Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581

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Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pursup

Buyer opportunism in strategic supplier relationships: Triggers, T

manifestations and consequences
Cees J. Gelderman∗, Janjaap Semeijn, Mark Verhappen
Open University of the Netherlands, Faculty of Management, Science and Technology, PO Box 2960, 6401, DL Heerlen, the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Opportunistic behavior is a well-known reason for the failure of collaborative buyer-supplier relationships. Despite the numerous studies on opportunism in buyer-
supplier relationships, the individual level is largely understudied. We explore opportunistic behavior of purchasing professionals in strategic supplier relationships,
focusing on triggers, manifestations and consequences. The Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was employed to interview professional purchasers in the Netherlands
about their personal opportunistic behavior. This resulted in rich descriptions of 29 critical incidents of opportunistic buyer behavior, extracting first-hand in-
formation. We identified triggers that provoked purchasing professionals to behave opportunistically. These triggers are linked to specific manifestations and
consequences.

1. Introduction
Collaborative relationships with strategic suppliers are generally
considered crucial for company performance and market competitive-
ness (e.g. Yen and Hung, 2017). Organizations increasingly outsource
strategically important functions and activities, which makes supplier
collaboration vital for the success and performance of companies (e.g.
Raassens, Wuyts and Geyskens, 2012). However, governing such re-
lationships can be problematic. Opportunistic behavior by one or both
parties is considered an important reason for collaborative relationships
to fail (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2015; Raassens et al., 2012). Oppor-
tunism implies a choice for self-interest with guile at the expense of the
partner (Williamson, 1975). It could be tempting to behave opportu-
nistically in pursuit of short-term profits or savings (Nooteboom, 1996).
Opportunism has been identified as one of the key factors that under-
mines and even destroys relationships (e.g. Trada and Goyal, 2017;
Samaha et al., 2011).
Opportunism can be studied at the firm level and the individual
level (e.g. Tangpong et al., 2010). Typically, opportunism is in-
vestigated at the firm level, explaining and describing firm behavior.
Despite the numerous studies on opportunism in buyer-supplier re-
lationships, the individual level is largely understudied (cf. Hawkins
et al., 2013). In this study, we explicitly focus on the individual buyer
level. Relations develop over time and could become more or less close.
Trust and honesty cannot be taken for granted in collaborative re-
lationships. Even trustworthy individuals could be untrustworthy, if the
incentives are right, according to Dasgupta (1988).
Meta-analytic reviews of opportunism have identified many
conceptual frameworks of antecedents and effects (e.g. Wang and Yang,
2013; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008). However, most studies refer to
‘buyers’ as buying companies and ‘suppliers’ as supplying companies.
Accordingly, the focus is most commonly on the behavior of companies,
investigating opportunism at the inter-organizational level. The in-
dividual level remains understudied, since the extant literature has
predominantly disregarded the role of human actors in buyer-supplier
relations (Hawkins et al., 2013; Tangpong et al., 2010). This study
specifically focusses on the individual level of analysis.
Why is opportunistic behavior so common in professional settings?
(Hawkins et al., 2008). Opportunism research is typically focused on
leverage supplier relationships, not on strategic supplier relationships
(e.g. Hawkins et al., 2013; Joshi and Arnold, 1997; John, 1984; Vidal,
2014; Bhattacharya et al., 2015). Despite the negative effects of op-
portunism, buyers still behave opportunistically even in strategic sup-
plier relationships (e.g. Liu et al., 2010), where opportunism is not
supposed nor expected to occur (cf. Granovetter, 1985). This study
investigates buyer opportunism within strategic supplier relationships,
as viewed by professional purchasers who themselves engaged in such
behavior.
Meta-studies reveal that opportunism is predominantly investigated
in the form of quantitative survey studies (e.g. Villena and Craighead,
2016; Bhattacharya et al., 2015; Hawkins et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2010).
However, survey studies give little insight into the manifestations of
opportunism and the conditions that induce or stimulate purchasing
professionals to engage in unethical behavior. Purchasing professionals
can be tempted to behave opportunistically as a reaction to specific
triggers. Current studies do not include the role of triggers, when

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kees.gelderman@ou.nl (C.J. Gelderman), janjaap.semeijn@ou.nl (J. Semeijn), m.verhappen@benier.nl (M. Verhappen).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2019.100581
Received 30 July 2018; Received in revised form 24 October 2019; Accepted 18 November 2019
Available online 27 November 2019
1478-4092/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
explaining the behavior of purchasing professionals. Understanding
triggers can shed light on the paradox why professionals may act op-
portunistically despite all the well-documented negative consequences.
The leading research questions in our study are: (1) what triggers
purchasing professionals to behave opportunistically in strategic sup-
plier relations? and (2) what are the manifestations and consequences
of such behaviors?
Our study aims to contribute to the extant literature in a number of
ways. We explore opportunistic behavior of purchasing professionals in
strategic supplier relationships, focusing on triggers, manifestations and
consequences. By using the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) we col-
lected and analyzed rich narratives through self-reporting professionals.
The most important finding and contribution of this study concerns the
identification of specific configurations, which consist of typical trig-
gers, manifestations, and consequences. Purchasing professionals in the
Dutch manufacturing industry were interviewed, producing thick de-
scriptions of 29 critical incidents, that triggered opportunistic buyer
behavior.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Strategic supplier relationships
Developing strategic relationships with innovative suppliers is a
viable, well-known innovation strategy (e.g. Oke et al., 2013). Buying
companies aim to leverage strategic supplier relationships to gain
competitive advantage (e.g. Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007). Such buyer-
supplier relationships may develop into a strategic supplier partnership
requiring compatible goals, coordination, planning, and problem sol-
ving efforts (e.g. Qrunfleh and Tarafdar, 2013). Strategic supplier
partnerships are long-term relationships, “designed to leverage the
strategic and operational capabilities of individual participating com-
panies to help them achieve significant ongoing benefits” (Li et al.,
2006, p. 109). These relationships with a small number of suppliers
require direct association, continuous improvement, mutual planning
and problem solving (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2001). Such partnerships
enable information sharing, integration, and responsiveness (cf.
Qrunfleh and Tarafdar, 2013). Strategic, integrated relations can be
characterized by high levels of trust, commitment, conflict resolution,
and cooperation (cf. Maloni and Benton, 2000). These exchange re-
lationships are embedded in social structures in which opportunism is
believed to be the exception, rather than the rule (cf. Granovetter,
1985). In strategic supplier relationships we expect norms of colla-
boration and trust, while a “norm of opportunism” might be found in
relationships concerning the procurement of non-critical and leverage
items (Hawkins et al., 2008). Still, both parties in a (strategic) re-
lationship can decide to behave opportunistically.
2.2. Opportunism and the violation of norms
Opportunism includes a range of activities such as stealing, lying,
deception, false threats and promises, cheating, deliberately mis-
leading, breach of contract, distorting data, cover-ups, disguising pre-
ferences, and withholding of information (Paswan et al., 2017). These
activities are all associated with negative feelings and sentiments.
Academic publications on opportunism generally use Williamson's
(1975, p. 6) definition: “self-seeking interest with guile” (p. 6) “at the
expense of the partner” (Kang et al., 2016 p. 240). Opportunistic be-
havior differs significantly from normal business practice, such as hard
bargaining and seeking confrontations (Young and Wilkinson, 1997).
These behaviors are expressions of competitive behavior that are most
commonly based on shared values and norms. Self-seeking behavior is
not problematic, however the notion of guile is. Williamson (1975, p.
47) describes guiles as “lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts
to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”.
The definition of “self-seeking interest with guile” allows for
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Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
discussion and misunderstanding. In order to label a given behavior as
opportunistic, there must be a violation of an existing norm within the
relationship (Wathne and Heide, 2000). To detect opportunism we must
assess whether a given behavior is “contrary to the principles of the
relation in which it occurs” (Macneil, 1981, p. 1024). These norms can
be specified in explicit contracts, but also in a range of relational norms
and informal agreements and understandings (cf. Heide and John,
1992). Different relationships, even with similar contracts, can be
governed by different relational norms. Certain behaviors will be la-
beled as opportunistic in a some relationships, while the same beha-
viors can be labeled as non-opportunistic (normal business) in other
relationships (cf. Artz and Brush, 2000). A weak point in many papers
on opportunism is that they ignore differences between relationship
types. The type of supplier relationship plays an important role in as-
sessing whether certain behaviors are considered opportunistic. In ad-
dition, over the years parties may adapt initial relational norms or even
develop their own specific relational norms (e.g. Ring and Van de Ven,
1992). Relational norms evolve from descriptive expectations (“this is
the way we do things in this relationship”) to normative expectations
(“this is the way things should be done in this relationship”) (Joshi and
Stump, 1999, p. 339).
Relational norms represent shared norms, values and behavioral
expectations. Although there is no exhaustive list of relational norms
within strategic supplier relationships, many studies have focused on
flexibility, solidarity and information exchange (as proposed by Heide
and John, 1992). Flexibility refers to the willingness to adapt behavior
in case of unforeseen developments and changes in the (contractual)
environment (Joshi and Arnold, 1997). Solidarity is evident from be-
havior that benefits to each other, while information exchange refers to
the willingness to provide any information that may be helpful to the
other (Heide and John, 1992). The latter implies that critical in-
formation is timely and accurately shared, regardless of a contractual
obligation (Joshi and Arnold, 1997). In a similar line of reasoning,
Macneil (1981) emphasized (1) the expectation of sharing benefits and
burdens and (2) the restraint of unilateral use of power. Other relational
norms are cooperation, mutual interests, goal congruence, trust, com-
mitment, satisfaction and relationship continuity (e.g. Tangpong et al.,
2010; Hawkins et al., 2013). While scholars differ on appropriate sets of
relational norms, they generally agree that relational norms encourage
collaboration and fit well with strategic buyer-supplier relationships
(e.g. Artz and Brush, 2000).
2.3. Antecedents, enablers and triggers of opportunism
Extensive literature has identified many potential antecedents and
consequences of opportunism (e.g. Paswan et al., 2017; Wang and
Yang, 2013). Additionally, much research is devoted to governance
mechanisms that safeguard against opportunism (e.g. Krishnan et al.,
2016). For studying opportunism, most studies apply transactions cost
analysis (TCA) and social exchange theory (SET) as principal theoretical
perspectives (cf. Trada and Goyal, 2017; Hawkins et al., 2008; Joshi
and Stump, 1999). TCA recognizes asset specificity, behavioral and
environmental uncertainty as core antecedents of opportunism (Crosno
and Dahlstrom, 2008). Relation specific investments may lead to de-
pendence and vulnerability for opportunistic behavior of the other
party (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Morgan et al., 2016). SET emphasizes
psychological and sociological factors, explaining the restraint or the
use of opportunistic tactics (Blau, 1964). Typical SET-antecedents of
opportunism are corporate ethical values (Hawkins et al., 2013), social
capital (Vilena et al., 2011), perceived fairness (Trada and Goyal,
2017), trust (Liu et al., 2009) and other relational norms (e.g. Hawkins
et al., 2008).
The actions of purchasing and sales professionals are likely to in-
fluence the context and the collaboration of the buying and supplying
firm (cf. Schurr, 2007). Non-cooperative purchasers could provoke sales
professionals to exhibit similar behaviors and ultimately develop a
C.J. Gelderman, et al. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581

mutual norm of opportunism. As mentioned in the introduction, the Table 1

roles of individuals have largely been ignored (cf. Tangpong et al., Job titles and years of critical incidents.
2010). In our study we have used the individual unit of analysis, which Resp Job titles of respondents Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3
is rarely used in studies on (buyer) opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2013).
Many studies have investigated the associations between opportu- # 1 Buyer machine factory 2008 2008 2014
# 2 Buyer metal machining company 2005 x x
nism and selected antecedents. Some of these antecedents can be seen
# 3 Purchase manager machine factory 2014 2016 x
as causing opportunistic behavior, while other antecedents merely # 4 Free-lance project buyer 2003 2007 x
precede behavior in a temporal sense. In the latter case, there is no # 5 Buyer packaging industry 2012 2015 x
causal relationship between the antecedent variable and the dependent # 6 Owner/MD metal construction 2015 2016 x
variable. In this study we specifically distinguish between triggers, company
#7 Owner/MD plastic moulding 2013 2010 2005
enablers, and causes (cf. Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). A trigger, within
company
the context of our study, is the starting point of opportunistic behavior #8 Buyer machine factory 2012 2012 2013
of a purchasing professional. A trigger initiates the course of events, #9 Buyer machine factory 2016 2016 2016
while a cause indicates the reason(s) for that something to happen (cf. # 10 Purchase manager chemical 2011 2015 2015
industry
the trigger is the finger-operated lever used to fire a weapon, while the
# 11 Purchase manager conveyor belt 2015 2016 x
cause refers to the reason for firing that weapon). Enablers are the manufacturer
conditions that facilitate the actors to react in response to certain # 12 Buyer machine factory 2008 2008 2005
triggers. A good example of an enabler is asymmetrical dependence. A
dominant position facilitates and enables opportunistic behavior, but is x: Respondent could not report on other incidents.
not a trigger initiating opportunism. Moreover, powerful parties in a
relationship are not automatically inclined to behave opportunistically purchasing management who (2) were responsible for the commu-
(e.g. Caniëls and Gelderman, 2010). In a study on relationship ending nication with and management of strategic supplier relations.
processes, Michalski (2004) found that customers were adapt at dis- Respondents in our sample have had higher education, most
tinguishing reasons from triggers. respondents have a vocational education (Bachelor degree). On
average, respondents had 24 years of professional experience, and no
3. Methodology respondent had less than 10 years of professional experience.
During a period of ten weeks in 2016, twelve respondents were
3.1. The Critical Incident Technique (CIT) interviewed, generating a total of 29 critical incidents. Table 1 provides
an overview of the job titles and the years in which the critical incidents
The critical incident technique (CIT) was introduced in studies on took place. In small companies, the roll of strategic buying with partner
work behaviors. Flanagan (1954, p. 327) defined an incident as “any suppliers is often performed by the director or owner. This was the case
observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to with respondent numbers six, seven and eight. A maximum of three
permit interference and predictions to be made about the person per- critical incidents per respondent was set (cf. Chell, 2004). This has
forming the act”. A great advantage of CIT is that it generates un- yielded a total of 584 min of recording, resulting in over 200 pages of
prompted information that is important from the perspective of res- transcripts. After twelve interviews it was decided to conclude the data
pondents (e.g. Oldenburger2008). CIT appears to be effective in ex- collection process, since the answers and categories for coding became
plorative studies, gaining insights into the perceived impact of in- saturated.
cidents, deriving broad (psychological) principles, and to solve prac- We collected the experience of participants as whole accounts or
tical problems (Flanagan, 1954). The technique has been applied in thick narratives, in an attempt to (re)construct their experience into a
many areas (Gremler, 2004), particularly in service encounters (e.g. coherent, consistent report. (cf. Saunders et al., 2013). In our study we
Bitner et al., 1990). However, CIT is hardly used within the context of followed a constructionist approach. In their (subjective) narratives
purchasing and supply management research (cf. Gelderman et al., participants develop and elaborate coherent views of their own con-
2016; Bakker and Kamann, 2007). structed reality. If respondents left out certain aspects of their oppor-
We applied CIT to investigate manifestations of opportunistic buyer tunistic behavior, the interviewer asked open-ended questions. Also,
behaviors, and specific triggers that provoked such behaviors as well as questions were asked to clarify positions and events. To collect com-
their consequences and how they are managed (cf. Chell, 2004). A plete and accurate answers, we asked respondents to restrict themselves
critical incident in our study is considered an event, incident or issue to first-hand observations and own decisions and actions. The triggers,
that has triggered a purchasing professional to behave opportunistically manifestations, and consequences (for/of opportunistic behavior) in
in a strategic supplier relationship. Respondents were asked to describe our study are subjective reflections and perceptions of the participants.
and explain situations in which they were engaged in opportunistic The reliability is respected by “a quality interview process in which
behavior. Flanagan (1954) emphasized that critical incidents should there is coherence” (Chell, 2004, p. 57). We have addressed reliability
refer to human activities that are “sufficiently complete (…) to permit with the use of a protocol, a database, and chains of evidence (cf. Yin,
inferences and predictions”. The consequences of a critical incident 2013). The focus is on understanding the perceptions of participants,
must be “sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects” not on trying to find an objective truth. We followed Chell (2004, p. 46)
(Flanagan, 1954, p. 327). More specifically, a critical incident in our where she posited “Ideally, it is desirable to observe a comprehensive
study is defined as any event, incident or issue that in itself was suffi- set of incidents from which a classification system is derived”. The
ciently complete to trigger the purchasing professional to behave op- criticality of the incidents is based on two considerations (cf. Roos,
portunistically in a strategic supplier relationship. 2002). First, the critical incident is important because the respondent
refers to it in the interview. Second, the critical incident is important
3.2. Data collection such that it affects behavior in the relationship.
We decided to use CIT because we expected the occurrence of
The empirical part of this study consists of in-depth interviews with specific triggers (as critical incidents) that directly induced purchasing
experienced purchasing professionals in Dutch manufacturing compa- professionals to behave in an opportunistic way. Since these incidents
nies. Flanagan (1954) proposes to conduct interviews with respondents yield a significant impact on the strategic supplier relationship, res-
with substantive knowledge of the subject. In our study, we have (1) pondents are likely to accurately remember and reproduce the course of
selected respondents with substantial experience in the field of events (cf. Chell, 2004). CIT is an effective research tool for the

3
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
identification and analysis of critical incidents that have affected spe-
cific behavior and decisions. Since our study was focused on the per-
ceptions, motives, attitudes, and experiences of purchasing profes-
sionals, we interviewed these professionals using expert interviews
instead of studying cases from different perspectives. Unlike the use of
completely unstructured interviews, CIT provides a focus that “enables
the researcher to probe aptly, and the interviewee to ‘hook’ their ac-
counts” (Chell, 2004, p. 47).
We are aware of the fact that respondents are likely to “generate
plausible accounts of the world” (Silverman, 2013, p. 238). Purchasing
professionals might be adept at covering inconvenient facts and beha-
viors. As recommended by Glaser (1965, p. 436), “talking in rather
loose, sharing fashion” with the respondents is “often the only way a
researcher can obtain any data or data that is accurate”. Chell (2004, p.
48) recommends that the interviewer establishes an atmosphere of trust
and confidence, which is likely to be relevant for investigating sensitive
issues such as personal opportunistic behavior. In the interviews we
avoided giving any judgmental comments and reactions to ensure that
the respondents could speak freely and sincerely about their ‘in-
appropriate’ behavior and problems within strategic supplier relations.
We aimed to create an atmosphere in which the interviewer and in-
terviewee were engaged in a conversation, as stipulated by Chell (2004,
p. 48). An important task of the interviewer was to reassure respondents
and to refrain from any value judgement on any matters. A related task
was to create a safe environment of trust so that participants felt en-
couraged to “openly discuss sensitive information” (c.f Bott and
Tourish, 2016, p. 282).
The Critical Incident Technique is focused on identifying triggers
that set things in motion. Such a trigger is in itself sufficiently complete
and of critical importance, shaping behavioral and business outcomes.
The technique is suitable for emotionally laden critical events (Chell,
2004) and is designed from a constructivist perspective. We sought to
generate genuine insights into events and triggers that shape pur-
chaser's opportunistic behaviors. We are aware that we “can only pre-
sent an interpretation of the events recounted” to us (Chell, 2004, p.
58). Also, it is very important to understand that we are not trying to
capture “the truth”. We used CIT to understand the incidents and (re)
actions as perceived and remembered by the professional purchasers
involved. The narratives are always a social construction of reality.
Since interviews are researcher-provoked ways of gathering data,
interviewers must be aware of the extent to which they are imposing
categories or suggesting certain responses (cf. Silverman, 2013). The
interview guide was constructed to avoid or limit such impositions.
Additionally, we did not work with predetermined thematic headings
for categorizing or grouping the answers. The interviewer ensured that
the main items of opportunistic behavior were addressed (i.e. mani-
festations, triggers, effects). For the preparation of the interviews, we
asked respondents to think about the following questions: can you re-
member situations with strategic supplier relationships in which you
personally behaved opportunistically? can you describe each situation
and the specific opportunistic behavior? what were the circumstances
of each situation and can you explain why you decided to behave op-
portunistically? how did the other party react and what were the ulti-
mate outcomes and consequences of your opportunistic behavior?
These were also the main questions of the interviews. Each narrative of
opportunism-trigger was described in terms of the following main ca-
tegories: context, manifestation of buyer opportunism, trigger, and
consequence/supplier reaction. The context consisted of the nature of
the strategic supplier relationship, the history and status of that re-
lationship and factors of potentially facilitating opportunistic beha-
viors. This classification of issues and items facilitated the collection
and analysis of data. Respondents were free to bring in anything they
wanted, but were systematically asked to substantiate observations and
opinions with evidence and examples.
In general, the validity of the research will increase with the number
of observations, wherein saturation is the goal. Upfront it is hard to
4
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
predict how many critical incidents and respondents are sufficient to
achieve adequate validity. Respondents were selected from a profes-
sional purchasing network in the Dutch manufacturing industry, based
on their first-hand experience with opportunistic behavior in a strategic
supplier relationship. Another criteria for selecting respondents was
that they have sufficient experience and authority within their orga-
nization to provide valuable information.
When applying the Critical Incident Technique, it is crucial to use a
clear definition of what constitutes a critical incident (e.g. Flanagan,
1954). We acknowledge this challenge, given that human behavior and
decisions are the focus instead of events that are more easily ob-
servable. Important questions in the interviews surrounded the critical
issue of what triggered the purchasing professional to behave oppor-
tunistically (cf. Bott and Tourish, 2016). We investigated what exactly
triggered a professional purchaser to behave opportunistically within a
strategic supplier relationship. Prior to the interviews, respondents
were sent general information on the set up and the purpose of the
study. Also, general information and definitions of core concepts were
provided (cf. Hamlin et al., 2011). To be specific, opportunism was
explained as “conscious choices in self-interest with guile and malicious
intentions, at the expense of the partner”. Strategic supplier relation-
ships were defined as “long-term relationships with important suppliers
to improve strategic and operational capabilities of the individual
companies and to achieve significant mutual benefits”.
Participants were asked to recall one or more occasions in which
he/she was personally engaged in opportunistic behavior. At the be-
ginning of each interview we checked that a specific narrative complied
with the requirements related to the three core concepts: opportunistic
behavior, critical incident, and strategic supplier relationship.
Whenever this was not the case, the participant was asked to recollect
another situation (cf. Butterfield et al., 2005). Sometimes we had to
conclude that the narrative of a respondent did not meet our require-
ments. We put much effort into ensuring that all respondents had a
clear and shared understanding of critical incidents, opportunistic be-
havior, and strategic supplier relationships. We explicitly and ex-
clusively wanted to discuss critical incidents in the context of strategic
supplier relationships. During the interviews, the interviewer sought
further clarification which prompted participants to collect their
thoughts (cf. Chell, 2004). The interviewer repeated some of the
questions to avoid any misunderstanding and to provide ample op-
portunity to revise or change answers. Thus, we did not encourage
respondents to follow and use different interpretations of the three key
concepts. Respondents were encouraged to freely tell their stories with
minimal interventions and minimal presuppositions by the interviewer.
Interviews lasted 60–90 min. At the end of each interview, partici-
pants were asked if they would like to add or explain their previous
answers. The aim was to avoid situations in which participants would
feel that their story was not told appropriately after the interview was
concluded. The interviews were fully transcribed and sent to partici-
pants, which allowed them to check and recheck their answers and
check the intended representation of their narratives.
3.3. Data analysis
The data was analyzed, after the interviews and were transcribed
and sent to respondents for approval. The analysis began with coding of
the materials (Miles and Huberman, 1994) with respect to manifesta-
tions, triggers and consequences of opportunistic behaviors. Coding and
data analysis were conducted manually by three researchers. Each re-
searcher independently reviewed the transcripts to identify themes and
answers to the research questions. The data analysis consisted of two
elements: intra-interviewee coding and inter-interviewee comparison.
Data analysis can be based either on a conceptual framework (de-
ductive logic) or on a grounded approach (inductive logic) (cf. Stauss,
1993). The first approach is appropriate when researchers seek evi-
dence in the data for preconceived categories or coding frames (Chell,
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
2004). In line with the exploratory nature of our study, we adopted the
second approach in which we tried to abandon preconceptions and
premature answers. We followed an inductive approach for developing
categories, in other words the coding was data driven (Kvale and
Brinkmann, 2009) by multiple readings of the empirical material (Bott
and Tourish, 2016). The categories were developed, in search for
commonality. We realize that coding is the stage of CIT “that attracts
the most controversy, as it is both subjective a well as difficult” (Bott
and Tourish, 2016, p. 289). The central theme in our study is buyer
opportunism in strategic supplier relationships. This theme is linked to
the main issues: the manifestation of opportunistic buyer behavior, the
triggers for this behavior, and the consequences of this behavior (cf.
Chell, 2004). After the interviews, the findings were classified into
categories that provided appropriate summaries and labels (Grove and
Fisk, 1997). After we classified the three elements (triggers, manifes-
tations, and consequences) of all narratives into categories, by using
pattern matching.
We coded the interview data manually, and we used a grounded
approach to extract suitable information (Langley, 1999). Using open
coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994) we identified concepts and prop-
erties (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). During the coding, we noted emer-
ging issues which resulted in the development of common frameworks
for the three investigated properties of buyer opportunism: manifesta-
tions, triggers and consequences. As is necessary for this kind of re-
search, codes have been identified through multiple readings of the
transcripts in search for commonalities. In this manner, the analysis
process moved back and forth between data and results. The cyclical
and iterative nature of this process of constant comparison promotes
the generation of knowledge and insights by staying close to the (raw)
data (Glaser, 1965). The classifications in our study are all developed
with an inductive, constructive approach. We specifically did not use an
a priori list of potential critical incidents (cf. Bott and Tourisch, 2016).
It is important that themes and classifications are driven by the data,
not by the researcher nor by prior studies (cf. Braun and Clarke, 2006).
An a priori classification would “limit the breadth and scope of find-
ings” (Bott and Tourish, 2016, p. 288). The main advantage of this
approach is that it allowed us to find triggers that were not discovered
in other studies.
4. Results
As expected, buyer opportunism with strategic suppliers does not
occur frequently in the industrial sector. Several potential respondents
approached could not recall any occurrence of this behavior, even after
prompting them by presenting examples of others. More than half of the
respondents who had experience with opportunism could remember
fewer than three incidents even though they had been buyers for 15
years or longer. Respondents reported a variety of consequences of
buyer opportunism. We agree with Bott and Tourish (2016) that CIT as
a method, is appropriate for gathering “thick descriptions” that are
useful for theory building purposes. In the representation of results, we
have included a number of ‘thick descriptions’ which provides an in-
sightful context, nuances and issues of the respondents' narratives.
4.1. Triggers for buyer opportunism
Our analysis supports the idea that opportunistic behavior is always
triggered by specific incidents and events. In most cases, we found more
than one trigger that induced professional purchasers to behave op-
portunistically. The analysis of triggers sheds light on the beginning of a
course of events and decisions with a central role for the purchaser.
Most respondents reported that they only behaved opportunistically as
a reaction to the behavior from the supplier's side.
In the first phase of the analysis we used open coding to identify the
categories for triggers. We found common points that emerged from the
interviews that could be used for labelling the categories. In an iterative
5
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
process, the open coding process resulted in six categories of triggers.
To increase the validity of findings, the analysis was done and discussed
with other researchers. Appendix 1 shows the trigger categories and
includes some representative quotes. We identified the following six
triggers:
1. The supplier refused a price reduction deemed necessary.
2. Internal pressure on the buyer that is reflected by an explicit as-
signment or an implicit expectation from management.
3. The supplier did not solve a quality or delivery problem.
4. The sales representative lied and/or behaved inappropriately.
5. The sales representative undermined the purchaser's personal and/
or professional honor.
6. The purchaser unexpectedly spotted an easy money opportunity.
The first three triggers relate to problems with an important supplier
which results in tensions between the buyer and the supplier company.
The management of the buying company is involved which puts pres-
sure on the individual buyer to solve the problems. When the supplier
does not meet buyer demands, purchasing professionals may feel
compelled to act opportunistically. Explicit assignments or implicit
expectations of management are included in trigger #2. This is the only
trigger that explicitly originates from management decisions within the
buying company.
“The collaboration with carriers is very important in our industry. The
cooperation must be very open and focused on continuous improvement,
aimed at effectiveness and efficiency. We have put out a tender, which is
odd in itself, since we wanted a strategic partnership. In advance, we
presented the case in a more favorable light, while we later put them
through hell and fleeced them for every euro they got. Within our or-
ganization, the general opinion is that purchasing is little more than
negotiating hard about money and payment terms. As a result, I was
driven by the realization of savings. In my organization I always hear
“can't you get the price down?” The supplier reluctantly served the
contract. We actually destroyed the relationship by the pressure from the
internal organization to negotiate lower prices.” (incident 10.3, internal
pressure)
Further analysis showed that trigger #1 and trigger #2 occur almost
exclusively in combination with each other. Apparently, the internal
pressure on purchasing professionals focusses on concerns about ne-
cessary price reductions. Suppliers that systematically and steadfastly
refuse to lower prices are at risk of encountering an opportunistic buyer
response.
Another combination in the triggers appeared to be specific beha-
viors of sales representatives. Trigger #4 accompanies trigger #5.
Purchasing professionals feel offended and insulted by sales re-
presentatives who lie and/or behave inappropriately. In those cases,
purchasers take it personally. Purchasing professionals feel embar-
rassed, especially when colleagues and managers think that they are
underperforming or even suggest that they are ‘lousy buyers’.
“We had call-off contracts with supplier X for bearings of a specific
brand. At one point I placed an order, then I was told “that is not pos-
sible, we do not have them”. The reason would be that their supplier Y
could not deliver. I insisted that they would immediately call Y.
Unfortunately, nothing was possible. As it turned out, X had not kept any
stocks, contrary to the agreements. So, they did not do their best for me
and they lied to me. My company had to place a rush order at a higher
price. My boss was not happy at all. He blamed me for it. “What kind of
no-good buyer are you?” Later on, our logistics manager called X, and
then everything turned out to be possible! I certainly felt compromised in
my professional honor, in my functioning. Ever since, I was taken less
seriously internally. Of course I personally took revenge.” (incident 2.1,
honor undermined)
Frictions and conflicts between the representatives of the buyer and
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
Fig. 1. Configurations of triggers, manifestations and consequences.
a supplier company can also be the main reason for buyer opportunism.
Occasionally, purchasers accidently encounter easy money that tempts
them to behave opportunistically, for instance:
“During negotiations with a sales director, we knocked back about four
bottles of wine. I kept saying “I don't know, I still think it is too ex-
pensive”. For me it was a bit of a game, teasing. But he really wanted to
close the deal, probably because he had only just been hired by that
supplier. He was dead drunk and gave away far too much of a discount.
In the middle of the night, I put the agreement on paper and let him sign
it. So I took take advantage of that golden opportunity, although I knew
that the sales director could get into deep trouble because he went way
out of line. Afterwards, I heard he regretted it. They eventually fired him.
But my relationship with the supplier has always remained good.”(-
incident 7.3, unexpected easy money)
4.2. Manifestations and consequences of buyer opportunism
In the second phase of analysis we focused on the manifestations
and consequences of opportunistic buyer behavior. Within the range of
potential manifestations we found three categories. The first category is
labeled ‘bluff poker’ which is aimed at pressuring a supplier to behave
in a certain way. Bluff poker is typically considered opportunistic be-
havior only within the context of strategic supplier relationships. Trust
and commitment are key concepts for understanding these relation-
ships. Playing hardball, threatening suppliers, and related behaviors
might be considered appropriate in negotiations with leverage sup-
pliers, not with strategic suppliers. Examples included threatening with
non-existent suppliers, negotiating with competitors of a strategic
supplier, exaggerating problems, and making unnecessary demands.
“We had to talk with a strategic supplier about the procurement of cer-
tain important parts for our machines. During negotiations I mentioned
names of all kinds of competitors. I had googled their names. Then I lied
that I had requested quotations. You can call it lying, another label
would be “not telling the whole truth”. You fantasize about something
and you turn up the pressure. It was not entirely without risk, but we just
wanted to go to the extreme. See what would happen. I knew, they
wanted us as a customer. I am not particularly proud of it, but we came
out very well. There were no negative consequences whatsoever.” (in-
cident 12.2, bluff poker)
The second category consists of ‘non-compliance with agreements’.
This opportunistic behavior can be considered inappropriate within
every supplier relationship. The buying company does not honor
agreements, which causes problems for the supplier. The supplier is
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Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
taught a lesson. The buyer shows who is in control, who has the upper
hand. Examples include having the supplier make products, but not
actually placing orders, not paying (the full price) after delivery, or-
dering from another supplier which violates existing agreements.
“We wanted to build a power plant. The contract value was approxi-
mately 65 million euros. The contractor should have controlled and
managed the subcontractor, which he did not do. They also lied to us. We
found out too late that the deadline was not going to be met. That would
cost us a lot of money. These double-crossed the contractor and entered
into a secret agreement with the subcontractor. However, at the end we
also double-crossed that particular subcontractor. We just did not want
to lose so much money. There were lawsuits, and obviously, the re-
lationships with the contractor and subcontractor were terminated, for
good.” (incident 4.2, non-compliance).
The third category of manifestations exceeds what might be con-
sidered effective and efficient supplier management. These manifesta-
tions are more brutal and are more personal in nature. This category
includes various forms of immoral and inappropriate behaviors, which
we have labeled as ‘bullying behavior’. Feelings of hatred and revenge
can play an important role in this type of behavior. In many cases, the
professional purchaser is offended on a personal level and seeks re-
venge, often personal revenge. Examples include fleecing a supplier and
then snapping his neck, having the supplier pay for unnecessary costs,
and leaking confidential information to the supplier's competitors.
When discussing the consequences, the respondents rarely seemed
to regret their behavior. They found justification for their behavior
partly in the triggers, partly in the consequences. Four different con-
sequences emerged from the interviews. The most positive outcome was
that the ‘objectives were met’. These objectives were formulated in
terms of suppliers that complied to the wishes or demands of the buying
company. In about half of the incidents it was reported that the ob-
jectives were met. The second consequence category is less positive. In
a number of cases the respondents merely reported that their oppor-
tunistic behavior had ‘no negative consequences’. The absence of ne-
gative consequences of purchaser's bluff poker might (partly) explain
why purchasers engage in opportunism. The third possible outcome was
a ‘worsened relationship’, which is typified as being less personal and
less friendly. The fourth and ultimate consequence of buyer opportu-
nism is a ‘terminated relationship’. In about one-third of the incidents,
opportunistic behavior resulted in the ending of the relationship. This
non-compliance behavior is most commonly considered unacceptable
by the supplying party which in turn often results in the termination of
the relationship. It should be noted that in these cases the relationship
was not healthy or ideal in the first place. Former incidents and
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
unsolved quality problems contribute to the termination of un-
satisfactory relationships.
4.3. Configurations of triggers-manifestations-consequences
In the data we observed specific configurations that include sets of
typical triggers, manifestations and consequences (see Fig. 1). The first
configuration depicts a situation with a strong internal pressure on the
purchaser to force the supplier into performing an action that he does
not want to do, namely reduce the price. The supplier's refusal is then
countered by some form of bluff poker. Bluff poker is always enabled by
the perceived low risk for the individual purchaser. The purchaser is not
punished by engaging in opportunistic behavior, particularly if it fits
with the corporate culture. Before the respondents engage in opportu-
nistic behavior it appears that they often first make an assessment of the
associated risks, substantiated by statements like “even with no deal I
would still be the winner” (incident 7.3) and “I'm confident that they
won't find out. Otherwise I wouldn't have done it” (incident 5.2).
Most commonly, flexing muscles works to a certain extent.
Apparently, respondents report that even strategic suppliers are sensi-
tive to (light) forms of threat and deception. However, a less desirable
side effect of playing poker for lower prices is a weakened relationship
with lower levels of trust and commitment. Illustrative quotes are:
“We had a long and good relationship with that supplier. However, in my
company, there was a growing conviction that something had to be done
about the price. At that time, the supplier was not at all willing to discuss
lower prices. Therefore, I wanted to put the pressure on the supplier. I
spread the rumor in the market that we were looking for another supplier,
because the current one did not meet our requirements. That was rather
unfair and disrespectful of me. That behavior is not something that is
appropriate in a strategic supplier relationship. The primary goal of price
improvement has been achieved. By showing my teeth, I have gained
more respect, even though they were not very happy with us at that time.”
(incident 1.1, refusal of price reduction – bluff poker – worsened re-
lationship, but objectives met)
“My boss wanted me to negotiate hard with a certain supplier. The
supplier was very dependent on us, he received perhaps 50% of his orders
from us. You could say that this was an unhealthy situation. There was
much internal pressure to gain more control over that supplier and to
negotiate lower prices. I was looking for a stick to beat the supplier. With
a blunt axe, although that is not my style. So, I kept the supplier on edge
by exaggerating bigger and smaller problems. I also started threatening,
so “if the quality does not get better, then ….”Ultimately, the supplier
stepped up and improved his performance. It changed our relationship.
The supplier has learned to says things like take it or leave it’. Trust
suffered.” (incident 8.1, internal pressure – bluff poker – worsened re-
lationship, but objects met)
The main triggers in the second configuration are unsolved quality
issues. The supplier does not perform according to the agreement. The
organization might have been dissatisfied with the supplier for a while.
The buyer feels that the supplier does not act as a real partner. In that
case, the purchasing professional adapts more aggressive forms of op-
portunistic behavior: bullying and non-compliance with agreements.
Sometimes, these behaviors are successful on a temporary basis. Most
commonly, this configuration of triggers and opportunism results in the
termination of the relationship. Few relationships survive such extreme
forms of opportunism. Illustrative quotes are:
“We encountered serious problems with the quality of special tires. The
supplier did not even want to talk about a solution. They lied, did not act
as partners and denied everything. That really bothered me. They kept
saying that they did not make any mistakes. So, how am I supposed to
react? We stopped paying for deliveries and broke the contract.
Apparently, they only wanted to get more money out of us. We saw them
as a partner with whom you can solve problems together. Our
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Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
relationship is totally screwed. We no longer buy from this supplier. They
have continued to deny everything. In the end it became an arbitration
case.” (incident 3.2, quality problems – non-compliance – relationship
termination)
“We were dissatisfied with the delivery reliability for some time. We
wanted to make a statement by sticking to a delivery date although it was
not necessary. Let them feel what it is like to be late. Just work overtime
and work at the weekend. I had no personal problems with those people.
But, there comes a moment when you have to say ‘stop, here is a line that
you cannot cross’. In my company that is also expected of you. It tends to
be a bit of revenge. It was also somewhat impulsive. Only later do you
think about what could happen. It was a wake-up call for them and it has
also increased their feelings of uncertainty towards us.” (incident 8.3,
quality problems – bullying – worsened relationship)
A comparable situation is the third configuration where the trigger
is not a quality problem, rather it refers to personal issues. The pur-
chaser is mocked by a representative of the supplying firm, which is
interpreted as a personal insult. His personal honor is challenged or v
violated. These strong negative feelings result in a tendency to take
revenge, also at a personal level. Emotionally charged buyers desire to
deliberately damage the relationship and thereby appear to overlook
the value of strategic cooperation. This is illustrated by statements as “I
did it for my own satisfaction” (incident 5.1) and “Our partner sent us a
young rookie as our new key account manager. What an insult, you just
don't do that! I have personally taken revenge” (incident 9.3). Similar to
the second configuration, engaging in non-compliance and bullying
behavior most likely result in the termination of the relationship. The
opportunistic behaviors are not successful in the sense that they change
that attitudes and behavior of the supplying party in a positive way.
“We had a contract with that supplier and there were firm agreements
about the price. Yet they wanted to unilaterally change it to their ad-
vantage. That sales representative tried to shove a bad deal down my
throat. That guy with his lies and B.S. stories. He gave me incorrect in-
formation and his offer was 25% higher than what is a reasonable price.
I took it as a personal insult. Very disrespectful. That's not how I want to
collaborate. I yelled at him and I had him thrown out. Then, behind his
back I called his boss and said that I never want to see this man again.
Later on, I heard that the man was fired.” (incident 3.1, inappropriate
behavior, disrespectful – bullying – relationship termination)
The last and fourth configuration combines the least expected
triggers with unplanned behaviors. The purchasing professional iden-
tifies and pursues an easy money opportunity. Within a reasonably
short time, the purchaser feels that he must act upon this opportunity.
The selected opportunistic behavior is always some form of playing
bluff poker, enabled by a perceived asymmetrical power relationship.
The outcomes of this configuration are rarely assessed as being nega-
tive. Quite often this opportunistic behavior is rewarded by a positive
outcome for the buyer.
“I made them think that I might buy from another supplier. There was no
internal pressure. I did request price quotations from other suppliers and
played bluff poker. He always had to come up with a better offer after I
had spoken to his competitors. I just wanted the best possible deal, purely
for economic reasons. You know what, it paid off. I got everything done,
everything worked out well. In the end, there were no negative con-
sequences. We have not had any conflict either.” (incident 6.2, golden
opportunity – bluff poker – objectives met)
“We were going to work with a dealer who gives us logistical convenience
and maintains stocks. This supplier provides more service and quality, at
the same price we paid earlier. So we improved, but I still wanted better
conditions. I thought that there was a good opportunity to negotiate
somewhat tougher, which fits also with the company culture. But, to be
honest, I just wanted to score, getting a bonus. I admit, that was in my
head. Well, it wasn't a very nice thing to do. But sometimes, you just give
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
it a try. I aimed at a short term success. Only later did I realize that I had
taken too much risk. Fortunately, the relationship has not deteriorated.
They were very down-to-earth and handled it very professional. They
simply refused to lower their price.” (incident 12.1, golden opportunity –
bluff poker – no negative consequences)
4.4. The complex role of dependence
In general, many buyers seem to have trouble with the dependence
associated with strategic supplier relationships. Even when the balance
of power is to their disadvantage, buyers use their power to counter
dependence from suppliers. In terms of power-balance, almost all re-
lations in this study were based on equivalence, or with a slight ad-
vantage to the purchasing party. Not surprisingly, only five cases of
“locked-in” partnerships were registered. Most of our sample is based
on equality. We found that a lower degree of dependence stimulates
buyers opportunistic behavior. Dependency appears negatively related
to opportunism. In other words, low dependence encourages buyers to
act opportunistically. This conclusion is substantiated by statements
like “I will get away with it because I am powerful” (incident 8.1), “I will
easily find another supplier”(incident 0.2) and “because they wanted us
real bad, I took as much as I could” (incident 12.2). Apparently, relatively
low dependence on the supplier can function as an enabler for buyer
opportunism. However, purchasers were only tempted to behave op-
portunistically, when they were not satisfied with the supplier.
In situations where the buying company was the dependent party,
we found evidence for both an inhibiting and a stimulating effect on
buyer opportunism. Purchasers are inclined to refrain from opportu-
nism when they have to deal with powerful or indispensable suppliers.
Arrogant suppliers might reduce the relational norms in the relation-
ship, although the purchaser will always be cautious and carefully
consider his options. We found instances where the buyer was actually
aware of his dependence and made a rational decision to refrain from
engaging in opportunistic behavior. “I need the source code, otherwise I
would have played harder” and “I remained on speaking terms because a
lawsuit was not a solution” (incident 7.1) are clear examples of the in-
hibitory effect of dependence on buyer opportunism.
In contrast, we also found cases in which the high dependence on a
supplier stimulated the purchasers to seek ways of alleviating locked-in
problems. When buyers were aware of their dependence they may take
measures to reduce it. “We wanted to get out of the strategic box” (in-
cident 10.1) and “We realized that we were dependent and therefore we
have taken preventive countermeasures” (incident 12.3) are examples.
Occasionally, opportunism was deployed as a means to lower the de-
pendence on a supplier.
5. Discussion
Opportunism is a broad construct that encompasses many different
types of unethical behavior (Tangpong et al., 2010). Literature has
produced long lists of opportunistic behaviors (e.g. Wathne and Heide,
2000), which makes it hard to unambiguously discuss opportunistic
behavior. It is useful to categorize the different opportunistic buyer
behaviours into three sequential types: a violation of relational norms
in strategic supplier relations (“playing bluff poker”), of contractual
agreements (“non-compliance/breach of contract”), and of general
standards of common decency (“bullying behavior”).
We know that purchasing professionals behave opportunistically
even in strategic supplier relationships, despite the well-documented
negative effects (e.g. Li et al., 2010). Our study has shed light on the
question: what triggers professional purchasers to behave opportunis-
tically in strategic supplier relations? This study contributes to the
knowledge on buyer opportunism in different ways. Our approach
differs on a number of points from other studies on buyer opportunism.
Despite the numerous studies on opportunism in buyer-supplier
8
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
relationships, we focused on the individual level which is still under-
studied (1). We focused on opportunistic buyer behavior in strategic
supplier relations where collaboration and partnership behaviors are
expected (2). The analysis of manifestations has resulted in a clear
categorization that proved to be rather new and shows an inherent logic
in its categories (violation of contractual agreements, violation of
norms within strategic supplier relations, and violation of generic
standards of common decency within any supplier relation) (3). To our
knowledge, the Critical Incident Technique has never been used before
in the context of investigating opportunistic buyer behavior (4). The
most important finding and contribution of this study concerns the
identification of specific configurations, built around typical triggers,
manifestations, and consequences (5). Based on these results (see also
Fig. 1), we can develop the following propositions:
P1. Management is inclined to pressure purchasers into violating relational
norms and playing bluff poker when a strategic supplier refuses a price
reduction deemed necessary. Strategic suppliers might give in at the expense
of the relationship quality.
P2. Unsolved quality and delivery problems by the strategic supplier might
induce the purchaser to violate contractual agreements and/or general
standards of decency. This may lead to the termination of the relationship,
especially when the relationship was not healthy or ideal in the first place.
P3. A sales representative of a strategic supplier who undermines the
purchaser's honor and/or behaves inappropriately could induce the buyer
to violate contractual agreements and/or general standards of common
decency. This may lead to the termination of the relationship, especially
when the relationship was not sustainable or satisfactory in the first place.
P4. A purchaser who grasps an easy money opportunity at the expense of the
strategic supplier, is often rewarded for his/her violation of relation norms
(bluff poker) with a positive outcome.
The extant literature is not clear about the impact of power and
dependence on opportunism. While some researchers suggest that de-
pendence of the weaker party provokes opportunism by the dominant
party (e.g. John, 1984), others predict that even dominant parties will
refrain from engaging in opportunistic behavior (e.g. Granovetter,
1985). Our findings provide nuanced insights into this issue. We found
a differentiated role and impact of dependence on buyer opportunism.
Dependent buyers are inclined to refrain from engaging in opportunistic
behavior, although in some instances purchasers used opportunism as a
means to counter the dominant position of the supplier. In cases of
dominant buyers, the low dependence on a supplier can function as an
enabler for opportunistic behavior. We found examples of this me-
chanism, which confirms studies like Mysen et al. (2011). Our findings
indicate that ‘satisfaction with the relationship’ is negatively related to
opportunism (cf. Villena et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013). Apparently,
purchasers only fall into opportunistic behavior when they are not sa-
tisfied with the relationship or when they are forced by internal sta-
keholders (cf. Hawkins et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2013). We propose the
following propositions:
P5. A low dependence on a strategic supplier encourages and enables
purchasers to act opportunistically, while purchasers are inclined to refrain
from opportunism when they have to deal with powerful or indispensable
suppliers.
P6. Purchasers may use opportunism as a means to alleviate locked-in
problems and to lower their dependence on a powerful or indispensable
strategic supplier.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
6.1. Conclusions
Opportunistic behavior is a well-known reason for the failure of
C.J. Gelderman, et al.
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships. Research on buyer oppor-
tunism typically focusses on leverage supplier relationships. Little is
known about the opportunistic behavior of purchasers in strategic
partnerships. This study is the first to use the Critical Incident
Technique to identify and describe configurations of triggers, mani-
festation and consequences of opportunistic buyer behavior. Purchasing
professionals were interviewed regarding their own personal opportu-
nistic behavior, resulting in thick descriptions of 29 critical incidents.
Our study suggests that manifestations of opportunism can be grouped
into three categories:
- a violation of relational norms in strategic supplier relations
(“playing bluff poker”),
- a violation of contractual agreements (“non-compliance/breach of
contract”), and
- a violation of general standards of common decency (“bullying be-
havior”).
These manifestations appeared to be triggered by distinct and var-
ious triggers. We found that purchasers behave opportunistically as a
reaction to four types of triggers: (1) internal pressure for price re-
ductions which are refused by the supplier, (2) unsolved quality pro-
blems, (3) inappropriate and provocative behavior of sales re-
presentatives, and (4) unexpected, easy money opportunities for the
purchaser. By combining triggers with manifestations and con-
sequences, we were able to provide explanations for the paradox as to
why purchasing professionals act opportunistically in spite of the well-
documented negative effects of opportunistic behavior in strategic
supplier relationships.
In many cases buyer opportunism appears to be driven by top
management, or is an integral part of the company culture. Purchasers
regularly act on explicit instructions from their superiors, or they feel
pressure to achieve short-term results or they are compelled to follow
unworkable procedures and protocols. In some instances, buyers in-
tentionally want to downgrade a (less-satisfactory) strategic relation-
ship into a leverage relationship. Our results indicate that opportunistic
behavior often appears to be a conscious choice by a purchaser, based
on a balanced assessment of risks and consequences. However, we also
found situations in which purchasers tend to seek revenge which is
driven by negative feelings and emotions toward a sales representative.
6.2. Recommendations for future research
We do not claim to have grasped all possible triggers and types of
opportunistic behaviors. The findings are the result of an explorative
study which limits the generalizability. We interviewed experienced
buyers in the Dutch industrial sector. Different relational norms and
different triggers for opportunism might prevail in other sectors and
countries. Future research could try to shed more light on sectoral and
cultural differences regarding triggers for buyer opportunism in stra-
tegic supplier relationships. Since we build our findings on expert in-
terviews, our results may serve as a basis for further quantitative re-
search. Another promising research design would be to analyze court
cases in which one party goes into court with the other party.
We promised and assured anonymity to respondents. Still, the re-
sults of this study should be interpreted with caution, because the
findings and the results are based on self-reported, socially less-ac-
cepted behavior. Professionals in organizations are likely to be hesitant
to admit their dishonest and deceitful behavior towards suppliers.
Furthermore, respondents may find it difficult to recognize internal
triggers, including the impact of their own personality traits. A pro-
mising avenue for future study could be to focus on the potential role of
subjective perceptions, interpretations and sense-making of the in-
volved professionals. Future research may want to explore the justifi-
cations of purchasing professional for their unethical and opportunistic
behavior. Also, we did not interview potential respondents that could
9
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581
not recall any occurrence of opportunistic behavior. However, these
‘respondents’ could be useful sources of information in future studies
aimed at investigating purchasers who refrain from such behaviors.
More general, “organizational buying behavior has often been
treated as a rational activity, even though humans are involved in the
decision-making” (Kemp et al., 2018, p. 19). As a result, emotions are
largely overlooked and understudied in research on organizational
buying behavior. Future research could focus on the influence of
emotions on the use and effectiveness of opportunistic buying behavior.
The focus of our study is on buyer opportunism in strategic supplier
relations, not on leverage relations. That is an informed choice which
allows the gathering of new and relevant insights in our understanding
of (buyer) opportunism. A weak point in many papers on opportunism
is ignoring differences between relationship types. We feel that more
useful and focused knowledge can be developed by explicitly excluding
other kinds of buyer-supplier relationship types. A recommendation for
future research would be to systematically investigate opportunism
(triggers, manifestations, and effects) in different types of relationships.
Purchasing and sales professionals represent their firms and often
act as decision-making agents in inter-firm exchange related decisions
(cf. Tangpong et al., 2010). In our study we have focused on the in-
dividual unit of analysis, which is rarely selected in studies on (buyer)
opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2013). Inter-individual opportunism is
crucial, since it may be the source of inter-firm opportunism as well
(Romar, 2004). Also, purchasing and sales professionals are likely to
influence the context and the collaboration of buying and supplying
firms (cf. Schurr, 2007). Different levels of analysis are likely to pro-
duce different antecedents and outcomes of opportunism. Future re-
search could address the interactions between the individual and the
organizational level regarding opportunistic behavior.
6.3. Recommendations for practitioners
If companies decide that strategic partnerships with suppliers are
necessary and appropriate, it is also necessary to take measures to
prevent, recognize and fight opportunism. The study shows that gov-
ernance structures often encourage buyer opportunism although they
intend to achieve the opposite. Purchasers typically feel that their op-
portunistic behavior is induced by company rules, supervisor instruc-
tions, corporate culture and pressure for short term results. Purchasing
professionals could benefit from clear guidelines and/or accepted be-
havioral norms for dealing with strategic suppliers.
Purchasing professionals tend to become emotionally involved in a
negative way, when it comes to trust issues, leading to a desire for re-
venge. Negative emotional involvement almost always encourages the
purchaser to break up the relationship. It is highly questionable whe-
ther a personal incident is a valid reason for a company to terminate a
valuable partnership. If companies aim for long-term partnerships with
suppliers they must ensure that buyers build a relationship on a busi-
ness foundation. When the emotional bond evolves into a counter-
productive relationship, companies should assign that supplier to a
different buyer.
Our results indicate that opportunism often appears to be a pur-
chaser's conscious choice, based on a balanced assessment of risks and
consequences of opportunism. Top management should regularly check
whether the relational norms of their purchasers are still aligned with
the norms of the company. Some (less professional) purchasers may, for
instance, have problems with adequately distinguishing between
leverage and strategic suppliers.
Our study suggests that many manifestations of purchasing oppor-
tunism seem to be triggered by the behavior and decisions of their
strategic suppliers. Purchasers feel that these ‘partners’ will not, or
cannot, constructively help and cooperate in solving specific buying
company's critical problems. From the purchaser's point of view, this
can be seen as a form of supplier opportunism. Within this constella-
tion, parties tend to have a negative interaction at the expense of the
C.J. Gelderman, et al. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management () 100581

relationship. Management and purchasing professionals should be
aware of this phenomenon and could try to prevent a negative spiral.
For example, at an early stage they could systematically inform sup-
pliers that every contractual agreement will be closely monitored.
Our research indicates that even strategic suppliers may be re-
sponsive to mild forms of buyer opportunism (playing bluff poker)
when it comes to price reductions that are deemed necessary by the
buying company. Although playing bluff poker and violating relational
norms of a strategic partnership weakens the relationship, it certainly
does not automatically end the relationship. Apparently, prices are al-
ways negotiable and negotiations about prices do not always lead to
conflicts and relationship termination. However, the purchaser should
know that even these mild forms of opportunism are more appropriate
and effective in negotiations with leverage suppliers. If strategic
suppliers are treated opportunistically, then the buying organization
should not be surprised to experience a significant decrease of trust and
commitment. In time, the partnership is likely to evolve into a less
strategic relationship.
Another trigger for buyer opportunism is that the supplier does not
solve quality and delivery problems. Purchasers may then tend to apply
more severe forms of opportunism, such as failure to comply with
contractual agreements or violating common decency standards.
However, our research shows that this approach rarely produces posi-
tive results.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that there are no conflict of interest.

Appendix 1. Triggers for buyer opportunism – results of open coding analysis

Representative quotes Trigger categories

“It was very hard to persuade them to lower prices. I was stuck. Something had to be done.” (incident 1.1) 1. Refused price re- Management pressures for price
“Due to developments, price reductions were possible, but that could not be achieved in a good, open conversa- duction reductions
tion.” (incident 8.2)
“It was expected of me to achieve a price reduction, although the supplier refused to cooperate.” (incident 1.3) 2. Internal pressure
“There was internal pressure. ‘Make sure the prices go down’, so I was told.” (incident 8.2)
“We found out that the contractor would never meet the deadline. That prompted us to take tough measures.” (incident 3. Quality problems
4.2)
“The supplier did not want to do anything anymore, while the machine was not working as it should work.”
(incident 7.2)
“He lied to me that they had no stock. And that delivery would cost extra money.” (incident 2.1) 4. Inappropriate be- Personal insult
“He involved my own director in our conflict, who he saw at the hockey fields with both their daughters played.” haviors
(incident 9.2)
“I was lied to, but the management thought me a lousy buyer. They have offended my honor and my functioning. 5. Honor undermined
Actually everything.” (incident 2.1)
“I had reported to the management that I was threatened by that supplier, but I was not taken seriously.” (incident
5.1)
“That sales director could not go home without a deal. I could take advantage of that opportunity.” (incident 7.3) 6. Easy money oppor-
“I just wanted to take advantage of the opportunity that presented itself.” (incident 12.2) tunity

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