Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Contents
I. EVOLUTION OF “HEALTH”..........................................................................1
II. NHP....................................................................................................................5
III. PPP.....................................................................................................................5
IV. TRANSITION TO PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: OATHS...............................5
1. HIPPOCRATIC OATH (Oldest version)...........................................................5
2. JOHN HOPKIN’s OATH...................................................................................7
3. DR. LOUISE LASAGNE DEFINITION...........................................................9
4. GENEVA DECLARATION, 1948..................................................................12
V. MEDICAL ETHICS: September......................................................................13
VII. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT DIALOGUE - 31/102017.........................................21
VIII. CASE BRIEFS.................................................................................................24
1. Marshall v. Curry (1933)..................................................................................24
2. Associated Provincial Picture Hourses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation.......26
3. Murray v. McMurchy.......................................................................................26
4. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee.........................................26
5. Griswold v. Connecticut...................................................................................28
6. Roe v. Wade.....................................................................................................29
7. Reibl v. Hughes................................................................................................29
8. Sideway v. Board of Governers.......................................................................32
9. Gillick v. West Norfolk....................................................................................33
10. F v. West Berkshire......................................................................................34
11. Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1........................................35
12. R v. Cox........................................................................................................36
13. Planned Parenthood v Casey........................................................................37
14. R v. W...........................................................................................................37
15. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.........................................................................37
16. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab........................................................................38
17. Bolitho v. City..............................................................................................39
18. St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S (?).................................................39
19. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. UoI...........................................................39
20. Mrs. X and Ors. V. UoI................................................................................43
“A state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity.”
i. First of its kind approach where “health” was being defined at a common platform
ii. Identification of certain common objectives for all countries
Need to see in the context of time and place – after World War II – shell shock –
not just physical.
Criticism:
i. Not a self-contained statement
ii. Very general and vague
iii. Very idealistic and ambitious – “complete” – not pragmatic. (Law making is a
pragmatic or teleological exercise)
“(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children,
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.”
Significance:
First definition where we started looking at the concept of “public health”.
Criticism:
*Health is not one universal parameter with a rigid definition that applies across
spectra. It has subjective elements – based on individuals, time, place. Individuals –
therefore, Bhutan has National Happiness Index. Health is much more than somatic
elements of bodily health. Health of society therefore becomes much more complex.
India – skills exist but implementation is faulty. India suffers from a lack of
awareness and lack of accesibility.
India was very active as compared to counterparts in coming up with documents.
From localised endemic, it became a pandemic. AIDS became the next big thing
after the two world wars – sudden sexual liberalisation.
Baclground – important. USSR is getting fragemented. Important because Alma Ata
a socialist imperative.
Hence, Alma Ata objectives were never achieved because of shift to private
based models. Primary HC is pushed back. HSR not focussed on rights but
currency based model. Instead of focussing on resource allocation, investments
which are more riskier were fsocussed upon.
WTO Patents etc. How will common man access with these patents – Africa generic
drugs not available.
Doha Declaration: Giving an oppourtnity to the states to develop its own resources
– ambit of protected to patens. South Africa – without medicines. Dying. Therefore,
compulsory licensing model. If state can show unforeseable circumustances, then
WTo will give these medicines to these countries.
WTO – IPR just to patent inventor. In 1991, a compulsory licensing model – a state
has to show two things – 1) welfare of the people; 2) public health.
(xi) Millanium Development Goals (Comes into existence in 2000 and deadline is
2015 target)
2012 GA Resolution on UHC- Each and every nation will aspire for universal health
coverage
Statistics – till 2015 – only infant and maternal morbidity rate has gone down.
Need something better.
17 SDGs
Sustainable is not time-bound. Targets are time-bound but the term ‘sustainable’
also encompasses caring about future generations
Equality is something absolute – not good – equity understand the differnces – can’t
eradicate but can control them.
MDGs talk about HIV AIDs in specific but SDGs talk about communication and non-
communication diseases both
Strategic partnership of goals in SDGs – more practicable than global partnership.
II. NHP
Two-way link between economic growth and health status – the aim os to
incresase health outcome and explicityl acknowledge that better health results in
inreased productivity demographics.
(Shows currency model)
2.1, 2.3, 2.10, 2.11, 2.17, 2.18 4, 4.1-3, 4.3.7, 4.3.8, 4.3.9, 4.3.11, 6 and 7 imp and 13
III. PPP
History
Original text:
Provisions:
TEXT COMMENT
“To consider dear to me, as my Medical science considered as an art back then.
parents, him who taught me this The term ‘art’ has a connotation of mystery. In
art” present times, it has become a “highly evolved
technical science”.
To look upon his children as my Only certain people could be taught the art an no-
own brothers, to teach them this one else. Usually included children of teachers. In
art… and no one else” the past, medical schools gave preferential
consideration to the children of physicians. The
profession was seen as privileged, exclusive and
secretive.
I will not cut for stone, even for Ma’am – Sanctity of human life demands that
patients in whom the disease is human body is sacred – should not be cut except
manifest; I will leave this by specialised surgeons – surgeons different from
I will not give a lethal drug to Since the legalization of abortion in many
anyone if I am asked, nor will I countries, the inclusion of the anti-abortion
advise such a plan; and similarly sentence of the Hippocratic oath has been a source
I will not give a woman a of contention.
pessary to cause an abortion.
…I will enter only for the good This went beyond in regulating not just the
of my patients profession but general activites as member of
society – no will, intention or seduction etc.
considered wrong.
All that may come to my The profession was considered more than a
knowledge in the exercise of my consumer service done for the purpose of earning
profession or in daily commerce money – It was considered more than a profession
with men, which ought not to be – There was an element of sanctity visible in
spread abroad, I will keep secret everything – Human life and humans in general
and will never reveal considered to be sacrosanct – People are required
to be treated as sacred with sacred trust – Burden
of responsibility and trust – hence, a high burden
of confidentiality imposed upon the doctors.
To keep the good of the patient There may be other conflicting 'good purposes,'
as the highest priority. such as community welfare, conserving economic
resources, supporting the criminal justice system,
or simply making money for the physician or his
employer that provide recurring challenges to
physicians.
Homogenous
Streamline conduct and professionalism
“ I swear by Apollo the Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the
gods, and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfill according to my
ability and judgment this oath and this covenant: To hold him who has taught me this
art as equal to my parents and to live my life in partnership with him, and if he is in
need of money to give him a share of mine, and to regard his offspring as equal to my
brothers in male lineage and to teach them this art–if they desire to learn it–without fee
and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction and all the other learning
to my sons and to the sons of him who has instructed me and to pupils who have signed
the covenant and have taken the oath according to medical law, but to no one else. I will
apply dietic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I
will keep them from harm and injustice. ” I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody
if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a
woman an abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art. I will
not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in favor of such
men as are engaged in this work. Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the
benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in
particular of sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep
myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about. If I fulfill this oath and do not
violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and art, being honoured with fame
among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the
opposite of all this be my lot.”
In the 1870s, many American medical schools chose to abandon the Hippocratic
Oath as part of graduation ceremonies, usually substituting a version modified to
something considered more politically and medically correct, or an alternate pledge.
1 “I swear by …. all the gods, all The word ‘covenant’ used in addition to
the goddesses…following oath ‘agreement’
and covenant”
3 I will apply dietic measures for Dietic – As a physician, can modify diet ad
the benefit of the sick according lifestyle as needed – unclear whether harm and
to my ability and judgment; I justice is arising out of sickeness or treatment OR
will keep them from harm and in general
injustice.
5 Similarly I will not give to a Different from earlier – recognises that abortion is
woman an abortive remedy a remedy – but still will not give.
7 Whatever houses I may visit, I Visits only for benefit of sick – “intentional
will come for the benefit of the injustice” – element of intention – if proven
sick, remaining free of all otherwise – innocent
intentional injustice, of all
mischief and in particular of
sexual relations with both female
and male persons, be they free or
slaves.
“A widely used modern version of the traditional oath was penned in 1964 by Dr. Louis
Lasagna, former Principal of the Sackler School of Graduate Biomedical Sciences and
Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts University:[8]
“I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant: I will respect
the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and gladly
share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow. I will apply, for the
benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those twin traps of
overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism. I will remember that there is art to medicine as
well as science, and that warmth, sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the
surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug. I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor
will I fail to call in my colleagues when the skills of another are needed for a patient's
recovery. ” I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed
to me that the world may know. Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life
and death. If it is given to me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my
power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness
and awareness of my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at God. I will remember
that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose
illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My responsibility includes
these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick. I will prevent disease
whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure. I will remember that I remain a
member of society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound
of mind and body as well as the infirm. If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and
art, respected while I live and remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act
so as to preserve the finest traditions of my calling and may I long experience the joy of
healing those who seek my help.”
4 I will remember that there is art Explicit recognition that medicine is not just an
to medicine as well as science, art but also a science – warmth sympahty and
and that warmth, sympathy, and understanding needed as well as drugs and
understanding may outweigh the surgeon’s knife.
surgeon's knife or the chemist's
drug.
5 I will not be ashamed to say "I From focus on “my ability” - to help by others –
know not," nor will I fail to call accepting ignorance
in my colleagues when the skills
of another are needed for a
patient's recovery. ”
7 I will remember that I do not Focus not just on the disease but the entire human
treat a fever chart, a cancerous – and familial and economic consequences –
growth, but a sick human being, broader perspective.
whose illness may affect the
person's family and economic
stability.
10 If I do not violate this oath, may No sanction or negative language in case of not
I enjoy life and art, respected following mentioned.
while I live and remembered
with affection thereafter. May I
always act so as to preserve the
finest traditions of my calling
and may I long experience the
joy of healing those who seek
my help.”
Physician’s Pledge
Member of Medical Profession
Pledge
Dedicate life to service of humanity
Health and well-being of the patient will be first consideration
Maintain utmost respet for human life
No discrimination: Discriminating factors like nationality, disease etc. will not
intervene “between my duty and my patient”
Confidentiality: Respect secrets confided in me – even after the patient has
died
Practice my profession with conscience and dignity and in accordance with
good medical practice
Honour and noble traditions of the medical profession
Respecting teachers: Respect and gratitude to “teachers, colleagues and
students”
Sharing knowledge: Share medical knowledge for beneit of patient and
advancement of healthcare
Self-Health: Take are of health of own to be able to provide high std medical
help
CLASS NOTES
Medical ethics is a sensible branch of moral philosophy and deals with conflicts
in obligations/duties of doctors and their potential outcome.
Two strands of thought exist in ethics regarding decision-making: deontological
and utilitarian.
Earlier, two different types of scholars existed – Rationalists and Empiricists.
Rationalists focus on theory like Socrates, Kant, Plato etc.
Empiricists focus on ends like Bentham, Mill, Aristotle
Dr. George Stahl – In Logica Medica – explained these in terms of logic and
gave deonotological and cobsequentialist approach.
Deontologists – focus on praxis or means; Consequentialists focus on the
outcome or tayet.
Deon. Said that relationship between patient-doctor is a “moral enterprise”.
In deontological approach, outcomes/consequences may not just justify the
means to achieve it while in utilitarian approach; outcomes determine the means and
greatest benefit expected for the greatest number.
In brief, deontology is patient-centered, whereas utilitarianism is society-
centered. Although these approaches contradict each other, each of them has their own
substantiating advantages and disadvantages in medical practice.
Over years, a trend has been observed from deontological practice to utilitarian
approach leading to frustration and discontentment. Health care system and
practitioners need to balance both these ethical arms to bring congruity in medical
practice.
Imhotep: An Egyptian guy who was part healer part priest part health care
provider - First recorded case of “cancer” in his book – cancer called the emperor of
maladies – he didn’t know how to heal that.
[MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interest in virtue ethics, which
identifies the central question of morality as having to do with the habits and knowledge
concerning how to live a good life. His approach seeks to demonstrate that good
judgment emanates from good character. Being a good person is not about seeking to
follow formal rules. In elaborating this approach, MacIntyre understands himself to be
reworking the Aristotelian idea of an ethical teleology.
MacIntyre intends the idea of virtue to supplement, rather than replace, moral rules.
Indeed, he describes certain moral rules as 'exceptionless' or unconditional. MacIntyre
considers his work to be outside "virtue ethics" due to his affirmation of virtues as
embedded in specific, historically grounded, social practices.]
i) Prudence (φρόνησις, phronēsis; Latin: prudentia): also described as wisdom, the ability
to judge between actions with regard to appropriate actions at a given time
ii) Courage (ἀνδρεία, andreia; Latin: fortitudo): also termed fortitude, forbearance,
strength, endurance, and the ability to confront fear, uncertainty, and intimidation
iii) Temperance (σωφροσύνη, sōphrosynē; Latin: temperantia): also known as restraint, the
practice of self-control, abstention, discretion, and moderation tempering the appetition;
especially sexually, hence the meaning chastity
Paton in his book The Moral Law, 1948? – Human action is morally good not
because it is done for immediate inclination and self interst but for the sake of duty.
1994 – Beauchamp – Sujectivity can be done away with by coming up with
objective list of praxis.
(Hippocratic oath – not ashamed in stating that I do not know and my physician
friends should deal with it – otherwise patient or he might regret later which we don’t
want)
i) It is not isolated from emotions (unlike Kantian etc. theories) – Emotions are important
and integral part of moral perception.
ii) It considers the motivation of agent (practioner) to be of crucial importance.
iii) It is adaptive as it is determined on a case to case basis.
iv) Encourages development of creative solutions and flexible.
v) Recognise that no situation can be completely bereft of regret – and sometimes, there
might be regret that will still be left – understandable.
Ethics is a crucial branch in medicine guiding good medical practice. It deals with the
moral dilemmas arising due to conflicts in duties/obligations and the faced
consequences. They are based on four fundamental principles, i.e., autonomy,
In the utilitarian approach, decisions are chose based on the greatest amount of benefit
obtained for the greatest number of individuals. This is also known as the
consequentialist approach since the outcomes determine the morality of the
intervention. This approach could lead to harm to some individuals while the net
outcome is maximum benefit. This approach is usually guided by the calculated
benefits or harms for an action or intervention based on evidence. A few examples of
utilitarian approach in medical care include setting a target by hospitals for resuscitation
of premature newborns (gestational age) or treatment of burns patients (degree of
injury) based on the availability of time and resources. There are two variants of
utilitarianism: Act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism deals with
decisions undertaken for each individual case analyzing the benefits and harms
promoting overall better consequences. Every action/decision arrived for each patient is
confronted with the measurement of balance of the benefits and harms, without
examining the past experience or evidence. This method would lead to enormous
wastage of time and energy in decision-making and are prone to bias. In rule
utilitarianism, no prediction or calculation of benefits or harms is performed. These
decisions are guided by preformed rules based on evidence and hence provide better
guidance than act utilitarianism in decision-making. According to rule utilitarianism,
morally right decision is an action complying moral codes/rules leading to better
consequences.[1] Although these concepts look appealing patients feels constrained
when clinicians make the decisions, affecting the fundamental ethical principles. These
ethical issues can be accommodated when dealing with patients who are competent to
play a role in decision-making, while posing moral dilemmas in patients who are
incompetent, e.g., in patients who are brain-dead (permanent vegetative state), decision-
making with regards to withdrawal of life-sustainment/organ donation, etc. In the above
scenario, dilemmas can be dealt ethically and legally if the patients had made advance
decision directives about their life similar to decisions on wealth.[2,3]
In contrast to the utilitarian concept, deontology is ethics of duty where the morality of
an action depends on the nature of the action, i.e., harm is unacceptable irrespective of
its consequences. This concept was introduced by a philosopher, Immanuel Kant and
hence widely referred as Kantian deontology. The decisions of deontology may be
appropriate for an individual but does not necessarily produce a good outcome for the
society. The doctor-patient interaction or relationship is by nature, deontological since
Traditional moral analytical studies (Greene's dual process model) revealed that
deontological and utilitarian inclinations are mutually exclusive while recent studies
utilizing the process dissociation moral analytical approach revealed that an inclination
toward an ideology may occur due to the absence of inclination to another. These
studies also reported the association of deontological inclinations with empathy,
religiosity, and perspective-taking, while moral concern and reduction in the cognitive
load being associated with utilitarian inclinations.[5] In conclusion, both utilitarian and
deontological perspectives have their own importance in medical ethics. In the current
scenario, we get to see utilitarian perspective countermanding the deontological
perspective and hence most ethical and moral dilemmas. A balance between these two
perspectives would bring better harmony and justice to medical practice.
Imhotep
First recorded case of “cancer” in his book – cancer called the emperor of
maladies – he didn’t know how to heal that.
Translated in 1930, the papyrus is now thought to contain the collected
teachings of Imhotep, a great Egyptian physician who lived around 2625 BC. Imhotep,
among the few nonroyal Egyptians known to us from the Old Kingdom, was a
Renaissance man at the center of a sweeping Egyptian renaissance. As a vizier in the
court of King Djozer, he dabbled in neurosurgery, tried his hand at architecture, and
made early forays into astrology and astronomy. Even the Greeks, encountering the
In general practice training, young doctors are raised on the four principles! This
approach was initially developed in the United States by Beauchamp and Childress1;
Virtue ethics began with the ancient Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle. They searched for the elements that made a person good but in so doing they
did not look at how a person acted but at what sort of character he had. They suggested
that a good person who behaves well must develop virtues, which, through habitual use,
become part of that person’s character.
Aristotle believed that a virtue lay in the middle of two contrary vices and
described it as “the mean by reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of
deficiency”.6 Courage—for example, lies between foolhardiness and cowardice.
Compassion lies between callousness and indulgence. Aristotle believed that the
purpose of human existence is to achieve a state of eudaemonia, which is a difficult
word to translate. “Happiness” is too superficial and subjective. We may feel happy if
we satisfy our desires but this is no guarantee of any enduring contentment. To be
eudaemon is rather to have the sort of happiness that is deep, lasting, and worth having.
It is a deeply rooted joy in the dynamic process of our lives. It is hard to find a single
word to sum up this concept but the closest approximation is “flourishing”.
Aristotle suggests that reason is the function unique to humans that sets them
apart from all other living creatures. We have a capacity to make choices based on
reason,which the most intelligent of higher order creatures do not appear to possess.
Animals do not recognise ends as such and do not have the capacity for choosing to do
something that will lead to a less good end when faced with two options (see reference
9, pp 25–51). It is by reasoning that a person determines how to act and feel in ways
appropriate to a given circumstance. It is not sufficient to possess virtues; one must
have the capacity to know when and how to exhibit them. Thus the virtuous person uses
rationality (practical wisdom) to decide how to be. Health care professionals are
usually motivated to improve the wellbeing of their patients. In pursuing this end, they
must balance their expert knowledge and understanding with the preferences of their
patients, taking into consideration the means by which that person has made their
choice and ensuring they themselves do not transgress anymedical moral code. Doctors
in the 21st century are encouraged to work in partnership with their patients, informing,
guiding, advising, and helping them to make appropriate choices about how to deal with
their illness. These choices are typically adapted to suit individuals, taking into
• It recognises that emotions are an integral and important part of our moral perception.
• As there are no rigid rules to be obeyed, it allows any choices to be adapted to the
particulars of a situation and the people involved. Two people might both behave well
when resolving the same situation in different ways.
VI.
Need to look at the entire patient profile (Hippocratic Oath: Not treating merely
a disease but an individual/entire human)
Physician needs to understand the background of the patient to establish “mutual
comprehension” – like paitent’s intellectual capacity; education; purchasing power.
(Like getting sociological position of the patient).
Patient competence
Doctor–patient relationship
Concept of Consent
Requirement that a patient must give consent is based on the principle of body
inviolability.
Mill: A member can rightfully exercise power over any other’s body only to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physicial or moral is not sufficient
warrant.
Gillick Competency
Dept. of Health came up with guidelines on famly planning for youg that stated
that doctors can lawfully prescribe contraceptives for children less than 16 years of age
without informing their parents or taking parents’ consent. Mrs. Gillick a mother of five
daughters contended that this was unlawful + her consent should have been taken.
House of Lords decided the case in favour of the Health Authority with a
majority of three to two. The majoity judges said that if the minors were deemed to
have sufficient understanding and maturity to take their decisions, known as having
“Gillick Competence.” then can make own healthcare choices. Lord Templeman and
Bradon dissented and found for Mrs. Gillick. She won unanimously in the Court of
Appeal.
Negligence
C operated on M to cure a hernia. During the operation, C found problems with M’s left
testicle and decided to remove it to save him. M sued C in battery for removing the
testicle.
Analysis:
Per Chisholm CJ, there are rules governing consent to medical treatment:
→ 1. Where consent can be obtained, it must be obtained;
→ 2. Such consent can be expressed or implied;
→ 3. Consent can be implied from conversations before surgery or from preceding
circumstances
This is an action for damages for negligence and assault in the course of a
surgical operation. The judgment, rendered by Chisholm, C. J., in the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court, is one of the most important in recent years upon the legal
responsibility of the surgeon. Here is discussed in detail, with references to the
jurisprudence, the duty of a surgeon who when operating for one condition discovers
another which he had not foreseen, but which in his opinion endangers the health or the
life of the patient.
Quoting an American case, the Court laid it down as a general principle of law
that "ordinarily, where the patient is in full possession of all his mental faculties and in
such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition without the consultation
being fraught with dangerous consequences to the patient's health, and when no
emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him, it is manifest that his
consent should be a prerequisite to a surgical operation". In other words under a free
government the first right of a citizen is the right to the inviolability of his person, and
the necessary consequence of this right is that a surgeon who has been asked to
examine, diagnose, advise, and prescribe for his patient cannot without the patient's
permission violate his bodily integrity by a major or capital operation, placing him
under an anaesthetic for that purpose, and operating upon him without his consent or
knowledge. It is the right of every one to determine what shall be done with his own
body. Practical considerations, however, require that this rule should not be applied too
strictly. If a person should be injured and rendered unconscious, and his injuries are of
such a nature as to require prompt surgical attention, a medical man would be justified
in applying such medical or surgical treatment as might reasonably be necessary for the
preservation of his life or limb, without his express consent. Again, if in the course of
an operation to which the patient had consented, the medical man should discover
conditions not anticipated before the operation was commenced, and which, if not
removed, would endanger the life or health of the patient, he would be justified in
extending the operation to remove or overcome them, though no express consent to the
extension could be given in the nature of things. In such an emergency the surgeon
would not be responsible unless the patient had expressly forbidden any extension of
the operation.
The juridical basis for holding the surgeon blameless in such cases is sometimes
said to be the implied consent that the patient is presumed to have given, sometimes that
the operating surgeon is the representative of the patient to give consent. To this the
Court said, with much reason,” I am unable to see the force of the opinion, that in cases
of emergency, where the patient agrees to a particular operation, and in the prosecution
of the operation, a condition is found calling in the patient's interest for a different
operation, the patient is said to have made the surgeon his representative to give
consent. There is unreality about that view. The idea of appointing such a
representative, the necessity for it, the existence of a condition calling for a different
The Court came to the conclusion that the defendant, after he had commenced
the operation, discovered conditions that neither he nor the patient had anticipated and
which could not have been reasonably foreseen, and that in extending the operation the
defendant acted in the interest of his patient and for the protection of his health and
possibly his life. "The removal I find was in that sense necessary, and it would be
unreasonable to postpone the removal to a later date". For this reason, as well as on the
ground that the action was barred under the Statute of Limitations, the action was
dismissed.
6. Murray v. McMurchy
Facts: Woman goes in for Cesarian. Doctor, while doing operation finds out that she has
tumour, and ties off her fallopian tubes. Doctor performed procedure with no consent,
and situation was not an emergency. Ratio: If it is an not a medical emergency, doctors
must leave decisions to the patient. Analysis: She should have been informed about the
tumour post-Cesearian, but to immediately tie off fallopian tubes is not appropriate.
It is important to note that at this time juries were still being used for tort cases
in England and Wales, so the judge's role would be to sum up the law and then leave it
for the jury to hold the defendant liable or not.
McNair J at the first instance noted that expert witnesses had confirmed, much
medical opinion was opposed to the use of relaxant drugs, and that manual restraints
could sometimes increase the risk of fracture. Moreover, it was the common practice of
the profession to not warn patients of the risk of treatment (when it is small) unless they
are asked. He held that what was common practice in a particular profession was highly
relevant to the standard of care required. A person falls below the appropriate standard,
and is negligent, if he fails to do what a reasonable person would in the circumstances.
But when a person professes to have professional skills, as doctors do, the standard of
care must be higher. "It is just a question of expression," said McNair J.
"I myself would prefer to put it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he
has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art. I do not think there is much difference in
sense. It is just a different way of expressing the same thought. Putting it the other way
round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely
because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. At the same time,
that does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pig-headedly carry on with
some old technique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially
the whole of informed medical opinion. Otherwise you might get men today saying: "I
do not believe in anaesthetics. I do not believe in antiseptics. I am going to continue to
do my surgery in the way it was done in the eighteenth century." That clearly would be
wrong."[1]
Facts: The defendant was the body who employed a doctor who had not given a
mentally-ill patient (the claimant) muscle-relaxant drugs nor restrained them prior to
giving them electro-convulsive therapy. The claimant suffered injuries during the
procedure. The claimant sued the defendant, claiming the doctor was negligent for not
restraining them or giving them the drug.
Issue: Establishing the tort of negligence involves establishing that the
defendant breached their duty of care to the claimant. To establish breach, the claimant
must establish that the defendant failed to act as a reasonable person would in their
position. This standard is higher in the case of professionals: they must act as a
reasonable professional would. The issue in this case was how to assess the standard of
care imposed on a professional defendant where a substantial portion of professionals
opposed a particular practice, while others did not.
Held: The High Court held that the doctor had not breached his duty to the
patient, and so the defendant was not liable. McNair J set out the test for determining
the standard of care owed by medical professionals to their patients (sometimes referred
to as the ‘Bolam test’). The professional will not be in breach of their duty of care if
they acted in a manner which was in accordance with practices accepted as proper by a
responsible body of other medical professionals with expertise in that particular area. If
this is established, it does not matter that there are others with expertise who would
disagree with the practice. As the methods used in this case were approved of by a
responsible portion of the medical profession, there was no breach.
The standard to be applied is not that of a most astute doctor or necessarily that
of a professor of general practice, but that of an ordinary and competent GP acting
responsibly
In the case of Gregg vs Scott brought to the House of Lords in 2002, it was
established that a patient must prove that a doctor's action, or lack of it, caused the
patient to suffer injury and not just the chance of avoiding an injury. In practical terms
this means that a doctor failing to diagnose a case of cancer in which a patient has only
a 25% chance of survival would not be found negligent. Only if the chance of survival
was over 50%, ie a probability of a cure rather than a chance of a cure, would
negligence be found.
8. Griswold v. Connecticut
9. Roe v. Wade
The reasoning and language of both Griswold and Eisenstadt were cited in the
concurring opinion by Associate Justice Potter Stewart in support of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).[14] The decision in Roe struck down a Texas law that criminalized
aiding a woman in getting an abortion.[15] The Court ruled that this law was a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abortion became legalized
for any woman for any reason, up through the first trimester, with possible restrictions
for maternal health in the second trimester (the midpoint of which is the approximate
time of fetal viability). In the third trimester of pregnancy, abortion is potentially illegal
with exception for the mother's health, which the court defined broadly in Doe v.
Bolton.
Roe v. Wade, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on January 22, 1973,
ruled (7–2) that unduly restrictive state regulation of abortion is unconstitutional. In a
majority opinion written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the court held that a set of
Texas statutes criminalizing abortion in most instances violated a woman’s
constitutional right of privacy, which it found to be implicit in the liberty guarantee of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“…nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
The case began in 1970 when “Jane Roe”—a fictional name used to protect the
identity of the plaintiff, Norma McCorvey—instituted federal action against Henry
Wade, the district attorney of Dallas county, Texas, where Roe resided. The Supreme
Court disagreed with Roe’s assertion of an absolute right to terminate pregnancy in any
way and at any time and attempted to balance a woman’s right of privacy with a state’s
interest in regulating abortion. In his opinion, Blackmun noted that only a “compelling
state interest” justifies regulations limiting “fundamental rights” such as privacy and
that legislators must therefore draw statutes narrowly “to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake.” The court then attempted to balance the state’s distinct
compelling interests in the health of pregnant women and in the potential life of fetuses.
It placed the point after which a state’s compelling interest in the pregnant woman’s
health would allow it to regulate abortion “at approximately the end of the first
trimester” of pregnancy. With regard to the fetus, the court located that point at
“capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” or viability.
The case settled the issue of when a physician may be sued for battery and when
it is more appropriate to sue the doctor in negligence. The Court wrote unanimously
that "unless there has been misrepresentation or fraud to secure consent to the treatment,
a failure to disclose the attendant risks, however serious, should go to negligence rather
than to battery." The case also marked the creation of a standard whereby a physician
must give the patient sufficient information so that an objective, reasonable person in
the patient's position would be able to make an informed choice about a medical
procedur
Background[edit]
Robert A. Hughes, a physician, was in the process of competently performing an
endarterectomy on his patient, John Reibl, when Reibl suffered a massive stroke.
Paralysis and impotence resulted. Reibl alleged that he had not truly given informed
consent, and as such the surgery constituted battery.[1] Although Reibl was aware that
the surgery was not without risks, he felt that Hughes had implied that the risks of not
having the surgery were greater. Reibl was eighteen months away from obtaining a
lifetime pension, and the stroke prevented him from earning that pension. He stated that
if he had been aware of the risks in the surgery, he would have waited the year and a
half to earn his pension before undergoing the procedure, even if it meant a shortened
life.
In the original trial, Reibl was awarded monetary damages for negligence and battery,
irrespective of his having signed a formal consent form. On appeal to the Ontario Court
of Appeal, the court directed that a new trial be held, but that the charge of battery be
disallowed from the new proceedings.
Ruling[edit]
It is a general principle in tort law that a defendant is not liable for damages unless their
negligence was the cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
In the context of a medical malpractice claim where it is alleged the doctor failed to
inform the patient of a risk, the doctor will not be held liable if the patient would have
had the procedure anyway (even if they knew of the risk).
Reibl v. Hughes the Supreme Court outlined a "modified objective test" for causation in
medical malpractice. It is well established in Canadian law that a doctor cannot be sued
for not disclosing information if the patient would have consented to the operation
irrespective of whether or not the information was disclosed.
The court looked at two approaches: an objective test ("what would a reasonable person
do?") and a subjective ("what would this plaintiff have done?"). There was concern that
an objective test favors the doctor while a subjective test favors the plaintiff.
In an objective test, the Court would accept medical evidence that the chance of
paralysis was 5% and the chance of death was high. A reasonable person, thinking
rationally, would take the risk of paralysis over death.
If it were a subjective test, the Court would ask the plaintiff. Logically, the plaintiff,
who is paralysed will say "no." Logically, if the plaintiff said they would have had the
operation anyway, they would not be suing the doctor.
In Reibl, The Court created a "modified objective test" which starts with the
"reasonable person" and adds some of the characteristics of the plaintiff, such as age,
sex, and family circumstances but will not allow "irrational beliefs" to be taken into
account.
The test has been frequently used to determine many medical malpractice and
negligence cases, including Arndt v. Smith.[2]
How specific must the information about the risks of a medical procedure be to enable
a person to make an informed choice between surgery and no surgery?
Facts Edit
Reibl underwent surgery for the removal of an occlusion in the left internal carotid
artery. Hughes, the surgeon, performed the surgery properly, however either during or
immediately after the surgery the plaintiff had a massive stroke that left him paralyzed
on the right side of his body and impotent. Prior to the surgery the respondent did not
inform the appellant specifically about the risk of stroke. The appellant consented to the
surgery. He only had 1.6 years left at his job before he was eligible for his pension and
extended disability benefits. Reibl was successful at trial and recovered $225,000;
however a new trial was awarded upon appeal.
1. Issue Edit
How specific must the information about the risks of a medical procedure be to enable a
person to make an informed choice between surgery and no surgery?
2. Reasons Edit
Laskin, writing for a unanimous court, agrees with the trial judge that Hughes did not
properly inform Reibl of the risks involved. He holds that you must inform a patient
3. Ratio Edit
Doctors must inform their patients of all material risks before the patient can give
informed consent. This includes a discussion of any possible serious outcomes such as
death or paralysis, even if they are very remote.
The test to see if enough information has been given is to objectively ask: would a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes decide to have the surgery or not if they were
given all of the information? Is this different than the answer with only the amount of
information that was given?
Facts: The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms.
Her neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not include
in his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said decompression
caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal operation. This Will come
up in the UCL SBA.
Lord Diplock stated "we are concerned here with volunteering unsought
information about risks of the proposed treatment failing to achieve the result sought or
making the patient’s physical or mental condition worse rather than better. The only
effect that mention of risks can have on the patient’s mind, if it has any at all, can be in
the direction of deterring the patient from undergoing the treatment which in the expert
opinion of the doctor it is in the patient’s interest to undergo. To decide what risks the
existence of which a patient should be voluntarily warned and the terms in which such
warning, if any, should be given, having regard to the effect that the warning may have,
is as much an exercise of professional skill and judgment as any other part of the
doctor’s comprehensive duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical
evidence on this matter should be treated in just the same way. The Bolam test should
be applied.’ and ‘a doctor’s duty of care, whether he be general practitioner or
consulting surgeon or physician is owed to that patient and none other, idiosyncrasies
and all.’ .’[1]
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if
he acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible
body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice. In short,
the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical
judgement.
The patient was suffering from neck pain. Remedy of neck pain inevitably
involved a 1-2% risk of spinal cord injury. Here, the patient was not warned of the risk
and hence she became severely disabled. She brought an action for negligence.
England's appellate court upheld a ruling that a surgeon who had performed an
operation resulting in severe spinal cord damage, without having advised the patient of
the risk of such an occurrence, was not liable. The physician's duty of care is discharged
by revealing enough information to enable the patient to make a rational decision, with
the extent of disclosure to be based on accepted medical practice. The judges rejected,
as not in accord with English law, the American doctrine of informed consent based on
the patient's right to disclosure of all material risks of significance to a "prudent
patient."
The Gillick case involved a health departmental circular advising doctors on the
contraception of minors (for this purpose, under sixteens). The circular stated that the
prescription of contraception was a matter for the doctor's discretion and that they could
be prescribed to under sixteens without parental consent. This matter was litigated
because an activist, Victoria Gillick (née Gudgeon), ran an active campaign against the
policy. Gillick sought a declaration that prescribing contraception was illegal because
the doctor would commit an offence of encouraging sex with a minor and that it would
be treatment without consent as consent vested in the parent.[4]
The issue before the House of Lords was only whether the minor involved could
give consent. "Consent" here was considered in the broad sense of consent to battery or
assault: in the absence of patient consent to treatment, a doctor, even if well-
intentioned, might be sued/charged.
The House of Lords focused on the issue of consent rather than a notion of
'parental rights' or parental powers. In fact, the court held that 'parental rights' did not
exist, other than to safeguard the best interests of a minor. The majority held that in
some circumstances a minor could consent to treatment, and that in these circumstances
a parent had no power to veto treatment.[5]
Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser proposed slightly different tests (Lord Bridge
agreed with both). Lord Scarman's test is generally considered to be the test of 'Gillick
competency'. He required that a child could consent if he or she fully understood the
medical treatment that is proposed:
As a matter of Law the parental right to determine whether or not their minor
child below the age of sixteen will have medical treatment terminates if and when the
child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what is
proposed.
— Lord Scarman[1]
The ruling holds particularly significant implications for the legal rights of minor
children in England in that it is broader in scope than merely medical consent. It lays
down that the authority of parents to make decisions for their minor children is not
absolute, but diminishes with the child's evolving maturity. The result of Gillick is that
in England today, except in situations that are regulated otherwise by law, the legal
right to make a decision on any particular matter concerning the child shifts from the
parent to the child when the child reaches sufficient maturity to be capable of making
up his or her own mind on the matter requiring decision.
Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 771 is an important
English tort law case, on the standard of care required by medical specialists. It follows
the Bolam test for professional negligence, and addresses the interaction with the
concept of causation.
F was a 36 year old woman. She had a serious mental disability caused by an infection
when she was a baby. She had been a voluntary in patient in a mental hospital since the
age of 14. She had the verbal capacity of a child of two and the mental capacity of a
child of 4. She developed a sexual relationship with a fellow patient. Her mother and
medical staff at the hospital were concerned that she would not cope with pregnancy
and child birth and would not be able to raise a child herself. Other methods of
contraceptives were not practical for her. They sought a declaration that it would be
lawful for her to be sterilised. F was incapable of giving valid consent since she did not
appreciate the implications of the operation.
Held:
The declaration was granted. It would be lawful for the doctors to operate without her
consent.
Lord Goff:
"It is well established that, as a general rule, the performance of a medical operation
upon a person without his or her consent is unlawful, as constituting both the crime of
battery and the tort of trespass to the person. Furthermore, before Scott Baker J. and the
Court of Appeal, it was common ground between the parties that there was no power in
the court to give consent on behalf of F. to the proposed operation of sterilisation, or to
dispense with the need for such consent…. If such treatment administered without
consent is not to be unlawful, it has to be justified on some other principle. Upon what
principle can medical treatment be justified when given without consent? We are
searching for a principle upon which, in limited circumstances, recognition may be
given to a need, in the interests of the patient, that treatment should be given to him in
circumstances where he is (temporarily or permanently) disabled from consenting to it.
It is this criterion of a need which points to the principle of necessity as providing
justification."
15. R v. Cox
17. R v. W
The English Court of Appeal, Civil Division, exercised its unlimited inherent
jurisdiction over minors, and ordered that a 16-year-old girl suffering from anorexia
nervosa be transferred against her will from an adolescent residential unit to a hospital
specializing in eating disorders. Although the girl had sufficient intelligence and
understanding to make informed decisions, the special hospital was in the girl's best
interest. The court emphasized that, because a unique characteristic of anorexia nervosa
is that the patient desires not to be cured, adhering to the minor's wishes in this case
could lead to her death or severe permanent injury. The court explained that treatment
of an anorexic patient must consider state of mind, as well as body weight. The court
further held that the 1969 Family Law Reform Act is inapplicable to the issue of
whether a 16-year-old minor has the absolute right to refuse medical treatment.
Tony Bland was a young supporter of Liverpool F.C. who was caught in the
Hillsborough crush which reduced him to a persistent vegetative state. He had been in
this state for three years and was being kept alive on life support machines. His brain
stem was still functioning, which controlled his heartbeat, breathing and digestion, so
technically he was still alive. However, he was not conscious and had no hope of
recovery. The hospital with the consent of his parents applied for a declaration that it
might lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical support measures
designed to keep him alive in that state, including the termination of ventilation,
nutrition and hydration by artificial means.
The patient came to hospital pregnant. The doctors advised a caesarian section
but she refused it. The doctors said that she lacked capacity and applied to the court for
leave to proceed. Held: It was wrong to apply to the court to override the will of a
patient with full capacity. Capacity is not necessarily lost if a patient is committed
under the Mental Health Act. Advance Directives are to be heeded. Patients without
mental capacity are to be treated according to the medical views of the doctors. The
court gave guidelines on the procedures to be followed.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the present matter, was approached
under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution to allow for the termination of the life of
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug, who was in a permanent vegetative state. The petition
was filed by Ms. Pinki Virani, claiming to be the next friend of the petitioner. The
Court in earlier cases has clearly denied the right to die and thus legally, there was no
fundamental right violation that would enable the petitioner to approach the court under
Article 32. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court taking cognizance of the gravity of the
matter involved and the allied public interest in deciding about the legality of
euthanasia accepted the petition.
Facts: It was stated that the petitioner Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug was a staff
Nurse working in King Edward Memorial Hospital, Parel, Mumbai. On the evening of
27th November, 1973 she was attacked by a sweeper in the hospital who wrapped a dog
chain around her neck and yanked her back with it. He tried to rape her but finding that
she was menstruating, he sodomized her. To immobilize her during this act he twisted
Thirty six years had lapsed since the said incident. She had been surviving on
mashed food and could not move her hands or legs. It wass alleged that there is no
possibility of any improvement in the condition and that she was entirely dependent on
KEM Hospital, Mumbai. It was prayed to direct the Respondents to stop feeding Aruna
and let her die in peace.
The respondents, KEM Hospital and Bombay Municipal Corporation filed a
counter petition. Since, there were disparities in the petitions filed by the petitioner and
respondents, the court decided to appoint a team of three eminent doctors to investigate
and report on the exact physical and mental conditions of Aruna Shanbaug.
They studied Aruna Shanbaug’s medical history in detail and opined that she is
not brain dead. She reacts to certain situations in her own way. For example, she likes
light, devotional music and prefers fish soups. She is uncomfortable if a lot of people
are in the room and she gets distraught. She is calm when there are fewer people around
her. The staff of KEM Hospital was taking sufficient care of her. She was kept clean all
the time . Also, they did not find any suggestion from the body language of Aruna as to
the willingness to terminate her life. Further, the nursing staff at KEM Hospital was
more than willing to take care of her. Thus, the doctors opined that that euthanasia in
the instant matter is not necessary.
ISSUES RAISED
Introduction to Euthanasia
Precedents
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Maruty Shripati Dubal,[i] the contention was that
Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional as it is violative of Article
19 and 21. It was held in this case by the Bombay high court that ‘right to life’ also
includes ‘right to die’ and section 309 was struck down. The court clearly said in this
case that right to die is not unnatural; it is just uncommon and abnormal. In the case of
P.Rathinam v. Union of India,[ii] it was held that the scope of Article 21 includes the
‘right to die’. P. Rathinam held that Article 21 has also a positive content and is not
merely negative in its reach. In the case of Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab,[iii]the validity
of Section 306 of the IPC was in question, which penalised the abetment of suicide.
This case overruled P.Rathinam but the court opined that in the context of a terminally
ill patient or one in the PVS, the right to die is not termination of life prematurely but
rather accelerating the process of death which has already commenced.[iv] Further, it
was also submitted that the right to live with human dignity[v] must also include a
death with dignity and not one of subsisting mental and physical agony.
Reliance was placed on the landmark judgement of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland,[vi]
where for the first time in the English history, the right to die was allowed through the
withdrawal of life support systems including food and water. This case placed the
authority to decide whether a case is fit or not for euthanasia in the hands of the Court.
Also, in the case of Mckay v. Bergsted,[vii] the Supreme Court of Navada, after due
evaluation of the state interest and the patient’s interest, upheld the permission for the
removal of respirator. However, in the instant case, Aruna could breathe by herself and
did not need any external assistance to breath and thus, distinguished from the Mckay
case.
The Hon’ble Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice
Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra, delivered this historic
judgment on March 7, 2011. The Court opined that based on the doctors’ report
and the definition of brain death under the Transplantation of Human Organs
Act, 1994, Aruna was not brain dead. She could breathe without a support
machine, had feelings and produced necessary stimulus. Though she is in a
PVS, her condition was been stable. So, terminating her life was unjustified.
Further, the right to take decision on her behalf vested with the management
and staff of KEM Hospital and not Pinki Virani. The life saving technique was
However, Aruna Shanbaug was denied euthanasia as the court opined that the
matter was not fit for the same. If at any time in the future, the staff of KEM
hospital or the management felt a need for the same, they could approach the
High Court under the procedure prescribed.
This case clarified the issues revolving around euthanasia and also laid down
guidelines with regard to massive euthanasia. Alongside, the court also made a
recommendation to repeal Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. This case is a
landmark case as it prescribed the procedure to be followed in an area that has
not been legislated upon.
We do not mean to decry or disparage what Ms. Pinky Virani has done. Rather,
we wish to express our appreciation of the splendid social spirit she has shown. We
have seen on the internet that she has been espousing many social causes, and we hold
her in high esteem. All that we wish to say is that however much her interest in Aruna
Shanbaug may be it cannot match the involvement of the KEM hospital staff who have
been taking care of Aruna day and night for 38 years.[25]:127-128
Since the KEM Hospital staff wished that Aruna Shanbaug be allowed to live,
Virani's petition to withdraw life support was declined. However, the court further
stipulated that the KEM hospital staff, with the approval of the Bombay High Court,
had the option of withdrawing life support if they changed their mind:
However, assuming that the KEM hospital staff at some future time changes its
mind, in our opinion in such a situation the KEM hospital would have to apply to the
Bombay High Court for approval of the decision to withdraw life support.[25]:128
The Petitioner No. 1- Mrs. X is about 22 years' old. She has approached this
Court under Artilce 32 of the Constitution of India seeking directions to the respondents
to allow her to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy. According to her, fetus
which is about 22 weeks old on the date of the petition has a condition knowns as
bilateral renal agenesis and anhydramnios. She apprehends that the fetus has no chance
of survival and the delievery may endanger her life. In order to verify the condition of
petitioner No. 1, this Court by order dated 03.02.2017 while issuing notice to the
respondents directed examination of the petitioner by a medical Board consisting of
following seven Doctors.
Opinion of Pediatric Surgeon in charge of Birth Defect Clinic : There is risk of
intrauterine fetal death/ still birth and there is no chance of long term post natal
survival, and no curative treatment is available at present for bilateral rengal agenesis.
There is thus a clear diagnosis of the condition of the single live fetus which is
said to have bialateral renal agenesis wheich means the fetus has no kidneys and
anhydramnios which means that there is an absence of amniotic fluid in the womb.
Further, there is a clear observation that there is a risk of intrauterine fetal death, i.e.
death within womb and there is no chance of a long term post natal survival. What is
important is that there is no curative treatment available at present for bilateral renal
agenesis.
The Medical Board has opined that the condition of the fetus is incompatible
with extra-uterine life, i.e. outside the womb because prolonged absence of amniotic
fluid results in pulmonary hypoplasia leading to severe respiratory insufficiency at