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Prison Contraband: Prevalence, Impacts, and Interdiction Strategies

Article in Corrections · April 2021

DOI: 10.1080/23774657.2021.1906356

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Prison Contraband: Prevalence, Impacts, and Interdiction Strategies

Bryce Peterson1, Megan Kizzort1, KiDeuk Kim1, Rochisha Shukla1

1
Justice Policy Center,
Urban Institute
500 L’Enfant Plaza SW
Washington, DC 20024

Abstract

Prison contraband poses a substantial threat to the safety of correctional staff and incarcerated

people. Yet there has been little research on critical contraband issues. Using descriptive

analyses of the 2018 National Survey of Correctional Contraband, a data collection effort

involving 301 prisons across six state departments of corrections, the current paper addresses

these knowledge gaps through a multi-state, scholarly examination of contraband. We found that

prisons recovered an average of 34 weapons, 31 cell phones, and 28 controlled substances over

the 12-month study period. Respondents also noted that both staff and visitors were conduits for

illicit items in prisons, though they reported more staff violations than visitor violations for

contraband-related incidents. Finally, we found that agencies employed a mix of strategies and

policies to prevent, detect, and remove contraband from their prisons. We discuss the

implications of our work for policy and future research.

Keywords: prison, contraband, policy, misconduct, assaults, technology

1
Introduction

In correctional institutions, contraband items such as drugs, alcohol, cell phones,

cigarettes, and makeshift weapons can be used by incarcerated people to enact violence, engage

in criminal activity, create underground economies, and perpetuate existing addictions (Centre

for Social Justice, 2015; Dillon, 2001; Gore et al., 1995; Swann & James, 1998; Turnbull et al.,

1994; Wolff et al., 2007). The use of drugs and alcohol in correctional facilities can also

contribute to HIV transmission and the spread of fatal illnesses (Calzavara et al., 2003; Center

for Disease Control, 2012; Jürgens et al., 2009), weapons can help facilitate escapes from prison

(Peterson, 2015; US Sentencing Commission, 2008), and illicit cell phones can be used to

intimidate witnesses, further criminal enterprises, and compromise public safety (National

Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2010; Shaffer, 2014; US Government

Accountability Office, 2011). In short, contraband poses a substantial threat to the safety of both

staff and incarcerated people in correctional institutions.

Despite its importance, there is dearth of research on contraband and the strategies

correctional agencies employ to prevent, detect, and remove contraband from their facilities. The

information that does exist is often outdated, methodologically limited, or from a single

jurisdiction or facility. There have been no systematic studies on the amount of contraband in

correctional facilities, nor the impact of contraband on institutional safety to date. To address

these knowledge gaps, the current paper presents results from the first scholarly examination into

the prevalence, types, and impacts of contraband in US correctional institutions, as well as the

interdiction strategies officials are implementing to combat the issue, relying on a survey of 301

prisons from six state departments of corrections.

2
Literature Review

Contraband in correctional facilities includes materials or items that are “unauthorized by

the formal prison administration” (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985, 440). Under this definition,

contraband includes (a) items that might be prohibited in any setting (e.g., illicit drugs); (b) items

that are prohibited in correctional facilities, but are generally permitted elsewhere (e.g., cell

phones, cigarettes, alcohol, weapons, etc.); (c) items that are permissible only within authorized

areas of a correctional facility (e.g., a handsaw brought to an individual's living space from a

woodshop); (d) and items that are generally authorized but can become contraband if used or

modified in a way that poses a threat to the safety, security, and good of the institution (e.g.,

bedsheet ripped into strips for use as weaponry or in escape attempts, commissary items used for

making prison alcohol, etc.) (Biermann, 2007; Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2014;

Shukla et al., 2021). Additionally, permissible items may be considered contraband if an

individual is in possession of more than the allotted amount (e.g. towels might be considered

contraband if an individual has three while the facility only permits the possession of two)

(Shukla et al., 2021).

Guidelines on what constitutes contraband can significantly vary across jurisdictions.

This information is typically provided to individuals in prison or jail in the “inmate handbooks”

they receive upon arrival at the facility. For instance, the Arkansas Department of Corrections

(2020) defines contraband in its inmate handbook as:

Any article not authorized nor issued to you as personal property or state property, nor

purchased by you from the commissary, is considered contraband. Articles in excess of

established limits, articles used for unauthorized purposes and/or articles in your

3
 possession in an unauthorized area are considered contraband. Any item altered from its

original state is also considered contraband. (9-10).

However, while there may be broad understanding on what constitutes contraband, there

is far less information about the prevalence of the various types of contraband, particularly in US

correctional facilities (US Government Accountability Office, 2011, 23). Most information on

the topic comes from data on convictions for contraband use or possession, random drug testing

of incarcerated people, self-reporting from surveys, and research from other countries, like the

United Kingdom (Centre for Social Justice, 2015; Penfold et al., 2005). Self-reported surveys

like the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Survey of Inmates in Local Jails provides aggregate

information on drugs, weapons, or unauthorized possessions, but the data are outdated and

limited to jails, not prisons. The Correctional Leaders Association (previously the Association of

State Correctional Administrators, or ASCA) has offered standardized performance measures in

the past for counting the volume and types of contraband seized (e.g., ASCA, 2012), but there is

no indication as to if or how widely these standards are used for measuring the prevalence of

contraband.

Prevalence of Contraband

Absent uniform, generalizable data, researchers interested in the prevalence of

contraband in US facilities are limited to one-off studies of certain systems or anecdotal reports.

These sources, however, suggest that the volume of contraband in US prisons and jails is

substantial. For example, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

confiscated over 15,000 cell phones in 2011, a tenfold increase in the number seized in 2007

(Jenkins, 2014). A more recent study by NBC News reviewed data from 44 states and found that

4
cell phones recoveries were particularly high in southern states, with up to one phone confiscated

per three incarcerated individuals in South Carolina (Riley, 2017).

Drugs and alcohol are also recognized as significant contraband issues within US prisons

and jails. Approximately 1,000 drug incidents are reported annually at California prisons, and

1.6% of 1,132 random drug tests tracked in a 2008-09 study were positive. Similarly, a report by

the US Department of Justice (2003) noted that illegal drugs were present in nearly all Federal

prisons. The prevalence of illegal drugs in correctional facilities, as reported in those news

articles and government reports, appears to be consistent with what is considered to be the most

sobering contraband-related concerns among correctional staff. According to the interviews with

correctional staff in California, Florida, and Maryland, Shukla and colleagues (2021) report that

correctional staff consider narcotics as one of the most critical contraband items, posing a serious

threat to safety and security in the institution.

Contraband-Related Incidents

Identifying the types of contraband that exist and the methods through which they enter

facilities is important because of the substantial risks these items pose to both incarcerated

people and correctional staff. Surveys of contraband-related injuries found 1.57 in every 1,000

individuals in maximum-and-medium security facilities, and .97 in every 1,000 staff, were

injured by contraband weapons over a twelve-month period, while other studies estimated that

141 in 1,000 incarcerated men, and 94 in 1,000 incarcerated women, were victims of inmate-on-

inmate violence with a weapon (Biermann, 2006; Wolff et al., 2007). Other contraband, such as

cigarettes and drugs, may create or perpetuate unregulated economies by fueling the demand for

extra resources to pay for contraband (Centre for Social Justice, 2015; Lankenau, 2001).

Participation in these informal economies has been found to increase the likelihood of violent

5
victimization (Copes et al. 2010). Contraband also poses public safety risks for those outside the

facility. Incarcerated people may use contraband communications devices, like cell phones, to

contact others outside of the prison or jail to plan and organize further criminal activities

(Shaffer, 2014).

Additionally, incarcerated people may use contraband drugs and alcohol to continue,

exacerbate, or develop substance use problems while in prison or jail (Centre for Social Justice,

2015; Dillon, 2001; Gore et al., 1995; Swann & James, 1998; Turnbull et al., 1994). Drug use in

prison also poses public health risks like HIV transmission (Calzavara et al., 2003; Jürgens et al.,

2009), while the creation of alcohol can spread potentially fatal illnesses like botulism (Center

for Disease Control, 2012). Finally, incarcerated people may use contraband weapons to

facilitate escapes from custody (Peterson, 2015; US Sentencing Commission, 2008). In one

sample of more than 600 individuals who escaped from prison or jail in 2009, approximately

four percent used a weapon against staff or people outside the facility during their escape

(Peterson, 2015, pg. 116).

Contraband Interdiction

In response to the risks posed by contraband, correctional facilities have adopted

numerous interventions to prevent, detect, and confiscate contraband items (Shukla et al. 2021).

These interdiction strategies fall into three categories: (1) those designed to prevent the

introduction of contraband into prisons, (2) those designed to detect and confiscate contraband

once in prison, and (3) those designed to reduce the demand and opportunity for use of

contraband.

To detect contraband at entry points and prevent it from coming into the facility,

correctional officers visually and physically search incarcerated people, staff, visitors, and

6
vehicles for unauthorized items during visits, upon entry to the facility, and before and after

being transported (Shukla et al., 2021). These searches range in intrusiveness from visual scans

to body cavity searches (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2014) and may involve K-9

units trained to detect contraband like drugs or cell phones (Binetti, 2008; Kannenberg, 2003;

Prendergast, 2004). Some prison systems have restricted visitation to reduce the risk of visitors

introducing contraband (Justice Council, 1998). With the advent of advanced contraband

detection technology, more facilities are also moving towards supplementing their physical

searches with technological interventions like metal detectors, full body scanners, or ion

spectrometry units that can detect metallic items, drugs, and other forms of contraband

(Holsinger, 2002; Shukla et al., 2021; US Department of Justice, 2003).

Many of the strategies for detecting contraband that was successfully smuggled into or

manufactured inside the facility are similar to the strategies used to detect contraband on entry.

Correctional agencies conduct regular, random searches of incarcerated people and their cells,

sometimes assisted by K-9 units (Shukla et al., 2021) or cell phone detectors (National

Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2010). Further, correctional agencies

typically have specialized teams that investigate contraband and prison gang issues. These teams

may gather intelligence from confidential informants, knowledge of ongoing gang activities, or

seized contraband cell phones (Shaffer, 2014).

Facilities also employ strategies aimed at reducing the demand for contraband. One such

strategy has focused on drug addiction treatment and detoxification (Penfold et al., 2005). In

addition to its rehabilitative properties, drug treatment is employed to reduce the demand for

contraband at both the federal (US Government Accountability Office, 2011) and state level

(Holsinger, 2002). However, the relative availability of drugs in prison, the presence of prison

7
gangs supporting the drug trade, and a prison subculture opposed to drug treatment are all

obstacles to effective correctional drug treatment (Leukefeld & Tims, 1992). A similar demand

reduction strategy proposed for contraband cell phones has been to lower the cost of prison

telephone services (Kukorowski, 2012; see Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010).

Other preventative strategies include strict sanctions for contraband smuggling and

possession. There are also technological interventions designed to render certain items useless.

These strategies make it less appealing for individuals to smuggle and procure these items. For

example, in 2011, Maryland launched an interagency collaboration supported by the Bureau of

Justice Assistance to reduce cell phone smuggling through the proactive prosecution of prisoners

caught with cell phones and increased criminal penalties (Basu, 2014). Additionally, many states

have laws in place that make it a felony for anyone, including staff, to introduce contraband into

a facility.

Additionally, several correctional agencies have adopted technological interventions like

Managed Access Systems (MAS) and Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS) that selectively deny

cell phone service to unauthorized users (Frantz & Harris, 2016). MAS distinguishes between

cell phones authorized to operate in an area and those that are not. Unauthorized cell phones are

prevented from accessing the cellular network by a radio frequency umbrella, which allows only

certain users to use cell phones and subscriber identity modules (SIM) cards. MAS systems can

also automatically 'whitelist' emergency calls from any device (Grommon et al, 2016). Because

MAS can be difficult to implement in facilities situated in densely populated urban areas, DAS

use small antenna systems and low power transmitters to adapt these systems for urban or

smaller sized facilities. An evaluation of MAS in the Maryland Department of Public Safety and

Correctional Services’ Baltimore City Complex concluded that the technology, in conjunction

8
with policy changes, contributed to a significant reduction in cell phone use in the prison (Frantz

& Harris, 2016).

To prevent contraband from being thrown over prison walls, some facilities have

installed netting on their outer fences (Emerson, 2018), or placed beehives around perimeters to

deter throwovers (Schmidt, 2015). In recent years, the technological improvements and reduced

costs of unmanned aerial vehicle technology have also made drones an increasingly common

delivery mechanism for contraband. These are particularly difficult to stop because people can

maneuver the drone around nets and use remote controls to deliver contraband from greater

distances (Schmidt, 2015). Thus, geofencing, a technology that blocks drones from flying in

certain locations, has emerged as an alternative to physical fencing of prisons and jails (Schmidt,

2015). Other technologies are designed to detect drones by intercepting radio frequencies

between drones and their pilots, or by identifying drones based on their movements or thermal

energy (Koslover et al, 2017).

Efficacy of Interdiction Strategies

Research on the efficacy of contraband interdiction efforts has focused primarily on drug

interventions or multiple interventions deployed together. The most frequently evaluated

interventions have combined random drug testing with a suite of other interventions. For

example, Pennsylvania achieved significant reductions in drug use, inmate-on-staff assaults, and

inmate-on-inmate assaults through a combination of drug treatment, random drug testing,

sanctions for drug use, and ion spectrometry (Feuchet & Keyser, 1999; Penfold et al, 2005).

California prisons were also able to achieve drug use reductions with a combination of random

testing, K-9 units, and drug detection technology (Prendergast et al., 2004) while Wisconsin

prisons used a system of random drug tests and progressive sanctions to decrease positive drug

9
tests from 26.9 percent to 9.2 percent (Vigdal & Stadler, 1989). Qualitative research from

National Institute of Corrections’ Drug Free Prison Initiative (Holsinger, 2002) and Federal

Bureau of Prison interviews (Vanyur & O’Brien, 2002) also identified technological

interventions like ion spectrometry as the most promising avenue for interdicting drugs.

Non-drug contraband interdiction efforts have a smaller and more mixed research base

and focus primarily on cell phone detection. Maryland increased its recovery of contraband cell

phones through the combined use of specially trained K-9 units and additional security upgrades

(Binetti, 2008), but it was unclear whether this intervention actually reduced prisoners’ access to

phones. Mississippi, the first state to implement MAS technology, found a decrease in

intercepted transmissions and confiscated phones, indicating that the technology may have

helped deter people from smuggling or using phones in the facility (Grommon et al., 2016). In 18

facilities in California, 11,960,781 calls and messages from 77,594 devices were blocked - an

average of 105 contacts per incarcerated person in the state (Roose & Harshaw, 2015).

Other interventions have focused on limiting inmates’ ability to create contraband: a 2006

National Institute of Justice study focused on modifying the physical construction of razors,

toothbrushes, brooms, and fencing materials to increase the difficulty associated with converting

these items into weapons. However, there was no follow-up research evaluating the

dissemination or efficacy of this approach (Biermann, 2007). The limited research on the

efficacy of contraband interdiction efforts is problematic given their potential for unintended

consequences. For instance, some research suggests policies prohibiting contraband items like

tobacco may generate secondary economies that lead to additional inmate-on-inmate-violence

(Lankenau, 2001).

Current Examination of Prison Contraband

10
 The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive, descriptive assessment of

contraband issues that overcomes some of the limitations of extant literature. This paper offers

the first multi-state, scholarly examination of prison contraband issues. Previous research has

primarily come from official reports by a single facility or agency or used a limited definition of

contraband (e.g., focusing on one or two types of contraband items). Thus, the field does not

currently have a way of examining trends across jurisdictions or understanding the full scope of

contraband issues.

Additionally, this paper extends the literature by examining the impacts of contraband.

To date, there has been no systematic research on how contraband is introduced to facilities

(entry points), the amount and types of contraband recovered in facilities, contraband-related

critical incidents (e.g., assaults using contraband weapons), or the interdiction strategies agencies

employ to prevent, detect, or remove contraband from facilities. To that end, this paper describes

findings from a novel survey focused on the scope of, and issues associated with, prison

contraband.

The National Survey of Correctional Contraband

Data for this paper come from the National Survey of Correctional Contraband (NSCC).

The NSCC had four objectives: (1) to estimate the prevalence and types of contraband known to

administrators; (2) to determine the methods by which contraband is introduced to inmates; (3) to

quantify the occurrence of contraband-related violence and misconduct in correctional facilities;

and (4) to understand the types of interdiction strategies used in these facilities and what kinds of

contraband these strategies target. Given these goals, the survey included 31 questions across 7

sections: facility characteristics, inmate and staff counts, facility programs, contraband

recoveries, contraband incidents, contraband interdiction, contraband entry.

11
 We sent the NSCC to nine state departments of corrections (DOCs). Although we were

not aiming to draw a representative sample of U.S. correctional systems, we selected the DOCs

because they managed prisons across different geographic regions and of varying sizes,

capacities, security levels, and populations. These specific DOCs were also recommended to us

by the American Correctional Association because they had previously demonstrated a

willingness to participate in similar surveys and research projects. Finally, a few of the DOCs we

identified had reviewed earlier drafts of the survey instrument or participated in an initial pilot

test, so we were confident they collected and were able to provide the requisite data. From these

nine DOCs, three declined or were otherwise unable to participate, resulting in six state prison

systems who participated in the survey: Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and

Wyoming. Survey administration to the six DOCs took place between August and December

2019, while survey questions focused on data and events that occurred over calendar year 2018.

Participants were asked to provide a survey response for every adult prison under their

jurisdiction, which resulted in a total analytic sample of 301 prisons across the six systems. This

included all facilities administered by the DOC, or by a private corporation on behalf of the

DOC, which had a separate budget and administrator (facilities that shared a budget or

administrator were reported as a single facility). We excluded private prisons that were not

primarily housing people for the DOC, federal prisons and jails operated by local governments,

and facilities that only held juveniles. Although we distributed the survey to a single point of

contact in each DOC, data were provided by numerous individuals within the DOC’s central

offices, as well as administrators and staff from the individual facilities.

Of the 301 agencies in the study sample, 93 percent were operated by a government

agency, while the remaining were operated by private companies. Approximately half (49.8

12
percent) of the facilities were classified as “maximum”, “close”, or “high” security, just over

one-quarter (25.8 percent) were classified as “minimum/low” (25.8 percent), 15.7 percent were

classified as “medium”, and 8.7 percent were classified as “other/administrative”. More than 70

percent of the facilities were in rural areas, followed by suburban (16 percent) and urban (11.6

percent) locations. The average rated capacity of the facilities (i.e., the number of beds

authorized by a rating official for safe and efficient operation) was 1,065, while the average daily

population (ADP) across facilities was 986 individuals (92.6 percent average capacity).

It should also be noted that, compared to the national average, the NSCC sample has a

higher representation of maximum-security facilities and a larger per-prison population. The

sample nonetheless accounts for approximately 20 percent of the state prisons in the U.S.,

rendering its findings more generalizable than any previous work on correctional contraband in

the U.S. Moreover, the NSCC sample captures a considerable variation across correctional

agencies not only in terms of their characteristics and contraband-related challenges, but also in

terms of their capacity to track and report on contraband-related metrics. For example, while

nearly all respondents were able to provide data on contraband recoveries, only half maintained

records of the disciplinary actions taken against staff and visitors for contraband-related

incidents. Our descriptive approach to analyzing such data will help establish the logical and

empirical foundation of any future undertaking to better understand how contraband-related

incidents are reported and processed.

Analytic Approach

We analyzed the data descriptively, using means and standard deviations for continuous

variables and proportions for categorical variables, to examine several contraband-related issues,

including entry points, recoveries, assaults, disciplinary actions, and interdiction strategies. This

13
examination, albeit descriptive and exploratory, is a significant step forward to understand the

extent of contraband-related issues. Given the scant and limited scholarship that exists today, it is

particularly important to describe the current state of contraband and the issues it creates for

correctional facilities. Among other things, findings from the current study will form a basis to

validate the measurement of contraband-related issues, analyze change in contraband-related

issues over time, identify structural and organizational determinants of contraband, and inform

policy decision-making around the interdiction and management of contraband in correctional

facilities. Lastly, it should be emphasized that descriptive research is considered a necessary first

step in the development of a body of research even though it is not suitable to offer causal

explanations or predictions (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996; for example, see Peterson et al. 2016).

We hope our exploratory approach to compiling systematic and reliable data on contraband from

a large sample of correctional facilities will pave the way for future research to examine a wide

range of critical, yet under-studied issues related to correctional contraband.

Findings and Discussion

Entry Points

One of the contributions of the current study is to shed light on how contraband gets into

prisons. Although entry points have been largely ignored in previous research, one recent study

examined contraband issues in three correctional agencies (Shukla et al., 2021). They found that

contraband that originates outside a facility (e.g., illicit drugs and cell phones) usually comes in

via (a) incarcerated people entering or returning to the facility; (b) staff, volunteers, or other

facility personnel; (c) visitors; (d) letters and packages; or (e) items being thrown or flown by

drone over a facility’s perimeter fence. In the same vein, the NSCC asked respondents to rate

14
how much of a problem specific points of entry were for each facility between January 1, 2018

and December 31, 2018 (Table 1).

People returning to prison from work-release, medical appointments, or transfers were

considered “not a problem” in nearly 45 percent of the facilities. This is likely because these

individuals underwent stringent security checks upon entering or re-entering the facility to detect

contraband hidden inside their layers of clothing or body cavities, including pat searches, strip

searches, and the use of metal detectors or body scanners (Shukla et al., 2021). It is also

conceivable that those granted privileges of leaving a prison (e.g., work release) would not have

been eligible for or given an opportunity to do so had they been at high risk of institutional

misconduct in the first place.

Nearly 38 percent of facilities reported that visitors bringing in contraband was “a big

problem” while half noted this was “somewhat of a problem” (only 12 percent said this was “not

a problem”). Despite the concern about visitors, it is important to note that prior research has not

found any significant increase in overall levels of contraband as a result of prison visits. For

example, Siennick and colleagues found that contraband infractions significantly decrease in the

weeks before a visit, then increase the week after until gradually returning to baseline levels

(Siennick et al., 2013). Moreover, other studies have found that visits can improve safety and

security by lowering rates of institutional misconduct and recidivism (De Claire & Dixon, 2017;

Duwe & Clark, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2016).

Notably, while only 6.4 percent of respondents reported that security staff were a “big

problem” for contraband entry, more than 65 percent reported they were “somewhat of a

problem.” Similar responses were provided for “other/non-security staff” (i.e., treatment staff,

medical staff, maintenance staff, and other professional and technical personnel), while only a

15
few prisons reported any problems with their volunteers or vendors/contractors. This is

consistent with prior research, which has found that staff can be a source of contraband (Shukla

et al., 2021), particularly in states with relatively low officer salaries (Riley, 2017).

More than four-fifths of the facilities reported that letters or packages were “somewhat of

a problem (56.2 percent) or a “big problem” (22.3 percent) for the introduction of contraband.

Drugs can be smuggled into prison through mail by mixing illicit substances into paint or

crayons or hiding them in envelope flaps or behind postage stamps (Shukla et al., 2021). Finally,

there was nearly an even split between facilities on the issue of items being thrown over the

facility’s perimeter or flown over by drone. Nearly half the facilities reported this was “not a

problem” while the other half reported this was “somewhat of a problem” (24.2 percent) or “a

big problem” (26.2%). This split may be because some prisons are more susceptible to

contraband being smuggled this way, such as those with large open outdoor areas, proximity to

public roads, and nearby trees to provide cover (Shukla et al., 2021).

[Table 1 about here]

Recoveries

In addition to understanding how contraband entered the prison, the NSCC was one of

the first ever systematic efforts to estimate the scope of the contraband problem across multiple

state DOCs. The survey asked respondents to report the total number and type of contraband

recoveries that occurred in their facilities between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018. The

NSCC defined recoveries as any incident where staff found or recovered contraband items,

regardless of whether an individual was disciplined for the infraction or not. The instructions

16
also asked respondents to count each type of recovered item separately. For example, if staff

recovered a weapon and a cell phone during a single search, each of these were reported.

However, if two cell phones were recovered during the same search, this was only counted as

one recovery for “cell phones”. Table 2 summarizes responses to this question, broken out by the

type of contraband. Nearly all facilities reported on all types of contraband, except “property

with gang identifiers”, for which 191 facilities reported any information, and “modified or

altered property”, for which only 50 facilities responded.

Weapons, cell phones, and controlled substances were the most common contraband

recoveries reported by NSCC respondents, with an average of approximately 30 recoveries of

each type per prison in 2018. Using the ADP from across prisons (986), we can calculate the

average contraband recovery rate as 34 controlled substances, 31 cell phones, and 29 weapons

per 1,000 incarcerated individuals. There was also large variation in these recoveries. For

example, the maximum value of reported recoveries for the year was 575 for weapons, 366 for

cell phones, and 296 for controlled substances. Consistent with these findings, prior research has

found contraband cell phones, drugs, and weapons to be longstanding, serious, and widespread

issues in prisons (Grommon et al., 2018; Riley, 2017; Shukla et al., 2021; US Department of

Justice, 2003).

There were other types of contraband reported in the NSCC, but their recoveries were

relatively less frequent. For instance, respondents reported an average of just over 13 tobacco-

related recoveries and 8 alcohol-related recoveries per prison (which also translates to over 13

tobacco recoveries and 8 alcohol recoveries per 1,000 incarcerated individuals). Of note, survey

respondents also reported fewer than one excessive property recovery during the reporting

period. This is likely an underestimate as minor contraband violations, such as excessive

17
amounts of toiletries or food, are extremely common. However, because minor violations are

often not punished and recorded with disciplinary reports, they can be under-reported in official

data (Shukla et al., 2021).

[Table 2 about here]

Assaults

One of the aims of this study was to provide information on the impact contraband has on

critical incidents and safety in prisons. To that end, the NSCC asked respondents to report on the

number of inmate-on-staff assaults with weapons and inmate-on-inmate assaults with weapons in

2018 (Table 3). More than 95 percent of the 301 prisons in our survey sample were able to

provide data on these outcomes. Respondents reported about 4 inmate-on-inmate assaults and 1

inmate-on-staff assault per prison on average during the reporting period, with some prisons

reporting as many as 54 inmate-on-inmate assaults and 28 inmate-on-staff assaults over the year.

Prior research has similarly found that contraband weapons can pose substantial risks to

other incarcerated people and staff. For example, a study of 70 prisons across 10 states found that

weapons were used to injure 203 incarcerated people and 37 staff across a 12-month period

(Biermann, 2006). Another study found that 12 percent of incarcerated men and 9.4 percent of

incarcerated women experienced inmate-on-inmate physical violence with a weapon over a six-

month period (Wolff et al., 2007). Contraband used in these attacks may include items modified

into cutting or piercing instruments (e.g., shanks, daggers, and razors) or blunt objects used for

bludgeoning (e.g., locks stuffed into socks, broom handles, pitchers) (Biermann, 2006).

18
 [Table 3 about here]

Disciplinary Actions

Several questions in the NSCC focused on the punitive or disciplinary actions

administrators took against incarcerated people, staff, and visitors for contraband-related

incidents. For incarcerated people, the NSCC asked respondents to provide the number of

contraband-related infractions that resulted in a disciplinary report, placement in restrictive

housing, and new criminal charges. Respondents were also asked to report the number of

contraband-related violations, suspensions, terminations, and arrests among their staff, as well as

the number of visitor violations and arrests related to contraband. The responses to these

questions are displayed in Table 4.

Nearly all prisons responded to the first two questions related to disciplinary actions

taken against incarcerated individuals. They reported an average of 235 disciplinary reports and

81 placements into restrictive housing units (presumably for more serious contraband-related

infractions) over the 12-month period. Very few facilities collected data on whether incarcerated

individuals were given new charges for their contraband infractions. Of the 23 facilities who

responded to this question, there was an average of 8 new charges over the reporting period, with

one facility reporting a maximum of 148 new charges.

Likewise, only about half of the facilities were able to provide information on the

disciplinary actions taken against staff and visitors. Based on these responses, there were an

average of 2.57 staff violations, nearly 1 staff termination, and fewer than 1 staff suspension and

1 arrest per prison in 2018. For visitors, there was an average of 1.68 violations and 0.85 arrests

during the 12-month period. It is noteworthy that there were more contraband-related violations

19
among staff than visitors. These numbers seem to contradict respondent perceptions about the

ways contraband is brought into facilities; as we described above (Table 1), 38 percent of

respondents saw visitors as “a big problem” for contraband entry, compared to a much smaller

percentage who viewed security staff (6.4 percent) and non-security staff (8 percent) as a big

problem.

[Table 4 about here]

Interdiction Strategies

Another area of focus in the NSCC focuses on the interdiction strategies agencies used to

detect, prevent, and remove contraband from their prisons. Table 5 describes some of the

strategies from the NSCC that agencies used on staff, visitors, and incarcerated individuals. One

of the most frequently used interdiction strategies for all groups was regular pat searches. Over

90 percent of prisons used this strategy on incarcerated individuals and visitors, while more than

80 percent used this strategy on security and other staff. An equally high percentage of prisons

also reported using random pat searches on incarcerated individuals and staff, but fewer than

one-quarter used this strategy on visitors. Some of the other most common technologies and

strategies for combatting contraband were walk-through metal detectors, random drug tests, K-9

units trained to detect drugs or cell phones, surveillance cameras, and staff-initiated

investigations and intelligence.

Around half of the respondents reportedly used x-ray inspection systems on staff, visitors,

and incarcerated individuals. Correctional agencies typically use these machines to scan

incoming packages or personal belongings (clothes, bags, lunchboxes, etc.) that may potentially

20
be concealing contraband (Shukla et al., 2021). Only a few prisons reporting using whole-body

scanners as any part of their approach to interdiction. Similar to the machines used during airport

security screenings, body scanners can detect objects hidden on or inside a person’s body.

Though some correctional agencies see body scanners as an effective interdiction technology,

their relative scarcity is likely because of their high cost and the challenges agencies face when

using them (e.g., limits on radiation exposure that make it difficult for body scanner to detect

small, non-metallic objects) (Shukla et al., 2021).

Table 5 also includes several interdiction strategies that agencies only use on incarcerated

people. For example, almost 98 percent of prisons used cell searches or shakedowns to find

contraband, while more than 90 percent used regular or random strip searches. Nearly one

quarter of respondents deployed Body Orifice Scanning System (or BOSS) chairs – devices that

use metal detection technology to find weapons or other small metallic objects concealed within

abdominal cavities. A few facilities also installed technologies specifically for the interdiction of

contraband cell phones. Fewer than 6 percent of prisons had installed Managed Access Systems,

while nearly13 percent had devices that detect and locate illicit cell phones by tracking radio

frequencies. Finally, nearly all facilities opened and searched the mail incarcerated people

received from family members and friends, while more than 83 percent did the same for mail

coming from attorneys (however, legal mail was likely opened in the presence of the

incarcerated individual in accordance with state laws see Shukla et al., 2021).

[Table 5 about here]

Conclusions

21
 The current study had a few limitations. First, although a large number of correctional

agencies participated in the NSCC, our sample is not representative of the all US prisons. Our

findings should therefore be interpreted with caution so that over-generalization can be avoided.

Given that our sample is over-represented by maximum-security and high-population facilities, it

is conceivable that contraband-related incidents/concerns might have been more pronounced in

the NSCC relative to the national average.

Second, data in the NSCC are limited to what was known to respondents (i.e., prison

administrators). For example, respondents provided information on the number of specific illicit

items they recovered in their facilities, but this could be different from the true amount of

contraband in those facilities because some proportion of contraband would not be detected and

remain unknown to administrators. This measurement issue is germane to all surveys, but it

would be remiss not to recognize the clandestine nature of contraband, which makes it even more

difficult to measure the “true score” of contraband prevalence, as well as other data points

presented above, including entry points, assaults, and staff and visitor violations. If anything, the

summary statistics reported in the current study would be underestimates of the true rates for

which contraband is smuggled in (or manufactured), detected, and recovered in correctional

facilities.

Third, when it comes to contraband-related metrics, current practices in records-keeping

and reporting vary across states and even across correctional facilities within the same states.

Specifically, the operational definitions of contraband vary across states, as well as the reporting

format and procedure, which may have affected the quality and completeness of the NSCC data.

While we did our best to mitigate this by including standard definitions of all relevant terms in

the NSCC instrument and provided the respondents with ample time and guidance as to how to

22
prepare a data extract for the NCSC, our standard definitions, developed in consultation with

field experts (including the American Correctional Association) and past research, may or may

not be compatible with the way each state department of corrections defines contraband for their

operational purposes. Similarly, data reporting and keeping capacity vary widely across states,

limiting how much we could reliably learn about the spread of certain contraband issues or

responses. This was evidenced by the fact that nearly all respondents had collected data on

contraband-related disciplinary actions for incarcerated people, but only half had similar data for

staff and visitors.

Despite these limitations, this study brings valuable contributions to the field of

corrections. First and foremost, this was the first study of its kind to assess the prevalence of

contraband recovered in prison, broken out by specific types of items. We found that some of the

items that most jeopardize institutional safety and security (i.e., weapons, cell phones, and drugs)

were also the items recovered at the highest frequency. On average, prisons recovered around 30

of each of these items over the 12-month study period. This is not to suggest that there would be

more contraband cell phones and weapons in prison than miscellaneous contraband items such as

cigarettes and excessive commissary items, but instead that correctional agencies spend more

time and effort, as they should, to detect and report incidents involving more directly harmful

contraband items like weapons, cell phones, and illicit drugs.

We also found that correctional agencies tended to perceive visitors as a bigger problem

for contraband entry than staff, but that respondents reported more staff violations than visitor

violations for contraband-related incidents over the study period. There are, at least, two

distinctive implications that transpire from this observation. It is in human nature to cast and shift

blame (Weiner, 1995). When assessing the severity of contraband-related issues and developing

23
strategies for interdiction, it would be reasonable not to rely solely on the perceptions of

correctional staff as a source of guiding information. It is also conceivable that the consequences

of violating policies and regulations might be tracked and recorded under stricter scrutiny when

committed by correctional staff than visitors, which could explain the differences in reported

violations. All in all, when interpreting data on contraband-related issues and recoveries, it seems

prudent to think critically about how the data were generated and recorded.

Further, we collected detailed information on the prevalence of numerous interdiction

strategies and the extent to which these were reportedly used on incarcerated individuals, staff,

and visitors. It is important to note that incarcerated individuals are more subject than staff and

visitors to interdiction strategies involving manual inspection, such as pat and strip searches.

Conversely, staff and visitors are typically subject to interdiction strategies involving

technology-based detection and screening, such as metal detectors and body scanners. When it

comes to advancing the field of corrections, technology often comes first to mind. However,

officer training and education are equally important areas of focus, especially given that

correctional agencies still rely heavily on manual inspection tactics to detect, deter, and disrupt

the possession, distribution, and use of contraband among incarcerated individuals.

Implications for Future Research and Policy

Contraband is clearly one of the most critical issues facing correctional agencies across

the country. As the current study is only a first step towards developing a systematic,

comprehensive understanding of contraband-related issues in the U.S., there is much room for

future scholarship. First, we strongly encourage the scholarly community to collect the kind of

data reported in this study and replicate our findings. In so doing, our approach to data

collection, including the operationalization of key metrics and measurement units, can be

24
validated, falsified, or modified to better inform the field. As long as there is sufficient similarity

in sample properties, such a replication attempt can also serve as analysis of change over time.

Second, findings from our study can be generalized to the six states that participated in

the NSCC, including Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. As the six

states collectively account for approximately 20 percent of all state prisons in the U.S., our

findings have broad implications for policy and practice in the management and interdiction of

correctional contraband. However, the NSCC data are less than optimal to inform national or

regional-level policymaking and budgeting as the NSCC is not representative of all 50 states.

Future research should therefore strive to develop national estimates of the amount and types of

contraband in US facilities, including local jails, through the development and use of nationally

representative samples of correctional facilities. These statistics can help guide decisions around

setting national/regional funding priorities and research trends (see Riley, 2017). A national

focus can also help promote collaboration to develop comprehensive interdiction strategies.

Third, future endeavors should go beyond developing a baseline knowledge on

correctional contraband and focus on identifying the correlates of contraband in correctional

facilities. For example, the field would benefit from understanding if there are certain facility-

level (e.g., security level, overcrowding, inmate-to-staff ratio), agency-level (e.g., staff pay), or

prison population (e.g., resident demographics) characteristics associated with levels of

contraband. Identifying such correlates of contraband will help create a risk profile for

correctional agencies in terms of contraband prevalence and contraband-related incidents so that

an effective, timely response can be formulated to assist high-risk facilities.

Finally, future scholars should evaluate specific interdiction strategies. The current study

showed that prisons rely on a mix of technologies and policies for combatting contraband, but

25
there is almost no scholarship on which specific strategies, or combination of strategies, are most

effective. Along with the directions for future research suggested above, we strongly believe

evaluative research on contraband interdiction strategies would be highly valuable to inform the

field of how to detect and control contraband while ensuring the safety of those incarcerated and

working in correctional facilities.

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33
Table 1. Perception of Contraband Entry Points (n = 301)
Not a Somewhat of A Big
Problem a Problem Problem
% % %
Incarcerated individuals returning to facility 44.5 32.8 22.7
Security staff 28.4 65.2 6.4
Other/non-security staff 34.1 57.9 8.0
Volunteers 73.7 23.9 2.4
Vendors/contractors 77.8 21.5 0.7
Visitors 12.3 49.8 37.9
Letters and packages 21.6 56.2 22.3
Items thrown or flown over perimeter 49.7 24.2 26.2

Table 2. Contraband Recoveries

Facilities
Reporting M SD Minimum Maximum
Weapons 299 33.61 66.97 0 585
Cell phones 300 30.97 53.73 0 366
Controlled substances 299 28.46 40.05 0 296
Tobacco 299 13.03 20.61 0 150
Alcohol 299 8.07 15.93 0 117
Cash or other moneys 300 3.59 16.12 0 255
Property with gang identifiers 191 1.68 6.57 0 71
Excessive property 290 0.56 4.28 0 66
Modified or altered property 50 14.70 32.88 0 201

34
Table 3. Assaults with Weapons
Facilities
Reporting M SD Minimum Maximum
Inmate-on-staff assaults 288 0.92 3.47 0 28
Inmate-on-inmate assaults 287 4.14 8.11 0 54

Table 4. Disciplinary Actions Related to Contraband

Facilities
Reporting M SD Minimum Maximum
Incarcerated Individuals
Disciplinary reports 297 235.32 210.91 1 1052
Restricted housing 295 81.33 117.65 0 807
New charges 23 8.43 30.77 0 148
Staff
Total staff violations 151 2.57 4.82 0 36
Staff terminations 154 0.99 2.37 0 12
Staff suspensions 164 0.37 1.79 0 20
Staff arrests 154 0.31 0.93 0 5
Visitors
Total visitor violations 159 1.68 3.96 0 26
Visitor arrests 153 0.85 2.49 0 21

35
 Table 5. Use of Interdiction Strategies (n = 301)
Security Other Incarcerated
staff staff Visitors Individuals
% % % %
Walk-through metal detector 75.4 75.4 79.7 69.1
X-ray inspection system 56.5 56.8 56.5 47.8
Whole-body scanner 6.3 8.0 8.0 8.0
Regular pat search 81.4 80.7 93.3 93.0
Random pat search 85.0 83.1 22.3 97.0
Random drug test 89.4 57.5 2.7 99.7
Statewide contraband interdiction team 31.2 26.9 26.9 32.9
Contraband interdiction team at facility 48.8 52.8 45.5 64.5
K-9 unit 67.4 62.8 51.2 79.4
Surveillance cameras 85.7 85.0 83.7 89.0
Mass spectrometry/hand swabs 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.3
Staff-initiated investigation/intelligence 78.1 73.4 74.1 94.0
Regular strip search - - - 91.0
Random strip search - - - 93.7
Cell shake downs/searches - - - 97.7
Body Orifice Scanning System chairs - - - 26.9
Cell phone Managed Access Systems (MAS) - - - 5.6
Devices that locate and track cell transmissions - - - 12.6
Staff open and search all social mail - - - 97
Staff open and search all legal mail - - - 83.7

36

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