Articulo Violencia en Carceles

Article
International Criminal Justice Review

2020, Vol. 30(1) 99-130
ª 2019 Georgia State University
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Influence of Criminal Activity DOI: 10.1177/1057567719850235
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and Governance on Prison
Violence in Latin America
Jennifer Peirce1 and Gustavo Fondevila2
Abstract
In this article, we explore patterns of prison violence in five Latin American countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru. Drawing on data from prisoner surveys conducted in 49 facilities
with over 4,400 prisoners, we analyze the association between facility-level and individual-level rates
of experiences of violence and the extent of perceived criminal activity committed in or ordered
from inside prisons. Contrary to classical theory, neither poor prison conditions nor prior delin-
quent experience is directly associated with increased violence. Rather, we demonstrate that prison
facilities with more widespread criminal activity inside have higher rates of prison violence. Further,
within a given facility, prisoners with closer ties to criminal activity have more pre-incarceration
criminal exposure and are also more likely to experience violence inside prison; this reflects
research on victim–offender overlap. At a general level, our study shows that involvement in the sub-
rosa economy of the prison increases one’s risk of violence in prison. We consider how common
features of Latin American prisons—scarce state-provided resources, permeability to people on the
outside, and more prisoner-led governance—explain these dynamics of violence inside prisons.
Where prisoner-led governance is more consolidated—such as in Brazil and El Salvador—violence
appears to be less common, even if criminal activity is prevalent, compared to countries where
prison governance is combined or contested between authorities and prisoners. These findings
suggest that prison violence reduction policies should respond to the real needs and strategies of
incarcerated people rather than simply impose more control.
Keywords
prison violence, prison governance, Latin American prisons, deprivation theory, importation theory,
protection rackets
1
Department of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice & CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, USA
2
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City, Mexico
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer Peirce, Department of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice & CUNY Graduate Center, 524 W 59th
St., New York, NY 10019, USA.
Email: jpeirce@jjay.cuny.edu
100 International Criminal Justice Review 30(1)
Violence inside prisons is one of the most serious concerns for justice systems: It causes harm to
individuals and a generalized sense of insecurity, and it amounts to additional punishment and suf-
fering for prisoners, on top of the deprivation of liberty. In Latin America, the most visible and brutal
forms of prison violence make the news (LaSusa, 2016), but more routine violence inside prisons
happens with little documentation or scrutiny. This is in part because prison data in the region are
generally weak. But it is also because there is less consistent formal management of daily life inside
many Latin American prisons, and staff often manage prisons by relying on some degree of collabora-
tion with incarcerated people (Darke & Garces, 2017). In this context, some acts of violence may be
deliberate and “accepted” as part of the prisoner subculture, as also occurs in U.S. prisons (Skarbek,
2014; Trammell, 2009). Inside prisons, groups that manage illicit transactions exert violence strate-
gically and instrumentally, to facilitate their activities (Gundur, 2018; Insight Crime, 2017; Skarbek,
2014). As a result, official records on violent incidents are likely incomplete at best.
To address this gap, this study uses prisoners’ self-reported experiences of violence inside prison,
in 49 facilities across five countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru. Building upon
theories of prison violence in the Global North, which consider prison conditions, prisoners’ prior
experiences, and management tactics, we add a focus on the internal, informal governance and social
dynamics among prisoners. Using data from surveys of prisoners, we take a measure of the extent of
self-reported criminal activity occurring inside prison facilities, as one reflection of variation in
management methods and degree of prisoner organization. We analyze how in-prison criminal
activity levels shape prisoners’ experiences of violence and victimization inside prison. In our study,
neither poor prison conditions nor prior criminal history, on their own, explains variation in pris-
oners’ experiences of violence. We find, though, that facilities with higher degrees of in-prison
perceived criminal activity have higher levels of violence experienced by prisoners. Further, indi-
vidual prisoners who are more involved in criminal activity inside the prison are more likely to
experience violence inside, compared to other prisoners in the same prison. This aligns with research
in the Global North that shows that people who perpetrate crime and violence are more likely to also
be victims of crime and violence inside prison (victim–offender overlap; Pyrooz, Moule, & Decker,
2014; Rufino, Fox, & Kercher, 2012; Schreck & Stewart, 2011).
We argue that this demonstrates the importance of accounting for prisoner culture and the sub-
rosa economy in relatively unregulated Latin American prisons. Although our study does not
directly measure facility governance types, we contend that a plausible explanation for the associ-
ation between in-prison criminal activity and in-prison violence may be that the illicit prison
economy is a reflection of the formal, informal, and hybrid governance strategies found in Latin
American prisons.
Review of Research on Prison Violence and Governance

Latin American prisons are as varied as U.S. prisons—ranging in political and social contexts,
infrastructure and resources, programs and services, and internal culture and social interactions.
There are some major differences, though. First, Latin American prisons are, on average, far more
overcrowded, with many countries at double or triple capacity and some well over 500% over-
crowded (Darke & Karam, 2016). This is due in part to much higher rates of pretrial detention. The
rate in the United States is about 21%, while the rates in Latin America range from 13% in Costa
Rica to 77% in Paraguay, with most countries around 50% (Institute for Criminal Policy Research,
2018). Ten of the 20 countries worldwide with the highest pretrial detention rates are in Latin
America (Schönteich & Varenik, 2014). This situation is due to harsher drug laws since the 1990s,
lack of alternatives to pretrial detention, and problems and poor capacity in investigative and
judicial processes, among other factors. A second difference between regions is that there is
typically no distinction between prisons and jails in Latin America. People in pretrial detention
Peirce and Fondevila 101
are, with some exceptions, held in the same facilities and conditions as sentenced people. Third, in
most Latin American countries, the services and programs inside prisons are very uneven, ranging
from extensive to zero. Similarly, parole systems and supports for people postrelease are minimal
(usually run by churches) and, in many places, nonexistent. Finally, the management of prisons in
Latin America is, with some notable exceptions like Costa Rica, in the hands of police or military
institutions, with some civilians in certain roles. Some systems are federations, with state-level
and federal-level prison systems (e.g., Mexico, Argentina), whereas many are national, with a
single prison system (e.g., Colombia, Chile). In general, prisons in the region are more permeable
and unregulated than U.S. prisons, with much lower staff-to-inmate ratios.
Due to all these factors, there is limited research on prison violence in Latin America. Scholars of
prison life in the region describe elaborate arrangements of rules and both violent and nonviolent
enforcement tactics (Antillano, 2015; Biondi, 2017; Darke & Garces, 2017). Because most research on
prisons in Latin America is ethnographic and within single facilities, there are few studies analyzing
violence and misconduct across multiple facilities or years (notable exceptions exist for Chile [San-
hueza, 2014] and Mexico [Bergman, Fondevila, Vilalta, & Azaola, 2014]).
In general, official data from prison institutions in Latin America cover population numbers and
demographic traits but rarely include reliable records on programs, risk assessments, misconduct,
violence incidents, or recidivism. Much North American and European research on prison violence
relies on official data about misconduct (Harer & Langan, 2001; Morris, Carriaga, Diamond,
Piquero, & Piquero, 2012; Scott, Petrossian, & Mellow, 2018; Wooldredge, Griffin, & Pratt,
2001) or, for facility-specific detail, surveys with prison wardens (Bierie, 2011; Hensley, Koscheski,
& Tewksbury, 2003; Tartaro, 2002). Other scholars use self-reported data—surveys or interviews
with prisoners—because this provides a more complete and honest picture (Celinska & Sung, 2014;
Hochstetler & DeLisi, 2005; Lahm, 2009; Rocheleau, 2013; Tasca, Griffin, & Rodriguez, 2010).
Although standardization is helpful, the principal risk with official data is that it may misrepresent or
omit a significant portion of violence that occurs because both prisoners and prison officials have
incentives to minimize reported violence (Byrne & Hummer, 2007). In Latin American prisons,
variation in institutional style and capacity generates official data that are difficult to compare cross-
nationally. The key limitation of self-reported data is, of course, that prisoners may understand a
given category or question differently—such as “physical assault.”
Deprivation Theory, Importation Theory, and Integrations

Most contemporary research upholds some integrated version of the two classic prison violence
theories—deprivation and importation—noting that factors from both theories, plus management
factors, matter. Deprivation theory (Clemmer, 1940; Sykes, 1958) proposes that the main explana-
tion for violence lies in the nature, extent, and variation in the “pains of imprisonment,” such as
family contact, heterosexual sex, safety, variety in food and daily routine, and opportunities for self-
determination. Such suffering is shaped by one’s previous experiences and expectations (Hochstetler
& DeLisi, 2005), and people respond differently to the same conditions (Blevins, Listwan, Cullen, &
Lero Jonson, 2010; Morris et al., 2012). Research has found associations between worse conditions
and higher rates of serious violence, specifically emphasizing the effects of poor conditions (Bierie,
2011), social and emotional “strain” (Morris et al., 2012; Rocheleau, 2013), and reduced visitation
(Cochran, 2012). Strain theory more generally posits that people with limited options for meeting
their basic needs may resort to violence or crime, including in prison (Agnew, 2006; Blevins et al.,
2010; Merton, 1938). The severity and range of “deprivations” in Latin American prisons can be
dramatic, given the material constraints, but these prisons often permit outside comforts, even for
poorer prisoners, such as conjugal visits or food brought in by families.
Overcrowding is extreme in Latin American prisons and often stands as a proxy for harsh
conditions generally. However, research findings are mixed about whether overcrowding increases
violence in U.S. prisons (Steiner, Butler, & Ellison, 2014; Tartaro, 2002). Some find that over-
crowding effects are moderated by other factors such as prisoners’ age (Lahm, 2008), facility
differences (Camp, Gaes, Langan, & Saylor, 2003; Hochstetler & DeLisi, 2005), nonviolent mis-
conduct (Franklin, Franklin, & Pratt, 2006), or the legitimacy of authority systems (McCorkle,
Miethe, & Drass, 1995; Useem & Piehl, 2006).
Importation theory, originally articulated by Irwin and Cressey (1962), contends that the preex-
isting experiences and attitudes that prisoners bring into prison, as well as demographic traits, shape
violence patterns. Generally, research finds that prisoners who are male, younger (particularly under
25), have more severe conviction types,1 have a history of criminal activity or previous violence in
custody, and who have spent less time in prison are more likely to commit violent misconduct
(Cunningham, Sorensen, Vigen, & Woods, 2011; Lahm, 2008; Steiner et al., 2014). Other factors
such as gang membership, security or actuarial risk classification, race/ethnicity, mental illness, and
longer term exposure to delinquent peers show mixed results across studies (Hochstetler & DeLisi,
2005; Meyer, 2010; Steiner et al., 2014).
Most contemporary research integrates both theories, accounting for facility conditions, individ-
ual traits, and other factors (Blevins et al., 2010; Hochstetler & DeLisi, 2005; Huebner, 2003;
McCorkle et al., 1995; Wooldredge et al., 2001), or aggregating individual indicators at the facility
level (Camp et al., 2003). Notably, one of the few studies to use system-wide quantitative data on
prison violence in Latin America (Sanhueza, 2014) takes this approach.
Prison Management Considerations

Contemporary research also integrates staff and management factors into combined theories,
although it is difficult to categorize this in a comparative way across settings (Mears, 2008).
Variations in staff–inmate ratios and demographic composition of staff sometimes matter, but
not in consistent ways (Camp et al., 2003; Reisig, 1998). But what matters most is the social
culture between staff and prisoners and among prisoners (Bosworth, 2003; Bottoms, 1999; Car-
rabine, 2005; Liebling, 2004). Balanced approaches by formal management entities—using pos-
itive and negative incentives and formal and informal ways of handling problems—are generally
more successful at keeping order and at achieving other goals (Byrne & Hummer, 2007; Cooke,
Wozniak, & Johnstone, 2008; Craig, 2004). Outside oversight by courts can generate improve-
ments in both material conditions and in order and discipline, at least for the short term (Boylan &
Mocan, 2013; Taylor, 2013). Of course, formal management strategies shape and are shaped by
prisoners’ culture, organizations, and reactions, too (Sparks & Bottoms, 1995). Informal prisoner-
led governance factors are discussed in more detail below.
International Research on Prison Violence

Most research on prison violence focuses on systems in the Anglo-American North, and there are
few cross-national studies at the global level (Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-Garcı́a, & Andrés-Pueyo,
2012; Singh et al., 2014). A system-wide study in Chile found that factors noted in Global North
research—such as age, prior history, staff-prisoner interactions, and conditions—are also significant
in Chile, but also that definitions of quality conditions and relationships must be adapted to the local
context (Sanhueza, Valenzuela, & de los Ángeles Smith, 2015). Qualitative studies emphasize that
the nature and extent of violence depends largely on which organized group inside controls the use
of violence and how they wield this role (Butler, Slade, & Dias, 2018; Darke, 2018; Symkovych,
2017). This aligns with North American research on prison gangs (Skarbek, 2014), inmate codes and
subcultures (Trammell, 2009), and prisoners’ understanding of threats from both formal and infor-
mal authorities (Maier & Ricciardelli, 2018).
Informal Governance and Gangs in Prison

In Latin American prisons, given the lack of amenities and relatively low staff–inmate ratio,
prisoner-led organizations tend to have more prominence and control over daily life and resource
distribution. Across the region, prisoners form groups to organize for collective needs, such as
cooking and distributing food, allocating sleeping space, handling the logistics of family visit days,
and sometimes quasi-administrative roles like counts or leading classes (Darke, 2018; Darke &
Garces, 2017; Darke & Karam, 2016; Macaulay, 2013). Within these groups, some are based on
quasi-democratic processes, such as voting for representatives, while others are based on local
affiliations by neighborhood, cellblock, or church group (Antillano, 2015; Darke, 2018; Skarbek,
2016). Some prisoner-led groups in Latin American prisons align with Buentello, Fong, and Vogel’s
(1991) framework of evolution from clique to protection group to predator group (see Gundur,
2018), while in some cases, the formal administration collaborates with factions of inmates in order
to hold control, analogous to what Irwin (1980) describes in pre-1970s California prisons. In Brazil
in particular, prisoner-led organizations quickly transformed into gangs (specifically the Primeiro
Comando Capital) that eventually also gained power in the streets (Butler et al., 2018; Lessing,
2016; Nunes Dias & Darke, 2016). Meanwhile, in Central America, street gangs (such as MS-13 and
18) subject to police crackdowns fortified themselves inside prisons, as they are separated by facility
(Insight Crime, 2017; Rosen & Cruz, 2018).
Prison gangs are prominent in studies of prison violence (Pyrooz, Decker, & Fleisher, 2011),
largely through their role in running illicit economies inside (Skarbek, 2014). A major overview of
gangs in Latin American prisons identifies at least six types of gangs, based on their goals and ties to
outside communities (Insight Crime, 2017). In line with U.S. studies (Skarbek, 2014; Worrall &
Morris, 2012), the way that gangs operate inside prison matters more than whether an individual
person is formally a member, since all prisoners and staff must navigate gang dynamics. Prison
gangs regulate and enforce economic and social transactions where information and trust are
severely constrained (Skarbek, 2012). Their structure and tactics (monopoly, vertical, horizontal)
depend largely on how the government seeks to control them and on whether the gang coheres
through ethnic, ideological, and/or economic ties (Butler et al., 2018; Gundur, 2018). When gangs
have leverage with people who are connected to outside communities, as is common in Brazil and
Central America, they can force compliance by prisoners to the rules they impose inside prison
facilities by threatening consequences on the street (Lessing, 2016; Nunes Dias & Darke, 2016).
Some groups form inside prison for specific reasons, such as protection or for managing drug sales
(Gundur, 2018). In some countries, such as Venezuela, gang-like groups have near-total control
inside the facilities (Antillano, 2015), while in Central America, they negotiate power with staff
(Weegels, 2018) and with street gangs (Rosen & Cruz, 2018), and in Chile and Argentina, prisoner-
led governance groups exist but are not tied to gangs (Insight Crime, 2017; Sanhueza, 2014).
Regardless of the type of group that holds power in informally governed prisons, the rules they
set—the inmate code or subculture, in U.S. parlance—affect what kinds of violence are permitted
(Trammell, 2009). Rules typically prohibit snitching, fighting, stealing, disobeying the hierarchy of
the prisoner governance system, and anything that disrupts the illicit markets that operate inside the
facility. These markets involve legal goods (space, food, water, communications, and other com-
modities, sometimes sex) and illegal goods (drugs, weapons, sometimes sex, etc.) (Darke, 2018).
When formal institutional recourses are not available for enforcing contracts and resolving inter-
personal disputes, groups of prisoners may use threats and violence to do so (on criminal governance
and violence generally, see Barnes, 2017; on this dynamic inside prisons, see Skarbek, 2011). Such
dynamics are noted by prison scholars in the United States (Gundur 2018; Skarbek, 2014; Trammell,
2009), Canada (Maier & Ricciardelli, 2018; Ross, 2017), the former Soviet Union (Piacentini &
Slade, 2015; Symkovych, 2017), Brazil (Biondi, 2017; Darke, 2018), and Venezuela (Antillano,
2015).
This Study: Hypotheses, Methods, and Data

This study explores the question of whether and how the extent and nature of criminal activity
inside a prison facility may explain variation in experiences of violence inside. The central question
of this study is: How does criminal activity inside a prison influence the degree and types of violence
that prisoners experience? Further, it analyzes which kinds of prisoners are closer to criminal activity
and how this proximity is associated with their experiences of violence and victimization. To do so,
we use data from surveys of prisoners, conducted in 49 facilities in five Latin American countries
(Argentina, 9 prisons; Brazil, 9 prisons; Chile, 8 prisons; El Salvador, 9 prisons, and Peru, 14
prisons).
This study has two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The level of criminal activities organized inside a prison is positively associated
with the level of violence suffered by prisoners (physical and sexual violence) and the level of
property theft experienced.
Hypothesis 2: The violence is concentrated among certain types of prisoners inside a given
facility. More specifically, those who report proximity to criminal activity inside are more
likely to experience violence inside prison, compared to other individuals in the same prison.
The following predictors of experiencing prison violence are included as controls: individual
demographics, criminal history, and conviction or sentence type and two measures of facility
conditions. The first is a measure of overcrowding, and the second is a prison conditions index (per
facility), calculated based on access to 19 basic services, such as a toothbrush, clean water, and
school. It also controls for an estimated “security level” of the prison, based on the aggregated
percentage of prisoners with homicide and kidnapping charges, since institutional security designa-
tions and inmate risk assessments are not widespread (see descriptive statistics in Appendix B).
The main outcome variable in this study is physical violence, as reported by prisoners. We also
include sexual violence through indirect experience (observation of this happening to another
person) since this encourages a more candid response—though measures of sexual violence are
highly susceptible to survey design and stigma (Wolff, Blitz, Shi, Bachman, & Siegel, 2006). We
also measure prisoners’ self-reported experiences of property theft, as a nonviolent type of victimi-
zation.2 Other forms of misconduct are excluded.
The main predictor variable is criminal activity directed from or committed inside facilities. We
acknowledge that this includes two types of criminal activity in a single question. The most common
types of crime reported in the survey are extortion, drug selling, robbery, kidnapping, and homicide.
But more minor crimes related to the illicit economy likely occur as well. Overall, we assume that a
portion of prisoners in any given facility will be involved in this type of activity. Official data are
used to build only a few variables, mainly related to prison population characteristics and over-
crowding rates.
Data
The data in this article come from the Survey of Incarcerated Populations in Latin America, a
research project designed and managed by scholars from Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas (CIDE Mexico), including the coauthor on this article (Fondevila) and CELIV
(Universidad Tres de Febrero, Argentina; Bergman, Amaya, Fondevila, & Vilalta, 2015). The team
administered the survey in 2012–2013 in prisons in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru.
These countries were selected for two principal reasons. First, they were the countries where
government partnerships and funding enabled data collection. Second, they have characteristics
in their prison systems that allow for comparisons. Argentina, Chile, and Peru share similar systems
with enough funding to provide basic services for inmates. Brazil and El Salvador have overcrowded
prisons that lack many basic services, and state control varies from partial to minimal, as gangs and
inmates’ groups provide some services an organization. Some features make for interesting single-
country analysis. For instance, Chilean prisons tend to be quite violent, as low-end criminals almost
never end up in jail due to alternatives to incarceration and other mechanisms. Gangs in Argentina
and Peru are almost nonexistent and prison control tends to be handled by ad hoc prisoner groups in
each prison. Brazilian prisons have a mix of nonviolent criminals, gang members, and very violent
criminals, as imprisonment (and pretrial detention) is the most common punishment in the criminal
justice system.
The survey questions are based on CIDE’s long-standing survey of prisoners in Mexico (Berg-
man, Fondevila, et al., 2014). The overall methodology of the survey follows established protocols
and permits specific adaptations required for particular national or local contexts (Bergman, Flom,
& Vilalta, 2014). The surveys for these five countries were funded by the United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP) and are published as part of the 2013–2014 United Nations (UN) Human
Development Report for Central America (UNDP, 2013).3
The total sample across the five countries is 4,437 surveyed inmates in 49 facilities. We used a
multistage sample process, through stratified random sampling of prison facilities (creating strata
using prisons from each provincial area [for Chile and El Salvador] or metropolitan area [for Sao
Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Lima]), with systematic selection of observations and with a gender quota
(explained below).4 We used two sampling frames. First, for the selection of prison facilities, we aimed
for purposive variation in types of facilities and also used feasibility factors (e.g., our project budget
and the distance between facilities). Selection by security level was not feasible, as most Latin
American prisons do not use such classifications for entire facilities. Second, within each facility,
we selected from the inmates who were willing to participate in each unit or area. In facilities with
separate units inside, we surveyed proportional numbers of individuals in each unit. Although pretrial
detention populations are high in Latin American prisons, our sample includes only sentenced inmates.
We selected individual respondents using the official list of inmates and a systematic jump procedure,
with a random starting point, in three steps.5 If a selected inmate refused to participate, then we chose
the following inmate on the list, using the systematic jump procedure. The sample was also stratified
by inmate sex: Because women make up only 5% of the total incarcerated population, we oversampled
women in the surveys. The estimates of key variables are different across countries and regions due to
the effects of survey design and response rates of each facility’s population.6
Survey Development and Administration Process

The survey administration team (hired by UNDP through private pollsters) completed the surveys
with inmates through an in-person interview, asking questions verbally and recording answers on
paper, without recording names. On average, in each country, the interviewer team was composed of
between 12 and 15 interviewers who were trained by the lead researcher in two 4-hr sessions. Due to
the prison authorities’ rules and restrictions, the team used paper-and-pencil interviewing. The
survey team typically spent 1 or 2 days in each facility. The interviews lasted roughly 45 min (each)
and took place in a specifically designated location within each facility or unit—away from any
guards or prison staff, but with explicit permission from the authorities.
The survey questionnaire has 310 (closed) questions that cover sociodemographic, criminal,
institutional, living standards, and other issues. The questionnaire is based in part on the National
Inmate Survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics in the United States, especially on the main
categories of criminal justice history and prison conditions and programs. The prison administrators
had to authorize all questions and screened out some sensitive topics, such as a direct question on
staff corruption. As such, some questions had to be written in a more indirect way. The relevant
question in this study was adjusted for this reason: “Do you know of crimes being committed inside
or being directed from inside prison?”
There was an average refusal rate of 0.4% of inmates summoned for the interview (during the
second day, the rejection rate increases considerably to 2%). This low refusal rate is likely due to the
fact that this was the first research project in most facilities and prisoners were eager to share their
views and, also, the prison staff gave ample space and autonomy to the research team.
As in any prison research, the formal and informal surveillance that prisoners experience influ-
ences the way they participate in interviews and surveys. Prison conditions and length of stay may
influence perceptions and what people report to researchers (Bulman, Garcia, & Hernon, 2012).
Because it is difficult to isolate these effects, it is advisable that studies of prisons develop a (weak)
quasi-experimental methodology to compare groups and explain their differences. In this study, we
compare prisoners’ experiences of violence based on factors affecting groups of prisoners: facility
conditions, overcrowding levels, extent of programs in a facility, and degree of criminal activity
inside a facility. We use various individual-level variables as controls.
Missing Data
Although the response rate out of total potential respondents was quite high (over 98%), not all
respondents answered every question in the survey. It is difficult to ensure that surveyed inmates
answer all questions, perhaps due to fear of retaliation or a desire to present a certain image to the
surveyor. Despite taking many precautions for privacy, prisoners may still hesitate to answer some
questions. We did not note any pattern of respondents skipping particular questions—such as those
to do with violence or drugs—more frequently than others. We did not impute data for questions
where responses were missing.
For this study, the key question is the one that asks about a person’s knowledge of crimes inside
prison. On this question, 83.7% of respondents provided an answer (3,709 valid responses of 4,437
surveys). This limits the present analysis to a maximum of 3,709 surveys. Within this set, in each
analysis, if an answer was missing on another relevant variable, we dropped the case from the
analysis. In the multivariate analysis (Appendix D), the smallest number of valid cases was
3,411. In the bivariate analyses of individual variables, the smallest number of valid cases was
594 (on a question about recent use of crack/cocaine).
Variables
Following our hypotheses outlined above, we explore experiences of violence and victimization
as outcome variables. These questions are all dichotomous (yes/no).
Prison violence: In the last 6 months, have you been beaten?

Sexual violence: Have you seen other inmates been forced to have sexual relations against
their will?7
Property theft victimization: Have your personal possessions been stolen in prison?
We include property theft as a dimension of victimization even though it is not necessarily

violent. The key independent predictor variable is the extent of crimes committed from inside or
inside the prison. This is measured through this question (dichotomous):
Do you know of crimes being committed inside or being directed from inside prison?
We acknowledge that there are limitations to a dichotomous question. When a higher proportion
of prisoners answers “yes” to the question, this suggests a more extensive and active illicit economy
and level of organization.
Each of the 49 prisons was classified into one of five groups according to the percentage of
inmates that responded positively to this question about crimes inside. The five groups are defined as
follows: a very low level of crimes (less than 10% of inmates answered “yes”), low (between 10%
and 20%), medium (between 20% and 30%), high (between 30% and 40%), and a very high level of
crimes (more than 40% of inmates answered “yes”). In these categories, 11 prisons were classified in
“very low,” 17 in “low,” 8 in “medium,” 7 in “high,” and 6 in “very high.”
In the logistic regression, we include other factors at the facility and individual level.
Facility factors.
Percentage of sentenced for homicide and kidnapping in the facility (0–100%).

Overcrowding (1/0): Are there inmates in your cell who do not have a bed?
Prison conditions: A score based on what percentage of prisoners answered yes to questions
on specific amenities and services.
The percentage of people sentenced for violent crimes is an estimation of the “security level” of a
facility, in a crude sense. The latter two factors—overcrowding and the prison conditions index—
reflect dimensions of the “pains of imprisonment,” part of deprivation theory.
Individual factors. Demographic factors are controls; we test the criminal justice history factors as part
of importation theory.
sex,
age,
conviction type (coded for the type of crime),
sentence length,
time in prison so far,
individual drug use in prison (yes/no),
participation in prison programs (yes/no),
prior experiences with violence (yes/no),
prior experiences with weapons (yes/no),
was in a juvenile detention institution (yes/no),
had contact with gangs during childhood (yes/no), and
robbed people or sold drugs as a juvenile (yes/no).
See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the sample. A description of the statistics of all variables
can be found in Appendix B.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Sample by Country and Enrollment Process.

Number of
Prisons Surveyed # of Prisons
Prison Prison Average Survey ( M F) Sample as a % as a % of Total
Population Number Population Occupancy Sample of Total Prison Number of
Country Total of Prisons Rate Level (%) Size W M Both Population Prisons/Country
Argentina 72,693 285 167 106.2 516 3 6 0 0.71 3.16

Brazil 668,914 1,449 322 162.9 751 1 8 0 0.11 0.62
Chile 42,226 103 232 110.9 805 2 3 3 1.19 7.76
El Salvador 39,110 25 598 348.2 1,160 1 5 3 2.97 36.0
Peru 85,175 69 266 230.5 1,205 0 7 7 1.14 20.29
Total 4,437 49
Note. Data on prison population rate and occupancy level are from Institute for Criminal Policy Research (www.prisonstudies.
org). Data on prison population are from the corresponding prison authority.
Findings
Descriptive Findings: Extent of Criminal Activity Inside Prison
Across all five countries in our study, almost one in four inmates answered affirmatively that they
knew of criminal activity inside the prison (23.5%). This proportion is higher in Chile and Peru, with
36.7% and 33.5%, respectively, and lowest in El Salvador, where only 11.1% of respondents
answered that they have knowledge of crimes inside prison. When disaggregating by type of crime
they knew about being committed in or directed from prison, the most common types, across all five
countries, are extortion (9.0%), followed by drug trafficking (5.8%), robbery (5.2%), kidnapping
(4.9%), and homicide (2.5%). These rates may seem low individually, but the aggregate level of
crimes is higher, though admittedly there are reasons for prisoners not to report this honestly,
particularly in gang-controlled facilities (see Appendix A).
This shows the variation in the approximate level of criminal activity inside prisons, as reported
by inmates, across facilities and across national systems. Notably, within each country, there is a
wide range from 5.9% to 35% in Argentina, from 0% to 16% in Brazil, from 10% to 57% in Chile,
from 0% to 11% in El Salvador, and from 11% to 33.5% in Peru (see Table 2 for details). As outlined
in the review of relevant research, it is reasonable to assume the prisoners who report knowledge of
organization of crimes in prison are closer to—though not necessarily participating in—the prisoners
who are directly involved in the criminal activity. Due to the risks of disruption or punishment, those
involved in crimes have reason to keep this information limited to people who are involved and/or
trusted. The rest of the inmates in the facility may be generally aware that illicit or criminal acts
Table 2. Summary of Prisons per Country, Disaggregated by Level of In-Prison Crimes.

Very Low Low (10–20% Medium (20–30% High (30–40% Very High
Group of Level of (<10% Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge (>40% Knowledge
Crimes/Country of Crimes) of Crimes) of Crimes) of Crimes) of Crimes) Total
Argentina 3 3 2 1 0 9
Brazil 2 6 1 0 0 9
Chile 0 1 1 3 3 8
El Salvador 6 2 1 0 0 9
Peru 0 5 3 3 3 14
Total 11 17 8 7 6 49
occur, but they do not have actual knowledge of these crimes. Many also likely deliberately distance
themselves from such information. Research in both North America and Latin America suggests that
committing crime inside prisons requires collaboration and organization among a group of prison-
ers—but this study does not directly measure the nature or strength of that organization. Rather, it
analyzes the extent of in-prison criminal activity and of violence and property theft inside, at the
facility level and the individual level.
Prisoners With Knowledge of Criminal Activity Inside Prison Report Higher Criminal
Exposure and Involvement Pre-Incarceration and During Incarceration
Prisoners with knowledge of criminal activity inside prison report experiences of previous
criminal activity and exposure significantly more (p < .01) than do prisoners with no knowledge
of criminal activity in prison (see Appendix C). These indicators include pre-incarceration crim-
inal exposure8 and pre-incarceration criminal activity and severity.9 Moreover, those involved in
crimes inside prison were more likely to have been unemployed or working with law enforcement
prior to arrest. Not surprisingly, prisoners who know about crimes inside prison have spent longer
in prison (over 10 years), compared to prisoners who do not know about crimes inside. This
difference may be due to having longer sentences due to charge severity. But a more plausible
explanation is that the longer one spends in prison, the more one has awareness of crimes com-
mitted inside and opportunities to be involved in such crimes. Moreover, time inside prison builds
trust and relationships that can be economically beneficial during and after prison. Because
punishment for in-prison crimes is unlikely and formal parole decisions are discretionary, the
incentives to participate in the prison illicit market may outweigh the incentives of parole criteria.
Prior and current substance use10 is also associated with knowledge of in-prison crime—which
makes sense because drug sales are a major part of most illicit markets inside prison (see Appendix
C for detailed statistics).
When disaggregating by country, there is some notable variation in terms of which specific risk
factor is significantly associated with knowledge of in-prison crime. For example, gang involvement
matters in Brazil, where 25.8% of prisoners who grew up with gangs report in-prison criminal
activity, compared to only 8.2% of those who did not grow up with gangs in their neighborhood;
the difference is modest in Argentina (18.8% vs. 20.1%). Also, in El Salvador, inmates charged with
a gang-related crime are twice as likely to have knowledge of crimes (10.2% vs. 21.8%), which is not
the case in Chile (36.5% vs. 40%). In Peru, previous violent crime matters: more than half (52.7%) of
inmates who have wounded or killed someone report in-prison crimes, compared to 30.4% whose
have never wounded or killed anyone, whereas in El Salvador, the difference is marginal (10.2% vs.
11.8%). Experience with firearms is associated with knowledge of in-prison crime in Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, with 22.3% vs. 9.5%, 19.6% vs. 9%, and 41.9% vs. 22.3%, respectively, but not in
El Salvador (12.8% vs. 9.4%).
In summary, almost one in four inmates in Latin America has knowledge of crimes being
organized from inside the prison. This group of prisoners also has higher involvement in and
exposure to criminal activity and peers, both before incarceration—including during childhood—
and during incarceration. In short, they appear to continue participation in illegal activities once
inside prison. These factors all represent the key elements of importation theory—the experiences
and values that an individual brings with him or her into incarceration. Building on importation
theory, we tested whether people with more previous exposure to crime and violence experience
significantly more violence inside prison. This direct association was not significant—which sug-
gests that simple importation theory is not a sufficient explanation. However, it is important to note
that prior exposure to crime and violence is related to knowledge of crimes inside prison, which is
the principal predictor variable we analyze, in the following section, first at the facility level and
then at the individual level.
Association Between Facility-Level Criminal Activity and Individual Experiences of Violence

Our analysis finds that prisoners who reside in facilities with higher levels of crimes organized
inside report experiencing more violence and property theft—with the exception of the association
with physical violence for three countries.
1. Property theft: In the prisons with higher proportions of people reporting knowledge of
crimes committed inside, more people report having their possessions stolen.
2. Physical violence: In the prisons with higher proportion of people reporting knowledge of
crimes committed inside, more people report being beaten by other prisoners (A) and by staff
(B). This relationship is significant for Argentina, Brazil, and for the five countries combined,
but not for Chile, El Salvador, and Peru.
3. Sexual violence: In the prisons with higher proportion of people reporting knowledge of crimes
committed, more people report experiencing nonconsensual sex. This relationship is significant
for Argentina and the combination of countries, but not for the other countries. Notably, reports
of sexual violence observed are higher in male facilities than female facilities.
Across all countries, in prisons with a very low level of crime inside, 17.9% of prisoners
experienced property theft, while 50% of prisoners in prisons with a very high level of organization
of crimes reported property theft. On physical violence, the proportion of inmates who report having
been beaten goes from 3.4% in very low-crime facilities to 21.1% in very high-crime facilities. On
sexual violence, the proportion of inmates who report having seen others forced to have sex rises
from 2.1% in very low-crime facilities to 14.3% in very high-crime facilities (see Table 3 and Figure
1 for details). Per prison, the correlation between knowledge of crimes and physical violence is .629
(N ¼ 49; p < .001), with property theft the correlation is .581 (N ¼ 49; p < .001) and with sexual
violence the correlation is .37 (N ¼ 49; p ¼ .008).
Thus, Hypothesis 1 (the level of criminal activities organized inside a prison is positively asso-
ciated with the level of violence suffered by prisoners) is not rejected.
As shown in Appendix B, violence levels vary widely among the countries. Brazil and El Salvador
have the lowest levels of violence while Chile and Argentina have the highest. Nonetheless, when
disaggregating the violence by level of organization of crimes, in all countries, we observe a tendency
for more violence in the prisons with the highest levels of organization of crimes. For instance, in
Argentina, the percentage of inmates who have been beaten in prisons with “very low level” of crimes
Table 3. Percentage of Inmates Who Have Suffered Violence Within the Prison, Disaggregated by the Level of
Crimes Committed Within the Prison.
Level of Organization % Belongings Have % Has Been % Others Have Been

of Crimes Been Stolen Beaten Forced to Have Sex
Very low 17.9 3.4 2.1

Low 35.7** 7.8** 5.7**
Medium 40.4* 12.9** 6.3
High 44.0 23.0** 11.3**
Very high 48.3* 21.1 14.3*
Note. Test of difference of proportions with the immediately previous level of organization of crimes.
Level of significance: **.01 and *.05.
% belongings have been stolen % has been beaten

% others have been forced to have sex
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very low Low Medium High Very high
Level of organization of crimes
Figure 1. Percentage of inmates who have suffered violence within the prison, disaggregated by the level of
crimes committed within the prison. Bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. Data from study survey.
Argentina Brasil El Salvador Perú Chile

Very low Low Medium High Very high
50%
% of inmates that hav e been beaten in the last six
45%
40%
35%
30%
months
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
% of inmates that have knowledge of crimes inside the prison
Figure 2. Percentage of inmates who have knowledge of crimes organized inside the prison and percentage
who have suffered physical violence, disaggregated by country.
inside is 10% and increases up to 19.6% in the prisons with “high level” of crimes inside. In Brazil,
1.5% of inmates in prisons with very low or low levels of crime organized inside have been beaten,
while 15.4% report beating in prisons with medium levels of crimes organized inside. This pattern is
similar in Chile (which has the most violent prisons): 10% were beaten in prisons with low levels of
criminal activity inside, while 28.3% were beaten in prisons with high and very high levels of criminal
activity inside. The exception is El Salvador, where physical violence does not correlate with any level
of organization of crimes. We speculate that this is due to the unique role of gangs in Salvadoran
prisons, with facilities almost entirely run by a given gang that exerts hierarchical control over both
criminal activity and the use of violence among prisoners (see Figure 2).
Association Between Prison Conditions and Violence

Following deprivation theory, we also tested the direct association between prison conditions at
the facility level and experiences of violence. To do so, we used the Prison Conditions Index, which
is built based on how many individuals in each facility responded that they had access to a series of
basic services. In aggregate, El Salvador’s prisons have the lowest conditions score and Argentina’s
prisons have the highest conditions score (see Appendix B for details). In the mixed effects logistic
regression of experiences of violence and theft and the prison conditions index (per facility), there
are no significant associations. Similarly, we tested the association between the overcrowding rate of
each facility and the prevalence of prisoners’ experiences of violence. This association was also not
significant (see Appendix D for these results.)
Further, we tested the direct association between the “security level” of the prison and experi-
ences of violence. As discussed above, prisons in the countries we studied are not classified as
maximum, medium, and minimum security. Instead, we assigned each prison a score of “severity”
based on the percentage of prisoners inside who had a sentence due to homicide and kidnapping—
the most severe charges. We have no way to determine whether conditions or security measures are
different for these facilities, but it is reasonable to assume that to the extent that the administration
could exert stronger controls on prisoners’ movements and privileges, they would apply these on the
prisons holding the people with the most violent charges. (Risk assessments on factors other than
charge are not widely used.) Using this approach, we find no significant associations between the
proportion of prisoners with severe violent crime charges and the prevalence of experiences of
violence at the facility level (see Appendix D)
These findings—about the role of prison conditions, overcrowding, and of the “severity” of the
facility—suggest that deprivation theory alone is not a sufficient explanation for the prevalence of
violence inside prisons. Although this direct association is not the main hypothesis in this study, we
nonetheless anticipated that harsher prison conditions and more overcrowding would be associated
with more violence. Given that our findings do not show support for a direct link between violence in
prison and individual criminal history (importation theory) or facility conditions (deprivation the-
ory), we turn to other dynamics inside prisons, to build a more nuanced picture.
Individual-Level Analysis
Now we move to an individual analysis to test Hypothesis 2 (the violence is concentrated among
certain types of prisoners inside a given facility). To analyze the individual characteristics associated
with prison violence, we use a model of logistic regression. We replicated the same model for the
property theft (nonviolent insecurity) and for two types of violence: physical and sexual (indirect)—
all dichotomous variables. Whether a person suffered these types of violence is the dependent
variable, and the predictor variables are (a) the individual’s knowledge of crimes organized from
inside prison (individual—dichotomous) and (b) the level of criminality within the prison (from very
low to very high, as per the levels described above).
Control variables for individual demographic and social characteristics are age, sex, education
level, and history of exposure to criminal activity before the current sentence (friends who com-
mitted crimes, previous prison sentences, use of firearms, and use of drugs). Variables on the
individual participation in community activities and the consumption of substances such as alcohol,
marihuana, cocaine, and ecstasy in the last 6 months are also included. Dichotomous variables for 10
kinds of crimes were included to control for the severity of the crime for which the person is
currently incarcerated (intentional homicide, manslaughter, sexual crimes, etc.). Finally, dichoto-
mous variables for each of the five countries were included to control for differences in criminal and
prison systems.
Our analysis finds that sex and age are more important than education level. There is a significant
difference by sex for property theft—men experience higher property theft than women—but
differences are not significant for the other types of violence. (This is rather surprising, given that
one might expect women to report higher levels of sexual violence.) Younger inmates (up to 35 years
old) suffer more physical violence compared to older inmates. But for sexual violence, older
prisoners report higher observations. There are no significant differences by age for property theft.
Individual education level does not affect the level for any of the types of violence or insecurity.
Few factors related to pre-incarceration exposure to criminal activity are significant. People’s
previous delinquent peer ties and prior use of a weapon moderately increase the probability only for
sexual violence but not for property theft or physical violence. Surprisingly, previous incarceration
(as an adult or juvenile) is not significantly associated with individual experiences of violence. On
substance use, past individual consumption of marijuana, but not other substances, moderately
increases the probability of property theft, while past consumption of ecstasy moderately increases
the probability of physical violence. (This may reflect the relatively low prevalence of cocaine and
heroin.) Once inside the prison, if a prisoner consumes marihuana, alcohol, or cocaine, the likelihood
that a person suffering violence, especially physical violence, increases.
The type of crime for which the person was sentenced affects their probability of experiencing
physical violence and property theft but has a particularly significant effect on their probability of
observing sexual violence inside prison. Those sentenced for crimes with major social impact and
visibility—namely, intentional homicide, kidnapping, assault, sexual crimes, aggravated robbery,11
small-scale drug selling, or simple theft—have observed more sexual violence than inmates sen-
tenced for other crimes, such as manslaughter or fraud. The only sentence type that increases a
person’s probability of experiencing or observing all types of violence is a sexual crimes sentence;
this likely reflects the reality that people with this charge tend to be targeted by or marginalized by
other prisoners, due to stigma. It is notable that type of crime does not seem to matter overall for the
probability of experiencing theft or physical violence.
Conversely, individuals’ participation in various prosocial activities inside prison—sports, aca-
demics, and a job—overall does not have any significant relationship with their likelihood of
experiencing violence or theft (see Appendix D). Participation in such activities depends on the
level of opportunity and access to such programs, which varies dramatically by prison (and is
reflected in the prison conditions index discussed above). But propensity and personal choice to
participate also reflects “positive values,” from the perspective of importation theory. The only
significant relationship is between participation in academic activities and likelihood of experien-
cing property theft, which likely reflects a higher socioeconomic position, and therefore may be
more about crimes of opportunity instead of individual values.
Discussion
The first notable finding from our analysis is that a direct test of deprivation factors—prison
conditions and overcrowding—and of importation factors—prior criminal activity/exposure—
shows that these are not significant predictors of prisoners’ experiences of violence and theft during
incarceration. This stands in contrast to classical North American and European theories in their
simplest form but aligns with more recent research suggesting that more multifaceted analysis—
accounting for factors like prison management styles—is required. Although a comprehensive,
multidimensional analysis of management factors is outside the scope of this study, our analysis
of criminal activity inside prison as a potentially important factor is part of this more complicated
picture. On this front, our findings generally provide support for our hypotheses. First, we find that
higher levels of perceived criminal activity inside facilities are associated with higher levels of
prisoners’ experiences of violence. Second, at the individual level, prisoners who are more closely
tied to criminal activity are more likely to experience violence, compared to others in the same
facility. As explained above, we consider criminal activity inside prison to be not just an important
factor on its own but also a reflection of certain informal governance dynamics in the prisoner
culture and in prisoners’ negotiated power arrangements with staff. In the following section, we
consider what our findings and the Latin American prisons context suggest in terms of understanding
criminal activity inside prison and, taking a step further, informal prison governance issues, as
relevant to the existing theories of prison violence (deprivation theory, importation theory, and an
analysis of management factors).
Poor Prison Conditions as a Governance Challenge

In our study, there is no simple, direct link between poor prison conditions and prisoners’
experiences of violence and theft. This may be due in part to the reality that for most incarcerated
people, poor material conditions and overcrowding inside prison do not differ much from the poor
material conditions of their home communities or from what marginalized communities know to
expect during detention. In other words, the bar for what counts as a real sense of “deprivation” is
higher for people who are accustomed to poverty and state neglect.
Another explanation might be that prisoners self-organize to fill the gaps. Prior research in Latin
American prisons and, to some extent, in North American prisons suggests that illicit economies and
informal prisoner-led governance arrangements emerge in situations where prisoners’ needs are not
being met by the formal administration. For example, prisoner-led governance groups may organize
collecting money for purchasing outside food supplies or providing mattresses and electricity (Darke
& Garces, 2017). Prisoner-led groups (gangs or otherwise) also organize to facilitate more illicit
transactions, such as drugs and weapons, in response to prisoners’ demands for these (Skarbek,
2014); this demand suggests a need for sedation/intoxication and for protection, to survive
incarceration.
If prisons are very overcrowded and underfunded, it is more challenging for these groups and for
staff to keep order and discipline, even if they are responding to some concrete needs. The groups
that hold power inside may use violence more liberally to enforce rules but may also develop
strategies to reduce or mitigate conflicts over scarce resources and harsh conditions. Similarly, in
overcrowded cells, prisoners’ actions and infractions are constantly observed by other prisoners,
which could increase enforcement by formal and informal authorities but could also generate
incentives to find day-to-day nonviolent ways of handling the pressures of overcrowding.
Further research is necessary to explore how different prisoners, at the individual level, and
different prisoner-led organizations, at the facility level, cope with the “pains of imprisonment” such
as a lack of basic amenities and space, in the Latin American context where these conditions are
widespread and normalized. Moreover, it is unclear whether the insignificant effects of prosocial
activities that may be available—such as sports, school, or jobs—on violence (in this study) reflect
inconsistent access to such activities across or within facilities. Although access to such activities may
serve as a way to cope with harsh prison conditions at the individual level, these do not necessarily
resolve prisoners’ basic needs for space, food, money, and protection. In Latin American prisons, even
individuals with decent access to pro-social activities likely need to participate in informal prisoner-led
governance arrangements in order to cover the conditions that the state does not provide.
Prior and Current Exposure to Criminal Activity and Experiences of Violence

Regardless of facility differences in crime or violence, this study shows that violence inside
prisons is concentrated among certain individuals. The prisoners who report knowledge of crimes
inside—that is, are close to the groups running criminal activity inside—also are more likely to
report experiences of violence. It is difficult to determine whether people with a propensity for
violence choose to—or are recruited to—join up with groups involved in crimes or whether those
who start committing crimes inside prison then later experience violence inside. Importation theory
suggests that they seek out what they are accustomed to, while strain theory suggests that those with
fewest options for survival are more likely to use force. Most likely, these links go in both directions
and reinforce one another. Further research should explore interactions between prior criminal
activity/exposure, current involvement in in-prison criminality, and experiences of violence, at the
individual and group levels.
What’s more, where there are more people in this high-crime high-violence group, there is a more
generalized effect on prison violence: All inmates experience higher levels of violence and theft.
This points to the possibility that this group has an influence on the general culture of prisoners,
regardless of any illicit market or governance factors. It is worth highlighting that the prisoners who
are in this “concentrated” group also reflect the individual characteristics that U.S. and European
research find to be significant for involvement in violence during incarceration: age (young), sex
(male), prior involvement in and exposure to criminal activity, and prior incarceration. This provides
some support for importation theory’s relevance in Latin American prisons, even when facility-level
and structural factors also matter. Theories that emphasize exposure to criminality as a predictor of
experiencing or committing violence in prison (see, e.g., Hochstetler & DeLisi, 2005) align with our
data—though in Latin America, the exposure also occurs inside prison for some people. The fact that
crime or charge type (at the individual level and aggregated at the facility level for severe crimes) is
not a significant predictor of experiences of violence also fits this explanation: Risk levels are less
about a single illegal action and more about one’s peers and social experiences.
Considering the Potential Effects of Informal Governance Arrangements

Our findings show that facilities with more widespread criminal activity also have more pre-
valence of violence and theft experienced by prisoners. As we have outlined, since a direct appli-
cation of deprivation and importation theories does not explain variations in experiences of violence,
it is important to consider how prisoners might respond differently to the conditions and cultures of
prison facilities in Latin America. Illicit and criminal activities undertaken by some prisoners might
be both a respond to the conditions of the facility and an influence on the culture of the prison more
generally. We argue that a plausible explanation for at least some of the link between criminality and
violence inside prison might be that prisoner-led informal governance mechanisms influence when
and how prisoners use violence. Where criminal activity is more widespread, the relative power of
the tactics for facilitating these activities—including violence as a rule-enforcing tactic—is stronger
than in prisons with lower levels of criminal activity.
Economic research shows that people use violence as a way to enforce rules and contracts for
transactions that are illegal or illicit and cannot rely on formal laws; this dynamic is exacerbated in
prison settings where buying and selling “regular” goods is often prohibited, along with goods such
as drugs or weapons. Therefore, the prison gangs or groups responsible for these transactions deploy
violence strategically and regularly (Skarbek, 2014). Research on how organized criminal groups
that run illicit markets outside prison highlights the importance of keeping order and avoiding high-
visibility incidents of violence, in order to facilitate uninterrupted transactions and to reduce atten-
tion from authorities (Durán-Martı́nez, 2018; Lessing, 2016). This can involve protection rackets, in
which those in power use violence deliberately to reinforce their power and to impose order, and
government officials may participate in these or turn a blind eye (Gundur, 2018). In the same vein,
when prisoner-led governance groups no longer meet prisoners’ needs, prisoners may use violence
to disrupt their rule; prisoners may also use coordinated violence to exert pressure on formal
authorities (Lessing, 2016; Weegels, 2018).
However, a key insight from this broader research on criminal groups’ use of violence is that
groups deliberately hide the violence they use or choose low-visibility tactics—such as burying
bodies—to avoid detection (Durán-Martinez, 2018). Periodically, confrontations between groups or
with law enforcement may generate episodes or incidents of violence. These dynamics likely occur
within the prison setting as well, particularly in more permeable prisons in Latin America where
such arrangements can involve actors on the outside as well as on the inside. Therefore, where
criminal governance structures cover most of a prison’s population or social environment, vio-
lence—both visible and covert or hidden—is likely more widespread—even if it does not appear
in official data or public reports. More detail on the frequency, severity, or visibility of violence
against prisoners, as well as changes over time, would be necessary to understand how the violence
patterns stem from protection racket dynamics.
A feature of protection markets and criminal governance is that, in many cases, when they
consolidate control, violence rates often drop, due to reduced conflict and more compliance with
the (illicit) rules (Arias, 2017; Lessing, 2016). So, in the prison setting, this might mean that where
criminal activity is more sophisticated and organized, there is less violence and more security,
though under a strict regime. This might explain the fact that prisoners report much lower levels
of violence, particularly physical violence, in prisons in El Salvador and Brazil—where gangs are
more dominant. Although some of the most visible and brutal cases of violence in prisons have
occurred in these prisons—such as the 2017 riots in prisons in Northern Brazil (Darke, 2018) and the
killing or decapitation of gang members in El Salvador (Insight Crime, 2017)—these are the
countries where gangs have the most consolidated control inside prisons (Lessing, 2016; Rosen &
Cruz, 2018). In contrast, governments in Chile and Argentina have imposed more formal authority
and have challenged the rule of informal groups inside prison; this could generate more conflict and
violence at least in the medium term. One study in Chile (Sanhueza, 2014) finds that the nature of
interactions between staff and prisoners is an important and understudied factor shaping violence.
Notably, there is much less variation across countries in prisoners’ reports of having their belongings
stolen. This may reflect that prisoners steal from one another in similar ways, outside of the
structures and rules of the organized groups inside.
This is a contrast to U.S. prison gang dynamics, where authorities have much stronger control
over organizations, which reduces the gang members’ ability to communicate with each other and
among the ranks (Skarbek, 2014). In order to understand these factors more concretely, further
research could develop a typology for the model of governance inside facilities, ranging from
completely consolidated illicit or prisoner governance (with distinctions for gang vs. nongang
formats) to completely consolidated formal authorities, and combinations in between, and analyze
the association with violence rates.
Limitations
Beyond the inherent limitations of using self-report survey data in a cross-sectional analysis
across very different locations, several limitations in this study are worth noting. First, this
study lacks the data to measure in a direct way the types and variation in governance models
across facilities, including formal management strategies or types (state institutions and staff
type) and informal governance dynamics, such as facilities that are gang-controlled and those
that have a hybrid or combined governance arrangement, between prisoners and staff. For this
reason, our discussion on governance as a potential explanation is speculative and requires
further research to substantiate. Our study is also missing direct measures of other relevant
facility-level factors that are important in other research: facility size, staff–inmate ratio, access
to family, and community ties.
Second, the extent of criminal activity inside is determined by prisoners’ knowledge of crimes—
which depends on their position within the facility and their willingness to share this information,
even in general terms, with the survey team. Even then, this is not a measure of actual crime inside
prison. There is slippage in our survey question between crimes committed in prison and crimes
directed from prison toward the outside, and this distinction may matter. Other more direct measures
of criminal activity inside—such as information developed through qualitative fieldwork in each
facility—would strengthen this measure. Third, due to stigma and lack of research on sexual
violence in prison (or in general) in the region, it is likely that respondents underreported their
observations on this topic. Finally, we were not able to do a multilevel modeling analysis in this
study, due to limitations with sampling at the facility level and the type of variable generated by the
survey question. Therefore, our analysis covers facility-level differences and individual-level dif-
ferences, but it does not integrate this analysis in a nested way. This limits the precision of our
comparisons.
Implications and Conclusion

Overall, this study highlights the ways that the different material and social realities of prisons in
Latin America shape patterns of violence in ways that are distinct from prisons in the United States
and Europe. Prisoners experience deprivations and harsh conditions in varying ways, but these do
not directly explain their experiences of violence. Similarly, prisoners’ prior exposure to and invol-
vement in criminal activity is relevant to their roles in culture and economies inside prison (e.g., to
their knowledge of criminal activity inside) but does not directly explain their likelihood of experi-
encing violence in prison.
This study suggests that looking at criminal activity inside prisons provides one avenue of
explanation. But we argue that criminal activity must be understood in the context of Latin American
prisons, not just through a strict definition or assuming clear distinctions between what is legal and
illegal. Criminal activity may emerge in different forms depending on prisoners’ needs and demands
and on the formal management style of a given facility—that is, it may be a way of securing basic
amenities for prisoners (food, clothing) or it may be a way of generating profits or running larger
criminal operations (e.g., drug trafficking or extortion). This study points to the importance of
analyzing illegal activity inside prisons as a potential influence on prison violence—and perhaps
on other aspects of prisoner experiences.
On first glance, it may appear that, given the findings of this study, an appropriate way to
reduce violence among prisoners would be to target criminal activity carried out by groups of
prisoners. Of course, both staff and prisoners have an interest in downplaying the connection
between illicit activities by prisoners inside and violence patterns, in order to avoid punishment
and to maintain profits. A potential unintended consequence of an institutional focus on violence
reduction is that the more organized groups may choose to hide their violence more thoroughly.
We argue that any intervention should be based on a clear analysis of why and how the criminal
activity exists and why and how its participants may use violence against other prisoners. The
answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this study and should be part of future research,
particularly qualitative and ethnographic research. To the extent that violence occurs as part of
managing criminal transactions in the prison context, whether tied to gangs or to other forms of
cooperation, reducing this violence requires understanding the reasons behind it. The implication
for policy makers is that violence-reduction efforts should seek to understand and engage strate-
gically with prisoner-led governance logics to address key causes of violence, rather than relying
solely on top-down infrastructure improvements, individual security classifications, disciplinary
schemes, or separation of groups.
Appendix A
118
Table A1. Percentage of Inmates Who Have Knowledge of Organization of Crimes Within the Prison, Disaggregated by Country, Prison, and Type of Crime.
Prison Group
Conditions % Accused % Accused % Know of Level % % % % %
Country/Prison N Index of Homicide of Kidnapping of Crimesa of Crimes Extortion Traffic Robbery Kidnapping Homicide
Argentina 456 .536 11.8 1.9 19.1 5.2 3.1 6.2 7.0 2.7
48 39 .575 2.2 2.2 35.9 High 4.3 4.3 15.2 4.3 0.0
42 57 .453 6.7 3.3 26.3 Medium 10.0 5.0 15.0 15.0 11.7
15 50 .472 12.9 1.6 26.0 Medium 4.8 0.0 6.5 8.1 0.0
2 81 .499 22.0 4.4 19.8 Low 6.6 2.2 6.6 6.6 3.3
30 98 .442 16.5 2.6 19.4 Low 8.7 6.1 5.2 8.7 3.5
8 28 .620 9.4 3.1 10.7 Low 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
33 40 .574 7.1 0.0 7.5 Very low 0.0 2.4 0.0 4.8 0.0
9 29 .612 20.6 0.0 6.9 Very low 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0
51 34 .577 8.8 0.0 5.9 Very low 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0
Brazil 594 .403 9.7 1.7 16.0 1.1 5.2 4.3 2.0 2.3
GUARULHOS 1 56 .472 27.5 1.1 28.6 Medium 1.1 9.9 9.9 0.0 1.1
GUARULHOS 2 105 .359 6.5 3.3 17.1 Low 0.8 4.1 4.1 0.8 4.1
FRANCO DA ROCHA 128 .299 4.0 1.1 16.4 Low 0.0 8.5 2.8 1.1 0.0
HORTOLANDIA 56 .310 5.8 1.2 16.1 Low 1.2 2.3 5.8 1.2 1.2
SOROCABA 113 .459 5.8 1.7 15.9 Low 3.3 4.1 2.5 5.8 6.6
SANTA ANA 90 .538 7.8 2.9 11.1 Low 1.0 1.9 3.9 2.9 1.0
PINHEIROS 1 20 .260 14.3 0.0 10.0 Low 0.0 4.8 0.0 4.8 4.8
PINHEIROS 2 21 .299 16.0 4.0 4.8 Very low 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
PINHEIROS 3 5 .632 0.0 0.0 0.0 Very low 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chile 662 .464 5.7 1.0 36.7 3.9 18.1 10.0 3.2 1.6
CONCEPCION 30 .442 4.3 0.0 56.7 Very high 4.3 13.0 7.2 5.8 1.4
CCP COLINA 127 .528 9.0 1.4 55.1 Very high 7.6 13.1 17.9 2.8 1.4
CPFF STGO 46 .487 10.6 2.1 43.5 Very high 10.6 36.2 19.1 8.5 8.5
CDF SANTIAGO 39 .463 9.8 0.0 35.9 High 7.3 34.1 9.8 9.8 2.4
Valparaı́so 167 .439 6.6 1.0 34.7 High 0.0 18.2 4.0 2.5 0.5
CDP STGO. SUR 151 .466 5.5 1.1 30.5 High 2.7 20.8 14.2 1.6 2.2
CDP PTE ALTO 74 .475 0.0 2.2 20.3 Medium 4.4 12.2 1.1 2.2 0.0
Quillota 28 .414 0.0 0.0 10.7 Low 0.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0
(continued)
Table A1. (continued)
Prison Group
Conditions % Accused % Accused % Know of Level % % % % %
Country/Prison N Index of Homicide of Kidnapping of Crimesa of Crimes Extortion Traffic Robbery Kidnapping Homicide
El Salvador 986 .317 35.2 4.4 11.1 6.9 0.8 0.5 1.5 1.6
Centro de Readaptación para 105 .345 5.9 7.4 26.7 Medium 18.4 1.5 2.2 1.5 3.7
mujeres (Ilopango)
Centro Penitenciarı́o de San Miguel 109 .310 21.0 1.7 18.3 Low 10.9 0.0 0.8 4.2 3.4
Centro Penitenciario de Apanteos 251 .388 18.2 7.4 15.5 Low 9.8 2.0 0.3 2.7 1.7
Penitenciarı́a Oriental San Vicente 93 .311 28.2 3.9 7.5 Very low 4.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Centro Penitenciario de Sonsonate 54 .210 38.2 4.4 7.4 Very low 2.9 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0
Centro Penitenciario de de Izalco 91 .449 43.4 1.9 4.4 Very low 1.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9
Centro Penitenciario de 105 .306 33.9 2.5 3.8 Very low 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Quezaltepeque
Centro de Cumplimiento de Penas 90 .259 74.5 8.5 3.3 Very low 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
Ciudad Barrios
Centro Penitenciario de de 88 .280 53.8 1.9 0.0 Very low 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chalatenango
Peru 1,009 .488 5.2 2.0 33.5 21.1 4.1 6.6 10.1 4.1
E.P. TRUJILLO 118 .435 9.0 5.2 52.5 Very high 42.5 0.7 6.7 11.2 11.9
E.P. PICSI 85 .404 6.3 1.0 49.4 Very high 40.6 2.1 1.0 19.8 1.0
E.P.LURIGANCHO 237 .506 9.1 2.6 46.0 Very high 28.5 8.8 11.3 18.2 5.8
E.P. SOCABAYA—AREQUIPA 76 .515 4.2 3.2 32.9 High 21.1 0.0 8.4 4.2 0.0
E.P. SANTA MONICA 47 .469 2.0 4.0 31.9 High 14.0 6.0 8.0 12.0 4.0
E.P. HUANCAYO—JUNIN 79 .471 9.9 2.2 31.6 High 16.5 3.3 11.0 7.7 2.2
E.P. MIGUEL CASTRO CASTRO 40 .444 4.5 6.8 25.0 Medium 20.5 2.3 4.5 13.6 4.5
E.P. VARONES 4 .579 0.0 0.0 25.0 Medium 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
E.P. CALLAO 51 .502 5.3 0.0 21.6 Medium 12.3 8.8 5.3 7.0 5.3
E.P. SANANGUILLO—TARAPOTO 39 .558 4.3 0.0 17.9 Low 8.5 2.1 4.3 2.1 0.0
E.P. YANAMILLA/AYACUCHO 63 .441 6.7 1.1 15.9 Low 6.7 1.1 2.2 1.1 2.2
E.P. SAN JORGE LIMA 20 .589 0.0 0.0 15.0 Low 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
E.P. QUENCORO 97 .469 8.3 1.5 12.4 Low 3.0 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.0
E.P. ANCON II 53 .449 3.2 0.0 11.3 Low 6.3 4.8 4.8 6.3 3.2
Total 3,707 .446 12.9 2.2 23.5 9.0 5.8 5.2 4.9 2.5
a
This is the percentage of people who report knowledge of any crimes being committed in or directed from prison. The specific types of crimes in the other columns is not a comprehensive list;
119
these are just the most commonly reported types. So the total percentage is higher than the sum of these types.
Appendix B
Table B1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics.
Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Peru

N 516 751 805 1,160 1,205
Violence inside the prison (% who answered yes)

Beaten in the last 6 months 18.2 4.5 26.1 3.5 14.4
Theft of personal items 31.8 30.1 38.3 31.8 47.0
Forced to sexual intercourse 2.3 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.9
Prison conditions indexa (deprivation variable, lower score means harsher conditions)
Mean 0.509 0.385 0.468 0.333 0.372
Standard deviation 0.175 0.175 0.142 0.136 0.146
Q1 0.389 0.235 0.368 0.222 0.267
Q2 (median) 0.500 0.368 0.474 0.333 0.375
Q3 0.618 0.526 0.579 0.421 0.465
Prison conditions (% who answered yes)
Has access to a television 39.7 43.7 53.4 48.4 43.3
Has enough water to drink 40.7 30.9 56.0 35.3 39.5
Toilets are clean 43.4 39.4 38.1 29.6 42.2
Has access to books 45.0 19.7 42.2 28.7 41.2
The institution provides medical attention 25.8 21.6 47.7 24.7 41.2
Family members receive good treatment 61.2 26.5 23.0 35.1 29.5
Has access to newspapers 36.0 18.5 40.5 24.3 42.3
Has access to magazines 37.8 34.0 38.1 15.9 34.1
Has access to radio 39.3 30.6 45.8 12.8 32.0
The institution provides medications 21.3 21.3 42.6 12.5 28.5
Has access to public telephone 50.2 0.4 17.8 18.3 47.6
Food quantity is enough 12.0 19.8 31.4 8.3 23.5
Medical care is good 12.2 6.9 16.3 5.9 10.7
Food quality is good 11.0 6.1 15.5 3.4 8.5
Has access to cell phone 7.0 1.5 14.2 6.4 3.5
The institution provides toilet paper 6.4 18.1 1.0 4.4 0.7
The institution provides toothpaste 7.6 12.9 0.7 4.1 0.6
The institution provides soap 7.2 13.7 0.7 4.4 0.6
The institution provides toothbrush 7.0 8.3 0.9 3.5 0.7
Participation in activities
Proportion that participates in sport activities 33.7 22.2 28.4 31.7 36.8
Proportion that participates in academic activities 29.7 9.6 30.3 26.9 20.0
Proportion that participates in cleaning activities 22.3 17.0 31.3 30.6 34.9
Proportion that has a job 29.3 24.9 34.2 24.2 36.2
Overpopulation (% who answered no; deprivation variable)
Each inmate has a bed 9.3 89.4 24.6 92.9 52.6
Individual factors (importation factors)
Proportion of men 79.1 86.3 86.1 81.9 87.0
Proportion that receives a visit at least once a week 20.7 21.6 52.2 15.6 32.7
Proportion that calls family least once a week 91.3 3.9 40.1 25.5 74.9
Proportion that consumed drugs or alcohol recently 9.9 13.2 20.7 1.6 15.1
Proportion that was in a juvenile detention institution 19.4 18.8 40.2 11.9 6.9
Proportion that had contact with gangs during infancy 68.4 46.2 63.9 46.0 40.4
Proportion that robbed or sold drugs when was a minor 44.4 35.9 59.0 12.6 15.8
Respondent age
Proportion on inmates of 35 years or less 61.2 65.8 60.8 68.5 45.1
Average 34.6 33.5 35.1 33.5 38.9
(continued)
Table B1. (continued)
Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Peru

N 516 751 805 1,160 1,205

Years attended school
Average 15.5 17.5 15.6 15.7 16.6
Years of imprisonment (sentence)
Average 9.3 10.8 7.9 18.5 12.3
Proportion of inmates accused of each crime
Intentional homicide 13.2 8.9 5.8 31.4 3.3
Manslaughter 7.6 1.2 2.0 4.8 1.0
Kidnapping 1.9 1.9 0.7 4.0 0.7
Assault 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.0 6.5
Sexual crimes 7.9 14.1 7.2 10.9 2.9
Theft 50.8 30.7 55.9 11.7 48.0
Drug trafficking 14.0 32.8 19.6 9.4 14.1
Illegal arms possession 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.9 2.3
Aggravated theft 0.2 6.0 2.4 1.1 16.0
Extortion 0.2 0.3 0.0 19.3 0.3
Obstruction of justice 0.1 0.0 0.0 n.d. 0.0
Other crimes 2.0 2.4 3.9 4.5 4.9
a
The index represents the proportion of the 19 services described in “prison conditions” to which the inmates have access (if
inmates have access to all 19 services, their index is 1; if they have access to none of the services, their index is 0). The Kuder–
Richardson (KR20) value to assess the internal consistency of the 19 items was 0.646 (moderate reliability).
Appendix C
Table C1. Comparing Prisoners With and Without Knowledge of Crime Inside by Individual Characteristics.
Knowledge of
Crimes Being Z Value
Survey Question Response Group Organized (%) (One Tail)
Childhood
Your best friends committed crimes Yes (N ¼ 1,780) 29.5 8.240 (.000)
No (N ¼ 1,861) 17.9
Your friends at school committed crimes Yes (N ¼ 903) 33.2 7.372 (.000)
No (N ¼ 2,491) 20.9
In the neighborhood where you lived there Yes (N ¼ 1,844) 28.1 6.441 (.000)
were youth gangs and criminal bands No (N ¼ 1,817) 19.1
Was in a juvenile detention center Yes (N ¼ 641) 34.3 5.423 (.000)
No (N ¼ 3,035) 22.9
Delinquent life
Ever worked? Yes (N ¼ 3,375) 22.9 2.532 (.005)
No (N ¼ 325) 29.2
Was in the army or police Yes (N ¼ 466) 29.1 3.094 (.001)
No (N ¼ 3,214) 22.6
Committed robbery (of people) or sold Yes (N ¼ 1,061) 33.8 9.402 (.000)
drugs before age 18 No (N ¼ 2,632) 19.3
(continued)
Table C1. (continued)
Knowledge of
Committed the abovementioned crimes Yes (N ¼ 961) 37.4 4.541 (.000)

with other people No (N ¼ 394) 24.6
Sold drugs without being arrested Yes (N ¼ 269) 32.3 4.868 (.000)
No (N ¼ 445) 16.6
Previously convicted of another crime Yes (N ¼ 1,155) 29.9 6.329 (.000)
No (N ¼ 2,516) 20.4
The crime for which you are convicted was Yes (N ¼ 175) 30.2 3.635 (.000)
ordered by a criminal group No (N ¼ 2,436) 18.9
Did anyone else participate in the crime you Yes (N ¼ 1,964) 26.4 4.483 (.000)
are charged with? No (N ¼ 1,691) 20.1
Preincarceration substance use
How frequently did you use marijuana in the Every day (N ¼ 663) 27.9 1.949 (.025)
6 months prior to arrest? Didn’t consume 22.5
(N ¼ 400)
How frequently did you use crack/cocaine in Every day (N ¼ 327) 33.0 0.997 (.159)
the 6 months prior to arrest? Didn’t consume 31.8
(N ¼ 267)
Did you ever consume inhalable drugs? Yes (N ¼ 468) 32.4 4.915 (.000)
No (N ¼ 3,159) 22.1
Substance use during incarceration
In the last month, have you consumed Yes (N ¼ 424) 41.7 9.466 (.000)
alcohol or drugs? No (N ¼ 3,255) 21.0
In the last month, you have consumed Yes (N ¼ 182) 42.3 7.297 (.000)
alcohol No (N ¼ 2,637) 19.5
marijuana No (N ¼ 2,483) 18.2
cocaine No (N ¼ 2,666) 19.5
You have observed other inmates Yes (N ¼ 2,426) 28.9 11.226 (.000)
consuming alcohol or drugs No (N ¼ 1,158) 11.9
Collusion with authorities
In the crime you are charged with, an Yes (N ¼ 122) 36.8 2.874 (.002)
authority/official participated as an No (N ¼ 1,890) 25.1
accomplice
What role did the authority/official have in Organizer (N ¼ 44) 38.6 0.432 (.332)
the crime? Not investigating/ 34.4
giving info (N ¼ 58)
Possession and use of weapons
Carried a weapon at the time of arrest No (N ¼ 2,423) 20.6 4.774 (.000)
Firearm (N ¼ 970) 28.2
Have ever held a firearm in your hands Yes (N ¼ 2,082) 28.2 7.775 (.000)
No (N ¼ 1,607) 17.3
Have ever held a long gun Yes (N ¼ 904) 33.4 8.058 (.000)
No (N ¼ 2,803) 20.3
Have ever held a handgun Yes (N ¼ 1,614) 26.9 4.322 (.000)
No (N ¼ 2,093) 20.8
Have tried to shoot another person Yes (N ¼ 798) 35.4 5.821 (.000)
No (N ¼ 1,258) 23.6
(continued)
Table C1. (continued)
Knowledge of
In the 6 months before arrest, had bought Yes (N ¼ 307) 33.2 2.088 (.018)
a firearm No (N ¼ 1,737) 27.4
Have injured or killed another person Yes (N ¼ 751) 34.7 8.163 (.000)
No (N ¼ 2,833) 20.5
Time in prison
Years inside the prison Less than 10 22.5 4.629 (.000)
(N ¼ 3,363)
More than 10 34.0
(N ¼ 320)
Note. Yes ¼ knowledge of crimes inside; no ¼ no knowledge of crimes inside (with significance test in parenthesis).
Appendix D
Table D1. Summary of Three-Level Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for the Violence Reported by the
Respondent (0 ¼ Did Not Suffer Violence, 1 ¼ Suffered Violence).
Observations per Group
Group Variable Number of Groups Minimum Average Maximum Integration Points
Country 5 448 685.2 939 1

Facility 49 3 69.9 237 1
Proprietary
Physical Violence Victimization Sexual Violence
B SE B eB B SE B eB B SE B eB
Has knowledge of crimes 0.494*** 0.128 1.64 0.677*** 0.133 1.97 0.925*** 0.148 2.52
Level of organization of crimes (base ¼ very low)
Low 0.907* 0.425 2.48 0.832* 0.326 2.30 0.601 0.446 1.82
Medium 0.855 0.484 2.35 0.967* 0.385 2.63 0.048 0.533 1.05
High 1.216* 0.501 3.37 1.254*** 0.387 3.51 0.613 0.505 1.85
Very high 1.486** 0.516 4.42 1.358*** 0.386 3.89 0.956 0.493 2.60
Personal characteristics
Man 0.043 0.249 .96 1.02*** 0.168 0.36 0.011 0.282 0.99
Age up to 35 years old 0.336* 0.134 1.40 .066 0.089 0.94 0.501*** 0.155 0.61
Study level (base ¼ less than primary)
Primary school 0.320 0.318 0.73 0.014 0.185 1.01 0.241 0.365 0.79
Secondary 0.431 0.334 0.65 0.081 0.194 1.08 0.067 0.379 0.94
Technical 0.418 0.424 0.66 0.441 0.237 1.55 0.250 0.459 1.28
Undergraduate or graduate 0.400 0.414 0.67 0.575* 0.245 1.78 0.077 0.451 1.08
History before current sentence
Had friends who committed 0.245 0.145 1.28 0.172 0.094 1.19 0.408* 0.171 1.50
crimes
(continued)
Table D1. (continued)
Proprietary
Physical Violence Victimization Sexual Violence
B B
B SE B e B SE B e B SE B eB
Was in a minors’ institution 0.277 0.144 1.32 0.052 0.114 0.95 0.090 0.182 1.09
Was imprisoned before 0.260 0.142 1.30 0.062 0.103 1.06 0.094 0.170 1.10
Had used a fire weapon 0.170 0.150 1.19 0.122 0.096 1.13 0.517** 0.177 1.68
Used to consume 0.307 0.162 1.36 0.293** 0.107 1.34 0.126 0.187 0.88
marihuana
Used to consume cocaine 0.099 0.144 0.91 0.073 0.105 1.08 0.073 0.174 1.08
Used to consume ecstasy 0.382* 0.155 1.46 0.216 0.128 1.24 0.097 0.194 1.10
Used to consume heroin 0.583 0.332 1.79 0.317 0.301 0.73 0.469 0.381 1.60
Sentence
Sentence for intentional 0.492 0.252 1.64 0.045 0.167 1.05 0.969*** 0.277 2.64
homicide
Sentence for manslaughter 0.728* 0.331 2.07 0.404 0.237 1.50 0.369 0.438 1.45
Sentence for kidnapping 0.712 0.365 2.04 0.482 0.253 1.62 1.003* 0.400 2.73
Sentence for assault 0.646 0.435 1.91 0.199 0.308 1.22 1.256** 0.451 3.51
Sentence for sexual crimes 0.548* 0.272 1.73 0.514** 0.173 1.67 0.962*** 0.292 2.62
Sentence for aggravated 0.429 0.252 1.54 0.121 0.175 0.89 0.991*** 0.273 2.69
robbery
Sentence for crimes against 0.143 0.246 1.15 0.096 0.157 0.91 0.703** 0.274 2.02
health
Sentence for illegal arms 0.092 0.266 1.10 0.050 0.191 0.95 0.534 0.358 0.59
possession
Sentence for simple robbery 0.537* 0.222 1.71 0.090 0.146 0.91 1.070*** 0.241 2.92
Sentence for fraud, 0.778 0.606 2.18 1.156* 0.489 3.18 0.410 1.055 0.66
embezzlement
Sentence for extorsion 0.322 0.409 1.38 0.453* 0.225 0.64 1.197** 0.447 3.31
Prison conditions and security level
Prison conditions index 0.226 1.761 0.80 0.994 1.350 0.37 1.212 1.794 3.36
Overpopulation in cell 0.031 0.533 1.03 0.432 0.323 1.54 0.609 0.391 0.54
% of accused of homicide 0.229 1.345 0.80 0.681 1.014 0.51 1.527 1.526 0.22
% of accused of kidnapping 6.751 6.146 0.00 1.201 4.920 3.32 0.948 6.289 2.58
Community activities
Participates in sport activities 0.058 0.152 1.06 0.071 0.105 0.93 0.159 0.185 0.85
Participates in academic 0.052 0.167 1.05 0.248* 0.114 1.28 0.197 0.200 1.22
activities
Has a job 0.098 0.156 0.91 0.073 0.105 0.93 0.040 0.186 0.96
Substances consumption during last month
Alcohol 0.588** 0.227 1.80 0.230 0.195 1.26 0.027 0.279 1.03
Marihuana 0.634*** 0.181 1.89 0.374* 0.160 1.45 0.278 0.229 1.32
Cocaine 0.866** 0.317 2.38 0.040 0.282 0.96 1.365*** 0.326 3.92
Ecstasy 0.829 0.607 0.44 0.052 0.503 0.95 0.555 0.813 0.57
Constant 4.08*** 1.145 0.02 1.565 1.190 0.21 4.75*** 1.188 0.01
Wald w2 216.72 187.81 178.68
df 41 41 41
N 3,419 3,426 3,411
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the journal editors, as well as Jeff Mellow,
for their helpful comments on this article. We would also like to thank the research teams who
helped with collecting the survey data, the government partners who facilitated access to prisons, the
United Nations Development Program for its project support, and Centro de Investigación y Doc-
encia Económicas (CIDE) and the Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre Inseguridad y Vio-
lencia (CELIV), Universidad Tres de Febrero.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/
or publication of this article: The collection of data used in this article was funded in part by the
United Nations Development Program and in part by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas (CIDE).
ORCID iD
Jennifer Peirce https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0432-4518
Gustavo Fondevila https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4818-0584
Notes
1. In this body of research on prison violence, “severe conviction types” generally refer to violent crime,
specifically including homicide, assault, and robbery.
2. We acknowledge that property theft is not necessarily violent. We include this measure as a way to
elaborate on other types of victimization experienced by prisoners.
3. Each country survey has been published separately. See Argentina (Bergman, Massello, & Arias, 2014),
Chile (Sánchez Cea & Piñol Arriagada, 2015), Brazil (Bergman, Filho, Fondevila, & Vilalta, 2013), El
Salvador (Bergman et al., 2015), and Peru (Costa & Romero, 2014).
4. We used strata only for the countries with national-level sampling, not regional-level sampling.
5. (1) Proportional allotment of the target number of survey respondents in each facility (or unit), based on its
percentage of the total prison population, (2) generating the jump number (total number of inmates in the
facility divided by the target number of inmates to be surveyed in that facility), and (3) generating the
random number to choose the inmates.
6. For the calculation of size effective samples in countries and subnational regions, the maximum variability
possible was assigned with a confidence level of 95% and a maximum theoretical precision level of +5%
of the estimate. The results of the survey offer higher or lower levels of precision to calculate the
confidence intervals depending on the questions and the effects of the specific design of the same. The
standard error is not constant across all the questions.
7. Due to the potential reluctance of a person to answer truthfully to such a delicate question, an indirect
question was selected to measure the sexual violence.
8. These indicators are: a) Friends at school committed crimes; b) Youth gangs in neighborhood; c) Has spent
time in a juvenile detention facility.
9. Participated in robbery or drug sales before age 18, committed previous crimes with other people, sold
drugs without being arrested, previously convicted of another crime, the crime (of current conviction) was
ordered by a criminal group/gang, others participated in the crime (of current conviction), collusion of an
authority/official in the crime (of current conviction), carried a weapon at time of arrest, ever held a
firearm, ever held a long gun, ever held a hand gun, ever tried to shoot another person, purchased a firearm
in 6 months before arrest, and have injured or killed another person.
10. There were significant differences for prearrest daily use of marijuana and inhalants but not for crack/
cocaine. When it comes to substance use inside the prison, consumption (in the past month) of each type of
substance—alcohol, marijuana, cocaine—was significantly associated with knowledge of crimes inside.
Heroin was not included in the study as almost all (98.1%) of responses were “no” on the question of
consumption of a given drug during the last month. Given this response level, it was not possible to
calculate the association of heroin consumption with the dependent variables. Heroin consumption is quite
uncommon in Latin American prisons due to its high price
11. Criminal classifications of crimes relative to burglary/theft/robbery are distinct in each country; none-
theless in the survey, the crime types were grouped in “simple theft,” meaning the stealing of property
without violence, and “aggravated robbery,” meaning the stealing of property with violence and/or use of a
fire weapon.
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Author Biographies
Jennifer Peirce is a PhD candidate in criminal justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY Graduate
Center) and a Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation Scholar (Canada). Her research focuses on initiatives to
improve conditions and human rights in prison reform processes in Latin America.
Gustavo Fondevila is a professor and researcher at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
(CIDE). He is also a member of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores of the Comisión Nacional de Ciencia
y Tecnologı́a. He has conducted research in human rights, citizen security, access to justice, rule of law, among
other areas.

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International Criminal Justice Review

Jennifer Peirce1 and Gustavo Fondevila2

Review of Research on Prison Violence and Governance

Deprivation Theory, Importation Theory, and Integrations

Prison Management Considerations

International Research on Prison Violence

Informal Governance and Gangs in Prison

This Study: Hypotheses, Methods, and Data

Survey Development and Administration Process

Prison violence: In the last 6 months, have you been beaten?

We include property theft as a dimension of victimization even though it is not necessarily

Percentage of sentenced for homicide and kidnapping in the facility (0–100%).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Sample by Country and Enrollment Process.

Argentina 72,693 285 167 106.2 516 3 6 0 0.71 3.16

Table 2. Summary of Prisons per Country, Disaggregated by Level of In-Prison Crimes.

Association Between Facility-Level Criminal Activity and Individual Experiences of Violence

Level of Organization % Belongings Have % Has Been % Others Have Been

Very low 17.9 3.4 2.1

% belongings have been stolen % has been beaten

Level of organization of crimes

Argentina Brasil El Salvador Perú Chile

% of inmates that have knowledge of crimes inside the prison

Association Between Prison Conditions and Violence

Poor Prison Conditions as a Governance Challenge

Prior and Current Exposure to Criminal Activity and Experiences of Violence

Considering the Potential Effects of Informal Governance Arrangements

Implications and Conclusion

Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Peru

Violence inside the prison (% who answered yes)

Table B1. (continued)

Argentina Brazil Chile El Salvador Peru

Standard deviation 10.3 10.6 11.2 10.3 11.0

Table C1. (continued)

Committed the abovementioned crimes Yes (N ¼ 961) 37.4 4.541 (.000)

Table C1. (continued)

Observations per Group

Group Variable Number of Groups Minimum Average Maximum Integration Points

Country 5 448 685.2 939 1

Table D1. (continued)

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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