Countries are establishing relations with the

Taliban even though none has offered formal

recognition of the militant government
Nearly a month after its takeover, there has been no formal recognition of the Taliban as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan. But that step appears increasingly irrelevant, at
least for the short and medium term, as countries around the world have established
varying degrees of relations with the militant regime.
For some, including the United States, the need to extricate their remaining citizens and
Afghan partners has imposed acceptance of the Taliban as the sole national authority. At
the same time, the Biden administration has pledged to continue humanitarian aid that
has amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars in the past few months alone.
“There is no diminution in our humanitarian assistance to the people of . . . any country
around the world where we may have differences, including profound ones,” State
Department spokesperson Ned Price said Thursday. “We do not express those
disagreements by taking it out on the people.”
Many of Afghanistan’s closest neighbors in Central and South Asia are consulting with one
another in search of a unified policy that will prevent them from being overcome with
refugees and maintain security in the region.
Others, including China and Russia, see the Taliban ascension as an opportunity, both to
highlight U.S. failure over 20 years of warfare and nation-building, and to boost their own
regional sway.
As they did on the battlefield, the Taliban outlasted the U.S. at the negotiating table
One signal of how many of the world’s richest economies plan to use their leverage over
the militants is likely to come when the Group of Seven finance ministers meet in coming
days, said Kanni Wignaraja, director of the United Nations Development Program’s
regional bureau for Asia and the Pacific. Those governments hold billions in frozen Afghan
government assets in their banks — most of them in the United States — and control
deciding votes in the international financial institutions that have suspended payments to
Afghanistan.
“That discussion is right in the center of their table,” Wignaraja said at a U.N. briefing for
reporters on Thursday. “It will be a significant signal as to whether they are going to
engage, how much they will,” and the extent to which Afghans will be able to access
needed injections of cash.
The Biden administration has said its future cooperation depends on how the Taliban’s
interim government conducts itself.
“We are not providing any bilateral assistance to the government of Afghanistan,” Price
said of the payments that paid most of the former government’s bills, and “are reviewing
the extent of assistance we have provided over the years to determine what may be
appropriate. Our approach . . . is going to be predicated on the answers that [the Taliban]
government provides.”
However world governments decide to relate to the Taliban, there is little disagreement
that the Afghan population is in dire need of help.
“Afghanistan pretty much faces universal poverty by the middle of next year. That’s where
we’re heading,” Wignaraja said. The combination of political instability, the freeze of
foreign reserves and a collapsed public finance system, drought and the coronavirus
pandemic has projected a worst-case poverty rate of 97 to 98 percent, she said.
The current poverty level is 72 percent, although significant development progress had
been made with massive aid flows during the war years. “Per capita income more than
doubled, life expectancy at birth increased nine years, years of schooling from six to 10,”
Wignaraja said.
Equally important, said Abdullah Al Dardari, the resident UNDP representative in
Afghanistan, has been the education and entry into the economy of women.
“Seventy percent and more of the Afghan economy is . . . informal,” he said. “Seventy
percent of that sector is made up by women” who operate small businesses and agriculture
in small towns and rural areas. “They are the backbone of the Afghan economy.”
An Afghan politician spent her life working for women’s rights. She barely made it out of
the country.
That poses a critical question for the Taliban, whose interim government named this week
contained no women and eliminated the ministry in charge of ensuring opportunity and
rights for women and girls. Although senior militant officials have said that women will be
allowed to work, they have caveated those promises as “within Sharia law” and Afghan
“culture.”
So far, the United Nations and the 156 partner nongovernmental organizations with which
it works in Afghanistan have been allowed to continue operations in most of Afghanistan.
“It’s really Kabul that has to open up,” Wignaraja said.
Although the administration has said that humanitarian assistance — all of which goes
through nongovernmental agencies such as the United Nations — should not be subject to
relations with the Taliban, political critics of its handling of the exit from Afghanistan have
charged that continued aid is tantamount to ransom for ensuring that American citizens
and Afghan allies can leave the country.
“Any agreement to allow safe passage should not be paired with the promises of U.S. aid,
dropping terrorists from U.S. or other sanctions lists,” as the Taliban have demanded, “or
the release of frozen financial assets,” Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) and Rep. Michael
Waltz (R-Fla.) said in a statement Wednesday. “It is clear to both of us that the Taliban are
seeking to hold family members of American visa holders hostage to gain leverage over the
United States.”
Asked Tuesday whether he was worried that countries such as China would eliminate
leverage held by the United States and its Western partners by buying its own influence,
President Biden told reporters that “China has a real problem with the Taliban.”
“As does Pakistan, as does Russia, as does Iran,” he said. “They’re all trying to figure out
what they do now.”
But Beijing seems less worried about its “problem” with the Taliban, including whatever
affinity the militants may have for Muslims in western China, than it is eager to point out
U.S. failings and responsibility.
“All believe that the United States and its allies are the culprits of the Afghan issue,” a
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said Thursday after a Pakistani-hosted meeting on
the subject attended by foreign ministers from China, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the
deputy foreign minister of Turkmenistan.
The Americans, the spokesperson said, “are more obligated than any other country to
provide economic, livelihood and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, and help
Afghanistan maintain stability, prevent chaos and move toward sound development.”
The Chinese also see the departure of the United States from Afghanistan as an
opportunity to expand their Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, already a major factor
in their close relations with Pakistan.
But even as it takes a different approach to the Taliban, China clearly shares some U.S.
concerns. “We should guide and urge the Afghan Taliban to unite with all ethnic groups
and factions,” not least to stem the flow of refugees, and “make a clean break with terrorist
forces,” the spokesperson said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin shares China’s concerns. “We are, of course, not
interested in Afghanistan remaining a threat for the neighboring states,” with terrorism,
drug trafficking or migrant flows, he said Thursday, according to Russian media.
But Putin has also taken advantage of the opportunity to blame the Americans for what he
said were “irresponsible attempts to impose foreign external values and establish so-called
democratic institutions… that ignore historical features and traditions.”
“The people of this country have been fighting for decades and deserved their right to
define their state themselves,” Putin said.

How has Iran reacted to the Taliban takeover in

Afghanistan?

It has welcomed the departure of U.S. forces and pledged to work with
the Taliban government. New Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said,
“America’s military defeat must become an opportunity to restore life,
security, and durable peace in Afghanistan.”

But the collapse of the Afghan government came at a time when the
Iranian political system was in transition, with Raisi in the process of
taking over the presidency. Thus, most of the domestic attention has
been focused on cabinet selection and the confirmation process for
ministers. Surging COVID-19 infections in Iran have also
overshadowed the situation in Afghanistan.

Iran-Afghanistan relations became very tense after the

murder of Iranian diplomats under the previous
Taliban regime. Is any similar Sunni-Shia friction
evident now?

The two countries nearly went to war in 1998 because of the murder of

those Iranian diplomats . But during the long years of Taliban
insurgency, this friction waned. The insurgency was also a source of
disorder that kept the United States busy in Afghanistan, which served
Iranian strategic purposes.

It’s also worth noting that during the post-2001 insurgency,

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) was active in
Afghanistan. By 2013, it was recruiting tens of thousands of
Afghans [PDF] to serve in one of the militias it used in Syria. The
question now is whether Iran can continue recruiting Afghans for its
various militias under the new Taliban reign.

But the situation today is different. The Sunni Taliban are no longer just
a guerrilla force; they now rule the country. An offshoot of the self-
proclaimed Islamic State, another Sunni group, also operates in
Afghanistan, and the country could attract similar militant groups,
which would raise concerns in Iran. Instability in Afghanistan, conflict
among its various factions, and Sunni militancy all present Iran with a
strategic problem that it likely did not anticipate. The new Iranian
government was already dealing with a struggling economy and a third
wave of COVID-19 infections. Now it faces unpredictability on its
eastern front.

Iran has hosted millions of Afghan refugees in the

past, and many remain. Will it allow more into the
country?

This time around, Iran is unlikely to welcome a large number of

refugees, like it did in the 1980s. The Iran-Afghanistan border is closed,
and with the COVID-19 pandemic raging in Iran, the regime is looking
to limit any further spread from outside the country.

Will the U.S. departure from Afghanistan have any

bearing on Iranian foreign policy?

It is unlikely that developments in Afghanistan will alter Iran’s level of

support for proxies in Syria and particularly Iraq; backing proxies is
already a strategic priority. But if the sectarian divide between Iran and
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan sharpens, Iran could further rely on the
Shiite proxies that it has trained and armed. The new Iranian
government has pledged to prioritize relations in the immediate
neighborhood more than its predecessor, which spent much of its time
trying to draw Western investors and dealing with the nuclear issue.

The Islamic Republic’s approach toward nuclear negotiations with the

United States likely won’t change because of the withdrawal.
Iran’s position has remained consistent: it will remain party to
the nuclear deal  as long as the United States returns to the agreement
under the previous conditions, with no changes. Both former President
Hassan Rouhani and now Raisi have stressed that Iran will neither
negotiate an extension of the current agreement nor accept the inclusion
of its missile capability in any talks, as has been raised by the United
States.

Why did Pakistani officials cheer the Taliban

takeover of Afghanistan?

It is important to note Pakistan’s government and military are not

monolithic institutions but rather groups with competing interests. With
that in mind, it is true that these groups were generally in favor of a
Taliban victory. After the Taliban took over Kabul, Pakistani Prime
Minister Imran Khan declared that the Taliban were “breaking the
chains of slavery .”

There are three long-standing and overlapping reasons for Khan’s

public show of support. First, Pakistan has vested ideological interests
in the Taliban. Pakistan was created in 1947 as a Muslim nation and
Islam was the glue that was supposed to hold together many otherwise
disparate communities with diverse linguistic and ethnic identities. But
this was a struggle. In 1971, after a bitter civil war, a large portion of
Pakistani territory in the east dominated by the Bengali-speaking
community broke away to become Bangladesh. That loss made the
Pakistani government particularly paranoid about the western territories
of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have large Pashtun or
Pashto-speaking populations. Pakistan established madrassas in these
territories to emphasize and teach a particularly strict brand of Islam in
the hopes that Islamic nationalism would suppress Pashtun nationalism.
Taliban leaders, who also espouse Islamic nationalism, were trained in
those madrassas .

Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Divides Pashtun Communities

Second, Pakistani officials worry about the border with Afghanistan

and believe that a Taliban government could ease their concerns. Since
1947, Afghan governments have rejected the Durand Line, which
separates Pakistani Pashtun-dominated territories from Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, home to a Pashtun majority, claims these territories as a
part of a “Pashtunistan” or traditional Pashtun homeland. Pakistan’s
government believes that the Taliban’s ideology emphasizes Islam over
Pashtun identity.

Third, it is imperative for Pakistan to have a Pakistan-friendly

government established in Afghanistan. Pakistan accuses India of
seeking to exploit its ethnic and linguistic divisions to destabilize and
break up the country. India’s good relationship with former Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani’s government did nothing to assuage this
concern. A Taliban government could help Pakistan counter India,
including by providing a haven for anti-India jihadi groups.
How has Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban
changed since 9/11? 

Pakistan continues to be a major source of financial and logistical

support for the Taliban. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI)  agency has supported the Taliban from their inception with
money, training, and weaponry. The ISI also maintains strong ties with
the Pakistan-based Haqqani network, a militant group that works
closely with the Taliban. (Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani
network, has also been a deputy leader of the Taliban since 2015.) The
Taliban own real estate in Pakistan and receive large donations from
private individuals in the country.

At the same time, under pressure from the United States, Pakistan has
over the years detained—and allegedly tortured —Taliban commanders,
including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a Taliban founder who is now
back as one of the group’s chief leaders. Moreover, the current Pakistan
Army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, is reportedly more wary of
the Taliban’s potential to destabilize Pakistan.

Going forward, Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban could decrease.

The Taliban have been politically savvy in attempting to build ties with
China, Iran, and Russia. If China, a close Pakistani ally, chooses to
recognize the Taliban-led government, it will do so without enthusiasm
for the virulent religious nationalism espoused by both the Taliban and
Pakistan. This is because it could spill over into China’s Xinjiang
region, where the Chinese government has used claims of separatism
to crack down on Uyghur Muslims .
What consequences could the Taliban takeover
have for Pakistan?

Pakistan is playing a risky game in supporting the Taliban. Its goal to

contain Pashtun nationalism and counter India by having a Pakistan-
friendly government in Afghanistan does not account for either the
quirks of the Taliban or the warring religious fundamentalist forces
within Pakistan.

Showing its sensitivity to the Durand Line, Pakistan has spent millions

of dollars  over the past few years to reinforce and demarcate the border.
Yet, the Taliban, in conformity with other Afghan governments, have
neither accepted the Durand Line nor Pakistan’s attempts to physically
demarcate it. Nor have the Taliban ever renounced or condemned the
Afghan goal of a Pashtunistan.

To complicate matters further, the Taliban maintain close ties with the
Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), sometimes referred to as the Pakistani Taliban.
The TTP comprises small Pashtun militant groups that are sympathetic
to the Taliban, operate along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and vow
to war with Pakistan until it secures an independent Pashtunistan. The
TTP is responsible for the deaths of many thousands of Pakistani
civilians. Recognizing the link between the Afghan Taliban and the
TTP, General Bajwa reportedly warned Pakistani lawmakers that the
groups are “two faces of the same coin .”

Moreover, if Afghanistan once again descends into civil war, Pakistan

will have to cope with another huge flow of refugees. Last year, an
estimated 1.4 million Afghan refugees  were living in the country.
Finally, Pakistan could jeopardize its relationship with China if
Afghanistan (as well as Pakistan) becomes a haven for Muslim
separatists, including disaffected Uyghurs from Xinjiang.

How could the United States and its allies work

with Pakistan on the situation in Afghanistan? 

The United States faces a complex situation in South Asia, and in its
bilateral relationship with Pakistan. The U.S. government has a long-
standing record of investment in Pakistan in return for cooperation on
terrorism, but this has yielded limited dividends given Pakistan’s own
regional security interests.

Now, Washington has two additional elements to consider. The first is

its deepening strategic partnership with India. Over the past few years,
India has become more receptive to U.S. overtures for closer security
ties . Given these gains in the U.S.-India relationship, the United States
should be extremely careful in its relationship with Pakistan; any sense
that Washington is not using what clout it has to rein in Pakistan’s
backing of cross-border terrorism will jeopardize its relationship with
New Delhi.

The second element is China’s growing interest in the region. Although

the Chinese government is unlikely to stir up religious terrorism in the
region, it will seek to work with the Taliban and possibly even
incorporate Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) . Any
U.S. strategy should seek to offset Chinese investments. And China also
has clout with Pakistan. One option for the United States is to utilize
China’s fears about religious nationalism and militancy spilling over
from Afghanistan to initiate space for a U.S.-China-Pakistan
cooperative strategy to pressure the Taliban. 
Even before the Taliban took control of Kabul, China started deepening
diplomatic ties with the group, hosting a Taliban delegation in July.
Since then, Chinese officials have said that Beijing respects Afghans’
right to decide their future, implying that the Taliban’s victory reflects
the people’s will.

What kind of relationship will Beijing have with the

Taliban?

Beijing’s relationship with the Taliban will be twofold. First, it will be

mercantilistic. China will seek to revive business ventures inside
Afghanistan, which the Taliban is likely to support because investment
will provide badly needed revenues. The Afghan economy is fragile and
highly dependent on Western donors’ foreign aid, which will almost
certainly be cut off. So any sort of investment, especially if it is not
accompanied by lectures on human rights, will be welcome.

Second, the relationship will depend on each side not interfering in the
other’s internal affairs. For Beijing, that means the Taliban cannot
export extremism into China’s troubled Xinjiang region, which shares a
tiny border with Afghanistan, or condemn the Chinese
government’s abuses against Uyghur Muslims  in that region. For the
Taliban, it means China will not question the group’s human rights
abuses unless Chinese citizens are involved.

In some ways, Afghanistan under the Taliban is China’s perfect partner:

dysfunctional, dependent, and happy with whatever China can do for it.
What are the Chinese government’s interests in
Afghanistan?

The economic interests are important but not decisive. At the end of the
day, Afghanistan is an insignificant market and has only a few sources
of raw materials.

Much has been made of Chinese projects in Afghanistan, but these have
been limited in scope . Even in stable countries, many Chinese projects
that are announced, including those through the Belt and Road
Initiative , are often not completed. So it is unlikely that China
immediately becomes an investing juggernaut in Afghanistan.

Instead, China’s goal is likely to be at least as much political as

economic. Beijing aims to head off any potential support for Muslims
in Xinjiang that could come from Afghanistan.

And perhaps most importantly, China’s engagement in Afghanistan can

show other countries how China supports regimes: with few questions
asked as long as they support Chinese interests.

Does China view the chaotic withdrawal as an

example of U.S. decline?

Chinese politics remain opaque, but it is clear that one important

faction of the ruling apparatus holds that the United States and the West
are in decline. This line of thinking is found in Chinese think tanks,
academia, and government. It is not unchallenged, but those who
argued, for example, for cooperating with the United States in
Afghanistan will be weakened, and those who see the West as in
decline will be emboldened.
It will also become easier for China to argue that when push comes to
shove, the United States is unreliable—it talks a good talk but will walk
away when it loses interest. Those in China who cautioned that the
chaos of the past few years was mainly due to one unusually
disorganized administration will find their voices weakened. Instead, it
will be easier to argue that the United States is in a secular decline.

China pressed the previous Taliban regime to end

support for Islamist extremism. Does it have similar
concerns now?

China is fighting what it calls a war against extremism in Xinjiang and

argues that international extremist groups have aided Islamists there.
There is little evidence for this—certainly not in recent years—but
China is wed to this story, so leaders will have to push the Taliban not
to admit extremists back into Afghanistan and especially not to allow
the country to become a haven for extremists, like it was in the late
1990s. The Taliban will likely agree to this because it needs the
investment and because China is much more powerful now than it was
twenty years ago.

Of course, for China, recognizing the Taliban makes for strange optics:
fighting Islamists at home but embracing them abroad. But it shows that
China could be the ultimate realpolitik nation.

How likely is it that Beijing and Washington will work

together to promote stability in Afghanistan?

In theory, this could work because they both want to fight terrorism. In
reality, however, it is hard to see how the United States can now be
engaged in any meaningful way in Afghanistan. It just walked away
from its best option for promoting stability there, effectively deciding
instead to turn the country over to the Taliban (even if the takeover was
sooner than expected).

At the same time, the United States is unlikely to pursue business

interests there—one can imagine sanctions being imposed after the first
human rights abuses are reported. Thus, the United States will basically
be absent from Afghanistan’s future, allowing countries such as China
and Pakistan to pursue their interests unilaterally.
Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar
2021/07/28

On July 28, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the visiting delegation
led by head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Tianjin.
The heads of the Afghan Taliban's religious council and publicity committee were also on the
delegation.

Wang Yi said that China, as Afghanistan's largest neighbor, has always respected Afghanistan's
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, adhered to non-interference in Afghanistan's
internal affairs and pursued a friendly policy toward the entire Afghan people. Afghanistan
belongs to the Afghan people, and its future should be in the hands of its own people. The hasty
withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan actually marks the failure of the U.S.
policy toward Afghanistan. The Afghan people now have an important opportunity to achieve
national stability and development.

Wang Yi pointed out that the Afghan Taliban is an important military and political force in
Afghanistan and is expected to play an important role in the country's peace, reconciliation and
reconstruction process. We hope that the Afghan Taliban will put the interests of the country and
nation first, hold high the banner of peace talks, set the goal of peace, build a positive image and
pursue an inclusive policy. All factions and ethnic groups in Afghanistan should unite as one,
truly implement the "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned" principle, push for early substantive results
in the peace and reconciliation process, and independently establish a broad and inclusive
political structure that suits Afghanistan's national realities.

Wang Yi stressed that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is an international terrorist
organization designated by the UN Security Council that poses a direct threat to China's national
security and territorial integrity. Combating the ETIM is a common responsibility for the
international community. We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist
organizations including the ETIM and resolutely and effectively combat them to remove
obstacles, play a positive role and create enabling conditions for security, stability, development
and cooperation in the region.

Baradar expressed appreciation for the opportunity to visit China. He said China has always
been a reliable friend of the Afghan people and commended China's just and positive role in
Afghanistan's peace and reconciliation process. The Afghan Taliban has the utmost sincerity to
work toward and realize peace. It stands ready to work with other parties to establish a political
framework in Afghanistan that is broadly-based, inclusive and accepted by the entire Afghan
people and to protect human rights, especially the rights of women and children. The Afghan
Taliban will never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to
China. The Afghan Taliban believes that Afghanistan should develop friendly relations with
neighboring countries and the international community. It hopes that China will be more involved
in Afghanistan's peace and reconciliation process and play a bigger role in future reconstruction
and economic development. The Afghan Taliban will also make its own efforts toward fostering
an enabling investment environment.

On the same day, Assistant Foreign Minister Wu Jianghao held talks with Baradar and his
delegation to exchange in-depth views on issues of common concern, which helped enhance
mutual understanding and broaden consensus.

Qatar’s foreign minister held talks in Afghanistan on Sunday, becoming the most
senior official to visit the country since the Taliban’s takeover on August 15.

A Taliban official tweeted that Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani met senior officials
of the new Afghan regime, although details were not disclosed.
The group released pictures of Sheikh Mohammad meeting new Prime Minister Mullah
Mohammad Hassan Akhund, while photographs of him with former president Hamid
Karzai circulated on social media.
In Doha, the foreign ministry confirmed he held meetings with the new Afghan government as
well as with Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, former chief peace negotiator for the ousted
government.

Sheikh Mohammad “urged the Afghan officials to engage all Afghan parties in the national
reconciliation”, it said.

The talks covered “latest developments regarding the operation of Kabul airport and ensuring
freedom of passage and travel for all”, it said in a statement.

The ministry said “the two sides stressed the importance of concerted efforts to combat terrorist
organisations”.

Qatar has long acted as a mediator on Afghanistan, hosting the Taliban’s talks with the United
States under former president Donald Trump, and then with the now deposed Afghan
government of president Ashraf Ghani.
It is also supporting tens of thousands of Afghans who were evacuated in the final weeks of the
US-led occupation as they are processed before heading to other nations.

No country has yet formally recognised the new Taliban government – and only three did during
the first rule of the hardline Islamists from 1996-2001.