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Re-Review: Ronald Goldman's Religious Thinking from Childhood to

Adolescence.

Article  in  The Modern churchman · January 1988

DOI: 10.3828/MC.30.2.44

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44

Re-Review: Ronald Goldman's Religious

Thinking from Childhood to
Adolescence^
Olivera Petrovich

Goldman's book originated at a time when there was general interest in the
effectiveness of religious education in schools since the passing of the 1944
Education Act. His desire to provide a basis for RE in empirical research
rather than speculation and his courage in suggesting radical changes in the
conception of RE in accordance with his findings remain highly commendable
features of Goldman's work.
Although it is more than twenty years since its appearance (1964), the book
is still regarded as relevant. This is chiefly on account of the importance of the
issue it purports to address, namely, the intellectual potential of children as a
basis for RE. An additional reason is that no similar work has been under-
taken in the meantime.
Goldman's book was given much attention in educational and theological
circles following its publication. It is of interest, however, that the book was
never discussed in psychological journals. This is somewhat paradoxical for
the work is decidedly psychological in its conception, method and aims.
Since Goldman's study is grounded in a particular psychological theory of
development, Piaget's, and since child psychology has undergone major
developments in the past twenty years, this re-review is a timely, if not over-
due, attempt to assess his work in the light of contemporary child psychology.
In Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence Goldman's main
aim is to test "children's concepts and logic in relation to religious stories and
experiences which are formed by the total influence impinging upon the child's
life, not merely the results of teaching by school and Church" (p. 39, italics
mine). Besides, Goldman wanted to see whether "Piaget's three stages could
be applied to the realm of religious thinking" (p. 51).
To accomplish this, Goldman used Piaget's clinical interview method (p.
36) to question some 200 pupils aged 6-17 about three slightly modified ver-
sions of Bible stories and three drawings portraying scenes with some religious
connection.1
In this review I shall examine the essentials of Goldman's project by focus-
ing on the story-part of the test since it provides data pertaining to his aims
RE-REVIEW: RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 45

overall and especially to the development of operational thinking about

religion.2
Among Goldman's questions about the stories were the following: "How
would you explain the bush burning, and yet not being burnt?", "If Moses
had been deaf, do you think he would have heard God calling him?", "How
would you explain the dividing of the waters of the Red Sea?", "If he was
hungry, why didn't Jesus turn the stone into bread?" (see Appendix A). Five
out of 22 questions about the stories were chosen for analysis because "the
discussion of each question with each child revealed the possibilities of check-
ing the child's mode of thinking by Piagetian methods" (p. 51).
The children's answers were then evaluated by "theologically trained
scorers on a theological scale" and by "psychologists on an Operational'
scale" (p. 66). The criterion of correctness for assessing the answers was "the
current theological approach to biblical theology, interpreted from a central-
to-liberal position" (p. 48-9), i.e. that to which "the majority of Bible scholars
would subscribe" in the 1960s (p. 68).
Since the correlations between the two sets of scores were high, Goldman
concluded that theological and logical thinking were closely related, that is to
say, his three stages of religious thinking corresponded to Piaget's three main
stages in general cognitive development (p. 62). The stages (intuitive, concrete,
and abstract or formal-operational thought) occur in a strict chronological
order. At first, children are said to be egocentric, magical, and concrete in
their thinking; later, at the age of 13 or 14, abstract thought makes its
appearance.
As Goldman himself stated, "the implications of this fact are very far
reaching for religious education" (p. 67). He argued that RE of children in
préadolescent years should not make any intellectual demands since these
could not be met by the children. Instead, teachers were advised to lead
children to religion "not rationally but playfully", enabling them to "fan-
tasise their way into religion" through dance, drama, music, etc. (p. 233). In-
deed, the tremendous influence of Goldman's findings has been particularly
prominent in RE policies with younger children so that abstract concepts, such
as "God", are carefully avoided in RE manuals for primary schools.3
To give a more complete assessment of Goldman's book it would be
necessary to consider not just its methodological side but first of all its
rationale. The simplest way to do this is to start from the title itself, i.e. the
terms "thinking" and "religious".
Although the theme of the book is "thinking", Goldman leaves this crucial
term undefined. In the context of Goldman's work, "thinking" could be
understood either as (a) using ones reasoning powers to form concepts, make
judgements, and draw inferences, such as in problem solving tasks or, (b)
thinking as opinion, belief, or attitude to information, such as is expressed in
46 RE-REVIEW: RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE

value judgements. While in (a) the result of thinking can be assessed as correct
or false, in (b) no such strict criteria apply.
A further complication in Goldman's design arises from the unknown
degree of the child's knowledge of the material to which the operation of
thinking is applied. Apart from asking the child to state whether s/he had
heard the story before by selecting one of the four possible options (i.e. Yes,
No, don't know, unsure), Goldman had no other way of checking the child's
actual memory of the story.
Since Goldman's investigation of thinking aims at providing a basis for RE
in schools, the implications of an ambiguous reference to "thinking" are not
inconsequential. It makes a great difference whether thinking about religion is
defined in sense (a) or sense (b), and whether the child's knowledge base
matches the researcher's assumptions.
Although Goldman considers his research to be dealing with thinking in
sense (a), his actual interest was in (b).4 Thinking in the latter sense is not so
much a matter of logical capacity as of knowledge of and agreement about
particular beliefs or opinions. When disagreement is an equally likely out-
come, logical constraints do not apply in the same way that they do in problem
solving situations.
Goldman's rationale therefore conflates two variables which experimental
psychologists seek to separate carefully: logical reasoning and factual
knowledge. Thus, what Goldman interprets as logically inadequate reasoning
could be explained in terms of the lack of necessary information, in this case
the knowledge that miracles should not be interpreted literally, i.e. in accor-
dance with natural laws, but as symbolising something else.
Cognitively minded psychologists and philosophers are likely to interpret
the title of Goldman's book as dealing with "thinking" in sense (a). Others,
however, were not alarmed at Goldman's vague usage of "thinking", assum-
ing that vagueness is an intrinsic property of this term and that its two senses
are inherently inseparable. For them, any distinction to be made between these
senses is a matter of intuition rather than objective judgement.
The point may be illustrated by examining the objections to Goldman's
work made by earlier critics. These range from the criticism of Goldman as
being too intellectually biased in his research,5 to that of being preoccupied
with "a small enquiry into children's vocabulary".6 In view of the
psychological significance of the distinction between the two senses of "think-
ing", and between having information and thinking about it, people have
understandably been confused as to what exactly Goldman investigated.
Goldman's definition of "religious" and religion only further confirms
that his concern is not with thinking in sense (a) but in (b). According to
Goldman, religion is "fundamentally a pattern of belief, and not an intellec-
tual formula" (p. 31), and "a way of life to be lived, not a series of facts to be
RE-REVIEW: RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE ΑΠ

learned".7 In religion so defined, the emphasis is on emotions rather than on

intellect and thinking. The corollary of this, directly relevant to RE, is that
"religious experiences are so profound and personal and mysterious that it is
doubtful if they are communicable at all, except through the emotional
language of the arts" (p. 2-3). Consequently, the aims of RE should be to
satisfy children's deeper needs for security (p. 228) rather than their cognitive
needs.
On the methodological side, Goldman's questions are unanswerable in
naturalistic terms. It is not clear whether and how the rules of logical reasoning
could be applied to such irregular events as biblical miracles. This is not to say
that similar stories might not be used for studying the child's capacity to
grapple with the Bible. However, it would seem wrong to mix logic with
miracles which, by definition, escape all logical explanation. To illustrate, the
child who said that if Moses had been deaf he could not hear God because
"Deaf people don't hear", had not violated the rules of logic but the standards
of theological accuracy concerning the interpretation of miracles employed in
the test.
The stories selected by Goldman belong, psychologically speaking, to the
category of unfamiliar or strange material, beyond the child's ordinary
experience. All three stories depict extraordinary events, or miracles, and are
therefore highly unfamiliar to all but those children who have been initiated in­
to the conventions of how such events ought to be understood.
The first condition in cognitive developmental research is that the child
should be familiar with the material employed in testing. Significant
improvements in children's logical performance were obtained in those studies
where the researchers used familiar, meaningful materials as opposed to
artifically created symbols. It is therefore not surprising that older children
scored higher on Goldman's tests since they were likely to have received more
RE teaching.
In Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence Goldman's con­
tribution did not consist in producing a new theory but in applying Piaget's
well-known stage theory to a hitherto unexplored area. His rationale (p. 51),
method (p. 36), and conclusions (p. 62), are explicitly Piagetian. However,
since 1964 a great deal of research in cognitive development has accumulated
and Piaget's stage theory no longer has the prestige it had two decades ago.
Advances made in the methods of studying cognitive and perceptual develop­
ment in infancy and early childhood suggest that there are no major qualitative
changes from preoperational to concrete operational thought. The emphasis
nowadays is upon quantitative, rather than qualitative, differences between
younger and older children and even adults. Moreover, Piaget's stages are
found only if his tests are used, otherwise not.8
Piaget's notion of egocentrism is crucial in explaining early cognitive
development, yet, there is little evidence to support it. In fact, the preschool
48 RE-REVIEW: RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE

child's ability to draw logical inferences, i.e. reason deductively, is no different

in quality from that of adults.9 Where they do seem to differ from adults when
reasoning deductively is in respect of memory, and this is what Goldman did
not control.10
The young child's ability to use abstract criteria in a variety of tasks has
been demonstrated in a number of studies.11 Also, the research on
metaphorical comprehension shows that from age 4 onwards children can
understand the difference between metaphorical and literal statements.12
Nor is there evidence to support the claim that magical thinking is a
dominant form of children's explanations of physical events. Indeed, the
research on causal development shows that even 4-year-olds do not differ from
adults when reasoning about physical causality.13
In brief, the view in contemporary child psychology is that what changes
with age are not logical abilities in themselves but strategies in using these
abilities under conditions which demand logic. It is now generally accepted
that in this respect Piaget considerably underestimated the young child's
cognitive potential.
In this re-review I have tried to show that the very foundation of
Goldman's theory of the development of religious thinking has undergone
major modification and no longer provides a solid support for Goldman's own
construction. In contrast to other areas of child development, e.g. language,
number, conservation of matter, space, etc., where Piagetian claims have
already been substantially revised, the area of religious thinking development
lags considerably behind. Without a similar effort to investigate experimental-
ly the variables involved in religious thinking no firm foundations for RE pro-
grammes in schools can be laid.
At the time revolutionary, Goldman's book is of interest in that it
demonstrates close links between psychological and educational research and
theory. The changes that have taken place within psychology in the past two
decades make it impossible for educational research and theory to advance
while ignoring them. Goldman's suggestion that "there would appear to be a
pressing need for further research of a systematic nature into recommended
biblical material to test out the suitability of the material recommended" is
very reasonable (p. 225). Its sequel, however, "The recommendation may have
to be faced that very little biblical material is suitable before Secondary
schooling", still waits empirical verification and should be seen as a challenge
to researchers working in the post-Piagetian era.
We still, pace Goldman's work, do not know why Bible study does not
seem to work with most, and especially with the youngest children.
Psychological evidence shows convincingly that this cannot be attributed to
lack of logical abilities.
RE-REVIEW: RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 49

Footnotes
1. The stories used were: Moses and the Burning Bush, the Crossing of the Red Sea, and the
Temptations of Jesus. The pictures included: Family going to Church, Child at Prayer, and
Child looking at a Mutilated Bible (see p. 37-8, as well as Appendix A).
2. As for the concepts central to understanding of religious stories and activities, Goldman's
test (stories and drawings together) revealed some 30 such concepts, classifiable into 9
different groups (p. 37-8). Due to Goldman's wide-ranging and inclusive aims, the results
obtained are too global even for a descriptive study. A large number of variables in the
research design precludes any precise control and manipulation of these. Consequently, the
results obtained cannot be used as reliable predictors of future outcomes.
3. See, for example, W. Claxton, ed., Paths to Understanding: A Handbook to Religious
Education in Hampshire Schools, Hampshire Education Authority, 1980.
4. Goldman's declared aim is "to know what a child is able to grasp intellectually" (p. xi), so
that it could be educated "at the level of critical judgement" (p. 226). However, his real in-
terest seems to have been to see to what extent schoolchildren have a liberal theologian's
grasp of the three Bible stories.
5. See K. G. Howkins, Religious Thinking and Religious Education: A Critique of the Research
and Conclusions of Dr. R. Goldman, Tyndale Press, London, 1966, p. 9.
6. See C. M. Fleming, "Research Evidence and Christian Education", Learning for Living,
6(1), 1966, p. 11.
7. See R. Goldman, Readiness for Religion: A Basis for Developmental Religious Education,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, p. 6.
8. For a comprehensive review of empirical evidence in post-Piagetian research on child
development see R. Gelman & R. Baillargeon, "A Review of Some Piagetian Concepts", in
P. H. Müssen, ed., Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. Ill, John Wiley & Sons, New York,
1983, pp. 167-230.
9. See, e.g. M. Donaldson, Children's Minds, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1980, p. 58.
10. See P. E. Bryant, Perception and Understanding in Young Children: An Experimental
Approach, Methuen, London, 1978, p. 48.
11. See R. Gelman & R. Baillargeon, "A Review of Some Piagetian Concepts", same source as
in 8 above.
12. S. Vosniadu and A. Ortony, "The Emergence of Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinc-
tion in Young Children", Child Development, 1983, 54, 154-161.
13. T. R. Shultz, "Rules of Causal Attribution", Monographs of the Society for Research in
Child Development, 47(1), Serial No. 194, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

Olivera Petrovich is currently doing research in the Department of Experimen-

tal Psychology, University of Oxford, England.
 ^ s
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