Javier v Veridiano

Same;  Same; Forcible Entry; Ownership; A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of

possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership.—But,
there is merit in petitioner’s argument that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil
Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0. Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry,
where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed
property. Thus, “[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material
possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The
philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence
or terror.” And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on
the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building.
Same;  Same; Remedies available to recover possession of real property; Accion
reivindicatoria, accion interdictal and accion publiciana, distinguished.—The doctrine in Emilia
v. Bado, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has preserved the age-old
remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property,
namely, accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where
the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful
detainer (desahuico) where the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so
by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial
court.

Same;  Same; Same; Same.—Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an

action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely
alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.
Same;  Same; A petition to quiet title has a cause of action different from that for ejectment.
—And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, even if we treat
Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of
action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action
between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot
bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.

Bustos v CA

Same;  Same; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Accion Reivindicatoria; To execute the

judgment in the unlawful detainer case by ejecting a party from the land that he or she has been
adjudged to own in accion reivindicatoria would certainly result in grave injustice.—In the
present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners
of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners
from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of
possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by
virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Same;  Same; Ownership; Possession; One of the essential attributes of ownership is
possession—an owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) “juses“ or attributes of ownership,
namely, the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or
alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits—is a crippled owner.—Placing petitioners in
possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision
declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership
is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. “An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) “juses” or attributes of
ownership—the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to
dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits—is a crippled owner.”

Heirs of Roman Soriano v CA

Ownership; Possession; Words and Phrases; “Ownership” and “Possession,”

Distinguished; A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession.—
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining
to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which
are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession
thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The
possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have
improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other
valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not
necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
Same;  Same; Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy; Security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood; The exercise of the
right of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.—It is important
to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject land, the
exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The
Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure
and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship
is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means
of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of
an agricultural tenant.
 Same;  Same; Same; Land Titles; A judgment in a land registration case cannot be
effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending
determination before the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB).—
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the
land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the
area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration
that the latter’s occupancy was unlawful.

Garcia v CA

Ownership; Possession; Words and Phrases; “Ownership– and “Possession,–

Distinguished; Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected
to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others while
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.–We stress again
that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of
which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife
Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject
property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept
of an owner and possession of a holder. “A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the
owner himself or one who claims to be so.– On the other hand, “one who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong.– The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the
concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents.
Same;  Same; Land Titles; Sales; Mortgages;  Registration does not confer ownership, it is
merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property; The deed of sale operates as a
formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as
proof of ownership.–We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to
PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over
the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does
not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The
deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the
buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already
the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

Rodil Enterprises v CA

Ownership; Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property—it is an attribute of
ownership, and this rule has no exception.—We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every
owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this
rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased
property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are
present.

Same;  Unlawful Detainer; In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in
prior physical possession.—In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in
prior physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease
contract with the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was
merely by virtue of acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC
merely issued a “temporary occupancy permit” which was not even in the name of the
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent
ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC,
the right of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same
to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject
premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly,
petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from
whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.

Isaguirre v De Lara

Land Registration; Writs of Possession; Ownership; The decision of the Court of Appeals,

which affirmed a party’s title over her property, serves as more than adequate basis for the
issuance of the writ of possession; A sole owner has the right to enjoy her property without any
other limitations than those established by law.— Petitioner argues that the abovementioned
decision merely settled the following matters: (1) that the transaction between petitioner and
respondent was not a sale but an equitable mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of
respondent is valid; and (3) that OCT No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void.
Since the aforementioned decision did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the
subject property and the delivery thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of possession by
the trial court on June 16, 1998 constituted an unwarranted modification or addition to the final
and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 120832. We do not agree with petitioner’s
contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995 decision of the appellate court, which was
affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996, served as more than adequate basis for the issuance of the
writ of possession in favor of respondent since these decisions affirmed respondent’s title over
the subject property. As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without
any other limitations than those established by law. Corollary to such right, respondent also has
the right to exclude from the possession of her property any other person to whom she has not
transmitted such property.

Same;  Same; Judgments;  Possession is an essential attribute of ownership—it would be

redundant for the mortgagor to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess the
property; A judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.—We hold that the trial court correctly
issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence
of this Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title
(OCT No. P-13038) in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time
nullifying the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio
Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for
respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property. Contrary
to petitioner’s claims, the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court did not constitute
an unwarranted modification of our decision in G.R. No. 120832, but rather, was a necessary
complement thereto. It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the
face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Same;  Same; Possessor in Bad Faith; As a possessor in bad faith, the mortgagee may only
claim reimbursement for necessary expenses and not for any useful expenses which he may have
incurred.—With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the
Court of Appeals’ characterization of peti-. tioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on the
factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning
that there was really no sale and that he held respondent’s property as mere security for the
payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for
necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which
he may have incurred.

Custodio v Corrado

Same;  Same; Same; Ejectment; A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of

no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
—An ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of action from
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the judgment of
the former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element of
ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a
bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. Incidentally, we
agree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but more
of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondent’s allegation in the complaint that he is
the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow thereon
and had been continuously occupying the same since then.
Same;  Same; Same; Same; What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from
a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto; The summary
action of ejectment, accion publiciana and accion reinvindictoria make up the three kinds of
action to judicially recover possession.—The distinction between a summary action of ejectment
and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in
our jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory
action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria)is that the
first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion
interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed
to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or
the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds
of actions to judicially recover possession.

Same;  Words and Phrases; For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.—Anent the second issue,
petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him and respondent’s father was amply
supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a factual issue requiring re-evaluation and
examination of the probative value of evidences presented which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Besides, this issue had already been squarely resolved by the Court of
Appeals and we find no impelling reason to set it aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the
milling tickets only showed that they were issued to Crisanto Corrado but did not show whether
such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In petitions for review on certiorari, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited
to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The findings of fact of the
appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.

Abejaron v Nabasa

Land Titles; Property; Actions; Reconveyance; An action for reconveyancee of a property

is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongful or erroneously registered
in another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value; For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.—An action for reconveyance of a
property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property
has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the
person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof.
Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it
is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his
title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Same;  Same; Same; Same; Proof of Ownership; While the receipts and tax declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or
supported by other effective proof.—Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared
the disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by
other effective proof. Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his
case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.
Same;  Same; Same; Same; Same;  The basic presumption is that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State; thus, evidence of a land grant must be “well-nigh
incontrovertible.”—Petitioner’s evidence do not consti tute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”
evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at
least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
and evidence of a land grant must be “well-nigh incontrovertible.” As petitioner Abejaron has
not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of
title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.

Javier v Lumontad

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; In forcible entry, the complaint must
necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.— As explicated in
the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 662 SCRA 14 (2011), “[t]he invariable rule is that what determines
the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must
necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of
that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not
essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.
In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the
property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a
cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; Jurisdiction; Municipal Trial Courts; Even in cases where
the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority
to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.
—Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level
courts by express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section
1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination
of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It must be clarified, however,
that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP and STATE OF NECESSITY

Spouses Fuentes v Roca

Civil Law; Family Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; The Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice
to vested rights.—The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to
apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Thus: Art.
105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256. (n)
Same; Same; Same; Same; In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property; It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.—In contrast to Article 173
of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the
wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides
that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would
be void. Article 124 thus provides: “Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x”

Same; Property Relations; Possession; Possessor in Good Faith; He is deemed a possessor in

good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.—He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said
Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were
under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final
judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the
improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement
is made.

Saluday v People

Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
ultimately stems from a person’s right to privacy.—The prohibition of unreasonable search and
seizure ultimately stems from a person’s right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes
into a person’s expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth
Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or
one’s expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
“search” within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Same; Same; Same; The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding
the case.—Indeed, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other
factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may
diminish this expectation. In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 14 (1999), a
common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to the hostile acts of
armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The Court held that “simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with nonintrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger’s
constitutional rights.” In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 333 (1991), a
compulsory right-of-way was found improper for the failure of the owners of the dominant estate
to allege that the passageway they sought to be reopened was at a point least prejudicial to the
owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained, “[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates
a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security
within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons
would be compromised.” Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and body scanners,
and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part
of the mall owner can compromise public safety.
Same; Same; Same; A person’s expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she
enters private premises that are accessible to the public.—Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach
resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude
anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible
to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose nonintrusive security measures and
filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and
the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety.
Necessarily, a person’s expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private
premises that are accessible to the public.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.—Doubtless, the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However,
to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness
are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or
secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or
her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that
no incriminating evidence will be found; (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state
of the person consenting.

USE INJURING RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

ANDAMO V IAC

Same;  Same; Property; Adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which

require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the
rights and interests of others.—It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon
the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures
on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECOVER ONE’S POSSESSION

BISHOP OF CEBU V MANGARON

REALTY; POSSESSION; CIVIL PROCEDURE; "ACCION PUBLICIANA."—Article 1635 of

the old Code of Civil Procedure not having been repealed by the Civil Code, if the acción
publiciana existed prior to its enactment it must necessarily exist after such enactment. Therefore
the action brought by the plaintiff in this case, to recover the possession of which he was
unlawfully deprived by the defendant, can be properly maintained under the provisions of the
present Civil Code, considered as substantive law, without prejudice to any right which he may
have to the ownership of the property, which ownership he must necessarily establish in order to
overcome the presumption of title which exists in favor of the lawful possessor, the plaintiff in
this case, who had been in the quiet and peaceful possession of the land for twenty years, more or
less, at the time he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant.

VICTORIA ECHANES V SPS HAILAR

Unlawful Detainer; The only question that the courts must resolve in an unlawful detainer case
is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute.—The only question that the courts must resolve in an unlawful detainer case is who
between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.
The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de
jure that either party may set forth in his pleading.

Same; Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the courts to provisionally
determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of physical
possession.—Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the courts to provisionally
determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of physical
possession. Otherwise stated, when the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.
Same; In an action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical
possession, he may recover such possession even from the owner.—In an action for forcible
entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover
such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior
physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be
the owner of the property.
Same; The summary character of the proceedings in an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest
of preserving the peace of the community.—The summary character of the proceedings in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is designed to quicken the determination of
possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary
proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on
ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the
purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.

SURFACE RIGHTS

US V CAUSBY

Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken
farm.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the
full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere.

The flight of aircraft is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use to which the land, or the space over the land, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as
to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land. Subject to that right of
flight, ownership of the space above the land is declared to be vested in the various owners of the
land beneath and a Constitutional taking may be found. 

REP V KABACAN

Civil Law; Property; Ownership; Rights over lands are indivisible, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.—In National Power Corporation v.
Ibrahim, et al., 526 SCRA 149 (2007), we held that rights over lands are indivisible, viz.:
[C]onsequently, the CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned
and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the
underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower
courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This
conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 437. The owner of
a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface
as well as to the subsoil under it. xxx xxx xxx Registered landowners may even be ousted of
ownership and possession of their properties in the event the latter are reclassified as mineral
lands because real properties are characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right extends to
the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical interests serves only to further weaken its
case. The theory would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which such area
offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners’ right extends to such height or depth
where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond
such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION

ROSARIO V LIM

Civil Law; Property; Ownership; Accession; The accessory follows the principal, that is, the
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby,
or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.—Neither can
Alfonso lean on the supposed tax declarations in his name as these are not conclusive evidence
of ownership unlike a certificate of title which indicates true and legal ownership by the
registered owners. Thus, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code find no application in this case,
but the doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property
gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. Verily, the RTC aptly held that preponderance of
evidence must shift in favor of petitioners and the contested properties should necessarily form
part of Brigida’s estate.

ACCESSION W/ RESPECT TO IMMOV PROP

ACCESSION DISCRETA

DACLISON V BAYTION

Civil Law; Property; Accretion; The following requisites must concur in order for an
accretion to be considered, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.—Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by
reason of accretion is misplaced. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: To the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters. In other words, the following requisites must concur in order
for an accretion to be considered, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Same; Same; Same; Alluvion; Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a
result of human intervention.—In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered
an accretion. To begin with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible
deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current
from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the
indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or
creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or accession.
Article 445 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land
of another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land,
subject to the provisions of the following articles.

LBP V PEREZ (No doctrine from escra related to property) (reader discretion advised)

ACCESSION CONTINUA – INDUSTRIAL

IGNACIO V HILARIO

PROPERTY; IMPROVEMENTS; RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF OWNER OF LAND

AND OF OWNER OF IMPROVEMENTS.—The owner of the building evected in good faith on
a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the .possession of the land until he is paid. the value
of his building, under article 453 of the Civil Code. The owner of the land, upon the other hand,
has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of
the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to
sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.

SPS MACASAET V MACASAET

Ejectment;  Unlawful Detainer; In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was
originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right
to possess, arising from an express or implied contract.—In actions for unlawful detainer,
possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the
defendant’s right to possess, arising from an express or implied contract. In other words, the
plaintiff’s cause of action comes from the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right to
continue possession. The case resulting therefrom must be filed within one year from the date of
the last demand.
Same;  Same; To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient.—To show a cause of
action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding
possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if it does not employ the
terminology of the law, provided the said pleading is couched in a language adequately stating
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become unlawful. It is equally
settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined from the
averments of the complaint.
Same;  Same; This court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at
the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound
by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. A summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation.—This Court has
consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. A summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Same;  Same; Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial
applies to the preliminary conference. Under section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a
party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause.—Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the
provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference. Under Section 4 of this
Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the
appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.
Same;  Same; Respondents have the right to appropriate—as their own—the building and
other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or
(2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the
option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more
than that of the structures—in which case, the petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.—
Respondents have the right to appropriate—as their own—the building and other improvements
on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the
increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures—in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

ESMAQUEL V COPRADA

Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them.—In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them. However, defendant’s possession became illegal when the
plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand. The sole
issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of
ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to
determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution
boils down to which of the parties’ respective evidence deserves more weight.

Same; Same; Land Titles; As against the respondent’s unproven claim that she acquired a
portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of the
latter must prevail; It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.—In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to
substantiate her allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact, when
petitioners sent a letter to the respondent, demanding her to vacate the subject property, the
respondent, in reply to the said letter, never mentioned that she purchased the subject land in
1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent should have immediately and categorically
claimed that in her letter response. Clearly therefore, respondent’s submission that there was an
oral sale is a mere afterthought. On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the petitioners.
As against the respondent’s unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the
petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners’ title
over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.

Same; Same; Builders in Good Faith; Where a party’s occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil
Code—it is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof; Persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners
are not possessors in good faith.—In respondent’s Answer filed before the MCTC, she claimed
that since she was able to build a structure on the subject lot with the prior permission from the
owner, she is a builder in good faith and thus entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and useful
expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Without such
reimbursement, she has the right of retention over the property and she cannot just be ejected
from the premises. Respondent’s argument does not hold water. Since respondent’s occupation
of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.  She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any
time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448
and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons
whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her
possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to
be a person who builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof.

SPS AQUINO V AGUILAR

Civil Law; Property; Builder in Bad Faith; Petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the
right to appropriate what has been built on the property, without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no right to a refund of any improvement built
therein,  pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.—We hold that petitioners, as the
owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on the property, without any
obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no right to a refund of any
improvement built therein, pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code: Art. 449. He who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right of indemnity. Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent. Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Same; Same; Same; Necessary Expenses; Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a
builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of
the land.—Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup
the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that
respondents in this case are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, being builders in
bad faith, they do not have the right of retention over the premises.

ARTICLE 448 AMD 447 APPLIED BY ANALOGY

SPS DEL CAMPO V ABIESA

Civil Law; Property;  Builder in good faith; Co-ownership; When a co-ownership is

terminated by the partition and the house of defendants overlaps a portion of the land of
plaintiffs which defendants built in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies; Article 448
may apply even when there was co-owner$hip if good faith has been established.—However,
when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the
house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisionB of Article 448
of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision
of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been
established.
Same;  Same; Same; Same; Right of a builder in good faith under Article 546 of the Civil
Code.—Applying the afore-said provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as
provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants
to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more . than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon,
then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable
rent to the plaintiffs upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or
remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.

PECSON V CA

Property; Ownership; Builder in Good Faith;  Art. 448 of the Civil Code does not apply to
a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or donation.—By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land
whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown
or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in
bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in
determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not
apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or donation.
Same;  Same; Same; The provision of Art. 448 on indemnity may be applied by analogy to a
case where one loses the ownership of the land on which he earlier built an apartment.—
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not
apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may
be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of
forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may
be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.

Same;  Same; Same; Equity; Unjust Enrichment; It is the current market value of the

improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement to the builder in good faith.—
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such
a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued incomeyielding four-
unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be
allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which
the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the
landowner.
Same;  Same; Same; Same; The right to retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built,
planted or sown and retention of ownership of the improvements and, necessarily, the income
therefrom.—The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to
the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents
have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession
and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the
portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been
so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income
therefrom.

GOOD FAITH
 HEIRS OF MARIANO V CITY OF NAGA

Civil Law; Property; Builders in Bad Faith; Petitioners, as hereditary successors of the
registered owners of the subject property, have the right to appropriate what has been built on
the property, without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, and the City has no right to a
refund of any improvement built therein.—The foregoing circumstances ineluctably show that
the City knew of a substantial flaw in its claim over the subject property. The proposed donation
was conditioned on the award of the construction contract to the Subdivision. By its Resolution
No. 89, the City accepted the proposal with all its conditions. Thus, the City could not have been
unaware that by awarding the same construction contract to Sabaria, it no longer had any cause
to continue occupying the subject property as the condition for the proposed donation had not
been satisfied. Accordingly, it should have vacated the subject property. However, it stayed on
and allowed Sabaria to undertake the construction. Furthermore, Macario’s September 17, 1959
and May 14, 1968 letters showed that Mayor Imperial had proposed that the Naga City
government would just buy the subject property from him and Gimenez. Said letters also
indicated that Macario had long been waiting for the City to act on this proposal but the latter
had not taken any action. The City, in the meantime, continued to enjoy possession of the subject
property and subsequently allowed other government agencies to build their offices in the
premises.

The proposal, however, was never brought to fruition by the City. It cannot, thus, be said that the
City was of an honest belief that it had a valid right to the subject property or that its actions had
not overreached the landowners. Accordingly, it cannot be considered to have acted in good
faith. Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code provide: Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper
rent. Thus, petitioners, as hereditary successors of the registered owners of the subject property,
have the right to appropriate what has been built on the property, without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor, and the City has no right to a refund of any improvement built therein.

Same; Same; Same; The rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to the
return of the property and to recover damages, which refer to “rents” or “the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,” or the “fair rental value of the
property” and attorney’s fees and costs.—The rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is
entitled to the return of the property and to recover damages, which refer to “rents” or “the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,” or the “fair rental value of
the property” and attorney’s fees and costs. More specifically, recoverable damages are “those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property.”
 
LEVISTE MNGMT SYS INC. V LEGASPI TOWERS
 Civil Law; Accession; Builders in Good Faith; It is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a
general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual
relation between the parties.—It is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article
448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the
parties. Morever, in several cases, this Court has explained that the raison d’être for Article 448
of the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership:
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner
of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d’être for this provision has been
enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a
state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land
the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.
Same; Same; Same; Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are
therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the
Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the Bylaws of the condominium
corporation).—In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation,
wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member in accordance with
Section 10 of the Condominium Act, which provides: SECTION 10. Whenever the common
areas in a condominium project are held by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall
constitute the management body of the project. The corporate purposes of such a corporation
shall be limited to the holding of the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in
real property recognized by law, to the management of the project, and to such other purposes as
may be necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes. The articles
of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation shall not contain any provision contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of
restrictions of the project. Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of whether it is
a stock or non-stock corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the condominium unit
of which it is an appurtenance. When a member or stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project
in which the condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall automatically
cease to be a member or stockholder of the condominium corporation. The builder is therefore
already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the
Condominium Act. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the special law prevails. Generalia specialibus non derogant. The provisions of the
Civil Code, a general law, should therefore give way to the Condominium Act, a special law,
with regard to properties recorded in accordance with Section 4 of said Act. Special laws cover
distinct situations, such as the necessary co-ownership between unit owners in condominiums
and the need to preserve the structural integrity of condominium buildings; and these special
situations deserve, for practicality, a separate set of rules. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act
where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the
subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the Bylaws of
the condominium corporation). This Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a condominium
unit, the purchaser not only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also binds himself to a contract
with other unit owners.

QUIETING OF TITLE

INC V PONFERRADA

Same;  Same; Quieting of Title; The nature of an action is determined by the material

allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such
relief; A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an
interest in land appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or which it would
be inequitable to enforce.—The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As
gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for quieting of
title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476 of the New Civil Code. The
latter provision reads: Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein. A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either
legal or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in land appearing in some legal form but which is, in
fact, unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to enforce. An action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted of his possession.
Same;  Same; Same; The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of
quieting of title even if, at the time of the commencement of his action, he was not in actual
possession of real property.—The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of
quieting of title even if, at the time of the commencement of his action, he was not in actual
possession of real property. After all, under Article 477 of the New Civil Code, the owner need
not be in possession of the propery. If on the face of TCT No. 321744 under the name of
plaintiff, its invalidity does not appear but rests partly in pais, an action for quieting of title is
proper.
Same;  Same; Same; An accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well—it is an action
whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
—Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner.
An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material
possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such
possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking
the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an
action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file
an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus
vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case,
respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and
the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce
their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from
fencing the property.
Same;  Same; Same; Prescription; The prescriptive period for the reinvidicatory action has not
yet commenced to run where the plaintiff was in actual or physical possession of the property
when he filed his complaint.— Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the
property when they filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive
period for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able
to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that x x x one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

HEIRS OF POCDO V AVILA

Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Titles; In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is
seeking for “an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant
is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title
to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.”—In an action for quieting of
title, the complainant is seeking for “an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property
adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a
cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.” Under
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title
are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity. 

HEIRS OF TAPPA V HEIRS OF BACUD

Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; In  Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137
(2000),  an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity.—
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession.
In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit: x x x Originating in equity
jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.” In an
action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, “. . . not only to place things in their proper place,  to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for
the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements  he may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original) In our
jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state: Art.
476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also
be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

Same; Same; The rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie  appearance.—For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.