Module 14 Case Digest

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

 Ynot vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals,

Facts:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos

Issue:
1. Whether or not the said Executive Order is valid.

Ratio: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based
on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered
restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Note: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person,
faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every
person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
  PASEI vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, 30 June 1988

FACTS:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
through petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police
power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:

WON D.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional it being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power since police power is legislative
and not executive in nature.

RULING:

NO. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are
not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

 Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, 11 October 2011.

Facts:

In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City
Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At
the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of
local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by
constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the
first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it
for their own purposes.
 The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought
the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that
he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-
66, “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the
enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they
sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA
from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held
that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of
property were being taken without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive.
It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property.
It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not
clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

Issues:

(1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.

(2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.

(4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

Ruling:

(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the
BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.

(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from
the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard
to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to
do so.

(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an
indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and
adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building,
the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of
persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those
things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
 MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

 Apo Fruits Corporationand Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R.No. 164195,12 October 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued
the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount. Consequently, on instruction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76,
respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made
additional deposits, placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of
nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate complaints for just compensation with
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a
case with the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the
valuation of petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the
Third Division of the Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third Division
deleted the award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry of judgment was issued. The just compensation of which was
only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of award of legal
interest and attorney’s fees and a motion to refer the second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly,
restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral
arguments with the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by the Office of the
Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

(1) Whether or not the “transcendental importance” does not apply to the present case.

(2) Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance” cannot justify the negation of the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in favor of the Government that respondent LBP
represents.

(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission showing that
just compensation for expropriated agricultural property must be viewed in the context of social justice.

RULINGS:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public interest – the
proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive just
compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent domain – “Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” While confirming the State’s inherent power and
right to take private property for public use, this provision at the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this
power. When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay
the owner just compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered “just,” it must not only be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.

(2) No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to the assertion it is applicable only to legal standing
questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It will be a very myopic reading of the ruling as
the context clearly shows that the phrase “transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize the overriding public
interest involved in this case. The Supreme Court said in their resolution:

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from these discussions.
A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain case be “just” when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has
been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is
to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain,
the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards have
been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court
should not leave uncorrected.

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government has unceasingly
sought to achieve in the past half century.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of justice are duly served.

(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give
a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission never intended to give agricultural
landowners less than just compensation in the expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.

[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right of landowners to receive
just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to
own large tracts of land should not be taken against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:

[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or
a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor,
to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

 Film Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, 16 June 2015.

Facts:

Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under Section
140 of the Local Government Code[2] (LGC)anchored on the constitutional policy on local autonomy,[3] passed City
Ordinance
 No. LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance).” Central to
the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing... stadia, and other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to
thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City. Said provisions
read:

CHAPTER XI – Amusement Tax

Section 42. Rate of Tax. – There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement, an amusement tax at
the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the... gross receipts from admission fees.[4]

Section 43. Manner of Payment. – In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld
by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said
proprietor, lessees, operators, and the... distributors of the cinematographic films.

Secs. 13 and 14 of RA

9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded films as follows:

Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained an “A” or “B” grading from the Council pursuant
to Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:

Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the
amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized and independent component... cities in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160
at the following rates:

For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and

For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue
to the funds of the Council.

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film
which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the

Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall
be deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30)
days from the termination of... the exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the
producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In said letters, the proprietors and cinema operators, including private respondent Colon Heritage Realty Corp.
(Colon Heritage), operator of the Oriente theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to pay the aforestated
amounts to FDCP... the city finally filed on May 18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for... declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529 (City of Cebu v. FDCP). In said petition,
Cebu City sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.

Colon Heritage filed before the RTC, Branch 5 Civil Case No. CEB-35601 (Colon Heritage v. FDCP), seeking to declare
Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.

Issues:

whether or not the RTC (Branches 5 and 14) gravely erred in declaring Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid for being
unconstitutional.
Ruling:

RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy

Principles:

Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre,[23] fiscal
autonomy was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
in the national... taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof.”

RA 9167, Sec. 14 states:

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film
which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent
component cities... in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the graded film
is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted
within thirty (30) days from the... termination of the exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding
amusement tax to the producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

A reading of the challenged provision reveals that the power to impose amusement taxeswas NOT removed from
the covered LGUs, unlike what Congress did for the taxes enumerated in Sec. 133, Article X of the LGC,[35] which lays down
the common... limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Thus:

Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
the... following:

(a) Inco

From the above, the difference between Sec. 133 and the questioned amendment of Sec. 140 of the LGC by RA
9167 is readily revealed. In Sec. 133, what Congress did was to prohibit the levy by LGUs of the enumerated taxes. For RA
9167, however, the covered LGUs were... deprived of the income which they will otherwise be collecting should they impose
amusement taxes, or, in petitioner’s own words, “Section 14 of [RA 9167] can be viewed as an express and real intention
on the part of Congress to remove from the LGU’s delegated... taxing power, all revenues from the amusement taxes on
graded films which would otherwise accrue to [them] pursuant to Section 140 of the [LGC].”[36]

In other words, per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to levy amusement taxes, albeit at the end of the
day,they will derive no revenue therefrom. The same, however, cannot be said for FDCP and the producers of graded films
since the amounts thus levied by the

LGUs––which should rightfully accrue to them, they being the taxing authority––will be going to their coffers. As a
matter of fact, it is only through the exercise by the LGU of said power that the funds to be used for the amusement tax
reward can be raised. Without said... imposition, the producers of graded films will receive nothing from the owners,
proprietors and lessees of cinemas operating within the territory of the covered LGU.

Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Congress did in this instance was not to
exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether
confiscate, the income to be received by... the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of
the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs
shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the power of

LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.

Section 130. Fundamental Principles. - The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of the taxing
and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:... x xx x

(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject
to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise spe

, in Pimentel,[38] the Court elucidated that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of LGUs to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. By earmarking the income on amusement taxes imposed by the LGUs in
favor of

FDCP and the producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated and distributed the LGUs’ funds––as though
it were legally within its control––under the guise of setting a limitation on the LGUs’ exercise of their delegated taxing
power. This, undoubtedly, is a usurpation... of the latter’s exclusive prerogative to apportion their funds, an impermissible
intrusion into the LGUs’ constitutionally-protected domain which puts to naught the guarantee of fiscal autonomy to
municipal corporations enshrined in our basic law.

 Film Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 204418, 15
October2019

Lessons Applicable: Doctrine of Operative Fact , Lifeblood theory

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

1993: Cebu City passed City Ordinance No. LXIX: Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu, Sections 42 and 43,
Chapter XI of the Ordinance required proprietors, lessees or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing
stadia and other places of amusement to pay amusement tax equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of the admission fees
to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.

June 7, 2002: Congress passed RA 9167 creating FDCP. Sections 13 and 14 thereof provide that the amusement tax on
certain graded films which would otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines during the period the graded film is exhibited, should be
deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted to the FDCP which
shall reward the same to producers of the graded films.

RTC: Granted Cebu City and CHRC separate petition for declaratory relief before the RTC Cebu City which sought to declare
Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: W/N doctrine of operative fact in relation to the declaration of Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and
unconstitutional.

HELD:
YES. The operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non-remittance by proprietors since the law produced legal effects
prior to the declaration of the nullity of Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167.

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior its being declared as
unconstitutional and legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of considerations of practicality and
fairness.

In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as unconstitutional by the
Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those
who have relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

The right to receive the amusement taxes accrued the moment the taxes were deemed payable under the provisions of the
Omnibus Tax Ordinance of Cebu City.

Taxes, once due, must be paid without delay to the taxing authority

Taxes are the lifeblood of Government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. This flows from the
truism that without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it.

The prompt payment of taxes to the rightful authority, cannot be left to the whims of taxpayers. To rule otherwise would
be to acquiesce to the norm allowing taxpayers to reject payment of taxes under the supposition that the law imposing the
same is illegal or unconstitutional. This would unduly hamper government operations.

 Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission
was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office
as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law.
While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal
counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner
of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of
any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine
(9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN.
In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared
vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to
December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private
sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private
sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old,
it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and
CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report
to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for
determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made
aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to
P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic,
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section
5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the
OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her
on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the validity
of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and
Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since
Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has
an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time
runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest
in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period
is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to
know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and
ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such issue
may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the
complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should
have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot
be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the
concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article
XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from
Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the
clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be
removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain
high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing
their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word
“may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from
office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the President
and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers.
Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a
conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative
supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel
thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the
Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public
officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the
presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the
President.
 Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference
that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-
filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity
required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon
the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur
of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are
enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

 Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

 Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

o Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
o Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
o Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
o whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
o Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
powers
o Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
o Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
o Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
o whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
o whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
o Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative,
o whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief
Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
o whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
o Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the
court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and
prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-
be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the
Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition
of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual
or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy
and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias
must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify
only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition
has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices
may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo
warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between
the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people
who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has
supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received
in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The
best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified.

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition
based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty
to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle
actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the
Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of
the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong
and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible
latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping
and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum
shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test
for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable
officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable
officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from
office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges
of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does
not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for
this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for
an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar
to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President
and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses
are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a
complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes
of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers
are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned
even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be
an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of
an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion
that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and
legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of
perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a
public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the
one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike
the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the
government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of
the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of
the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes
of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There
is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that
it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the
Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto.
Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action.
Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the
highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification·
for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid
on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies
with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its
non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates.
What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale,
the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must
be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or
wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from
resolving.
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the
JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”
Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence,
the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of
law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public
officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is
so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even
provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may
also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case,
those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens
and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative
provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a
formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily
dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet,
Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked
by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the
branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository
agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact
of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by
[Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude
that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the
burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon
the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN because it
is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the
periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted
from the SALN laws on RA 6713.
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno
was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not
yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges
and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on
2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not
substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and
administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date
of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist
nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She
should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered
Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the
Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or
conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended
by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996
SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006
SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN
was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of
P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day
that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her
lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal
against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC
rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices,
absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From
the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for
having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away
with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only
Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno
wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned
from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P.
cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in
her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno
curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such
failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially
from a Member of the Supreme Court.

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the
first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the
law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform
his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC
should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false representations
that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false
claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax
fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota
Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused
P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC
contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue
of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased
judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by
using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that
Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity
was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice.
On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in
order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the
required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness
or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality
of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot
verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the
JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be
a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains
the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally
created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident from the composition
of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which,
the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from
the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the
State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed
to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice
rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.