APPLICATION OF FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS

ANALYSIS AND ISM APPROACHES IN ELEVATOR

COMPONENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

DISSERTATION II REPORT

Submitted by
SALEEMBASHA C (2019229036)

In partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF ENGINEERING IN
QUALITY ENGINEERING AND
MANAGEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, GUINDY
ANNA UNIVERSITY,
CHENNAI

MAY 2021

i
 ANNA UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI.
BONAFIDE CERTIFICATE
Certified that this report titled “APPLICATION OF FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS AND ISM APPROACHES IN ELEVATOR COMPONENT MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY” is the bonafide work of SALEEMBASHA C (2019229036) and who carried
out the work under my supervision. Certified further that to the best of my knowledge the
work reported here in does not form part of any other design phase or dissertation based on
which a degree or award was conferred on an earlier occasion on this or any other
candidate.

Dr. T. RAMESH BABU Mrs. V. KAMALA,

Head of the Department Assistant Professor

Department of industrial Engineering Department of industrial Engineering

College of Engineering, Guindy College of Engineering, Guindy

Anna University Anna University

Chennai -600025 Chennai-600025

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 ABSTRACT

A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a procedure in product development

and operations management for analysis of potential failure modes within a system for
classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures. A successful FMEA activity helps
a team to identify potential failure modes based on past experience with processes, enabling
the team to design those failures out of the system with the minimum of effort and resource
expenditure, thereby reducing development time and costs. The purpose of this study is to
analyse and model various risks which may disrupt the elevator component manufacturing
industry. To analyze and further model the risks in the elevator component manufacturing
company has been studied. First phase of the study is to identify various risks in the company
through literature review and expert’s opinion from the industry. Further, failure mode and
effect analysis (FMEA) is used to prioritise the risk elements based on the risk priority
number. 11 risk elements have been identified as critical to the supply chain. In the next
phase, interrelationships among these risk elements have been identified through interpretive
structural modelling (ISM). MICMAC analysis helped identifying the driving and
dependency power of these risk elements.

KEY WORDS: FMEA, ISM APPROCH, ELEVATOR MANUFACTURING

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Mrs. V. KAMALA,

Assistant professor, Department of Industrial Engineering, college of Engineering Guindy,
Anna University Chennai, under whose guidance and supervision, the current design phase
project is done. I gratefully acknowledge for the unwavering support and continuous
inspiration in accomplishing this project work.

I am grateful to Dr. T. RAMESH BABU, Head of the department, Department of

industrial Engineering for his cooperation and providing all the facilities and help during
the course of work.

I am very thankful to the panel members Dr. T. RAMESH BABU and

Dr. A.GNANAVELBABU for their valuable suggestions throughout the review process.

I would like to thank for the support received from the other teaching and non-
teaching faculty members of our department. Finally, I wish to thank all who supported
and encouraged me in my entire work.

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 SALEEMBASHA C

CHAPTER NO TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO

ABSTRACT v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v
LIST OF TABLES v
LIST OF FIGURES v
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT 5
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 6
3 METHODOLOGY 16
PROCESS INFORMATION 17
3.1 SELECTION OF TOOLS AND 22
TECHNIQUES
3.1.1 CAUSES AND EFFECT DIAGRAM 22
4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 23
4.1 INDUSTRIAL DESCRIPTION 23
4.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 24
4.3 PROCESS FMEA 27
4.4 SEVERITY RATING FOR PFMEA 31
4.5 OCCURRENCE RATING FOR PFMEA 32
4.6 DETECTION RATING FOR PFMEA 33
4.7 APPLICATION OF ISM APPROACH 43
5 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 55
6 CONCLUSION 57

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 LIST OF TABLES

SL.NO TITLE PAGE NO

4.1 PRODUCTION PLAN VS ACTUAL 27
4.2 SEVERITY RATING FOR PFMEA 31
4.3 OCCURRENCE RATING FOR PFMEA 32
4.4 DETECTION RATING FOR PFMEA 33

4.5 PROCESS FMEA BANDSAW CUTTING 34

4.6 PROCESS FMEA DRILLING 35
4.7 PROCESS FMEA WELDING 36
4.8 PROCESS FMEA PAINTING 37
4.9 PROCESS FMEA PAINTING 38
4.10 PROCESS FMEA ASSEMBLY 39
4.11 PROCESS FMEA PACKING 40
4.12 PROCESS FMEA BENDING 41
4.13 PROCESS FMEA SHEARING 42
4.14 PROCESS FMEA STORING 43
4.15 RISK PRIORITY NUMBER 45

4.16 STRUCTURAL SELF-INTERACTION MATRIX 47

4.17 REACHABILITY MATRIX 48
4.18 ITERATION 1 49

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 4.19 ITERATION 2 50
4.20 ITERATION 3 51
4.20 ITERATION 4 51
4.21 ITERATION 5 51
4.22 DEVELOPING A CONICAL FORM OF 5
REACHABILITY MATRIX

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 LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE NO TITLE PAGE NO
3.1 FLOW CHART OF METHODOLOGY 16
3.2 PROCESS 17

3.3 BANDSAW CUTTING 18

3.4 DRILLING 19

3.5 WELDING 20

3.6 PAINTING 20

3.7 ASSEMBLING 21

3.8 CAUSES AND EFFECT DIAGRAM 22

4.1 PRODUCTION PLAN VS ACTUAL 26

4.2 DIGRAPH 52

4.3 ISM MODEL 53

5.1 DEPENDENCE AND DRIVING POWER 56

viii
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a methodology in product

development and operations management for analysis of potential failure modes within a
system for classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures. A successful FMEA
activity helps a team to identify potential failure modes, based on past experience with
similar products or processes. Failure modes are any errors or defects in a process, design,
or item, especially those that affect the customer, and can be potential or actual. Effects
analysis refers to studying the consequences of those failures. FMEA can provide an
analytical approach, when dealing with potential failure modes and their associated causes.
When considering possible failures in a design – like safety, cost, performance, quality and
reliability – an engineer can get a lot of information about how to alter the
development/manufacturing process in order to avoid these failures. A systematic process
for identifying potential design and process failures before they occur, with the intent to
eliminate them or minimize the risk associated with them” FMEA procedures are based on
standards in the reliability engineering industry, both military and commercial.

The Process FMEA is normally used to analyze manufacturing and assembly

processes at the system, sub-system or component levels. This type of FMEA focuses on
potential failure modes of the process that are caused by manufacturing or assembly
process deficiencies. A robustness analysis can be obtained from interface matrices,
boundary diagrams and parameter diagrams. A lot of failures are due to noise factors and
shared interfaces with other parts and/or systems, because engineers tend to focus on what
they control directly. To start, it is necessary to describe the system and its function. A
good understanding of FMEA simplifies further analysis. This way an engineer can see

1
which uses of the system are desirable and which are not. It is important to consider both
intentional and unintentional uses. Unintentional uses are a form of hostile environment. It
is useful to create a coding system to identify the different system elements. Before starting
the actual FMEA, a worksheet needs to be created, which contains the important
information about the system, such as the revision date or the names of the components.
On this worksheet all the items or functions of the subject should be listed in a logical
manner.
Continuous improvement of product and processes is very important nowadays to
have an edge over others in the competitive manufacturing market and that is becoming
more commanding in highly competitive industries like automotive. Unfortunately,
continuous quality improvement has not been successfully implemented in small scale
manufacturing industries, it remains a concept to be endeavored for. There are many quality
tools available which make more difficult to choose the right tool to achieve improvement.
If the wrong tool selected then it may lead to failure of the improvement project or may not
produce the intended results. It is, therefore, important to know how, when and which tools
should be used in problem-solving or improve processes. Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) is one of the tools used for continuous quality improvement. FMEA is a
structured analysis used for identification of failure modes and their effects It is a very
prevailing tool, extensively used in manufacturing processes design, to scrutinize failure
modes and to reduce effects of respective failures. Hence it helps in identifying measures
necessary to improve the product and processes by concentrating on failure modes and its
impact
The objective of the research was to check the applicability of FMEA for continuous
quality improvement in small-to-medium size enterprises. It is very important to establish
the measurable performance parameters which depict the quality improvement on a
continuous basis. One of the important performance indicators of quality improvement is
rejection. Hence, the in-process rejection and customer return (rejection) were chosen to
measure the quality improvement due to the application of Failure Modes and Effect
Analysis tool. The research was commenced to recognize the effects of FMEA, as being a

2
preventive tool, especially in automotive small-to-medium enterprises. The entire paper is
structured as per the research was conducted in actual. The next section presents the
literature review carried out to investigate the past work and support the research. Then
methodology used for the research is presented followed by the application of FMEA in
case companies. In the research, four companies were selected to strengthen the results and
outcome. The application phase is also divided in Cross Functional Team (CFT) selection,
FMEA implementation through brainstorming and process study, identification of
improvement opportunities and its implementation.

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), first developed as a formal design
methodology in the by the aerospace industry has proven to be a useful and powerful tool
in assessing potential failures and preventing them from occurring. FMEA is an analysis
technique for defining, identifying and eliminating known and/or potential failures,
problems, errors and so on from system, design, process and/or service before they reach
the customer. When it is used for a criticality analysis, it is also referred to as failure mode,
effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). The main objective of FMEA is to identify
potential failure modes, evaluate the causes and effects of different component failure
modes, and determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure. The results of
the analysis can help analysts to identify and correct the failure modes that have a
detrimental effect on the system and improve its performance during the stages of design
and production. Since its introduction as a support tool for designers, FMEA has been
extensively used in a wide range of industries, including aerospace, automotive, nuclear,
electronics, chemical, mechanical and medical technologies industries.
The main purpose for performing an FMEA is to prevent the possibility that a new
design, process or system fails to achieve, totally or in part the proposed requirements,
under certain conditions such as defined purpose and imposed limits. Through the FMEA
the client requirements are evaluated and products and processes are developed in a manner
that minimizes the risks of the occurrence of potential failure modes, with an emphasis on

3
insuring the safety and health of the personnel and the security of the systems. Another
purpose of the FMEA is to develop, evaluate and enhance the design development and
testing
Methodologies to achieve the elimination of failures and thus obtain world-class
competitive products. The main advantages of using the FMEA method are: the reduction
of costs, with a critical impact on warranty returns, the reduction of the time needed from
the project phase to the market launch and the improvement of the quality and reliability
of the products, while increasing the safety of their operation. The ultimate goal for
attaining these benefits is the increase of customer satisfaction, which assures the growth
of the organization’s competitively and the improvement of the image on the market.
This type of FMEA focuses on potential failure modes of the process that are caused
by manufacturing or assembly process deficiencies. Process FMEA is of two type are
Manufacturing FMEA, and Assembly FMEA. In Manufacturing FMEA the failure modes
are generally dimensional or visual. While in Assembly FMEA these are generally
relational dimensions, missing parts, parts assembled incorrectly.

4
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT

To identify and eliminate current and potential problems from a manufacturing process
of bed plate in the company through the application of failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA) for improving the reliability of sub systems in order to ensure the quality which
in turn enhances the bottom line of a manufacturing industry.

5
 CHAPTER-2

LITERATURE REVIEW
Almannai et al. (2008) the manufacturing world is facing major pressures due to
the globalization of markets. Internal and external organizational pressures have led to
increased competition, market complexity, and new customer demands. It has been noted
how organizations adopt lean or agile manufacturing strategies to overcome this problem.
These strategies have different approaches and elements to address in the design of the
manufacturing system, but they all depend on two common things: acquiring technology
and the effective operation of this technology by humans. Developments in computer-
integrated manufacturing systems and the methods by which they are designed have
induced firms to shift their emphasis towards human factors, particularly man–machine
interaction, and to consider people as assets instead of costs. In the manufacturing systems
design literature, emphasis is directed towards producing a coherent interaction between
echnology, organization, and people to overcome new competitive challenges. Various
authors have pointed out the importance of addressing human factors generally in the
evaluation and design of manufacturing systems, calling specifically for the adoption of a
balanced method based on technology, organization, and people. Furthermore, the
literature on investment evaluation is continuously being updated to accommodate the new
market demands and manufacturing technology.
The changes in the market environment and justification of new manufacturing
technologies have caused management to shift away from relying on traditional economic
justification to the incorporation of intangible benefits and organizational strategy.
However, there continue to be reports of investment failures and difficulties in computer-
integrated manufacturing systems implementation, due to the lack of addressing man–
machine interaction appropriately.

6
 Vinodh et al. (2011) a developed Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a
problem prevention tool, to improve or consolidate the basic customer requirements to
avoid negative customer satisfaction, especially at the design stage It is a tool for
contemporary engineers to depict in a structural and formalized manner the subjective
thinking and experiences. FMEA is a decision-making tool for prioritizing corrective
action to enhance product/system performance by eliminating or reducing failure rate. The
major benefits of implementing FMEA are improving the product/process quality and
reliability thereby ensuring customer satisfaction. FMEA considers three input factors that
determine the risk priority (output). The inputs are severity (S), seriousness of effect of
failure, occurrence (O), probability of frequency of failure, detection (D), probability of
failure being detected before the impact of the effect is felt. The risk priority number (RPN)
is the mathematical product of S, O and D, RPN. S_O_D. Higher the RPN, higher the
chance that the mode will fail and subsequently demands higher priority for corrective
action. There existed a need for the case company to prioritize the corrective actions so as
to enhance product/system performance by reducing the failure rate. In this context, FMEA
has been applied.
This studied the interaction between two quality tools of quality function
deployment and FMEA and emphasized a methodology that will enhance the product
development cycle. Proposed the FMEA implementation in a collaborative supply chain
environment and analyzed the problems in implementing the integrated FMEA in terms of
inconsistency in the ranking of S, O and D. The study offered guidelines for manufacturing
industry in correcting the problems in FMEA applications, so companies can adopt their
FMEA process into a collaborative supply chain environment. Proposed a new approach
to enhance FMEA capabilities through its integration with Kano model. Severities have
been classified according to customer’s perceptions and a new index called correction ratio
has been introduced. Applied the data envelopment analysis technique to enhance the
assessment capabilities of FMEA. The authors have evolved the current ranking for failure
modes by giving a managerial insight into S, O and D than justifying the efforts on RPN
alone. Analyzed system failure behavior more consistently and suitable maintenance

7
actions have been planned by adopting three tools, namely, root cause analysis (RCA),
Failure mode effect analysis (FMEA), and non-homogeneous Poisson point process .

Liu et al. (2013) A implementation of FMEA is an analysis technique for defining,

identifying and eliminating known and/or potential failures, problems, errors and so on
from system, design, process and/or service before they reach the customer. When it is
used for a criticality analysis, it is also referred to as failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA). The main objective of FMEA is to identify potential failure modes,
evaluate the causes and effects of different component failure modes, and determine what
could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure. The results of the analysis can help analysts
to identify and correct the failure modes that have a detrimental effect on the system and
improve its performance during the stages of design and production. Since its introduction
as a support tool for designers, FMEA has been extensively used.
Traditionally, criticality or risk assessment in FMEA is carried out by developing
a risk priority number (RPN). Nevertheless, the crisp RPN method shows some important
weaknesses when FMEA is applied in the real-world cases. Therefore, many alternative
approaches have been suggested in the literature to resolve some of the shortcomings of
the traditional RPN method and to implement FMEA into real world situations more
efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, no research has been done on the review of
approaches employed to enhance the performance of FMEA. This paper provides a review
of those academic works attempting to deal with problems in the traditional RPN method
and classify the existing literature by the approaches used.

Adar et al. (2016) The implementation FMEA analysis, which is a modern

and numerical risk analysis method, is a quality tool that is used to determine the potential
failures of a product or system and to identify their reasons and effects. Furthermore, this
analysis also ensures the prioritization of the failures that occur. This analysis method also
ensures increased system/product quality or efficient-cy. The FMEA technique is used in
several industries (mining, automotive, military, nuclear industries, etc.). The RPN method

8
is used to prioritize the failures identified with the cause-and-effect diagram in terms of
their risks. RPN is a product of occurrence (O), severity (S) and detectability (D). It is
calculated using the below formula. RPN = O*S*D The risk factors for occurrence, severity
and detectability are determined by engineers and specialists using 10-point scales. The
parameter with the highest RPN generally has the highest importance. The scales used to
determine the 3 risk factor values are provided. Generally, corrective measures are taken
for parameters with the RPN values above 100 in FMEA applications. Since the highest
value above 100 would carry the highest risk, it indicates the failure that should primarily
be tackled.

Pandey et al. (2017)The implementation failure to effectively manage supply chain

risk may result not only in economic and financial losses, reductions in product quality,
but also the loss of goodwill with respect to its customers and suppliers. Therefore, risk
management should be a considered as a core issue in planning and control of any
organization. Numerous companies have implemented various initiatives in the supply
chain to increase revenues and to reduce costs. However, companies that understand the
importance of supply chain risk often do not know where to start in order to tackle it. With
this regard, literature takes a quite general perspective on supply chain uncertainties and
provides a limited support about how to deal with them from a practical point of view.
Wide range of techniques but they have been scarcely adapted to the needs of SCM. For
the success of supply chain in an unstable environment, the ways or means to mitigate the
possible supply chain risks critical to manage supply chains needs to be explored. As the
supply chain risks can have significant impact on the firm’s both short-term and long-term
performance. Thus, managers need to identify and manage risks from a more diverse range
of sources and perspectives.
There has been recent research interest from academics and practitioners regarding
Supply chain interruptions and related issues, certainly because these risks can potentially
be harmful and costly for the whole supply chain. There are numerous frameworks,

9
approaches and techniques that are proposed in the SCRM, but a hybrid approach which
not only identifies and classify the risks involved but also establishes the structural
relationship among the key risks is missing and is thus required for effective SCRM. This
paper describes a supply chain network risk approach, to assist supply chain decision
makers to identify the risks, assess them based upon their occurrence, severity and
detection. The proposed approach is based on combination of FMEA, ISM to establish
structural relationship between key risks. For application point of view a case of an
automotive supply chain (tractor manufacturing company) has been investigated. As such,
the automotive supply chain is a combination of various industries starting from raw
material suppliers to small equipment manufacturers to original equipment manufacturers
to the main companies that perform remaining required operations. Finally, comes the
retailer and then the customer.

Dosh et al (2017) a FMEA Continuous improvement of product and processes is

very important nowadays to have an edge over others in the competitive manufacturing
market and that is becoming more commanding in highly competitive industries like
automotive. Unfortunately, continuous quality improvement has not been successfully
implemented in small scale manufacturing industries, it remains a concept to be endeavored
for. There are many quality tools available which make more difficult to choose the right
tool to achieve improvement. If the wrong tool selected then it may lead to failure of the
improvement project or may not produce the intended results. It is, therefore, important to
know how, when and which tools should be used in problem-solving or improve processes.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is one of the tools used for continuous quality
improvement. FMEA is a structured analysis used for identification of failure modes and
their effects. It is a very prevailing tool, extensively used in manufacturing processes
design, to scrutinize failure modes and to reduce effects of respective failures. Hence it
helps in identifying measures necessary to improve the product and processes by

10
concentrating on failure modes and its impact. Continuous quality improvement can be
achieved by initiating quality improvements which may be identified based on the
implementation of quality tools. Six sigma and lean tools are extensively used in the
automobile industries.
The decision making in the situation of emergency is very important and the same
becomes more crucial in manufacturing. FMEA has the ability to identify the associated
risk with that option to be addressed in the manufacturing system and implementation
phases. The ultimate aim of the FMEA is to reduce failure modes and to produce required
quality products. The financial impact of various possible problems in the processes is not
directly considered, and therefore, it was necessary to create a method which would
identify and give priorities to those failures that have the biggest (financial) impact on the
operation. The lacunas in FMEA prioritization method is as: identical values of RPN may
be produced as a result of severity, occurrence and detection indexes and the team may not
agree on the ranking index then approving average or higher value.

Wei Lo et al. (2019) The Increasing the reliability of machine tools and reducing
possible risks during the manufacturing process is crucial for the future of industry. The
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) method is reliant upon the experience of experts
to determine the primary failure modes and detect the most critical factors for preventing
risk. Clearly, an effective method capable of integrating the various different expert
opinions is required. This study proposes a novel FMEA model based on multi-criteria
group decision-making, which is developed by integrating a rough best–worst method, and
modified rough technique for order preference by similarity to an ideal solution for ranking
failure modes. The model can overcome some of the limitations of the conventional FMEA.
It also includes the expected cost as a risk element to provide a more practical result. The
effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated by conducting a case study involving
a machine tool company. The results indicate that the proposed model can effectively assist
managers in evaluating risk factors and identifying critical failure modes.

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 These limitations can be overcome by combining multi-criteria decision-making
(MCDM) methods with the FMEA. Qualitative methods for evaluating the weights of the
RPN elements include the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and analytic network process
(ANP). MCDM also provides several methods for prioritizing failure modes. Examples of
such methods include the technique for order preference by similarity to an ideal solution
(TOPSIS), decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL), complex
proportional assessment (COPRAS), and grey relation analysis (GRA). All these methods
have been applied to analyze the RPN and have provided a basis for risk assessment

Sonntag et al. (2019) A presented Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) is

presented in this paper that provides an organizational tool that allows the organization to
highlight the actual business conditions that deviate from the ideal conditions. This ability
to systematically review the checklist of conditions is derived from the knowledgebase
developed in this effort. This knowledgebase categorizes the conditions based on four
categories: personnel, equipment, materials, and schedules. The modified FMEA takes the
conditions in each category that deviate from the ideal and prioritizes them based on the
risk to the Lean system as defined by severity, probability of occurrence, and effectiveness
of the organization to control them. The ability to perform this analysis in a practical
manner will enhance the reliability of the Lean system and the probability that the system
will sustain. Models that explicitly allow one to enhance the reliability of Lean systems are
not presently available. This widely accepted FMEA approach has its own drawbacks. One
drawback is that a variety of different risk scenarios represented by various values of S, O
and D generate identical RPN values. FMEA does not allow one to differentiate between
different risk implications. Another drawback is that the FMEA team may average the
values of S, O, and D when there is a difference of opinion. This may generate an RPN
identical to others without the ability to articulate the risk implications. The following is a
representative list of research efforts that have attempted to overcome the FMEA
drawbacks.

12
 Mutlu et al. (2019) a implementation of Risk analysis is implemented in order to
adopt risk control measures against potential hazards, decrease occupational accidents, and
increase the reliability of the production and service systems. Stated that risk analysis is a
practice for gaining information regarding the nature and degree of risk and defined the
main risk analysis steps as; identifying the threats and hazards, recognizing the cause and
effect relations including exposure and weaknesses to risks, and describing the potential
risk. Classified the safety analysis methods used for assessing risks that cause occupational
hazards in the food production industry as; biased reactive, unbiased proactive, and biased
proactive. Categorized the factors causing Accidents during the operation stages in food
production systems as visible and invisible risks factors. Furthermore, created a risk
analysis action plan by identifying the situations with uncertainties in the cogeneration
system in their research to prevent losses that may be caused by uncertainty and lack of
knowledge.
Indicated that appropriately implementing interconnected practices as corrective
actions can significantly improve safety within the shortest time, and at minimum cost.
Many risk analysis and assessment methods are used in risk rating. One of the most widely
used methods is failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It outperforms other methods
as it relies on quantitative-proactive analysis top re-detect risks. FMEA is adopted in this
study because it is a flexible tool to identify and mitigate risks that can further be improved.
FMEA method has areas that can be improved in practice. This study is conducted to test
the hypothesis that explains the possibility of the integration of FTA and BIFPET algorithm
with FMEA method to improve the robustness of FMEA method.

Sangode et al. (2020) A developed promising automotive industry often gains

economic success as well as is considered to be a symbol of modern-day technological
advancements. It is also recognized as a mature industry as it goes on to become a leading
manufacturing sector of any economy. In general, automotive plants are required to import
so many parts due to the shortage of local suppliers Despite the use of such management

13
exercises, the supply chain in this sector has to face real-time issues as well as risks that
have an impact on delivery concerning the elements that are delivered at the right place as
well as at the right time. At times, high logistics services are not authentic and not regular
as well due to the higher holding of the inventory in almost all stages of the supply chain
The concept of the supply chain has become an international industrial landscape.
The idea of regulating companies not in a compartmentalized manner but in a cross-sectoral
way has advanced based on the local performance goals. In most of the small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) logistical functions as well as tasks are both outsourced. All
companies these days have a huge concern for safe and healthy workplaces which can be
worked upon using Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) concepts. HSE aims to
facilitate services, products and also procedures by health, safety, and environmental
considerations. Achieving HSE principles non-stop production, on-time delivery of the
services, reduction of excessive costs and removal of wastes. It is quite helpful in
identifying hazardous risks in any professional safety and health environment. Risk
evaluation is a systematic approach to calculate both quantitative as well as qualitative risks
linked with that of hazardous substances or processes, material, and environment. Failure
modes and effect analysis (FMEA) methods are some of the important risk evaluation
methods used in the system. While putting FMEA into action corrective steps are defined
as well as also implemented by noticing potential or probable problems and at the same
time measuring risk or lessening their possibility of occurrence

14
 CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The method consider literature we framed our methodology. First this study the
existing process of the industry in order to understand the problem faced by the industry
existing system in lack of productivity. Identify all potential failure modes, determine the
causes of failure, evaluate control for process and determine detectability, and evaluate action
for correction after implementation ISM approach. Shown in Figure 3.1

STUDY ABOUT EXISTING

PROCESS

LITERATURE REVIEW

PROCESS MAP

IDENTIFY ALL POTENTIAL

FAILURE MODES

DESCRIBE AND RECORD EFFECTS OF

FAILURE

DETERMINE SEVERITY

DETERMINE THE CAUSES OF

FAILURE

DETERMINE HOW OFTEN THE

FAILURE OCCURE

EVALUATE CONTROL FOR PROCESS AND

DETERMINE DETECTABILITY

CALCULATE THE RISK PRIORITY

NUMBER

EVALUATE ACTION FOR

CORRECTION

REVIEW RESULT

15
 List of potential risk sources in elevator
manufacturing industry

Develop structural self-interaction matrix

(SSIM)

Develop reachability matrix

Partition of levels in reachability

matrix

Develop the diagraph

Develop of ISM model

Developing a conical form of

reachability matrix

Dependence and
driving power

Conclusions

Fig 3.1 Flow chart of methodology

16
PROCESS

This industry producing elevator component. This following process bandsaw cutting,
drilling, welding, painting, bending, shearing, assembly, packing. Shown in figure 3.2

BANDSAW
DRILLING
CUTTING

PAINTING WELDING

ASSEMBLY PACKING

Figure 3.2 Process of elevator manufacturing

17
BANDSAW CUTTING
As per the name of the process, the saw is formed as a band and is
continuously cycled in one direction around pulley wheels. This enables a
continuous cut to be made. The blade has to be sufficiently thin to bend around the
pulley wheels. It is possible to make a contour cut, but the minimum curvature
depends on the cross-section of the blade. On some machines it is possible to adjust
the table angle, creating tapered parts or parts with angled sides. Cutting fluids may
be used for lubrication/cooling on some operations the process is shown in figure
3.3

Figure 3.3Bandsaw cutting

DRILLING
Drilling is a cutting process that uses a drill bit to cut a hole of circular cross-
section in solid materials. The drill bit is usually a rotary cutting tool, often multi-
point. The bit is pressed against the work-piece and rotated at rates from hundreds

18
 to thousands of revolutions per minute. This forces the cutting edge against the
work-piece, cutting off from the hole as it is drilled. The process is shown in figure
3.4.

Figure 3.4 Drilling

WELDING
The TIG process uses the heat generated by an electric arc between the metals to
be joined and an infusible tungsten-based electrode, located in the welding torch. The arc
area is shrouded in an inert or reducing gas shield to protect the weld pool and the tungsten
electrode. The filler metal as a rod is applied manually by the welder into the weld pool.
TIG welding is especially suited to sheet materials with thicknesses up to about 8 or 10
mm. The process is shown in figure 3.5

19
 Figure 3.5 Welding

PAINTING
Spray painting is a painting technique in which a device sprays coating material (paint,
ink, varnish, etc.) through the air onto a surface. The most common types employ compressed
gas—usually air—to atomize and direct the paint particles. Spray guns evolved from airbrushes,
and the two are usually distinguished by their size and the size of the spray pattern they produce.
The process is shown in figure 3.6

Figure 3.6 Painting

20
ASSEMBLING
An assembly line is a manufacturing process (often called a progressive assembly) in
which parts (usually interchangeable parts) are added as the semi-finished assembly moves from
workstation to workstation where the parts are added in sequence until the final assembly is
produced. The process is shown in figure 3.7

Figure 3.7 Assembling

21
3.2 SELECTION OF TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

3.2.1 CAUSES AND EFFECT DIAGRAM

The fish bone analysis which was used for finding the causes and effect of the
problems mentioned. This diagram is used in process improvement methods to identify
all of the contributing root causes likely to be causing a problem. The Fishbone chart is
an initial step in the screening process. After identifying potential root cause(s), further
testing will be necessary to confirm the true root cause(s). This methodology can be used
on any type of problem, and can be tailored by the user to fit the circumstances.
Constructing a Fishbone Diagram is straightforward and easy to learn. The Fishbone
Diagram can incorporate metrics but is primarily a visual tool for organizing critical
thinking. By Involving the workforce in problem resolution the preparation of the
fishbone diagram provides an education to the whole team. Using the Ishikawa method
to explore root causes and record them helps organize the discussion to stay focused on
the current issues. It promotes "System Thinking" through visual linkages. It also helps
prioritize further analysis and corrective actions. Causes and effect diagram shown in
figure 3.8

Figure 3.8 causes and effect diagram

22
 CHAPTER 4

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INDUSTRIAL DESCRIPTION
Excel Engineering Company located in
19 NP, SIDCO Industrial Estate,
Ambattur, Chennai - 600 098
• Excel has been entrusted with fabricating the elevator parts of the world renowned
"Kone Elevators" for well over 17 years.
• Excel are known for commitment to quality and hence the long standing repute. In
recognizing this, TUV NORD chose to confer us with ISO 9001:2008 certification
for our unhindered commitment to our quality practices
At Excel Engineering has fabricate such elevator components like Bed Plates,
Counterweight Frames, Beams, Entrance Frame Assembly, etc. We possess the necessary
expertise and experience in fabricating the most challenging and unique elevator interiors
to the most simple and basic models. It comes under small scale industry sector.

23
4.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION

PRODUCTION PLAN VS ACTUAL

PRODUCTION PLAN ACTUAL QUANTITY

DAYS
QUANTITY

1 22 21

2 28 27

3 38 38

4 31 31

5 47 45

6 44 43

7 41 40

8 43 41

9 48 47

10 40 38

11 41 40

12 30 28

13 33 33

24
DAYS PRODUCTION PLAN ACTUAL QUANTITY
QUANTITY

14 31 30

15 32 31

16 28 27

17 24 22

18 30 30

19 31 30

20 36 34

21 42 40

22 45 42

23 31 30

24 29 28

25 41 39

Table 4.1 Production plan vs actual

25
PRODUCTION PLAN VS ACTUAL

Figure 4.1 Production plan vs actual

26
 4.3 PROCESS FMEA
This type of FMEA focuses on potential failure modes of the process that are caused
by manufacturing or assembly process deficiencies. Process FMEA is of two type are
Manufacturing FMEA, and Assembly FMEA. In Manufacturing FMEA the failure modes
are generally dimensional or visual. While in Assembly FMEA these are generally
relational dimensions, missing parts, parts assembled incorrectly. Process FMEA
(PFMEA) discovers failure that impacts product quality, reduced reliability of the process,
customer dissatisfaction, and safety or environmental hazards derived from:
• Human Factors

• Methods followed while processing

• Materials used

• Machines utilized

• Measurement systems impact on acceptance

• Environment Factors on process performance

The description of the FMEA process steps are followings

1. Establish the FMEA team.

2. Describing the product/process/system which we want to be analyzed.

3. Creating a Block Diagram of the product or process which shows major components
or process steps as blocks connected together by lines that indicate how the components or
steps are related.
4. List of Potential failure modes, causes of failures and their effects on the system.
5. Assign Severity, Occurrence and Detection rankings to each failure mode.
6. Calculate RPN (Risk Priority Number) by using mathematical formula (RPN=
Severity X Occurrence X Detection.)

27
 7. Develop the action plan and Define who will do what by when.
8. Take actions those are identified by your FMEA team.
9. Calculate the resulting RPN after implementation of actions.
FMEA Procedure
Following steps are used to implement the FMEA:
1. Severity (S) Determine all failure modes, based on the functional requirements and
their effects. Examples of failure modes are: electrical short-circuiting, corrosion or
deformation. A failure mode in one component can lead to a failure mode in another
component; therefore each failure mode should be listed in technical terms and for
function. Thereafter the ultimate effect of each failure mode needs to be considered. A
failure effect is defined as the result of a failure mode on the function of the system as
perceived by the user. In this way it is convenient to write these effects down in terms of
what the user might see or experience. Examples of failure effects are: degraded
performance, noise or even injury to a user. Each effect is given a severity number (S) from
1 (no danger) to 10 (critical). These numbers help an engineer to prioritize the failure modes
and their effects. If the severity of an effect has a number 9 or 10, actions are considered
to change the design by eliminating the failure mode, if possible, or protecting the user
from the effect. A severity rating of 9 or 10 is generally reserved for those effects which
would cause injury to a user or otherwise result in litigation. Shown in table 4.2
2. Occurrence (O)
In this step it is necessary to look at the cause of a failure mode and the number of times
it occurs. This can be done by looking at similar products or processes and the failure
modes that have been documented for them in the past. A failure cause is looked upon as
a design weakness. All the potential causes for a failure mode should be identified and
documented. Again this should be in technical terms. Shown in table 4.3

28
 2. Detection (D)
When appropriate actions are determined, it is necessary to test their efficiency. In
addition, design verification is needed. The proper inspection methods need to be chosen.
First, an engineer should look at the current controls of the system, that prevent failure
modes from occurring or which detect the failure before it reaches the customer. Thereafter
one should identify testing, analysis, monitoring and other techniques that can be or have
been used on similar systems to detect failures. From these controls an engineer can learn
how likely it is for a failure to be identified or detected. Each combination from the
previous two steps receives a detection number (D). This ranks the ability of planned tests
and inspections to remove defects or detect failure modes in time. The assigned detection
number measures the risk that the failure will escape detection. A high detection number
indicates that the chances are high that the failure will escape detection, or in other words,
that the chances of detection are low. After these three basic steps, risk priority number
(RPN) is calculated Shown in table 4.4

4. Risk priority number (RPN)

Risk priority number (RPN) does not play an important part in the choice of an
action against failure modes. They are more threshold values in the evaluation of these
actions. After ranking the severity, occurrence and detectability, the RPN can be easily
calculated by multiplying these three numbers: RPN = S × O × D this has to be done for
the entire process and/or design. Once this is done it is easy to determine the areas of
greatest concern. The failure modes that have the highest RPN should be given the highest
priority for corrective action. This means it is not always the failure modes with the highest
severity numbers that should be treated first. There could be less severe failures, but which
occur more often and are less detectable. After these values are allocated, recommended
actions with targets, responsibility and dates of implementation are noted. These actions
can include specific inspection, testing or quality procedures, redesign (such as selection
of new components), adding more redundancy and limiting environmental stresses or

29
operating range. Once the actions have been implemented in the design/process, the new
RPN should be checked to confirm the improvements. These tests are often put in graphs,
for easy visualization. Whenever a design or a process changes, an FMEA should be
updated.

30
4.4 SEVERITY RATING FOR PFMEA

severity Effect Criteria: severity or effect on product

10 Failure to meet May endanger operator(machine or assembly)without warning

safety and/or
regulatory
9 May endanger operator(machine or assembly)with warning
requirements

8 Major disruption 100% of product may have to be scrapped. Line shutdown or stop ship

7 Significant A portion of the production run may have to be scrapped. Deviation

disruption from primary process including decreased line speed or added man
power

6 Moderate 100% of product may have to be reworked off line and accepted
disruption

5 A portion of the production run may have reworked off line and
accepted

4 Moderate 100% of product may have to be reworked in station before it is

disruption processed

3 A portion of the production run may have to be re worked in station

before it is processed.

2 Minor disruption Slight inconvenience to process, operation or operator.

1 No effect No discernible effect,

Table 4.2 Severity Rating For PFMEA

31
4.5 OCCURRENCE RATING FOR PFMEA

Failure probability of Standard: likelihood that a specific Frequency

occurrence cause/mechanism will occur PFMEA
(per/number of events)

Very high 100 per 1000(>1 in 10) 10

50 per 1000(1 in 20) 9

High 20 per 1000(1 in 50) 8

10 per 1000(1 in 100) 7

2 per 1000(1 in 500) 6

0.5 per 1000(1 in 2000) 5

Medium in size

0.1 per 1000(1 in 10000) 4

Low 0.01 per 1000(1 in 100,000) 3

0.001 per 1000(<1 in 1million) 2

Very low Failure can be trough prevention and 1

control to eliminate

Table 4.3 Occurrence rating for PFMEA

32
 4.6 DETECTION RATING FOR PFMEA

Detection opportunities Guidelines: likelihood/possibility of detection by process control Rating detection

No detection opportunity No current process control: cannot detect or is not analyzed. 10 It is almost
impossible

No likely to detect at Failure mode and/or error (cause) is not easily detected. (e.g random 9 Tiny
any stage audits)

Problem detection post Failure mode detection post processing by operator through 8 Tiny
processing visual/tactile/audible average

Problem detection at Failure mode detection in station by operator through 7 Very low
source visual/tactile/audible average or post processing through use attribute
gauging(go/no go, manual torque check/clicker wrench, etc)

Problem detection post Failure mode detection post processing by operator through use of 6 Low
processing variable gauging or in station by operator through use of attribute
gauging(go/no go, manual torque check/clicker wrench, etc)

Problem detection at Failure mode or error cause detection in station by operator through 5 Medium
source use variable gauging or

by automated control in station that will detect discrepant part and

notify operator gauging performed on setup and first piece check (for
set up causes only)

Problem detection post Failure mode detection post processing by automated controls that 4 Moderate
processing will detect discrepant part and lock part to prevent further processing. high

Problem detection at Failure mode detection in station by automated controls that will 3 High
source detect discrepant part and automatically lock part to prevent further
processing

Error detection and/ or Error cause detection in station by automated control that will detect 2 Very high
problem prevention error and prevent discrepant part from being made

Detection not applicable; Error cause prevention as a result of fixture design, machine design 1 Almost
error prevention or part design. Discrepant parts cannot be made because item has certainly
been error proofed by process/product design

Table 4.4 detection rating for PFMEA

33
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) DRILLING

Process Requirements Potential Potential Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects of causes of process process
function mode failure failure controls controls

(Prevention) (Detection)

A portion of 4 2 6 48
product to be
Improper
Length reworked, Stopper in the
machine Measuring tape
oversize process machine
setting
delay in
overall occur
Length
A portion of 8 Improper 2 Measuring 6 96
product to be machine tape
Length scrapped, setting Stopper in the
undersize delay in machine
overall
Bandsaw process
cutting

100% of 6 2 7 84
product Improper Right angle
Operator
Squareness Square out should be machine profile check -
training
reworked setting random check
offline

Table 4.5 process FMEA bandsaw cutting

34
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) DRILLING

Process requirements Potential Potential severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects causes process process
Function mode of of controls controls
failure failure
(prevention) (detection)

100% of 8 3 7 168
Hole First piece
product Wrong Operator
drilling check by
may have Drill bit training with
diameter Variable
to be used W.I
wrong gauge
scrapped
Hole Diameter
100% of 8 3 7 168
First piece
Hole product
Drill bit Tool check by
DRILLING Oblong/ may have
worn out monitoring Variable
Taper to be
gauge
scrapped

100% of 8 3 7 168
First piece
product Jig
Wrong hole check by
Holes pitch may have clamping Jig control
pitch Variable
to be wrong
gauge
scrapped

Table 4.6 Process FMEA drilling

35
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) WELDING

Process Requirement Potential Potential effects of Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure failure causes of process process
function mode failure controls controls

(Prevention) (Detection)

Improper
Operator
welding due to Visual
Weld break Assembly cannot be done 4 1 training & 8 32
operator inspection
certification
negligence
Welding
thickness
Improper
Operator
Less 100% of product have to welding due to
6 2 training & Fillet gauge 6 72
thickness be reworked offline operator
certification
negligence

Machine set
Degradation of primary Wrong weld Machine set
7 3 parameter 6 126
function parameter set control
Porosity sheet

Operator
Degradation of primary Operator Visual
pinholes 7 3 training & 8 168
function negligence inspection
certification

No welding If during use

WELDING you notice that
defect
a particular area
of the gun gets
The copper strands that are
very hot, it’s an
located inside the gun tend Operator
indication of Visual
crack to break and wear out with 5 8 training & 8 320
internal inspection
time. This results in faulty certification
damage. So
wire delivery.
prevent welding
defects,
immediately
replace the gun.

Excessive heat input can Decrease the

Excess lead to the weld metal voltage range Machine set Visual
8 3 8 192
penetrations melting through the base and the wire control inspection
metal. feed speed.
No penetration
defect
Insufficient heat input, Adjust the wire
Lack of improper joint preparation feed speed and Machine set Visual
6 2 8 96
penetrations or the thickness of the base voltage to control inspection
material higher settings.

Table 4.7 process FMEA Welding

36
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA)
PAINTING

Potential Potential Current Current

Potential process process
Process step/ effects causes
Requirements failure Severity Occurrence controls controls Detection RPN
function of of
mode
failure failure (Prevention) (Detection)

Improper Work Visual

2 8 112
dwell time instruction inspection
Next
operation- PH value Operator PH meter
Rust/ painting not 2 training with checking 6 84
residual defects, A 7 maintained W.I every 4 hours
surface portion
have to be
3 in 1
Surface finish scrapped Operator
solution
1 training with Visual check 8 56
topping not
W.I
done

Improper
Next
Cleaning cleaning Operator
SURFACE operation- Visual
not 6 due to 4 training with 8 192
PREPARATION painting inspection
effective operator W.I
AND defects
negligence
PAINTING
OPERATION
Improper
Operator
painting due
3 training with DFT meter 6 90
to operator
W.I
negligence

A portion of High air

Less or production Machine
pressure / Visual
Paint thickness more run have to 5 1 control with 8 40
low air inspection
thickness be reworked pressure gauge
pressure
offline

Improper
Viscometer
mixing of Process sheet &
1 check every 4 6 30
thinner & manual control
hrs
paint

Table 4.8 Process FMEA Painting

37
 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) PAINTING

Process step/ Requirements Potential Potential Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
function failure effects causes process process
mode of of controls controls
failure failure
(Prevention) (Detection)

Machine
High air Visual
1 control with 8 32
pressure inspection
pressure gauge
Paint run Customer-
Paint quality down or visual not 4
sagging satisfied Improper
Viscometer
mixing of Process sheet &
1 check every 4 6 24
thinner & manual control
hrs
paint

SURFACE
PREPARATION Machine
High air Visual
AND 1 control with 8 48
pressure inspection
PAINTING pressure gauge
OPERATION

100%
Machine
Paint peel product Low air Visual
Paint visual 6 1 control with 8 48
off reworked pressure inspection
pressure gauge
off line

Improper
mixing of Work Visual
1 8 48
thinner & instruction inspection
paint

Table 4.9 FMEA Painting

38
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) ASSEMBLY

Process Requirements Potential Potential Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects causes process process
function mode of of controls controls
failure failure
(Prevention) (Detection)

Not aware
about the
Child part
Assembling the fitment
not
child part issue at the
assembled
customer
end
Assembling and
Part cannot
packing
be Final
instruction and
ASSEMBLING assembled 8 4 inspection 5 120
awareness
with the report
training given
matting part
to operator
Assembled
Not aware
Assembly of the child
about the
child part at part in
positioning
correct position wrong
problem
position

Table 4.10 Process FMEA Assembly

39
 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA)
PACKING

Process Requirements Potential Potential Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects of causes of process process
function mode failure failure controls controls

(Prevention) (Detection)

Unawareness
Skin cover 50
Packing less As per CSR about CSR and Operator training
microns and 6 1 Vernier caliper 5 30
thickness not acceptable not following the with W.I
above
W.I

Accurate quality
and Unawareness
Fasteners Unable to
specifications of about CSR and Operator training Visual
packing with assemble in 2 2 4 16
fasteners not following the with W.I inspection
low quality site
PACKING mentioned in the W.I
PROCESS drawing

No box damage Unawareness

Unable to
and box with Fasteners about CSR and Operator training Visual
assemble in 2 2 4 16
proper band and missing not following the with W.I inspection
site
tape W.I

Table 4.11 Process FMEA Packing

40
 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA)
BENDING

Process requirements Potential Potential severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects causes process process
Function mode of of controls controls
failure failure
(prevention) (detection)

Stopper not
Wrong Operator In process
Fitment set to
Bending Size Stopper 7 2 awareness & inspection 6 84
issue Occur required
position training Report
length

Study Of Study Of
Operator In process
Bending drawing not Fitment drawing not
8 2 awareness & inspection 6 96
Position made issue Occur made
training Report
Properly Properly
BENDING
PROCESS

Not
Not butting
properly Operator In process
the job in Fitment
Squareness 5 Butting 2 awareness & inspection 6 60
stopper issue Occur
with the training Report
properly.
stopper

Table 4.12 Process FMEA Bending

41
 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) SHEARING

Process requirements Potential Potential severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects causes of process process
Function mode of failure failure controls controls

(prevention) (detection)

Stopper not
Wrong Operator in process
Fitment set to
Shearing Size Stopper 7 2 awareness & inspection 6 84
issue Occur required
position training Report
length

Study Of Study Of
Operator in process
drawing not Fitment drawing not
Plate Thickness 8 2 awareness & inspection 6 96
made issue Occur made
training Report
SHEARING Properly Properly
PROCESS

Not properly Operator in process

Diagonal Fitment
Squareness 5 Butting with 2 awareness & inspection 6 60
out issue Occur
the stopper training Report

Table 4.13 Process FMEA Shearing

42
 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) STORING

Process Requirements Potential Potential Severity Potential Occurrence Current Current Detection RPN
step/ failure effects causes of process process
function mode of failure controls controls
failure
(Prevention) (Detection)

Next
Traceability operation-
Identification
not difficult to 5 1 4 20
in the rack
available handle
the material

Material
Improper verified
STORING Traceability
identification before
stacking
Next
operation-
Materials chances of
First in first out
kept with taking 5 1 4 20
method
other sizes wrong size
for
production

Table 4.14 Process FMEA Storing

43
 4.7 APPLICATION OF ISM APPROACH
Interpretive structural modelling (ISM) is a well-established methodology for
identifying and structuring relationships among important issues, which define a problem.
These direct and indirect relationships between the factors develop the understanding for
more accurately than the individual factor taken into isolation. The basic idea behind ISM
approach is to use experts’ practical experience and knowledge to decompose a
complicated system into several sub-systems and construct a structural model. Warfield
developed a methodology to find out the relationship among various complex issues. It is
an interactive learning process in which a set of various issues (directly or indirectly
related) are structured into a comprehensive model which is systematically drawn upon
finite or discrete mathematics. When the relationship in between elements is not clear it
complicates the system’s structure. Hence, the methodology like ISM is required which
helps to find out the structure within the system.
The terminology used in ISM methodology to represent the relationship in
between
the variables is presented as under:
For any two random elements ‘i’ and ‘j’
• V: when i influences j
• A: when j influences i
• X: when both influences each other
• O: when there is no relation in between i and j.

First, we represent available information in the matrix in terms of ‘V’, ‘A’, ‘X’ and
‘O’ called structural self-interaction matrix (SSIM). Then this information is converted
into the binary form in initial reachability matrix (IRM) by the following rules.
• if the value of (i, j) in the SSIM is V, then in the IRM (i, j) becomes 1 and (j, i) becomes
0
• if the value of (i, j) in the SSIM is A, then in the IRM (i, j) becomes 0 and (j, i) becomes
1
44
 • if the value of (i, j) in the SSIM is X, then in the IRM (i, j) and (j, i) both becomes 1
• if the value of (i, j) in the SSIM is O, then in the IRM (i, j) and (j, i) both becomes 0

Through FMEA, risk elements that are identified as critical and needs immediate
consideration.

RISK PRIORITY NUMBER

Failure modes RPN

1.crack 320

2.Excess penetrations 192

3.Cleaning not effective 192

4.Pin hole 168

5.Hole drilling diameter wrong 168

6.Hole Oblong/ Taper 168

7.Wrong hole pitch 168

8.Porosity 126

9. Child part not assembled 120

10. Assembled the child part in

120
wrong position
11.Rust/ residual surface 120

Table 4.15 risk priority number

45
Identification of risks sources in elevator manufacturing company.
FMEA analysis is performed on potential failure modes out of which 11 are selected
on the basis of their weighted RPN and in the process of literature review it seemed that
many authors have researched and mentioned about the similar issues or risks which affect
the automotive supply chain the most. These 11 risk sources are presented in SSIM (Table
4.15).

Modelling of risks with ISM approach

After the identification of risk sources, the next steps are to model the risks with
ISM approach and find out the structural relationship in between the risks.

46
 STRUCTURAL SELF-INTERACTION MATRIX
To identify the contextual relationship in between these 11 risks variables involved
in this supply chain network authors have obtained opinions from experts from the
company and academic. On the basis of these opinions the contextual relationships and
associated direction is decided. Based on the contextual relationship, a SSIM (Table 4.16)
is developed.

Failure modes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1.crack X O O A O O O A O O O

2.Excess penetrations X O O O O O A O O O

3.Cleaning not effective X O O O O O O O V

4.Pin hone X O O A O O O O

5.Hole drilling diameter

X V V O V V O
wrong

6.Hole Oblong/ Taper X V O O O O

7.Wrong hole pitch X O V V O

8.Porosity X O O O

9. Child part not assembled X V O

10. Assembled the child

X O
part in wrong position

11.Rust/ residual surface X

Table 4.16 STRUCTURAL SELF-INTERACTION MATRIX

47
REACHABILITY MATRIX

The SSIM (Table 4.16) is converted into a binary matrix, called as IRM. The relationship
symbols V, A, X, O is replaced by 1 and 0 according to the rules explained in Section (Table 4.17).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0

6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Table 4.17 REACHABILITY MATRIX

48
LEVEL PARTITIONING OF THE RISK ELEMENTS
Once the reachability matrix is formed, the next phase is to divide the risk elements into different
levels. For this, the reachability set, antecedent set, and intersection set are identified. the reachability
set is the combination of risk element i and those elements affected by i. the antecedent set is the
combination of j and the risk elements that influence j. Intersection set is the common elements of the
reachability set and antecedent set. Risk elements having the same reachability set, and intersection set
are the top-level risks in ISM hierarch. They are removed from the matrix and the same process is
iterated till all the risks are compartmentalized in levels

Iteration 1

Risk Elements Reachability Antecedent Intersection set Level

set set

1 crack 1 1,4,8 1 1

2 Excess penetrations 2 2 2 1

3 Cleaning not effective 3,11 3 3

4 Pin hone 2,4,8 1,4,7 4

5 Hole drilling diameter 5,6,7,9,10 5 5

wrong

6 Hole Oblong/ Taper 6,7 5,6 6

7 Wrong hole pitch 7,9,10 5,6,7 7

8 Porosity 1,8 2,8 8

9 Child part not assembled 2,9,10 5,6,7,9 9,10

10 Assembled the child part 2,9,10 9,10 9,10

in wrong position

11 Rust/ residual surface 11 3,11 11 1

Table 4.18 iteration 1

49
Iteration 2

Risk Elements Reachability set Antecedent set Intersection set

3 Cleaning not effective 3 3 3

4 Pin hone 4,8 1,4,7 4

5 Hole drilling diameter wrong 5,6,7,9,10 5 5

6 Hole Oblong/ Taper 6,7 5,6 6

7 Wrong hole pitch 7,9,10 5,6,7 7

8 Porosity 8 2,8 8

9 Child part not assembled 9,10 5,6,7,9 9,10

10 Assembled the child part in wrong 9,10 9,10 9,10

position

Table 4.19 iteration 2

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Iteration 3

Risk Elements Reachability set Antecedent set Intersection set

4 Pin hone 4 1,4,7 4

5 Hole drilling diameter wrong 5,6,7 5 5

6 Hole Oblong/ Taper 6,7 5,6 6

7 Wrong hole pitch 7 5,6,7 7

Table 4.20iteration 3
Iteration 4

Risk Elements Reachability set Antecedent set Intersection set

5 Hole drilling diameter wrong 5,6 5 5

6 Hole Oblong/ Taper 6, 5,6 6

Table 4.21 iteration 4

Iteration 5

Risk Elements Reachability set Antecedent set Intersection set

5 Hole drilling diameter wrong 5 5 5

Table 4.22 iteration 5

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DEVELOPMENT OF DIGRAPH
On the basis of conical matrix an initial digraph including transitivity links is
obtained, and when the indirect links are removed, a final digraph is developed. In this
digraph, the risk variables are positioned according to the levels obtained during iteration.
Figure 4.2

CONSTRUCTING DIGRAPH

Figure 4.2 DIGRAPH

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DEVELOPMENT OF ISM MODEL
The digraph is converted into an ISM model by replacing the nodes by the names
of risk Variables as shown in Figure 4.3

CONSTRUCTING THE ISM MODEL

Figure 4.3 ISM MODEL

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CONICAL MATRIX
A conical matrix can be developed by clubbing together risk variables in the same level across
rows and columns of the final reachability matrix. Summing up the number of ones in the rows gives
the driving power and similarly summing up number of ones in the columns gives dependence power.
After that the rank of drive and dependence powers of the risk variables is calculated, more the number
of ones higher will be the rank. shown in table 4.23
Developing a Conical form of Reachability Matrix

Driving
1 2 11 3 8 9 10 4 7 6 5
power

1.crack 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

2.Excess penetrations 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

11.Rust/ residual surface 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

3.Cleaning not effective 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

8.Porosity 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

9.Assembling the child part 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3

10.Assembly of child part at

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
correct position

4.Pin hone 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3

7.Wrong hole pitch 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4

6.Hole Oblong/ Taper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2

5.Hole drilling diameter wrong

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 5

Dependence Power 2 3 2 1 2 4 3 1 2 3 3 26

Table 4.23 Developing a Conical form of Reachability Matrix

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 CHAPTER 5
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
DEPENDENCE AND DRIVING POWER
MICMAC method is a structural analysis tool which describes a system using a
matrix that links up its constituent components and was developed. They developed two
hierarchies, one based on driving power and the second based on dependence power to
study the diffusion of impacts. This method identifies the main variables that are
influential, dependent and essential to the evolution of the system. To analyse the driving
and dependence power of the risk variables Matrice d’Impacts croises-multiplication
appliqúe and classment (MICMAC) cross-impact matrix multiplication applied to
classification) analysis is performed. This is done to classify the risk variables into four
categories as follows:

1. Autonomous risk variables: The risk variables which have weak driving and
dependence power come under the category of autonomous risks. They are
relatively less connected to the system.
2. Linkage risk variables: The risk variables which have strong driving and
dependence power come under the category of linkage risks. They are also not very
stable.
3. Dependent risk variables: The risk variables which have weak driving but strong
dependence power come under the category of dependent risks.
4. Independent risk variables: The risk variables which have strong driving power but
weak dependence power come under the category of independent risks.
It is generally observed that a risk variable with a very strong drive power is called the
‘key risk variable’ and falls into the category of independent or linkage risks. The driving
and dependence power of risk variables is shown in Table 6. After that, a driving power
and dependence power diagram is drawn (Figure 4). This diagram has been divided into
four clusters. The first cluster includes ‘autonomous risk variables’, the second cluster

55
includes ‘dependent risk variables’, the third cluster includes ‘linkage risk variables’ and
fourth cluster contains ‘independent risk variables’. All the risk variables’ are placed
according to their driving and dependence power. From the driving power and dependence
power diagram it is observed that risk Variables ‘pin hole’, ‘wrong hole pitch’ come under
independent risk variable category. These independent risk variables have higher driving
power and least dependence power so that managers need to focus on them. The risk
variables ‘hole drilling diameter wrong, child assembled ’ falls under linkage risk
category. They have the highest driving power, which means they are the key risk variables
and can be considered as the root cause of the problem. The risk variables ‘excess
penetration, hole oblong/tapper, assembled child part wrong position, rust/radial surface’
have strong dependence power and weak driving power so they fall under dependence risk
variables category. This risk comes on the top of the ISM hierarchy and hence can be
considered as the most important risks and management should focus on these for the
success of the Elevator manufacturing industry. Shown in figure 5.1

Figure 5.1 DEPENDENCE AND DRIVING POWER

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 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This paper presents a FMEA and ISM approach, to assist elevator component
manufacturing industry to identify the risks, assess them based upon their occurrence,
severity and detection and further model the structural relationship among the key risks.
The proposed approach is based on the combination of well-established methodologies, i.e.
Failure mode and effects analysis and ISM. The methods make use of subjective
assessment, the experience, and intuition of experts with respect to different types of risks
involved in a elevator component manufacturing company. Based upon literature studies
have identified 11 potential risk sources related to key entities, in manufacturing process
selected after performing FMEA analysis. Further, ISM model has been developed to find
out the structural relationship among these risks. The results of the ISM model suggest that
improper execution and technology risk both have higher driving power and least
dependence power so that managers should focus on them. The results also demonstrate
Excess penetrations, Hole Oblong/ Taper, Assembly of child part at correct position and
Excess penetrations have strong dependence power and hence can be considered as the
most important risks and management should focus on these for the success of the elevator
manufacturing industry. The results of the study and the developed model for assessing the
risk in the elevator manufacturing can be of great importance to the practicing industry
managers in order to make decisions to mitigate the effect of possible risks.

57
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