/*Arigo V.

Swift
G.R No. 206510
September 16, 2014
Facts:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the
US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of
the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 6, 2013, the ship
left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for
fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting
the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in
the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to
the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident
and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States
will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."
By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last
piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
Issue/s:
1. Whether this court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not
submit any pleading or manifesting in this case.
2. Whether there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA.
Ruling:
Issue No. 1:
No, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides for the State's protection
from suit, generally known as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State.
Section 3 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The state may not be
sued without its consent.
This classical concept of State immunity, which protects a state from being sued in
another state's courts without the latter's consent or waiver, has evolved into a rigid
doctrine that distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil) from
private, commercial, and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). State immunity is
limited to acts Jure imperii under the limiting norm of State immunity. Only when
the proceedings arise out of the foreign sovereign's commercial dealings,
commercial activity, or economic issues is the application of State immunity
restricted.
Issue No. 2:
None, The VFA is a treaty that governs the treatment of US soldiers and personnel
visiting the Philippines in order to promote "shared security interests" in the region
between the US and the Philippines. It establishes criteria to control such visits by
military personnel, as well as the rights of the US and Philippine governments in
terms of criminal jurisdiction, vessel and aircraft mobility, and the import and
export of equipment, materials, and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort
laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.

Philippine Textile Research Institute v. CA

G.R. No. 223319
October 09, 2019
Facts:
On February 11, 2013, E.A. Ramirez filed before the RTC a Complaint for Breach
of Contract with Damages (Complaint) against PTRI and a number of its
employees, i.e., Tomboc, Diaz, Rufin, Rico, Lim, Marin, and Cometa. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 73790-TG.
In the said Complaint, E.A. Ramirez, a construction company engaged in electrical
works, alleged that sometime in 2012, it entered into a Contract of Works for the
Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot
Plants (Subject Contract) with PTRI for the rehabilitation of the latter's electrical
facilities in its main building and in three of its pilot plants. According to E.A.
Ramirez, on February 28, 2012, it was issued by PTRI a notice to proceed and it
immediately moved into the project site to carry out its obligation under the said
Subject Contract.
E.A. Ramirez alleged that soon thereafter, or in the afternoon of March 13, 2012,
Diaz, the consultant of the subject project, requested for a meeting with Ramirez.
During the meeting, Diaz allegedly told Ramirez that the former had been tasked
by PTRI to demand P500,000.00 from the latter as purportedly the standard
amount "for the boys." In exchange for the said amount, Diaz said that they would
make things easier for E.A. Ramirez to finish or complete the project. E.A.
Ramirez did not give in to the demand, explaining that E.A. Ramirez's bid for the
project was in fact competitive and above board. Diaz did not budge, proposing
instead that they come up with a variation order until they would have realized the
said amount of P500,000.00.
PTRI, et al., through the OSG, filed a Motion to Dismiss, invoking the privilege of
state immunity from suit. They asserted that PTRI is an agency of the Department
of Science and Technology (DOST) and thus cannot be sued without the consent of
the State. PTRI alleged that the immunity extended to the impleaded employees of
PTRI since they were sued while they were performing official or governmental
functions.
PTRI, et al. likewise contended that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. They asserted that under Sections 34, 35, and 36 of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9285, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) has original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes under
certain conditions, and that such conditions were applicable to the instant case.
PTRI, et al. maintained that referral of the dispute to the CIAC had been stipulated
under Article I, Section 1.2 of the Subject Contract executed by the parties, which
provides that the relevant provisions of R.A. 9285 and its revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) would govern the agreement.
Issue/s:
1. Whether PTRI, et. Al. are immune from suit; and
2. Whether RTC has jurisdiction to hear E.A Ramirez’s complaints.
Ruling:

Issue No. 1

In the assailed Decision, the CA concurs with the assertion of PTRI, et al. that they
are immune from suit owing to the rule that the State and its instrumentalities
enjoy immunity from suit.

The Court disagrees. PTRI, et al. are not immune from suit.

Under Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued
without its consent.

In explaining the rationale of State immunity from suit, the Court in Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic18 held that "a continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle
to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were
not thus restricted."

In the instant case, it is not disputed that PTRI is an unincorporated national

gove1nment agency. The PTRI was created under Resolution NSDB 246 RJ in
accordance with R.A. 4086.20 Under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 700,21 the PTRI
was transferred from the National Science Development Board to the then Ministry
of Industry. The PTRI was tasked to directly assist the textile industry specifically
in the field of training for the textile industry personnel in line with the industry's
rationalization program.

Issue No.2

No, The Court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction
contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original jurisdiction.
Under Section 4 of E.O. 1008, the CIAC shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered
into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute
arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or
breach thereof. The provision further states that the CIAC acquires jurisdiction
when the parties to a dispute agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.

The provision also states that the jurisdiction of CIAC includes, but is not limited
to, violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the
terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and
delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and
changes in contract cost.

Macalintal V. COMELEC

G.R No. 157013

July 10, 2003

Facts:

Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, has filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, seeking a determination that certain parts of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional.
Petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, claiming that he
has a genuine and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
ensuring that public money are properly and lawfully used and appropriated.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof
which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of
the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry
out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating
public funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds.
Issue/s:

Whether section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere
act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 established the "Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee," which has the authority to evaluate, revise, alter, and approve the COMELEC's
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, established by Sections 19 and 25, is
unconstitutional since it interferes with the COMELEC's independence. Should the
COMELEC's rules be found to be in violation of the law, the Court has the authority to review
them on the petition of any interested person, including politicians.

Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
Yes, Congress went over its constitutional jurisdiction when it gave itself the
right to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003. The COMELEC's constitutional mission of independence was
violated by Congress. The second sentence of Section 19's first paragraph, which
states that "the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval," and the second sentence of Section 25's second paragraph, which states
that "it shall review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by virtue of this Act," and the second sentence of Section
25's second paragraph, which states that "it shall review, revise, Both measures are
flagrant violations of the COMELEC's independence mission.

Ruling:

Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be

exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by
law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of
those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring
that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
R.A. No. 9189 was adopted in response to the Constitution's demand in the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V, that Congress establish a method allowing
qualified Filipinos living overseas to vote. It is important to note that Section 2
does not define the parameters for exercising legislative authority in adopting the
statute in question. As a result, in the absence of limits, Congress is deemed to
have carried out its duties as outlined in Article VI of the Constitution (The
Legislative Department).

A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and
abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore,
a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency
requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a
declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE

G.R. No. 20275

July 17, 2018

Facts:

To ensure road safety and address the risk-taking behavior of bus drivers as
its declared objective, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 1 on
January 4, 2012, requiring "all Public Utility Bus (PUB) operators . . . to secure
Labor Standards Compliance Certificates" under pain of revocation of their
existing certificates of public convenience or denial of an application for a new
certificate.

Five (5) days later or on January 9, 2012, the DOLE issued Department
Order No. 118-12, elaborating on the part-fixed-part-performance-based
compensation system referred to in the L TFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001. Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for
computing the fixed and the performance-based component of a public utility bus
driver's or conductor's wage. 

On January 28, 2012, Atty. Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf of the

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Integrated Metro Manila
Bus Operators Association, Inter City Bus Operators Association, the City of San
Jose Del Monte Bus Operators Association, and Pro-Bus, wrote to then Secretary
of Labor and Employment Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, requesting to defer the
implementation of Department Order No. 118-12. The request, however, was not
acted upon.

Meanwhile, on February 27, 2012 and in compliance with Rule III, Section 3
of Department Order No. 118-12, the National Wages and Productivity
Commission issued NWPC Guidelines No. 1 to serve as Operational Guidelines on
Department Order No. 118-12. NWPC Guidelines No. 1 suggested formulae for
computing the fixed-based and the performance-based components of a bus
driver's or conductor's wage.

On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition with Urgent
Request for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, impleading the DOLE and the LTFRB as respondents.
They pray that this Court enjoin the implementation of Department Order No. 118-
12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 for being violative of their right to
due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of obligation of contracts.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 deprive public utility bus operators of
their right to due process of law.

2. Whether the DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 impair public utility bus operators’
right to non-impairment of obligation of contracts.

Ruling:

Issue No. 1
No, before issuing Department Order No. 118-12, the DOLE established a
Technical Working Group that had multiple meetings and consultations with
interested parties. Bus drivers, conductors, and operators were among those
invited, and DOLE officials held concentrated group sessions with them. The way
these discussions were conducted met all of the procedural due process
requirements.
The police power issuances Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are reasonable and legitimate. The urgent
need for Department Order No. 118-12 is clear, given petitioners' admission that
prior to the Order's promulgation, payment schemes included "paying by
outcomes," "commission basis," and the "boundary system." These payment
schemes do not guarantee the payment of minimum salaries to bus drivers and
conductors. There is also no mention of payment of social welfare benefits to bus
drivers and conductors under these payment programs which have reportedly been
in effect from “time immemorial.”
In sum, Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001 are in the nature of social legislations to enhance the economic standing of bus
drivers and conductors, and to promote the general welfare of the riding public.
They are reasonable and are not violative of due process.
Issue No. 2
No, Here, petitioners claim that Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 violate bus operators’ right to non-
impairment of obligation of contracts because these issuances force them to
abandon their “time-honored” employment contracts or arrangements with their
drivers and conductors. Further, these issuances violate the terms of the franchise
of bus operators by imposing additional requirements after the franchise has been
validly issued.
Wages, working conditions, hours of labor, and other issues are all covered
by particular labor laws. To put it another way, labor contracts are subject to the
state's police power. Department Order No. 118-12 was issued to award bus drivers
and conductors minimum pay and social welfare benefits, as previously described
in the section on due process. Furthermore, petitioners stated that they use the
boundary system or commission basis to compensate their bus drivers and
conductors, payment systems that cause drivers to drive irresponsibly. Department
Order No. 118-12 not only aims to improve the economic situation of bus drivers
and conductors, but it also promotes road and traffic safety.

Macalintal V. COMELEC
G.R No. 157013

July 10, 2003

Evasco v. Montanez
G.R No. 199172
February 21, 2018
Facts:
On August 8, 2000, the city government of Davao (City Government),
through its Sangguniang Panlungsod, approved Ordinance No. 092-2000 entitled
"An Ordinance Regulating the Construction, Repair, Renovation, Erection,
Installation and Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and For Related
Purposes.
As early as 2003, the City Engineer of Davao City (City Engineer) started
sending notices of illegal construction to various outdoor advertising businesses,
including Ad & Promo Management (APM), owned by herein respondent Alex P.
Montañez, that constructed the billboards in different areas within the city. The
City Engineer reminded the entities to secure a sign permit or apply for a renewal
for each billboard structure as required by Ordinance No. 092-2000.
In February and March 2006, the City Engineer issued orders of demolition
directing erring outdoor advertising businesses, including APM, to "voluntarily
dismantle" their billboards that violate Ordinance No. 092-2000 within three days
from receipt of the order. Otherwise, the city government shall summarily remove
these structures without further notice. In the orders of demolition dated March 17,
2006, the summary removal was scheduled on March 30, 2006 at 8:30 in the
morning.
Issue/s:
WHETHER SECTION 7 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE, WHICH IS
LIFTED/COPIED FROM UNCHALLENGED PROVISION OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION (SIC) OF NATIONAL
BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RUNS CONTRA[R]Y TO THE
NATIONAL BUILDING CODE ITSELF?
Ruling:
In its Decision dated January 19, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of herein
respondents Montañez and DABASA, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered declaring as
void and unconstitutional the following provisions of City Ordinance No. 092-
2000 as follows: (a) Sections 7, 8 and 41 for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the
National Building Code of the Philippines.
The injunction previously issued base (sic) on the aforesaid provisions of the
ordinance is hereby made permanent WHEREFORE, and in view of all the
foregoing, the instant motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner is GRANTED
modifying the court's decision dated JANUARY 19, 2009 as follows:
(a) declaring as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of City
Ordinance No. 092-2000, as follows:

aa) Sections 7, 8 and 37, for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the National
Building Code of the Philippines;

[bb] declaring herein Section 41 of City Ordinance No. 092-2000 as deleted;

and

[cc] declaring the injunction previously issued by the Court based on the
aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance, permanent.

Respondents' (sic) motion for reconsideration is DENIED

74City of Cagayan De Oro v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light
G.R No. 224825
October 17,2018
Facts:
On January 24, 2005, the petitioner, through its local legislative council,
enacted Ordinance No. 9527-2005,7 which imposed an annual Mayor's Permit
Fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) on every electric or telecommunications
post belonging to public utility companies operating in the city.
The respondent, Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) is a
public utility engaged in the distribution of electric power and the owner of an
estimated 17,000 utility poles erected within Cagayan de Oro City. The
ordinance entailed that the electricity distributor would have to pay an annual
Mayor's Permit Fee of P8,500,000.00.
CEPALCO thus filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages & Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction11 dated September
30, 2005 before the Cagayan RTC assailing the ordinance's validity. CEPALCO
contended that the imposition, in the guise of police power, was unlawful for
violating the fundamental principle that fees, charges, and other impositions
shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory.12 Additionally,
CEPALCO argued that, assuming the imposition was a valid regulatory fee, it
violated the legislative franchise that specifically exempted the electricity
distributor from taxes or fees assessed by Cagayan de Oro City.
On November 7, 2005, the city filed its Answer with Affirmative/Special
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim.14 It countered that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of its powers vested by the applicable provisions of the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, and other laws. Also, the city
maintained that Section 9 of CEPALCO's legislative franchise expressly
subjected the latter to taxes, duties, fees, or charges.
May 5, 2006, pending the determination of the ordinance's validity, the
Cagayan RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not CEPALCO should have exhausted administrative remedies
by challenging Ordinance No. 9527-2005 before the Secretary of Justice
prior to instituting the present action
2. Whether or not the amount of the Mayor's Permit Fee is excessive,
unreasonable, and exorbitant.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Anent the issue on exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioner argued that
CEPALCO should have raised the ordinance's alleged excessiveness before the
Secretary of Justice because it imposes a tax.21 Hence, the city maintained that
the case should have been dismissed at the first instance for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
CEPALCO countered that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
applies only to taxes and other revenue measures, and not to regulatory fees.
No, Without evidence indicating that the amount of the Mayor's Permit
Fee is disproportionate to the cost of regulation, inspection, and licensing of
utility poles located in Cagayan de Oro City, the Court cannot agree with
the CA's invalidation of the ordinance.
Local governments are allowed wide discretion in determining the rates of
imposable fees. In the absence of proof of unreasonableness, courts are bound
to respect the judgment of the local authorities. Any undue interference with
their sound discretion will imperatively warrant review and correction.
In this case, as the party assailing the ordinance, it was CEPALCO's
responsibility to prove the amount's excessiveness; it had the burden to show
that the fee was not commensurate with the cost of regulation, inspection, and
licensing. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, it failed to dismantle
the presumption of validity because it never established that the city council
abused its discretion in setting the amount of the fee at P500.00.
Magalona v. Ermita
G.R No. 187167
August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign
right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however,
was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically,
RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation
passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical
errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
Issue:
Whether RA 9522 violated Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Ruling:
The acquisition or loss of territory is not addressed under UNCLOS III. It is just
a codified standard that governs state behavior.
The RA 9522 is a baseline rule that establishes geographic beginning locations
along coastlines. RA 9522 also contains measures that make our claims to the
KIG, SS, and Sabbah enforceable.

Republicv.Sagun,G.R.No.187567,February15,2012
Facts: Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino
citizen, have a legitimate kid, respondent. She was born in Baguio City on
August 8, 1959, and did not choose to become a Filipino citizen when she
reached the age of majority. She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines in 1992, at the age of 33, after marrying Alex Sagun. On
December 17, 1992, Atty. Cristeta Leung notarized the document, however it
was not documented or registered with the Baguio City Local Civil Registrar.
Respondent sought for a Philippine passport in September 2005. Her
application was declined due to her father's citizenship and the lack of an
annotation on her birth certificate indicating that she had chosen Philippine
citizenship. As a result, she requested a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship, as well as an order that the Baguio City Local Civil
Registrar annotate the same on her birth certificate.
Issue/s: Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years
after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made "within a
reasonable time" as interpreted by jurisprudence.
Ruling:
Issue No. 1: No, There is no legal or procedural framework in place for a
judicial declaration of an individual's citizenship. There is no particular law
 permitting the establishment of a court action to determine whether or not a
person is a citizen of the United States. The trial court's decision to make a
particular statement of respondents' Filipino citizenship was clearly erroneous,
as such a declaration was not within the court's jurisdiction.
Issue No. 2: The 1935 Constitution, which defines people whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, was the governing document when respondent was born on
August 8, 1959. The 1935 Constitution, Section 1, Art. IV, states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

The citizenship of a legitimate child born to a Filipino mother and an alien

father was determined by Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution,
unless the child opted Philippine citizenship when he or she reached the age of
majority. Respondent's citizenship followed that of her father, who is Chinese,
unless she chooses Philippine citizenship when she reaches the age of majority.
Respondent must have legitimately elected Philippine citizenship when she
reached the age of majority in order to be deemed a Filipino citizen.

Vilando v. HRET GR. Nos.192147&192149 August23,2011

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring private
respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of
the House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and
its Resolution dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won
over the other contender, Olivia Paras.
The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by
her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120); Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-
33); and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41). These three (3) petitions were
consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos.
178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which
resolved the disqualification cases against her.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before
the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged
the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that
Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected
and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they
invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s
citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the
naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
Issue/s:
Whether Limkaichong is a natural born-citizen
Ruling: Respondent Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen through his father. 
(From the 1935 Constitution, Section 1(3), Article IV) It makes no difference whet
her the father was a naturalized citizen or not. As a natural-born Filipino citizen, th
e respondent has satisfied the prerequisite for candidacy and holding office, as she 
has followed the line of transmission established by the 1935 Constitution through 
her father.
Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4,
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March
24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as
Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros
Oriental.
Re: Application of Ching ,BAR MATTERNo.914 October1,1999

Facts: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the
St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit
to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and
a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Issue: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable
time".
Ruling: No, Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can
be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged
to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly,
in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
Ma et.Al.v.FernandezJr.GRNo.183133 July26,2010
Facts: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.),
Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma
(Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix
(Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born
under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957,
respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have lived there for nearly sixty (60)
years; they spent their entire lives, studied, and received their primary and
secondary education in the country; they do not speak or understand Chinese, have
never visited Taiwan, and are unaware of any of their father's relatives; they have
not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their children.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their
Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). 
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the
Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L.
Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. On 14 January 1972,
Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao
City, Surigao del Norte. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then
Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the latter
attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.
Issue: Whether all the petitioners are filipino citizen?
Ruling: The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection
(4), Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to
be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but
only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at
large.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration
of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No.
625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the
Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the
Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are
hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix
Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days
from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of
Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their
financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted
by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.
Go.Sr.v.Go GR No.167569 September4,2009
Facts: These petitions arose from a deportation case filed by Luis T. Ramos against
Jimmy T. Go before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration), arguing that the latter is an illegal and undesirable foreigner. While
Jimmy claims to be a Filipino citizen, Luis claims that his personal circumstances
and other records show that he is not. Luis showed Jimmy's birth certificate, which
indicated Jimmy's citizenship as "FChinese" and was issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Luis contended that, while Jimmy's birth certificate purports to show that his
parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document looks to have been
tampered with because only Carlos' citizenship appears to be handwritten, while all
other data appear to be typewritten. He further said that in September 1989 or
thereabouts, Jimmy was able to conceal his genuine citizenship by using deception,
machination, and planning to obtain a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs using false documents and untruthful claims.
Issue: Can the bailbond cancellation be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus?
Ruling: No. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a unique action that is
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The purpose of the writ is to
evaluate if the imprisonment or confinement is valid or legal. If that is the case, the
writ will not be issued.
BengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001
Facts: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4).
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for re election.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
Issue:  whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Ruling: The petition is without merit.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Coquillav.COMELEC,G.R.No.151914,July31,2002
Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the
United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970
to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S.
Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he
remained in the United States.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga,
Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration
Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two (2) years."
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of
Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a
resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about
six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar
for more than one (1) year.
Ruling: No, The term "residence" should not be interpreted in the sense of
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather as "domicile" or legal residence, which is
defined as "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
After joining in the US Navy in 1965, Coquillo lost his Oras citizenship and
became a US citizen. He was an alien without any right to dwell in the Philippines
from then until November 10, 2000, when he regained Philippine citizenship. Our
immigration regulations may have enabled him to stay as a guest or as a resident
alien. Petitioner did not reclaim his lawful residence in the Philippines until
November 10, 2000, when he reclaimed his Philippine citizenship.
Tabasav.CA G.RNo.125793August 29,2006
Facts: Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old,  his father, Rodolfo
Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative
naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship by virtue of naturalization ), petitioner also acquired American
citizenship.
On August 3, 1995, petitioner arrived in the Philippines and was granted a one-
year visa as a "balikbayan." Following that, on May 23, 1996, petitioner was
arrested and held by BID agent Wilson Soluren in Baybay, Malay, Aklan, in
accordance with BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72; he was then sent to the BID
Detention Center in Manila.
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June
10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa,
born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasa’s passport has been
revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued
on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution,"
of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)
(1), and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section
243.4 (D). 
Petitioner submitted a Supplemental Petition asserting that he obtained Filipino
citizenship through repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
8171), and that he cannot be deported or imprisoned by the respondent Bureau
since he is now a Filipino citizen.
Issue: Whether petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost
his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA
8171?
Ruling: The Court finds no merit in this petition.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is
a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by
derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
Repatriation is a privilege conferred by the government rather than a right. This is
required by Section 3 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
citizenship may be relinquished or reacquired in the manner prescribed by law. The
state has the authority to establish the qualifications, procedure, and requirements
for repatriation through legislation. It has the authority to evaluate whether a
repatriation application fits the legal conditions, as it is the State's inherent ability
to choose who shall be its citizens and who can reclaim citizenship once it has been
lost. If an applicant, such as petitioner Tabasa, fails to meet these standards, the
State is justified in denying his or her application.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
Mercadov.Manzano G.R No.135083 May 26,1999 
Facts: The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
His father and mother were both Filipinos at the time of his birth, hence he was a
natural born Filipino citizen under the 1935 Philippine Constitution. His parents
transported him to the Philippines when he was six (6) years old, using an
American passport as a travel document. His parents also had him registered with
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration as an alien. He was given an alien
registration certificate. However, because he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship or swear an oath of loyalty to the United States, he did not lose his
Philippine citizenship.
Issue: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or
run office in the local position.
Ruling: No, Dual citizenship is not to be confused with dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is incompatible, but so are naturalized citizens who keep their
allegiance to their countries of origin after naturalization. As a result, the word
"dual citizenship" in RA 7160 must be interpreted as "dual allegiance." As a result,
people who just have dual citizenship are exempt from this rule.
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC G.R No.162759 August4,2006
Facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship
under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among
others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to
vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration,
as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain
individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing
to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation
(in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" ,
observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the
petition moot and academic.
Issue: whether petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as... absentee
voter under R.A. 9189.
Ruling: Yes, The RA 9225 makes no provision for dual nationals to first establish
residency and physically stay in the Philippines before exercising their right to
vote. Under Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, Congress established
RA 9189, designating who can vote under it, among others, Filipino immigrants
and permanent residents in another nation. Section 5(d) of the same Act establishes
an exception and qualifies the disqualification provision.
Calilungv.Datumanong,G.R.No.160869,May11,2007
Facts: The instant petition was brought against respondent, then-Secretary of
Justice Simeon Datumanong, the individual in charge of enforcing citizenship
laws. Petitioner requests a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from enforcing
Republic Act No. 9225, titled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending Commonwealth
Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Rep. Act No. 9225, according
to the petitioner, is illegal because it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that "dual allegiance of individuals is detrimental to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by the legislature."

Issue: 1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

Ruling: Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it

is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual
allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.