Towards a framework for cyber attack impact
analysis of electric cyber physical systems
Yinan Wang
College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 310007
Email:11410065@zju.edu.cn
Gangfeng Yan
College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 310007
Email:ygf@zju.edu.cn
Abstract—This paper proposes an unified framework
for electrical cyber physical systems (ECPSs) and studies
the mechanism of cyber attacks and cyber security.
Communication networks are designed by characteristics
of power grids. This model is universal to both
transmission and distribution grids. The fragility of
ECPSs under cyber attacks (DoS attacks and false data
injection attacks) is analyzed in three scenarios based on
different types and attackers’ acknowledgments of the
ECPSs. It has been proved that attacks happen at
information uploading routers or control strategy
downloading routers will influence the system differently.
The effectiveness of relay protection policies and cyber
security policies are verified by experimental results.
Keywords—ECPS; Cyber Security; Cyber Attack;
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the issue of security has become ever more
prevalent in the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems
(CPSs). According to Industrial Control System Cyber
Emergency Team reports [1], major cyber threats against
critical cyber-physical infrastructures have increased from 9
incidents in 2009 to 257 major intrusions in 2013. In particular,
cyber-attacks in smart grids against wide area measurement,
supervisory control, and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
have potentials to damage power grids [2]. Real-world
examples include the 2003 blackout in the United States [3]
and the electrical blackout caused by cyber attacks in
Ukrainian on 23 December 2015.
In literatures, several cyber attacks have been proved to
have the ability to damage CPSs, especially electrical cyber
physical systems (ECPSs) [4], such as deception attacks,
denial of service attacks, false data injection attacks and replay
attacks [5], [6]. The situation of cyber attacks makes the study
of cascading failures in ECPSs more confusing [7]. Thus, it
has great significance to analyze cyber security in ECPSs.
Buldyrev et al.[8] and Huang et.al [9] studied cyber
security in CPSs with complex networks. Random attacks and
target attacks are considered to analyze the cascading failures.
l-)))
Wei Li
College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 310007
Email: 894883719@qq.com
Sumian Song
College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 310007
Email: songsm1002@163.com
Teixeira et al.[4][5] systematically studied the mechanism of
various cyber attacks and the complexity of applying attacks
in ECPSs. Zhang et al.[10] proposed the necessary conditions
for damaging CPSs from a view of attackers in order to give
some advice on improving cyber security. Bobba et al.[11]
shows that protecting a subset of sensors and PMUs is a way
to prevent cyber attacks. However, there is no unified
framework to reflect characteristics of both power grids and
communication networks. So current studies of cyber security
in ECPSs lack universality and unification.
The previous study [18] proposed a new framework for
ECPSs and design the interdependency relationships of power
grids and communication networks in order to capture the
characteristics of power grids. However, two points were
missed when analyzing the cascading failures of ECPSs. One
is that substation nodes play a role of regulating voltages
while consume no powers, so attackers cannot inject false
powers on these nodes. The other is that the framework is still
too general to describe the information transmission and
cannot study the action mechanism of control strategies. In
this paper, we describe the framework of ECPSs through
information flows and routers. Mechanisms of relay protection
and loads shedding are also described in the framework. In
order to study the mechanisms of cyber attacks, we divide
cyber attacks into three scenarios based on different types and
attackers’ acknowledgments of the ECPSs. Relay protection
control strategies are also considered to deal with failures in
power systems. A large numbers of simulations are made to
show the performance of ECPSs under false data injection
attacks and DoS attacks.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, a new
framework of ECPSs is proposed to analyze the mechanisms
of cyber attacks and cyber security. The influence of
communication networks to power grids are studied by
information (or instruction) uploading (or downloading)
routers. Second, our study of ECPSs under cyber attacks can
be used to detect vulnerable nodes and analyze the scale of
cascading failures. We divide cyber attacks into active attacks
and passive attacks and study different performances of
ECPSs. Control strategies such as load shedding and relay
protection are extended to the analysis of cascading failures.

 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The that these sensors and controllers are links of power grids and
modeling framework for ECPSs is presented in Section II. In communication networks. In Fig. 1, dashed lines stand for the
Section III, the mechanism of control schemes and three attack wireless communication, while solid lines stand for wire local
scenarios are introduced. A number of examples with IEEE 9- communication in power grids or optical fiber communication
node and 30-node system are illustrated in Section IV. Section in the control center.
V concludes the paper and discusses future works.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ECPSS
Study [18] proposes a new framework of ECPSs. Each
communication node is associated with one or two power
nodes in the power grid with directional information lines.
Classic types of power nodes (generator, load and substation
nodes) and communication nodes are (sensors and actuators
on breakers, routers, and control centers) involved. In this
paper, Considering the specific of substation nodes, we study
beakers on lines instead of substation nodes. Cyber attacks
may handle breakers states and cause the change of topologies
of power grids. In this paper, we describe the framework of
ECPSs through information flows. Mechanisms of relay
protection and loads shedding are also described in the
framework.
According to the complex network theories [12], a power
grid can be abstracted as a graph, , where
and are the set of power nodes and lines, respectively. The
DC power flow [13] model is used to analyze the behaviors of
a power grid. Similarly, a communication network can be
described as a graph, , where and are the
set of communication nodes and lines, respectively.
Let be a -dimensional vector so that denotes the
Fig 1 Framework of ECPSs
power injection at power node . Let be
the susceptance matrix so that reflects the reactance
relations of node and , Moreover, let III. CONTROL SCHEMES AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
be the matrix of power flows in transmission In this section, we study the mechanisms of protection
lines and be the phases at all power nodes. So DC control strategies and analyze the possible attack scenarios by
power flow can be modeled as follows. using our proposed framework of ECPSs.
(1) There exists a vast literature on computer attack and
(2) security focusing on data and IT services [16]. Denial-of
Eq. (1) is used to calculate the power injection in each service (DoS) attack[5] and false data injection attack [15] are
node, while Eq. (2) is used to calculate the power flow in two typical types of attacks which usually happen in
every line. If the power injection is changed, the power flow information transmissions. In this paper, we consider these
in every line will be redistributed, vice versa. two cyber attacks in ECPSs.
Fig. 1 shows the proposed framework of ECPSs. Block 1 Let represent the line that power flow goes
represents the communication network, which including from node to node via edge . First, we make three
control center, routers, sensors and controllers. In order to assumptions for the ECPS model:
study the mechanism of control strategies, we divide the 1) Each transmission line has a maximum power
control center by functions. A control center plays a role of capacity limit ;
detection, protection, calculation and decision making. 2) Each generator has a maximum allowed output power;
Sensors which are used for monitoring operation conditions in 3) The power can be balanced after each control strategy
power grids are installed on nodes such as line breakers, loads owing to the balance node.
or generators. Routers exchange information from the control Function is defined as the power injection function, and
center and sensors. Controllers in block 1 are local controllers
it is defined from to as:
of actuators. Block 2 represents the power grid with generators,
loads and breakers. In this study, we do not mention (3)
substations nodes because they can be eliminated to an (4)
equivalent transfer network as discussed in [19]. There is an (5)
overlapping area between block 1 and block 2, which means


where I u and Ia is defined as power injections controlled by in ECPSs under single-node DoS attacks. The line
control centers and attackers, respectively. Here is the overloads at time , which causes . The breaker
maximum power capacity of the node in a power grid. cuts off the line successfully.
Define that power injects a node to be positive, and outflows Attack policy (1): At time , DoS attacks block the
from a node to be negative. Considering the capacities of uploading routers so that the Changed topology and electric
generators and loads, I u has a security boundary as information of the power grid cannot be transmit to the control
for node k . As for attackers, the boundary center through router 1 or 3.
may be expanded to double of I u in this paper. Attack policy (2): At time , DoS attacks block the
Associated with the assumptions and definition downloading routers so that the control instrction vector (or
mentioned above, we study four scenarios of ECPSs under reclosing instruction) cannot be transmit to local controllers
cyber attacks or overloads. Overloads have been proved as the through router 4 (or router 2).
common faulty which usually happens in power grids [14]. Control strategy:
Compared with the control strategies in Part A, attack
A. Mechanism of the protection
policy (1) can happen on step (1) or (3), while attack policy (2)
Scenario I describes the mechanisms of load shedding and can happen on step (4) or (5). The former attack policy will
relay protection control schemes in ECPSs under faulty of lead to a cascading failure owing to that the control center
overloads. The line overloads at discrete time , cannot monitor the faulty immediately at time . However,
which causes as beginning. in attack policy (2), control measures can be transmitted to the
In the first process (protection startup), sensor 1 monitors power grid except the fault node.
the abnormal condition and uploads a signal through router 1 C. Attack Scenario II
to detection area of the control center. After analysis in the
decision area, the protection area downloads instructions Scenario II describes the relay protection control schemes
through router 2 to the local breaker controller 1 on the in ECPSs under single-node false data injection attacks. The
overloaded line. The line is cut off by the breaker, the line overloads at time , which causes .
topology of the power grid changed. Attack policy: At time , false data injection attacks
In the second process (strategy decision), because of the disturb the downloading channels so that the deliberated
change of topology, current and powers are redistributed. control measures vector is transmit to power
Electric information is uploaded through sensor 1 and router 1 grids.
to the calculation area. On /off state of breakers is also Control strategy:
uploaded to the calculation area through sensor 2 and router 3. Compared with the control strategies in Scenario I, attack
After analysis in the decision area, the control center will give policy can happen on step (4) or (5).
load or generator shedding instructions through router 4 to the
node controller 2. D. Attack Scenario III
In the last process (reclosing), because of the change of Scenario III also describes the relay protection control
power injection, power flows are redistributed. Electric schemes in ECPSs under single-node false data injection
information again is uploaded to the calculation area. If there attacks. The difference from scenario III is that the ECPS
is no fault, the protection area will transmit the instruction of operates normally at time .
reclosing to the line breaker controller 1. Attack policy: At time , false data injection attacks
In order to reflect the functions of different routers, we disturb power injection on nodes, which makes the original
divide the three processes into five steps as follows. vector into by . The vector
Control strategy: represents for the deliberately injected constant bias. The
Step (1): Faulty information is transmitted to the detection purpose is to make the line overloads, which
and decision areas through route 1.
causes .
Step (2): The protection area downloads the instruction to
Control strategy:
the breaker on line to cut off the line immediately by Compared with the control strategies in Scenario I, attack
router 2. policy will happen before those steps.
Step (3): Changed topology and electric information of the In conclusion, in order to study cyber security and the
power grid is uploaded to control center for calculation and influence of communication networks to power grids, scenario
decision through router 1and 3. I and II analyze the influence passively caused by attacks after
Step (4): The control center makes decisions and a failure in systems, while scenario III analyzes the influence
feedbacks control measure to local controllers through actively caused by attacks. In scenario I and II, we considers
router 4. two possibly communication failure conditions. One is that
Step (5): The protection area downloads the reclosing limited bandwidth causes communication break, which further
instruction to the breaker through router 2. lead to cascading failures; The other is attackers has limited
B. Attack Scenario I resources of ECPSs, they can disturb information
transmissions only when there is a change in one information
Scenario I describes the relay protection control schemes


channel transmission. All in all, these two communication
failure conditions are passively. In scenario III, the
communication failure can happen actively. Attackers know
the framework of ECPSs, so they can inject false data to the
information channels to disturb the normally operations of
ECPSs.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND SIMULATION RESULT
A. Simulation example
In this section, we study cyber security and the influence
of communication networks to power grids through MATLAB
simulations. Firstly, we use IEEE 9-node system to model an
ECPS. Based on our proposed framework of ECPSs in Sec II,
the communication network has 9 nodes corresponding to the
9 nodes in the power grid numbered from 1 to 9. Fig. 2 shows
the topology of the power system, which comprises 9 nodes
and 15 lines, each line is equipped with a breaker and the
breaker can be directly controlled by routers attached to it. Fig.
2 also calculates the power flows by the DC power functions
Eq.(1) and Eq.(2). Secondly, based on the attack policies and
control strategies proposed in attack scenario I, we use this
system as a specific example to show the different
performance of the ECPS when DoS attacks happen on
uploading routers or downloading routers. Thirdly, the
cascading failures of the 9-node ECPS is showed. Finally, in
order to analyze the false data injection attacks in attack
scenario II and III, a large scale of IEEE 30-node system is
used to do the simulations.
Due to the fact that the IEEE database does not provide the
capacity of the lines in the 9-node grid, we refer to the similar
conception of tolerance parameter in Koç’s paper [17] to
reflect the relationship of maximum capacity of a line and its
base load. In this paper, we will do the simulation with
. scenario I. As for the attack policy (1) in scenario I, DoS
Generator 2
Bus 2 Bus 7
Bus 8
P = 163MW
Line 2-7 Line 7-8
Load c
Line 9-8
G
P = 163.65 MW P = 71.30 MW
Load Rate: Load Rate: 40%
40%
close to 1 [17]. The following are the formulas of .
B. Simulation Results
According to attack scenario I, we assume that the line 7-5
overloads at time . The breaker on the line is triggered
and cut off the line. Fig. 3 shows the redistribution of power
flows in the power grid at time . Compared with Fig. 2,
the load rate in each line is changed owing to cutting off the
line 7-5. Notice that line 9-8 and line 4-5 in red round in Fig. 3,
the load rate is higher than 100%, which means that these two
lines overload. If there is no communication network and
control strategies, the system will cut off these two lines at
time . Finally, , .
Fig. 4 (a), (b), and (c) show different situations of the
ECPS. In Fig. 4(a), the faulty information is transmit to the
control center at time , and two decisions made by the
control center are transmitted to the power nodes at time
. One is that cutting 10% of generations off in generator
2, the other is that shedding 40% of load a. The power flows
redistribute at time , and all the system is under a stable
state with , .
Fig. 4(b) and 4(c) show the states of the system under DoS
attacks happen on the information channels from the decision
area to local generator and load controller 2 through routers 4,
respectively. These two DoS attacks both happen at time
. It means that the control strategies have been made by
the control center, but DoS attacks occur on the information
downloading routers. In Fig.4(b), line 9-8 overloads owing to
the cyber attacks. Finally, the system goes to a stable state
with , . In Fig.4(c), line 4-5 overloads
and the system goes to a state with , .
Fig.4(b) and 4(c) reflect to the attack policy (2) in attack
attacks happening at time means that the faulty
P = 100 MW
Bus 9 Bus 3
Generator 3 information cannot upload to the control center, so the system
Line 3-9
P = 85 MW will finally go to the state in Fig.5(a). It can be seen that DoS
P = 20.68 MW P = 82.83 MW
G attacks happen at the uploading routers will lead to a larger
Load Rate: 40% Load Rate:
40%
scale of cascading failures in ECPSs.

P = 84.66 MW P = 59.23 MW Generator 2 Bus 8

P = 100 MW
Load Rate: 40% Load Rate: 40% Bus 2 Bus 7 Bus 9 Bus 3 Generator 3
P = 163MW Load c
Bus 5 Bus 6 Line 2-7 Line 7-8 Line 9-8 Line 3-9
G G
P = 125 MW P = 163.65 MW P = 158 MW P = 66 MW P = 82.83 MW
P = 90 MW Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: P = 85 MW
40% 40% 127.7% 40%
Load a Load b
P = 146.2 MW
Load Rate: 98.7%
Line 1-4

Bus 4
P = 71.64 MW Bus 5 Bus 6
Load Rate: 40%
Bus 1 P = 125 MW P = 90 MW
Load a Load b
P = 71.64 MW
G Generator 1
Line 1-4

Bus 4
Fig. 2 Power flows in IEEE 9 nodes system P = 60 MW
Load Rate: 33.6%
Bus 1
Here we use the fraction of nodes , represents for the P = 71.64 MW

ratio of rest of the connected nodes after the cascading failure G Generator 1

and the whole number of the nodes in the power grid. The Fig. 3 State of the system without control strategy
system proves to have better robustness with the value of


 Generator 2
Bus 2 Bus 7
Bus 8
P = 100 MW
Bus 9 Bus 3 Generator 3
The vertical axis represents for the fraction of nodes in the
P = 163MW
Line 2-7 Line 7-8
Load c
Line 9-8 Line 3-9
physical power system. Lines connected to generators are not
G
P = 146 MW P = 146 MW P = 45 MW P = 82.83 MW
G
considered in this simulation.
Cut off 10%
Load Rate:
36%
Load Rate:
81.9%
Load Rate:
87.1%
Load Rate:
40%
P = 85 MW
The following example choose a large scale of power
P’=146.7MW
system to model an ECPS and study the system under false
P = 128.3 MW
Load Rate: 86.6% data injection attacks mentioned in Section 3, scenario III and
Bus 5 Bus 6 IV. Table 1 shows the partition of IEEE 30-node system. Note
P = 125 MW P = 90 MW that region 1, 2, and 3 are still physically connected by
Load a
Load shedding 40%
Load b
transmission lines. Fig.7 shows the macroscopic ECPS model
P’=75MW of IEEE 30-node system. Each region is monitored and
P = 35 MW
Line 1-4
Bus 4
operated by a control center.
Load Rate: 19.7%
Bus 1
P = 71.64 MW Table 1 The partition of IEEE 30-node system
G Generator 1 Region 1 2 3
Fig. 4(a) State of the system with countermeasures taken Number of nodes 1-8 9-24 25-30

Generator 2 Bus 8
P = 100 MW
Bus 2 Bus 7 Bus 9 Bus 3 Generator 3
P = 163MW Load c
Line 2-7 Line 7-8 Line 9-8 Line 3-9
G G
P = 163.65 MW P = 158 MW P = 66 MW P = 82.83 MW
Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: P = 85 MW
Cut off 10% 40% 40% 127.7% 40%
P’=146.7MW

P = 146.2 MW
Load Rate: 98.7%

Bus 5 Bus 6

P = 125 MW P = 90 MW
Load a Load b
Load shedding 40%
P’=75MW
Line 1-4

Bus 4
P = 15 MW
Load Rate: 8.5%
Bus 1
P = 71.64 MW

G Generator 1

Fig. 4(b) State of the system with DoS attacks happen at Generator 2 Fig.5 The scale of cascading failures in power system and ECPS

Generator 2 Bus 8
P = 100 MW
Bus 2 Bus 7 Bus 9 Bus 3 Generator 3
P = 163MW Load c
Line 2-7 Line 7-8 Line 9-8 Line 3-9
G G
P = 146 MW P = 146 MW P = 45 MW P = 82.83 MW
Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: Load Rate: P = 85 MW
Cut off 10% 36% 81.9% 87.1% 40%
P’=146.7MW

P = 128.3 MW
Load Rate: 86.6%

Bus 5 Bus 6

P = 125 MW P = 90 MW
Load a Load b
Load shedding 40%
P’=75MW

Fig.6 ECPS of IEEE 30-node system

Line 1-4

Bus 4
P = 80 MW
Load Rate: 45.1%
Bus 1
P = 71.64 MW
Fig.7 simulates the situation in attack scenario II. A line
G Generator 1
overloads at time . At time , false data
Fig. 4(c) State of the system with DoS attacks happen at bus 5 injection attacks happen at the downloading router with
. In the Figure, excepting the swing node 1# and
Randomly select a line, at time , we assume that the lines and connected to the node, the rest 39
line overloads, and do the similar simulations as we discuss transmission lines in the system are numbered from 1 to 39.
above. The scale of cascading failures in the 9-bode ECPS is Fig.8 simulates the situation in attack scenario III. The
showed in Fig.5. Fig.5 also compares the scale of failures in system is stable at time . At time , an attacker
the power system with the proposed ECPS. It can be verified chooses the node in the power grid and changes the
that the ECPS has higher robustness than the power system injection power with through the related
owing to the real-time control strategies. The horizontal axis communication node, where . From the figure, node 3,
represents for the number of selected initial overloaded line. 4, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, and 30 are the vulnerable nodes.


 Compared with Fig.7 with passive attacks, active attacks
in Fig.8 can make a targeted attack in the system. However,
the vulnerable nodes are the nodes which need more cyber
security protections. It can be used to reinforce cyber security
in ECPSs.
Fig.7 The performance of the system under attacks in scenario II
Fig.8 The performance of the system under attacks in scenario III
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a unified framework for studying the
performance of ECPSs under cyber attacks. By classifying the
nodes and dividing the information transmission into
uploading and downloading routers, this paper provides a
universal way for analyzing cascading failures in ECPSs. In
the future, we will focus on analyzing the influence of systems
under multiple cyber attacks and defending strategies .

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work are supported by two projects.
1. National Natural Science Foundation of China,
61471328
2. State Grids Research Grant ‘The Safe Operation
Strategies and Cyber supporting Technologies in Electrical
Cyber Physical System’, XXB17201400056
REFERENCES
[1] D Peterson. ICS-CERT: Stuxnet Lessons Learned[J]. Digital Bond, 2010.
[2] D. Kundur, X. Feng, S. Liu, T. Zourntos, and K.L. Butler-Purry. Towards
a framework for cyber attack impact analysis of the electric smart grid. IEEE
Smart Grid Communications, pages 244–249, 2010.
[3] A Vespignani. Complex networks: The fragility of interdependency[J].
Nature, 2010, 464(7291): 984-985.
[4] A. Teixeira, K.C. Sou, H. Sandberg, and K.H. Johansson. Secure control
systems: A quantitative risk management approach. IEEE Control Systems,
35(1):24–45, 2015.
[5] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H.Sandberg, and K.H. Johansson. A secure control
framework for resource-limited adversaries. Automatica, pages 135–148,
2015.
[6] M.A. Rahman and H. Mohsenian-Rad. False data injection attacks with
incomplete information against smart power grids. IEEE Global
Communications Conference, pages 3153–3158, 2012.
[7] D H Shin, D Qian, J Zhang. Cascading effects in interdependent
networks[J]. Network, IEEE, 2014, 28(4): 82-87.
[8] S. V Buldyrev, R Parshani, G Paul, H. E Stanley, & S Havlin.
Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks[J]. Nature, 2010,
464(7291): 1025-1028.
[9] X Huang, J Gao, S. V Buldyrev, S Havlin, & H. E Stanley. Robustness of
interdependent networks under targeted attack[J]. Physical Review E, 2011,
83(6): 065101.
[10] M Zhang, B Xiao, X He, et al. Modeling & Simulating Cascading Failure
of Critical Infrastructures Based on Cyber-Attack[J]. Journal of System
Simulation, 2013, 1.
[11] R. B. Bobba, K.M. Rogers, Q. Wang, H. Khurana, K. Nahrstedt, and T.J.
Overbye. Detecting false data injection attacks on dc state estimation. In
Preprints of the First Workshop on Secure Control Systems, 2010.
[12] M Parandehgheibi, E Modiano, D Hay. Mitigating cascading failures in
interdependent power grids and communication networks[C]. 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, 2014: 242-247.
[13] B Stott, J Jardim, O Alsaç. DC power flow revisited[J]. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, 2009, 24(3): 1290-1300.
[14] W Zhengshi: Power system control and dispatching automation[M].
China electrical power press, 2012, 2nd, edn. 2014.
[15] Y Liu, P Ning, M K Reiter. False data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids[J]. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security (TISSEC), 2011, 14(1): 13.
[16] M Bishop. Computer Security: Art and Science[M]. Addison-Wesley
Professional, 2003.
[17] Y Koç, M Warnier, P Van Mieghem, R. E Kooij, & F. M Brazier. The
impact of the topology on cascading failures in a power grid model[J].
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2014, 402: 169-179.
[18] Y N Wang, Z Y Lin, X Liang, W Y Xu, Q Yang, & G F Yan. On
modeling of electrical cyber-physical systems considering cyber security.
Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 2016, 17(5),
465-478.
[19] J Machowski, J Bialek, J Bumby. Power system dynamics: stability and
control[M]. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.