RESEARCH ARTICLE | MARCH 14 2023

Power-grid vulnerability and its relation with network

structure 
Jussara Dias  ; Arthur N. Montanari ; Elbert E. N. Macau

Chaos 33, 033122 (2023)

https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0137919

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 Chaos ARTICLE scitation.org/journal/cha

Power-grid vulnerability and its relation with

network structure
Cite as: Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
Submitted: 6 December 2022 · Accepted: 20 February 2023 ·
Published Online: 14 March 2023 View Online Export Citation CrossMark

Jussara Dias,1,a) Arthur N. Montanari,2 and Elbert E. N. Macau3

AFFILIATIONS
1
Associated Laboratory for Computing and Applied Mathematics, National Institute for Space Research, Sao José dos Campos,
SP 12243-010, Brazil
2
Luxembourg Centre for Systems Biomedicine, University of Luxembourg, Belvaux L-4367, Luxembourg
3
Institute of Science and Technology, Federal University of Sao Paulo, Sao José dos Campos, SP 12247-014, Brazil

a)
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed: jussara.dias@inpe.br

ABSTRACT
Interconnected systems with critical infrastructures can be affected by small failures that may trigger a large-scale cascade of failures, such
as blackouts in power grids. Vulnerability indices provide quantitative measures of a network resilience to component failures, assessing the
break of information or energy flow in a system. Here, we focus on a network vulnerability analysis, that is, indices based solely on the network

24 November 2023 14:25:46

structure and its static characteristics, which are reliably available for most complex networks. This work studies the structural connectivity
of power grids, assessing the main centrality measures in network science to identify vulnerable components (transmission lines or edges) to
attacks and failures. Specifically, we consider centrality measures that implicitly model the power flow distribution in power systems. This
framework allow us to show that the efficiency of the power flow in a grid can be highly sensitive to attacks on specific (central) edges.
Numerical results are presented for randomly generated power-grid models and established power-grid benchmarks, where we demonstrate
that the system’s energy efficiency is more vulnerable to attacks on edges that are central to the power flow distribution. We expect that the
vulnerability indices investigated in our work can be used to guide the design of structurally resilient power grids.
Published under an exclusive license by AIP Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0137919

Blackouts are cascading outages that start in vulnerable compo-
nents of a power grid. This paper studies the vulnerability of
power grids from a structural point of view. The power-grid struc-
ture can be represented as a complex network in which centrality
measures can be used to quantitatively measure the importance
of an edge (transmission line) in the energy flow of the system.
We evaluate the use of three centrality measures, as well as a
combined index, for the vulnerability analysis of real-world and
randomly generated power grids. A modified efficiency measure
assesses the drop in network performance after simulations of
successive failures of transmission lines. Since this modified effi-
ciency metric implicitly accounts for the power flow distribution
in the grid, we expect that our framework can be used to pro-
vide a more accurate analysis of the network vulnerability to
out-of-operation transmission lines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electrical blackouts are extreme events that affect the entire
society. They can suddenly lead to large economic consequences
as well as jeopardize the safety of consumers. Small failures in
secondary transmission lines or low-power generators can cause
subsequent failures that can trigger a cascade of failures resulting in
a blackout. As nonlinear phenomena, blackouts are both challenging
to predict and mitigate once the cascade has started. Decentralized
control strategies, for example, can mitigate blackouts by improv-
ing the system stability and suppressing perturbations that could
potentially lead to cascades.1–3 Another viable alternative, which we
explore in this paper, is the use of robustness assessment tools to
guide the design of power grids that are deliberately resilient to
the propagation of cascading failures4,5—a pressing problem as new
grid extension strategies are considered to accommodate distributed
power generation.6
Robustness assessment tools for power grids can be classi-
fied into two categories: (1) network analysis, which focuses on the
network structure describing the interconnections between gener-
ators and consumers;7–9 and (2) dynamical analysis, which models
the power flow through the grid, the electrical and thermal capac-
ity of the system components, and the synchronization dynamics
between generators and loads.10–12 Although dynamical analysis can

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 Chaos
provide a more accurate description of the power-grid dynamics,
it is also more dependent on the validity of the modeling assump-
tions and sensitive to the considered dynamical parameters.13,14
In particular, previous works have shown that different modeling
assumptions can lead to the formation of distinct, possibly larger,
cascades.15 On the other hand, network analysis is only based on a
very reliable representation of the network structure and other static
power grid specifications (e.g., nominal power and transmission line
capacities).9
The robustness of an interconnected system can be assessed
by quantifiers known as network vulnerability indices.16,17 Defined
as the system’s susceptibility to damage, vulnerability indices quan-
tify the extent to which a system is affected by an adverse sit-
uation, including environmental factors and human-based attack
strategies. For instance, vulnerability indices have been designed to
measure the robustness of a power grid to random and targeted
attacks,18–20 with many techniques being based on complex network
theory.8,9,21,22 Network analysis of critical infrastructure systems, like
power grids, provides a simplified framework to identify and pre-
dict potential vulnerable components (nodes and edges) in these
systems. Based solely on structural data of the grid,23,24 previous
works showed that it is possible to mitigate widespread outages
caused by terrorist attacks25 and extreme weather events.26,27 Recent
works have then provided a more reliable analysis of the power-grid
vulnerability by incorporating other static (line impedance, nomi-
nal power) and dynamic (power flow) characteristics of the power
grid.9,28,29
Complex network models, such as small-world30 and scale-
free 31,32
networks, play a key role in assessing the robustness of differ-
ent types of network structures to random and targeted attacks.33–35
In particular, power grids share some topological similarities, such
as a node degree distribution with an exponential tail. Based on
statistical properties of real-world power grids, a synthetic power-
grid generation model was proposed as a statistical benchmark for
the trade-off analysis between cost-optimization and redundancy in
power-grid design,36 a framework used in several works to analyze
the power-grid resilience to random perturbations.37–40
In this work, we analyze the power-grid vulnerability to tar-
geted attacks (edge removals). Using solely data of the network
structure of the power grid, we measure the energy efficiency in
the power grid and evaluate its vulnerability to the removal of
central edges (according to different centrality measures). Previ-
ous works have shown that the power-grid efficiency can be vul-
nerable to attacks on highly central edges.9 However, such works
were restricted to efficiency and/or centrality measures based on
the geodesic distance between nodes, which are not appropriate to
model the power flow between generators and loads in a grid. To
more accurately represent the energy flow in power grids in our
analysis, we evaluate the network efficiency with a distance mea-
sure that models the current-flow path in electrical systems, known
as the “resistance distance.”41 This distance measure provides an
implicit, and more realistic, representation of the energy flow in
power grids, while also preserving the simplicity of our analysis to
account for systems where only structural data are reliably avail-
able. Using this measure, we find that, in general, the power grid’s
efficiency decreases under targeted attacks on edges with high cen-
trality, as demonstrated in randomly generated power-grid models
Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
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ARTICLE scitation.org/journal/cha
and established power-grid benchmarks. Moreover, we show that
the network efficiency is substantially more vulnerable to attacks on
edges that are highly central to the system’s power flow distribution
(e.g., using the current-flow betweenness centrality), as compared
to attack strategies based on other centrality measures in network
science (e.g., disconnected component centrality).
This paper is organized as follows. Section II revises complex
network theory and centrality measures investigated in this work.
Section III presents the methodology to assess the power-grid vul-
nerability under different attack strategies. Numerical results are
presented and discussed in Sec. IV, while Sec. V concludes this work
by summarizing the main results and future research directions.
II. COMPLEX NETWORK THEORY
A. Graph definitions
Complex network theory refers to graphs with a non-trivial
structure representing complex relationships, such as biological,
neuronal, social, communications, and energy delivery networks.42
A complex network can be represented as a graph defined by
G = {V, E}, where V = {1, . . . , n} represents the set of nodes and
E ⊆ V × V represents the set of edges (i, j) ∈ E.
Let A ∈ {0, 1}n×n be the adjacency
matrix of an unweighted
graph G; i.e., Aij = 1 if i, j ∈ E and Aij = 0 otherwise. The
Laplacian matrix of a graph G is defined by L = D − A, where
D = diag(d 1 , . . . , dn ) is the degree matrix given by the node degrees
24 November 2023 14:25:46
di = j Aij (i.e., the number of edges linked to a node).
P


The geodesic distance d i, j is defined as the shortest path
length (i.e., the smallest number of edges) connecting node i to node
j. If there is no path connecting two nodes (i, j), then d(i, j) = ∞.
A connected component of an undirected graph is a subgraph G0
= {V0 , E0 } in which any pair of nodes are connected via some path,
where V0 ⊆ V and E0 ⊆ E. A graph is connected if there is exactly
one connected component.
Power grids can be represented as undirected graphs, where
nodes represent generators and consumers, while edges represent
transmission lines interconnecting these components. The Lapla-
cian matrix provides important properties of a graph, such as the
algebraic connectivity and the number of spanning trees of a graph.
In the context of power grids, it can be used for the calculation
of resistance distances and electrical network analysis, as it also
represents the network admittance matrix.43
B. Centrality measures
Centrality measures of complex networks determine the
importance of nodes and edges in the network information flow
based on their structural characteristics. Such measures allow the
identification of vulnerable points in the system to attacks or fail-
ures. For example, pinpointing vulnerable edges (transmission lines)
can indicate the need to improve the electrical system redundancy in
certain areas against storms, forest fires, and other electrical faults.
The most representative centrality measures in complex net-
works are the degree and betweenness centrality measures. Degree
centrality ranks nodes according to their node degree di , while
betweenness centrality assesses the importance of an edge (i, j) in
33, 033122-2
 Chaos
FIG. 1. Top five most central edges in the IEEE-118 benchmark system as ranked by each centrality measures: (a) current-flow betweenness, (b) disconnected components,
(c) spanning tree, and (d) structural index. Note that some edges are relevant with respect to two or more measures.
the network information flow, being defined by
X σkl (i, j)
B(i, j) = , (1)
σkl
k,l∈V
where σkl (i, j) is the number of shortest paths from node k to l that
pass through edge (i, j) and σkl is the number of all shortest paths
between k and l.
Betweenness centrality is widely used in the literature for
robustness analyses,44 including applications in many disciplines,
such as social,45 psychological,46 and infrastructure networks.20 Vari-
ations of this measure, such as the relative betweenness centrality,47
can quantify the importance of an edge with respect to the impor-
tance of its end-nodes. This measure can also be extended to mea-
sure the influence of a team or a group (i.e., a subset of nodes)
in social networks48 and assess critical components in multiplex
networks, such as cyber-physical systems.49
Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
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24 November 2023 14:25:46
To model cascade propagation in power grids, centrality mea-
sures should not only reflect the power grid structure but also the
underlying energy flow in these systems.50,51 Accordingly, different
types of variations and generalizations of centrality measures have
been proposed for vulnerability analysis, in which the most promi-
nent ones are the betweenness current flow, spanning trees, and
disconnected component measures. These centrality measures are
defined as follows.
1. Current-flow betweenness centrality
The standard betweenness centrality quantifies the information
flow in the network based only on the shortest paths between nodes.
However, in power transmission networks, the current flow (as well
as the power flow) is not only transmitted through the shortest path,
but through all connected components between two given nodes,
prioritizing paths of smaller resistance. Therefore, in the context of
power grids, it is more appropriate to implicitly model the current
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FIG. 2. Network efficiency as a function of the number of edges removed for different attack strategies in IEEE benchmark systems: (a) IEEE-300. (b) IEEE-118. (c) IEEE-57.
Edges are successively removed in order of importance according to the centrality measures: current-flow betweenness, disconnected components, spanning tree, and
structural index. Edges are incrementally removed until 20% of the total number of edges is removed.

flow into the structural analysis of such networks,52 as formalized by pairs (s, d),
the current-flow betweenness centrality measure.53
F(s,d)
P
Let each transmission line (edge) be represented as a resistor, CB(i, j) =
s<d ij
. (4)
1
assigned with a unit value for simplification purposes.54 Consider a 2
n(n − 1)
source node s for the input current and another target node d for the
output current. The current flow between a source-target pair (s, d) Note that this centrality measure is equivalent to the notion
that passes through an edge (i, j) is given by53 of random-walk betweenness centrality (for a large number of
random-walk realizations),55 which provides a more computation-

24 November 2023 14:25:46

F(sd) =
X
Aij |v(sd) − v(sd) (2) ally efficient method to compute Eq. (4).
ij i j |,
j∈V
2. Disconnected component centrality
where v(sd)
i = L+ +
is − Lid is the potential at node i and L
+
is the Let bridge edges and cut-off nodes be elements that divide the
Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse of the Laplacian matrix. Thus, graph into two or more disconnected components. Such elements
Eq. (2) can be expressed as can assess the system vulnerability to the break of information flow
X in the overall network due to disconnected components. In practice,
F(sd)
ij = Aij |L+ + + +
is − Lid − Ljs + Ljd |. (3) it allows the identification of network elements without redundancy.
j∈V The disconnected component centrality of an edge (i, j) is defined as
Finally, the current-flow betweenness centrality CB(i, j) is the 1
DC(i, j) = , (5)
current flow through edge (i, j) averaged over all source–target ρ(i, j)

FIG. 3. Node degree distribution of IEEE benchmark systems: (a) IEEE-300. (b) IEEE-118. (c) IEEE-57. The inset plot shows the graph corresponding to each power-grid
benchmark.

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 Chaos
FIG. 4. Node degree distribution of randomly generated power grids: (a) Distribution of a single random network realization. (b) Distribution over 100 random network
realizations.
where ρ(i, j) is the number of nodes in the largest connected com-
ponent of the graph G = {V, E\(i, j)} after the removal of an edge
(i, j). Consequently, after the edge removal, the smaller the largest
connected component, the larger the measure, indicating a more
vulnerable edge.
3. Spanning tree centrality
This measure is defined as the fraction of minimum spanning
trees (MST) in which a particular edge is present, assessing the
importance of the edge to the graph connectivity in non-redundant
paths for the network information flow. The spanning tree centrality
of an edge (i, j) is defined as56
τ (i, j)
ST(i, j) = , (6)
τ power grid), facilitating the power flow distribution between distant
where τ is the total number of different MST in G and τ (i, j) is the
number of different MST containing the edge (i, j). Equation (6) can
be computed following the matrix-tree theorem.57 Let L(i, j) be the
Laplacian matrix in the absence of rows i and j and columns j and
i, and let L(i) be the Laplacian matrix in the absence of row and
column i. Therefore, for undirected unweighted graphs, the number
of MSTs are given by τ (i, j) = det L(i, j) and τ = det L(i).
4. Structural index
Each centrality measure ranks the importance of an edge with
respect to a different characteristic of the power-grid structure. To
unify the analysis of well-established measures into a single measure,
we consider a structural index based on the geometric mean of the
aforementioned centrality measures, defined as

Pi wi
SI(i, j) = CB(i, j)w1 DC(i, j)w2 ST(i, j)w3 , (7)
Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
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ARTICLE scitation.org/journal/cha
where, in what follows, we set the weights as wi = 1 (i = 1, 2, 3) for
simplification purposes. We choose a geometric mean to normalize
its terms, and this makes it possible to compare metrics at any scale.
24 November 2023 14:25:46
5. Example
Figure 1 illustrates the importance of edges according to each
of the described centrality measures in the power-grid IEEE-118
benchmark system.58 Note that the most important (vulnerable)
edges are different depending on the computed measure, show-
ing that each centrality measure models a different aspect of the
information (energy) flow over the network. Compared to the other
measures, the current-flow betweenness centrality selects edges that
are more vital to the interconnection of geodesically distant nodes
in the network (or, in other words, geographically apart areas in
sections of the system. On the other hand, the disconnected com-
ponents and spanning tree centrality measures tend to rank edges
located at the extremes (or “dead ends”) of the power grid as most
important, pinpointing edges whose removal can lead to isolated
nodes (generators or consumers).
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS IN POWER GRIDS
Network vulnerability is a property of complex networks that
quantifies the susceptibility of the information or energy flow to
damage (e.g., removal) of a particular element of the graph.21 How-
ever, modeling of the information or energy flow of a network
usually requires more challenging and detailed assumptions regard-
ing the underlying dynamical processes. Thus, one viable alternative
is to determine proxy measures that can quantify the network vul-
nerability based on more reliable data, such as the network structure.
Here, the centrality measures described in Sec. II are used to
quantify the network vulnerability to edge attacks (removal). Let
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24 November 2023 14:25:46

FIG. 5. Network efficiency of randomly generated networks as a function of the number of edges removed for different attack strategies, shown as an average over 100 network
realizations (shaded colors represent one standard deviation). Edges are successively removed in order of importance according to the centrality measures: (a) current-flow
betweenness, (b) disconnected components, (c) spanning tree, and (d) structural index.

V(i, j) be the network vulnerability to the removal of the edge (i, j),
defined as9,59,60
ξ − ξ(i, j)
V(i, j) = , (8)
ξ ciency measures can be used to identify vulnerable components that
where ξ and ξ(i, j) represent a centrality measure computed for the
corresponding graphs before and after the removal of the edge (i, j),
respectively. Note that we focus on edge attacks in this work because
transmission lines represent a relatively easy target to destructive
agents or severe weather events (e.g., strong winds, atmospheric dis-
charges, or wildfires) compared to other operational components,
such as generators and substations (nodes).
For power grids, vulnerability is also related to a drop in the
efficiency of the system’s energy transmission under disturbing pro-
cesses that causes the removal of an edge (a transmission line) or the
isolation of a node (a generator or load).22,61,62 Consequently, effi-
can potentially trigger a cascade of failures and blackouts.59 Among
several definitions of efficiency for complex networks,63 consider the
following one based on the average shortest distance between any
pair of nodes:8,64,65
1 X 1
Ed = . (9)
N(N − 1) i6=j d(i, j)

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 Chaos
Although the measure (9) has been applied to assess the vul-
nerability to cascades in synthetic and real-world power grids,66,67 it
assumes that energy flows only through the shortest path between
any two nodes. For the same reasons stated in Sec. II, the energy
flow in power grids is more appropriately represented by all paths
between any two nodes, weighted according to their resistance.
Therefore, for the vulnerability analysis of power grids, here, we con-
sider the modified measure (9) based on the resistance distance R(i, j)
between any two nodes rather than the geodesic distance d(i, j),68
1 X 1
Er = , (10)
N(N − 1) i6=j R(i, j)
where R(i, j) is conceptually related to the admittance matrix of a
power system and can be computed using the Laplacian matrix as
follows:69
det L(i, j)
R(i, j) = . (11)
det L(i)
Note that, for undirected unweighted graphs, the resistance dis-
tance R(i, j) between two nodes i and j connected by an edge (i, j) is
equivalent to the spanning tree centrality ST(i, j) of this edge.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We investigate the vulnerability of power grids to different
edge attack strategies. The relation between the network efficiency
measure (10) and the removal of highly central edges is investi-
gated according to the centrality measures described in Sec. II. The
subsequent removal of edges is expected to decrease the network
efficiency, although the removal of lines may also increase it due
to the Braess’s paradox.70 We expect the removal of more important
edges to reflect more significant drops in efficiency depending on the
considered centrality measure. To that end, we evaluate the decrease
in measure (10) as edges are subsequently attacked according to
the vulnerability index (8) for some centrality measure ξ , targeting
the most vulnerable edge at a time. This attack strategy is simu-
lated according to the following greedy algorithm. Consider some
graph G = {V, E}. At each iteration, Eq. (8) is computed for all edges
(i, j) ∈ E in graph G, and we select the edge (k, l) that maximizes the
vulnerability index,
(k, l) = argmax(i,j)∈E V(i, j). (12)
Then, we remove the selected edge (k, l) from the graph
G0 = {V, E\(k, l)}, updating the graph G ← G0 , and proceeding to
the next iteration. The network efficiency (10) is reevaluated at
every iteration after the removal of an edge. Numerical results are
presented for established power-grid benchmark systems (publicly
available datasets at Matpower toolbox;58 summarized in Table I)
and randomly generated synthetic power grids (generated using the
model36 with N = 100 nodes, average node degree 2.7, and other
parameters set as n0 = 1, p = 0.2, q = 0.3, r = 1/3, and s = 0.1).
Figure 2 compares the vulnerability of IEEE power grids to dif-
ferent target attack strategies. As expected, the network efficiency
always decreases with the removal (attack) of any given edge. How-
ever, the decrease of network efficiency (vulnerability) may be more
sensitive depending on the choice of edge and its centrality ranking.
Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
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TABLE I. IEEE benchmark systems.
Benchmark Nodes Edges Average degree
IEEE-57 57 78 2.74
IEEE-118 118 179 3.03
IEEE-300 300 409 2.73
Among the evaluated measures, edge attacks based on current-
flow betweenness centrality show the largest decrease in network
efficiency in all benchmark systems compared to other centrality
measures. Network efficiency drops to around 6% of the nominal
efficiency (under no attacks) by removing only 10% of the total
number of edges ranked according to the current-flow betweenness
centrality, whereas other centrality measures require 20% or more
attacks to reach the same level of network efficiency.
These results show that power grids are highly vulnerable to
attacks on important edges ranked with current-flow betweenness
centrality. However, for the first few attacks (less than 5%), simula-
tions also show that power grids are more vulnerable to attacks on
edges ranked with disconnected component centrality compared to
the current-flow betweenness centrality and other measures. This is
often a consequence of a few bridge edges interconnecting the net-
work to a branch of N ≥ 2 nodes containing “dead ends” [see edges
1 and 2 in Fig. 1(b)]. After these few bridge edges are removed, cen-
24 November 2023 14:25:46
tral edges ranked with disconnected component centrality are more
likely located at direct connections between the network and its dead
ends [see edges 3, 4, and 5 in Fig. 1(b)], in which removal/isolation is
less crucial to the overall power flow distribution and network effi-
ciency. Consequently, after the first initial attacks (e.g., >5% of the
total edges), the network efficiency displays less sensitivity to attacks
on central edges based on disconnected component centrality.
Given all the specific characteristics of each centrality measure,
the structural index captures the average behavior among all con-
sidered attack strategies. For the first few attacks on important edges
ranked with the structural index, results show large drops of network
efficiency, followed by a less sensitive decrease for the remaining
edge attacks. The large drop is related to the high sensitivity of the
network efficiency to attacks on: (i) important edges ranked with
the current-flow betweenness centrality and (ii) the first few impor-
tant edges ranked with the disconnected component centrality. The
subsequent small decrease, on the other hand, is a consequence of
the low vulnerability of the network efficiency to attacks on edges
located at dead ends, which are often classified as important with the
disconnected components and spanning tree centrality measures.
The vulnerability analysis conducted so far depends on the
structural characteristics of the systems, such as its node degree
distribution (Fig. 3), and may be dependent on the specific bench-
mark cases considered in our study. To further confirm the results
observed in the IEEE benchmark systems and statistically evaluate
the network vulnerability under different attack strategies, we ran-
domly generate 100 power-grid networks following the power-grid
network model.36 Figure 4 illustrates the node degree distributions
for randomly generated networks, leading to synthetic networks
that share similar characteristics to real-world power grids (Fig. 3),
33, 033122-7
 Chaos
especially, its node degree distribution following exponential decay-
ing tail.
Figure 5 presents the network vulnerability of random power
grids under different attack strategies. Overall, the same qualitative
results observed in Fig. 2 are observed for the random networks.
The network efficiency is considerably more vulnerable to attacks
on the 5%–10% most important edges with respect to current-flow
betweenness centrality and also highly vulnerable to the attacks on
the 3%–5% most important edges with respect to the disconnected
component centrality (but showing low sensitivity for successive
edge attacks). Power grids (real and synthetic) are less vulnera-
ble to attacks on important edges ranked according to spanning
tree centrality. Finally, the structural index shows an average result
between current-flow betweenness and disconnected component
centrality measures, suggesting its potential use as a representative
vulnerability index for both measures.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The vulnerability analysis of critical systems, such as power
grids, is necessary to support decision-making policies for mitigat-
ing outages and the design of more resilient systems. The proposed
methodology for network vulnerability analysis networks locates,
in power-grid networks, transmission lines that are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks and extreme weather events (such as fires, thun-
derstorms, etc.). Such events are geographically localized; therefore,
their effects can be mitigated if vulnerable transmission lines can be
identified in advance.
We evaluated four centrality measures used in network science
to quantify the vulnerability of power grids to target edge attacks.
The network efficiency, related to its overall power flow distribution,
showed different sensitivities to edge attacks depending on its cen-
trality ranking. While most works in the literature have investigated
the power-grid vulnerability to critical node failures,71 here, we focus
on centrality metrics to indicate critical edges. The betweenness cen-
trality is the most commonly used indication of critical edges as it
represents an essential path for the flow in the network. We apply
a variation of this metric, which more realistically models the flow
of energy (information) in power grids. Likewise, the spanning tree
metric gives us an indication of an edge relevance or redundancy
to the power flow, indicating edges that have a significant effect on
the power flow distribution and may overload other components
if attacked or removed. The disconnected component centrality is
then used to assess whether a component failure may break the
power flow in two isolated components, possibly leading to “outage
isles.” Finally, creating a composite index of these three measures
provides a single metric to jointly analyze characteristics.
We highlight that the network efficiency measure used in this
work is a more appropriate choice to analyze the vulnerability of
power grids under edge (and node) attacks, a novelty of the frame-
work proposed in this paper. By replacing the geodesic distance
by the resistance distance, we implicitly model the current flow in
power grids through multiple paths between any two nodes, instead
of evaluating only the shortest distance between these nodes. Ana-
lyzing the numerical results on real-world and synthetic power grids,
we expect that the high vulnerability of power grids to edge attacks is
related to the importance of an edge with respect to the power flow
Chaos 33, 033122 (2023); doi: 10.1063/5.0137919
Published under an exclusive license by AIP Publishing
ARTICLE scitation.org/journal/cha
distribution in the grid. In fact, both the network efficiency measure
(10) and the current-flow betweenness centrality (4) depend on the
power flow distribution and the resistance distances (11) between
any two nodes—which might justify the higher vulnerability to
attacks on important edges with respect to current-flow between-
ness centrality compared to other measures. However, the relation
between the network efficiency (10) and the centrality measure is not
trivial and still deserves further investigation. For instance, note that,
even though the spanning tree centrality is computed using the same
expression (6) as the resistance distance (11), all power grids showed
low sensitivity to attacks on central edges with respect to spanning
centrality. We highlight that, although our research was designed
with the power grid application in mind, the centrality and network
efficiency measures used in our work are relevant to many other
infrastructure networks, including water and gas supply networks
as well as multi-layer energy delivery systems. Potentially, other
applications could benefit from the framework developed here.
The dependence between the network efficiency and its vul-
nerability to edges that are more important to the power flow
distribution shows promising results for future studies on network
design and expansion. The studied vulnerability indices, especially
those implicitly related to the power flow distribution in the grid,
may be incorporated in the co-design of power grids that simultane-
ously optimize the system’s power flow and maximize the network
resilience (redundancy) to edge attacks and failures—while also
considering the many geographic and costs constraints involved.
This paper is, however, a pilot study in this direction, and
24 November 2023 14:25:46
many other factors have yet to be considered. For example, here,
the analysis is simplified by assuming that the admittance of each
edge (transmission line) is normalized to a unit value. Results may
be quantitatively different if the actual admittance matrix of real-
world power grids is also considered in the vulnerability analysis,
which can be further analyzed using real-world databases. More-
over, although this work shows a clear link between network effi-
ciency and centrality measures, the relation between these measures
and the emergence of cascading failures (blackouts) in power grids
is still an open challenge. This can be further pursued by explicitly
modeling the power grid’s nonlinear dynamics and its synchroniza-
tion conditions under edge attacks on important edges to the power
flow distribution. The research problem is quite vast and depen-
dent on the network structure of the transmission networks under
study as well as the underlying dynamics. Based on our frame-
work, critical components can be identified solely based on the
network structure. To assess the system stability and resilience to
the impact and propagation of large perturbations, we expect that
our analysis can then be complemented by dynamical tools that
can also incorporate other data characteristics of real-world power
grids, including measurement data of past cascading failures72 or the
operation information37,38 (such as the system’s power flow, power
demand, and synchronization dynamics).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Jussara Dias acknowledges financial support from the Con-
selho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (Grant
No. 140475/2018-4) and the Instituto de Pesquisas Eldorado, Brazil.
33, 033122-8
 Chaos
This research was also supported by the São Paulo Research Foun-
dation (FAPESP), Brazil (Grant Nos. 2015/50122-0, DFG-IRTG
1740/2, and 2018/03211-6).
AUTHOR DECLARATIONS
Conflict of Interest
The authors have no conflicts to disclose.
Author Contributions
Jussara Dias: Methodology (equal). Arthur N. Montanari:
Methodology (equal). Elbert E. N. Macau: Methodology (equal).
DATA AVAILABILITY
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were
created or analyzed in this study.
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