Nominal Individuals for Ontic Structuralism

Draft

September 2021

Ontic structuralism (OSR) treats structures as the main constituents of our fun-
damental reality. According to radical ontic structuralism, structures are all what
there is. In contrast, moderate ontic structuralism (MOSR) holds that nonstruc-
tural entities exist but they are dependent on the fundamental structures they are
in. An implication of MOSR is permutation invariance: merely permutating entities
in structures does not result in any genuine change in state of affairs. This concept
can be conveniently illustrated by (fungible) digital goods: exchanging one bitcoin
for another does not make any difference.1 MOSR is called “moderate” also because
it holds that the nonstructural entities that enter fundamental structures are fun-
damental, and that those entities and structures are mutually dependent. (These
statements call for further clarification, which will be provided in Section 1.)
MOSR has neat applications in quantum mechanics and spacetime theories. Take
the latter as an example. There is a famous argument against manifold substantival-
ism (the view that our spacetime represented by a manifold is real and fundamental)
called “the hole argument,” which argues that if manifold substantivalism is true,
then our world is radically indeterminate in the sense that no amount of world his-
1
In contrast, exchanging nonfungible digital goods does make a difference. NFT (Non-fungible
token) enabled by blockchain technique has recently picked up. For example, it has made headlines
that Jack Dorsey sold the ownership of his first twitter for nearly 3 million dollars. The twitter will
continue to be free for everyone to see, to copy, and to share, but the buyer will somehow own the
original twitter that has its identity uniquely stored in the Ethereum blockchain.

1
tory can determine the distribution of quantities over the spacetime points of even a
tiny region (which is a “hole”). This is because we can freely permutate spacetime
points in spacetime structures that result in distinct possibilities that are empirically
indiscernible (more technically, such a permutation is a diffeomorphism, which maps
a manifold to itself in a way that preserves its differential structure). MOSR solves
the hole argument because such permutations (or diffeomorphisms) do not result in
distinct physical possibilities (Section 1). (The solution based on non-haecceitism for
spacetime points proposed by Pooley 2006 and others is essentially the same.)
However, just as the claim that numbers are not real goes hand-in-hand with
the task of dispensing with references to numbers, the claim that distinct models in
spacetime theories represent the same physical possibilities should be supported by
the feasibility of dispensing with the redundant features in those models that do not
correspond to reality. It is not adequate to simply replace every reference to a model
with the equivalence class of all the models that allegedly represent the same reality,
because we will still need to make references to specific spacetime points or regions
that are individuals in a specific model (Section 2). How should we understand or
translate these references?
In this paper, I will propose to meet this challenge to MOSR by using an al-
ternative framework to standard set theory based on permutation invariance. Any
permutation of the elements in a structure formulated in this framework will not re-
sult in any objective change as a logical consequence (Section 3). In this sense, we
can talk about entities without assuming their primitive identities. Such entities are
“nominal individuals” because their apparent distinct identities are merely a feature
of our naming system (analogous to digital goods mentioned in footnote 1). After
presenting the formalism of nominal sets and recasting MOSR in this framwork, I
will apply it to the examples of spacetime points and quantum particles (Section 4).

2
1 Moderate Ontic Structuralism

Moderate ontic structuralism (MOSR) is the view that some structures are funda-
mental, and nonstructural entities are grounded in the fundamental structures that
they are in. Part of what this means is that merely permutating the entities within
such structures does not result in any objective change. The gist of this approach
is already salient in Leibniz’s arguments against absolute space: it is not a distinct
possibility from the actual world if everything were moved one meter to the south.
While Leibniz intended to reject the existence of absolute space, this consideration
can also by met by the MOSR approach to space.2 The scenario is conceptually
equivalent to moving all spatial points one meter to the north, and this permutation
of spatial points, according to the MOSR approach, does not result in a a distinct
possibility.
The hole argument is a famous modern version of Leibniz’s argument, which goes
as follows. Suppose hM, g, hi is a model for general relativity, where M is a spacetime
manifold (set of points equipped with a topology and differential structure), g is a
metric field (which determines the distance relations between spacetime points), and
h is the totality of other physical fields (i.e., matter fields). It follows from general
relativity that hM, g 0 , h0 i is also a model, where g 0 and h0 are respectively g and h
carried by a diffeomorphism f from M to M (for every point x, g 0 (x) = g(f (x))). By
standard set theory, hM, g, hi and hM, g 0 , h0 i are different models, since g 6= g 0 and
h 6= h0 unless f is the identity map. But the two models are completely empirically
indistinguishable. Moreover, it leads to a radical indeterminism of the distribution
2
While Leibniz’s argument targeted at Newton’s position on absolute space, it may not be effective
against Newton’s actual view. In fact, Newton’s view looks very similar to MOSR about space
and time: “...just as the parts of duration derive their individuality from their order, so that (for
example) if yesterday could change places with today and become the later of the two, it would
lose its individuality and would no longer be yesterday, but today; so the parts of space derive their
character from their positions, so that if any two could change their positions, they would change
their character at the same time and each would be converted numerically into the other.” (Newton,
De Gravitatione [1962])

3
of states over spacetime points. Let f be the an identity map outside a small region
(called the “hole”) but not inside it. It follows that fixing all physical states outside
the hole does not fix the physical states within it, no matter how small the hole is.
This is problematic because, while our world could be indeterministic, we would not
want this to be a trivial consequence of our metaphysics.
A great deal of solutions to the hole argument have been proposed. The most
promising directions are (1) spacetime do not exist fundamentally, and (2) spacetime
points do not have primitive identity. The first strategy (which I take up in [anony-
mous]) is not relevant to the project of this paper. The second one is akin to MOSR
(we can regard MOSR as a specific solution of the second sort). How does MOSR
solve the hole argument? Roughly put, the difference between the models hM, g, hi
and hM, g 0 , h0 i is simply that the latter is a permutation of spacetime points in the
former that keep the relation between g and h invariant. If the relation between g
and h is the only relevant structure, then MOSR about spacetime entails that the two
models do not represent distinct possibilities. Rather, they are two representations
of the same physical reality.
Finally, a brief note on (radical) ontic structuralism (OSR), which holds that only
structures exist at the fundamental level. I focus on MOSR instead not because I
believe it is definitely better than OSR, but because OSR faces some specific diffi-
culties that are irrelevant to our discussion. For example, one objection to OSR is
that it blurs the distinction between physical structures and mathematical ones (since
normally we think a structure is physical if it is instantiated by concrete objects). I
would not get into this issue, but just note that MOSR faces less controversy that
may distract us from the challenges that I want to focus on.

4
2 The Challenge

In addressing the hole argument, to say that the distinct models hM, g, hi and hM, g 0 , h0 i
represent the same reality is to say that those models have redundant features that
do not correspond to any part of reality. It is a common task (frequently encountered
in philosophy of science and metaphysics) to dispense with such redundant features,
for if we couldn’t dispense with them, then it is doubtful not to admit those features
in our ontology. While some people disagree with the necessity of this task (c.f. easy
nominalism about mathematical entities), I will take it for granted that meeting this
task is valuable.
In the case of the whole model, the obvious move is to consider the equivalence
class of all models that are related to hM, g, hi in the same way as hM, g 0 , h0 i is. We
can claim that only this equivalence class is the realistic model for general relativity.
Regardless of whether this claim faces problems of its own, it doesn’t solve all the
interpretative problems. For example, the claim that ”there are two spatial points
that have a distance of 5 meters” is true according to our physics, and this claim is
made true by the existence of two points that have a distance of 5 meters. This seems
to revive the primitive identity

3 Nominal Sets

4 Applications

5
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