Presented at Seminars:

 SRI: April 24, 2012 http://www.ai.sri.com/seminars/detail.php?id=379

 Stanford: June 6, 2012 http://ee380.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/videologger.php?target=120606-ee380-300.asx
with slides at: http://HIST.CarlHewitt.info

Inconsistency Robustness in Foundations:

Mathematics self proves its own Consistency and Other Matters
This paper is dedicated to Alonzo Church and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Carl Hewitt
http://carlhewitt.info
Inconsistency Robustness requires repairing mathematical foundations in the face of contradictions that have arisen over and over again. In
the Inconsistency Robustness paradigm, deriving contradictions are a progressive development and not “game stoppers.” Contradictions can
be helpful instead of being something to be “swept under the rug” by denying their existence, which has been repeatedly attempted by the
Establishment (beginning with some Pythagoreans). Such denial has delayed mathematical development. This article reports how
Inconsistency Robustness has recently influenced the foundations of mathematics for Computer Science since the first International
Symposium in 2011 continuing a tradition developing the sociological basis for foundations [White 1956, Wilder 1968, Rosental 2008]
That mathematics is thought to be consistent by an overwhelming consensus of working professional mathematicians justifies the use of Proof
by Contradiction. In addition, Proof by Contradiction can be used to infer the consistency of mathematics by the following simple proof:
The self-proof is a proof by contradiction. In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that mathematics is inconsistent. Then there is some
proposition Φ such that ⊢Φ and ⊢Φ. Consequently, both Φ and Φ are theorems that can be used in the proof to produce an immediate
contradiction. Therefore mathematics is consistent.
Please note the following points: The above argument mathematically proves the theorem that mathematics is consistent and that it is
not a premise of the theorem that mathematics is consistent. However, the proof does not intuitively increase our confidence in the
consistency of mathematics because it does not rule out that there might be other proofs in mathematics that result in contradictions.
The above theorem means that the assumption of consistency is deeply embedded in the architecture of classical mathematics. The above
proof of consistency can be formalized in Classical Direct Logic [Hewitt 2010] (a powerful inference system in which computer systems can
reason about their own inferences). Having a powerful system like Direct Logic is important in computer science because computers must be
able to carry out all inferences (including inferences about their own inference processes) without requiring recourse to human intervention.
Self-proving consistency raises that possibility that mathematics could be inconsistent because of contradiction with the result of Gödel et. al.
that if mathematics is consistent, then it cannot infer its own consistency. The resolution is to provide a properly constructed grammar of
mathematical sentences so that a fixed-point operator cannot be used to construct the kind of “self-referential” proposition used by Gödel in
his results by exploiting an untyped grammar of sentences. Self-referential propositions of the kind used by Gödel do not seem to have any
important practical applications. (There is a very weak theory called Provability Logic that has been used for self-referential propositions
coded as integers, but it is not strong enough for the purposes of computer science.) Direct Logic makes use of a typed grammar that prevents
the construction of self-referential sentences using unwanted fixed points. The bottom line is that self-referential propositions are “monsters”
(in the sense of Lakatos) that are ruled about by a properly constructed grammar of sentences for the mathematical foundations of computer
science. It is important to note that not having self-referential propositions does not place restrictions on recursion in computation, e.g., the
Actor Model, untyped lambda calculus, etc.
A mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs are computationally enumerable. For example, group theory is obtained
by adding the axioms of groups to Classical Direct Logic along with the requirement that proofs are computational enumerable. If a
mathematical theory T is consistent, then it is inferentially undecidable (i.e. there is a proposition Ψ such that ⊬TΨ and ⊬T Ψ (which is
sometimes called “incompleteness” in classical terminology) because provability in T is computationally undecidable [Church 1935, Turing
1936].
Information Invariance is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of the following:
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inference
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be inferred
Direct Logic aims to achieve information invariance for the mathematical foundations of Computer Science. But that a mathematical theory is
inferentially undecidable (“incomplete” in classical terminology) with respect to Ψ (above) does not mean incompleteness with respect to the
information that can be inferred because (by construction) it is provable in mathematics that ⊬TΨ and ⊬TΨ.
This article has become highly controversial and the Establishment has censored (without substantive justification) its publication in
electronic archives that are intended to record priority dates for scientific results. Consequently, this article is itself another episode in the
ongoing saga of inconsistency robustness in foundations.
Contents
Mathematical Foundations for Computer Science ......................................................................................................... 3
Classical Natural Deduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Inferences can be used in Subarguments .......................................................................................................... 3
Subarguments can be used for Proof by Contradiction .................................................................................... 3
Mathematics Self Proves its own Consistency .............................................................................................................. 4
Monster-Barring ............................................................................................................................................................ 4
Self-referential propositions lead to inconsistency in mathematics ............................................................................... 5
contra Gödel et. al ......................................................................................................................................................... 5
Classical Direct Logic ................................................................................................................................................... 8
Foundations with both Types and Sets ........................................................................................................................ 10
Natural Numbers, Real Numbers, and their Sets are Unique up to Isomorphism ........................................................ 11
Mathematics Self Proves that it is Open ...................................................................................................................... 11
Completeness of Inference versus Inferential Undecidability of Mathematical Theories ........................................... 12
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Acknowledgement ....................................................................................................................................................... 13
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................ 14
Appendix 1. Historical Background ............................................................................................................................ 17
Wittgenstein: self-referential propositions lead to inconsistency ....................................................................17
Gödel was certain ............................................................................................................................................18
Provability Logic .............................................................................................................................................19
Church's Paradox ............................................................................................................................................19
Sociology of Foundations ................................................................................................................................20
Appendix 2. Classical Boolean Equivalences .............................................................................................................. 21
Appendix 3. Classical Natural Deduction .................................................................................................................... 22
End Notes .................................................................................................................................................................... 23

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 2 of 26

Mathematical Foundations for Computer Science
Computer Science brought different concerns and a new perspective to mathematical foundations including the following
requirements:i [roman numeral superscripts refer to endnotes at the end of this article]
 powerful inference machinery so that arguments (proofs) can be short and understandable
 standard foundations so they can join forces and develop common techniques and technology
 incorporate axioms thought to be consistent by the overwhelming consensus of working professional
mathematicians, e.g., natural numbers [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889], real numbers [Dedekind 1888], etc.
 facilitate inferences about the mathematical foundations used by computer systems
This article reports how Inconsistency Robustness has influenced the foundations of mathematics for Computer Science since
the first International Symposium in 2011.

Classical Natural Deduction

Classical Natural Deduction was developed in [Jaśkowski 1934]ii based on a suggestion by Jan Łukasiewicz.iii
See an appendix 2 of this paper for Classical Direct Logic Natural Deduction, which is a generalization of the work
of Jaśkowski.
Inferences can be used in Subarguments
A fundamental principle of Natural Deduction is that steps can be used in
subarguments of proofs:1

Ψ i premise

Ψ i conclusion
...

Subarguments can be used for Proof by Contradiction

Proof by contradiction has been crucial in mathematics ever since Euclid.iv
As a Natural Deduction rule proof by contradiction looks as follows:2
Stanisław Jaśkowski
Φ i assumption
…
Ψ⋀¬Ψ i inference

¬Φ i conclusion

See [Barker-Plummer, Barwise and Etchemendy 2011] for an introduction, tutorial, and online teaching system for
Classical Natural Deduction.

1
If Ψ is inferred in an argument, then it may be used in a subargument.
2
If assuming  in a subargument infers a contradiction, then conclude .

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 3 of 26

Mathematics Self Proves its own Consistency
A mathematically significant idea involves:
“…a very high degree of unexpectedness, combined with inevitability and economy.” [Hardy 1940]
Consistency of mathematics can be defined as follows: Consistent ≡ ∀[Ψ:Proposition]→ ⊬ Ψ, Ψ
Consequently, Consistent ⇔ ∃[Ψ:Proposition]→ (├Ψ) and (├ Ψ)
Theorem: Mathematics self proves its own consistency.v
In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that Consistent. Consequently,
∃[Ψ:Proposition]→ (├Ψ)  (├ Ψ)
and there is a proposition Ψ0 such that ├Ψ0 and ├ Ψ0. These theorems can be used to infer Ψ0 and  Ψ0 , which is a


contradiction.
Using proof by contradiction, ├ Consistent
Please note the following points: The above argument mathematically proves that mathematics is consistent
and that it is not a premise of the theorem that mathematics is consistent.1 However, the proof does not intuitively
increase our confidence in the consistency of mathematics because it does not rule out that there might be other
proofs in mathematics that result in contradictions.
The above proof illustrates that consistency is built deeply into the structure of classical mathematics because of
proof by contradiction. The consistency proof above can be formalized in Classical Direct Logic [Hewitt 2010] that
is a powerful inference system in which theories can reason about their own inferences.vi Having a powerful system
like Direct Logic is important in computer science because computers must be able to carry out all inferences
(including inferences about their own inference processes) without requiring recourse to human intervention.

Monster-Barring
“But why accept the counterexample? ... Why should the theorem give way...? It is the ‘criticism’ that
should retreat.... It is a monster, a pathological case, not a counterexample.”
Delta, student in [Lakatos, 1976, pg. 14].
The Euler formula for polyhedra is Vertices-Edges+Faces=2, which can be proved in a variety of different ways.
But the hollow cube below is a counterexample because Vertices-Edges+Faces=4.

Counterexample to Euler’s formula for polyhedra

In the face of this counterexample, it becomes important to characterize polyhedra more rigorously. For example,
 A Regular solid
 A convex solid with polyhedral faces
 A surface consisting of a system of polygons
 etc.
Lakatos has called this strategy “monster-barring.”

1
Some logicians have maintained that consistency is an implicit assumption of every proof in mathematics that uses classical logic!

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 4 of 26

Self-referential propositions lead to inconsistency in mathematics
An example of a self-referential proposition is “This proposition is not provable” that was used by in [Gödel 1931].vii
Unfortunately, allowing construction of self-referential propositions1 results in contradictions [Wittgenstein 1937].2
For example the following paradoxes prove every proposition using self-referential propositions:viii
 Curry’s Paradox [Curry 1941]: Suppose that Ψ is a proposition.

Currys ≡ Fix[f ] where f[Ψ] ≡ Ψ├Ψ

1)ix CurryΨ ⇔ (CurryΨ├ Ψ)
2)├ (CurryΨ├ CurryΨ) i idempotency
3)├ (CurryΨ├ (CurryΨ├Ψ)) i substituting 1) into 2)
4)├ (CurryΨ├Ψ) i contraction
5)├ CurryΨ i substituting 1) into 4)
6)├Ψ i chaining 4) and 5)
 Löb’s Paradox [Löb 1955]: Suppose that Ψ is a proposition.x
Löbs ≡ Fix[f ] where f[Ψ] ≡ (├Ψ)├ Ψ
1)xi LöbΨ ⇔ ((├ LöbΨ)├ Ψ)
2) ├ ((├ LöbΨ)├ LöbΨ) i integrity
3) ├ ((├ LöbΨ)├ ((├ LöbΨ)├ Ψ )) i substituting 1) into 2)
4) ├ ((├ LöbΨ)├Ψ) i contraction
5) ├ LöbΨ i substituting 1) into 4)
6) Ψ i chaining 4) and 5)
Of course, it is completely unacceptable for every propositionxii to be provable and so measures must be taken to
prevent this.
contra Gödel et. al
“Men… think in herds …
they only recover their senses slowly, and
one by one.”
Charles Mackay
The that mathematics self proves its own consistency contradicts the result [Gödel 1931] using
self-referential propositions3 that mathematics cannot prove its own consistency.
One resolution is not to have self-referential propositions. This can be achieved by carefully
arranging the rules using a properly constructed grammar so that self-referential propositions
cannot be constructed as shown below.4 The basic idea is to use types [Russell 1908, Church 1940]
to construct sentences from other sentences so that fixed points do not exist and consequently
cannot be used to construct self-referential propositions.
However, there is a crucial difference between how Russell used types and the method used in Bertrand Russell
Direct Logic. Russell attempted to use types as the fundamental mechanism for preventing inconsistencies.
However, he ran into trouble because his type mechanism was too strict and prevented ordinary mathematical
reasoning.5

1
using fixed point operators exploiting an untyped grammar of mathematical sentences
2
See Appendix 1.
3
constructed using a fixed point operator exploiting an untyped grammar for sentences
4
It is important to note that disallowing self-referential sentences does not place restrictions on recursion in computation, e.g.,
the Actor Model, untyped lambda calculus, etc.
5
In order to be able to carry out ordinary mathematical reasoning, Russell introduced an (unmotivated) patch called “ramified
types” that collapsed the type hierarchy.

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 5 of 26

In this paper, types are used to prevent the construction of self-referential sentences and to provide the foundations
for sets. The difficulties encountered by Russell are avoided as follows:
 having integersxiii as primitive
 constructing sets from the characteristic functions of typed functions
 types are used to resolve the usual paradoxes with sets, e.g., there is no set of all sets, etc.xiv
The above approach provides a very usable foundation for ordinary mathematical reasoning.
Combining types and sets as the foundation has the advantage of using the strengths of each without the
limitations of trying to use just one because each can be used to make up for the limitations of the other. The
key idea is compositionality, i.e., composing new entities from others. Types can be composed from other types
and sets can be composed from other sets. 1
In response to the paradoxes, Hilbert initiated a program to prove the consistency of mathematics using limited
means in which mathematicians hoped they could have confidence. One variant of the Hilbert programme was the
“the first-order thesis” in which sets defined by propositions are arbitrarily restricted to not mentioning sets and the
integers and reals cannot be properly axiomatized [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889].
[Barwise 1985] critiqued the first-order thesis as follows:
“The reasons for the widespread, often uncritical acceptance of
the first-order thesis are numerous. The first-order thesis ...
confuses the subject matter of logic with one of its tools. First-
order language is just an artificial language structured to help
investigate logic, much as a telescope is a tool constructed to help
study heavenly bodies. From the perspective of the mathematics
in the street, the first-order thesis is like the claim that astronomy
is the study of the telescope.”2
Jon Barwise
In first-order logic, theorems provable from an axiomatization are the ones true in
all models of the axiomatization. Unfortunately, first-order logic is not strong enough to characterize many
fundamental structures, e.g., the Natural Numbers and Real Numbers.3
For example, the cut-down-first-order theory FirstOrderPeano to limited to serve as foundation for Computer Science :
(⊢FirstOrderPeano) ⇨ ⊢Peano
There are some 0 that are important in Computer Science (see immediately below) such that:
 ⊢Peano0
 ⊬FirstOrderPeano0

1
Compositionality avoids standard foundational paradoxes. For example, Direct Logic composes sentences from others using
types so there are no self-referential propositions.
2
First-order theories fall prey to paradoxes like the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems (e.g. any first-order theory of the real numbers
has a countable model). First-order theorists have used the weakness of first-order logic to prove results that do not hold in
stronger formalisms such as Direct Logic [Cohen 1963, Barwise 1985].
3
see immediately below

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 6 of 26

In Computer Science, it is important that the Natural Numbers (ℕ) be axiomatized in a way that does not allow non-
numbers (e.g. infinite ones) in models of the axioms. Unfortunately, first-order logic cannot prove the following
theorem of Classical Direct Logic:
For every model N of Peano [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889], there is no element of N that is infinite
(i.e., ∄[iN]→ ∀[mℕ]→ m<i) cannot be proved in a first-order theory.
Proof: Suppose that it is possible to prove the theorem in the cut-down first-order theory. Therefore the
following infinite set of sentences is inconsistent:1 {i0N}([m]→ m<i0 )⟦ℕ⟧. By the compactness
theoremxv of first-order logic, it follows that there is finite subset of the set of sentences that is
inconsistent. But this is a contradiction, because all the finite subsets are consistent.
A similar result holds for the standard theory DedekindReals of real numbers [Dedekind 1888] compared to the
cut-down, first-order theory RealClosedField [Tarski 1951], which allows models with infinitesimals:
For every model R of DedekindReals , there is no element of R that is infinitesimal
1
(i.e., ∄[iR]→ i>0  ∀[mℕ]→ i< ) cannot be proved in a first-order theory.
𝑚
Proof: Suppose that it is possible to prove the theorem in the cut-down first-order theory. Therefore the
1
following infinite set of sentences is inconsistent:2 {r0R}([m]→ 0<r0<  )⟦ℕ⟧. By the compactness
𝑚
theorem of first-order logic, it follows that there is finite subset of the set of sentences that is inconsistent.
But this is a contradiction, because all the finite subsets are consistent.
Since it is not limited to first-order logic, Classical Direct Logic characterizes structures such as natural numbers and
real numbers up to isomorphism. 3
Of greater practical import, that a computer provides service (i.e. ∃[iℕ]→ ResponseBefore[i]) cannot be proved in
a first-order theory.
Proof: In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that it is possible to prove the theorem that computer server
provides service (∃[iℕ]→ ResponseBefore[i]) in a first-order theory T. Therefore the following infinite set of
sentences is inconsistent:4 ([i]→ ResponseBefore[i]  )⟦ℕ⟧. By the compactness theorem of first-order logic, it
follows that there is finite subset of the set of sentences that is inconsistent. But this is a contradiction, because all
the finite subsets are consistent since the amount of time before a server responds is unbounded
(∄[iℕ]→ ⊢T ResponseBefore[i]).
The above examples illustrate the following fundamental limitation of First-order theories:
In a first-order theory T, it is impossible to have both of the following for a predicate P:
 ∄[iℕ]→ ⊢T P[i]5
 ⊢T ∃[iℕ]→ P[i]
Proof: Suppose that it is possible for both of the above to hold in a first-order theory T. Therefore the following
infinite set of sentences is inconsistent:6 ([m]→ P[m] )⟦ℕ⟧. By the compactness theorem of first-order logic,
it follows that there is finite subset of the set of sentences that is inconsistent. But this is a contradiction,
because all the finite subsets are consistent.

1
i.e. in classical notation: {i0N}{ m<i0 | mℕ}
1
2
i.e. in classical notation: {r0R}{ 0<r0< | mℕ}
𝑚
3
proving that software developers and computer systems are using the same structures
4
i.e. in classical notation: { ResponseBefore[i] | iℕ}
5
i.e. ∀[iℕ]→ ⊬T P[i]
6
i.e. in classical notation: { P[m] | mℕ}

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 7 of 26

Classical Direct Logic
I suspect there are few today who share ... [the]
belief that there should be a single overarching
theory embracing all of mathematics
[Dowson 2006]
Classical Direct Logic is a universal foundation for the mathematical foundations of computer science which can be
used by computer systems to reason about their own inferences.
In Direct Logic, recursion is allowed in programs. For example,
 There are uncountably many Actors. xvi For example, Real.[ ] can output any real number 1 between 0 and 1
where
Real.[ ]:List ≡ [(0 either 1) ⩛postpone Real.[ ]]▮
where
o (0 either 1) is the nondeterministic choice of 0 or 1,
o [ first ⩛rest] is the list that begins with first and whose remainder is rest, and
o postpone expression delays execution of expression until the value is needed.
 There are uncountably many propositions (because there is a different proposition for every real number).
Consequently, there are propositions that are not the abstraction of any sentence. For example,
p ≡ [xℝ]→ ( [yℝ]→ (y=x)) defines a different predicate p[x] for each real number x, which holds
for only one real number, namely x.2
Direct Logic distinguishes between sentences and propositions. If s is a grammatical sentence, then s (the abstraction
of s) that can be used for inference. On the other hand, if Φ is the abstraction of some sentence, then Φ has a reification
Φ , which is a sentence such that Φ ⇔  Φ .
There are no “self-referential” propositions because
 Fixed points to construct self-referential propositions do not exist because the grammar for sentences in
Direct Logic is strongly typed preventing the construction of unwanted fixed points.3
 Sentences are not enumerable because there are uncountably many constant symbols including the real
numbers.

1
using binary representation.
2
For example (p[3])[y] holds if and only if y=3.
3
Direct Logic is different from [Willard 2007], which developed sufficiently weak systems that self-referential sentences do not
exist even using an untyped grammar.

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 8 of 26

Syntax is defined in of Term, Predication, and Sentence as follows:
• Term i.e., syntax that can be part of a Sentence or Predication
• True and False are Term and 0 and 1 are Term
• If x is Constant, then x is Term.xvii
• If x is Variable, then x is Term
• If f is 𝛔𝟐𝛔𝟏 and t is σ1, then ≪f[t]≫ is σ2.
• If t is Term and x is Variable, then ≪ [x]→ t≫1 is Term.xviii
• If t1, t2, t3 are Term, then ≪t1 ¿ True ↝ t2 ; False ↝ t3 ?≫ is Term2
• If t1 is σ1 and t2 is σ2, then ≪[t1, t2]≫ is σ1×σ2 (the list of t1 and t2)
• If t is Term, then ≪ t  ≫ is Term (the abstraction of t). If t is Term, then ≪ t ≫ is Term (the reification of t).
• Predication, (syntax that can be abstracted to a Predicate)
• If s is Sentence and σ is Term, then ≪[x:σ]→ s≫ is Predication3 and x is Variable in s
• Sentence (syntax that can be abstracted to a Proposition)
• If s1 and s2 are Sentence, then, ≪s1≫ (negation), ≪s1s2≫ (conjunction), ≪s1s2≫ (disjunction) are Sentence.
• If s1 and s2 are Sentence, then ≪s1⇨s2≫ (logical implication) and ≪s1⇔s2≫ (logical equivalence) are Sentence.
• If t is Term and s1, s2 are Sentence, then ≪t ¿ True ↝ s1; False ↝ s2 ?≫ is Sentence.4
• If t1, t2 are Term, then ≪t1=t2≫, ≪t1t2≫, ≪t1⊑t2≫ and ≪t1t2≫ are Sentence.
• If s is Sentence, then ≪ s ≫ is Sentence (the abstraction of s).
• If p is Predication and t is Term, then ≪p[t]≫ is Sentence
• If p is Predication, σ is Term and x is Variable, then ≪∀[x:σ]→ p[x]≫ and ≪∃[x:σ]→ p[x]≫ are Sentence.
Semantics is defined in terms of Type, Predicate, and Proposition as follows:
• Type
• Boolean, Term, Sentence, Predication, Predicate, and Proposition are Type.
• If σ1, σ2 are Type, then σ1⊔σ2, σ1⊓σ2, σ1×σ2xix, [σ1]↦σ25 and 𝛔𝟏𝛔𝟐xx are Type
• If σ is Type, then Setσ6, Listσ7 are Type
• Predicate (can be applied to an argument to form a Proposition)
• If p is Predication with no free variables, then p (the abstraction of p) is Predicate
• If σ is Type and :Booleanσ, then  is Predicate and if x:σ, then [x] is Proposition and [x]⇔([x]=True)
 Proposition (can be asserted)
• If s is Sentence with no free variables, then s (the abstraction of s) is Proposition
• If σ1, σ2 are Type, then σ1⊑σ2 is Proposition (σ1 is subtype of σ2)
• If  and  are Proposition, then,  (negation),  (conjunction),  (disjunction) are Proposition.
• If  and  are Proposition, then ⇨ (logical implication) and ⇔ (logical equivalence) are Proposition.
• If  is Predicate and σ is Type, then ∀[x:σ]→ [x] is Proposition and ∃[x:σ]→ [x] is Proposition
• If σ is Type and t:σ and 1, 2 are Proposition, then t ¿ True ↝ 1; False ↝ 2 ? is Proposition.8
• If σ1, σ2 are Type and t:σ1, then t:?σ29 is Proposition.
• If σ1, σ2 are Type and t1:σ1 and t2:σ2, then t1=t2, t1t2, t1⊑t2 and t1t2 are Proposition.
• If  1, …,  k are Proposition, and 1, …, n are Proposition, then 1, …, k ⊢1, …, n is Propositionxxi
 𝐩
• If p is Term with no free variables and  is Proposition, then ├  is Proposition10

1 an (untyped) partial function

2 if t1 then t2 else t3
3
This restriction makes it impossible to construction “self-referential” sentences (a la Gödel) using because the type restrictions
prevent the construction of unwanted fixed points. (Another way of constructing self-referential sentences is blocked because
sentences are not countable.)
4 if t then s1 else s
5 type of a procedure from type σ1 into type σ2.
6
type of set with elements of type σ1.
7
type of list with elements of type σ1.
8 if t then 1 else 2
9 t is σ
10
p is a proof of 

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 9 of 26

Foundations with both Types and Sets
“Everyone is free to elaborate [their] own foundations. All that is required of [a] Foundation of Mathematics is
that its discussion embody absolute rigor, transparency, philosophical coherence, and addresses fundamental
methodological issues.” [Nielsen 2014]
Classical Direct Logic develops foundations for mathematics using both1 types2 and sets3 encompassing all of standard
mathematics including the integers, reals, analysis, geometry, etc.xxii
Combining types and sets as the foundation has the advantage of using the strengths of each without the limitations
of trying to use just one because each can be used to make up for the limitations of the other. The key idea is
compositionality, i.e., composing new entities from others. Types can be composed from other types and sets can be
composed from other sets.4
Functions are fundamental to Computer Science. Consequently, graphs of functions and sets are fundamental
collections.xxiii SetFunctionsσ (type of set functions based on type σ) that can be defined inductively as follows:
SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[1] ≡ σσ
SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n+1] ≡ (σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n])σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n]
Furthermore the process of constructing orders of SetFunctionsOfOrderσis exhaustive for SetFunctionsσ:5
SetFunctionsσ≡ ∐iℕ SetFunctionsOfOrder𝛔[i]
Sets (along with lists) provide a convenient way to collect together elements.xxiv For example, sets (of sets of sets of ...)
of σ can be axiomatized as follows:
∀[s:Setsσ]→ ∃[f:SetFunctionsσ]→ CharacteristicFunction[f, s]
where ∀[s:Setsσ, f:BooleanSetFunctionsσ]→ CharacteristicFunction[f, s]⇔∀[e:σ⊔Setsσ]→ es ⇔ f[e]=True
i.e. every set of type Setsσ is defined by a characteristic function of SetFunctionsσ
Note that there is no set corresponding to the type Setsℕwhich is an example of how types extend the capabilities
of sets. xxv
Although Setsℕ are well-foundedxxvi, in general sets in Direct Logic are not well-founded. For example, consider
the following definition:
InfinitelyDeep.[ ] ≡ {postpone InfinitelyDeep.[ ]}▮6
Consequently, InfinitelyDeep.[ ]InfinitelyDeep.[ ].

1
Past attempts to reduce mathematics to logic alone, to sets alone, or to types alone have not be very successful.
2
According to [Scott 1967]: “there is only one satisfactory way of avoiding the paradoxes: namely, the use of some form of the
theory of types... the best way to regard Zermelo's theory is as a simplification and extension of Russell's ...simple theory of types.
Now Russell made his types explicit in his notation and Zermelo left them implicit. It is a mistake to leave something so
important invisible...”
3
According to [Scott 1967]: “As long as an idealistic manner of speaking about abstract objects is popular in mathematics,
people will speak about collections of objects, and then collections of collections of ... of collections. In other words set theory is
inevitable.” [emphasis in original]
4
Compositionality avoids standard foundational paradoxes. For example, Direct Logic composes sentences from others using
types so there are no self-referential propositions.
5
The closure property below is used to guarantee that there is just one model of SetFunctionsℕ up to isomorphism using a
unique isomorphism.
6
InfinitelyDeep.[ ] = {{{{{...}}}}

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 10 of 26

Natural Numbers, Real Numbers, and their Sets are Unique up to Isomorphism
The following question arises: What has been captured in the above foundations?
Theorem (Categoricity):xxvii ∀[M:ModelSetsℕ]→ M≈Setsℕ, i.e., models of
Setsℕ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism.1
The following strong induction axiomxxviii can be used to characterize the natural numbers
(ℕxxix) up to isomorphism with a unique isomorphism:
∀[P:Booleanℕ ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[iℕ]→ P[i]
where ∀[P:Booleanℕ ]→ Inductive[P] ⇔ P[0]  ∀[iℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1]
Setsℕ (which is a fundamental type of mathematics) is exactly characterized axiomatically,
Ernst Zermelo
which is what is required for Computer Science.
Proof: The set ℕ of natural numbers is isomorphic by a unique isomorphism [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889].
Unique isomorphism of higher order sets can be proved using induction from the following closure property
for SetFunctions (see above):
SetFunctionsℕ≡ ∐iℕ SetFunctionsOfOrderℕ[i]
Unique isomorphism for SetFunctionsℕ can be extended Setsℕ because every set in Setsℕ is defined
by a characteristic function of SetFunctionsℕ (see above):
Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than first-order axiomatizations of set theory.xxx

Mathematics Self Proves that it is Open

Mathematics proves that it is open in the sense that it can prove that its theorems cannot be provably
computationally enumerated:xxxi
Theorem ⊢Mathematics is Open
Proof. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that it is possible to prove closure, i.e., there is a provably computable
total procedure Proof such that it is provable that
p
(∃[Ψ:Proposition]→ ├ Ψ ) ⇔ ∃[iℕ]→ Proof[i]=p
As a consequence of the above, there is a provably total procedure ProvableComputableTotal that enumerates the
provably total computable procedures that can be used in the implementation of the following procedure:
Diagonal[i] ≡ (ProvableComputableTotal[i])[i]+1
However,
• ⊢ ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is implemented using provably computable total
procedures
• ⊢ ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is a provably computable total procedure that
differs from every other provably computable total procedure.
[Franzén 2004] argued that mathematics is inexhaustible because of inferential undecidability 2 (“incompleteness” in
classical terminology) of mathematical theories. The above theorem that mathematics is open provides another
independent argument for the inexhaustibility of mathematics.

1
Consequently, the set of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and the set of reals ℝ is unique up to
isomorphism.
2
See section immediately below.

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 11 of 26

Completeness of Inference versus Inferential Undecidability of Mathematical Theories
A mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs are computationally enumerable. For example,
group theory is obtained by adding the axioms of groups to Classical Direct Logic along with the axiom that
theorems of group theory are computationally enumerable.
By definition, if T is a mathematical theory, there is a total procedure ProofT such that:
p
(∃[Ψ:PropositionT]→ ├ T Ψ) ⇔ ∃[iℕ]→ ProofT[i]=p
Theorem:1 If T is a consistent mathematical theory, there is a
proposition ChurchTuring such that both of the following hold:2
 ⊢⊬T ChurchTuring
 ⊢⊬T ChurchTuring
Note the following important ingredients for the proof of inferential
undecidability of a mathematical theory:
 Closure (computational enumerability) of theorems of a
mathematical theory to carry through the proof.
 Consistency (nontriviality) to prevent everything from being
provable. Alonzo Church Alan Turing
Information Invariance3 is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of the following:
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inference4
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be inferred

Note that mathematical theories are inferentially undecidable (“incomplete” in classical terminology) with respect to
ChurchTuring does not mean incompleteness with respect to the information that can be inferred because
⊢(⊬T ChurchTuring), (⊬T ChurchTuring).
Conclusion
The world always needs heretics to challenge the prevailing orthodoxies. We are lucky that we can be heretics
today without any danger of being burned at the stake. But unfortunately I am an old heretic. Old heretics do not
cut much ice. When you hear an old heretic talking, you always say, “Too bad he has lost his marbles.” What the
world needs is young heretics. I am hoping that one or two of you people in the audience may fill that role.
[Dyson 2005]
Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Autobiography [Planck 1949], sadly remarked that ‘a
new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather
because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.’
[Kuhn 1962]
A mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs are computationally enumerable. For example,
group theory is obtained by adding the axioms of groups to Classical Direct Logic along with the axioms that the
theorems of group theory are computationally enumerable. If a mathematical theory T is consistent, then it is
inferentially undecidable (i.e. there is a proposition Ψ such that ⊬TΨ and ⊬T Ψ, which is sometimes called
“incompleteness” in classical terminology) because provability in T is computationally undecidable [Church 1935,
Turing 1936].

1
[Church 1935, Turing 1936]
2
Otherwise, provability in classical logic would be computationally decidable because
∀[p:Program, xℕ]→ Halt[p, x] ⇔ ⊢ Halt[p, x]
where Halt[p, x] if and only if program p halts on input x. If such a ChurchTuring did not exist, then provability could be
decided by enumerating theorems until the sentence in question or its negation is encountered.
3
Closely related to conservation laws in physics
4
E.g. inconsistent information does not infer nonsense.

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 12 of 26

Information Invariance is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of the following:
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inference
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be inferred
That a mathematical theory T is inferentially undecidable (“incomplete” in classical terminology) with respect to Ψ
(above) does not mean incompleteness with respect to the information that can be inferred because (by construction)
⊢(⊬TΨ), (⊬T Ψ).
Computer Science needs a rigorous foundation for all of mathematics that enables computers to carry out all
reasoning without human intervention. xxxii [Frege 1879] was a good start, but it foundered on the issue of being well-
founded. [Russell 1925] attempted basing foundations entirely on types, but foundered on the issue of being
expressive enough to carry to some common mathematical reasoning. [Church 1932, 1933] attempted basing
foundations entirely on untyped higher-order functions, but foundered because it allowed self-referential
propositions leading to contradictions [Kleene and Rosser 1935]. Presently, Isabelle [Paulson 1989] and Coq
[Coquand and Huet 1986] are founded on types and do not allow theories to reason about themselves. Classical
Direct Logic is a foundation for all of mathematical reasoning based on both sets (for well-founded structures) and
types (to provide expressibility for concepts including a grammar for propositions) that allows general inference
about reasoning.
[Gödel 1931] proved inferential undecidablity (“incompleteness” in classical terminology) results for Principia Mathematica
as the foundation of all of mathematics using “self-referential” propositions using fixed points exploiting a untyped grammar
of mathematical sentences. In opposition to Wittgenstein's argument that self-referential sentences lead to contradictions in
mathematics, Gödel later claimed that his results were for a cut-down first-order theory of Peano numbers. However, first-
order logic is not a suitable foundation for Computer Science because of the requirement that computer systems be able to
carry out all reasoning without requiring human intervention (including reasoning about their own inference systems).
Following [Frege 1879, Russell 1925, and Church 1932-1933], Direct Logic was developed and then investigated self-
referential propositions with the following results.
 Formalization of Wittgenstein's proof that Gödel's self-referential sentence leads to contradiction in mathematics. So
the consistency of mathematics had to be rescued against Gödel's self-referential sentence. The self-referential
sentences used in results of [Curry 1941] and [Löb 1955] also lead to inconsistency in mathematics. Consequently,
mathematics had to be rescued against these self-referential sentences as well.
 Self-proof of the consistency of mathematics. Consequently, mathematics had to be rescued against the claim [Gödel
1931] that mathematics cannot prove its own consistency. xxxiii
A solution is to bar self-referential sentences using a properly constructed grammar for sentences of
mathematics.xxxiv However, the Establishment has very reluctant to accept the solution.
According to [Dawson 2006]xxxv
 Gödel’s results altered the mathematical landscape, but they did not “produce a debacle”.
 There is less controversy today over mathematical foundations than there was before Gödel’s work.
However, Gödel’s results have produced a debacle of a very different kind from the one discussed by Dawson:
 Gödel's result that mathematics cannot prove its own consistency1 has been disproved.
 Consequently, Gödel's results have led to increased controversy over mathematical foundations
This article has become highly controversial and the Establishment has censored 2 its publication in electronic
archives that are intended to record priority dates for scientific results. Consequently, this article is itself another
episode in the ongoing saga of inconsistency robustness in foundations.

1
the result was accepted doctrine by the Establishment for over eight decades
2
without substantive justification

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 13 of 26

Acknowledgement
Extensive discussions with Tom Costello, Eric Kao, Ron van der Meyden and other members of the Stanford CS
Logic Group helped the development of this paper. Comments by James Lottes, Pat Suppes, Daniel Raggi, Eric
Winsberg, John Woods, and Ming Xiong helped improve the presentation. Alan Bundy pointed out many crucial
places where the presentation needed improvement. John Woods served ably as the senior referee by compiling an
excellent synopsis of anonymized referee reports.

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Appendix 1. Historical Background
The powerful (try to) insist that their statements are literal depictions of a single reality.
‘It really is that way’, they tell us. ‘There is no alternative.’ But those on the receiving end
of such homilies learn to read them allegorically, these are techniques used by
subordinates to read through the words of the powerful to the concealed realities that have
produced them.
Law [2004]
Wittgenstein: self-referential propositions lead to inconsistency
All truth passes through three stages:
First, it is ridiculed.
Second, it is violently opposed.
Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) Ludwig Wittgenstein
Early on, Wittgenstein noted that self-referential propositions infer inconsistency: 1
Let us suppose I prove2 the improvability (in Russell’s system) of [Gödel's self-referential propostion] P; [⊢⊬P where P⇔⊬ P]
then by this proof I have proved P [⊢P].
Now if this proof were one in Russell’s system [⊢⊢P]—
I should in this case have proved at once that it belonged [⊢P] and did not belong [⊢P because P⇔⊢P] to Russell’s system.
But there is a contradiction here!xxxvi
According to [Monk 2007]:xxxvii
Wittgenstein hoped that his work on mathematics would have a cultural impact, that it would threaten the
attitudes that prevail in logic, mathematics and the philosophies of them. On this measure it has been a
spectacular failure.
In 1972, Gödel responded: “Has Wittgenstein lost his mind? Does he mean it seriously?”xxxviii because of the
following points of contention:
 Are self-referential sentences a requirement of mathematics?3
 Do self-referential sentences lead to inconsistency in mathematics? 4
Unfortunately, recognition of the worth of Wittgenstein’s work on mathematics came long after his death. Classical
logicians mistakenly believed that they had been completely victorious over Wittgenstein.

1
[Wittgenstein in 1937 published in Wittgenstein 1956, p. 50e and p. 51e]
2
Wittgenstein was granting the supposition that Gödel had proved inferential undecidability (“incompleteness” in classical
terminology) of Russell’s system, e.g., ⊢⊬ P. However, inferential undecidability is easy to prove using the self-referential
proposition P. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that ⊢ P. Both of the following can be inferred:
1) ⊢ ⊬ P from the hypothesis because P⇔⊬P
2) ⊢ ⊢ P from the hypothesis by Adequacy.
But 1) and 2) are a contradiction. Consequently, ⊢⊬ P follows from proof by contradiction.
3
Gödel, et. al. believed that self-referential sentences were a requirement because of the very definition of sentences exploiting
an untyped grammar of mathematical sentences. In defense of self-referential sentences, Feferman[1984] maintained “…natural
language abounds with directly or indirectly self-referential yet apparently harmless expressions ... , e.g. in such statements as
'You're not listening to me' ... ” However, Feferman's example does not require self-referential propositions because it can be
interpreted as meaning the following: You did not listen to me including listening to my saying that “You did not listen to me.”
It is important to note that disallowing self-referential sentences does not place restrictions on recursion in programs.
4
Gödel, et. al. believed by restricting mathematics to cut-down first order theories that inconsistency could be avoided. See section
in this paper on Provability Logic.

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Gödel was certain
“Certainty” is far from being a sign of success; it is only a symptom of lack of
imagination and conceptual poverty. It produces smug satisfaction and prevents
the growth of knowledge. [Lakatos 1976]

Paul Cohen [2006] wrote as follows of his interaction with Gödel:

His [Gödel's] main interest seemed to lie in discussing the “truth” or “falsity” of
these questions, not merely in their undecidability. He struck me as having an almost
unshakable belief in this “realist” position, which I found difficult to share. His
ideas were grounded in a deep philosophical belief as to what the human mind could
achieve. I greatly admired this faith in the power and beauty of Western Culture, as
he put it, and would have liked to understand more deeply what were the sources of
his strongly held beliefs. Through our discussions, I came closer to his point of view,
although I never shared completely his “realist” point of view, that all questions of
Set Theory were in the final analysis, either true or false.
Kurt Gödel
Wittgenstein disputed Gödel’s proof using the argument that self-referential propositions lead to inconsistency in
mathematics.xxxix In response, Gödel replied: “Has Wittgenstein lost his mind? Does he mean it seriously?”xl
The upshot is that Gödel never acknowledged that self-inferred inferential undecidability of mathematical theories
based on his self-referential proposition implies inconsistency. See further discussion in an appendix of this paper.
Also, the ultimate criteria for correctness in the theory of natural numbers is provability using strong induction
[Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889]. In this sense, Wittgenstein was correct in his identification of “truth” with
provability. On the other hand, Gödel obfuscated the important identification of provability as the touchstone of
ultimate correctness in mathematics.
von Neumann [1961] had a very different view from Gödel:
It is not necessarily true that the mathematical method
is something absolute, which was revealed from on
high, or which somehow, after we got hold of it, was
evidently right and has stayed evidently right ever
since.

John von Neumann

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 18 of 26

Provability Logic
One kind of Provability Logic (called PL) is a cut-down theory of deduction that has been used to investigate
provability predicates for languages that allow self-referential propositions [Verbrugge 2010]. Because it is first-
order, PL is very weak; even for proving theorems about integers
In formulating his results, [Löb 1955] proposed the following provability conditions xli that became the basis of
Provability Logic:xlii
1. (⊢PL ) ⇨ ⊢PL ⊢PL  
2. ⊢PL (⊢PL ⇨  ⇨ (⊢PL   ⇨ ⊢PL  )
3. ⊢PL (⊢PL   ⇨ ⊢PL  ⊢PL  )
Using self-referential propositions, [Löb 1955] proved the following:xliii (⊢PL ((⊢PL )⇨)) ⇨⊢PL .
However, PL is a very weak theory of deduction. For example, the principle of natural deduction below that
allows theorems to be used in subarguments is not allowed in PL :xliv
(⊢ )⇨

Church's Paradox
...in the case of any system of symbolic logic, the set of all provable theorems is [computationally] enumerable...
any system of symbolic logic not hopelessly inadequate ... would contain the formal theorem that this same system
... was either insufficient [theorems are not computationally enumerable] or over-sufficient [that theorems are
computationally enumerable means that the system is inconsistent]...
This, of course, is a deplorable state of affairs...
Indeed, if there is no formalization of logic as a whole, then there is no exact description of what logic is, for it
in the very nature of an exact description that it implies a formalization. And if there no exact description of logic,
then there is no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing as logic.
[Church 1934]xlv
[Church 1932, 1933] attempted basing foundations entirely on untyped higher-order functions, but foundered because
contradictions emerged because
1. His system allowed self-referential propositions [Kleene and Rosser 1935]
2. He believed that theorems must be computationally enumerable.
Our proposal is to address the above issues as follows:
1. Not providing for the construction of self-referential propositions in mathematics
2. Mathematics self proves that it is “open” in the sense that theorems are not computationally enumerable (i.e. not
“closed”).1

1
In other words, the paradox that Church was concerned could mean the demise of formal mathematical logic has been
transformed into fundamental theorem of foundations!

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 19 of 26

Sociology of Foundations
“Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that there is no need to do so,
almost everyone gets busy on the proof.”
John Kenneth Galbraith [1971 pg. 50]

“There is a crisis in contemporary mathematics, and anybody who has not noticed it is being willfully blind.
... In order to resolve one aspect of this crisis, emphasis will have to be transferred from the mechanics of
the assembly line which keeps grinding out the theorems, to an examination of what is being proved.”
[Bishop 1975]
The inherently social nature of the processes by which principles and propositions in logic are produced,
disseminated, and established is illustrated by the following issues with examples:1
 The formal presentation of a demonstration (proof) has not lead automatically to consensus. Formal
presentation in print and at several different professional meetings of the extraordinarily simple proof in
this paper have not lead automatically to consensus about the theorem that “Mathematics is Consistent”.
 There has been an absence of universally recognized central logical principles. Disputes over the
validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle led to the development of Intuitionistic Logic, which is an
alternative to Classical Logic.
 There are many ways of doing logic. One view of logic is that it is about truth; another view is that it is
about argumentation (i.e. proofs).
 Argumentation and propositions have be variously (re-)connected and both have been re-used.
Church's paradox is that assuming theorems of mathematics are computationally enumerable leads to
contradiction. In this papers, the paradox is transformed into the fundamental principle that “Mathematics
is Open” (i.e. it is a theorem of mathematics that the theorems of mathematics are not computationally
enumerable) using the argument used in Church's paradox.
 New technological developments have cast doubts on traditional logical principles. The pervasive
inconsistency of modern large-scale information systems has cast doubt on classical logical principles, e.g.,
Proof by Contradiction and Excluded Middle. xlvi
 Political actions have been taken against views dissenting from the Establishment. According to [Kline
1990, p. 32], Hippasus was literally thrown overboard by his fellow Pythagoreans “…for having produced
an element in the universe which denied the…doctrine that all phenomena in the universe can be reduced
to whole numbers and their ratios.” Fearing that he was dying and the influence that Brouwer might have
after his death, Hilbert fired2 Brouwer as an associate editor of Mathematische Annalen because of
“incompatibility of our views on fundamental matters” xlvii e.g., Hilbert ridiculed Brouwer for challenging
the validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle.
The Establishment has often ridiculed dissenting views and attempted to limit their distribution by political
means.xlviii Electronic archives and repositories that record precedence of scientific publication in
mathematical logic have censored3 submissions with proofs such as those in this article.

1
cf. [Rosental 2008]
2
in an unlawful way (Einstein, a member of the editorial board, refused to support Hilbert's action)
3
while refusing to provide any justification for the censorship other than administrative fiat

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 20 of 26

Appendix 2. Classical Boolean Equivalences

The following classical Boolean equivalences hold in Classical Direct Logic:

Self Equivalence:  = 
Double Negation:  = 
Idempotence of :  = 
Commutativity of :  = 
Associativity of :   () = ()  
Distributivity of  over :   () = ()  ()
De Morgan for : () =  
Idempotence of :  = 
Commutativity of :  = 
Associativity of :   () = ()  
Distributivity of  over :   () = () ()
De Morgan for : () = 
Absorption for :   () = 
Absorption for :   () = 
Implication as disjunction: ⇒ = 

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 21 of 26

Appendix 3. Classical Natural Deduction
Below are schemas for nested-box-style Natural Deduction1 for classical mathematical theories:

├ Introduction (SubArguments) ├ Elimination (Chaining)

├ Ψ i hypothesis ├T Ψ i premise
TΨ
...
... Ψ├T Φ i premise
├
TΨ
Φ i inference
...
├TΦ i conclusion
Ψ├T Φ i conclusion

(├ Φ) ├T (Ψ├TΦ) Ψ, (Ψ├TΦ) ├T Φ
TΨ

 Introduction  Elimination
├T Ψ i premise ├T (ΨΦ) i premise
… …
├T Φ i premise ├T Ψ i conclusion
... …
├T (ΨΦ) i conclusion ├T Φ i conclusion

Ψ, Φ ├T (ΨΦ) (ΨΦ) ├T Ψ, Φ

 Introduction  Elimination
├T Ψ i premise ├T Ψ i premise
…
… ├T (ΨΦ) i premise
…
├T (ΨΦ) i conclusion ├T Φ i conclusion

Ψ ├T (ΨΦ) Ψ, (ΨΦ) ├T Φ

Proof by Contradiction Cases

├T (ΨΦ) i premise
├
TΨ
Ψ i hypothesis …
Ψ├T Θ i premise
... ...
├
TΨ
(ΦΦ) i inference Φ├T Θ i premise
...
├T Θ i conclusion
├T Ψ i conclusion

(├ (ΦΦ)) ├T Ψ (ΨΦ), (Ψ├T Θ), (Φ├T Θ) ├T Θ

TΨ

Integrity Reflection
(├TΨ) ⇨ Ψ (Φ├T Ψ) ⇔ (├T (Φ├T Ψ))

1
Evolved from classical natural deduction [Jaśkowski 1934]. See history in Pelletier [1999].

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 22 of 26

End Notes
i
Classical mathematics is the subject of this article. In a more general context:
 Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is for pervasively inconsistent theories of practice, e.g., theories for climate
modeling and for modeling the human brain. Proof by Contradiction is not a rule of Inconsistency Robust Direct
Logic lest everything be inferable. See [Hewitt 2010] for discussion of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic.
 Classical Direct Logic (augmentation of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic with the rule of Proof by Contradiction) is for
theories thought to be consistent by an overwhelming consensus of working professional mathematicians
ii See discussion in [Pelletier 1999].
iii
The system of Jaśkowski of is different from the one developed independently and contemporaneously in [Gentzen 1934-1935].
According to [Jaśkowski 1934]:
“In 1926 Professor Jan Łukasiewicz called attention to the fact that mathematicians in their proofs do not appeal to the theses of
the theory of deduction, but make use of other methods of reasoning. The chief means employed in their method is that of an
arbitrary supposition. The problem raised by Łukasiewicz was to put those methods under the form of structural rules and to
analyze their relation to the theory of deduction.” [Fitch 1952] subsequently adopted the graphical notation of Jaśkowski.
According to [Fitch 1952], the method of subordinate proofs was
“suggested by techniques due to Gentzen (1934 35) and Jaśkowski (1934)”
iv
According to [Hardy 1940], proof by contradiction is “one of a mathematician's finest weapons”, saying “It is a far finer gambit
than any chess gambit: a chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece, but a mathematician offers the game.”
v
Note that this theorem is very different from the result [Kleene 1938], that mathematics can be extended with a self-referential
sentence asserting its own consistency. Also, there are many theories in mathematics that cannot prove their own consistency
[Feferman 1989, Visser 2011].
vi
[Skansi 2014] has a constructive proof of cut elimination for a system of full second order logic. If the proof holds up, then it
provides further argument that mathematics proves its own consistency.
vii
Unfortunately, in formalizing Gödel's proof, [Shankar 1994] and [O'Connor 2005] followed Gödel in using integers to code
self-referential sentences using fixed points (exploiting an untyped grammar of sentences). According to [Cantini 2012]:
In the twenties and in the early thirties, the orthodox view of logic among mathematical logicians was more or less type- or set
theoretic. However, there was an effort to develop new grand logics as substitutes for the logic of Principia Mathematica. These
frameworks arose both as attempts to recover the simplicity of the type-free approach, as derived from the so-called naive
comprehension principle, as well as in order to satisfy meta-mathematical needs, such as the clarification of fundamental concepts
underlying the notions of “formal system,” “formalism,” “rule,” etc.
...

However, the theories of Curry and Church were almost immediately shown inconsistent in 1934, by Kleene and Rosser, who
(essentially) proved a version of the Richard paradox (both systems can provably enumerate their own provably total definable
number theoretic functions). The result was triggered by Church himself in 1934, when he used the Richard paradox to prove a kind
of incompleteness theorem (with respect to statements asserting the totality of number theoretic functions).
...

The reason for the inconsistencies was eventually clarified by Curry's 1941 essay. There he distinguishes two basic completeness
notions: a system S is deductively complete, if, whenever it derives a proposition B from the hypothesis A, then it also derives the
implication A⇨B (deduction theorem or introduction rule for implication); S is combinatorially completevii if, whenever M is a term
of the system possibly containing an indeterminate x, there exists a term (Church's λ[x]→ M) naming the function of x defined by M.
Curry then remarks that the paradox of Kleene-Rosser arises because Church's and Curry's systems satisfy both kinds of
completeness, thus showing that the two properties are incompatible.
viii
In Direct Logic, fixed points on propositions cannot be shown to be propositions and consequently the proofs are not valid for
the following reason:
The fixed point operator is usually defined as follows using the untyped lambda calculus:
Diagonal[f] ≡ [x]→ f[ x[x]]
Fix[f] ≡ (Diagonal[f ])[Diagonal[f ]]
The above fixed point operator cannot be used to construct self-referential propositions in Direct Logic because typing
constraints in the grammar of sentences prevent the construction of unwanted fixed points.
(Another way of constructing “self-referential” sentences is blocked because propositions are not countable.)
ix
Not allowed in Direct Logic because cannot show CurryΨ is a proposition.

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x Recently, [Yanofsky 2013 page 328] has expressed concern about Löb’s paradox:
we must restrict the fixed-point machine in order to avoid proving false statements [using Löb's argument]. Such a
restriction might seem strange because the proof that the fixed-point machine works seems applicable to all [functions on
sentences in an untyped grammar of sentences]. But restrict we must.
Yanofsky solved the above problem posed by Löb’s paradox using systems of logic that are so weak that they cannot abstract
and reify their own sentences. Unfortunately, such weak systems are inadequate for Computer Science. Instead of weakening,
Direct Logic adopted the strategy of barring self-referential propositions by using a grammar for sentences that does not allow the
fixed-point machinery for sentences.
xi
Not allowed in Direct Logic because cannot show LöbΨ is a proposition.
xii
and it negation
xiii
with general induction axioms [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889]
xiv Consequently there is no need to introduce a special kind of set called a “class” that was introduced as a patch by von Neumann.
xv [Gödel 1930]
xvi
The Computational Representation Theorem [Clinger 1981; Hewitt 2006] characterizes computation for systems which are
closed in the sense that they do not receive communications from outside:
The denotation DenoteS of a closed system S represents all the possible behaviors of S asxvi
DenoteS = 𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐭 ProgressionS 𝒊
𝒊→∞
where Progression Si⇾xvi Progression Si+1
In this way, S can be mathematically characterized in terms of all its possible behaviors (including those involving unbounded
nondeterminism).xvi
The denotations of the Computational Representation Theorem form the basis of procedurally checking programs against all
their possible executions,
\

xvii There can be uncountably many constants, e.g., the real numbers. Consequently, sentences cannot be enumerated.
xviii
Because there is no type restriction, fixed points may be freely used to define recursive procedures on terms. Also,
If σ is Type and y is Term, then ≪ [x:σ]→ y≫ is Term and x is Identifier in y
xix ordered pairs of σ1 and σ2
xx functions from σ1 into σ2
xxi  1, … and k infer 1, …, and n
xxii [Church 1956; Boolos 1975; Corcoran 1973, 1980]
xxiii along with lists

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 24 of 26

xxiv
Setsσ is the type for sets over type σ and Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ with the following axioms
{ }:?Setsσ i the empty set { } is a set
∀[x:Domainσ]→ {x}:?Setsσ i a singleton set is a set
∀[s1,s2:Setsσ]→ (s1Xs2):?Setsσ i the cross product of two sets is a set
∀[s1,s2:Setsσ]→ s2s1:?Setsσ i all functions from one set into another is a set
∀[s:Setsσ]→ ⋃s:?Setsσ i all elements of the subsets of a set is a set
∀[x:Domainσ, s:Setsσ]→ xs ⇨ x:?Setsσ i a subset of a set is a set
∀[x]→ x{ } i the empty set { } has no elements
∀[s:Setsσt, f:Domain𝛔Domain𝛔] → f⟦s⟧:?Setsσ i the function image of a set is a set
∀[s:Setsσt, p:BooleanDomain𝛔] → f↾p:?Setsσ i a predicate restriction of a set is a set
∀[s:Setsσ]→ { }s i { } is a subset of every set
∀[s1,s2:Setsσ]→ s1=s2 ⇔(∀[x:Domainσ]→ xs1 ⇔xs2)
∀[x, y:Domainσ]→ x{y} ⇔x=y
∀[s1,s2:Setsσ]→ s1s2 ⇔ ∀[x:Domainσ]→ xs1 ⇨ xs2
∀[x:Domainσ; s1,s2:Setsσ]→ xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2)
∀[x:Domainσ; s1,s2:Setsσ]→ xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2)
∀[p:Domainσ; s1,s2:Setsσ]→ ps1Xs2 ⇔ ∃[x1s1, x2s2]→ p=[x1, x2]
∀[f:Domainσ; s1,s2:Setsσ]→ fs2s1 ⇔ fs1Xs2  ∀[xs1]→ (∃[ys2]→ [x, y]f  (∀[zs2]→ [x, z]f ⇨ y=z))
∀[x:Domainσ; s:Setsσ]→ x⋃s ⇔ ∃[s1:Setsσ]→ xs1  s1s
∀[y:Domainσ; s:Setsσ, f:Domain𝛔Domain𝛔] yf⟦s⟧ ⇔ ∃[xs] → f[x]=y
∀[y:Domainσ; s:Setsσ, p:BooleanDomain𝛔 ] → ys↾p ⇔ ys  p[y]
The axiom of choice for sets can be expressed as follows:
∀[s1, s2:Setsσ]→ (∀[xs1]→ ∃[ys2]→ [x, y]s1Xs2) ⇨ ∃[f:Setsσ]→ fs2s1
The natural numbers are axiomatised as follows where Successor is the successor function:
 0ℕ
 Successor:?ℕℕ
 ∀[iℕ]→ Successor[i]≠0
 ∀[i, jℕ]→ Successor[i]= Successor[j] ⇨ i=j
 ∀[P:Booleanℕ ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[iℕ]→ P[i]
where ∀[P:Booleanℕ ]→ Inductive[P] ⇔ P[0]  ∀[iℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[Successor[i]]
xxv
I.e., ∄[s:Setsℕ]→ ∀[e:Domainℕ]→ es ⇔ e:?Setsℕ where Domainℕ= ℕ⊔Setsℕ
xxvi
a set is not well founded if and only if it has an infinite  chain
xxvii [Dedekind 1888], [Peano 1889], and [Zermelo 1930].
xxviii [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889]
xxix ℕ is identified with the type of natural numbers
The Continuum Hypothesis remains an open problem for Direct Logic because its set theory is very powerful. The forcing technique
xxx

used to prove the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis for first-order set theory [Cohen 1963] does not apply to Direct Logic
because of the strong induction axiom [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] used in formalizing the natural numbers ℕ, which is the
foundation of set theory. Of course, trivially, (⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis)(⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis) where
Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ.
xxxi
[cf. Church 1934, Kleene 1936]
xxxii Consequently, there can cannot be any escape hatch into an unformalized “meta-theory.”
xxxiii
The claim also relied on Gödel's self-referential sentence.
xxxiv Formal grammars were invented long after [Gödel 1931].
xxxv emphasis in original
xxxvi There can be uncountably many constants, e.g., the real numbers. Consequently, sentences cannot be enumerated.

Draft: March 7, 2014 Page 25 of 26

 Subsequent further discussion of Wittgenstein's criticism of Gödel’s results has unfortunately misunderstood Wittgenstein.
xxxvii

For example, [Berto 2009] granted that proof theoretically if P⇔⊬P, then:
1) ⊢⊬P
However, the above has proof consequences as follows:
2) ⊢P because (⊬P)⇔P in 1) above
3) ⊢⊢P because of 2) above
4) ⊢P because (⊢P)⇔P in 3) above
Of course, 2) and 4) are a manifest contradiction in mathematics that has been obtained without any additional “‛semantic’ story”
that [Berto 2009] claimed is required for Wittgenstein's argument that contradiction in mathematics “is what comes of making up
such [self-referential] sentences.” [Wittgenstein 1956, p. 51e]
xxxviii [Wang 1997] pg. 197.
xxxix [Wittgenstein in 1937 published in Wittgenstein 1956, p. 50e and p. 51e]
xl [Wang 1997] pg. 197.
xli all of which hold in Direct Logic using    ⇔ 
xlii These are expressed below in the notation of Direct Logic. The notation used by Löb was considerably more convoluted.
xliii
As pointed out elsewhere in this paper, in the more powerful system of Direct Logic, Löb's theorem when generalized to all of
mathematics turns into a paradox because Direct Logic has the Principle of Integrity that in mathematics: (⊢ )⇨, which does
not result in the same proof of contradiction because self-referential propositions are not allowed in Direct Logic.
xliv
If the principle were allowed, then PL would be inconsistent because every sentence would be provable in PL by Löb's
theorem.
xlv Statement of Church's Paradox
xlvi
for discussion see [Hewitt 2010]
xlvii
[Hilbert letter to Brouwer, October 1928]
xlviii
e.g. “The problem with such papers [critiquing Establishment doctrine] is that casual readers will use them to criticize and
maybe stop future funding ...” [Berenji, et. al, 1994]

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