.”
Boethius, In bibrum de Inter-pretatione, Editio Secunda, Liber
Primus, col. 422 (J. P. Migne, P. L., LXIV.). “Fit autem voeis divisio
tribus modis...Alio autem modo secundum modum, haec enim
plura non significant, sed muhis modis, ut cum dirimus infinitum,
unam rem quidem signifieat...” Boethius, Liber de Divimone, eol.
888 (J. P. Migne, P. L, LXIV.).
»• “Significaxe autem vel monstrare vocum est, significari vero
rerum.” Peter Abaelard, Login Ingredientiinu, op. eiU, Gloua
ntptr Porphyrium, p. 10.
»• Cf. Treatise on Suppositions, p. 3.
INTRODUCTION Ira*
is, the property of representing something, by virtue of the fact
that the intellect confers this property upon it. Since the word
signifies a thing, it is active. On the other hand, the thing does
not signify; it is that which is indicated by the word. The word is
passive with respect to its receiving significance from the intellect
but once having received it, it is active. The thing which is signified
by the word is always passive with respect to its signification. It is
a subject of discourse and nothing else. These considerations
furnish the basis for the fundamental division of the modes or
forms of signification into the “modus signxfioandi activus” and
the “modus signifioandi passivus” of the Grammatica
Speculative.*
However, the intellect imposes a word, not only for signifying,
but also for consignifying. The word “infinite” is used by the
intellect to signify a quantity. Hence, it functions as a
conventional sign inasmuch as the property of signifying “a
quantity” is imposed upon it by the intellect. But the same word
may be used categorematically, that is, significatively, as a general
term signifying the quantity of a thing, or it may be used
syncategorematically as a distributive sign which imparts
indeterminate supposition to the general term accompanying it
When it is used categorematically, it functions as a noun,
whereas when it is used syncategorematically, it functions as a
quantitative adjective. The word (vox) “infinite” remains the
same. The principal signification (signifieatio) which is primarily
imposed upon “infinite” by the intellect remains the same. But in
accordance with its functioning as a categorematic or a
syncategorematic word, “infinite” has a secondary property
imposed upon it by the intellect, that of consignifying
substantively or adjectivally. Thus, the consignification of
“Modus tiffnificandi activus” est modes, «ve proprictas vods, ab
lntaUwta ribi concern, medianto qua, vox proprictetem ret
signtflcat. Modai rtgniftcandi passivus, art modus, rive propriety
rei, proot art par vocam rijitiflcata.” Thomas of Erfurt,
Grammutit* SpemJatwa, in UM Optra Omnia of Duns 8eotus. I
(Vivas edition, 1891), ch. 1, 3.
“ Cf. Treatise on Exponibles, pp. 119 and 121.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
something substantively or adjectivally is a secondary property
which is conferred upon a word already significant and hence
may rightly be termed a mode of signifying (modus
significandi).” This position of Peter of Spain is reflected in the
Grammatica Speculative, which clearly distinguishes between
signification (siffniftcatio) and the mode or manner of signifying
(modus significandi).” Indeed, the Grammatica Speculativa is
devoted, for the most part, to a precise formulation of the
mode of signifying which is proper to the individual parts of
speech.
The answer to the question as to what is the fundamental basis
upon which the modes of signifying rest, is the same for both
Peter of Spain and Thomas of Erfurt, though they express it
differently. Peter of Spain, like John of Salisbury, regards
grammar as imitating nature. The substantive noun corresponds
to the substantive thing and the adjective, which modifies the
substantive noun, corresponds to the accident which qualifies
or modifies the substantive thing. Thomas of Erfurt is saying
what is equivalents the same thing when he states that the
“active modes of signifying... are basically rooted in the
property of some thing”,” except that he is generalizing what is
only particular in Peter of Spain.
*» The position of Peter may be gleaned from a study of the
Treatise of Suppositions, p. 2. The use of the term “modus
tigniftcand?’ to designate the consigniflcative properties of
words is only implicitly in the text.
”... cum intellectus vocem ad significandum, et
consigniflcandum imponit, duplicem ei rationem tribuit; scilicet
rationem significandi, quae vocatur ngrdficatio, per quam
efflcitur signum, vel significans, et sic formaliter est Dictio; et
rationem conrignificandi, quae vocatur Modus tiffnifiauuH
aetivua, per quam vox significans, fit consignum, vel
consigniflcans; et sic formaliter est pars orationis.” Thomas of
Erfurt, Grammatica Speculativa, op. eit., ch. 1, 4.
“Nam quaelibet pars orationis aggregat in se tria, scilicet vocem,
significationem et modum significandi.” Ibid., ch. 34, 5.
*« Cf. Treatise on Suppositions, p. 2.
»»”... cum... modi significandi activi non suit flgmenta, oportet
omnem modum significandi activum, ab aliqua rei proprietate
radieal-iter oriri...” Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatica Speculativa,
op. at., ch.2,6.
INTRODUCTIONIrani
The trinal distinction of “modus signifieandi”, “modi in-
telUgendC’, and “modi essendi” of Thomas of Erfurt is
unnecessary for Peter of Spain. {
As an extreme realist who maintains that the universal really
exists as a thing, Peter has no need of a universal concept. Only
two modes are necessary for him, the modes of things and the
modes of words.@} With this in mind, one could say, in a sense,
that the modes of things (modi rerum) of Peter correspond to
the mode of being (modi essendi) and the mode of understanding
(modi intelligent*) of Thomas and that the modes of words
(modi vocum) of Peter correspond to the modes of signifying
(modi signifieandi) of Thomas.
From the point of view of the determination of the modes of
signification which specify the individual parts of speech, the
relationship of the Summulae to the Grammatiea Speculative is
not too obvious and care must be taken not to overstate it
However, many suggestive analogies can be pointed out with
reference to the natures and subdivisions of the individual parts
of speech.
{
Since the term “nomen” applied both to the “substan-tivum” and
the “adjectivum”, it had to signify something which they had in
common. The problem of what it was they had in common was
implicitly posed by Peter when he differentiated the types of
signification.@} The dichotomic analysis which was pursued in the
“ordinariae tectiones”,-could not help but have made it explicit. A
solution of this problem provided Thomas of Erfurt with the
introduction to his analysis of the nature of the “nomen”, the first
part of speech which he discussed.
The distinctive property or the “modus signifieandi” of the
“nomen” is that of signifying “per modum entis, vd
determinatae apprehensionis” * The note of signifying “per
modum entis” being proper to the “nomen” and the
M For a diacaaafcm of the natore of the
“on&nori— Uctkmn”, et
Cfcarlea Than*, DM TOroammticm etc, op. rft, p. 28.
“ “Noam «rgo e*t pan oratiot datarurinatM apprthanafooia.”
Thonaa of 1 Mlatfeo, op. oft, ch. 8.
Ixxxviii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
pronoun, the note “determinatae apprehensionisr is added to
differentiate the former. The essential characteristic which
differentiates the pronoun is its indeterminate nature (tn-
detertninata apprehensio). This distinctive feature of the
pronoun is pointed out by Peter of Spain in his solution of the
sophism “Homo videt asinum, qui est rationalis”, wherein he
observes that the relative signifies some indefinite substance
which is equally related to both of the things which are signified
substantively (per modum substantia*) ,namely, “homo” and
“asinus”.**
The Grammatica Specuiativa distinguishes between the
substantive and the adjective by having the substantive signify
“per modum per se stantis” and the adjective “per modum
adjacentis”. The only thing which is capable of standing by itself
(per se stantis) is the substance. Therefore, the noun signifies a
substance. However, in this case, one must not understand by
substance any thing which truly exists in the category of
substance but any thing which exists in its determined essence
in any of the ten categories.’As Thomas of Erfurt expresses it:
“The form of signifying after the manner of a thing standing by
itself is taken from a property of the determined essence
itself.”” This conception of the nature of the substantive is
latent in the Sum-mulae. In it, {
a relative of identity of substance always denotes the thing
which its antecedent denotes. But its antecedent must always
be a noun, for if it were an adjective, the relative would refer to
it in a denominative manner.
The relative would then be a relative of accident and not a relative
of substance. Thus, the antecedent of a relative of substance
must necessarily be a noun and always stands for a substance.
But by substance one must not understand a thing in the
category of substance, for Peter gives “whiteness” as an
example of a substantial antecedent. Therefore, by substance is
meant any thing in any genus whatsoever, taken according to the
mode of its essential being.@}” It is from this very understanding
of substance that Thomas of Erfurt derived the mode of signifying
“per se stantia” which is characteristic of the substantive.
The relationship between the Summulae and the Gram-matiea
Speadativa is much clearer in the case of the adjective and the
adverb. In the Grammatica SpeeuUUiva, the mode of signifying
which is common to the adjective and to the adverb is that of
signifying “per modum adiacentis alteri” which is taken from the
property a thing has of inhering in some other thing for its being.
The same idea is expressed by Peter of Spain when he says that
“a mode is an added determination of a thing which has to be
expressed by an adjective (adiectivum) .”** After designating the
generic “modus adiacentis otter?’ which applies to all adjectives,
the Grammatiea Speculativa proceeds to set up a specific
nomenclature which is applicable to the various possible types of
adjectives. The types which are listed include virtually all of the
quantitative and qualitative adjectives which were mentioned by
Peter of Spain in the Treatises on Relatives and Distributions. The
language which is used in discussing the comparison of adjectives
resembles that used by Peter of Spain in treating of comparatives
and superlatives in the Treatise on Exponibles. The listing of types
is a reflection of the tendency toward the multiplication of
distinctions which is found among the terminists.
‘* Cf. TrMtto OB ExponlblM, pp. 122, 124.
« SUMHULAE LOGICALES
According to Thomas of Erfurt, the adverb can determine the
verb either by affecting that which the verb signifies (ratione rex
significatae) or by affecting the manner in which it signifies
(ratione modi signiflcandi). In the latter fashion, the adverb can
determine the verb by specifying the mode of inherence of the
verb (ratione compositionis), as in the case of the modal
adverbs. It can also determine the verb with respect to time
(ratione temporis). Finally, it can determine the verb by
specifying the mental state of the speaker (ratione qualitatis
give modi), as in the case of the hortative and optative adverbs.
This schematic arrangement is the framework for the
differentiation of the classes of adverbs in the Grammatiea
Speculativa.** Yet, except for the fact that the Summulae does
not group the latter three subdivisions of adverbs under the
more general classification of “ratione modi aignificandi”, it
includes this entire outline, both in its terminology and
conceptual content. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
Thomas of Erfurt alludes to the fact that exclusive adverbs such
as “only” (tantummodo) may modify the noun and other parts
of speech as well as those usually modified by an adverb.* The
treatment is reminiscent of Peter of Spain’s analysis of the
nature of exclusive syncategorematic words in the Treatise on
Exponibles.”
Two factors indicate a relationship between the treatment of
the verb in the Swnmulae and in the Grammatiea Specttr lativa.
They are the division of verbs into substantival and adjectival,
and the assertion of the composite nature of the verb.”
The division of verbs into substantival and adjectival is clearly
indicated when Peter of Spain says “... ‘running* is not, in the
strict sense, substantival or adjectival sig-
•» Cf. Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatiea Sp«eulativa, op. cit.. ch. 36.
M Ibid., eh. 38, 2-3.

Treatise on Exponibles, pp. 106, 107.

»• Relevant to the treatment of the verb in speculative
grammar and in the SummuUu, cf. p. liii, n. 64.
INTRODUCTION ««
nification, but is rather the signification of something
substantively or adjectivally...”.”
In the De Interpretatione, Aristotle says that the verb “is”
implies a copulation of things and has no signification apart
from this very copulation. Consequently, it cannot be
understood without the things it copulates, the extremes of the
proposition. In defining a categorical proposition, Peter of Spain
says that every such proposition is composed of three principal
parts, that is, a subject, a predicate, and a copula.* However,
every verb may be asserted of a subject By this very fact, it asserts
something about something and constitutes a proposition. But if
a categorical proposition always includes a copula, the verb “is”
must be included in every verb as its root to signify composition
(compositio). The statement “A man thinks” should be resolved
into “A man is thinking” to signify the composition of thinking
with the man. Thomas of Erfurt mentions this property of
composition (compositio) as being the most common accidental
mode of signification which belongs to the verb and specifically
attributes the conception to a development of Aristotelian
thought by the “modemi”.*
Much more evidence can be adduced to demonstrate the
suggestiveness of the Summulae with regard to the problems of
this section of a speculative grammar. For instance, the problem
of determining the manner of signification which is proper to
the cases of the noun is implicitly posed by Peter of Spain’s
treatment of the reciprocal pronoun, wherein he asserts that the
nominative may signify that which is active or passive but it may
not signify a mode of passivity. However, from what has been said
about the verb and the other parts of speech, it is fairly obvious
that much of the spade
• Treatise on Supposition, p. 3.
«• SmmmuUu UffieaUa. Tractate* I. This insistence upon
resolving the verb ao a* to specifically mention the copula is still
found among modern iieo-Scholastke. Cf. George Hayward
Joyce, Presets!** */ Logic (New York. 1929), p. 40.
« Thomas of Erfurt, Grmmmmtim Sp>mlitfwa> op. ait, eh. 17, L
** Treatise on Relative*, p. 23.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
work has been completed in the formulation of the specific
modes of signification which are to be attributed to the
individual parts of speech in any speculative grammar.
The fundamental distinction of grammatical constructions is
into transitive and intransitive, with the former including the
reciprocal construction. In the transitive construction, the verb
depends on the object rather than on the subject for the
completion of its meaning. The verb seeks to have as its object
a term which signifies something different from that which is
signified by the subject. Even in the case of the reciprocal
construction where the object of the verb signifies the same
thing as the subject, the object signifies the thing in a different
manner than the subject. The subject signifies the thing as
acting, while the object signifies the thing as receiving the
action. This analysis of the divisions of constructions in the
Grammatica Speculative,** is foreshadowed by Peter of Spain’s
inquiry into the nature of the reciprocal in the Treatise on
Relatives and into the nature of restriction effected by the
transitive property of the verb in the Treatise on Restrictions.
Furthermore, the Grammatica Specvdativa insists that it is
especially necessary for intransitive verbs to have the property
of composition, that is, of including the verb “is” in their basic
meaning*—a fact worth noting in view of what has been said
previously.
The analysis of the congruity of grammatical constructions
determines the common principles and then the proper
principles which regulate the utilization of the various types of
modifying words. The adherence or non-adherence to these
principles determines the congruity or incongruity of any
construction.
The modifying determinants of any subject may or may
** Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatica Speculativa, op. eiU, ch. 47.
** Treatise on Relatives, p. 23.
“Treatise on Restrictions, p. 61.
«•” et ideo eompositio in hujusmodi dependentia, maxime est
Verbo Neeessaria.” Thomas of Erfurt. Grammatin Spseuiotttro,
op. cit., ch. 48, 3.
INTRODUCTION TdH
not be declinable, but regardless of the nature of the
determinants, the subject must be expressed in a determinable
manner (per modum determinabilis) and the determinants in a
determining manner (per modum determinantis). If the
determinant is declinable, it is an adjective. Every adjective
functions in a determining manner (per modum determinantis et
modum adiaeentis) in relation to a determinable subject (per
modum determinabilis et modum per se stantis). A{
adjectives can be distinguished into four types by means of the
modes which are proper to them. These modes have a
corresponding mode in the substantive tc which they are
syntactically related. Of these four types, namely, denominative,
relative, interrogative, and distributive adjectives .only two are of
interest in relation to the Summulae. A denominative adjective
functions in an absolute denominative manner (per modum
denominantis simpliciter) in relation to a subject capable of
being denominated absolutely (per modum denominatriUs
simpliciter). A distributive adjective functions in a distributive
manner (per modum distribuentis) in relation to a subject capable
of being distributed (per modum distribuibilis).@}
On the other hand, if the modifying determinant of any subject
is indeclinable, it is either a conjunction, a preposition, an
adverb, or an interjection. Of these four, only the adverb is of
interest for the study at hand. An adverb functions in an
exclusive manner (per modum exeludentis) in relation to a
subject which is capable of being treated in an exclusive manner
(per modum exeludibUis).” This analysis of grammatical
modifiers reveals that congruity is the due union of
constructiblea, that is, of parts of speech into syntactical
relationships which are in conformity with the manner of
signification proper to the individual parts of speech. Conformity
is of two kinds, conformity of proportion (pro-portio) and of
likeness (simiUtudo). In a grammatical construction, sometimes
only one kind of conformity is necessary and sometimes both
are necessary. If the dependent
“ Tht CrmnmmaHm SptmlaX* abo undertook the MUM type of
•aaljrna in relation to the modiflera of the predicate.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
constructible or modifying word has a certain manner of
signifying from the properties of that which the determined
constructible or modified word signifies and not from the
properties of that which it signifies itself, only a conformity of
likeness is required, for example, agreement in gender, number,
and case between an adjective and a noun. But if. the
dependent constructible has its manner of signifying from the
properties of that which it signifies, a conformity of proportion
is demanded, as for example, an adjective which signifies in an
adjectival manner (per modum odia-centia) requires a
substantive which signifies in a substantial manner (per modum
per se stantis).**
This theory of congruity is by no means as clearly stated in the
Summulae as it is outlined above from the Gram-matica
Speculativa, but the theory is unmistakably derivable from the
Summulae. According to Peter of Spain, “a mode is an added
determination of a thing which must be expressed by an
adjective”.* It follows that an adjective must determine the
word to which it is attached and the word to which it is attached
must be capable of being determined. Thus, wehave the
common modes of signifying which are proper to any subject or
predicate.
In saying that a “mode is an added determination of a thing”,
Peter of Spain understands “thing” in a twofold sense, for
“thing” can stand for that which is denoted by the subject of
any construction or it can stand for the subject itself insofar as it
is the subject of the construction. Consequently, the subject can
be characterized in a twofold manner. One method of
characterising it is through a modification of the thing which is
denoted by the subject. The
» This synopsis of the treatment of the eongrnency of
construction, which is foond in chapter L to LIII inclusive of the
Grammatiea Speculativa, represents only an epitome of material
relevant to the establishment of a relationship between that
work and the Sun
••Adjective to be taken in the general sense, for, in medieval
grammar, ‘aductivum” is understood to denote both the
adjective and the adverb of modern grammar.
INTRODUCTION xrv
nominal adjective “white” characterizes the thing signified by
the noun to which it is attached, as in the case of “white
signpost”. Inasmuch as “white” characterizes the thing which is
denoted by the noun “signpost”, it belongs to the noun in an
absolute manner. This is proven by the fact that if “white
signpost” constitutes the middle term in the major premise of a
syllogism, it must be repeated as a unit in the minor premise.
Furthermore, the subject must be capable of being
denominated, for insofar as a mode is an added determination
of a thing, the thing must be capable of being determined. The
derivation of the “modus denotni-nantis simpltciter” of the
subject to which the adjective is attached, is presaged in this
analysis in the SvmtnuUu. The other method of characterizing
the subject is through a modification of the subject insofar as it is
the subject. It concerns the relation of the subject to the
predicate. In the statement “Every animal is sentient”, the
distributive sign “every” distributes the subject “animal” in
relation to the predicate “sentient”. However, it does not
characterize the subject in an absolute manner, for, given the
same circumstance mentioned in connection with the use of
“white” in a syllogism, “every” need not be repeated in the
minor premise of the syllogism together with the term to which it
is attached. From this it is clear that a distributive sign functions
in a distributive manner in relation to the subject to which it is
attached. Consequently, the subject must be capable of being
distributed, for otherwise the construction would be
incongruous.* Indeed, Peter of Spain specifically states that the
construction “every Sortes” is incongruous because a distributive
sign cannot be added to a singular term.* Here then is a basis for
the determination of the principles of congruity which are
attributable to distributive adjective*.

The affinity of Thomas of Erfurt’s treatment of the principles of

congruity involved in the use of exclusive adverbs to Peter of
Spain’s treatment of exclusive words in the
•* Cf. Trmtim on Dteribvtiona, pp. 66, 67. •• Cf. /ML, p. ®.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Treatise on Exponiblea” is unmistakeable and needs no
elaboration.
The definition of congruity flows naturally from what has been
said and one can justly assert that it is implicit in the Summulae.
It implies conformity in the manner of signifying. Of the two
types of conformity, the conformity of proportion is more
important, for it is more fundamental. Without it, speech would
be unintelligible. That Peter of Spain is cognizant of it, even
though in an unscientific manner, is evident from his definition
of a mode and his description of the functioning of an adjective
such as “white” in relation to a subject. Since “white” signifies in
a determining manner and it has this characteristic from the
property of the thing which it signifies, it requires as subject, a
substance capable of being determined. Therefore, a
conformity of proportion is required.
Finally, since language is a medium of communication, it can be
considered from the point of view of both the speaker and the
auditor. The perfection of language (sermo) is related to the
understanding of the auditor. A grammatical construction is
more or less perfect in proportion to its generation of perfect
understanding in the mind of the auditor.” When anyone says
“white man”, the listener comprehends what is said, but he is
not satisfied and his mind is not at rest for it desires to know
what is going to be said about “white man”. His desire is
satisfied and his mind is at rest only when the construction is
completed, as for instance in the statement “The white man is
rapidly losing his superiority complex”. If we disregard Thomas
of Er-
Cf. Treatise on Exponiblea, pp. 106, 107.
•»”... signum perfeetionis constructionis est, generare
perfecluin senium in animo auditoris, ita quod omnis ilia
eonstructio exit perfect*, quae perfeetum sensum in animo
auditoris generabit. Sed haec perfectio sensus in animo
auditoris non est punetualia, sed habet gra-dum perfeetionis
secundum magis, et minus: et secundum hoc eonstructio dicitur
magis, et minus perfects. Nam e* magis perfects est, quae
magis quieUt animum auditoris; et quae minus quieUt, minus
perfect* erit.” Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatiea Specuintiva, op.
oit., ch. 54, 7.
INTRODUCTION xevu
f urt’s integrated analysis of the requisite elements of perfect
constructions which he ties in with his detailed development of
previous sections, this represents his statement of the theory of
the perfection (perfectio) of constructions. It can be culled in its
entirety from the first tract of the Summulae” and it ultimately
rests on the De Inierpretatione of Aristotle.”

The relationship of the Snmmulae to the Grammatica

Speculative, is unmistakeable but it must be said that even
where there is a topical affinity, the former is treating only
incidentally what the latter is treating essentially.
In the twelfth century, the appearance of the last four books of
the Organon of Aristotle caused a pronounced change in the
method of teaching. Under the dominating influence of Abaelard,
dialectic began to reign supreme. The treatment of sophisms
became an integral part of scholarly exercises. John of Salisbury
asserted that there was nothing easier to expain to youths than
sophistic because it was naturally attractive to them. He even
held that the Sophistici Elenchi was preferable to the Analytics
inasmuch as, in addition to its being just as profitable as the
Analytics for scholarly exercise, it also promoted eloquence which
leads to better understanding. To Salisbury, logic was a practical
tool.* He condemned compilers of opin-
.disputatio aon potest haberi nisi mediant* woo... Oratto-s
imperfecta. Perfect*, est ilia que perfectom a generat in anima
aoditoris, at “Homo eurrit”. Imperfecta eat ilia quae imperfectam
sensum generat in anima aoditoris, at “homo albas.” Svmmulat
Logical—, Tractates L
••Aristotle. De /uterprvtatMmc, 4, 16a, 26-30. Apropos of this,
Martin Grabmann says that Codex 468 of the StadtMbUothek of
Mains brings the tracts D« aforfu Signifiamdi into relation with
the via
OtUtOMO.
John of Salisbury, Jfsealopieim, op. eiu, IV. 22.
•™In eo aatem michi Tidentur Analeticis preferendi, qood non
minus ad exerdttan confer out et facfliori intelleeta etoquentiam
pro-moveot.” John of Salisbury, Metalogioon, op. «t, IV, 24,
BSOd.
There arc many indications of this viewpoint in the Afetoiooiosm;
for instance, Salisbury asserts that it is a matter of wmplete
indUTer-
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
ions” and authors who subjected utility to subtlety.* He
recommended the constant exercise of the rules of logic which
were laid down in the compendia beginning to appear in his
time, for such works were useless unless they were
supplemented by constant application and assiduous exercise of
the rules.* Such a positive position on the part of a philosopher
who exercised such a strong influence over Peter of Spain, could
scarcely help but be reflected in the Stmu mulae. So, in the very
first treatise of the Parva Logicalia, we find a sophism’ used in
connection with the explanation of indeterminate supposition.
This process of explaining a rule or a principle by means of a
sophism eventually reached a point where the sophisms
constituted the major part of the treatise, as in the Treatise on
Distributions. The sophisms were formulated with a twofold
purpose in view, to train youths in the detection of a faulty
syllogism and to illustrate the significative functioning of
syncategorematic words.
The development of the selections of sophisms, which are
called Sophismata, by philosophers like Kilmington or Clymeton,
Albert of Saxony, Heytesbury, Buridan, or Hol-landrin, is
narrowly tied to treatment of syncategorematic words in
manuals like those of William of Shyreswood, Lambert of
Auxerre, and Peter of Spain.” Since the manual ence whether the
adjective means its quality or the quality bearer. Cf. Metaloffiexm,
op. eit., Ill, 2, 893d.
»• “Compliant omnium opiniones...; proponunt... omnia, quia
nes-eiunt preferre meliora.” Ibid., II, 7, 864c.
•*”... aubtrahitur namque subtilitati utilitas. Nkhil autexn, ut in
primo Declamationum ait Seneca, odibilius subtilitate, ubi nichil
aliud tat quam subtilitas.” Ibid., II, 8, 865b.
“Porro inutilis est opera preceptorum, si non usu et exercitatio
assiduo roboretur; nisi forte cum in habitum transient
dispositio.” /Wi, IV, 28, 932c Also cf. Ibid., Ill, 10, 916a.
« Sophism is not taken in the Aristotelian sense. Bather, it
denotes a thesis to be demonstrated or a statement taken as a
basis of discussion. It is the means used by scholars to apply the
Aristotelian principles of Sophistic. Cf. G. Wallerand, “Les
Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai”, in Let PhUoiophu BAgn, VIII
(Louvain, 1913). pp. 27-29. •» Cf. Konstantyn Miehalski, Le
Criticisme et le SeeptJcisme etc,
op. eit., p. 68.
INTRODUCTION wa*
of Peter of Spain displaced the manuals of other authors, the
development of the Sophitmata must be due in greater measure
to the Summulae of Peter than to that of any other author.
A direct relationship can be established in some cases between
the Sophismata and the Summulae. Immediately after the
sophisms of Albert of Saxony, the manuscript Sor-bonne 848
contains a collection of sophismata relative to the universal
distributive sign “every”.* This collection is probably derived
directly from the Treatise on Distributions in the Summulae*
Again, the Sophismata of John Buridan may be directly related to
the Summulae, for three chapters of his Sophismata are devoted
to sophisms related to “sup-positio”, “appellatio”, and
“ampliaiio”. The dependence of the Sophismata upon the
Summulae is also indicated in Buridan when he explicitly states
his intention of treating sophisms which are categorical
propositions involving the use of exclusive and exceptive words.*
The nature of such words is analyzed by means of sophisms in the
Syncate-goremata” of Peter of Spain but the words themselves
are treated prior to this in the Treatise on Exponibles which is
found in the Summulae proper. Obviously then, the develop-
“Sequitur registrant prime parti*, in qua posita sunt sophismata
diAcultatem habentia eo quod signum universale afflrmativum
distri-butmnn indilferenter pro substantia et accidente additur
terraino staphd. Omnia homo est omnia homo. Omnia fenix eat
Omne animal fait tn arena Nee. Omnes apostoli sunt XIL” Cited
by Charles Thurot, “Notices et Extraits etc.”, op. eiu, p. 119, n. 1.
•» Treatise on Distributions, p. S3 ff.
“Quarto (considerabo) de cateforieis secundum vocem
indigent!-bus exponi per hypothetieas sfcut sunt exclusive,
excepthrae, reduptt-cativae et ahae multae de aliquibus verbis ut
indpH, deamit, differt etc et de pluribus aliis dictionibus
atocategorematids” John Buridan, Sophitmata, eh. L
•» The tract SvntnUgorvmal*, which was sometimes appended
to the Summmlnt, treated more syiieategoremalic words than
were treated in the Summmla* and H developed in greater
detail even those words i had been analysed in the Sinmmifm.
Nevertheless, H was baaed M, for it merely winllluled an
elaboration of the Sean-
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
ment of the Sophismata must be said to stem from the
treatment of syncategorematic words in the manuals of logic
and most likely from the Summulae of Peter of Spain.
Finally, the Summulae contributed to the development of the
scepticism which existed during the fourteenth century. At the
very beginning of the Summulae, Peter of Spain asserted that
his entire work would have only the character of probability.
For him, dialectic was the science which held the key to the
principles of all methods. Knowledge of it was acquired prior to
the knowledge of any of the other sciences, for dialectic
discussed with probability the principles of all the other
sciences.** Consequently, any development which resulted
from a discussion of the principles proper to these sciences had
only the character of probability. Again, the Summulae was
directed towards the Topics and its specific enumeration of the
types of dialectical argument as its climax. The Topics,
together with the Sophistici Elenchi, formed the core of the
Summulae. Peter of Spain eliminated the Posterior Analytics
which explained the foundations of scientific demonstration
and constituted an essential part of the Organon of Aristotle.
Indeed, he not only emphasized probabilism but he also hinted
at proba-biliorism, for in discussing the sophism “What is stated
by both of them is true”,** he offered two possible solutions of
the sophism but preferred one of them because it was “the
better and the more subtle”.’ Furthermore, the sophisms of
the Logica Moderna were characterized by the constant play of
argument and counter-argument. When these factors are
considered in conjunction with the fact that the Summulae had
to be committed to memory by impressionable youthful
students who were then plunged into the dia-
•* “Dialectiea est ars artium, Bcientia scientiarum, ad omnium
metho-dorum principia viam habens. Sola enim dialectiea
probabiliter dis-putat de principiis omnium aliarnm scientiarum. Et
ideo in acquisition* omnium aliarnm scientiarum dialectiea dieitur
esse prior.” Summulae Logical**. Tractatus I.
•• Treatise on Distributions, p. 85.
‘•/Wd., p. 87.
INTRODUCTION el
lectical life of the university, one sees that a tendency towards
scepticism is a logical outcome for “ ‘tis education forms the
common mind; just as the twig is bent, the tree’s inclined.” So
we find Michalski saying that though Duns Scotu8 was the main
cause of the scepticism of the fourteenth century, the terminist
and probabilist current which stems in great part from the
Summulae of Peter of Spain pointed thinkers in that general
direction/
The germs of future developments, which are found in the
Summulae, are then the ascription of physical properties to a
term, the suggestion of a philosophical treatment of the modes of
signification, and the collection of sophisms which are useful for
illustrating rules and principles of logic The greatest effect of the
Summulae lies in the impetus it imparted to the sceptical trend
which was to flourish in the fourteenth century.
6. SOURCES OF PRESENT PRACTICAL EDITION OF TRACT VII
The Summulae Loffieales consists of seven tracts and the
seventh tract in turn consists of seven treatises. The first six
tracts, approximately half the entire work, are, as we have seen,
mainly traditional in character. As a consequence, their
treatment has been limited to a genetic study and an analysis of
content, and no edition of them has been prepared. An edition of
the seventh tract, which constitutes the remainder of the text,
has been prepared, for it contains the developments of logic
which are particularly important to the historian of medieval
philosophy and to some modern logicians. The following edition
of this tract is not intended to be critical but only practical. For
this reason a translation is also provided. The edited text is the
result of the collation of the Logiea Moderna as it is found in two
editions
» Cf. Keoatantyn Michalald: “Ua eoorants philosophkraM *
Oxford ct * Paris pendant le XIV* •Jtdc” in BulUti*
InUrmationmi da TAmUmit P«lnmmtt dm KWMM at dm UUnm
(19*2). Part I. p. 61; “Lm mmrmnU arttstwa «t •empUqum 4mm U
pMnttpMt dm XIV alada”, in ibid. (MB). Part II (Printed Cracow,
1927), p. 227.
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
of the Summulae which will hereafter be designated as texts
“A” and “B”.
Text”A” is a Scotistic commentary on the text of Peter of Spain
by Nicholas de Orbellis, which was printed by Alberti-nus
Vercellensis in Venice on March 10, 1500. An incuna-bulum of
this text in the Plimpton Library, Columbia University Library,
has been used as the basis for this edition. Its bibliographical
description is:
Logica Magistri Nicolai de Orbellis una cum textu Petri Hyspani.
Venice, Albertinus Vercellensis, 10 March, 1500.
Quarto. 155 x 107 mm. 34-46 lines. 2 columns. 134 leaves.
Signed a-qV.
Types: 7/10 lines = ca. 68G, 8/67-68G, 12/91G: running titles.
Initials: c, d, e, f, v. Rubric $.
3 Woodcut diagrams.
Fol. la (title): Logica Magistri Nicolai // de orbellis vna
cum//textu Petri//hyspani// Fol. lb: Blank.
Fol. 2a, col. 1: Excellentissimi viri artium ac sacre//theologie
professoris eximij magistri Ni//colai de orbellis de francia ordinis
mi-//nonun secundum doctri-nam doctoris subtil is//Scoti:
logice brevis: sed admodum vti//lis super textu magistri Petri
hy8pani//exposito incipit.//(Q) Uoniam teste sa-//piente
proverbio//rum 22°... Fol. 134a? col. 2, 1. 7: .. .Et hec de
exponibili-// bus dicta sufficiant //Explicit Logica magistri
Ni//colai de orbellis vna cum te-//xtu Petri hispani
feliciter.//Im-pressa Uenetiis per al-//bertinum Uer-cellensem:
die. x. //Marcii. M.ccccc.// Registrum.// [3 lines.] Fol.
134b:Blank. i Terti “A” and “B” are Not. 123 and 68 wtpeetiTely in the
Bibliography of Editions of the Summuta* LogieaUi which u in the
Appendix.
INTRODUCTION ciii
On the four fly-leaves at the beginning of the volume and on two
at the end are annotations on the text which are written in an
Italian hand of the early seventeenth century. On the title-page,
in the same hand, is written the date: “pridie Kalendas Julij
1627”.
Binding: Full vellum; probably contemporary. Text “B” is a
Thomistic commentary on the text of Peter of Spain by the
masters teaching at the Bursa Montis of Cologne University. The
first six tracts of “B” were printed on June 15, 1494 but the date
of printing for the remainder of the text is unknown. A negative
microfilm of the incunabulum which is at Johns Hopkins
University Library has been used as the second source in the
production of the collated text The bibliographical description of
this incunabulum is:
Copulata omnium tractatuum Petri Hispani cum textu.
Nuremberg, Anton Koberger, 15 June, 1494.
Quarto. 213 x 148 mm. Fol. 3a: 145 (154) x 96 mm.: 46 lines of
commentary and running title. Fol. 184b: 143 mm.: 31 lines of
text No. of lines varies. 1 column.
422 leaves: 274 unnumbered, 2-268 numbered: Folio I-CCLXIX;
276-422 numbered: Fols. I-CXLVIL with errors.
Types: 130G: titles, head-lines (numbers, also in part II names of
tracts etc.); 91G: titles, text; 63G: commentary.
Woodcut capitals on 2a and 276a, blank spaces for capitals
elsewhere. Capitals measure 53x53 mm. A few section-
headings printed in the margin at the beginning of the second
part A few woodcut diagrams. Full page woodcut on Folio
LXXXII, 145x98 mm.: center-tree; left-standing man; right-
seated man. Fol. la (title): Textus et copulata
omnium//Tractatuum Petri Hyspani. etiam//Panionim
logicalium. et tractatus syncathegore-ma//tum quern aliqui
octauum vocant cum quibusdam atijs//sagaciter adiunc-
tis.iterum atque lterum dUigen-//tis-sime corrects secundum
doctrinam irre-fragabilem diui// Thome Aquinatis. ac iuxta
frequens exercitium//magistro-rum Colonic infra sedecim
domos in buraa//Montis regentium: in hunc vnum librum
congesta//[woodcut let-
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
tered: Accipies tanti doc/, toris dogmata sanc/ti.] Fol. 269a:
Copulata sex tractatuura Petri hyspani secundum doctrina
sancti Thome Aqui-//natis. studio magistrorum Colo-nie in
bursa Montis regentium indus-triose//collecta et nuper pro
exercitio neophytorum logice solerter impressa. Anno//domini.
M.cccc.xciiij. quindeci-ma Iunij. finiunt feliciter./// (tabula) Viro
sue natiuitatis vultum in spe//culo consideranti... Fol. 273b:
Finitur tabula questionu.// Fol. 275a: Copulata super
omnes//tractatus paru-orum//logicalium Petri hyspani. ac
su-//per tres tractatus modernorum te-//xtui pulcerrime
annotata in argu// mentis et replicis denuo diligen//tissime
correcta iuxta inuiolatum pro//cessum magistrorum Colonie
bur//sam montis regentium.// Fol. 422a (end): Et hac de
syncathegorematibus dicta sufficiant// This edition is a very
close reprint of Quentell’s 1493 edition, the diagrams also being
copies, as far as leaf LXVIa of the second part. From this point
Quentell’s text is mostly unleaded, which accounts for the
present issue occupying 4 more leaves than the other.
Quentell’s quiring is not retained. Volume rebound.
Text “A” has been chosen as the basic text, for it is noticeably
superior to “B” in all the Treatises of Tract VII with the
exception of the final Treatise on Exponibles. Even on the
Exponibles “A” may be superior to “B”, but the superiority, if
any, is far less marked. Variants in the texts have been noted.
Where no difference in meaning results from the choice of
either variant, “A” has been used except in a few instances
where consistency has recommended the use of the “B” variant
Finally, the medieval orthography has been changed to the
modern classical.
yyy
TREATISE ON SUPPOSITIONS
{
Peter of Spain@}

Some linguistic expressions are complex, as “The man runs”;

others are incomplex, as “man”, because it is an in-complex
term. {
A term, as it is taken here, is a word which signifies the universal
or the particular, ar “man” or “SorteB” and so forth. Moreover,
each and every incomplex term either signifies substance, or
quality, or quantity, or relation, or action, or passion, or place,
or time, or position, or habit Signification, as it is taken here, is
the representation, established by convention, of a thing by an
utterance.@} Wherefore, since every thing is either a universal
or a particular, it follows necessarily that words which do not
signify a universal or a particular do not signify any thing. And so
they would not be terms in the sense in which “term” is taken
here, as for example the signs of universality and particularity are
not terms.
Of significations, one is that of a substantival thing and is
accomplished through a substantive noun, as “man”; another is
that of an adjectival thing and iB accomplished through an
adjective, as “white”, or through a verb, as “running”. This is
not, in the strict sense, substantival or adjectival signification,
but is rather the signification of something substantively or
adjectivally, because to signify something substantively or
adjectivally are modes of words, while adjectivity and
subatantivity are modes and differences of the things which are
signified and which do not signify.
{
Substantive nouns are said to stand for or denote isup-ponere),
but adjectives or verbs are said to characterize (copuiare).
Supposition (suppontio) is the acceptance of a substantive term
as denoting something.@} Supposition and signification differ,
however, because signification is accom-pliahed through the
imposition of a word to signify a thing, while supposition is the
acceptance of a term, already significant, as denoting something;
as when one says: “Man runs”, the term “man” is taken to denote
Sortes, Plato and the rest of men.

Thus, signification is prior to supposition. They also differ in that {

signification belongs to the word, whereas supposition belongs to
the term already composed of the word and its signification.@}
Therefore, to denote (sup-ponere) and to signify (significare) are
not the same, but rather are different, as holds by the topic of
co-ordinates and inflections. Furthermore, signification is the
relation of a sign to the signified, whereas supposition is the
relation of that which denotes to that which is denoted.
Therefore, supposition is not signification. Characterization
(copula-Ho) is the acceptance of an adjectival term for
something.
Of suppositions, one type is general; the other, discrete. General
supposition is that which is accomplished by means of a general
term, such as “man”, “animal”. Discrete supposition is that which
is accomplished by means of a discrete term, such as “Sortes”, or
by means of a general term taken in conjunction with a
demonstrative pronoun, as “this man”, which is a discrete term.
Again, of general suppositions, one type is natural; the other,
accidental. {
Natural supposition is the acceptance of a general term for all
those things of which, by its original imposition, it can be a sign;
as the term “man”, when it is taken by itself, denotes all men@},
including those who exist, those who will exist, and those who
have existed. Accidental supposition is the acceptance of a
general term for all those things its adjunct determines, as in the
statement: “Man runs”. In this instance the term “man” denotes
all men who exist at the present time. When one says: “Man was”
or “Man ran”, “man” denotes all men who existed in the past.
And when one says: “Man will be” or “Man will run”, “man”
denotes all men who will exist. Consequently, “man” has different
suppositional values depending upon the diversity of those terms
which are added to it.

Of accidental suppositions, one type is simple; the other,

personal. {
Simple accidental supposition is the acceptance of a general term
for the universal thing signified by that term,
as when one says: “Man is a species”, “Animal is a genus”.@} In
these instances, the term “man” denotes man in general and not
any of the particulars included under it, and the term “animal”
denotes animal in general and not any of the particulars included
under it The same thing must be said about any general term
whatsoever, as in the statements: “Risible is a property”,
“Rational is a differentia”, “White is an accident”.

Further, of simple suppositions, one type is that of a general term

functioning as the subject, as in the statement: “Man is a
species”. In this case the term “man” has simple supposition
because it denotes only the nature of the species. A second type
is that of a general term functioning as predicate in an affirmative
proposition, as in the statement: “Every man is an animal”. In this
statement the term “animal”, functioning as predicate, has simple
supposition because it denotes only the nature of the genus. A
third type is that of a general term placed after an exceptive word,
as in the statement: “Every animal, other than man, is irrational”.
Here, the term “man” has simple supposition because its
particular cannot validly be inferred. Hence, the following is not a
valid inference: “Every animal, other than man, is irrational;
therefore every animal, other than this man, is irrational”,
because of the fact that a fallacy of figure of speech is involved in
progressing from simple supposition to personal. likewise, [the
following is not a valid inference]: “Man is a species; therefore
some man is a species”. Nor again: “Every man is an animal;
therefore every man is this animal”. In all these cases an
inference is made from simple supposition to personal
supposition.
However, it is dear that a term, functioning as predicate, has
simple supposition because when one says: “There is the same
science of all opposites”, unless the term “science” had simple
supposition, its particulars could be validly inferred and the
statement would be false. For there is no
 Ariatotk, M*tmpk*ym. IV. 2. 1004*. B-10.
TREATISE ON SUPPOSITIONS •
particular science of all contraries. For medicine is not a science
of all contraries, but only of the healthy and the ill; grammar is
not a science of all contraries, but only of the grammatically
suitable and unsuitable; logic only of the true and the false and
so on.
{
Personal supposition, however, is the acceptance of a general
term for its particulars; as when one Bars: “Man runs”, the term
“man” denotes its particulars.
Further, of personal supposition, one type is determinate; the
other, indeterminate. Determinate supposition is the acceptance
of a general term taken indefinitely or taken with a sign of
particularity, as in the statements: “A man runs” or “Some man
runs”. The supposition in each of these statements is said to be
determinate because, although in each statement the term
“man” may denote any man, both those running and those not
running, the statement is nevertheless asserted as true of only
one man who is running.@} And because it is one tiling to denote
(evpponere) and another thing for a statement to be true or false
of something, therefore in the above propositions, as has been
said, the term “man” denotes every man, both those running and
those not running, although it yields a true statement only with
reference to the one man who is running.

However, it is dear that there is determinate supposition in both

of these propositions, because when one says: “An animal is
Sortes, or an animal is Plato and so on; therefore, an animal is
every man”, there is a fallacy of figure of speech involved in
progressing from a determinate many to a determinate one. On
that account, this term “animal”, posited indefinitely, has
determinate supposition. The same holds true in the case of a
general term taken with a sign of particularity.
{
Indeterminate supposition is the acceptance of a general term for
many by means of a universal sign, as when one says: “Every man
is an animal”.@} In this case, the term “man” denotes many men
by means of the universal sign, because it denotes any one
whatsoever of the things it can denote. Further, of
indeterminate suppositions, one type is in-
TREATISE ON SUPPOSITIONS 11
determinate by the exigency of the sign or mode and the other
by the exigency of the thing [signified], as when one says: “Every
man is an animal”. In this instance, the term “man” is made
indeterminate or is distributed by means of the universal sign for
any one whatsoever of the things it can denote [its “values”]; and
the term “animal”, functioning as predicate, is made
indeterminate by the exigency of the thing [signified].
Also, since each and every man has his own essence, the verb
“is”, by the exigency of the thing signified, is understood for as
many essences as the term “man” is understood for men. And,
since each and every man has his own animality, the term
“animal”, by the exigency of the thing signified, is understood for
as many animals as the term “man” is understood for men and as
the verb “is” is understood for essences.
Hence, the term “man” should have movably indeterminate and
distributive supposition. It is understood as indeterminate and
distributive because it is understood for every man; but it is
taken as movably indeterminate because a valid inference can
be made to any one whatsoever of its particulars, as “Every man
is an animal; therefore, Sortes is an animal”.

However, {
the term “animal” is said to be immovably indeterminate because
a valid inference cannot be made to its particulars, as “Every man
is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal”.@} Here, an
inference is made from simple supposition to personal, just as in
the case of: “Man is the noblest of creatures; therefore, this
man or some man (is the noblest of creatures)”; or in the case of:
“The rose is the most beautiful of flowers; therefore, some rose
(is the most beautiful of flowers)”.

But the latter cases differ from the former because in the latter
there is simple supposition on the part of the subject while in the
former the simple supposition is on the part of the predicate.
This may seem to contradict what we said previously, namely,
that in the proposition: “Every man is an animal”, the term
“animal”, functioning as predicate, has simple supposition,
whereas we just now asserted that it has indeterminate
supposition. To this it must be replied, according to
TREATISE ON SUPPOSITIONS H
some people, that because a genus is predicable of many differing
in species, the term “animal”, whenever it is taken for the
common nature itself insofar as it is a genus, has simple
supposition; but insofar as the common nature of that genus is
multiplied by reason of the things denoted by the term “man”, it
is said to have indeterminate supposition, not movably but
immovably.

However, immovably indeterminate supposition, can occur along

with simple supposition not in the same [respect] but in different
[respects], as has been affirmed. Wherefore, according to this
view, it must be said that movably indeterminate supposition
cannot coincide with simple supposition, either in the same
[respect], or in different [respects], as has been stated.

But I believe that it is impossible for a general term, functioning

as predicate, to have simple suppositional value and to be
movably or immovably indeterminate when there is a universal
sign in the subject of an affirmative proposition, as in the
statement: “Every man is an animal”, and in similar propositions.

The reason for this is, as Porphyry indicates,* that everything

which is predicated of something is either greater than or equal to
that of which it is predicated—and he had essential predication in
mind.

But in this proposition: “Every man is an animal”, the predication

is essential and the predicate is not of equal extension with the
subject; therefore, it is greater. It is not accidental; therefore, it is
substantial or essential.

Consequently it is a genus or a differentia. It is not a differentia;

therefore, it is a genus. But the nature of a genus, when it is
distributed either movably or immovably, is not a genus.
Therefore, when one says: “Every man is an animal”, since the
genus is there predicated, it would not be possible for this general
term to be distributed either movably or immovably, because that
would signify that what already has actual existence as the nature
of a genua, is not a genus; just as if “man” were distributed, either
movably or immovably, it would no longer be a species,
 Porphyry (Cited In Commentary B+rtm fa ParpAyrfaon A &
TrtmsUUm*, ffl, col. 1«C. J. P. Mip». PX, LXIV.)
TREATISE ON SUPPOSITIONS IB
Again, this same conclusion is evident from what Aristotle says
in the first book of the Topics, namely, that everything which is
predicated of another is either predicated of it convertibly or
not If it is predicated convertibly, it is a definition or a property.

However, if it is not predicated of the thing convertibly, it either

belongs to the definition of the thing or not If not, then it is an
accident If it belongs to the definition of the thing, then it is
either a genus or a differentia. Not a differentia; then a genus.
And Aristotle had in mind the case of direct predication where the
species, as such, is the subject or is distributed.

But in this proposition: “Man is an animal”, there is direct

predication and “man” is the subject Also, the predicate is not
of equal extent and it is not an accident; therefore it is a genus.
Wherefore it is not possible for a general terra, functioning as
predicate, to be movably or immovably indeterminate.
Furthermore, the universal [intensions!] whole which is a genus
and the quantitative [extensional] whole are related to each other
in an opposite manner.

The quantitative whole is twofold: one kind of quantitative whole

is complete, for example, wherever a general term is movably
indeterminate, as in the statement: “Every man is an animal”; the
other kind of quantitative whole is incomplete and limited, for
example, wherever a general term is immovably indeterminate
and whenever a general term is diversified unconditionally.

Therefore, if it is impossible for a quantitative whole, as such, to

be a genus, it will not be possible for a genera] term, placed in
the predicate, to be movably or immovably indeterminate;
which was what we asserted.

Also, {
that type of comparison by which the more particular is reduced
to the more general is opposed to the type of comparison by
which the more general is reduced to the more particular. In the
first type, general is taken in the sense of that which is common.
In the second type, general is taken as distributed or
indeterminate.@} Therefore, since a general term as such has
the character of a genua, it is
not possible for it qua genus to be distributed.
These four arguments must be granted. The difficulty which
prompted them, which is just one difficulty, is easy to solve.
For, given the statement: “Every man is an animal”, it was
asserted that since each man has his own ani-mality or his own
essence—because he cannot be a man without being an animal,
therefore the term “animal” should be understood for as many
animals as the term “man” is understood for men.

But it is manifest that that argument has no force, because

when one says: “Every man is white”, it is necessary that as
many animalities are understood in the subject as there are
men of which “man” is understood.

Whence there is no reason to assert that “man” has these

animalities from the predicate, since in this case “white” is
predicated.
Whence it must be said that man, logically speaking, not naturally
[speaking], is compounded from animal and rational; and
therefore he possesses of himself this diversification of
animalities. Hence, when I speak thus: “Every man is white”,
those animalities do not in the least belong to man by reason of
the predicate, since in this case “white” is the predicate, as was
said.
So it is in the matter under discussion, where a genus is
predicated of a species, as in the statement: “Every man is an
animal”.
For in this proposition, “man”, under which is understood the
diversification of those animalities, is the subject; and this genus
“animal” is the predicate which is not distributed in any way,
either movably or immovably, but in this case denotes the nature
or the essence of the common genus itself which is predicable of
many. Whence “animal” is the predicate and “animal” is
understood in the subject, just as when one says: “Every rational
animal is an animal”.
Similarly, I say that the verb “is” is not distributed either movably
or immovably, because the fact that an animal might be or
might exist in this man is implied in the subject itself prior to its
becoming a subject in a proposition with respect to either an
oaafnrisl or an accidental predicate.
And, for this reason we discard a certain division which was
TREAT18E ON SUPPOSITIONS 1»
made previously,’ namely: of indeterminate suppositions, one
type is indeterminate by the exigency of the thing [signified]; the
other is indeterminate by the exigency of the mode or sign.

For we assert that all indeterminacy occurs by the exigency of

the sign or mode; as when one says: “Every rational animal is an
animal”, the term “animal”, functioning as subject, is taken by
the exigency of the [distributive] sign for every animal that is a
man.

Similarly in this statement: “Every man is an animal”, the term

“man” is taken for every man, and not only for man but also for
every animal that is a man;

and on that account as many animalities are understood as

humanities, naturally speaking, because it is only according to the
viewpoint of logic, and not according to the way of nature, that
the humanity in each individual man is the same humanity; in this
manner “man in general” is the same.
Hence the fact that there exists this or that animality is by reason
of matter. For, in the natural order my humanity differs of itself
from your humanity; and my soul through which my humanity is
caused in me, is other than your soul, through which your
humanity is caused in you. And it is because of this that this sign
“every” distributes “man”, and yet does not distribute “animal” in
its full generality but as limited to man through his differentiae.
Whence it follows that all indeterminacy occurs by the exigency of
the sign or mode. This is sufficient concerning the supposition of
absolute terms.
 Cf. ntpra, pp. 9 and 11.
TREATISE ON RELATIVES
{
Relative has two [meanings]: in one way, a relative is that whose
essential character is to be in some way related to something
else, and in this sense a relative is one of the ten categories; in
another way, a relative is that which refers back to something
mentioned previously, because, as Priscian indicates in his larger
work, a relative is a reminder of something mentioned previously,
as in the statement: “Sortes, who is moved, is running”.@} In
this sentence the relative “who” produces a recollection of, or
involves a reference to, Sortes who is the object mentioned
previously. {
In this section we are not going to consider relatives of the first
type [Le. relatives belonging to the category of relation]; we are
going to consider relatives of the second type [Le. relatives which
refer back to something mentioned previously].
Some relatives are relatives of substance, such as “who”, “he”,
and the like; others are relatives of accident, such as “such a
kind”, “such a sort”, “such a size”, “as great as”.@}
A relative of substance is one which refers to an object which is
numerically the same as its antecedent, such as “he”, “who”.
Furthermore, some relatives of substance are relatives of
diversity, as “another”, and such a relative refers to an object
numerically the same but denotes another, as in the statement:
“Sortes is running and another is debating”; others are relatives
of identity, such as “who”, “he”, “the same”. Now a relative of
identity of substance is one which refers to and denotes an object
numerically the same as the object which its antecedent
denotes, such as “Sortes who debates is running”. Here, the
relative “who” refers to Sortes and denotes Sortes.
Some relatives of identity of substance are nouns, such as “who”,
“someone”; others are pronouns, such as “he”, “the same”.
Furthermore, some relative pronouns of identity are reciprocal,
such as “of 11101860*”, “to himself’, “himself*, along with its
possessive, such as “his”; others are non-
 Priadaa, l«t. Grim.. «L H. KeU. XVH. M.
TREATISE ON KF.l AT1VF.R ?■<
reciprocal, such as “he”, “the same”. {
A relative is called reciprocal not because it is passive but
because it adds a mode of passivity to an active substance; for
the passive is one thing, and a mode of passivity is another. This
is dear from the fact that the nominative can be passive, as in
saying: “Sortes is hit”, but it cannot have a mode of passivity.
Hence a mode of passivity is always in a oblique case. Thus it is
dear that it is one thing to be passive and another to be a mode
of passivity.@}
If one asks what is added over and above passivity by the
reciprocal relative, then we must answer that the reciprocal
relative adds identity of substance and presents it under a mode
of passivity, as in saying: “Sortes sees himself. In this case the
substance which in the first place was the agent is presented
under a mode of passivity, as in the case of the pronoun
“himself”. Consequently, {
a reciprocal relative can be defined in the following fashion: a
reciprocal relative is one which signifies an active substance under
a mode of passivity; or in this way: a reciprocal relative is the
very thing which is passive with respect to itself. Therefore, this
relative “of himself’ signifies by means of a mode of passivity that
into which the action of the verb is said to pass; a nominative
case, however, signifies by means of a mode of activity.@}
Again, if it is asked why the pronoun “of himself, or “to himself,
or “himself, is lacking in the nominative case, it must be said
that the solution is dear from what has been said previously, for
that which is active cannot signify the passive or under a mode
of passivity except in the oblique cases. But the nominative case
connotes the active mode. Therefore the nature of the
nominative case is repugnant to the nature of the pronoun “of
himself. Consequently, it cannot have a nominative.
From what has been said previously it is dear that relatives of
identity refer to the same thing as their antecedent and always
stand for a thing numerically the same. From this it is dear that
greater certitude results from the use of the relative of identity
than from the use of the antecedent
TREATISE ON RELATIVES *”>
placed in the position of the relative, as in the statement: “The
man is running, the man is debating”, because it is doubtful
whether the same man is meant in both cases. But when one
says: “The man is running and the same [one] is debating”, it is
certain that the same man is meant in both cases. For this is
made clear by Priscian* who, in his larger work, maintains that
when one says: “Ajax came to Troy and Ajax fought
courageously”, it is doubtful whether the same Ajax or different
ones are meant; but when one says: “Ajax came to Troy and the
same fought courageously,” one immediately understands that
numerically the same Ajax is meant Hence, it is clear that greater
certitude results from the use of the relative of identity than
from the use of the antecedent placed in the position of such a
relative.

With respect to the relative of identity, there is the customary

question as to whether a deception caused by a diverse relation
results from equivocation, amphibology, or some other fallacy, {
as in the statement: “A man sees an ass who is rational”. In this
proposition, the relative “who” can be referred to the term
“man” or to the term “ass”; and in this way diverse relations exist
in the statement.
Therefore some maintain that equivocation is fittingly ascribed
to such a proposition.@}

The argument against this position asserts that this noun “who”,
insofar as it is a relative, signifies a single thing related equally to
whatever is signified in the manner of substance, as in the
expressions: “color which is in a body”, “place which contains
the located thing”, and so on; consequently, a deception caused
by a diverse relation does not constitute an equivocation.
Furthermore, this noun “who”, insofar as it is a noun, signifies
an indefinite substance. But this indefinite substance is such that
it can be determined by one antecedent quite as well as by the
other.

Therefore, since that substance, taken indefinitely in itself, is one

and can be referred to any antecedent whatever, the signification
of this relative will be one. Hence, it follows that in this case
equivocation is not involved.

Moreover, the definition of any relative whatsoever, qua relative,

is one only, namely: “something previously mentioned” or
“recollective of something previously mentioned”. Therefore
every relative, qua relative, has in common one name and one
definition.

Consequently, the relative is uni-vocal insofar as it is recollective

of something mentioned previously. Hence, particular relatives,
such as “who”, “he”, and “another”, insofar as they are relatives
of their antecedents, are not equivocal.
If anyone objects that this relative “who” has one meaning
when taken in relation to the antecedent “man” and another
meaning when taken in relation to the antecedent “ass”, as in the
aforementioned sentence, and that consequently it is a single
term having diverse meanings, and is therefore equivocal, his
argument must be declared invalid.
For any univocal term whatever could be proved equivocal in this
fashion: as “animal” would be equivocal [in that it would have
one definition] insofar as it is man or in man and it would have
another definition insofar as it is horse or in horse; and thus the
name “animal” has a different definition in one case from that
which it has in the other but [the name] is the same; yet it is not
equivocal but univocal.
It must be briefly explained that just as univocal terms are said
to have the same definition, not as among themselves, but as
agreeing in some one meaning (in univoco tintvo-cante), as
“man”, “cow”, “horse”, and the like [agree] in “animal”, similarly
all relatives are said to have the same definition, not as among
themselves, but in [the character of] referring or relating; and
they also have the same name; hence they agree (univoeantur)
in that name. But the objection was concerned with the
definition of relatives as among themselves. Consequently, we
concede the objections stated other than this last one, and
therefore we concede that a deception caused by a diverse
relation is not due to equivocation.
Furthermore, that type of deception lies in the arrangement of
words among themselves. Therefore it lies in the sentence,
because the arrangement of words among them-scelves is
nothing other than the sentence. Consequently it is not
equivocation, since equivocation only occurs in the case of a
single word.
Again* we prove that amphibology is not present in this case,
because wherever amphibology occurs, there is a syntactical
relation of words, the one with the other, as in this example:
“Aristotle’s book”, as a first mode; “The shore is ploughed”
(“Littus ara&ur”), as a second mode; and “He knows [this]
generation” (“Sett aaecidum”), as a third mode. And from this it
is inductively obvious, with respect to all the modes of
amphibology, that wherever amphibology exists, there is a
syntactical relation of one word to but one other word. But
wherever there are diverse relatives, there is not a syntactical
relation of one word to just one other word; nay rather there is
a syntactical connection of one word with diverse words.
Therefore, a deception caused by a diverse relation does not
constitute an amphibology.
Furthermore, wherever deception arises from the fact that some
one word can be referred to diverse words, there is [a fallacy of]
composition or division. But a deception caused by a diverse
relation arises from the fact that some word can be referred to
diverse words. Therefore, a deception caused by a diverse
relation is [a fallacy of] composition or division. We subscribe to
this view.
Next we treat of relatives of diversity. A relative of diversity is
one which denotes something other than that to which it refers,
as in the statement: “Sortes is running and someone else is
debating”. In this case the relative “someone else” refers to
Sortes and denotes someone other than Sortes. Consequently,
it is recoUective of Sortes.
*”Littu$ aratur” may be translated literally, as The share is
ploughed”; or proverbially, at “It is a vain labor”. “Sett
trntrulmm” means “He knows [this] generation” or -[This]
feneration knows [something]”, depending upon whether
“muxmhtm” is taken as subject or predicate of the statement Cf.
Summmbu LoginOu, Tractatus VI, De fanada i
TREATISE ON RELATIVES 81
As concerns relatives of diversity, the following rule is given: if a
relative of diversity is added to a term of greater extension, the
extension becomes less; and if it is added to a term of lesser
extension, the extension becomes greater.

For example, when one says: “What is other than an animal

runs; therefore, what is other than a man runs”, there is a topical
argument from species to genus, or from a subjective part to its
universal whole, because in this proposition : “What is other than
animal runs”, the relative of diversity, “What is other than”,
since it is added to “animal”, which is a wider class than “man”,
designates a class of lesser extension; and in the proposition:
“What is other than man runs”, it is added to a term of lesser
extension, “man”, and consequently it designates a class of
wider extension; therefore, “What is other than an animal” is of
less extension than “What is other than a man”. Thus there is, in
this instance, a topical argument from species or from a
subjective part.
Concerning relatives of identity, the following rule is given by
the older authors: no proposition beginning with a relative of
identity has a contradictory. They assign the following reason,
namely, that when one says: “Every man is running and he is
disputing”, the relative “he” has reference to the antecedent
“man” because of its dependent relation; but when negation
occurs in the proposition beginning with a relative, as in stating
the following: “He does not debate”, then the negation denies
the verb which follows and does not deny the reference of the
relative to the antecedent; therefore the negation does not deny
the whole of that which the affirmation affirms; consequently, it
does not contradict Since this is the case in any proposition
whatever beginning with a relative, it follows that no proposition
beginning with a relative has a contradictory.
But against this it is objected that whatever can be affirmed of
any subject (gupposito), can be denied of it; but a verb may be
denied of any subject whatever, and therefore it may be affirmed
of any subject which is a relative
TREATISE ON RELATIVES 33
word; therefore, any proposition whatever beginning with a
relative has a contradictory.
Furthermore, any proposition or statement which is single has a
contradictory; but a proposition beginning with a relative, as
long as it does not contain any equivocal word nor a multiple
subject or predicate, is a single proposition; therefore, a
proposition beginning with a relative has a contradictory.
Moreover, in the first book of the De IrUerpretatitme,* with
regard to affirmation and negation Aristotle asserts that a single
negation is opposed to a single affirmation, and conversely, that a
single affirmation is opposed to a single negation. Therefore, a
single negation is opposed to an affirmation beginning with a
relative. This we concede, affirming that the aforementioned
rule is false.
To the arguments of those [who uphold the rule] we reply that
a relative is related both to the antecedent and to the verb
whose subject it is. Thus, since an affirmation or a negation is a
sentence asserting something or denying something of
something, that is, a predicate of a subject, therefore, as is clear
from the aforementioned definition of an affirmation and a
negation, an affirmation and a negation only refer to the relation
of a subject to a predicate. Therefore, in the case of a proposition
beginning with a relative, the contradictory is only derived from
the relation of the relative term to the verb whose subject it is
and not from the relation of the relative to its antecedent, for this
latter relation is not present by reason of the nature of an
affirmation, nor by reason of the dependence of the subject, qua
subject, but by reason of the dependence of that [word] which is
the subject. It should, however, be said that a subject, qua
subject, is not the same as that which is the subjected a
predicate, qua predicate, is not the same as that which is the
predicate. Thus whatever is affirmed in a proposition beginning
with a relative, is denied by its contradictory, for the contradictory
of this statement: “Re is
« Artetotl* Dt lufrpniation*, 6, 17a, 31-82.
TREATISE ON RELATIVE8 *fi
disputing:”, is this: “Not he is disputing”—the negation being
placed before the relative.
{
As concerns the non-reciprocal relative of identity, this rule is
given: every non-reciprocal relative of identity has the same
supposition which its antecedent has; as when one says: “Every
man runs and he is Sortes”, the relative “he” denotes every man
because the meaning of” that statement is “Every man runs and
he is Sortes”, that is, “Every man is Sortes”. However, I say “non-
reciprocal” because when one says: “Every man sees himself, the
meaning is not: “Every man sees every man”. Therefore the
antecedent cannot be substituted for the relative “himself”,
although it can be substituted for the other relative@} [i.e.
“he”].

zzz

The consideration of relatives of substance having been

completed, we must consider relatives of accident {
A relative of accident is one which refers to the same thing in a
denominative manner, as does “such”, “as”,@} and so forth.
Consequently, {
there is a difference between a relative of substance and a
relative of accident, because the relative of substance refers to a
univocal thing according to the mode of its essential being, as in
“Whiteness which is in a wall”, “Color which is in a body”; but a
relative of accident is that which refers to its object in a
denominative manner, such as “Sortes is white and such is Plato”.
Another difference between them is that a relative of substance
refers to that which is numerically the same as its antecedent,
while a relative of accident refers to that which is specifically
the same, as in the statement: “Sortes is white and such is
Plato”@}, because the same in number cannot be in diverse
subjects but the same in species can very well be [in diverse
subjects].
One type of relative of accident is the relative of identity, for
example, “such”; another type is the relative of diversity, such as
“otherwise”. A relative of identity of accident is one which refers
to a quality the same in species [as its antecedent] and denotes a
quality which is the same in species, as in the statement:
“Sortes is white and such is
TREATISE ON RELATIVES W
Plato”. However, a relative of diversity of accident is one which
refers to a quality the same in species [as its antecedent] but
denotes a quality of diverse species, as “Sortes is white and Plato
is otherwise”. But a relative of identity of substance differs from
relatives of identity of accidents because a relative of identity of
substance refers to a substance the same in number, whereas
relative of identity of accident does not refer to an accident the
same in number but only to an accident the same in species.
One type of relative of identity of accident is a relative of
continuous quantity, for example, “as great as”, “so great”;
another type is the relative of discrete quantity [or of number],
for example, “as many as”, “so many”. Furthermore, some
relatives of number are nouns, such as “just as many”; others
are adverbs, such as “so often”.
It should be noted that “such”, “so great”, “as many as”, “so
often”, “just as many”, can be called relative, responsive, and
demonstrative: relative, when they are referred to things
present; demonstrative, as when we say, pointing to the sea:
“Such is the Red Sea”, and pointing to Hercules : “Such was
Plato”; but if their reference is not to the things present or is not
accomplished through pointing to things which are present,
then they are responsive because they render a reply to a
preceding interrogation, as “Of whatever kind Plato is, such is
Sortes”. Sometimes relatives are used without a previous
interrogation, as “Sortes is such as Plato is”; and sometimes they
are used in connection with adjectives connoting special
accidents, as in the propositions: “An Ethiopian is black and such
is the raven” and “Sortes was white and such was Plato”.
TREATISE ON AMPLIFICATIONS
{
Personal supposition is the acceptance of a general term for its
particulars. One type of personal supposition is determinate;
the other is indeterminate@}—as we explained previously. Still
another division of personal supposition is into restricted and
amplified supposition. Hence, amplification and restriction have
to occur in respect to personal supposition.
{
Restriction is the contraction of a general term from a greater
supposition to a lesser supposition, as when one says: “A white
man is running”, the adjective “white” restricts the denotation of
“man” to white men alone.
Amplication is the extension of a general term from a lesser
supposition to a greater, as when one says: “A man can be the
Anti-christ”, the term “man” not only denotes men who exist
but also men who will exist; therefore, it is amplified to include
those who will exist in the future.@} I say “of a general term”
because a singular term, such as “Sortes”, is neither amplified
nor restricted.
One kind of amplification is accomplished by means of a verb, as,
for example, by means of the verb “can”, as in the statement: “A
man can be the Anti-christ”; a second kind is accomplished by
means of a noun, [that is, a substantive verbal expression,] as in
the statement: “That a man be the Anti-christ is possible”; a third
kind is accomplished by means of a participle, as in the
statement: “A man is able (potent) to be an animal”; a fourth
kind is accomplished by means of an adverb, as in the statement:
“A man necessarily is an animal”, because “man”, in this instance,
is amplified so as to include not only the men existing in the
present but also the men who will exist in the future. Another
division of amplication follows as a consequence of this, namely,
one kind of amplification occurs in relation to the things denoted,
as in the statement: “A man can be the Anti-christ”; another kind
occurs in relation to time, as, for example, in the statement: “A
man necessarily is an animal”—as we mentioned previously.
{
TREATISE ON AMPLIFICATIONS@} 41
With respect to the aforementioned, {
there occurs the problem of the sophism: “The impossible can
be true”. The sophism is proved in the following fashion: That
which is or will be impossible can be true; but that the Antichrist
has not existed is impossible after his time but it can now be
possible and true; therefore, the impossible can be true.
Contra: Utilizing the third mode of the first figure: “Whatever
can be true is possible; but the impossible can be true;
therefore, the impossible is possible”. But this conclusion is
false; therefore one of the premisses is false. Not the major;
therefore the minor. But the minor premiss is the original
statement; therefore, the original statement is false.
A solution is as follows: The original statement is unqualifiedly
false, that is, “The impossible can be true”; and the sophism is
guilty of the fallacy of accident because when I say: “that which
is or will be impossible”, I affirm two things, namely, the subject
of that impossibility, and that impossibility or the predicate
“impossible”. But “That which is or will be” denotes a thing that
is the subject; “impossible” belongs to this subject; and “can be
true” is asserted to belong to both.@} For example, “That the
Antichrist has not existed will be possible, that is, that the
Antichrist has not existed can be true; therefore the impossible
can be true”, is invalid because “That the Anti-christ has not
existed” denotes the thing that is the subject, and “impossible”
is an accident, and “can be true” is asserted to belong to both.
The following rule is offered in relation to amplification which is
accomplished by reason of the things denoted: a general term
occurring with a verb which has the power of amplifying, either
intrinsically or extrinsically, is amplified to include in its
denotation those things which can exist under the form of the
denoting term, as in the statement: “A man can be an animal”. In
this proposition, the term “man” not only denotes men existing at
the present time but it is amplified to embrace all who will exist
as well.
TREATISE ON AMPLIFICATIONS 4n
However, I say “intrinsically” because this verb “can” has in
itself the power of amplification. I say “extrinsically” because the
participle “having the potency” and the noun “possible” bestow
the power of amplifying on the verb with which they are united,
as in the statements: “A man is able (potent) to be an animal” or
“It is possible that an animal is white”, and so on.
The following rule is offered in relation to amplification
accomplished by reason of the time element: a general term
occurring as subject or predicate with a verb which has the
power of temporal amplification, denotes those things which
exist, which will exist, or which have existed, as in the
statement: “Man necessarily is an animal”. In this proposition,
both “man” and “animal” are understood to include those who
have existed, those who exist, and those who will exist. These
remarks concerning amplification may suffice.
{
TREATISE ON APPELLATIONS
Appellation is the acceptance of a term for an existing thing. I say
“for an existing thing” because a term signifying a nonentity
does not name [anything], as “Caesar”, or “Anti-christ”, or
“chimera”, and so forth. Moreover, appellation differs from
signification and supposition because appellation is only of an
existing thing, whereas supposition and signification are both of
an existing thing and of a non-existing thing@}; as “Anti-christ”
signifies Anti-christ and denotes Anti-christ but does not name
[the Anti-christ]. For “man” signifies man and naturally denotes
both existing and non-existing men. but it names only existing
men.
One kind of appellation is that which belongs to a general terra,
such as “man”; another, that which belongs to a discrete or a
singular term, such as “Sortes”. {
A singular term signifies, denotes, and names the same thing,
that is, the [same] existing thing, such as “Peter” or “John”@}.
Again* one type of appellation by a general term consists in the
appellation of the universal thing by the general term, such as
occurs whenever a general term has simple supposition, as, for
example, when one says: “Man is a species”, “Animal is a genus”;
in such cases, the term denotes, signifies, and names the same
thing, as “man” signifies man in general, denotes man in
general, and names man in general: {
the other type of appellation which belongs to a general term
consists in its naming its particulars, such as happens whenever
the general term has personal supposition, as when one says: “A
man runs”; in this case, “man” does not signify, denote, and
name the same thing, but rather it signifies man in general,@}
denotes particular men, and names only those particular men
who exist These remarks concerning appellations may suffice.
{
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS
Restriction is the contraction of a general term from a greater
supposition to a lesser supposition, as we said previously. One
type of restriction is effected by means of an adjective (nomen),
as in the expressipn “white man”, the term “man” does not
denote black or intermediately colored men but is restricted to
“white men”;@} a second type of restriction is effected by
means of a verb, as in the statement : “A man is running”, the
“term “man” only denotes men who exist at the present time; a
third type is effected by means of a participle, as when one says:
“A running man is arguing”, the term “man” denotes men who
are running; a fourth type is effected by means of a subordinate
clause, as when one says: “A man who is white is running”, the
clause “who is white” restricts “man” to white men.
Furthermore, of restrictions effected by means of a noun, one type
is produced by the more particular being in apposition to the
more general, as in the statement: “An animal, man, runs”, the
term “animal” denotes only animals who are men; a second
type is effected by the addition to the genus of a differentia
which is essential since it is constitutive of the thing, as when one
says “rational animal”, the term “animal” denotes rational
animals; a third type is effected by an adjective of accident, as
when one says: “white man”, the term “man” denotes only white
men.
The following rules are given for restrictions effected by mans of
nouns, [both substantival and adjectival nouns]. {
Every noun which does not limit or which does not have the
force of amplification, when added directly to a more general
term, restricts that term to the denotation of those things
which the restrictive term signifies, as is clear in the
aforementioned examples, where “man”, on account of its
signification, restricts “animal” to those animals which are
men, as when one says “an animal, man@}” and where “white”, on
account of its signification, restricts “man” to white men, as
when one says: “white man”. However, I say “which does not
limit” in order to exclude nouns limiting the nature of the
adjunct, such as “dead”, or “corrupt”, and the like, which do not
restrict but rather destroy the adjunct Moreover, I say ‘Vhich does
not have the force of amplification” to exclude amplificative
words, such as “being able”, “can”, “possible”, which do not
restrict but rather amplify. It should be noted that the leas
general always restricts the more general, as when one says: “A
white man is running”, because man is found in white, black, and
intermediately colored men but nevertheless white is not
Therefore, {
in this respect “man” is more general and “white” is less general;
consequently, “white” restricts “man”. But according as white is
found in men, sticks, stones, and brutes, while man is not taken
this way, “white” is more general and “man” is less general; thus
“man” contracts “white” to the whiteness existing in men when
one says: “A white man ia running”. So each contracts the other
in diverse respects.@}
The following rule is also given concerning a restricted term: if a
universal sign is added to a restricted term, it distributes the
restricted term only among those things to which it is restricted.
For when I say: “Every white man runs”, “man” is here restricted
to white men and can only be distributed among white men.
The following rule is likewise given for restriction: no term which
has the position of a predicate can restrict a general term
having the position of subject as far as its principal signification
is concerned; as in the statement: “A man is white”, the term
“white”, in the position of predicate, cannot restrict “man”, in
the position of subject to white men because if [”man”] were
restricted to white men, then by the preceding rule—if a universal
sign is added to a restricted term, it distributes the restricted term
only among those things to which it is restricted—“man” would
be distributed, in the case under consideration, only among
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS 6]
white men. Consequently, the meaning of the proposition:
“Every man is white” would be “Every white man is white”.
Therefore, if one will be true, the other will be true; and if one
will be false, the other will be false. However, this is false.
Hence, when one says: “Every man is white”, the term “man” is
not restricted. Thus this rule is clear. But I say “as far as its
principal signification is concerned” because the predicate does
restrict the subject as far as its consignification, which is its
gender, is concerned; as when one says: “A swan is white”, the
term “swan” is restricted to males and not to females. Thus,
“white” restricts “swan” with respect to [its] consignification,
that is, its gender, but not with respect to its signification.
{
The following rule is given for a restriction effected by means of
a subordinate clause: every subordinate clause which is
immediately conjoined to a general term restricts it just as its
adjective does, as when one says: “A man, who is white, is
running”, the term “man” is restricted to white men by the
clause “who is white”.@}
The following rule is likewise given for the same type of
restriction: whenever a universal sign and a subordinate clause
are incorporated into the same sentence, the statement is
ambiguous because of the fact that [a] the sign can precede the
subordinate clause and so distribute the general term among all
the things it can denote, as when one says: “Every man runs,
who is white”; or again, [b] the subordinate clause can come
first and restrict the general term, and then the sign, being
added afterwards, does not distribute it except among those
things to which it is restricted, as in the proposition: “Every man,
who is white, runs”. In the latter case, it is equivalent to the
proposition: “Every white man runs”.
We now treat of restrictions effected by verbs and give several
rules, the first of which is the following: a general term which
occurs as subject or predicate with a verb in the present tense
which is taken simply and which does not have the power of
amplification, either intrinsically or extrinsical-
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS M
ly, is restricted to the denotation of those things of the nature
signified by the denoting general term, which are existing. I say
“of a general term” because a discrete term is neither restricted
nor amplified. Moreover, I say “a verb in the present tense” to
exclude other verbs in other tenses, because a genera! term has
another supposition when taken with such verbs. I say “taken
simply” to exclude verbs taken with limiting particles, such as “it
is believable” and “unbelievable”. I say “which has not the power
of amplifying” to exclude amplifying verbs, such as “can”.

I say “either intrinsically or extrinsically” to exclude verbs which

have their power of amplifying extrinsically, for instance, from
something conjoined, like this verb “is” when we say “it is able
to”.
I say “of the nature signified by the denoting general term”
because “man” denotes those things which are included under
humanity and “animal” denotes those things which are included
under animality, as when one says: “Man is an animal”.
Another rule is as follows: a general term which occurs as subject
or predicate with a verb in the past tense which is taken simply
and which does not have the power of amplification, either
intrinsically or extrinsically, is restricted to the denotation of
those things of the nature signified by the denoting general term,
which exist or have existed; as when one says: “Man was an
animal”, the term “man” denotes those who are or were men and
[the term] “animal” denotes those who are or were animals.

A third rule follows: a general term which occurs as subject or

predicate with a verb in the future tense denotes those things of
the nature signified by the denoting term, which exist or will exist,
that is, those things which exist or which will exist in the future
as in the statement: “Man will be an animal”. From the
aforementioned, it is clear that the verb restricts in its temporal
consigniflcation but not in its principal signification.
{
With respect to what has just been discussed, the question of this
sophism arises: “Every animal was in Noah’s ark”. The sophism is
proved in the following fashion: A man
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS :>”
was in Noah’s ark; a horse was in Noah’s ark and so forth;
therefore, every animal was in Noah’s ark.
It is argued to the contrary: Every animal was in Noah’s ark; but
Caesar was an animal; therefore, Caesar was in Noah’s ark. This
is false; therefore, one of the premisses is false. Not the minor;
therefore the major.
That the original statement [the sophism] is false, is also clear
from that rule which asserts that a general term which occurs as
subject or predicate with a verb in the past tense, taken simply, is
restricted to the denotation of those things of the nature
signified by the denoting general term, which exist or have
existed.@}
Furthermore, there is that other rule that if a universal sign is
added to a restricted term, it distributes the term among all
those things to which it was restricted. Therefore, when one
says: “Every animal was in Noah’s ark”, the term “animal”
denotes every animal which was; but all animals were not in
Noah’s ark; consequently, the original statement is false.
Again, on the same point, in the proposition: “Every animal,
which existed at that time, was in Noah’s ark”, the term
“animal” is more restricted than in the proposition: “Every
animal was in Noah’s ark”, since more animals are denoted in the
original statement. But the term “animal” is restricted to those
animals which existed at that time due to the dependent clause
introduced in that proposition. Therefore only those animals
which existed in that past time were in Noah’s ark, and no more.
Hence it is necessary that the following proposition be false:
“Every animal was in Noah’s ark”, since more animals are
denoted in it
A solution is as follows: Some assert that the proposition:
“Every animal was in Noah’s ark”, is ambiguous because the
distribution can apply to the individuals of the genera or to the
genera of the individuals. In the first sense, the proposition is false
but in the second sense, the proposition is true. For whenever
distribution is made among the individuals of the genera, then
there is a distribution among the individuals which are included in
the same genus and in
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS “
the same species. Then it would be necessary that all the
individual animals which are included in the genus “animal” would
have been in Noah’s ark. [However,] this is false. But when there
is a distribution of the genera of the individuals, then there is
only a distribution of the genera or of the species. But there was
no species of animal which was not in Noah’s ark. In this sense,
the proposition is true.
But I do not agree with this solution, because no species of
animal as such was in Noah’s ark but only some individuals.
Therefore, in that time the proposition was only true as denoting
the individuals of the genera, that is, as denoting the individual
animals and not merely the genera of individual animals.
Consequently, I say that the proposition [the sophism] is false and
I concede all the arguments advanced to disprove it The proof
errs according to an inference from insufficient induction because
it does not include all the members of the distribution which are
included in the subject of the proposition: “Every animal was in
Noah’s ark”.
It is also customary to raise the question as to whether terms are
restricted in the same fashion in a negative and in an affirmative
proposition. Some assert that this is not the case, because
“being” restricts to the existent and “non-being” restricts to the
non-existent; consequently, restriction is not effected in the same
way in an affirmative and in a negative proposition.
Furthermore, it seems that every negative proposition in which
“being” is denied is false without qualification, if terms are
similarly restricted in a negative and in an affirmative
proposition. For in the proposition: “A rose is”, the term “rose”
is restricted to the existent; and if in the proposition: “A rose is
not”, it is similarly restricted to the existent, then the meaning
would be “A rose, which is not, is”. But this is false; therefore,
the proposition: “A rose is not” is also false. Thus any negative
proposition in which “being” is denied would be false without
qualification. But this too is false. Consequently, H seems that
terms are not restricted in the same fashion in an affirmative and
in a negative proposition.
TREATISE ON RESTRICTIONS 69
But it is proved that they are restricted in the same fashion,
because if in the proposition: “A man exists”, the term “man” is
restricted to an existing thing and in the proposition: “No man
exists”, it is restricted to a non-existing thing, then each of the
propositions is true, because “being” is truly predicated of
existing things and is truly denied of non-existing things. But then
contradictories are simultaneously true, which is impossible.
Hence that from which the impossible follows, namely, that terms
are not restricted in the same fashion in an affirmative and in a
negative proposition, is impossible.
Futhermore, the rule is that every verb which is taken simply and
which has not the power of amplification, either intrinsically or
extrinsically, restricts the denoting term with respect to its
temporal consignification but not with respect to its [principal]
signification. Therefore time is the cause of the restriction of that
term. But the time element is the same in opposed affirmative and
negative propositions, as in the statements: “A rose exists” and
“No rose exists”. Consequently, the cause of the restriction is the
same in each of them. Hence the restriction applies to the same
thing in each proposition. We concede these arguments.{
To the first objection, it must be said that “being” does not
restrict to the existent and “non-being” does not restrict to the
non-existent, just as the verb “run” does not restrict to running
things, because no verb restricts to itself a denoting term with
respect to signification but [only] with respect to temporal
consignification. Hence [the verb] does not restrict to the
denoted things as existing but to the denoted things as being
present For present things, both existing and non-existing, can be
in some terms, as when I say: “An assertible is”, “assertible”
denotes both existing and non-existing assertibles; for all
assertibles which are false in the present, are present and yet do
not exist, because no false [assertible] exists. Consequently,
“being” does not restrict to existing things but to present things,
since the time element, which is the cause of the restriction, is
the same for both.@}
TRF.ATISE ON RESTRICTIONS 61
To the second objection, it must be said that the form of the
general term is twofold: one is that form which applies to
existing things alone, as “humanity” which is the form of “man”
and “animality” which is the form of “animal”, and in such cases
all the present things denoted are existing things; the other is the
form of the general term which applies to both existing and non-
existing things, as “as-sertibility”, which is a form of “assertible”,
because there are some existent assertibles, such as “God-
existing” and “All-things-being-true”, and other non-existent
assertibles, as “Man-being-ass” and “All-things-being-false”, and
in such cases the general term is not restricted to existing things
but it applies both to existing and non-existing things.
Consequently, the meaning of the proposition: “A rose is not”, is
not that “A rose, which is, is not”, but rather “A rose, taken
otherwise than in the present, is not”. It is also customary to say
that a certain kind of restriction occurs by usage, as when one
says: “Nothing is in the ark”, although it is full of air, because the
term “nothing”, from its usage, denotes solid or firm objects; or
again, the term “the king” denotes the king of one’s own country
and the term “the teacher” stands for one’s own teacher.
It is also customary to say that a certain kind of restriction is
effected by the transitive property of the verb; as when one
says: “Sortes feeds a man”, the term “man” denotes another
man distinct from Sortes by virtue of the transitive property of the
verb, because the man giving and the man receiving should be
different persons. On that account, if sometimes they are the
same person, this is only accidentally because of the fact that the
same thing is the subject of mention in both cases, just as the
same person is accidentally a Duke and a Count Therefore, they
say that the following is not a valid inference: “Sortes feeds
himself; he is a man; therefore, he feeds a man”, for this
involves the fallacy of accident because the pronoun “himself’
cannot denote persons distinct from Sortes but “man” can well do
so.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS
{
Distribution is the extension of a general term effected by a
universal sign;@} as when one says “every man”, the term
•*man” is distributed or referred indeterminately to any of its
particulars by virtue of the sign “every”, and in this fashion
extension occurs. I say “of a general term” because a singular
term cannot be distributed. Hence, such expressions as “every
Sortes”, “every Plato”, and so forth are incongruous, for they
constitute solecisms.
{
Some universal signs are distributive of substance, such as
“every”, “none”; others are distributive of accident, such as
“such a kind”, “such a size”.@} A sign distributive of substance
distributes things essentially related, such as “every”, “none”, as
when one says “every whiteness”, “every blackness”.

But substance is taken in the broader sense to include things of

any genus whatsoever when one says “A sign distributive of
substance”.

A sign distributive of accident is one which distributes things

related by a mode of accident, such as quality or quantity, for
example, “any kind whatever”, “any size whatever”.

Some signs distributive of substance are distributive of integral

parts, such as “the whole”; others are distributive of subjective
parts, such as “every” (omnis), “none”.
Further, some signs distributive or subjective parts are
distributive of two parts, such as “either of two”, “neither of the
two”; others are distributive of many parts, such as “every”,
“none”, and the like.
Of these signs, we must first treat those distributive of substance
and, among these, primarily the sign “every”.
It must be known that “every” (omnis) is taken in the plural in a
twofold sense: in one way collectively, as in the statement: “All
the apostles of God are twelve”—it does not follow: “Therefore
these apostles of God are twelve”,
» “Omiria” nntm “•very” and “all” in the rinfnlar bat only **ajl”
Id the plural. However, the customary translation la “every” in the
afe-fttlar and “all” la the phiral.
TREATI8E ON DISTRIBUTIONS «K
some of them being pointed to; in another way it is taken
distribuxtively, as in the statement: “All men naturally desire to
know”.
{
The next question is what does the sign “every” signify. It
appears to signify nothing, because every thing is either
universal or particular; but the sign “every” does not signify a
universal thing or a particular thing; therefore, it signifies no
thing.
Furthermore, on the same point, “every” is neither predicable of
one nor of many; therefore it is neither universal nor particular;
so it signifies nothing.
Yet, on the contrary, from the fact that a thing is or is not, a
stateemnt is said to be true or false. Therefore, if “every”
signifies nothing, the truth or falsity of a proposition will not be
caused by its presence or absence. But this statement is true: “An
animal is a man”; and therefore [if the presence or absence of
“every” does not affect the truth of statements] this is also true:
“Every animal is a man”. But this is false. Hence the first
statement is false, namely, that “every” signifies nothing.@}
The solution of the problem follows: It is said that “every” does
not signify a universal but signifies universally, because it makes
the general term which it qualifies stand for all its particulars, as
“Every man runs”. In this way, “every” signifies some thing. But
“thing” is taken in two senses, because in one sense a thing is
that which can be a subject or a predicate, as man, animal, runs,
argues, and so forth, and in this case it is true that “every”
signifies nothing, because any such thing is either universal or
particular; [and] there is another thing which is a disposition of
that thing which is a subject or a predicate, and the sign “every”
signifies such a thing. But the truth or falsity of a proposition is
caused by both things.
However, it is objected that “every” does not signify a disposition
of a subject thing, because the middle term of a syllogism must be
repeated with its dispositions in the minor premiss. Therefore we
should syllogize in the following fashion: “Every man is an
animal; Sortes is every man:
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS «7
therefore, Sortes is an animal”, because “every” is a disposition
in the major premise and therefore must be repeated in the
minor premise. But this is false. Therefore, “every” is not a
disposition of a subject.
The solution follows: Just as “father” connotes two things,
namely, that thing which is the father and the father insofar as he
is a father, so “subject” connotes two things, namely, the thing
which is the subject and the subject insofar as it is a subject.
According to this, the subject has a twofold disposition, for one
is a disposition of that thing which is the subject, as white, block,
and such similar accidental dispositions, and these dispositions
should be repeated with the middle term in the minor premiss;
the other is a disposition of the subject insofar as it is a subject,
that is, in relation to the predicate, as “every”, “none”,
and all signs both general and particular, and such a disposition
should not be repeated with the middle term in the minor premiss
because it is relative, since it distributes the subject in relation to
the predicate.

For example, when one says: “Every white man runs”, that
disposition “white” should be repeated with the middle term in
the minor premiss because it is an absolute disposition of that
which is the subject; but that disposition “every” should not be
repeated because it is a sign of a relation of the subject to the
predicate and so is a disposition of the subject insofar as it is the
subject. Consequently, we should say: “Every white man runs;
Sortes is a white man; therefore, Sortes runs”; and not: “Sortes is
every white man”.
Having discussed how this sign “every” signifies things and their
dispositions, {
the question naturally follows as to whether “every” requires
three things named. This would seem to be so, because every
perfection occurs in threes, as is held in the first book of the De
Caelo et Mundi*; and thus all that is perfect occurs in threes. But
the all and the perfect are the same, as is held in the same
passage. Therefore, all occurs in threes. Hence “every” requires
three things@}
» Ariatatle, D» C—U * Mundi, I, 1, 268*, 12 mtq.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS «9
Aristotle, speaking on the same point in the same passage, says
that we do not predicate “all” of two men but we do predicate it
of three men; wherefore, “every” requires three things named.
To the contrary: There are universal propositions in any
demonstration; but demonstrations can be formed involving the
sun and the moon; therefore we must say “every sun”, “every
moon”; but “sun” has only one denotation and so also “moon”;
therefore “every” does not require three things named.
On this same point: “Every [object] deprived of light by the
interposition of the earth is eclipsed”. This proposition is
conceded since it is held by the authorities. But “Every [object]
deprived of light by the interposition of the earth” has only one
denotation, namely, the individual moon. Therefore “every” does
not demand three things named.
Again, the sign “every” signifies quantity universally. But
“quantity universally” is a proper universal mode. However, a
property is diversified according to the diversity of its subject, so
that if “man” is of less extension, “capable of laughter” is of less
extension; and if a man is dead, what is capable of laughter is
dead. But the universal is sometimes preserved in many things,
such as “man” and “horse”; sometimes in one thing alone, as
“sun” and “moon”. Hence “every” sometimes requires three
things named and sometimes not; indeed, at times, only one.
On the same point, form can be taken in a twofold manner,
because one form is the form of matter, as the soul is the form
of the body, and this form is a part of but is not predicated of
that of which it is a part; the other is predicable form, and thus
all the higher [predicates]—as genera, species, and differentia—
are said to be the forms of the particulars included under them,
for example, “man”, “horse”, and so forth, and the individuals
included under the predicable form are its matter. Therefore,
since form, in neither of the aforementioned modes, exceeds its
matter nor is exceeded by H, no universal exceeds the individuals
included under H nor are the individuals exceeded by it
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 71
Therefore, since “every” bespeaks adequation of the universal
with their particulars, as “every man”, it follows that “sun” has
only one denotation so that one can truly say “every sun”. We
grant this in affirming that the aforementioned statements are
true and that “every” does not always require three things
named. Nay rather, when it is joined to a general term denoting
many things, it requires many things named; but when it is joined
to a term denoting one thing only, it requires only one thing
named.
{
To the first objection, that all perfections occur in threes, we
still say that the statement is true; and these three are the
substance of the thing, its potency, and its operation. Aristotle
briefly touches upon these three when he says: “Nature, being
so constituted, acts this way.”’ When Aristotle says “nature”, he
touches upon the substance of a thing; when he says “being so
constituted”, he touches upon its potency; and when he says
“acts this way”, he touches upon the operation proper to it In
like manner@}, this sign “every” has the substance of a universal
sign, the potency to distribute, and its operation or act when it
distributes. Its perfection lies in these three things.
With regard to the second objection, it must be said that “man”
and “men” differ because “man” asserts that species as such
which is predicable of many; but “men”, in the plural, does not
assert species as such but species multiplied in act according to
the matter diversified in the number of individuals. Whence
“every”, in the plural, by reason of the multitude represented,
effects distribution by reason of the diversified matters and
requires three things named. But “every”, in the singular,
embraces the species as such but not the matter of the
individuals; and it requires an essence naturally predicable of
many, whether it actually belongs to one or to many. Hence
“every” requires three things named, or only one, depending on
the nature of the universal to which it is conjoined.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS i*
However, some say that “every” requires at least three things
named and they assign the following reason. Whenever a
universal sign is added to a general term lacking suflRcient things
named, it refers to a non-being, as when one says: “Every Phoenix
is”, the term “Phoenix” refers to non-existent Phoenices because
it denotes only one thing. Consequently, when one says: “ Every
Phoenix is”, the meaning is “The one Phoenix, which is, is” and
“The two Phoenices, which are not, are”. Hence, they say these
two propositions are false: “Some Phoenix is not” and “Every
Phoenix is”, but they are not contradictories because the
Phoenix, which is, is taken for granted in the negative proposition
and the two Phoenices, which are not, are taken for granted in the
affirmative proposition; from this point of view the propositions
do not have the same subject. However, their argument can be
disproved in many ways since the difficulty arises from their
begging the question in assuming that “every” always requires
three things named, an assumption previously shown false.
Besides, Aristotle things that a proposition which has a
distributed universal as the subject of any predicate, contradicts
that negative proposition in which the universal, undistributed,
is subject of the same predicate. But the aforementioned
propositions are such: “Every Phoenix is”, “Some Phoenix is not”;
therefore they are contradictories. But this is what these people
deny. Therefore, their rule is
On the same point, another rule is as follows: a general term
which occurs as subject or predicate with a verb in the present
tense which is taken simply and which does not have the power
of amplification, either intrinsically or ex-trinsically, is restricted
to the denotation of those things of the nature signified by the
denoting general term, which are existing. Therefore, when one
says: “Every Phoenix is”, the term “Phoenix” is restricted to the
denotation of that Phoenix alone which is, since it denotes only
one thing. Therefore, utilising the rule just given, if a universal
sign
« Aristotle, Dt InUrprwUtieut. 7, 17b, 16-19.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 7fi
is added to it, it only distributes it in relation to the one* thing
denoted [by the term]. Consequently, the rule of those other
people is false and rests on a fallacy. This we grant.
With reference to the foregoing, the sophisjn arises: “Every man
is and whatever differs from him is not-man”. Proof: This is a
copulative [proposition] each of whose parts is true; therefore
the copulative is true.
{
Disproof: “Every man is and whatever differs from him is not-
man; Sortes is a man; therefore, whatever differs from Sortes is
not-man”, which is false, because this is a copulative
proposition one of whose parts is false; consequently, the
whole is false.
Solution: The initial statement is absolutely true and the disproof
is guiHy of the fallacy of the consequent because the phrase
“different from every man” is less in extent than “different from
Sortes” because “different from every man” only denotes things
other than man but “different from Sortes” denotes these and all
men other than Sortes as well. Therefore the following is a valid
inference: “Different from every man; therefore different from
Sortes”; and this is a topical argument from the subjective part
to its whole. But if a [universal] sign is added to the statement:
“Different from every man”, there will be, simultaneously with
distribution, an inference from the particular to the general.
Thus the [disproof] is guilty of the fallacy of the consequent
according to one process of reasoning,@} for there is a twofold
process of reasoning in the disproof because the following is a
valid inference: “Every man is; therefore, Sortes is”, and it is a
topical argument from a quantitative whole to its part; but this is
not a valid inference: “This is different from every man;
therefore it is different from Sortes”, but a fallacy of the
consequent just as “Every man is; therefore every animal is”.
Let us now examine the sophism: “Every man and another man
are”. Proof: Sortes and another man are; Plato and another man
are, and so on; therefore, every man and another man are.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 77
Disproof: “Another” is a relative of diversity of substance;
therefore it denotes a thing different from man. But there is not
another man distinct from every man. Therefore, the initial
statement is false.
Solution: The initial statement is absolutely false and the proof
is guilty of the fallacy of figure of speech in arguing from several
determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition,
because that term “other” has determinate supposition in the
premisses and in the conclusion.
Again, the proof is guilty of the fallacy of accident, because
although “Sortes and Plato and so on” makes an inference to
every man as such, nevertheless every man cannot be inferred
from the conjunction “Every and another man”, as when one
says: “Every man and another man are”; just as I know Coriscus,
as such, nevertheless I do not know him under this accident of
coming.
Wherefore, the following rule is offered: {
whenever something follows another, convertibly or not, if
somettiing belongs to one which does not belong to the other,
and if through that to which it belongs, an inference is made
concerning that to which it does not belong, there is always a
fallacy of accident. For example: “Man is; therefore substance
is”. But species belongs to man and not to substance. Therefore,
if through man species is inferred of substance, there is a fallacy
of accident, as “Man is a species; therefore substance is a
species”. Likewise in the case of “Risible is a property; therefore
man is a property”.@} However, of things which are logically
related, some are related convertibly, as “man” and “risible”; but
others are not, as “man” and “substance”.
{
Having dealt with this sophism, we now discuss another: “Every
man is every man”. Proof: Sortes is Sortes; Plato is Plato and so
on; therefore, every man is every man.
And, as Boethius thinks, no proposition is more true than the one
in which the same thing is predicated of itself.* But the
proposition in question is such, because “every man” is
predicated of “every man”. Therefore, no proposition is more
true than that; and consequently it is true.
Disproof: The contradictory of this proposition is true, viz., “Some
man is not every man”. Therefore, the proposition is false.
On the same point: Every man is every man; but Sortes is man;
therefore, Sortes is every man. This is a syllogism of the type
Darii. The conclusion is false; therefore, one of the premisses.
Not the minor; therefore the major. But the major is the
sophism; therefore, this sophism is false.
Solution: The initial statement is absolutely false and the proof is
guilty of the fallacy of the consequent due to an insufficient
enumeration of the particulars@}, because along with those
which it includes, it should include in the subject : “Sortes is
every man; Plato is every man and so on”, and it certainly
should include in the predicate: “Even-man is Sortes; every man
is Plato and so on”; which things it fails to do. Thus it is guilty of
the fallacy of the consequent from an insufficient enumeration
of the particulars. With regard to the other point, it is said that in
this case the same thing is not predicated of itself but “every man”
is predicated of “every man” taken in extension.
We now treat of the sign “no” (nullw) which signifies a
universally negative quantity. Hence it signifies the same thing
as the sign “every” with the negative placed after it; therefore
“every not” and “no” (or “none”) are equipollent.
We submit the following rule concerning “none”: whenever the
sign “no” is immediately added to a general term, it distributes the
term movably and distributively, and it does the same for the
general term which is mediately added to it, as “No man is an
ass”. Hence an inference can be made to the particulars included
under the subject in the following way: “Therefore, Sortes is not
an ass, nor Plato and so on”; and also under the predicate.
In this connection, we have the sophism: “No man » every man”.
It is proved thus: Sortes is not every man: Plato is not every man
and so on; therefore, the aopinna,
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS HI
is true. Or in the following fashion: Its contradictory is false, viz.,
“Some man is every man”; therefore, the sophism is true.
To the contrary: In the sophism, a thing is predicated of its
opposite; therefore, the statement is false.
Solution: The initial statement is true. As to the disproof, it is
overruled because in the proposition, a thing is not predicated of
its opposite, but rather “every man” is denied of “every man”
taken as distributed; and this is true.
{
We now discuss the term “nothing” which signifies the same
thing as “no” but which includes in itself the term it distributes,
for “nothing” is a universal sign with a negation and “thing” is
the term it distributes.
From what has been said, the problem of the sophism arises:
“Seeing nothing is seeing something”. It is proved thus: Not
seeing this thing is seeing something, because not seeing Sortes
is seeing Plato: not seeing that thing is seeing something and so
on; therefore, seeing nothing is seeing something. Therefore,
the sophism is true.
To the contrary: In this case a thing is predicated of its opposite;
therefore the statement is false.
Some observe that in the proposition: “Nihil videns est aiiquid
videns”, the word “nothing” (nihil) can be in the accusative case
and the meaning is: “Seeing nothing is seeing something”, or it
can be in the nominative case and the meaning is: “Nothing
seeing is something seeing”; and in this manner they posit
amphibology by reason of case. But this does not solve the
problem, for in each sense the sophism is false.@}
Again, others observe in the proposition: “Seeing nothing is
seeing something”, that the negation included in the term
“nothing” can deny the first participle and the meaning is: “Seeing
no thing is seeing something”—and in this way the proposition
is taken in the divided sense; or it can deny the verb “is” and the
meaning is: “Seeing anything whatever is not seeing
something”—and in this way the proposi-
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS «M
lion is taken in the composite sense. But this does not solve the
problem because the proposition is false in each sense in that
opposites are predicated of the same thing.
Solution: One must say that the sophism is absolutely false and
the proof is guilty of the fallacy of figure of speech in reasoning
from a determinate many to a determinate one with regard to
this term “seeing”, because in the premisses, and likewise in the
conclusion, it has determinate supposition. Or it is guilty of the
fallacy of accident, because although “seeing” is predicable of all,
as among themselves, nevertheless it is not predicable of all
insofar as they are united in the whole “seeing nothing”; as a
result, the whole belongs to the part and the being of “seeing
something” is assigned to be in each.
It should be understood that the premisses of the proof are
ambiguous because the negation can determine the verb or the
participle, as was stated above. On this account, the ancients
reckoned the premisses ambiguous in the light of the following
rule which they offered: whenever negation and distribution are
included in one term, to whatever one is referred, the other is
also. From this it follows that since distribution, posited in the
accusative case, cannot affect the verb in the previous statement,
neither can the negation. The same opinion holds concerning the
following sophisms: “Having no head is having some head”,
“Different from no man is different from some man”, etc.
We now discuss signs distributive of two things, as “neither” and
“both” [taken separately]”. They differ
 The traditional distinction between tnmu dtvuiu and unnu
oom-p<mtu$ usually relate* to the two senses of modal term*
in modal propositions. Any modal proposition which is
understood as if the modal term functioned as predicate,
whether it actually functions as predicate or it functions as an
adverb modifying the copula (the only two ways in which modal
terms enter into propositions), is taken in the composite sense.
Otherwise, it is taken in the divided sense. Here, Peter of Spain
appHes this distinction to the two ways in which the negation in
the sophism can be understood, either as internal to the
participial phrase wMI vtdiuT in the divided sense or as negating
the predicate “aHqvid viaVns” in the composite sense.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS Rf>
from the terms discussed previously, because “every”, “no”, and
the like, distribute all individuals included under the general term,
while “both” and “neither” distribute only two such as may be
pointed to, as “both of them”, “neither of them”.
With reference to this,
we have the sophism: “What is stated by both of them is true”.
Posit that Se*tes says “God is”; Plato says “Man is an animal”;
and both simultaneously say “Bfan is an ass”; and suppose that
those two are indicated by the pronoun “of them”. Proof: What
is stated by Sortes is true; what is stated by Plato is true;
therefore, what is stated by both of them is true.
To the contrary: What is stated by both of them is true; but
nothing is stated by both of them except “Man is an ass”;
therefore “Man is an ass” is true. But this is false.
Solution: The initial statement is true but the proof is guilty of
the fallacy of accident As it is held by Aristotle, the following
proposition is posited as true: “There is the same science of all
opposites”. Nevertheless there is no particular science of all
opposites, for in this case “science” is taken distributively.
Consequently, the fallacy of accident occurs in the following:
There is the same science of all opposites; but there is no science
apart from this science cr that science and so on; therefore, this
or that science is the same for all opposites. But this is false. In
like manner: Man is a species; but no one is man apart from
Sortes or Plato and so on; therefore, Sortes is a species or Plato
and so on. Hence there is the fallacy of accident in the sophism,
because the expression “what is stated” and the word “true” are
each taken for what they signify genetically, and in this way “What
is stated by both of them is true”. It follows from this that “what is
stated” does not stand for a particular statement by both.
Consequently, “what is stated by both of them” in the particular
sense is accidentally related to “what is stated” in the generic
sense, just as a particular included under a general term is
accidentally related to that genera) term; and “true” is said to
belong to
‘ Aristotle, Metophvafao, IV. 2. 1004*. ft-10.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS H7
both. Here, general refers to all that is greater, whether
essential or accidental.
However, some say that the sophism is absolutely false. They
say that “what is stated” is taken for a particular statement by
both and similarly “true” for a particular truth; and that the
proof is guilty of the fallacy.of figure of speech in arguing from a
determined many to a determined one with respect to both the
term “what is stated” and the term “true”. But the first solution
is the better and the more subtle.
We now treat of the sign “neither” which means the same as
“both” with a negation placed before it Just as “no” intrinsically
distributes and negates, so also does “neither”. But “neither” is
only distributive of two.
{
Now the questions of this sophism arises: “Having neither eye,
you can see”. Proof: Not having the right eye, you can see; not
having the left eye, you can see; therefore, the sophism is true.
To the contrary: Having neither eye, you can see; therefore,
having neither eye or while you have neither eye, you can see.
But this is false. The consequence is obvious, for gerunds ending
in do have to be resolved by “while”, “if, or “because”. But in
each case it is false. Therefore the sophism is false.
Solution: The sophism is false and the proof is guilty of the
fallacy of accident because the ability to see is proper to the
parts as such, that is to say, separately, but it is not proper to
the parts taken together as a whole. Hence it is evident from a
former rule that since the whole follows after the parts, the
power of seeing is proper to the parts and not to the whole.
Therefore, there is a fallacy of accident if the parts are inferred
from the whole.@}
Having treated signs distributive of subjective parts, the
question next arises as to whether negation has the power ol
distributing or of rendering indeterminate. It seems that it does,
because Aristotle, in the first book of the De inter-
TRKATIKK ON DISTRIBUTIONS *9
pretatione, says that these are contradictory: “Man is just”, “Not
man is just”/ Hence, one of them is universal, since it has a
general term as subject; but it can only be this one: “Not man is
just”; therefore the term “man” is distributed. But there is
nothing by which it is distributed except the negation.
Therefore, it is distributed by the negation.
To the contrary: If negation has the capacity to render
indeterminate, then just as “Every Sortes runs” is incongruous,
so “Not Sortes runs” is incongruous. But this is false, because
although a distributive sign cannot be added to a singular term,
nevertheless negation can.
Secondly, wherever distribution takes place, a general term is
taken universally. Wherefore, it is necessary that there be a
word signifying quantity universally. But only a universal sign
signifies quantity universally, for negation does not. Therefore,
negation does not have the power to distribute. This we grant,
maintaining that negation does not render indeterminate but
denies that which follows it From which it follows that when
negation is added to a general term, it denies the general term.
But in the case of the negation of the more general, the
negation of any inferior included under it follows from the fact
that when the more general is nullified, any particular whatever
included under it is nullified. Consequently, negation does not
render indeterminate but denies what follows after it, be it
universal or particular.
The solution to the objection is obvious, because the fact that the
proposition: “Not man is just” is a universal, is not due to the
nature of distribution existing in the negation but rather
because man in general is denied; and this being denied, any of
its particulars whatsoever is denied.
Again, it is customary to posit a certain “distribution of
aptitude”, as “Every man fears the sea”, that is, man is born apt
to fear the sea. Or again, it is customary to posit “befitting
distribution”, as “Heaven touches all things apart from itself and
“God created all things apart from Him-
 Amtotk, D* ImtrrprHnHon*. 10. 19b. 26 c«o.
TREATI8E ON DISTRIBUTIONS »1
self*. But these two kinds of distribution are not as proper as
the other.
{
We now discuss the sign “whole” which is distributive of integral
parte, as in the proposition: “Sortes as a whole is white”. The
sense is: “Sortes according to any one whatsoever of his parts, is
white”. From this it folloro: “Any part whatever of Sortes is
white”. Proof: In the proposition, “Sortes as a whole is white”,
Sortes as such is the subject of whiteness, and his parts are not
white by reason of themselves but according as they are in the
whole of Sortes or under the form of the whole. Therefore they
are not the subject of whiteness except through the whole.
Hence, this proposition follows first in order, “Sortes, according to
any one whatsoever of his parts, is white”; and then there
follows this proposition: “Any part whatever of Sortes is
white”.@}
Further, in the proposition: “Sortes as a whole is white”, the
whole is the subject of whiteness directly; but the parts indirectly,
because the parts are understood indirectly in that which is the
whole and the whole is understood indirectly in that which is
the part This is evident from a division of the whole, as a house is
constructed of wall, roof, and foundation and Sortes is
constituted by his parts. Therefore the whole causes us to
understand the parts indirectly. Consequently, from the
proposition: “Sortes as a whole is white”, there follows
immediately the proposition: “Sortes, according to any one
whatsoever of his parts, is white”; and mediately the
proposition: “Any part whatever of Sortes is white”.
Again, on the same point, {
that which is the part, has being only from that which is the
whole because it derives its perfection only from the whole.
Therefore it is the subject of something only through the
whole.@} Consequently, the whole is the primary subject.
Therefore, from the proposition: “Sortes as a whole is white”
immediately follows: “Sortes, according to any one whatsoever
of his parts, is white”; and mediately “Any part whatever of
Sortes is white”.
TREATISE ON DISTfMl IT!’ »NS VA
In reference to what has been said, {
we have the sophism : “Sortes as a whole is leas than Sortes”.
Proof: Any part whatever of Sortes is less than Sortes, and
Sortes, according to any one whatsoever of his parts, is less than
Sortes; therefore, Sortes as a whole is less than Sortes.@}
It is argued to the contrary: Sortes as a whole is less than Sortes;
therefore, Sortes is less than Sortes.
Solution: The initial statement is true, viz., “Sortes as a whole is
less than Sortes”, but the proof is guilty of the fallacy of accident
because {
in the proposition: “Sortes as a whole is less than Sortes”, the
predicate is attributed to the parts to which it truly belongs; but
it does not belong to Sortes; therefore, the proposition: “Sortes
is less than Sortes”, is absolutely false.@} On that account, if
one infers that the parts are less than Sortes as a whole or as
Sortes, there will be ? fallacy of accident by virtue of the
previously mentioned rule. Hence Sortes as a whole is the
subject thing, Sortes belongs accidentally to it, and “to be less
than Sortes” is ascribed to both.
In like manner, the disproof is guilty of the fallacy of confusion
of absolute and qualified statement (secundum quid ad
simpliciter), because the proposition: “Sortes as a whole is less
than Sortes”, does not posit Sortes as such but according to his
parts. Therefore, it asserts that Sortes in a qualified sense is less
than Sortes without qualification. So when one makes the
unqualified inference: Therefore, Sortes is less than Sortes”,
there is the fallacy of confusion of absolute and qualified
statement, as in the case: “Sortes qua foot is less than Sortes;
therefore, Sortes is less than Sortes”.
Furthermore, in some cases it follows: “Sortes as a whole;
therefore Sortes”, as “Sortes as a whole is white; therefore
Sortes is white”; in other cases it does not follow. We may ask in
which cases it follows and in which cases it does not follow. It
must be said that there are some accident* which belong to the
part and to the whole indifferently, as white, black, hot, cold,
growth and shrinkage, and in such cases, “Sortes as a whole;
therefore Sortes” logically
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS w»
follows; there are other accidents which belong to the part and
not to the whole and conversely to the whole and not to a part
or parts, as totality, minority, smallness and, in such cases,
“Sortes as a whole; therefore Sortes” does not follow.
We now discuss signs distributive of accidents among which we
first treat those distributive of quality. A sign distributive of
quality is said to be one which distributes things related through
a qualitative mode, as “such a sort as you please” whose
particular is “some one sort as you please”.
But it is objected that if an accident is multiplied when the
subject is multiplied, it necessarily follows that since signs
distributive of substance distribute or multiply the subject, they
necessarily multiply or distribute the accident itself. Consequently,
signs distributive of accidents are superfluous.
To this it must be said that the multiplication of accidents is
twofold, because one is the multiplication of accident according
to number and is effected through a sign distributive of
substance, as “Every white man runs”; the other is mulplication
according to species and is effected through a sign distributive of
accident, as “Such a sort as you please runs”, which is equivalent
to the proposition: “A thing, having any quality whatever, runs”.
In connection with the foregoing, this sophism is discussed :
“Everything of whichever kind you please, knows, concerning that
kind, that it is what it is”. Let it be supposed that Sortes knows
grammar, logic and rhetoric and Plato and Cicero likewise, and
that they know themselves to possess these; and suppose that
there are three other men of whom oneknows logic, another
grammar, and the third rhetoric and that these do not know
themselves to possess these sciences, and that they know nothing
of the other men, whereas the others know about themselves and
also of these three; and suppose that there exist no other men
and no other qualities. Proof: This “whichever kind you please”
knows, concerning that kind, that it is what it
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 97
is. Similarly with the second and the third; and there are not any
more “whichever kind you please”. Therefore, “every thing of
whichever kind you please, knows, concerning that kind, that it is
what it is”.
To the contrary: Everything of whichever kind you please,
[knows, concerning that kind, that it is what it is]; therefore, every
grammatical thing knows, concetning that kind of thing, that it is
what it is.*
The first solution is true, and the disproof is guilty of the fallacy
of the consequent in reasoning from the inferior to the superior
with the distribution of the superior. For “of whichever kind you
please” stands only for three [men], namely, for the first three;
but “grammarian” stands for these and also for someone who
possesses grammar only, and thus “grammatical thing” stands
for more things than does “of whichever kind you please”.
Hence, if the universal distributive sign is placed before it, as in
saying “Everything of whichever kind you please”, et cetera,
therefore “everything grammatical”, there arises a consequence
like this one: “Every man; therefore every animal”. And the same
occurs in the later expression, when it is said “concerning that
kind”, as if [we argued] “Concerning everything of whichever
kind; therefore concerning everything grammatical”.
We turn our attention to signs distributive of quantity and they
are signs which distribute things related through a mode of
quantity, as, for instance, “as often as”, “as much as”.
In this relation we have the sophism: “As often as you were at
Paris, so often you have been a man”. Proof: At one time you
were at Paris and at that time you were a man; at another time
you were at Paris and at that time you were a man, and so on;
therefore, as often as yon were at Paris, so often you were a
man.
 Interpolate [But this is false. Therefor*, the sophism ta false.]
Thia consequence la offered as provingthe falsity of the
sophism, sine* it appears to eandude a false consequent^for, on
the hypothesis, it u false that the grammarian amongthe three
“other men” knows hmv setf and the tat three men to be
mmmarians.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 99
Disproof: As often as you have been at Paris, so often you have
been a man; but twice you have been at Paris; therefore, twice
you have been a man. This is false, because the word “twice”
introduces the interruption of the act to which it is joined but
the act of being man was not interrupted in you.
Solution: The initial statement is false. The proof is to be
answered by destroying it, because the second part of the
copulative is false, viz., “at that time you were a man”, for as yet
you have not been a man even once, because of the fact that
life has not yet been terminated in such manner that you might
once again begin to live and afterwards have your life terminated,
which is required in order that you be a man twice; the same as a
race must be begun and terminated twice in order that anyone
run twice. Note that “twice” does not involve interruption of time
but only the termination of that act to which it is joined; but
interruption follows a termination. If, however, the paralogism
were formed in the following fashion: “Whenever you have been
at Paris, you have been a man; but twice you have been at Paris;
therefore, twice you have been a man”, the initial statement
would be true and the disproof would be guilty of the fallacy of
figure of speech due to a change in category, because “whenever”
is in the category of time and “twice” is in the category of
quantity, for it is a member of the genus of discrete quantity.
We now discuss the sign “infinite which is spoken of in five ways.
In the first way, “infinite” is said to be that which is incapable of
being gone through, as the voice is said to be invisible because of
the fact that it is not its nature to be seen. In a second way,
“infinite” is said to be that which has incomplete transition by
reason of the fact that it has not yet been terminated, although it
is its nature to be terminated, as while someone is crossing a
space and has not yet arrived at its end. In a third way, we speak
of the “infinite” in the sense of addition, as augmentable number is
infinite by the addition of unity or another number. In a fourth
way, “infinite” is spoken of in relation to division, as
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 101
in the case of a continuum. But every continuum is infinitely
divisible. Hence Aristotle defines it thus in the fourth book of the
Physics: “The continuum is divisble ad infinitum”.” In the fifth
way, “infinite” is spoken of in both ways, viz., according to
addition and division, as in the case of time; for since time is a
continuum, it is divisible ad mfinitum and since one time follows
another, it is infinite through the addition of one time to
another. With regard to the last three significations, {
“infinite” is defined thus: “Infinite is that whose quantity is such
that we can always take a part outside what has been already
taken” ; as if another part were taken after the last part of the
line, and after this, a third, and [since] the end of the line could
never be attained, the line is said to be infinite.@}
It is customary to assert that “infinite” is sometimes taken for a
universal term, in which case the proposition: “Infinites are
finite” is equivalent to the proposition: “Some infinites are
finite”; and at other times it is taken as a distributive sign, in
which case the proposition, as far as distribution is concerned, is
equivalent to the proposition: “More than whatever number
you please, is finite”. And it is proved thus: More than one is
finite; more than two is finite; more than three is finite and so
on; therefore, more than whatever number you please, is finite.
In this fashion there is said to be an interrupted or discontinuous
distribution within the numerical scale, because this word
“more” in the first proposition stands for two, in the second for
three, and in like manner, step by step, in the ascending
numerical scale. So the expression “More than whatever number
you please” effects distribution within the numerical scale,
because the expression “than whatever number you please”
stands for some [numbers] and “more” stands for other
[numbers] according to increasing number, as was said above.
>• Perhaps this refer* to Pkviea. IV, 12, 220A, 30. However,
language and context suggest rather Phytic*, til, 7, 207b. 15. “
Aristotle. Pkmn. III. S. 207a. 8.
TREATISE ON DISTRIBUTIONS 10:1
In reference to what has been said, this sophism arises:
“Infinites are finite”. Proof: Two is finite; three is finite and so
on ad infinitum; therefore, infinites are finite.
Disproof: Here an opposite is predicated of its opposite:
therefore, the statement is impossible.
It also can be proved thus: More than whatever number you
please, is finite; therefore, infinites are finite.
Solution: Some distinguish by reason of the fact that “infinite” is
equivocal as regards what is infinite with respect to us and what
is infinite in the absolute sense. Wherefore, if we take what is
infinite with respect to us, the initial statement can be true and
an opposite is not predicated of an opposite, for the stars and
the sands of the sea, which are not absolutely infinite, are
infinite with respect to us. But if we take what is infinite in the
absolute sense, the initial statement is absolutely false and an
opposite is predicated of an opposite. But others make a
distinction by reason of the fact that “infinite” can be a
universal term and thus the initial statement is false; or it can be
a syn-categorematic word, implying in itself distribution, as has
been said, and in this way they consider the statement to be
true.
But neither of these solutions has value, because if the
distinction in each is denied and “infinite” is taken absolutely
and as a universal term, the proof and the disproof of the
sophism still remain. Wherefore, it must be said that the initial
statement is absolutely false, and the proof is guilty of the
fallacy of confusion of absolute and qualified statement because
“infinite” in succession is infinite in a qualified sense and not
absolutely. Wherefore, when the parts of number are taken in
succession, as two and three, we do not grasp the infinite
absolutely but in a certain fashion or a qualified sense; hence
infinite in the absolute sense cannot be inferred from these.
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLES
{
An exponible proposition is one whose meaning is obscure and
requires an exposition because of some syncategorema-tic
[word] implicitly or explicitly contained in it,@} or contained in
some word, as in the following: “Man only is animal”, “Sortes
begins to be white”, “The line is infinite”, and so on. In cases of
this kind it must be noted that those things responsible for a
proposition being exponible differ in many ways. For {
some are exclusive signs, as “only”, “alone”; others are exceptive,
as “with the exception or’, “but” (nisi); some ar reduplicative, as
“insofar as”, “according as”; others introduce beginning or
ending, as “begins”, “ends”;@} others introduce privation of end,
as “infinite”; others introduce excess, as adjectives in the
comparative and the superlative degree; others introduce a
distinction, as “differs”, “other than”, and so on; others introduce
a special mode of distribution, as “whole”, “any one you please”,
and so on. On account of these [syncate-gorematic words] the
proposition becomes obscure and re quires exposition, and so
they are said to make a proposition exponible. Consequently we
must investigate them in turn and we will first investigate
exclusive [signs].
We now discuss exclusive signs. {
Exclusive signs are those which, in virtue of their
consignification, introduce exclusion and so render a proposition
exclusive, as do such
words as “alone”, “single”, “only”, “merely”, “precisely”, and so
on.@} These signs sometimes exclude on account of otherness,
sometimes on account of plurality; sometimes they are placed in
a proposition without negation, sometimes with a negation
preceding or following. We now offer certain rules respecting
them.
The first rule is that an exclusive proposition without negation is
expounded through an affirmative copulative proposition whose
first part is that to which the exclusive sign was prefixed, and
whose second part is a negative proposition denying the predicate
of all others apart from the subject; thus “Only man is rational” is
equivalent to “Man is rational and nothing other than man is
rational”; or “Only twelve are the apostles of God” is equivalent to
“The apostles of God are twelve and not more than twelve are
apostles of God”.
The second rule is that an exclusive proposition of this kind
implies a copulative compounded of two exponents or
components, and it implies either one of these singly but not
conversely; as in the case of: “Only man runs”, therefore “Man
runs and nothing other than man runs”.
The third rule is that a valid consequence is had in reasoning from
an exclusive affirmative proposition to a universal proposition
with transposed terms, if the exclusion is the result of
otherness, but not conversely; as “Only animal is man therefore
every man is an animal”.
The fourth rule is that an exclusive proposition contradictory of
a previous [statement] is expounded through an affirmative
disjunctive proposition whose parts contradict the previous
copulative proposition; as “Not only man runs”
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLES NW
is equivalent to “No man runs or another than man runs”. This
is clear from the force of the contradiction, because the
opposition of contradiction is preserved in both. From this also it
is clear how the consequence is valid in such propositions.
The fifth rule is that an exclusive proposition in which the
negation is placed after the exclusive sign, is expounded through
an affirmative copulative whose first part is the preceding negative
proposition and whose second part is an affirmative in which the
predicate is asserted affirmatively of any other subject you
please; as “Only an accident is not a substance” is equivalent to
“An accident is not a substance and everything other than an
accident is a substance”. From this it is clear how its contradictory
should be expounded and how the consequence is valid in the
case of exclusive propositions.
We now discuss exceptive words. Exceptive words are those
which signify the exception of something which is contained
under anything distributed, as “with the exception of, “except”,
and so on. Certain rules concerning them follow.
The first is that every exception occurs in relation to a
quantitative whole or in relation to a term with a universal sign
attached. But a general term with a universal sign attached is a
quantitative whole, as in the case of: “Every man except Sortes
is running”.
The second rule is that an exceptive word, unless prevented,
causes the general term to which it is immediately attached to
have simple supposition, as in the case of: “Every animal except
man is irrational”. Here, “man” has simple supposition.
The third rule is that an affirmative exceptive universal
proposition is expounded copulatively by three categorical
TREATI8E ON EXPON1BLB8111
exponents, of which the first affirms the predicate of the subject
taken with “other than”; in the second, the term from which the
exception is made is asserted affirmatively of the term which is
excepted; the third is a negative proposition in which the
predicate is denied of the excepted term. If for example we say
“Every animal except man is irrational”, this proposition is
expounded thus: “Every animal other than man is irrational, and
man is an animal, and man is not irrational”.
The fourth rule is that a negative exceptive universal
proposition is expounded copulatively by three exponents, in
the first of which the predicate is denied of the subject taken
with “other than”; the second is an affirmative proposition in
which the term from which an exception is made is asserted of
the term which is excepted; in the third, the predicate is
affirmed universally of the excepted term. For example: “No
animal except man is rational” is expounded thus: “No animal
other than man is rational, and man is an animal, and every man
is rational”. From this it is dear how their contradictories should
be expounded and how the consequence is valid in them.
We now discuss reduplicative signs. Reduplicative signs are those
which imply the reason according to which something is
attributed to another, as “insofar as”, “according
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLE8 W
as”, “by reason of the fact that”, and so on. Concerning these
the following rules are offered.

The first rule is that a reduplicative word presupposes a certain

predicate to be in a certain subject and denotes that that to
which it is immediately attached is the cause of that inherence.
The second is that a reduplicative word alwayt refers to the
predicate and never reduplicates it
The third is that a reduplicative proposition in which there is no
negation ia expounded through four affirmative exponents, of
which the first affirms the principal predicate of the subject; the
second asserts the reduplicate of the subject; the third asserts
the principal predicate of the reduplicate; the fourth is a causal
proposition, in whose antecedent the reduplicate is predicated,
and in whose consequent the principal predicate is asserted. For
example: “Man in so far as he is rational is tearful” is equivalent
to “Man is tearful”, and “Man is rational”, and “Every rational
[thing] is tearful”, and “Because something is rational, it is
tearful”.
The fourth rule is that a reduplicative proposition in which a
negation follows the reduplicative word is expound-
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLE8 11&
ed copulatively through four exponents, of which the first
denies the principal predicate of the subject; the second asserts
the reduplicate of the subject; the third universally denies the
principal predicate of the reduplicate; the fourth is a causal
proposition, in whose antecedent the reduplicate is asserted,
and in whose consequent the principal predicate is denied. For
example: “Man in so far as he is rational is not capable of
braying” is equivalent to “No man is capable of braying, and every
man is rational, and no rational [thing] is capable of braying, and
because something is rational, it is not capable of braying”. From
this it is clear through the law of contradiction how the
contradictories of these should be expounded and how the
consequence is valid in them.
We now treat of “begins” and “ends” in whose exposition it must
be noted that there are some things whose whole being is
acquired all at once in an instant, as “man” or “double”, whether
this is effected with a certain successive preceding transmutation
intervening, as in natural production, or with no preceding
transmutation, as in the creation of an angel; but there are other
things whose being is acquired successively and part after part,
as things of a per-
TREATISE ON EXPON1BLES 117
manent nature whose denomination rests upon the domination of
one contrary over another, such as white, black, cold hot, and
also things of a successive nature, such as motion and time. In
like manner, there are some things whose being is lost all at
once and in an instant; and others, successively. In accordance
with these differences, four rules are offered.
The first rule is that propositions which deal with the beginning
of things whose being is acquired all at once, are expounded
through a copulative proposition, of which the first part is an
affirmative in the present and the second a negative in the past;
as “Man begins to be” is equivalent to “Man now is but
immediately prior to this was not”.
The second rule is that propositions which deal with the
beginning of things whose being is acquired successively, are
expounded through a copulative, of which the first part is a
negative in the present and the second an affirmative in the
future; as “Sortes begins to be white” is equivalent to “Sortes
now is not white but immediately after this will be white”; or
thus: “Motion begins to be” is equivalent to “Motion is not but
immediately after this will be”.
The third rule is that propositions which deal with the ending of
things whose being is lost all at once, are expounded by a
copulative, of which the first part is an affirmative in the present
and the second a negative in the future; as “Sortes ceases to be
man” is equivalent to “Sortes now is a man but immediately
after this will not be a man”.
The fourth rale is that propositions dealing with the ending of
things whose being is lost successively, are expounded
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLES 11”
copulatively through a negative in the present and an
affirmative in the past; as “Sortes ceases to be white” is
equivalent to “Sortes now is not white but immediately before this
was white”. From what has been said, it is apparent how the
contradictories of these should be expounded and how the
consequence is valid in them.
We now treat of the adjective “infinite”, with* respect to which
certain distinctions are usually made. The first is that infinite
sometimes is taken negatively, and in this sense it is that which
is not finite nor is its nature such as to be finite; as a point or
God. In another way it is taken privately, and in this sense it is
that which is not finite but whose nature is such as to be finite;
as motion, not yet perfected, is infinite. This [sense of “infinite”]
is threefold, viz., infinite through addition only, as number; infinite
through division only, as a continuum; and infinite through
addition and division simultaneously, as time.
There is a second distinction of infinite applicable to any one of
the preceding modes, for one thing is said to be infinite in act, as
is quantity not terminated; another is infinite in potency, as are
the continua; a third is infinite only with respect to us and not in
reality.
The third distinction is that “infinite” is taken in two ways: in one
way it is taken categorematically, significa-tively as a general
term, and thus it signifies the quantity of the thing which is
subject or predicate, as when one says: “The world is infinite”; in
another way it is taken syncate-gorematically, not insofar as it
indicates the quantity of
TREATISE ON EXPONIBT.ES 1Z1
the things which is subject or predicate, but insofar as the
subject is related to the predicate, and in this way there is
distribution of the subject and [it is] a distributive sign. We [now]
offer some rules concerning these distinctions.
The first rule is that “infinite”, taken syncategorematical-ly and
placed in the subject, causes the following general term to have
indeterminate supposition only, as “Infinite men run”. In this
case, “men” has indeterminate but not movably indeterminate
supposition.

The second rule is that a proposition concerning the infinite,

taken syncategorematically, is expounded by a copulative whose
first part affirms the predicate of the subject taken according to
some quantity, continuous or discrete, and whose second part
denies that the predicate is in such a subject according to a
determined quantity: as “Infinite men run”, which is expounded
thus: “Some men run and not so few that they will not be more
than two or three”, or thus: “Some men run and as many more
as you please”.
The third rule is that a proposition concerning the infinite, taken
categorematically or significatively, is expounded through a
copulative whose first part asserts quantity of the subject and
whose second part denies the terminus of that quantity; as “A
line is infinite” is equivalent to “A line is long and does not have
any end of its quantity”. This is the case if “infinite” is in the
predicate. But if it is in the subject, the first part asserts the
predicate of the subject and the second part denies the
terminus of that quantity; as “Some infinite body is white” is
equivalent to “Some great body is white and the same body does
not have any end of its quantity”. Note that it is necessary to
deny the
TREATI8E ON EXPONIBLEB 12*
terminus of that quantity according to the way the infinite is
spoken of, so that if the infinite in act is spoken of, the terminus
of that actual quantity must be denied; and if the infinite in
potency is spoken of. whether according to addition or division,
ao that the infinite according to potential quantity and not
according to actual quantity is spoken of, the terminus of
potential quantity and not of actual quantity must be denied.
We now discuss comparatives and superlatives and offer some
rules concerning them. The first rule is that a proposition
containing a comparative, taken properly and not pervertedly, is
expounded copulatively by three exponents, the first of which
asserts the positive degree of the thing exceeding; the second
asserts the same [positive] of the thing exceeded; and the third
asserts an excess of the thing exceeding in relation to the thing
exceeded—as “Sortes is more white than the ass” is equivalent to
“Sortes is white, and the ass is white, and Sortes is more white
than the ass” —or [it asserts an excess of the thing exceeding] by
denying that there ifl an equality of form in the thing exceeded
in relation to the thing exceeding—as “Sortes is white, and the
ass is white, but the ass is not equally as white as Sortes”.
The second rule is that a superlative distributes the general term
following it, which signifies the exceeded thing; as “The lion is
the bravest of animals”. In this case “animals” is distributed.
The third rule is that a superlative, properly taken, denotes that
the thing exceeded agrees with the thing exceeding. The rale is
evident, for this is an improper statement : “The lion is the
bravest lynx”.
The fourth rule is that a proposition with a superlative.
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLE3 1»
taken strictly, is explained copulatively by three exponents, the
first of which affirms the positive of the thing exceeding; the
second affirms the positive of the thing exceeded; and the third
universally denies an excess of the thing exceeded in relation to
the thing exceeding.
Thus “A rose is the most beautiful of flowers” is equivalent to “A
rose is beautiful, and every flower is beautiful, and no flower is
irore beautiful than a rose”. But if the superlative is taken
affirmatively, the third exponent should be an affirmative
proposition asserting an excess of the thing exceeding in relation
to the thing exceeded taken universally, as when one says: “A
rose is more beautiful than every flower”. All propositions
concerned with maximum and minimum, and thus concerning the
other superlatives, can be explained in these two ways as long as
the genitive denoting the thing exceeded is contained in them;
but if that genitive is not included the second exponent should be
omitted. For example: “Sor-tes is the bravest man” is equivalent
to “Sortes is brave and no man is more brave than he”. The
contradictories of these should be expounded through disjunctive
propositions with contradictory parts.
{
We now treat of “differs” and “other than”, and offer some rules
concerning them. The first rule is that “differs”, “other than”, and
“different” apply only to beings. For, as is said in the fourth
book of the Metaphysics,* neither is non-being the same as nor
different from being, nor vice versa.@}
The second rule is that the ablative case dependent on these
words through “from” or “than” is distributed, if it can be
distributed, unless there is some impediment
The third rule is that an affirmative proposition with
 Referwc* it incorrect. Possible ware*: Artetotto, Mrtapfc—fea.
X, 8, 1064b, 17 •«.
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLE8 J*v
“differs” is expounded copulatively by three exponents, of which
the first affirms the verb “is” of that which differs; the second
affirms the same of that from which it differs; the third denies
one of the other; as “Man differs from an ass” is equivalent to “A
man is, and an ass is, and a man is not an ass”.
A fourth rule is that a negative proposition with “differs” should
be expounded by a disjunctive with contradictory parts; as
“Sortes does not differ from an ass” is equivalent to “Sortes is
not, or an ass is not, or Sortes is an ass”. And the consequences
in these are valid, just as in the preceding.
{
We now discuss the sign “whole” concerning which we should
know that this syncategorematic word can be taken in three
ways. In one way, it is taken properly for everything that has
component parts. In a second way, it is taken more strictly for
everything that is complete by virtue of all its parts, as a house is
said to be whole when it is complete. In these two ways,
“whole” is taken significative-ly and categorematically.@} In a
third way, it is taken syn-categorematicaly as equivalent to a
distributive sign; as “The whole Sortes is white”. Here it does not
assert of what sort the subject is but how the subject is related to
the predicate; and in this way the proposition becomes exponi-bk.
Concerning this, we offer two rules.
The first [rule] is that “whole” distributes the term to which it is
joined for any integral part of it whatsoever; as “The whole
Sortes is white” is equivalent to “Any part whatever of Sortes is
white”.
The second rule is that an affirmative proposition with “whole”
is expounded through a categorical proposition by altering the
term “whole” into that which is so according to any one
whatsoever of its parts; as “The whole Sortes is
TREATISE ON EXPONIBLES 129
less than Sortes” is equivalent to “Sortes, according to any one
whatsoever of his parts, is less than Sortes”.
Furthermore, it should be noted that these signs, “of whatever
quality you please”, “as much as you please”, do not properly
make propositions exponible but they effect distribution, not
absolute distribution after the fashion of other signs, such as
“every”, “any one you please”, but rather they restrict to some
determined categorial genus; for example, “as much as you
please” distributes in relation to continuous quantity and only has
meaning as containing every continuous quantity, and “of
whatever quality you please” distributes in relation to every
quality and only has meaning as containing every quality. And
thus these signs are called mentally complex expressions whose
propositions are formed by synthesis. These remarks suffice
concerning exponibles.
APPENDIX 1M
Pro Proctor, Robert. An Index to the Early Printed Books in the
British Museum. Part I: From the Invention of Printing to the
Year MD, 2 Vols., London, 1898; and Supplement for 1899. Part
II: MDI-MDXX, 2 VoU.,London, 1908-1988.
St Stillwell, Margaret Bingham. Incunabula in American
Libraries. A second census of fifteenth-century books owned in
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The Btoliographical
Society of America, New York, 1940. Terms
[NJ\]No place of printing given.
[n.pr.] No printer given.
[n.<L] No date given.
[Sina nota.] No place, printer, or date given.
[Ref]Bibliographical references.
Bibliography of Editions of the SmmummUe ImmaU* of Peter of
Spate and of Commentaries oa the Smmmmtme I soi rafts,
The bibliography is divided into two general sections, editions
without a commentary and editions with a commentary. The
latter section is in turn divided into editions with an anonymous
commentary and editions with an ascribed commentary. Within
each section the editions have been arranged alphabetically
according to the place of printing and then chronologically for
each place.
A. Editions without a commentary.
1. Textus septem traetatuum rammularum magistri petri
“fpsp* [Sina nota.] 20 1. 88 ff.
Bef: H 8678; (Pra T).
2. Textus omnium Suirnnnlamm Petri hyspani. [Sine nota.] 28
1.189 ff.
Ref: H 8879; (Pra S). 8. Dialectica.—F. 120*: Petri hyspani viri
dfcctiaatnri ordtefa nre-
dktarum (tie) ranmularum Ubor dyalsctice artis f laiasiUniii
[Sine nota.] 21 1. 120 ff.
Bef: C2996. 4. Summula logicae Joaaals papae XXL
[Sine nota.] 104 ff.
Ref: BN RCe. R. 77S. 4b. Summulae logicae Joaania papao XXL
[Gaudaaum, Gorardus Lsou, »-*.] Apparently a 9 loaf fragment
of No. 4.
Ref: BN Bos. m. R. 87.