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Investigación original / Original research

Water privatization and public health


in Latin America
John P. Mulreany,1 Sule Calikoglu,2 Sonia Ruiz,2
and Jason W. Sapsin 3

Suggested citation Mulreany JP, Calikoglu S, Ruiz S, Sapsin JW. Water privatization and public health in Latin America.
Rev Panam Salud Publica. 2006;19(1):23–32.

ABSTRACT Objectives. This study had two objectives: (1) to determine what the public health and de-
velopment literature has found regarding the public health outcomes of water privatization in
Latin America and (2) to evaluate whether the benefits of water privatization, if any, outweigh
the equity and justice concerns that privatization raises.
Methods. Using a standard set of terms to search several databases, the authors identified
and reviewed articles and other materials from public health and development sources that
were published between 1995 and 2005 and that evaluated the public health effects of water
privatizations in Latin America from 1989 to 2000, based on (1) access to water by the poor
and/or (2) improvements in public health. Next, the authors examined the experiences of three
cities in Bolivia (Cochabamba, El Alto, and La Paz) in order to illuminate further the chal-
lenges of water privatization. Finally, the authors considered the equity and justice issues
raised by the privatization of water.
Results. The literature review raised persistent concerns regarding access to water by the
poor under privatization. The review also suggested that the public sector could deliver public
health outcomes comparable to those of the private sector, as measured by access rates and de-
creasing child mortality rates. In terms of social equity and justice, privatization marked a
troubling shift away from the conception of water as a “social good” and toward the concep-
tion of water—and water management services—as commodities.
Conclusions. Our results indicated there is no compelling case for privatizing existing
public water utilities based on public health grounds. From the perspective of equity and jus-
tice, water privatization may encourage a minimalist conception of social responsibility for
public health that may hinder the development of public health capacities in the long run.

Key words Water supply, privatization, public health, public policy, Latin America.

1 Xavier High School, Religion Department, New


Access to clean, safe water is a cor- mains inadequate in many regions of
York City, New York, United States of America. nerstone of public health, but it re- the world (1). Compared with Asia
2 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Africa, access to (presumably) safe
Department of Health Policy and Management,
Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America. States of America. Send correspondence to: Jason water is higher in Latin America and
3 Formerly with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg W. Sapsin, Assistant Attorney General, Maryland the Caribbean, with about 78% of the
School of Public Health, Department of Health Health Care Commission, 4160 Patterson Avenue,
Policy and Management and with the Johns Hop- Baltimore, Maryland 21215, United States of population obtaining water piped di-
kins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for America; telephone: (410) 764-3451; fax: (410) 358- rectly through a household connection
Public Health Preparedness, Center for Environ- 1236; e-mail: jsapsin@mhcc.state.md.us. (This arti-
mental Health Tracking, and Center for Law and cle does not reflect the position of any agency of
(2). Rapidly growing urban areas will
the Public’s Health, Baltimore, Maryland, United the state of Maryland.) continue to stretch developing coun-

Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 19(1), 2006 23


Original research Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America

tries’ abilities to provide the infrastruc- trol of water systems in private hands. Text databases, substituting “privati-
ture necessary for urban water and However, if, for example, privatiza- sation” for “privatization” in our
sanitation. For public health advo- tion preferentially favors the “non- searches. Noting the importance of de-
cates, policymakers, and government poor,” then it might properly be re- velopment literature for this issue, we
officials, there are thus clearly two jected on equity and justice grounds. also identified relevant studies, consis-
challenges: (1) increasing water access We also argue that communities must tent with our search terms, from the
and (2) developing additional water be aware of how endorsing privatiza- Web sites of the World Bank Group,
sources, if necessary, to meet the needs tion shapes discussion and thinking the Inter-American Development Bank,
of expanding urban populations. about government commitments to so- and the United Nations University/
In the 1980s and 1990s, some advo- cial development and public health. In World Institute for Development Eco-
cates proposed privatization in order other words, privatization may intro- nomics Research. These databases
to combat the problems of inadequate duce a more limited view of a govern- generally utilize American English for
financing for infrastructure and ineffi- ment’s obligation for promoting pub- English-language articles related to
ciency in the provisioning of water sys- lic health than a community might Latin America, so searches using the
tems and other public services (3). Im- desire. British “privatisation” spelling were
portant global institutions such as the not considered necessary. Also, our
World Bank have taken prominent searches in these databases did not
roles in introducing the private sector METHODS solely rely on the Web site search en-
into the reform of state-based water gines, but also involved scanning the
management. Throughout the 1980s We searched for articles that evalu- Web sites. The studies upon which we
and 1990s the Government of the ated the public health effects of water focus the majority of our discussion
United States of America, the World privatization in Latin America based compare variables before and after pri-
Bank, and the International Monetary on (1) physical and economic access to vatization or, alternatively, between
Fund endorsed a development model water by the poor and/or (2) directly privatized and nonprivatized munici-
known as the “Washington Consen- measured improvements in public palities. We excluded studies from
sus,” which was built on the pillars of health due to privatization. In order to areas other than Latin America, as well
market liberalization, fiscal austerity, capture a wider range of relevant stud- as studies that only focused on market
and privatization (4). The Washington ies, we did not adopt a single, stan- profitability or other purely economic
Consensus contended that the free dard definition of the “poor.” The issues related to privatization.
market, unimpeded by government in- studies that we evaluated employed Eight studies met our initial search
terference and corruption, could trans- three different definitions of “poor”: criteria; we summarize them in Table 1
form underdeveloped economies. (1) households with unsatisfied basic (5–12). Published between 1995 and
The privatization of water resources needs, (2) households below the pov- 2005, these studies evaluated the ef-
raises at least two questions. The first erty line as set by the governments of fects of privatizations in Latin America
is whether water privatization im- the countries in the case studies, and that occurred between 1989 and 2000.
proves public health outcomes, com- (3) households in the bottom deciles of We summarize other studies not of a
pared to public provision of water. We the income distribution of their coun- strictly comparative nature in Table 2
discuss this issue below as it has been tries. These different definitions neces- (13–17). Next, to elucidate further the
presented in the available public sitate caution in making generaliza- challenges of water privatization, we
health and development literature, tions about the poor based on the briefly examine the experiences of
briefly considering questions of physi- studies that we located. three cities in Bolivia: Cochabamba, El
cal access, the issue of pricing, and, Our search used the key words Alto, and La Paz. Finally, we consider
finally, direct measurement of public “water privatization” and “Latin the equity and justice concerns raised
health improvements. The second America” and “water privatization” by the privatization of a scarce, essen-
question is whether the benefits of pri- and “health” in the PubMed database tial resource such as water.
vatization of water adequately balance (United States National Library of
the equity and justice concerns that Medicine), the Social Sciences Full
privatization raises. We explore this Text database (H.W. Wilson Web), RESULTS
question by examining the philosoph- and the Academic Search Premier
ical assumptions of privatization and (EBSCOhost Research Databases), for Public health improvement: access
consider how these assumptions peer-reviewed literature published be- and the related issue of price
might influence public health policy, tween 1995 and 2005. Only Academic
particularly from the perspective of Search Premier indexed articles with Two common measures of the ef-
the poor. the British spelling “privatisation” fects of water privatization on public
Clearly, these two questions are re- along with “privatization.” Therefore, health are increased physical access
lated. The social good of improved we performed additional searches in and economic access (using price).
public health may justify placing con- the PubMed and Social Sciences Full Generally, privatization has positive

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Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America Original research

TABLE 1. Empirical studies of the effects of water privatization in Latin America

Study Countries Methodology Water-related findings

Alcázar et al., 2000 (5) Argentina Calculated the gain in consumer surplus based Under privatization, new connections increased
on Aguas Argentinas records 1992–1997, by 11%, and coverage increased from 70% in
using a demand elasticity based on studies of 1992 to 83% by 1997. Compared to public
willingness to pay in similar cities. provision, consumers were better off by almost
US$ 1.33 billion. Gain in consumer surplus
disproportionately benefited high- and middle-
income users. Affordability was a problem for
poorer households.

Barja and Urquiola, 2001 (6) Bolivia Compared pre-reform and post-reform access Foreign investment enabled increases in ac-
rates, 1989 to 1999. cess to basic services in urban areas. Access
improvements did not bypass the urban poor.
Evidence from the water sector regarding a
privatization/capitalization effect, however, was
inconclusive.

Chisari et al., 1997 (7) Argentina Assessed the macroeconomic and distribu- Including all utilities, effective regulation bene-
tional impacts of privatization in electricity, gas, fits all income classes. Ineffective regulation is
water and sanitation, and telecommunication equivalent to a 16% implicit tax on the average
services by comparing the economy in 1993 consumer, paid directly to the owner of the util-
and 1995, using a general equilibrium model. ity; this tax is 20% for the poorest-income class,
and it is lowest for the median-income class.

Clarke et al., 2004 (8) Argentina, Performed a regression analysis on connection Privatization positively and significantly cor-
Bolivia, and rates in privatized and nonprivatized areas, related with coverage until controlled for time
Brazil based on household surveys before and after trends and compared to cities that never
privatization taken between 1995 and 2001. privatized. In the presence of these controls,
the analysis does not reveal any statistically
significant correlation between private sector
participation and coverage rates.

Delfino and Casarin, 2001 (9) Argentina Compared preprivatization and postprivatiza- Water and sewerage prices increased 11%
tion prices, 1992 to 1999. Used Household following privatization. Only 69% of poorer
Expenditure Survey data (1998) from Greater families benefited from water and sewage
Buenos Aires to estimate welfare changes for services, compared to 89% of the wealthy.
initial consumers and the surplus of the Expenditures for the poor and for the wealthy
newcomers. were 2.7% and 0.5% of income, respectively.

Galiani et al., 2003 (10) Argentinaa Performed a difference-in-difference test of the Privatization resulted in a statistically significant
proportion of households with access to a increase in access to water services. Authors
water network in 1991and 1997 between urban estimate that privatization led to a 5%
localities where water provision had been decrease in child mortality rates.
privatized and where it had not. Calculated a
difference-in-difference estimate of the impact
of privatization on child mortality rates between
1990 and 1999.

Galiani et al., 2002 (11) Argentinaa Performed a difference-in-difference estimate Privatizing municipalities experienced signifi-
of the change in the proportion of households cantly larger increases in the proportion of
connected to water services in privatizing and households connected to water services than
nonprivatizing municipalities from 1991 to nonprivatizing municipalities did. Privatization
1997. Calculated a difference-in-difference accounted for 4.8% to 6.7% lower childhood
estimate of the impact of privatization on child mortality rates in privatized municipalities than
mortality rates between 1990 to 1999. in nonprivatizing municipalities.

McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003 (12) Argentina, Estimated impact of changes in price and Privatization resulted in no clear pattern of price
Bolivia, access on the welfare of households, using change. Welfare benefit from increased access
Mexico, and surveys of income and expenditure between outweighed the effect of price increases.
Nicaragua 1984 and 2000.
a As they relate to water privatization, both of these Galiani et al. articles present findings from Argentina, using similar data and methodologies. Both studies are relevant because they present

slightly different findings and levels of detail. The 2003 article tends to be cited in the literature, but the 2002 article is more detailed on the subject of water. The 2003 article focuses not just
on water privatization but privatization more generally in Argentina.

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Original research Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America

TABLE 2. Other studies related to water privatization in Latin America

Study Countries Methodology Water-related findings

Chong and López-de-Silanes, Argentina, Literature review. The authors found little evidence of generalized
2003 (13) Brazil, Chile, market power abuses, exploitation of workers,
Colombia, or lack of fiscal benefits.
Mexico,
Peru, and
others

Chisari et al., 2001 (14) Argentina, Case study of subsidies and service Rather than pay utility charges that they
Bolivia, and obligations. previously avoided, the poor may self-exclude
others themselves from the utility networks, moving to
neighborhoods that are not serviced. When
faced with unemployment and other economic
difficulties, the poor are likely to abandon utility
networks rather than pay heavy late-payment
penalties and delinquency fees.

Parades, 2001 (15) Chile Compared telephone and electricity access Privatization improved electricity and telephone
rates from 1988, the year before privatization, coverage. Water privatization was not studied
with rates 10 years later. Water and sewage, because privatization in this sector occurred
which were not privatized until later, were a more recently than in other sectors. However,
counterfactual. Examined price changes in the water prices did increase postprivatization to
utility sectors between 1990 and 1999. reflect investments in water treatment plants.

Ugaz, 2002 (16) Argentina, Case studies. Absence of competition and lack of
Bolivia, and transparency in regulatory procedures still
Peru characterize utility provision after nearly a
decade of privatization. Regulation must
include consumers as stakeholders.

Zuluaga, 2000 (17) Chile Compared outcomes from regulatory reforms Market coverage for water reached 100% soon
(not privatization) of the water system after regulatory reform, while sewage coverage
introduced 1989–1990 with a counterfactual increased from 88% in 1989 to 97% from 1994
case between 1989 and 1998. onwards. Rising prices led to decreases in con-
sumer consumption. Reforms led to substantial
increases in domestic welfare gains. However,
in contrast to the outcome of the Buenos Aires,
Argentina, private concession contract, the
largest beneficiary in Santiago, Chile, was the
government, not consumers.

effects on physical access to water in tinct, La Paz and El Alto are linked geo- standable that the gains in the nonpri-
Latin America. Galiani et al. (10) show graphically and economically. El Alto vatized areas would not be as great as
that, in Argentina, household connec- rapidly grew from a poor shantytown in the privatized areas. In addition, the
tions to municipal water supplies in- into a large city.) percentage of users with water cover-
creased by approximately 11% from Nevertheless, the evidence for pri- age at the end of the period examined
1991 to 1997 in areas with privatized vatization’s superiority in expand- was still greater in the nonprivatized
water services. McKenzie and Mook- ing physical access to water relative to localities (89.9%) than in the privatized
herjee (12) found that water privatiza- public systems is inconclusive. While localities (71.4%) (10).
tion increased access to clean water by Galiani et al. (10) point out that the in- Barja and Urquiola (6) found that
the poor, and the researchers also crease in access under privatized local- there was no major difference in the
found some evidence of service im- ities was greater than under nonpri- evolution of water access for La Paz
provements. Barja and Urquiola (6) vatized localities, the nonprivatized and El Alto, the two urban centers in
found that access to water under pri- locations started from a higher propor- Bolivia with privatized systems, ver-
vatization “did not bypass” the urban tion of coverage (86.6%) than did the sus for comparable urban areas in Bo-
poor in Bolivia in the capital city of privatized locations (64.0%). It may be livia with public systems. Until the
La Paz (population 800 000) and the more difficult to gain incremental im- short-lived water privatization in
adjoining city of El Alto (population provements starting from a higher Cochabamba in 1999–2000, La Paz and
750 000). (Though jurisdictionally dis- baseline of coverage, making it under- El Alto had the only privatized water

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Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America Original research

utilities in Bolivia, having been priva- of unemployment for households in version of those rates to devalued
tized in 1997. As will be discussed the lowest income decile in Argentina pesos. Several studies (7, 13, 16) note
below, the privatization contract for in January 1998 was over 40%, and the difficulties of implementing appro-
La Paz and El Alto would itself be can- utility expenses can represent 35% of priate regulatory frameworks for pro-
celled as result of public protest in this decile’s total monthly income. tecting the public from exploitative
2005. Although Barja and Urquiola (6) Households in this decile are particu- pricing. Ugaz (16) notes that while reg-
regard the evidence as “somewhat in- larly vulnerable to downturns in the ulation has been successful in protect-
conclusive,” they note that the conver- overall economy. Not surprisingly, the ing investors and achieving efficiency
gence in water access rates by 1999 in poor are likely to abandon service net- gains, rising utility prices cast doubt
privatized and nonprivatized munici- works when they cannot avoid late- on how effectively regulation has pro-
palities suggests that there was not a payment and delinquency charges. tected poor consumers. Furthermore,
“strong capitalization/privatization As noted above, Barja and Urquiola Ugaz notes that the lack of competi-
effect” for the privatized areas. In (6) found that the private water system tion and transparency that plagued
other words, their evidence did not in La Paz and El Alto in 1999 did not public utility provision still character-
suggest that increased capital from bypass the urban poor. Since that time, izes private utility provision after a
privatization led to greater levels of ac- however, Aguas del Illimani, the water decade of privatization.
cess to water in the private systems as provider to La Paz and El Alto since
compared to the public systems. 1997, failed to keep pace with needs of
In addition, studies often estimate the burgeoning urban population in El Public health improvement:
access indirectly from service avail- Alto. In February 2005, in response to child mortality
ability per building or neighborhood, popular unrest, Bolivia cancelled its
combined with reported household contract with Aguas del Illimani, effec- Despite a vast literature on the rela-
expenditures (9, 12). In a study of Ar- tive immediately. According to a pub- tionship between clean water and im-
gentina, Delfino and Casarin (9) re- lished news report (18), prohibitively proved public health, only one study
ported that water networks in 1997, expensive hookup fees and a failure to in the utility privatization literature ad-
four years after privatization, reached reach agreement with the government dresses the direct effects that the priva-
76% of the households of Greater on service expansions left 200 000 peo- tizing of water utilities has on public
Buenos Aires, an area that includes ple without access to the system. No health. Galiani et al. (11) analyze child
the federal capital and various nearby doubt the failure of Aguas del Illimani mortality differences between priva-
communities. In the same study, how- and the government to reach agree- tized and nonprivatized water systems
ever, only 55% of the households de- ment on service expansions reflects the in Argentina. Though they do not give
clared expenditures for water. The practical difficulty of reconciling the exact numerical data for child mortality
discrepancy between the 76% of needs of the poor with profitability. rates per year, a graph in their study
households physically connected to Long-term price affordability re- provides approximations of the rates.
water and the 55% of households re- mains a persistent concern under pri- According to their presentation, the
porting expenditures for water sug- vatization. Lobina and Hall (19) de- average mortality rate for children aged
gests that some households may have scribe how water pricing can change 0 to 4 years old for privatized and non-
been either abstaining from the water over time, with initial tariff reductions privatized water services in 1995 was
supply or illegally accessing the avail- more than offset by later increases. As about equal—slightly less than 5 chil-
able water. The resulting uncertainty of February 2005, Aguas Argentinas, dren per 1 000. As privatizations in-
over whether these households can one of the largest water concessions in creased after 1995, the child mortality
meaningfully be said to have “access” Argentina and whose largest share- rate for privatized municipalities was
to public water undermines the claim holder is French utility group Suez, re- significantly lower than the rate for
that privatization effectively promotes mained in difficult contract negotia- their nonprivatized counterparts. In
access to water for all members of a tions with the Argentine Government 1998, the year with the greatest ob-
community. in its efforts to obtain a 60% rate in- servable difference in rates, the child
Chisari et al. (14) note that in Argen- crease (20). In 1993, the company re- mortality rate for municipalities with
tina the poor can face significant ob- ceived the concession to provide water nonprivatized water services was some-
stacles in obtaining and maintaining and sewage services covering metro- what less than 4.5 deaths per 1 000, but
access to public utilities. For example, politan Buenos Aires and fourteen out- for the privatized municipalities the rate
newly supplied utility services to lying districts. It now serves ten mil- was less than 4.0 deaths per 1 000. Con-
shantytowns entail connection costs lion people in Buenos Aires proper trolling for confounding variables, such
and fees, which may cause the poor and the seventeen surrounding dis- as income, unemployment, and in-
to relocate to areas that lack those tricts. The request for a substantial rate equality across municipalities, Galiani
services. Moreover, ongoing service increase follows heavy losses that the et al. (11) estimate that privatization ac-
charges need to accommodate the company suffered from Argentina’s counted for child mortality rates that
poor’s financial vulnerability. The rate 2002 freezing of utility rates and con- were 4.8% to 6.7% lower for municipal-

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Original research Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America

ities that were privatized than for those ception of the telecommunications in- and some of the surrounding area,
that were not privatized between 1995 dustry the growth in private invest- would solve water supply problems
and 1999. Further, the effect on child ment in Latin America was insufficient affecting these locations (21). The
mortality was stronger in municipalities to offset declines in public invest- discussions identified the following
with higher levels of poverty. By 1999, ments. This has led to a widening gap problems: insufficient supply of water
however, the mortality rates for priva- in infrastructure between Latin Amer- sources to Cochabamba, SEMAPA’s
tized and nonprivatized water services ica and some East Asian nations (3). lack of financial resources to expand
were almost identical. According to Galiani et al. (11) note that deteriora- water infrastructure beyond 60% of the
their graph, the mortality rates for pri- tion in the performance of water sys- population, and an insufficient supply
vatized municipalities and nonpriva- tems in Argentina under public man- of water for agricultural use.
tized municipalities in 1999 were 3.7 agement was so large that it allowed Following the World Bank’s recom-
and 3.9 per 1 000, respectively. The au- privatization to generate profits, at- mendation, the Government of Bolivia
thors do not explain the similarity of the tract investments, expand service, and in 1999 auctioned the rights to Cocha-
rates, but the numbers could indicate reduce child mortality. bamba’s water system to Aguas del Tu-
that the remaining public municipalities Advocates view privatization as a nari, a consortium comprised of Inter-
performed as well as their private coun- way to make up for lack of public fi- national Water Limited of the United
terparts, as far as providing clean and nancing for infrastructure. However, Kingdom, with a 55% stake (itself a
safe water is concerned. If true, this con- lack of public resources is itself a func- partnership between the Bechtel com-
clusion is important because it would tion of policy choices. At least in part, pany of the United States and the Edi-
suggest that private systems do not al- Latin America’s relatively low tax base son SpA company of Italy); Spanish
ways outperform nonprivate systems— hampers public financing for infra- company Abengoa, S.A., with a 25%
perhaps only the poorly run or underfi- structure. Tax revenue in Latin America stake; and four private Bolivian in-
nanced systems. If nonprivate systems is 16.1% of the gross domestic product vestors, each with a 5% stake (22).
can operate as well as private systems, (GDP), compared to 28.7% of GDP in Under the law, Aguas del Tunari legally
the solution to poorly performing non- developed countries (3). Low revenues gained control of all urban and subur-
privatized systems is not necessarily are due in part to low personal income ban Cochabamba’s surface and subter-
privatization, but rather better managed tax collections, which are 1% of GDP in ranean water, including independent
and better financed nonprivate systems. Latin American countries, but closer to cooperatives, rural wells, and irrigation
7% in developed countries. De Ferranti systems, which had never even been
et al. (3) argue that tax policy in Latin part of the SEMAPA network (23).
An artificially low baseline America should be reformed in order Shortly after privatization in 1999,
resulting from insufficient public to boost public revenues. They recom- water rates in Cochabamba rose on av-
investment mend instituting a consumption tax erage by 43% (12). Massive protests
that is broad-based but that exempts ensued over the arrangement, result-
More generally, the studies we re- food and other essential items in order ing in at least five deaths (24). Ulti-
viewed cannot account for the prob- to prevent excessive burdens on the mately, Bolivia voided the contract in
lem of insufficient public investment. poor, raising personal income tax col- April 2000, returning water provision
Investments in public infrastructure lections by closing tax loopholes, and and administration to SEMAPA and
declined steeply in Latin America generating more revenue from prop- local communities. Aguas del Tunari is
throughout the 1990s due in part to erty taxes through higher rates coupled seeking as much as US$ 50 million in
expectations of privatization (3). This with better property tax administration. compensation for the concession’s ter-
decline may have created an artifi- mination (22). Today, SEMAPA strug-
cially low baseline in terms of water gles to supply sufficient water for its
and sanitation infrastructure such as Lessons from Bolivia: the cities of 56 000 household and business users,
pipes and water mains, against which Cochabamba, El Alto, and La Paz and its customers must store water in
gains resulting from privatization are tanks or containers because water is
magnified both in the before-and-after The example of Bolivia illustrates the not available continually (25). A 2003
studies and in the side-by-side studies. public health challenges raised by pri- news report indicated that 20 000
Private systems may appear more suc- vatization of public water utilities. In households were illegally “tapped
cessful than public systems if the pri- two days of meetings during July 1997 into” the SEMAPA system and that
vate systems produce rapid increases the World Bank urged the President of another 17 000 lacked meters neces-
in the number of households with Bolivia and the Governor of the prov- sary to measure consumption and to
water access. The comparison, how- ince of Cochabamba to recognize that bill it properly (26).
ever, is somewhat unfair if the coun- privatization of SEMAPA (Servicio As noted above, the Bolivian Gov-
try’s tax structure did not generate ad- Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcanta- ernment recently cancelled its water
equate funds for investment in public rillado), the semi-autonomous, public privatization contract for the cities of
systems from the outset. With the ex- water utility for the city of Cochabamba La Paz and El Alto. In 1997 the Boli-

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Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America Original research

vian Government had contracted with ceptable to the local populations. an ample supply of profitable, ines-
Aguas de Illimani, a subsidiary of the Fourth, these cases raise doubts about sential erectile dysfunction drugs (29).
French water company Suez, to run the financial viability of privatization Similarly, one might expect market
the water systems in La Paz and El as a model for extending water ser- forces, whether in the United States or
Alto. At the time of privatization the vices to the poor. in Latin America, to provide water ser-
state water company offered services vices less effectively to the poor, for
to a little over 152 000 households. whom providing service is less prof-
Over the next eight years Aguas de Illi- DISCUSSION itable than with the wealthy.
mani increased the number of house- Finally, we hypothesize that, over
holds with service to about 234 000 The public health effectiveness the long run, privatization discourages
(18). In recent years, however, prohib- of water privatization the development of local capacity to
itively expensive hookup fees and a manage water systems. First, private
failure to come to an agreement on Several considerations qualify our companies may employ managers
service expansion in El Alto left thou- research. First, the different definitions from outside the community, partic-
sands of households (with a total of of the “poor” used in the studies that ularly at senior levels, hindering the
about 200 000 residents) without ac- we considered suggest caution in mak- development of local management ex-
cess to the system. In response to pro- ing comparisons about the poor across pertise and capacity. Second, the insti-
tests, the Bolivian Government can- studies. Second, we limited our article tution of privatization, despite popular
celled its contract with Aguas de searches to peer-reviewed literature disapproval, may discourage the poor
Illimani in January 2005, returning the and leading development institutions. from participating in community-
operation of the water systems in La Third, we only searched English- based public health initiatives. When
Paz and El Alto to public control (18). language sources. However, in our successful, privatization can discour-
The failure of privatization in this case view, the literature does not make a age participation in local public health
is instructive because unlike the priva- compelling case for privatizing ex- initiatives, because public health, like
tization fiasco in Cochabamba, which isting public water utilities in Latin water, may be seen as something for
could be written off as a poorly con- America based on public health which others are responsible. Of
ceived plan, Government officials and grounds. First, physical access to water course, privatization brought commu-
academics regarded the plan for pri- for the poor remains a concern under nities together in Bolivia—to reject
vate water provision for La Paz and privatization. Second, tariffs for public privatization—but ideally communi-
El Alto as carefully constructed and services may drive the poor into less- ties would come together to address
“pro-poor” (27). The plan’s failure developed areas where services are pi- health care issues proactively, not in
calls into question the viability of pri- rated or nonexistent. Third, regulatory reaction to injustices. Further, advo-
vatization as a way to finance water frameworks to protect consumers from cates for community-based develop-
systems for the poor. In 2002, in a pre- unacceptable price increases are inade- ment lose a powerful recruitment and
sentation to the World Bank water quate. Fourth, evidence suggests that motivating cause when governments
division, the chief executive of SAUR the public sector can deliver compara- disconnect the management of water
International, a major international ble public health outcomes as mea- resources from political mechanisms
water company, also rejected the sus- sured by access rates and decreasing that hold management accountable to
tainability of full cost recovery from child mortality rates. Fifth, the Bolivia local consumers. Third, privatizing
users in developing countries (28). cases raise concerns about the financial water systems despite popular disap-
The failed privatizations in Cocha- viability of privatization as a model for proval suggests a broader unwilling-
bamba and subsequently in La Paz extending water systems to the poor. ness of governments to collaborate and
and El Alto demonstrate several While the private sector may have listen to local communities in the de-
salient features of water provision that the capacity to meet specific public sign of successful policies. Listening to
are critically important from a public health needs, that sector is necessarily the poor and taking into account their
health perspective. First, these cases and primarily profit-motivated, not conditions is a prerequisite for achiev-
corroborate lingering concerns ex- public-health-motivated. The health ing just policies, because the poor un-
pressed in the scientific literature over care system in the United States illus- derstand the systemic conditions that
water access and pricing for the poor trates the discrepancies that emerge harm them (30).
under privatization. Second, the cases between public health objectives and
underscore that communities justifi- private sector objectives. In the United
ably regard water as essential for life States the market allocates resources Equity and justice concerns:
and maintain a strong desire for public toward maximizing profit, not achiev- privatization’s paradigm shift
control of water. Third, the cases re- ing optimal public health outcomes.
mind the World Bank and other inter- For example, the country can experi- In our view, water privatization rep-
national organizations that proposed ence a shortage of low-profit, poten- resents a troubling shift away from the
development strategies must be ac- tially life-saving flu vaccines but have conception of water as a good requir-

Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 19(1), 2006 29


Original research Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America

ing common social management, and minishing public investments seen in Alternatives to water privatization
towards the conception of water and Latin America throughout the 1990s in
water management services as com- anticipation of privatization. Adoption Several studies suggest a growing
modities that individuals can purchase of pro-privatization policies casts awareness of alternatives to water pri-
as they can afford. Water is essential doubt on governments’ commitments vatization. Trawick (35) proposes a
for life. The United Nations has de- to development of public health capac- model based on indigenous Andean
clared that access to sufficient afford- ities, especially for the poor. management principles. Ostrom et al.
able, safe, acceptable water is a human Amartya Sen (34) articulates a richer (36) conclude that there are more solu-
right (31). Gleick et al. (32) call water a view of freedom, human rights, and tions for sustainable development than
“social good” because it improves development. In his view, freedom is previously thought. They point out
both individual and social well-being. not merely associated with political that traditional, self-organized group
Kaul (33) identifies water as an “inter- and economic rights, but with the property regimes are sometimes more
mediate” global public good, that is, fullest development of human capabil- effective than central government or
one that contributes to an ultimate ities. In this view, basic health care and private corporate management, be-
global public good of health. Because education are necessary prerequisites cause they employ time-tested rules
water is both essential for life and an for exercising one’s human capabilities that balance the needs of users with
important social or public good, it is to the fullest. When these basic needs the conservation of resources. Sustain-
understandable that communities re- are met, more substantial freedom is able development may require govern-
gard public control over water sys- possible than with the freedom that is ment, private, or traditional manage-
tems as critical. Privatization may derived solely from political and eco- ment forms, or some combination of
make sense for industries where mar- nomic rights. Development calls for them, in order to preserve and use pre-
ket competition brings efficiency and the elimination of sources of “unfree- cious resources fairly and intelligently.
individuals can exercise choice. Water doms” such as poverty as well as tyr- Hall et al. (37) point to the success of
systems, which are traditionally run as anny; poor economic activity as well as the municipal water system in the city
monopolies, are unlike most indus- systematic social deprivation; and ne- of Porto Alegre, Brazil, as an alterna-
tries. While there may be competition glect of public facilities as well as re- tive to privatization. The World Bank,
among providers to acquire a water pression. This expansive view of free- traditionally a proponent of privatiza-
contract, the municipality awards the dom, human rights, and development tion, in its World Development Report
contract to only one provider. The na- is more compatible with the public 2004 no longer presented private sector
ture of water as a scarce, essential, health community’s desire to promote provision as the key to improved water
monopolistic resource makes it partic- greater capacity to address global pub- and sanitation in urban areas (38). The
ularly important that governments lic health needs. developing recognition of valid priva-
guarantee access to it. Privatization of Privatization raises fundamental tization alternatives—that, like privati-
public resources, such as water, may questions about how a nation and a zation, also recognize the need for bet-
diminish the ability of governments to community are to meet the public ter management practices and sound
ensure that the needs of all their citi- health needs of their citizens. Commu- financing—is an important trend for
zens are met, because governments are nities are right to question whether public health. Public health and inter-
no longer directly in charge of these privatization affords them enough national development professionals
services. control of water and other essential must seek to refine and promote these
Privatization is equally troubling on resources. Privatization distances gov- alternatives to wider audiences, in-
other grounds. It inaugurates a mini- ernment from its responsibility for cluding local, national, and global
malist approach to public health im- meeting the needs of its people, and policymakers.
provement by defining public health it diminishes the ability of a commu-
issues first in terms of economic via- nity to ensure that the needs of all its
bility rather than human need. Privati- members are met. Further, privatiza- Conclusion
zation is part of a philosophical ap- tion and its philosophical assumptions
proach that equates freedom, human can shape public discussion about pub- There appears to be little compelling
rights, and development solely with lic health and other public services. evidence in the public health literature
political and property rights. In this The philosophical basis of privatiza- or the relevant development literature
view, governments have a limited tion suggests a narrow role for gov- that privatization is the best, or even
obligation to provide for the social and ernment in promoting public health. necessarily a good, route for improving
health-related needs of their people. Citizens should know that it is possi- water access and public health. First,
People may purchase basic health- ble to envision a greater role, rather there are persistent concerns about
related goods and services if they can than a lesser one, for government in access and affordability for the poor
afford them, but society formally de- the provisioning of public health ser- under privatization. Second, examples
clines to guarantee access to them. vices, in contrast to the model sug- of privatization failures suggest that
Such a view is consistent with the di- gested by privatization. privatization alone is not a fiscally vi-

30 Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 19(1), 2006


Mulreany et al. • Water privatization and public health in Latin America Original research

able way for financing service exten- erally, potentially hindering the devel- whole and back to the poor themselves,
sions for the poor. Third, privatization opment of additional capabilities. Pri- and it works against the notion that
misses opportunities to develop local vatization can suggest that public in- communities have a shared responsi-
health-related capacities. Not only does vestments are not necessary to address bility to meet the needs of their poorest
privatization take control of critical in- vital needs such as health care for the members. Such a mindset runs counter
stitutions out of public hands, it lowers poor. It shifts the burden for providing to public investments in developing
expectations of public institutions gen- services to the poor from society as a health care capabilities.

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RESUMEN Objetivos. Este estudio tuvo dos objetivos: 1) determinar lo que dicen las fuentes bi-
bliográficas sobre sanidad y desarrollo acerca de las consecuencias que puede tener
para la salud pública la privatización del abastecimiento de agua en América Latina
La privatización y 2) determinar si los beneficios de dicha privatización, de haberlos, son mayores que
del abastecimiento de agua los problemas que plantea en materia de equidad y justicia.
y la salud pública en Métodos. Usando ciertas palabras para buscar en varias bases de datos, los autores
encontraron y revisaron artículos y otros tipos de materiales obtenidos de fuentes re-
América Latina lacionadas con la salud pública y el desarrollo. Se buscaron fuentes publicadas entre
1995 y 2005 donde se evaluaban los efectos para la salud que tuvieron las privatiza-
ciones de los abastecimientos de agua en países de América Latina de 1989 a 2000. Se
prestó particular atención a 1) el acceso de los pobres, 2) las mejoras obtenidas en el
campo sanitario, o ambas cosas. Posteriormente los autores examinaron las experien-
cias de tres ciudades de Bolivia (Cochabamba, El Alto y La Paz) a fin de entender
mejor los problemas planteados por la privatización. Exploraron, por último, cómo
esta repercute en la equidad y la justicia.
Resultados. La revisión de las publicaciones reveló inquietud en torno al acceso de
los pobres al agua después de la privatización. Puso de manifiesto, además, que el
sector público es capaz de lograr resultados equivalentes a los obtenidos por el sector
privado, medidos en función de las tasas de acceso y de la reducción de las tasas de
mortalidad de niños menores de cinco años. En lo que respecta a la equidad y la jus-
ticia, la privatización marca el comienzo de una tendencia alarmante a concebir el
agua y su gestión como bienes de consumo y no como “bienes sociales”.
Conclusiones. Nuestros resultados indican que no hay argumentos convincentes de
tipo sanitario que respalden la privatización del abastecimiento de agua. Desde el
punto de vista de la equidad y la justicia, dicha privatización podría fomentar una vi-
sión minimalista de la responsabilidad social en materia sanitaria que a su vez podría
menoscabar las funciones del sector de la salud en el largo plazo.

Palabras clave Abastecimiento de agua, privatización, salud pública, política social, América Latina.

32 Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 19(1), 2006

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