Giant

Discovery
 Contents

The Prelude 9

The Discovery 19

Maiden Days aboard

"Ocean Viking" 32

A Giant Oil Discovery 36

Development Plans Take Shape 45

A Long Way from Landing Sites 58

Ekofisk Becomes a "City" 64

Focusing on the Colossus 69

From Ekofisk to the Consumer 92

The Development Project

Is Completed 108

Here's What Happens

at the Ekofisk Complex 124

Costly Lessons 126

Organization under Rapid Expansion 156

Norway in Miniature 172

The Future of Ekofisk 195

Jack Up! 208

Ekofisk and Norway 212

Foreword
A sea of shining, blinking lights appeared on
the horizon. The helicopter pilot must have
experienced it as something special himself,
and he made his only two passengers aware
of what lay up ahead. The impression was
so strong that this, my first encounter with
Ekofisk, on that cold December morning in
1981, has been fixed in my memory forever.
After having vibrated in a Bell 212
helicopter for nearly two hours, with
nothing but blue sky all around, the
encounter with the platforms at Ekofisk was
unforgettable.
My first close encounter with the Ekofisk
environment also left its impression in my
memory: the people, the informal tone, the
international atmosphere, the dimensions -
and, of course, the smorgasbord. In addition
there were the natural elements, represented
by the fog when we were to head for home.
Since 1981 there have been innumerable
helicopter trips between Forus in Stavanger
and the Ekofisk platforms. I have visited
twenty-three of the twenty-five platforms —
only the two booster platforms along the
Teesside pipeline remain.
The next overwhelming impression to be
firmly fixed in my mind was the subsidence
of the seabed: both the discovery of the
phenomenon and the jacking of the
platforms. Technology and people —
together able to solve problems in such an
ingenious way. Ekofisk has always come up
with surprises; viewed from that
perspective, the subsidence is almost a
matter of course.
When I was given the task of recording
the history of Ekofisk on paper, in late 1984,
I thought it would be finished in a year's
time. When I started digging in the archives
and talking with possible sources, the scope
of the task I had undertaken began to dawn
on me. The oral sources had different
versions which often contradicted each
other; the little that others had written on
the history spread in all directions. The
difficulties began with the early history —
many books, articles and TV programs had
told about the representatives from Phillips
who visited Oslo and Trygve Lie in 1962.
They were the first representatives from any
oil company who wanted to discuss drilling
on what would become the Norwegian
continental shelf. A closer check revealed
that there were not two men, but three —
nor were the names originally used the
correct ones. Therefore, the story that
Phillips wanted to buy the Norwegian
continental shelf, for next to nothing, also
had to be investigated further. The
circumstances surrounding the drilling of
the discovery well on Ekofisk, 2/4-2, are
another good example. In this instance the
version stating that the Phillips Group had
been threatened into drilling the well by the
Norwegian authorities had found its way
into historical accounts. This misconception
has been referred to so often that it has
almost become historical fact.
We could go on referring, point after
point, to the way in which events around
the Ekofisk area have been misrepresented.
It takes time to dig to the depths of history
- and I soon found that this book needed to
contain, as far as possible, facts that could be
documented. Therefore the work has taken
time. At the same time the book does not
cover everything. It represents a subjective
selection. For the history of Ekofisk through
twenty years has been eventful — for better
and for worse. Many things have been done
for the first time at Ekofisk, the first oil and
gas field on the Norwegian continental
shelf. The oil activity has often been
described as the oil adventure. Adventure it
is not — nor has it ever been. The oil activity
has been struggle and toil in the outer
reaches of technology. No one had done
anything similar to what was done at
Ekofisk in the beginning of the 1970''s - a
pioneering effort that ushered Norway into
the oil age.
This book is by no means a one-man
effort. I have received support from a
number of persons within and outside of the
Phillips Group — none of whom should be
held responsible for the final product. It is
my own.
An editorial committee assisted with the
gathering of written material in the first
phase. Security Officer Ingvar Bjornevik
contributed stories from the first phase of
the offshore activity — and later he worked
fulltime for several months to provide
background material and pictures. Likewise,
Boat Coordinator Baste Fanebust provided
background material and wrote a portion of
Chapter 8. Kjetil Holme and Svein
Abrahamsen supplied the basis for Chapter
9. Their material was supplemented by Kjell
Rott, Leif Hauge and Per Magne Gil.
Engineering Manager Rolf Wiborg
contributed greatly to the formation of
Chapter lion the future of Ekofisk.
Thor Aresvik invested a lot of time and
energy in unearthing background material
for Chapter 12.
A number of the persons who contributed
to this book's development cannot be
mentioned here, due to space
considerations. But I want to acknowledge
Bill Wicker at Phillips headquarters in
Bartlesville who was helpful with
interviews, finding photos and providing
addresses of Ekofisk veterans. Likewise
Owen Thomas, who voluntarily placed his
private Ekofisk file at my disposal; Ward and
Mary Dunn, who opened their home and
their file to me for several days to assist in
my search for the history; Carl Johnson, Carl
C. Anderson, Gordon Goering, Leonard L.
Meade, Bill Boyce, Anders O. Waale, Per
Borten, and Arve Johnsen, who patiently
answered questions and helped me to an
understanding of the events. Deputy
Managing Director Knut Am has
contributed comments and input along the
way. A very special thank-you to Anders O.
Waale, manager of the Oslo office. He has
been a very valuable consultant during the
writing. Without his comments and
incredible knowledge, experience and file,
this book would not have been written. The
same applies to Director of Public Affairs
Bjorn S. Lasrdal, who has encouraged,
commented, and made it possible for me to
spend so much time on the book.
Torunn Mo, Evy Aase Ravndal, Bjorg
Sandal, Liv Marit Baardsen, Ingrid Hylland
and Marit Svendsen in Public Affairs have
always been of service to me and lent their
assistance.
Arnulf Husmo's pictures are prominent in
both quality and number. Besides being a
true professional - he has also been a very
good travelling companion through five
years of Ekofisk travelling. Eirik Moe is
responsible for the layout, and he has also
been a fine and critical consultant. The book
was translated into English by Minda
Laerdal.
A few words to all those who have
supplied me with stories, pictures, etc., that
have not been included: The scope of the
Ekofisk story is such that we had to be
selective. For this reason it was impossible
to include all the material submitted, but let
me express my sincere thanks.
Tananger, 16 August 1988
Stig S. Kvendseth
The Prelude

It came as a surprise to management at It was Shell's

Phillips Petroleum Company when, at the gigantic gas
discovery at
close of the 3 August 1962 meeting, then Groningen, the
Vice Chairman Paul Endacott raised the Netherlands, in 1959
question as to whether the company had that opened the eyes
of oil companies to
investigated the possibilities of oil North Sea
exploration in the North Sea. The possibilities. The
background for the question, and Paul reservoir rock could
reach northward and
Endacott's interest, was a vacation in Europe out into the sea. Paul
from which he had recently returned. He Endacott drew
had coincidentally discovered a drilling Phillips' attention to
the North Sea in
derrick near Groningen in the Netherlands. 1962, inspiring
Later investigations revealed that studies that led the
«something» had been discovered there. company to the
Norwegian
Even though the gas discovery had been continental shelf.
made in 1959, it took a long time before Here, in his 86th
information as to its size began to leak out. year, he is enjoying
retirement in
However, in 1962 various trade journals Bartlesville in the
made several references to this discovery, spring of1988.
and in August of that year it was also
possible to read about drilling activity in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Great Britain.
sea outside the discovery area. In addition, That was accomplished partly through
there was a certain amount of seismic Phillips' Paris office, under the leadership of
activity in the channel area on the British Ward W. Dunn, which secured information
side. All of this pointed toward the fact that from sources in Europe — and partly through
a new area had become of interest to the big the systematic examination of records in
oil companies, with Shell, Esso and BP Washington.
leading the way. In Paris the initiative from B>artlesville
Paul Endacott's question triggered was received with enthusiasm. For Ward W.
activity at Phillips headquarters in Dunn, the North Sea held appeal in both
Bartlesville. It was quickly established that technical and economic terms. The energy
the North Sea had not been appraised as a market in Europe was the world's fastest
priority area for exploration. The reason growing, as well as being overall the world's
was that, with the exception of Groningen, second largest energy market. This meant
only small discoveries of gas and oil had that any involvement in the North Sea
been made in Western Europe. would be important - and that put him in a
The newly-established international very interesting position.
department within Phillips recommended
that geological data be obtained Round Trip through Europe
immediately from West Germany, the At the beginning of October 1962, Owen 9
 Owen D. Thomas
and Ward W. Dunn,
along with Silvio
Eha, took on the task
of investigating
possibilities of North
Sea exploration.
That led them to
Trygve Lie in Oslo -
the first
representatives of
any oil company to
show interest in
Norwegian waters.
Thomas was sent from Bartlesville to
Europe.1 He was to accompany Ward W.
Dunn and Silvio Eha on a round trip to the
countries of interest in order to gather
geological data and establish contacts. Their
point of departure was the fact that the
Groningen field had been discovered in
sediments from the Permian and
Carboniferous periods. There were
indications that these sediments extended
from land out into the North Sea. Available
geological data showed that the most
interesting area was off the northern coast
of the Netherlands, the northwestern coast
of Germany and Denmark. Great Britain
was ranked in third place.
Norway and Norwegian waters were not
of interest at that point in time. The thought
had not occurred to anyone that the
sedimentary deposits might reach so far
north that there could be oil or gas reserves
there.
The three geologists - Owen Thomas,
second in command at Phillips' international
exploration department, Ward W. Dunn,
head of the Paris office, and his European
chief geologist, Silvio Eha — set course first
for Karlsruhe. On October 10 the annual
German conference on petroleum research
and petrochemistry got under way in that
city, and the three men felt that useful
information could come out of it. They
turned out to be right. Through
conversation with Alfred Bentz, head of
Bundesanstalt fur Bodenforschung, they
gained insight into the seismic tests which
had been made. In addition to receiving
confirmation that the technique itself had
been successful — with good reproductions
of structures down to 5,000 meters, they
also learned that the tests showed
10 sedimentary deposits all the way out to
Doggerbank, the outermost point for the
German testing.
This led to further conversation with
Waldernar Zettel, head of PRAKLA, the
company which had carried out the seismic
tests.
From Karlsruhe the journey continued to
Bonn. The three were now fairly convinced
that the North Sea area held potential with
regard to oil and gas reserves. The question
remaining was: what were the possibilities
of obtaining concessions in the individual
countries?
On October 15, in Bonn, the three men
began with a meeting at the German
Ministry of Finance. It became clear that
possibilities of obtaining an exploration
license existed, but they understood that
there had been many interested companies
before them. Among others, the American
firm Panamerican had offered a seismic
program valued at 2.5 million dollars
toward obtaining a concession for the entire
sector of the North Sea which the Germans
might be allotted when boundary line
negotiations were concluded.
The next meeting on the agenda was at
the Norwegian embassy. The three men had
understood from the seismic results they
had heard about in Karlsruhe that the
sedimentary source rocks for oil and gas
could extend much farther north than they
had first assumed. Norway was therefore
about to become interesting.
At the Norwegian embassy they were
received by Commercial Attache Bue Brun.
He was totally unprepared to deal with the
matter. The visit was concluded with his
handing them a copy of the brochure
Investor's Guide to Norway» — a
publication which told about investment
possibilities and conditions in general in
Norway. The brochure had been prepared
by a committee chaired by Trygve Lie,
former secretary general of the United
Nations. Bue Brun asked them to contact
Trygve Lie for further information, and felt
that Lie could put them in touch with the
proper agencies in Oslo.
Following the meeting at the American
embassy in Bonn, the three men traveled on
to Kassel, Hannover and Klausthal. Through
a series of meetings with German regional
authorities and research institutions, it
became clearer and clearer that possibilities
in the German sector were small. Their
belief in Norway, however, was
strengthened. Their daily reports,
transmitted continually to Phillips
headquarters, revealed that on October 18 -
after a lunch meeting with Alfred Bent,
Waldemar Zettel and Hans-Wilhelm Maass
(deputy director of PRAKLA) - the full
significance of the principles of the Geneva
Convention as they applied to the North
Sea became clear to them. Norway and
Great Britain would come out with the
largest continental shelves.
On October 19, the journey reached
Denmark. Through meetings in
Copenhagen with the A.P. M011er concern,
it became clear that all doors there were
closed. The concern had signed a 50-year
contract for all of Denmark including the
continental shelf. Besides, the company was
already associated with several larger oil
companies through D.U.C. (Dansk
Undergrunds Consortium).
The conclusion the three Phillips envoys
reached after the Copenhagen visit was that
Norway was the only country which had
not previously been contacted by oil
companies. They had already scheduled
meetings in the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Great Britain for the following week, but a
letter was sent from Copenhagen to Trygve
Lie requesting a meeting for the week after
that.
The conversations in The Hague, Then he wanted to discuss the offer with the This is the letter
Ward W. Dunn sent
Haarlem, Brussels and London made it clear Norwegian authorities before a final to Trygve Lie after
that the British continental shelf was the decision would be reached. their 2 7 October
most attractive — both geologically and with The three Phillips representatives acted 1962 meeting. Ward
W. Dunn was then
a view to concession possibilities. Then quickly and with enthusiasm. The head of Phillips'
England would hold a concession round in possibilities of an early start would give the office in France,
which all companies would have equal company a little edge on the competition, which explains the
standing. letterhead used.
which was concentrating on the southern
part of the North Sea.
Norway Next During the course of that day and the
On Monday, October 27, the three Phillips next, a letter with an offer to the Norwegian
geologists met Trygve Lie in Oslo. During authorities was drafted, wired to
the course of that first meeting, it became headquarters for approval, and sent on
clear that Norway had not at all considered October 29. The main point in the letter was
the possibilities of oil and gas in the North an offer whereby Phillips would be awarded
Sea. A company had begun operations on oil and gas concessions for those areas
Svalbard, but the majority of Norwegians which lay outside territorial waters and
regarded this as an adventure out of touch which could, either then or in the future, be
with reality. During the meeting with the placed under Norwegian jurisdiction. In
three Phillips representatives, Trygve Lie return Phillips would undertake to carry out
and his colleagues expressed their gratitude seismic exploration of the area in the North
for Phillips' having pointed out the potential Sea which could come under Norwegian
in the continental shelf. However, Trygve supervision. The cost of such exploration
Lie wanted a concrete offer from Phillips. was calculated at approximately 160,000 11
 dollars per month and could amount to over
one million dollars.
Later this offer from Phillips has been
viewed as an attempt to take the Norwegian
authorities by surprise and secure exclusive
rights on the continental shelf. Ward W.
Dunn says that they didn't expect the offer
to be accepted without further ado. It was
intended as a starting point in the
negotiations. Furthermore, it should be
remembered that at this point in time in
1962, nothing was known about the wealth
that lay hidden in the continental shelf. Nor
was it known which area would be placed
under Norwegian jurisdiction. Furthermore,
when considering the sum of money, one
should also bear in mind the rate of inflation
in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, as well as
the price of oil at the start of the 1960's —
approximately two dollars per barrel.
On November 5 Trygve Lie
acknowledged receipt of the letter by his
reference to the fact that it had been
forwarded to the Ministry of Industry for
further handling.
Pause for Reflection
As time went by, other oil companies came
to Norway, following in Phillips' footsteps.
The Norwegian authorities allowed
themselves plenty of time for evaluating the
offer from Phillips. At the end of May 1963,
Trygve Lie wrote a letter to Phillips' Paris
office in which he pointed out that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had granted a
number of applications for seismic
exploration and that, if Phillips was still
interested, the company ought to apply.
Phillips replied immediately by sending an
application, at the same time calling
attention to the earlier offer.
While letters were being exchanged
between Trygve Lie and Phillips' Paris
office, preparations were being made in
Norway for petroleum legislation. On 26
April, Trygve Lie took up the legal aspects
of oil exploration in a letter to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. And action was swift in
this area. As early as 31 May 1963,
Norwegian national supremacy over the
continental shelf was proclaimed — at the
same time as a draft was presented of the
temporary act on exploitation and
exploration of subsea reserves.
On 6 June 1963 Phillips received
12 permission to carry out seismic tests on the
Norwegian shelf — and four days later Ward
W. Dunn was able to inform Trygve Lie
that, during the course of the summer, the
company planned to shoot seismic at an
approximate cost of $ 300,000. The reason
for maintaining the contact with Trygve Lie
was that Phillips wanted to stand firm on
the company's first offer. However, the
Norwegian authorities felt that more time
was needed and asked Phillips to bide their
time.
Dividing Up the North Sea
The principles for dividing up the North Sea
continental shelf were established by a
convention in Geneva in 1958. The main
principle was the center line between two
countries, but with an important limitation:
the continental shelf was to be defined as
«the sea floor and subsurface in the subsea
areas touching on the coast to a depth of
200 meters or as far out as the ocean depths
will permit exploitation of natural reserves.*
Norway had opposed this principle from
the start, because it would give coastal
states a disproportionately large area at the
expense of inland nations. But when the
vote was taken it became clear that Norway
would fall in the minority, and the country
declined to vote. However, private talks
with Great Britain were instigated by
Norway at the conference. At these
meetings it became clear that Great Britain
would support the Norwegian point of view
that the Norwegian Trench should not cut
Norway off from the rest of the North Sea
shelf. If the principles of the Geneva
convention were given a literal
interpretation, that is what the situation
would be.
After the convention was adopted,
Norway was not in a hurry to sign — the
feeling being that there was no rush since
questions on exploitation of subsea reserves
had no practical significance. There were
several things that contributed to this
attitude on the part of the Norwegian
authorities. One factor was the statement
from Norges Geologiske Undersokelse in
1958 which read, «The possibility of the
existence of coal, oil or sulfur on the
continental shelf along the Norwegian coast
should be disregarded.* The second factor
was that experts in a number of large oil
companies doubted the existence of oil/gas
that far north. Among the doubters, there

was the head geologist in a large oil
company who, as late as the mid-'60's,
claimed that he would drink whatever oil
could be found on the Norwegian shelf.
The meeting which the three
representatives held with Trygve Lie at the
end of October 1962 changed the picture,
however, and the act concerning Norwegian
supremacy over the continental shelf was
the first effort in the work to draw up legal
regulations for the shelf. The main principle
in the temporary act on exploitation and
exploration of subsea natural reserves gives
the State the right to said reserves, and the
King (the Government) can grant
permission to explore or to exploit reserves.
With this backbone of legal regulations,
Norway could initiate negotiations with the
other North Sea countries as to the final
boundary line for the entire North Sea shelf.
During the course of 1964-65, separate
negotiations were held with Denmark and
Great Britain — and in 1965 the boundary
lines were basically clear as we know them
today. In 1968 a similar agreement was also
entered into with Sweden, concerning
Skagerrak. But not until April 1971, after the
size of Ekofisk was known, did the
The presentation of
North Sea seismic
maps to
management at
Phillips headquarters
in Bartlesville was
surrounded by
secrecy. There are
therefore no pictures
from the event. The
seismic profiles
convinced company
management that
exploration drilling
in the North Sea was
a chance worth
taking.
Government propose that Norway sign the
Geneva convention of 1958.
Seismic Exploration
The first seismic tests on what would
become the Norwegian shelf were made in
the summer and fall of 1963. Several
companies were utilizing their own vessels,
and the results were to some degree shared
among the companies. Phillips carried out
their own tests along with the Belgian
company Petrofina. Due to weather
conditions, the program was not completed
in 1963 — and the companies spent close to
$ 600,000 dollars in 1964 to conclude the
program.
The interpretation of the seismic tests
confirmed the assumptions of the
geologists. The sedimentary deposits
extended northward in the North Sea - and
there were many interesting structures
where they were itching to spud wells in
order to gain more knowledge about the
area.
With his interpretations in the back of his
head, Owen Thomas lay out the long
seismic profiles in the Adams building's
gymnasium in Bartlesville. The profiles were 13
 Fred Terry was
responsible for
Phillips' becoming
established with its
own company in
Norway on 22
October 1964. He
was the company's
first employee in the
country, and his task
was to pursue
developments toward
the first concession
round on the
Norwegian
continental shelf.
nearly 100 meters long, and he invited
Phillips' chairman of the board, Boots
Adams, along with a number of other
persons from management to come take a
closer look. One whole afternoon these
gentlemen spent crawling around on the
floor in order to become convinced that the
North Sea was worth investing millions of
dollars — and that the Norwegian shelf was
very interesting. What the geologists had
particularly noticed was the area which
would presumably become the center line
between the Norwegian and British shelves.
It appeared to go into a Tertiary basin — and
basins from younger geological periods
were especially interesting, since history
showed that a great deal of the world's oil
and gas reserves came from these structures.
Phillips' conclusion was clear — here they
had an area where the time was definitely
ripe for beginning exploration.
Becoming Established in Norway
The next step on the road to acquiring an
exploration license in Norway was to
establish the company here. It was
recommended as early as the last half of
1963 that a subsidiary be established in
Norway which would continue to work
14 with the Norwegian authorities. On 4
September 1964, Fred Terry was on location
in Oslo, and one of his first tasks was to
establish a Norwegian company. On 22
October the first company — Phillips
Petroleum Norsk A/S - was formally
founded, and on 25 November it was duly
registered with Oslo Handelsregister. Fred
Terry's tasks were then to follow
developments within Norwegian oil politics
and see to it that Phillips was involved when
the first blocks were open for bids.
Moreover, Phillips was operating with a
handicap in relation to many other oil
companies in Norway. The company had no
marketing organization in
the country as did, for example, Esso and
Shell. Therefore it was important for the
company to make itself known. One of the
tasks was to see that Phillips with two «l's»
wasn't confused with the radio and TV
manufacturer with one «1» from the
Netherlands.
The Phillips Norway Group2
Oil exploration in a totally new area of the
world involves a tremendously great
financial risk. The costs are high, and early in
the game Phillips had begun to look around
for partners who were interested in
becoming involved. The company already
had a working relationship in refining and
petrochemistry with the Belgian Petrofina
concern in Europe. It was natural that that
company be drawn in, and Petrofina was
very interested. Cooperation with Fina
started as early as 1963. A French company
was also approached orally, but it declined.
In Nigeria Phillips was interested in
participating in Agip's concessions. The
Italian state oil company was also on the
lookout for partners, and an exchange
resulted. Phillips participated in Agip's
Nigeria activity while Agip joined with
Phillips in the North Sea.
Phillips' strategy with regard to
exploration in Europe involved having
participants from the country in which the
exploration was taking place. This worked
well in the British sector, and in 1964 efforts
were under way to locate a Norwegian
partner. Agip and Petrofina were also in
complete agreement with this attempt.
Through Hambros Bank in London the
group came into contact with a coalition of
the largest Norwegian industrial firms,
known as Norwegian Oil Consortium.
During the course of 1964 and early 1965,
negotiations were held with this coalition.
However, the attempt failed in the spring of
1965. There were several reasons for this,
but two of the most important factors were
the coalition's requirement of 50 percent
carried interest — and signals from the
Norwegian authorities indicating that
Phillips, Agip and Petrofina held a strong
position as applicants for production
licenses without Norwegian participation.
The Norwegian authorities were of the
opinion that if carried interest — or
participation only after the discovery was
made and no financial participation during
the exploration phase — were to enter into it,
then the State should be the one to profit by
this arrangement, not private companies.
It can be noted in parentheses that this
requirement on the part of the Norwegian
authorities came up in connection with the
second concession round in 1969, and
Phillips was the only American oil company
to accept this with 17 percent carried
interest for the State in block 2/10.
But in the first concession round it was
Phillips, Agip and Petrofina who applied —
with Phillips as operator. These three
companies are popularly recognized as the
original Phillips Group.

First Concession Round

Norsk Lysningsblad's issue of 13 April 1965
contained a one-column announcement to
the effect that 278 blocks in the Norwegian
sector of the North Sea were available for
production license applications. The modest
advertisement was supplemented by an
English translation which was sent to the
larger oil companies as well as to the trade
press.
When the June 15 application deadline
arrived, there were 11 applicants covering
208 blocks in all. Because of the strong
concentration on the same blocks, there
were only 81 blocks on which it would be
possible to grant licenses.
The Phillips Group had applied for a total
of 28 blocks. Block 2/7 (Eldfisk and Edda)
was given first priority, while block 2/4
(Ekofisk, West Ekofisk, large portions of Tor
and half of Albuskjell) came in the number
10 slot on the list.
The results of this first - and decidedly
largest — concession round were made
 It was Minister of
Industry Karl Trash'
who presented the
awarding of the first
blocks on 18 August
1965. We recognize
Jens Evensen to Karl
Trash's right on the
rostrum. As deputy
secretary in the
Ministry of
Industry, Jens
Evensen played a key
role in the first phase
of Norwegian oil
history.

Eight company refineries in Norway, utilization of

partnerships were Norwegian ships, or by other means.*
awarded production
licenses covering 78 Production licenses were awarded for a total
blocks in the first of 78 blocks in that first round. The Phillips
concession round. Group (Phillips Petroleum Company,
The Phillips Group
received three licenses Norske Fina A/S, and Norsk Agip A/S) was
over a total of II awarded three production licenses — 016,
blocks.
(Red color)
017, and 018. License 016 covers blocks
7/8, 8/1, 16/11, and 17/12, license 017
blocks 8/8, 8/10, and 8/11, while license
018 covers 1/5, 2/4, 2/7, and 7/11.

Stavanger Becomes an Oil Town.

public at a press conference on 18 August
1965 by Minister of Industry Karl Trasti.
After the application deadline there had
been negotiations between the applicants
and the companies. Karl Trasti told the press
that «the applicants' financial strength and
practical experience within oil exploration
were used as a point of departure.
Consideration has also been given to the
extent to which applicants have contributed
or will contribute to strengthening
Norway's economy in general, through
16 marketing in Norway, construction of
Phillips' head office in Norway was set up in
Oslo, but it was logical that practical
operations had to be situated on the
southern or western coast. There were many
factors to consider in the selection of a base.
Phillips made several investigations in the
area between Kristiansand and Stavanger —
and after some time chose Stavanger. The
city had a favorable geographic location,
good communications, and it welcomed the
oil activity. Politicians in Stavanger saw in
the oil the possibility to compensate for the
decline in the fisheries which had previously
been the city's principal industry. They had
therefore campaigned actively with the oil
companies, and it soon became clear that
other companies besides Esso and Phillips
were also on their way into the city. This
would result long term in the establishment
here of service companies within the
industry for the purpose of serving the oil
companies.
Ed Crump was in Tripoli, Libya, when he
received word that the next stop in his
career with Phillips would be Stavanger,
Norway. He received this notice at the end
of September, 1965. At that point in time,
Jack Casto was working at the head office in
Oslo. Everett Thrall was named as head of
operations in Norway, but he was still
stationed in Egypt.
On 6 November 1965, Ed Crump arrived
in Stavanger with his wife and four children
and their belongings. Temporary lodgings
were in Hotel Atlantic — and Mayor Arne
Rettedal was already on hand the first day
to welcome them. The reason for the
celebrity reception was the fact that the six
members of the Crump family were
Stavanger's first oil immigrants.
Selecting a Base
Work got under way immediately to find a
base site. Several alternatives were
investigated, and finally Ed Crump was left
with two possibilities — Dusavik in
Stavanger, or Tananger in the municipality
of Sola. Negotiations were held with
Thomas Ekeberg at Norsco in connection
with the Tananger alternative, and with
Smedvig Tankrederi about Dusavik. Ed
Crump says that both made good offers, and
at one point it looked like it would go in the
direction of Tananger. But Ed Crump
himself preferred Dusavik. After some time
he managed to convince Everett Thrall in
On 8 November
Oslo to that effect. The proximity to 1965 Stavanger
Stavanger was the decisive weight in the Aftenblad informed
balance. The contract included construction its readers that the
first oil explorer and
of a base at Dusavik with a quay, office and his family had
warehouse — and Smedvig would provide arrived in town.
temporary facilities until the base was built. That was Alfred
"Ed" Crump. The
The temporary office on Verksgata article reported
consisted of two rooms, with Ed Crump in optimistically that
one and Ed O. Seabourn in the other. Ed O. the Phillips Group
would be ready to
Seabourn had been transferred from Libya start drilling in
to Stavanger as drilling superintendent. September 1966.
17
The Discovery
When the Phillips Group was awarded the
three production licenses, they committed
themselves to drilling five wells in different
structures - at least one hole of which in
blocks covered by the individual license —
over a period of six years. In addition, a
seismic program was to be carried out
during the same time frame. Naturally, in
order to carry out this drilling program, the
group needed a drilling rig. During the
course of 1965 a contract was entered into
with Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co.
(ODECO) for the leasing of a drilling rig
which was to be built for this purpose in
Norway. The contract involved a leasing
period of five years.
The desire to build the rig in Norway was
a result of the Phillips Group's position in
the country. Whereas the other larger
companies had marketing organizations and
were well known, the companies in the
Phillips Group were starting out with the
handicap of being new to the territory. (The
exception to this was Fina, established with
a sales operation.) Especially within Phillips
it was felt that this was a philosophy the
public would appreciate. In addition,
Norwegian yards were recognized as
capable shipbuilders, so the know-how was
available. From a cost standpoint, it would
be somewhat more expensive than building
in other parts of the world, but this was
compensated for by the positive impact of
building the first drilling rig in Norway.
This was also a strategy Phillips chose to
use in Great Britain, where the company had
the drilling rig «North Star» built.
On 22 June 1966, half of the hull of the
first Norwegian-built drilling rig - «Ocean
Viking* — was launched at Rosenberg Verft
in Stavanger. The building of the other half
On 22 June 1966
Rosenberg Verft
(shipyard) in
Stavanger could
launch its first
oil-related product, a
section of the hull for
what would become
the "Ocean Viking"
drilling rig. Aker in
Oslo was awarded
the contract to build
the rig, but part of
the work was
subcontracted to
others.
of the hull was subcontracted to Burmeister
& Wain in Copenhagen by Aker, who had
been awarded the building contract. The
sections were towed to Nylands Verksted in
Oslo where Aker assembled the rig. There
it was christened in September 1966.
Mary Dunn, wife of Phillips' exploration
manager, Ward W. Dunn, had the honor of
being «godmother».
The Phillips Group Expands
During 1966, Phillips and Agip came to the
conclusion that the blocks awarded in this
new exploration area were too
concentrated. The geologists in the two
companies felt it would be an advantage to
have greater coverage. As a result of
negotiations with the so-called Petronord
Group, a deal was made. The Petronord
Group, with Elf as operator, consisted of
several French companies and Norsk Hydro.
The group had participated in the first 19
 The "Ocean Viking"
drilling rig is towed
out Oslofjord. "The
good luck rig" on the
Norwegian shelf was
owned by ODECO.
Phillips chose to
specify that the rig be
built in Norway as
part of the strategy
to utilize Norwegian
goods and services.

concession round and been awarded three
licenses for a total of 12 blocks. The two
groups reached an agreement which entailed
the Petronord Group's obtaining 20 percent
of production licenses 016, 017, and 018 —
while Phillips and Agip would receive a 20
percent total share of the Petronord Group's
licenses.
Esso First
Esso was the first oil company to start
drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf.
The drilling rig «Ocean Traveler* spudded
on block 8/3 on 19 July 1966.
The rig made its maiden voyage from the
yard in New Orleans to Stavanger in early
summer. It attracted an enormous amount of
attention in the latter city - and from the
Norwegian authorities. In spite of the fact
that the rig was regarded as the most
advanced one imaginable, Norwegian
inspection officials found no fewer than 30
"Ocean Traveler" at
Dusavik near
Stavanger. This was
the rig that opened
the drilling for oil in
the North Sea for
Esso in 1966. The rig
came to Stavanger
directly from its
building site in New
Orleans.
20
shortcomings which had to be remedied
before the drilling could get under way.
During 1966 the rig drilled two wells for
Esso. After it finished on block 8/3, with a
dry well, it drilled on block 25/11. In this
well traces of hydrocarbons were detected —
the first sign that oil and gas might be found
on the Norwegian shelf.
That first drilling season was a tough
encounter with the North Sea. It turned out
that the rig had weaknesses that had to be
corrected through frequent visits to the
yard; the North Sea weather was as
inclement as expected. «Ocean Traveler*
was the first North Sea rig to sustain
damage — resulting in a four-month halt in
drilling. Experience was gained with «Ocean
Traveler» while «Ocean Viking» was in its
completion phase at Aker-Nyland in Oslo.
A number of the lessons learned led to
modifications on «Ocean Viking», resulting
in some delays.
On 17 March 1967 everything was ready
onboard «Ocean Viking*. The tow out
Oslofjord could begin. The first well to be
drilled by the rig would be in the U.K.
sector. For a week the rig was enroute in
some fairly rough weather - a real maiden
voyage which made the crew firm believers
in the fact that drilling in the North Sea
would be quite different from drilling
onshore - or in the Gulf of Mexico. The
crew onboard could be divided into two
categories: all technical drilling personnel
were Americans recruited by the rig owners,
ODECO, while Norwegians served as
roustabouts. And there was keen interest
among Norwegians in joining the oil
industry. When jobs were advertised in
Stavanger, close to 2,000 hopefuls applied.
For both the Americans and the
Norwegians, the work onboard a floating
drilling rig in the North Sea was a new
experience. Finding out how the various
systems worked, and getting the job done,
was pretty much a matter of trial and error.
The drilling superintendent on board, Frank
Redford, had never been on a semi-
submersible rig.
The first well drilled by «Ocean Viking»
provided valuable experience with the rig. It
became obvious that the wellhead and some
of the tools on board would have to be
modified and made stronger. The equipment
that functioned in the Gulf of Mexico was
not suitable for the tough conditions in the
North Sea. The modifications were carried
out in Stockport, England.
Ready for the Norwegian Sector
Management for the drilling operation on
«Ocean Viking» in the U.K. sector was
located in Stavanger. When the rig got
under way with the well on block 16/11,
Norwegian sector, on 14 July 1967, both
the onshore support functions and the
drilling crew were considerably more
experienced. The drilling went steadily
down to a depth of 3,023 meters. On 31
October the well was abandoned as a dry
hole. From block 16/11 — where the riser
platform for the Statpipe line is located
today, «Ocean Viking» moved on to block
16/6 where the rig drilled a well for
Petronord. That one was dry as well.
Cod Sparks Hope
The Phillips Group's drilling strategy on the
Norwegian shelf was two-phased. Naturally
they sought interesting and potentially
commercial structures, but they had also
realized the necessity of gaining experience
with North Sea conditions and drilling at
such great water depths. Therefore it was
decided to begin at relatively moderate
depths. On block 16/11 the depth was 72
meters.
On 26 February 1968, «Ocean Viking*
started drilling on the second well in the
Norwegian sector for the Phillips Group —
on block 7/11. This was the 10th well to be
drilled on the shelf, and so far only Esso in
block 25/11 had found traces of
hydrocarbons.
These two
ODECO - advertisements in
Oljeboring i Nordsjøen Stavanger Aftenblad
in June 1966 inspired
For arbeid på oljeboreplattform trenges både faglært
og ikke faglært arbeidskraft. about 2,000 persons
Arbeidsrytmen vil bli 7 døgn med 12 timers arbeids-
dag ute på plattformen og etterfølgende 7 døgn fri
to state their interest.
på land. — Lønn kr. 32 000,— og oppover, avhengig The lure of oil
av kvalifikasjoner. exploration was
Av arbeidskraft trenges følgende kategorier:
ELEKTRIKERE — SVEISERE great — and the rig
MOTORMENN (Maskinist)
RADIOTELEFONIOPERAT0RER med 2. kl. sertifikat
owner had no trouble
HJELPEARBEIDERE manning the "Ocean
Søknad eller personlig henvendelse til ODECO, Gjen- Traveler".
sidiges Hus, Stavanger, Mr. Jastrey.
Employment
on Odeco drilling barge
ODECO has opportunities for skilled and unskilled
personnel to work on the oil boring platform. Work
schedule will be 7 days on the platform and 7 days
free ashore. While on the platform employees will
work twelve out of every twenty-four hours. Pay will
be on an hourly basis. In exces of 32 000,— depencing
on categorie. Specific categories of workers needed
ELECTRICIANS — WELDERS — MOTORMEN
LABORERS — SECOND CLASS RADIOMEN "
Reply in person or by mail to ODECO, Gjensidiges
Hus, Stavanger. Attention Mr. Jastrey.
21
 Work on the drill
floor was hard and
demanding. New
equipment would be
tried out for the first
time as well.
The Americans onboard «Ocean Viking»
felt that 7/11 were lucky numbers. Now
they were sure to find something. And they
were actually right. The well, which was
drilled to almost 4,000 meters - the deepest
in the Norwegian sector at that time, found
gas and condensate. The condensate
consisted mostly of gas and contained little
oil.
When «Ocean Viking» went off location
in late June 1968, the discovery had
attracted an enormous amount of attention.
It was impossible to keep it a secret, and the
mass media brought out page-one, bold-face
headlines to let it be known that Norway
had now become an oil nation.
In a press release dated 24 June, Phillips
attempted to put a damper on expectations.
The release stated that traces of
hydrocarbons had been found in the well -
traces that were confirmed in testing — but
that additional wells would have to be
drilled in the structure before the scope of
the discovery could be determined.
The discovery on the structure, which
was named Cod, generated numerous
activities both within the Phillips Group and
on the part of the Norwegian authorities.
The Government appointed a special
committee - the Cod Committee — whose
job it was to determine what was to be done
with the gas. On their part, Phillips initiated
a preliminary study to investigate
alternatives for transporting the gas to
shore. Engineer Carl C. Anderson was
22. assigned to the task.
Since «Ocean Viking» was to be moved to
block 17/4 to drill a well for the Petronord
Group, «Ocean Traveler* was contracted to
drill the second well on the Cod structure.
The well, which was completed in
mid-October, confirmed the first discovery.
This well also contained condensate.
The test results were encouraging — both
wells tested approximately 40 million cubic
feet of gas along with 2,000 barrels of
condensate per day. As soon as the tests on
the second well were concluded, «Ocean
Traveler* started drilling on the third Cod
well. While this was under way, work
continued to consider the consequences in
case the field should be found commercial.
It was assumed that the daily gas
production could reach 275 million cubic
feet. Pipeline destinations were England,
Sweden/Denmark and Scotland. In addition,
studies were begun on the feasibility of
laying a pipeline across the Norwegian
Trench. Pipelines of the dimensions in
question had not previously been laid at
such great depths.
In late 1968/early 1969, the results from
«Ocean Traveler* indicated that the third
well was a disappointment. The size of the
discovery was not as great as hoped. The
well was side-tracked, but this also showed
that the structure was smaller than
anticipated. Traces of hydrocarbons were
found, but production characteristics were
not good enough.
During the course of January and
February 1969, it became clear that Cod on
its own could not be considered commercial.
The cost of transportation to shore was too
high in relation to the size of the discovery.
Despite the disappointments of the third
Cod well, the Government-appointed Cod
Committee prepared a recommendation.
The committee ascertained that the
Norwegian Trench was a hindrance to
piping hydrocarbons to Norway, but they
felt that it was only a matter of years before
pipelaying technology would be able to
manage such ocean depths. The committee
also expected similar progress in the field of
diving. In 1969 the greatest depth at which
divers could carry out maintenance work
was 185 meters.
As a result of the committee's
recommendation, Phillips asked the
Ministry of Industry to develop guidelines
in political quarters for transportation of
petroleum from the Norwegian shelf. This
would make it easier for the companies to
make plans in the case of a commercial
discovery. The answer they received
indicated that no advance approval would
be given for piping oil or gas from the
Norwegian shelf to a foreign country.
Disappointing Status
While «Ocean Traveler* was busy with
delineation drilling on Cod, «Ocean Viking*
drilled a dry well on block 7/8. After a repair
stop in Stavanger, «Ocean Viking» was sent
on by the Phillips Group to block 8/10. This
was a structure which the geologists
considered very promising — but once again
the result was negative. It was then decided
to explore a new structure in block 7/11,
northeast of the Cod discovery. A discovery
there could be viewed in close association
with Cod. But in July 1969 it turned out that
the structure did not contain any trace of oil
or gas.
The Phillips Group then took a pause for
reflection, while «Ocean Viking» was
subcontracted to Syracuse for drilling on
block 11/10. After 30 exploratory wells on
the Norwegian continental shelf, no
commercial reserves of oil or gas had been
found. In addition to the discovery on Cod,
traces of hydrocarbons had been found in
some structures, but on the whole the
results were very disappointing. Several of
the companies which had been most eager
to get under way with drilling in the virgin
Norwegian waters of the North Sea were
about to reevaluate their plans. Only the
drilling obligations tied to the licensing held
them back.
Three rigs were in activity early in the fall
of 1969. Besides «Ocean Viking», Esso had
«Glomar Grand Island* in action on block
25/10, while Amoco was drilling with
«Orion» on block 2/11. «Ocean Traveler* left
the Norwegian sector for good after having
completed the second well for Murphy on
block 2/3. That company had found
hydrocarbons in their first well, but the
second turned out to be dry.
A total of 32 wells had been drilled on the
This picture from the
control room
onboard "Ocean
Traveler" in many
ways epitomizes the
way in which
American
oil-explorers were
perceived.
23
 Norwegian continental shelf by the fall of
1969 — including the two about to be
completed by Esso and Amoco. The total
bill came to around 750 million kroner.
There were no commercial discoveries there,
in contrast to the U.K. sector where
commercial gas discoveries had been made.
As early as 1968, Phillips had signed a sales
contract with a British gas company for gas
from the Hewett field, and the development
of the discovery and the terminal at Bacton
was under way.
It would appear that the chief geologist
who had said he would drink all the crude
oil found in Norwegian waters was going to
survive after all.
A noteworthy action was taken in 1968.
At that time, Phillips Petroleum Company
Norway was registered as a U.S.
corporation with a branch in Norway. Then
following approval by the Norwegian
authorities, all the rights and obligations in
connection with operator responsibility and
licenses on the Norwegian continental shelf
were transferred from Phillips Petroleum
Company to the branch in Norway.
Slow Start
The mood within Phillips on the European
side of the Atlantic — in London, Oslo and
Stavanger — was still marked by optimism.
But at headquarters in Bartlesville,
Oklahoma, there were problems. It looked
like 1969 would be a bad year for the
company, and this would have to affect the
exploration program. There was particularly
skepticism toward such a high-risk area as
the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. At
the time, CJ. «Pete» Silas was head of
Phillips' Europe-Africa operations
headquartered in London. He can recall that
he was in daily telephone contact with
Bartlesville, and the message was quite clear:
Don't drill any more wells.
In their concession application in 1965,
the geologists had given block 2/4 tenth
priority. Now they wanted to try their luck
there. The seismic data showed a large
structure which had been pressed upward
by salt. In the middle of it, however, there
appeared to be a collapsed area, but the
structure was large enough for a discovery
to be commercial. On 29 July 1969, Owen
Thomas had the task of presenting the
2.4 drilling program for 2/4-1 to Phillips
management. Cost estimates were set at
approximately 1.3 million dollars and had
been prepared by T.J. «Ed» Jobin, then
manager of Phillips' operations in Norway.
Based on the company's economic
outlook and the poor exploration results in
Norwegian waters, the well received a
thumbs-down vote. The Phillips group had
not met its drilling obligation under the
concession license awarded in 1965 - one
well remained to be drilled, but there was
plenty of time before the six-year period ran
out. The last well could be drilled later.
The message from Bartlesville was clear:
Find interested companies who can sublease
«Ocean Viking».
Efforts got under way immediately to
accomplish this goal, but it was easier said
than done. It is true that Shell considered
using «Ocean Viking» on a block 1/6 well,
but in the end the company decided not to
drill. Esso also considered the rig for a
possible new attempt, but the results from
«Glomar Grand Island*, drilling on 25/10,
were not encouraging. A final negative
reply came from Esso on 13 August.
It was not possible to sublease — nobody
was interested in making new tries. The
Phillips Group's contract with ODECO,
owner of «Ocean Viking», was still in effect,
so the companies had to pay daily charges
whether it was drilling wells or not. With
this as his trump card, Owen Thomas made
another attempt to sway Phillips
management toward approving the drilling
program for 2/4-1.
As long as subleasing was impossible, the
rig had to be paid for. The only extra
expenses involved would be those of the
drilling operation itself.
This time the drilling program was
approved — by the partners as well.
Well 2/4-1
On 21 August 1969 «Ocean Viking*
spudded on block 2/4. The first phase of the
drilling went very well. After eight days a
depth of 1,335 meters had been reached.
Some traces of gas were noted, but
everything was under control and the
drilling continued. Two days later the drill
bit had reached 1,662 meters — then
suddenly things came to a halt. The drill bit
had encountered a gas pocket, the weight of
the drilling mud pumped down to counter
the gas pressure became too great, and the

mud disappeared into the formation. The
normal circulation of drilling mud had been
lost. Max F. Melli was Phillips' geologist
during the drilling. He recalls that it was just
under the 900-meter mark when heavy
hydrocarbons and traces of oil were noticed,
but what happened at 1,662 meters was
totally unexpected: «I was sitting by the gas
detector instruments. It must have been just
after midnight. All of a sudden I noticed that
the gas detector needle was moving sharply
to the right, showing a sudden increase in
the gas which was dispersed in the mud. The
needle continued beyond the measurements
shown on the scale. I couldn't believe my
own eyes, so I went out of the office and
over to the shale shaker for drilling mud to
check it out. Eddie Seabourn, the platform
supervisor, was already there. He looked
pale and worried. A young Norwegian
roustabout was there with him. Oil mixed
with gas and drilling mud came up. I was
actually supposed to have taken a sample
from this interval to check out the
formation. Instead I found a bucket which I
The needle on the gas
detector moved out
beyond the scale
when the drill bit from
"Ocean Viking" had
reached a depth of
more than 1,600
meters. This was the
first indication of the
Ekofisk field.
However, drilling on
the first well had to
be interrupted, and
"Ocean Viking" was
moved about 1,000
meters to make a
new attempt in block
2/4.
filled up with oil. I had never seen oil pour
out of a shale shaker before!»
Ed Seabourn recalls the same episode
very well: The drilling went smoothly down
to over 1200 meters. There the drill bit hit
gas. Late at night on 30 August, Drilling
Supervisor Jerry Winget on «Ocean Viking»
called Ed Crump at home in Stavanger and
told him that gas was bubbling up on the
outside of the riser. The divers reported that
the gas came up between the 13 3/8-inch
and 20-inch casings.
When Ed Seabourn came out to the rig
the next day, he suggested that the coupling
on the 20-inch casing be redone in order to
bring the gas to the surface — and thus check
it. Cement was poured around and in the
space between the two casings, thereby
stopping the leakage. The drill string was
pulled up, and on 3 September the drill bit
was out of the hole. Once again the drill
string was lowered into the well, and
drilling continued down to 1,686 meters.
On 7 September there was another kick.
Heavier drilling mud took care of it, but 25
Exploration onboard circulation of the drilling mud was lost. The
"Ocean Viking" was drill string was pulled up to 1,037 meters
followed with great
attentiveness — not before proper circulation was resumed.
least by the Ed Seabourn felt that at that point he
Norwegian political could say there had to be something big
authorities. Here
Prime Minister Per down there, and he jotted down a report to
Borten pays a visit the office in Stavanger: «I can cover the
and is given North Sea from here to the North Pole with
orientation as to the
work on the drill oil.*
floor. He also called Ed Crump at home at 1:30
in the morning and asked if he was awake.
«Yes!» came the reply.
«OK, then sit down!»
«I'm sitting.*
«Crump, I have oil all over the North Sea,
but the well is under control. We're at the
problem depth of 5,530 feet, and I have
plenty of oil samples that I'm bringing
onshore!*
But even though the well was under
control, there were problems to resolve.
Time and time again the circulation of the
drilling mud was lost as attempts were made
to drill deeper. During the following days
aboard «Ocean Viking», mud was mixed at a
hectic pace, but every time they thought abandon the well was not made easily, but it
they had found the right mud weight for had to be done in the end.
keeping the gas under control, the mud Well 2/4-1 was cemented tight on 15
disappeared into the formation again and September 1969. The results were pretty
circulation was lost. lean since it had not been possible to run
The bill for the drilling mud alone was tests - or bring up core samples. The
rapidly approaching one million Norwegian objective with this well had been threefold.
kroner (1969 value). The decision to First the Phillips Group wanted to explore
the Miocene layer where Murphy Oil had
found traces of gas in well 2/3-1, Eocene
The Phillips Group's
first well in
where Shell had found traces of oil in well
Norwegian waters 1/3, and Upper Paleocene where the gas
was in block 16/11. deposits on Cod had been found. In
It was followed by
three wells on block
addition, there was interest in the Danian
7/11 (Cod), one well formation where there had also been traces
each in blocks 7/8 of hydrocarbons on Cod, and Upper
and 81"10, before a
second effort was
Cretaceous where Shell had found traces of
made in 7117. Then condensate and gas in well 1/3-1.
came block 2/4 — Furthermore, gas condensate had been
Ekofisk.
found in the Upper Cretaceous layer in the
Dutch sector.
Well 2/4-1 had been planned to a depth
of 3,355 meters.

Ekofisk Well 2/4-2

As early as 11 September, Ed Jobin, head of
Phillips in Norway, had flown to Brussels to
meet the head of the company's
international operation, Edwin Van den
26 Bark. Financing was on the agenda. A new
well would have to be drilled instead of the
discontinued 2/4-1. Ed Jobin took along to
Brussels a bottle of the oil that Max Melli
had collected on «Ocean Viking». The oil
sample convinced Van den Bark that a new
well was justified. The other companies in
the Phillips Group were convinced as well.
It was decided that the second well
should be drilled only 1,000 meters away
from the first one. «Ocean Viking» was
moved — and on 18 September the new well
was spudded.
The first few days everything went
smoothly. The 20-inch casing was set on
22 September at a depth of 581 meters —
deeper than usual. While this was going on,
the wind picked up, and the rig was moving
about in the waves. The eighth anchor came
loose, and «Ocean Viking» came out of
position. The weather finally calmed down
on 30 September, and the work could be
resumed. The 20-inch coupling had to be
done over again before drilling could be
restarted.
The next day they expected to reach the
Miocene formation which had stopped the
drilling operation on the first well. The drill
bit hit grey-blue clay instead, but tests
showed that there was 4-5% gas in the
formations.
During the days that followed, the
drilling went well. Some kicks occurred,
indicating gas pockets, but they were easily
controlled. The drill bit reached 1,600
meters without any sign of oil. Thus the
drilling had penetrated the same formation
as in the first well, and no oil had been
found. Disappointment was felt throughout
the rig.
Nevertheless the work had to continue,
and up until 25 October it went according
to routine. The samples taken showed that
The drill floor crew
is in the process of
carrying out a
"round-trip": the
drill bit will be
drawn up and
lowered again and
the drill string hung
up in the derrick.
Over 3,000 meters of
drill siring can be
pulled and lowered
on a "trip" like this.
27
 the bit was moving through layers upon
layers of clay-shale and dolomite containing
sand. Gas was found, and the weight of the
drilling mud was gradually increased to
maintain control.
On 25 October the gas volume increased
sharply, and core samples taken showed that
the bit had entered chalk. At a depth of
3,081 meters, the chalk samples showed oil
content. A reservoir had been penetrated.
The drill bit moved carefully downward
while samples were taken all along the way:
there continued to be oil in the chalk, and
the gas volume was increasing.
On 28 October the drill bit reached 3,169
meters — and circulation of the drilling mud
was lost. The drill string was pulled while
every effort was being made to recover
circulation. At that point the weather
entered into the picture, and the exciting
drilling had to be delayed for several days.
Schlumberger, the well service company,
started logging the well on 31 October, and
they were able to work a couple of days
with just brief interruptions due to the
weather.
On 6 November drilling could be
resumed, and four days later — at a depth of
3,192 meters - preparations were made for a
first production test. Initially it appeared to
go smoothly, but then the equipment broke
down. Leakage in a valve could not be
stopped. The second and third tries were
also unsuccessful. The equipment
breakdown combined with constant
interruptions due to the weather made the
work difficult, but finally on 18 and 19
November the fourth test could be carried
out — but without perfectly clear results.
Drilling was resumed on 21 November,
The equipment used
and seven days later samples showed that
in the drilling the drill bit had passed through the
operation is of proper reservoir. New rounds of logging remained
dimensions. Despite
the help of winches
to be carried out.
and cranes, it was a From 25 October to the time drilling
lot of work for the through the reservoir had been completed,
daily coded messages were sent from
«Ocean Viking» to the Stavanger office —
and Ed Crump. The message was: «We are
still in it.» Ed Crump's answer came loud and
clear: «That's too bad!» The coded messages
were sent so that competing companies
would not understand what was going on.
Max F. Melli was the geologist on
«Ocean Viking* during the drilling of the
28 second well also. He summarizes the
situation like this: «Again we saw signs of oil
when the drill bit went deeper than 900
meters, but we did not find the oil reserves
that we had in the first well when we drilled
carefully through the same geological zone.
The drill bit ate its way down — deeper and
deeper - and suddenly at about 3,050
meters we hit a big gas pocket and
experienced a powerful kick. The gas
detector needle continued once more out to
the right past the instrument scale — and to
our great surprise we started getting
samples of chalk saturated with oil. The oil
gave off a light golden sheen — almost
transparent, like gold. To me it looked as if
we had discovered a huge treasure of gold.
The American astronauts had just landed on
the moon, and I remember that Ed Seabourn
exclaimed: «What the astronauts have done
is great, but how about this?»
Storm Stops «Ocean Viking«
While Schlumberger was working on the
logging, one of the North Sea's famous
winter storms struck. Attempts were made
to continue the logging. On the cellar deck
roustabouts stood ready to bring up the
riser for drilling mud as soon as
Schlumberger was finished. Wave height
was on the increase — getting close to 10
meters, and the slip joint for the riser was
going up and down like a yo-yo. Two
10-ton weights which were supposed to
keep the riser in the right position were
behaving similarly.
Wave height kept increasing and was
approaching 15 meters. The logging was

stopped, and the equipment was pulled out
of the bore hole. The task of bringing up the
riser was about to get under way - but then
an anchor lost its hold in the sea floor. Then
two other anchors came loose. «Ocean
Viking» was drifting away from the bore
hole. The riser for drilling mud started to
heel, but it continued to move up and down.
The 10-ton weights were pulled up against
two big steel beams, the result being that
one of them was jammed into the beams —
and became stuck. The wire was worn loose.
The same thing happened with the other
weight — the only difference being that this
one disappeared into the sea. With it the
riser also disappeared into the waves.
There was a howling and a whining
coming from all the equipment on the cellar
deck. The guide wire on the guide frame
also went into the sea - and two big drums
which had been welded to the deck were
torn loose with such a force that they flew
8-10 meters through the air before
disappearing.
The following night was even rougher.
The sea beat against the underside of the rig,
which had 140 tons of drill pipe hanging
from the derrick. This combined with the
fact that two of the three remaining anchors
were lying under the rig and pulling it
The weather gods —
represented here by
King Neptune — were
constantly calling the
drilling operation to
a halt. WOW is an
expression often
found on the pages of
the rigs' logbooks:
waiting on the
weather.
downward made the crew afraid that the
whole vessel would capsize. As a result, as
soon as it was daylight several of the crew
members were evacuated by helicopter.
But the weather began to calm, and later
in the day the rig was out of danger.
Tugboats were used to reposition «Ocean
Viking» over the well. That job took almost
a week. Once back in position, the work
could begin to save the equipment which
had fallen overboard. With the help of
divers the outcome was successful. It turned
out that the riser had not been broken, but
only pressed together. Thus the drilling
mud had not been washed out of the hole.
It was the 7th of December by the time
«Ocean Viking» was back in position. Hectic
diver activity followed to get things back in
working order again. A rather dejected
comment in the daily report on 12
December stated that, up to that point, it
had taken 32 dives to carry out the
salvaging operation. It was 16 December
before work could be resumed on the well.
After having circulated the drilling mud,
Schlumberger was able to resume work on
the logging — before work to secure the well
got under way.
It became clear that weather conditions
were such that further testing was not 29
 At the end of
January 1970, the
crew on "Ocean
Viking" began
drilling the first
appraisal well on the
Ekofisk field. Well
2/4-3 became the
first that could be
properly tested —
with very
encouraging results.
justifiable - and even the job of securing the
well was greatly delayed because of the
weather. Even so, by Christmas 1969
everything was finished — and around noon
on Christmas Day «Ocean Viking* was
towed toward calmer waters in the British
sector.
How Large Was the Discovery?
Since the weather had put a stop to further
tests, the information available was limited.
In addition to the single test which had been
carried out, seven core samples had been
brought up from the reservoir interval.
These samples were sent onshore for
analysis.
One negative aspect in the whole picture
was that the discovery had been made in a
30 chalk reservoir. The larger discoveries of oil
and gas elsewhere in the world had hitherto
been made primarily in sandstone.
In Norway rumors began to circulate in
the fall of 1969. Both Stavanger Aftenblad
and Aftenposten informed their readers that
Phillips had struck «something» while
drilling on block 2/4. An article in
Aftenposten on 28 October stated that, at
that point in time, it was not possible to say
whether this «something» was large or small,
whether it was gas or oil or both — or
whether it would prove to meet all
expectations or just be a passing dream.
Phillips' spokesman Ward W. Dunn
commented somewhat tersely to the
newspaper that it wasn't easy to tell what
might be in a wellbore until the drilling had
been completed!
Somewhat wiser, the same Ward W.
Dunn reported on the well to Owen D. B-blocks, etc. The idea was to call the fields
Thomas in Bartlesville on New Year's Eve by the names of types of fish. When the
1969. Results from the fourth test produced discovery was made in exploration area «C»,
1,071 barrels of oil during a six-hour period it was easy to find the name of a fish to
with a choke opening of 34/64 inches. The correspond — Cod. But what fish had a name
test also showed a gas stream of 5.9 million that began with E? Eel had already been
standard cubic feet — without any used on a structure on block 2/7. Earl
production of water. But since the Walters at Phillips' London office suggested
equipment did not properly separate oil and Ekofisk, and no one objected. So Ekofisk it
gas, considerable amounts of oil were mixed was — even though it should have been
with the gas, thus yielding less than accurate spelled Ekkofisk in Norwegian, or Echofish
results. in English. Confusion as to the correct name
In the report, reference was also made to soon arose, and in reports, letters,
the fact that the reservoir was located in newspaper articles — yes, even in
approximately 153 meters of fractured chalk parliamentary papers from the early days,
in two zones. The porosity of the two main the three different spellings were used
intervals of fractured oil-bearing chalk was interchangeably.
30 percent on the average.
In addition to the results from the well
itself, there was also seismic with which to
compare the information. The seismic data
showed reflections of a structure which from
the top of the Danian formation was about
244 meters thick, and the delineated faults
caused the size of the area to be estimated at
49 square kilometers. But the seismic data
also indicated that at the top of the structure
there was an indentation or a big block of
the structure which had collapsed. The
second well was drilled 1,006 meters
south/southeast of the first one. Both wells
were drilled on the west side of the
structure, and it was clear that in order to
determine the exact size of the reservoir it
would be necessary to drill delineation
wells.
Based on the limited data available — the
size of the structure, the extent and
thickness of the oil-bearing layers, plus the
results from the core samples - Edwin Van
den Bark and Silvio Eha calculated that the On 28 October 1969
field could contain the enormous amount of Stavanger Aftenblad
told its readers about
2.7 billion barrels of oil, in terms of a new gas and oil
recoverable amounts, that is. The figure discovery by the
indicated a giant of a field. Phillips Group, but
Phillips' spokesman
Ward W. Dunn
Ekofisk pointed out that 2-3
The discovery had already been given a weeks of drilling
remained before the
name — Ekofisk. The background for this results would be
name, which is something of a linguistic certain.
anomaly, is this: Right from the start,
Phillips had used letters to identify the
various exploration areas on the Norwegian
shelf. This was done in order to group the
blocks geographically and make it easier to
identify them. It started with A-blocks, 31
 Maiden Days aboard
«Ocean Viking»
Ingvar Bj0rnevik left
a safe work site
onshore to give oil
exploration a try in
1967. Twenty-one
years later he is a
security officer at the
Ekofisk Complex.
In 1988 Ingvar Bj0rnevik is working as a safety
officer for Phillips at Ekofisk. He has been out on
the field since day one — at least. Here is an
account of his impressions from his first
encounter with the oil business — and «Ocean
Viking».
«It all began in November 1966. A friend of
mine, Egil Edvardsen, told me that he had been
down inquiring about a job with the oil
company ODECO. Egil was a first mate. He had
sailed in international waters for a number of
years and was beginning to tire of life at sea. The
time was ripe for trying something new, and he
had already sent in his application to ODECO.
«He wasn't the only one. The day after
ODECO had advertised in Stavanger
newspapers to sign on a crew for 'Ocean
Traveler', the line of hopefuls outside the office
in Ankerbygget reached almost all the way
around the building. There was no question of
an interview at the outset; the office staff had
more than enough to do with stenciling
application forms for the horde. Whether it was
the lure of adventure, the work routine, or the
prospect of the 32,000 kroner annual salary that
attracted most is hard to say; but roughly two
thousand applications came in!
«Egil was an optimist just the same, and he
suggested that I send in an application too. We
could, of course, try to get on the same platform,
as ODECO was now under way with
construction of a new drilling rig in Oslo —
'Ocean Viking'.
32 «At that time I was working at Kvernelands
Fabrikker in Klepp. It was a good place to work.
The pay was good, and I was happy there. Of
course, I had read in the newspapers about
'Ocean Viking' which would be drilling for oil in
the North Sea, and I also knew that there were a
couple thousand applicants for the jobs on
board.
«'Well/1 thought, 'it doesn't cost anything to
send in an application.' So I did — well aware that
my chances were slim.
«But then after I had sent in my application, I
began to develop an appetite for it. Landing this
job became something of a sport. As often as I
had opportunity, I would drop by the ODECO
office to hear if there was any news.
«One day in December 19661 went by the
office. While I was sitting there, all ears, I
happened to overhear a conversation between
John Jastry, office manager, and someone who
had already gotten a job aboard 'Ocean Viking'.
The latter had come to let them know that he
was unfortunately unable to take the job after
all. Before he was out the door, I had already
stepped forward. Couldn't I take over that job?
«One week later I was asked to report in to
the office again. There I was introduced to the
platform superintendent, Tom Rees. His
Norwegian was approximately on a level with
my English - and I honestly didn't know a single
word! John Jastry had a Norwegian wife, so he
was able to serve as our interpreter. I was asked
three questions:
'Can you work over Christmas?'
'Can you work over New Year's?'
'Can you work 12-24-36-48 hours without
sleep?'
I answered in the affirmative: 'Yes.'
The job was mine*.
To Oslo
«The pay was the same as at Kverneland,
NOKl2.50/hour. The twelve-hour workday for
7 days, followed by 7 days off, was pretty
attractive. My workday was already 12 hours, at
least if you include travel time to and from work.
But the real reason? This thing that Egil had
gotten me into was something new and exciting.
You can call it the lure of adventure.
«On the 2nd of February 1967, there were a
couple dozen of us spanking new oil workers
boarding the morning plane to Oslo. We
weren't exactly bursting with confidence as we
stood down on the quay at Nylands Mek.
Verksted and looked up at that giant towering
40-50 meters over us. It didn't get any better
when we came on board and looked down. The
training ship 'Christian Radich' lay next to us,
and when the boys climbed to the top of the
masts we stood and looked down at them.
«Well now. We weren't given much time to
philosophize about such things. There it was
simply a matter of putting on your coverall; they
wanted value for their money. My first job
consisted of stacking drilling equipment along
the wall of the mud room with Einar 'Oil Fever'
Olsen, and after that it was one thing after
another. We may have been lacking in
experience, but we weren't short on bosses: for
all practical purposes, we regarded everyone
who spoke English as our boss. We could have
as many as twenty different jobs a day, and
finished none of them. As soon as we were
under way with a new job, one of these
English-speakers came and gave us a new one,
and so we went back and forth between the
Americans. It should come as a surprise to no
one that we were pretty frustrated by the end of
the first week. But the job was not very secure —
if you hoped to hold on to it you just had to
keep your mouth shut and do as you were told.
Many times it was hard to keep it up — the
general impression was that everything was to
be done 'the hard way'.
«There is no getting around the fact that there
were language problems. At least 2/3 of the
3 - Giant Discovery
crew had great difficulty understanding the
Americans and their various dialects. In addition,
everything was new to us; every single little
item had a name we had never heard before.
One day when I was doing a job on the deck,
one of the Americans came and asked me to get
a 'chain tong'. To me it sounded as if we were
going to have Chinese food for lunch — so I just
said, 'Yes', and continued with what I was doing.
'Run,' he yelled; and then I understood that we
wouldn't be having Chinese food for lunch after
all Gradually we began to grasp the fact
that many of the Americans were just as lost and
frustrated as we were — they didn't have any
experience either when it came to drilling at sea.
Thus the watchword for everyone became: Look
busy! And there's no question but that this
watchword sometimes led to a bit of comedy.
One day when Egil and I were having trouble
looking busy, an idea occurred to us. We found a
suitable crate and nailed a couple of boards to it
so that it functioned as a stretcher. Down on the
cellar deck lay a big junk heap, arid we started
moving it up to the pipe deck. It took us two
busy days to cart up all the trash. It took us just
as long to return the junk to the cellar deck. We
got a lot of praise for that job. . ..»
Out to Sea
«But, of course, for the most part we worked on
sensible things. In mid-March both the pipe
decks were full of drill pipes and casing, and
towout day for 'Ocean Viking' was drawing
near. We were really to have gone home for our
time off the day after towout, but it was decided
that the crew on board at the time should come
along on the trip over to the U.K. side, where
The sailing ship
"Christian Radich"
became small next to
"Ocean Viking" in
Oslo's harbor. The
dimensions were the
Norwegian crew's
first overwhelming
encounter with the
oil rig. In the
background is Oslo's
city hall.
33
 Casings are hoisted
from the pipe deck
and into the drilling
derrick for setting in
the well.

the first hole was to be drilled. That, of course,
was not part of our plan.
«On March 17 towout began out Oslofjord,
and at Oscarsborg we nearly ended up on the
rocks along the shore, thanks to the strong tide.
'Blucher'3 and 'Ocean Viking' side by side - that
would have been quite a sight!
board was new, and finding out how it worked
was partly a matter of trial and error. The safety
valve, for example, was a monster 6-7 meters
high and weighing about 40 tons. No one had
seen a safety valve of those dimensions before —
and it really wasn't so strange that our bosses
lay flat out on the deck and studied the drawings

«It took us a week to make the journey across

Compared with
drilling rigs of the to the U.K. side, without any problems worth
1980's, "Ocean mentioning along the way. The days were spent
Viking" seems painting and getting the rig ready for drilling.
extremely slight of The Americans soon discovered that drilling for
stature. But when it
oil in the North Sea would be something quite
started drilling for
the Phillips Group in different from what they were used to on the
1967 it was Texas panhandle and thereabouts. A storm blew
advanced for the up, and we had to soak the tablecloths before we
technology of the ate. We saw only the smokestacks on the
day.
tugboats above the waves; they really should
have been paid divers' wages for that trip. So we
can safely say that 'Ocean Viking' had a good
washing on her maiden voyage.

«Finally we arrived at the drilling site, and

then it was a matter of getting the anchor hauled
in. I wouldn't try to hide the fact that we had a
number of problems, as could well be expected.
This was the first time, both for 'Ocean Viking'
and for the crew. But at last we were on location,
and now we could get under way with what we
had all been itching to start doing: drilling for
oil! This was to be a test well in the broadest
34 sense of the term. All the equipment we had on
to find out how it worked. But they had years of
experience in drilling — and their job on the deck,
that they could do. Of course, the problem was
that quite a bit of the equipment had to go down
to the sea floor, from a platform that almost
never lay still.
«We in the roustabout gang were pushed
extremely hard at times, but they certainly had a
tough time up on the drill floor, too. To be sure,
we cursed the roughnecks up there every so
often when they hosed down the drill floor and
we who were working below got the spill water
over us. But the job they did brought them
respect — especially, perhaps, when they were
involved with a so-called 'round trip'. That is,
they pull up the drill string and send it down
again on one and the same shift; or, a length of
pipe of, for example, 3500 meters has to come
out of the well and go back again in 12 hours'
time. It wasn't a rare occurrence that the same
shift could have three-four round trips, one after
the other - with all the yelling and complaining
that went with it.
«After a trip like that, the roughnecks looked
like walking clay men, on account of all the
drilling mud that had sprayed over them.
Putting it mildly, it had to have been a nasty job
standing there in all kinds of weather,
particularly during winter, with their clothes
soaked with drilling mud. Better equipment has
probably made work on the drill floor somewhat
easier today, but the weather, the pipes and the
drilling mud are still the same as before.
«One of the drillers, a giant of a Canadian, had
four roughnecks on his shift. He was quite a
slavedriver, and blew his top at them all the time
for not doing a good enough job. They went at
it like wild animals, but all the same he would
normally fire his whole crew three-four times
during the course of a good day. After the shift,
when everything had calmed down a bit, one of
those who had been 'fired' would ask:
'Elmer, don't we have our jobs anymore?'
'Yes, you do - just forget about it,' Elmer
would reply. And, to be perfectly fair, he did the
work of four men himself. That's the way it was
across the board — the Americans definitely
didn't go easy on themselves. One expression
that recurred was, 'You can take the first
chopper in.' That was an expression the
Americans had brought with them from 'over
there', and it was synonymous with 'You're
fired.' They didn't take it so seriously themselves
— there were enough jobs for them on the Gulf
of Mexico. For us it was a little different to get a
message like that; jobs didn't grow on trees at
that time in our homeland of Norway — even
though a poor job performance wasn't always
the reason for someone's being fired. A person's
Hats and coats were
the attire for the
helicopter trip to
shore at the end of
the 1960's. Today
that attire would be
considered
"madness" for the
travel in question.
face could just as easily be the determining
factor.
«We can safely say that, for us roustabouts,
the rest of that maiden voyage was spent for the
most part on the cellar deck. From Friday
morning to Monday noon we were allowed a
total of four hours' sleep. As Sunday drew to a
close, somebody tossed out a suggestion that
maybe we could go to bed for a while. The
answer was a slightly astonished: 'Why? You're
going home tomorrow!' The next day
eventually dawned, and we were squeezed
down to the last second. You see, there was no
chance of leaving work before your respective
replacement had shown up, on deck and in his
coverall! This style continued unchanged for
many years — only a very few times, if the boss
was in an extra good mood, were we allowed to
go and get washed 20 minutes before the
helicopter arrived.
«The first helicopter trip to Teesside was also
a little adventure in itself. We flew with a
Bristow helicopter that had previously been in
military service. On the trip out to 'Ocean
Viking' the door had fallen out, so when I
boarded the helicopter I said to myself once
again, 'Good God, Ingvar, how is this going to
turn out?'
«We were seated on benches running along
the sides, and the baggage was placed just inside
the open doorway. Since I sat closest, I was told
by the pilot (there was only one pilot back then)
to press hard with both my feet on the luggage
so it wouldn't start flying on its own! There
wasn't any luggage compartment on those
machines. It turned out to be an airy trip,
literally speaking - even though much of the
fresh air was replaced by exhaust from the
motor. Finally we were able to blow off steam
on board a chartered plane from Teesside, and in
spite of everything it was a merry crew that
landed at Sola after 24 'maiden' days on 'Ocean
Viking'.»
35
 A Giant Oil Discovery

Testing of the
discovery is finally
under way onboard
"Ocean Viking".
The flame announces
that the test is going
well, and the smoke
indicates what is
down in the
reservoir: white
smoke (or gas and
black for crude oil.
This picture, taken
by Leif Hauge from a
supply boat, made a
splash in the media,
illustrating the
discovery of the
Ekofisk reservoir.

While «Ocean Viking* was leaving the
discovery well at Ekofisk during Christmas
weekend of 1969, Phillips and the Phillips
Group were working on the many questions
raised by the discovery. Analyses were
done based on the tests and results which
the discovery well provided. Seismic studies
were made — but it would take several wells
on the Ekofisk structure to provide answers
as to the size of the discovery. Eventual
tests on these wells could then yield further
answers regarding the production
characteristics of the chalk reservoir.
The Phillips Group decided to drill the
first delineation well on the east side of the
Ekofisk structure. «Ocean Viking» returned
from the British sector during the last half of
January - and on January 27 the drilling got
under way on 2/4-3.
With the experience gained from the first
two wells on the structure, the drilling went
36 quite smoothly, and on April 3 they had
reached total depth — 3,342 meters. On the
way down, 18 core samples were taken from
varying depths, and a comprehensive
logging program was carried out. From
April until the well was abandoned at the
end of May, 10 production tests were
carried out from various intervals in the
reservoir. The results were very
encouraging, and the assurance of a gigantic
oil discovery began to grow. What made
the discovery unique was that, for the first
time since the drilling began in the North
Sea, oil had been found — not just gas and
condensate as had been the case earlier in
the U.K. sector and on Cod.
The tests made during the drilling were
continually sent off for analysis. In a report
dated June 8, Core Laboratories in England
concluded that Ekofisk contained between
4,214 and 6,904 billion barrels of oil with a
recovery percentage of between 15 and 22.
Based on the test results from 2/4-3,
Corelab allowed for a daily oil production
rate from each well of between 8,000 and
10,000 barrels. Another important item in
the report from Corelab was the question as
to whether there might be oil in a western
extension of the Ekofisk structure. This
extension could be connected to the main
structure, and in that case the field would be
even larger. When the next delineation
well — 2/4-4 — was begun far south on the
structure on 2 June 1970, the Phillips Group
had decided to explore the West Ekofisk
structure as well.
In a press release dated 2 June 1970,
Phillips announced for the first time
that Ekofisk could be a giant oil field. The
term giant is used for particularly large
fields. Another confirmation of the size of
the field was available when «Ocean Viking*
was finished with 2/4-4 at the beginning of
August.
The well showed less reservoir thickness
than the first three drillings, but this was
anticipated based on the far south location.
The last delineation well - 2/4-5 — was
drilled parallel with 2/4-4 by the French rig
«Neptune 7», far north on Ekofisk. This well,
too, became another confirmation.
«The Alaska of Europe»
Ever since «Ocean Traveler* had dropped
anchor in Stavanger's harbor in the summer
of 1966, the drilling in the North Sea had
been followed closely by the Norwegian
mass media.
The discovery of Cod in 1968 brought
about even closer news coverage, and
through the media the Norwegian people
were educated in the basic facts about
drilling for oil. The disappointment was
great when it turned out that Cod was not
commercial. Bold-type headlines had been
brought out when reports of this discovery
began to leak out. Having learned the hard
way, the newspapers were more cautious
when in September 1969 rumors started to
fly about another gas discovery. Stavanger
Aflenblad was the first one out with the
news on September 5. Aftenposten and the
other news media followed the next day,
but they went along with the comments
from the companies and the authorities to
the effect that it was still too soon to say
anything, since drilling had only been under
way for three weeks on block 2/4.
«They say that oil
has been found in the
North Sea,» was the
caption for this
caricature in the
London Daily Mail
on 29 April 1970.
The Ekofisk
discovery was the
first oil find in the
North Sea — and its
significance was
equally preat for the
activity in the British
and Norwegian
sectors.
At the end of October rumors started to
fly again, and Phillips' Ward W. Dunn was
speaking in somewhat guarded terms when
he told the journalists and other interested
parties that something was happening out
there in the ocean, in the middle of the
North Sea.
In November the Oil and Gas Journal
followed up with assumptions based on
«Norwegian sources*. The article said that
the Ekofisk discovery was the size of Cod,
had been discovered in a sandstone
reservoir at 5500 feet (1666 meters) and
contained 300 million barrels of heavy crude
oil. Pure guesswork, in other words. At the
end of November Phillips was able to
confirm that they had struck oil, but that
testing remained. Only after that had been
done could anything more concrete be said
about the discovery.
During the winter and spring of 1970, the
rumors increased about the discovery in the
North Sea. Phillips, on their part, tried their
hand with a cautious press release on 24
March in which they merely stated that Cod
and Ekofisk together indicated the existence
of a new petroleum province in those
waters. One month later the company was
more concrete, reporting that the test result
from 2/4-3 showed a production rate of as
much as 2000 barrels of oil per day — oil 37
 with a low sulphur content. The press
release was kept in an optimistic tone
because reservoir thickness was great — and
since the seismic maps showed a large
structure.
The press release from Phillips was sent
out the day before the company's annual
meeting — and it caused the Norwegian
mass media to bring out those bold
headlines again. Aftenposten could tell its
readers that «Norway's territory (is) best in
the North Sea.«
The Norwegian authorities continued to
maintain a low profile in relation to the
discovery and refrained from further
comments. The fact that there was
uncertainty as to the consequences is shown
in a note introduced by Minister of Industry
Sverre Walther Rostoft during a
governmental conference on 14 May. There
the cabinet minister wrote that neither the
ministry nor Phillips had the necessary basis
for forming any certain conclusion with
regard to the size of the discovery, the
amounts which could be recovered and thus
the discovery's significance in commercial
terms. «However, the ministry views the
discovery optimistically and hopes the
estimates as to its commercial nature will
prove to be correct.*
At the same time as this official
Norwegian view came out, one of the
companies in the Phillips Group — Belgian
Petrofina — jumped the gun with a
«declaration of commerciality». The
company's chairman of the board, L.B.
Welters, announced at the annual meeting
on 14 May that Ekofisk contained several
On 5 September
7969, Stavanger
hundred million tons of crude oil of very
Aftenblad could fine quality. Confronted with the official
inform its readers Norwegian view, Wolters said to
that Phillips had
made another
Aftenposten that the preliminary results
discovery — in block available from drilling on Ekofisk were
2/4 in the sufficient for him to believe that the field
southernmost part of
the North Sea.
could be produced.
The statement caused stocks in Norsk
Hydro, part of the Petronord group and
therefore a shareholder in Ekofisk, to rise by
15 kroner on the Oslo B0rs (stock
exchange).
One newspaper stated in its headline that
«Ekofisk (is) big as first Alaskan discovery*
and concluded the article with: «One hardly
dares to draw the parallels with Alaska any
further.*
Norway Prepares for the Oil Age
«As a guideline for the amount of income
Norway will receive in the eventuality of a
commercial Ekofisk field, the ministry will
mention that the calculations which have
been made — based on the information the
ministry has at this writing — show that
income will probably lie between 100 and
500 million kroner per year over a 20-30
year period. The sum is an average figure,
and will be considerably lower to begin
with, in that from the time production gets
under way, a royalty of 10 percent on the
gross value of the recovered products at the
production site will be received until the
operation yields a profit. Thereafter a
combined tax of about 45 percent on the
operator's profit will also come in.» This
quote from Stortingsmelding (parliamentary
report) no. 95 (1969-70) heralded the fact
that the oil income's significance had a direct
impact on the Storting and Norwegian
politics.
The Storting report, which was
completed 12 June 1970, was the first one
which specified anticipated oil income. The
need for reserve continued with regard to
the size and production level of the field,
since drilling of the delineation wells had
not been completed. But the awareness that
Norway was in the process of becoming an
oil-producing nation kept growing.
The following year this became a reality,
and in a more thorough and inclusive
Storting report from the Ministry of
Industry it was pointed out that peak
production from Ekofisk could presumably
reach approximately 15 million tons per
year over a period of 6-7 years - after which
production would gradually decline. Based
on these figures and current oil prices, the
fantastic Ekofisk income figures emerged at
between 2.5 and 3 billion kroner per year. In
relation to Norwegian oil consumption at
that time, Ekofisk production would be
twice the country's own consumption of oil
and petroleum products.
Field Declared Commercial
On the 13th day of January 1971, the
Phillips Group advised Norwegian
authorities that the Ekofisk field was
commercial and provided an estimate of the
field's potential. However, there was a
reservation to the effect that this
commerciality would be confirmed through
a test production phase. There were several
things which made the companies take this
reservation. In the first place, the pressure in
the reservoir was abnormally high. While
normal pressure in a reservoir at 10,500 feet
would be 4500 psi4, the pressure at Ekofisk
was 7135 psi. That meant a longer
production period was needed in order to
observe the pressure development. Ekofisk
was one of the world's largest oil fields with
such high reservoir pressure. In addition, the
fact that the reservoir lay in fractured chalk
was an element of uncertainty requiring a
period of observation.
Just as important as experience with the
high reservoir pressure and the chalk was
the fact that the Phillips Group at Ekofisk
had to make use of new technology — new
technology in a geographic area where no
previous experience had been gained in oil
recovery.
The Phillips Group had obtained advisory
opinions from various companies in order to
establish that the field was commercial. The
declaration of commerciality was based on
figures from the firm of De Golyer and
MacNaugton. They recorded the following
key figures for the reservoir at Ekofisk:
Productive area, acres 12,145
Reservoir thickness, feet 391
Reservoir volume, acre-feet 4,747,176
Porosity percentage 31
Water saturation percentage 21
Reservoir volume factor 2.1
Oil content per acre-foot, barrels 905
Total oil content, million barrels 4,296
Dissolved gas
Cubic feet per barrel under standard
conditions 2,100
Total in billions of cubic feet 9,022
Potential oil recovery in millions of barrels:
15 percent degree of recovery 644
20 percent degree of recovery 859
25 percent degree of recovery 1,074
The jack up rig
"Zapata Nordic"
discovered the
Albuskjell field in
Fall 1972. Shell was
the operator of the
rig, but the Phillips
Group participated
with 50 percent of
the cost since it
appeared that the
structure penetrated
blocks 1/6 and 2/4.
Potential recoverable gas in billions of
cubic feet:
With 15 percent oil recovery 6,000
With 25 percent oil recovery 3,000
Not Only Ekofisk
The extent of the Ekofisk discovery hadn't
been fully digested when the Phillips Group
presented plans for new exploration wells in
the same area. The seismic mapping showed
many promising structures in the same
block in which Ekofisk had been discovered
- and in neighboring block 2/7 which was at
the top of the Phillips Group's concession
application in 1965. Furthermore, the
discovery of Ekofisk brought renewed faith
in the Norwegian sector for those
companies holding neighboring blocks.
Both Shell and the Amoco/Noco Group
were in the planning phase for new wells in
blocks 1/6, northwest of Ekofisk — and 2/5,
east of the discovery.
The Phillips Group employed two rigs at
that time for further exploration of the area.
In August 1970, «Neptune 7» started drilling
on the exploration well on the so-called
West Ekofisk structure which was partly
viewed in association with the Ekofisk
discovery structure. At the same time,
«Ocean Viking* got under way with the first
well in block 2/7 on a structure that was
named Eldfisk.
Tor
In addition, the Phillips Group was in on the
Amoco/Noco Group's first well on a
structure that Amoco christened Tor (the
Phillips Group's name for it was Ergfisk), on
the boundary between blocks 2/5 and 2/4.
The two groups agreed to split the costs
50/50, since the seismic showed that the
structure was pretty equally divided
between the two blocks. 39

License 018,
awarded to the
Phillips Norway The agreement between the two groups
Group in 1965, was signed 28 July 1970. In the beginning
became a gilt-edged
document. In
of August the «Orion» rig, with Amoco as
addition to Ekofisk operator, spudded — just 150 meters from
block 2/4, the dividing line between the two blocks,
discoveries were
made in block 2/7 —
2/5 and 2/4, on Amoco's side (2/5-1).
Eldfisk and Edda, On 22 November the well's total depth
7/11-Cod, and 1/5 of 3945 meters was reached. On the way
— Flyndre, The latter
was not big enough
down the bit had passed through a nearly
for production. 90-meter thick reservoir in Upper
Cretaceous - the same geologic formation
as at Ekofisk. The best test results showed a
production rate of 4600 barrels of oil per
day of the same fine quality as at Ekofisk.
A new discovery in the area had been
made, and it was called Tor — the same name
the Amoco/Noco Group had originally
given the structure.
Two more wells were drilled on Tor as
delineation wells, one by Amoco/Noco
within block 2/5 and the other by Phillips in
40 block 2/4. Later tests showed that the Tor
reservoir lay mainly on the 2/4 side of the
dividing line between the blocks, and it was
natural that Phillips and the Phillips Group
should develop and operate the field. A
unitization agreement to this effect was
signed by the Phillips Group and
Amoco/Noco.
West Ekofisk
«Neptune 7» started drilling on the west side
of Ekofisk on 28 August 1970. By 12
November the bit had reached the total
depth of 3388 meters, and had then passed
through an oil and gas reservoir nearly 180
meters thick.
Phillips Petroleum Company's president,
John M. Houchin, was able to announce on
1 December 1970 that the test result was
very encouraging — 3600 barrels of oil were
produced from the lower section of the
reservoir through a one-inch choke opening.
The test was limited by the equipment on
the rig, and Phillips believed that the
production potential here was equal to that
of discoveries elsewhere in the Ekofisk
area - around 10,000 barrels per day.
A minor disappointment amid all this
Phillips success was the fact that the test
lessened the possibility of a connected
reservoir between Ekofisk and West Ekofisk.
The so-called API-gravity of the oil in West
Ekofisk was eight degrees higher than in the
main Ekofisk structure. Thus they were two
separate fields.
Eldfisk
«Ocean Viking* started drilling in block 2/7
on 3 August 1970. By 17 November the
well's total depth had been reached — over
4,546 meters, deeper than usual in the
Ekofisk area at that time. Four tests were
carried out, all with slim results. Only
insignificant amounts of oil were obtained —
quantities so small they couldn't be
measured. However, it was clear that there
was oil in the structure. The question was
where — and how much? The well was
drilled very far north on the structure, which
was named Eldfisk — and its aim was to
examine both the Danian and Upper
Cretaceous formations, in which Ekofisk had
been discovered, and the sandstone
formations in the Jurassic period. The
testing showed hydrocarbons in both, but
several wells were required to map the
structure.
In a press release from Phillips on 22
December 1970, the company reported that
there was uncertainty as to whether the
poor test results in the well were due to
possible damage to the reservoir formation
during the drilling — or whether the
formation had less permeability than the
other structures in the area.
At the same time it was made clear that
the well had been drilled on the far northern
flank of Eldfisk, and that a new well would
be drilled higher up on this structure when
«Ocean Viking» was finished with an
exploration well on a different structure
south in block 2/7.
Exploratory Drilling Continues
While the West Ekofisk structure was so like
the main structure on Ekofisk that further
drilling was not necessary until the
permanent platform was in place, both Tor
and Eldfisk raised questions which could
only be answered through more drilling.
After «Orion» was finished with 2/5-1 in
December 1970, in January of the following
year «Maersk Explorer* was given the task
of examining a structure east of the
discovery well. When this assignment had
been completed, the same rig got the job of
mapping the western area with the 2/4-7
well in July 1971. It also became necessary
to drill a fourth test well, 2/4-8, before Tor
was sufficiently mapped. The drilling
program was concluded in March 1972.
Amoco drilled three additional
exploratory wells in block 2/5 — on other
structures than Ergfisk where the Tor
reservoir is located. None of these yielded
commercial results. The Phillips Group, on
the other hand, drilled 2/4-10 at the end of
1973 in a structure northwest of the Tor
reservoir and found traces of hydrocarbons,
but not in large enough amounts to warrant
development for the time being.
The geology in block 2/7 is somewhat
different from that otherwise found in the
Ekofisk area. This meant that it took time
before the structure's potential could be
established. When the second exploratory
well was to be drilled, it was placed
southernmost on the block — on a structure
which has been designated Eel. «Ocean
Viking* drilled the well early in 1971, but
the result was negative. Only on the third
attempt on block 2/7 did the Phillips Group
and the «Orion» drilling rig get a bull's eye.
When the well was completed in October
1973, it was clear that the fifth - and second
largest — reservoir in the Ekofisk area had
been confirmed.
Edda
While «Orion» was drilling 2/7-3 on the
Eldfisk structure, «Ocean Viking* was under
way on an exploratory well in the
northwestern corner of block 2/7 — an area
which was christened Southwest-Ekofisk.
Here too there was a discovery, but the
structure was small compared with Eldfisk.
A new well to delineate the structure in the
east was started on as soon as the discovery
well was completed. This hole, however,
was dry. In October 1973 «Zapata Explorer*
drilled a well in the far northwestern corner
of Southwest-Ekofisk. This time there was a
discovery, and later it became clear that the
field, which was christened Edda, was
commercial viewed in association with the
other five fields in the Ekofisk area.
Albuskjell
As early as 1969, Shell had strongly
evaluated whether the company should drill
in block 1/6 — the neighboring block
northwest of block 2/4 where Ekofisk was
discovered that same year. The company
was, among other things, contacted by
Phillips with an inquiry about subletting
«Ocean Viking*. That time it was decided
that the 1/6 block should wait.
After Ekofisk was discovered and the
other reservoirs in the area were established
- particularly West Ekofisk, which is located
closest to block 1/6, Shell was encouraged
to resume plans for a well in 1/6. During the
course of 1971, Shell and the Phillips Group
settled on a 50/50 agreement for an
exploratory well in the block — all the way
up to the area bordering on block 2/4. Shell
had christened the structure Albuskjell — and
the seismic tests showed that this structure
appeared to be evenly apportioned between
the two neighboring blocks. In July 1972
everything was finally ready tor drilling on
well 1/6-1. «Zapata Nordic* did the job.
There was evidence of four reservoirs
under each other, and tests were carried out
in each zone. Only one of the zones tested
commercial quantities of gas and
condensate, but this was enough for Shell to 41
 The Phillips Group's
exploration program
through 1973. The
map shows clearly
that the Group
concentrated its
efforts in the 2/4 and
2/7 blocks.
strike an optimistic note in a press release of
22 November based on the test result —
2,700 barrels per day.
Shell also drilled another exploratory well
on the block, but there the result was
negative. Phillips then drilled well 2/4-9 on
the eastern section of the Albuskjell
structure in the autumn of 1973. The well
confirmed Shell's discovery. Then in the
summer of 1974 Shell drilled one last
confirmation well — 1/6-3.
Thus there were seven oil and gas fields
in the Ekofisk area - and all seven lay totally
or partially in blocks which had been
awarded to the Phillips Group under license
018 in the first concession round in 1965.
Knowledge and a Game of Chance
Oil exploration will always be a
combination of knowledge and a game of
chance. The outcome can never be known in
advance. During the period 1967-80, the
Phillips Group drilled between 50 and 60
exploratory and delineation wells in the
southern section of the North Sea. The
result was seven oil and gas fields which
could be developed on a commercial basis —
and participation in one field which it has
now been resolved to develop in stages,
Tommeliten. The level of success has been
high, based on the norm for this industry
characterized by risk.
42 The Phillips Group's first exploratory
well on the Norwegian shelf was 16/11-1
which was drilled in late summer of 1967.
Here the result was negative, but already in
the next attempt in spring of 1968, Cod was
discovered on block 7/11. The second and
third wells on the Cod structure were
regarded as discoveries as well, but these
wells made it clear that the field was too
small for separate development. Between
the second and third wells on Cod, a dry
well was drilled on block 8/10 before the
fourth well was drilled on Cod.
Then followed the 7th attempt - the
interrupted drilling on Ekofisk which
provided the necessary encouragement for
the second attempt on the structure, and
thus yielded the discovery of the field.
Three delineation wells were
subsequently drilled on the Ekofisk structure
to determine the size of the reservoir. In
between these, West Ekofisk was discovered
and Eldfisk confirmed, but with many
question marks. Two more attempts were
necessary on block 2/7 before the third well
confirmed the discovery in summer and fall
of 1972. And before the Eldfisk discovery
was charted, Tor was then uncovered in
cooperation with Amoco. The fourth
wellbore on Eldfisk block 2/7 then led to the
discovery of Edda — at the same time as the
cooperative effort with Shell brought
Albuskjell to light.
Between, and parallel with, the drilling in
the Ekofisk area, the Phillips Group drilled in
block 17/12 -just 90-100 km west of
Stavanger. Here a smaller oil discovery was
made which was designated Bream. The
following year a new well was drilled in this
structure, but it confirmed only that the
discovery was too small to be developed.
During the winter season of 1971—72, a
dry hole was drilled in block 8/1. Dry was
also the conclusion on the new attempt in
blocks 16/11 and 7/8 which were tested ini
1974. In 1973/1974 block 1/5 was also
drilled in the Flyndre structure, but the
result was that further tests were shelved.
During this period - and later throughout
the 1970's - a number of wells were also
drilled in potential structures in block 2/7
where Eldfisk and Edda are located. The
wells examined the same geologic
formations in which the discoveries had
been made, but also down to Jurassic Sand
which lies at approximately 4000 meters'
depth. Discoveries were not made there in
Cretaceous, in which Eldfisk and Edda had
been found, but there was evidence of
hydrocarbons in Jurassic. None of these
have been examined more closely to date,
but structures such as Eel and Ebba can be
tested again if the necessary conditions
prevail.
In 1975 «Ocean Viking* and other rigs
were used for drilling in old and new blocks.
Dry holes were drilled in blocks 8/11 and
2/10, at the same time as a dry hole was
drilled in block 2/4, southwest of Ekofisk.
During the period 1976-78, five wells
were drilled in block 1/9 — which later
became known as Tommeliten. The drilling
was carried out cooperatively between the
original Phillips Group (Fina, Agip and
On 21 July 1970, Dagbladet states that all
doubt has now been swept away — as a result of
the Ekofisk discovery, Norway has become an
oil nation. The newspaper claims that the field
can meet the country's own needs for 21 years to
come. On 17 November 1970, the same
newspaper uses bold headlines, referring to a
secret report that is supposed to reveal that the
Ekofisk field contains enormous amounts of oil.
Phillips) - and Statoil as operator. The first
three wells established the Alpha structure,
while the last two found Gamma.
Tommeliten is a gas-condensate field which
was declared commercial by Statoil in 1985,
to be developed in stages in the spring of
1986. The development would be carried
out with subsea wellheads operated from
the Edda platform.
In 1979 and 1980 new wells were then
drilled in blocks 17/12 and 8/10. Well three
in 17/12 yielded a discovery (Brisling), but
still on such a modest scale that
development would not be profitable.
In block 8/10 the second well also turned
out to be dry.
43
 This is the way the
geological structures
appear on a seismic
map of the Ekofisk
reservoir. The green
line at the top marks
the top of the
reservoir, the red in
the middle indicates
the compact layer of
shale separating the
two reservoirs — and
the yellow the
bottom of the
reservoir. The lines
at the center of the
map are not properly
drawn. The reason
for this is that gas
makes the picture
unclear — even in
1987. It is not
strange that
geologists during the
initial phase believed
there was a collapsed
area at the middle of
the Ekofisk reservoir.

44
Development Plans
Take Shape
On 3 September 1970 the Phillips Group
delivered its application to the Ministry of
Industry for a test production license on the
Ekofisk field. The companies had spent their
time usefully. During the course of spring
and summer in 1970, comprehensive studies
had been made of the discovery in block
2/4, as well as a technical plan for a quick
production start-up.
There were several reasons for their
desire to get production under way as soon
as possible. The companies wanted to gain
experience with both the reservoir and area
weather conditions before a comprehensive
and expensive development with permanent
platforms was implemented. Furthermore, it
was important to obtain income as quickly
as possible. Exploration costs were high.
When the first development plan for the
Ekofisk field was presented to the
Norwegian authorities in the fall of 1970,
only Ekofisk itself had been confirmed as a
commercial field. In addition it was
anticipated that the Cod discovery, in
association with a development of Ekofisk,
would be economically profitable.
During the first years after the
development plan had been presented,
exploration in the area developed rapidly
and the new fields were discovered. This
meant that the conditions for development
changed as time went by. This, of course,
had to have an effect on the technical
solutions chosen — and on the timetables.
The timetables were constantly being
altered as the development grew in
complexity.
Another important factor easily
overlooked today was that Ekofisk, as the
first commercial oil and gas field, confronted
the Norwegian authorities and politicians
with new challenges. They were to develop
an oil policy which would have to apply to
eventual new oil fields as well. Thus during
this phase the shaping of oil policy and the
formation of legislation and rules for
operations on the shelf occurred often,
parallel with the development of Ekofisk.
The Reservoir
The three confirmation wells, 2/4-3, -4 and
-5, confirmed the dimensions of the reservoir
on Ekofisk. Through comprehensive test
programs it also became clear that the
reservoir had good production
characteristics. It appeared from the tests
that the fractured chalk would be able to
produce around 10,000 barrels of oil per day
from each well. Appeared — because the
tests were limited by the surface equipment
on the drilling rigs. The analysis results
received from various research laboratories
confirmed the encouraging tests. The
permeability — and therefore the production
capabilities — were good.
From the beginning of 1970 and up to the
time the application for a test production
license was delivered to the Norwegian
authorities in the fall of that year, Phillips'
reservoir experts worked at full capacity to
uncover all the secrets in the reservoir
approximately 3000 meters below the sea
floor. This was important in order that they
might determine as accurately as possible
how much oil and gas there was in Ekofisk —
and how it could be effectively recovered.
There were two factors which made Ekofisk
somewhat special as reservoirs go. First, the
field was the first larger oil discovery in
chalk. Secondly — and a factor which gave 45
 additional cause for further studies, the
pressure in the reservoir was abnormally
high. The chalk didn't create such difficulties
once it was discovered that the porosity was
as great as it was. On the average, core tests
showed a porosity of slightly less than 30
percent. On the other hand, the pressure
was measured at 7135 psi at a depth just
over 3100 meters. Normal at this depth
would be 4500 psi.
The question asked was how reduced
pressure in the reservoir through production
of oil and gas would affect the rock
formations.
Michael J. Fetkovitch at Phillips
headquarters in Bartlesville was drawn into
Ekofisk-related work as early as the end of
1969. He had some experience with gas
This is a cross section reservoirs with abnormally high pressure.
of a core sample
taken from the oil After having set up the test routines for
and gas reservoir at confirmation well 2/4-3, obtained the results
Ekofisk. We can and done the preliminary analyses, he
clearly see the
fractures in the chalk started accumulating all available material
— and it is these that on reservoirs of this kind. The literature,
make Ekofisk which was limited, showed that abnormally
production as good
as it is. high pressure in reservoirs had always led to
abnormal «behavior».
At the end of October 1970, the Phillips
Group delivered to the Ministry of
Industry's petroleum office a report in which
this problem, among other items, was dealt
with. In addition to the written report, a
presentation was made before the people in
the ministry. The purpose was to explain
why it was so important to gain experience
with Ekofisk through a test production
phase. One of the central questions on
Phillips' part particularly concerned
conditions surrounding the extremely high
pressure - as seen in connection with the
porosity in the rock formation. Michael J.
Fetkovitch pointed out that it could be
expected that the high pressure would help
bear the weight of the layers above the
reservoir. Upon reduction of pressure, more
of this weight would be transferred to the
actual rock structure in the chalk. As this
weight on the chalk structure increased, it
could be expected that the structure —
because of the great porosity - would be
compressed vertically and expanded
horizontally. This could then lead to a
squeezing of both the horizontal and
vertical fissure structure. Laboratory
research could not provide answers as to
46 whether these expectations would be
realized — or to what degree this would
occur. The only way it could be found out
would be through surveillance of producing
wells — and through periodic tests on
pressure development in the wells.
It was further pointed out in the report
that such a compression in the reservoir as a
result of pressure reduction could have three
effects: reduced permeability near the well,
reduced permeability generally in the
reservoir, and — subsidence on the surface or
under the surface.
Since there is a connection between
permeability and production capabilities,
compression in the reservoir would be
noted through a decrease in production.
Therefore, as a countermove, the Phillips
Group implied that some form of pressure
maintenance might be of interest - gas
injection in particular. In the report this
possibility was also taken into consideration
in the calculation of Ekofisk production
capacity.
The First Development Plan
Early in the spring of 1970 Bill Keeler, then
chairman of the board at Phillips, took the
initiative to attain a rapid development of
the field. A task group chaired by Bill Boyce
was formed and quickly got down to work.
Bill Boyce, who was to head up Phillips'
activity in Norway from 1978 to 1984,
relates that their main task was to find a
solution which could be put into effect as
quickly as possible. The task group
consisted of three engineers from the
international department, the same number
from the engineering department, and
representatives of the transportation and
supply department.
In addition the group drew on the talents
of the various technical groups within the
company, as they were needed. Within a
few days the draft evolved into a
development plan - and it was so simple that
the first question asked was: What's wrong
with it?
The key lay in finding a jackup rig which
could quickly be rebuilt into a temporary
production unit for a short period of time —
six to twelve months, relates Bill Boyce.
Otherwise the plan was based on known
technical solutions with which Phillips had
experience from California, Egypt, and the
Persian Gulf. The development draft from
Bill Boyce's group sketched a four-phase
Bill M. Boyce was
given the task of
heading up the group
thai was to draft a
development plan for
Ekofisk. From 1970
to 1984 he played a
key role in Phillips'
involvement in the
Ekofisk area.
development, in which the first phase was a
shorter test production period and the last
phase involved transportation of oil and gas
through pipelines to a landing terminals.
The Test Phase
There were both economic and technical
factors behind the desire to get production
under way as quickly as possible. The
economic ones were obvious - a quick
start-up would bring income which could be
used in financing the rest of the
development. On the technical side there
were several things, in addition to the actual
reservoir question, which made it important
to gain experience that could lead to the
best possible permanent development.
It was necessary to obtain operating
experience from this area of the North Sea.
How much of a stress factor would the
climate be - on the rig itself, the processing
equipment, and for buoy loading of oil in a
sea environment such as this? There were no
answers to any of these questions, as this
was the first time the attempt would be
made in such a rough weather area and at
such great ocean depths. Furthermore it was
very important to demonstrate to the
Norwegian authorities and the Norwegian
populace that production of oil and gas from
the North Sea did not represent any
pollution risk. This was a theme of great
interest at the time. Almost daily the mass
media printed articles and letters to the
editor in favor of and opposed to oil
production — the latter due to the pollution 47
 The development «Gulftide». Onboard «Gulftide» separators,
plan for the test phase
shows "Gulftide" in manifolds, pipes and pumps would then be
the middle with the installed to process the oil and gas
four production wells produced.
connected to the
platform via From «Gulftide» the oil would then be
pipelines. Two pumped through two pipelines to large
loading buoys are floating loading buoys. Tankers could then
tied to the jack-up
platform. be moored to the buoys and receive the oil
through a floating hose system. The gas
would be conducted to a flare atop
«Gulftide«'s drilling derrick and burned off.
Phillips estimated that approximately
40,000 barrels of oil and 50 million cubic
feet of gas per day could be produced
during this test phase. The goal was to be
Phase II of the
able to start production on 1 March 1971.
development
included the central Phase II
Ekofisk Complex
with the four steel
The development model that Bill Boyce's
jacket platforms task group presented in late summer of 1970
FTP, Q, C and P, would be highly influential for the
one flare and the
Ekofisk Tank, plus
development of the Ekofisk area. The
the two production Norwegian authorities were presented with
platforms, A and B. the draft in connection with the test
The plan was to
connect the four
production application. Phase II marked the
production wells start of permanent platform construction on
from the test phase to the field. It was to include placement of a
the permanent
platforms.
production platform, a flare installation, and
A pipeline links the two drilling platforms. Capacity on the
two loading buoys production platform was estimated at
with the processing
platform, FTP.
350,000 barrels of oil per day and 450
million cubic feet of gas.

Furthermore, during this period a study

danger and the oil activity's effect on fishing
interests.
A last but at least as important point was
the marketing possibilities. There was rapid
growth within energy consumption in
Western Europe, but there was uncertainty
with regard to the price that Ekofisk oil
delivered by tanker loads would bring. In
the report to the Ministry of Industry it was
indicated that the Phillips Group expected a
price of $2.00-2.50 per barrel, depending
upon delivery method and site.
The technical plan for Phase I — the test
phase — consisted of preparing wells 2/4-2,
-3, -4 and -5 for production by installing
tubing in the wells and equipping each well
with subsea production valves — Christmas
trees. These four wells were then to be
connected into one point by pipelines and
control cables — and then brought up on the
48 jackup, temporary production platform
was to be carried out to determine how
profitable it would be to return the gas to
the reservoir. At the beginning of Phase II,
emphasis would be on buoy loading of the
oil — but it also involved laying a 34-inch oil
pipeline to shore. Where it would end had
not been determined, but it was pointed out
that the alternatives being investigated were
Lista (Norway), Wilhelmshaven (West
Germany), Rotterdam (Netherlands) and
Teesside (England). An onshore receiving
terminal would also be built for intermediate
storage of the oil. It was also pointed out
that the Phillips Group was already under
way with studies on the utilization of a
subsea storage tank for oil, as well as other
alternatives for storage at sea. In the
orientation, the time frame for completion in
this construction period was set for
1 January 1972 - and also included was an
extension to the production platform to
make room for pipeline pumps for the
pipeline to shore, as well as an onshore
export terminal.
Phases III and IV
Phase III was more limited with only one
platform and ten wells on West Ekofisk - if
that structure should prove productive. At
the same time it was necessary to anticipate
an expansion of the production platform's
processing capacity, to be able to receive an
additional quantity of 50,000 barrels per day
(estimated prior to completion of drilling on
West Ekofisk). The time frame for
completion in this instance was 1 October
1973.
Phase IV was outlined to include the
laying of a gas pipeline to shore,
construction of a receiving terminal, as well
as the development of Cod and linking of
Cod with Ekofisk. The time frame here was
dependent upon the sales contracts for gas,
as was the question of where the pipeline
would go. Studies were being made on
transportation to shore in Norway,
Denmark, southern Sweden, Germany and
England. Along the 36-inch gas pipeline
there would also be a need for a booster
platform enroute to shore.
The license for test production at Ekofisk
was awarded by the Norwegian authorities
on 2 April 1971. That same day a committee
ULA OIL
AL1USKJELL
LEGEND
Phase II
Phase III (4 fell)
Phase III (3 fell)
Water Injection
Third part
36/2 2A
To Teesside
4 - Giant Discovery
was also appointed for the purpose of
negotiating royalties to the Norwegian
Government.
Draft Becomes Plan
While the test production work went from
plan to realization, the permanent
construction plan for the field was being
further developed. As early as August 1970
the Norwegian authorities appointed a
committee whose tasks were, among other
things, to look at possibilities for
transportation to shore and for increased
employment opportunities in Norway. The
committee was soon dubbed «the Ekofisk
Commission* and consisted of
representatives from both the authorities,
politicians, Phillips and Norsk Hydro.
At the same time progress was being
made in the sea, where exploratory drilling
was yielding new discoveries. Gradually it
became clear that perhaps the most
important element in the development plan
was flexibility - the flexibility to be able to
adapt the development to the varying
quantities of oil and gas which were being
charted through exploratory and delineation
drilling.
At Phillips work was going on at full
capacity on the development plans for the
permanent solution. Both the company's
A 1988 map of the
Greater Ekofisk
Area: 25 platforms
linked by a number
of pipelines.
To Emden
 own personnel resources as well as expertise The oil was then pumped to the two loading
on loan were utilized. buoys that were included in «Gulftide»
In the first draft of the development plan production, while the gas would be
that was prepared - and submitted to the transported to the third wellhead platform,
Norwegian authorities, only two 2/4 C, to be increased in pressure in the
drilling/production platforms were planned. compressors and from there be injected back
One of the reasons for this was that the into the reservoir pending a permanent
seismic tests indicated the probability of a solution. In addition to these platforms, a
collapsed area in the middle of the Ekofisk flare was needed as an emergency solution
structure where the existence of production in case it should be necessary to get rid of
characteristics was very uncertain. The plans the production due to a processing failure.
were revised, however, and the final
solution with three drilling/production Housing Platform
platforms was settled on. On the two The first two wellhead platforms had to
original platforms — known today as Ekofisk have their own quartering facilities for the
2/4A and 2/4B - there was only space crew. However, quartering for the third
allotted for the limited equipment necessary wellhead and injection platform and the
for drilling production wells, bringing up oil terminal platform could be handled jointly
and gas and sending it on to the central by connecting the two platforms with
processing platform. On the third bridges. These two platforms had to be
drilling/production platform (2/4C) which connected in any case, since the gas would
was located at the midpoint on the be conducted to the compressors on the
reservoir, in addition to these basic wellhead wellhead platform for transfer back to the
functions there were also injection
compressors which would conduct the gas
back to the reservoir. For a time the idea of
an injection platform was considered, but
this was abandoned. What would happen
with the gas produced along with the crude
oil was a big question. The Norwegian
authorities went along with the idea that the
gas produced from «Gulftide» during the test
phase could be burned off, but this was
regarded as a temporary solution. Valuable
resources were going to waste here, and a
solution had to be found which could also
utilize these natural resources.

Processing Platform
The processing — or terminal — platform
where oil and gas from the three platforms
would be processed was planned on the
basis of the production calculations for the
main Ekofisk field itself — and with the
possibility of conjunction with West
Ekofisk. The latter was uncertain, however,
since they didn't have the complete picture
with regard to production volume from that
field. The capacity on the oil side was set at
350,000 barrels per day, while the gas
volume was limited to approximately one
billion standard cubic feet per day.
Processing was relatively simple on this
platform (2/4 FTP). Via three levels of
separation, the oil and gas were separated
50
50 from each other and the water removed.

periods of bad weather which would
prevent loading. Thus during these periods
production would have to be shut down —
and that would result in a halt in gas
production as well. In any case, the gas
would have to be transported to market via
pipeline in order for it to bring an acceptable
price. The alternative of cooling the gas
down to liquid form on the field so as to
send it on to market was abandoned at an
early point. The price of the gas was
dependent upon continuous production.
Regular pauses in production could not be
tolerated. Therefore a solution had to be
found which would make it possible to keep
production going without having to stop
the whole operation because of the weather.
This artistic drawing
shows how one
imagined an
artificial harbor and
oil storage facilities
at Ekofisk. The
illustration is taken
from the report that
was made on the
subject.
An oil pipeline to shore was regarded early
on as the only permanent solution, but with
the Phillips Group's operational timetable it
was necessary to find an alternative solution
until the pipeline could be built and put into
operation.
Weather-Resistant Tank
The puzzle that remained was how to secure
against the weather gods and maintain
continuous operation. A number of official
committees were assigned the task, and
within the Phillips Group there was a
persistent effort to find solutions.
Appropriately for the seafaring nation of
Norway, the idea of building an artificial
harbor in the middle of the North Sea was 51
 Norwegian one of the first initiatives. A committee was
construction
companies had long formed through an agreement between the
and solid experience Ministry of Industry and Phillips in early
in the slip-forming December 1970. Its principal task was to
technique proposed
for the construction consider how such a harbor would have to
of the Ekofisk Tank. be built, and how tankers would be able to
Here is an example maneuver into it in bad weather. Two
in the form of a grain
elevator in solutions were presented as to how the
Stavanger. harbor should be designed — one in the
shape of a horseshoe, opening toward the
east — the other in the shape of a cross,
where ships could utilize whichever of the
four possiblities was least exposed at the
moment to wind and waves. Built into this
artificial harbor - or island - would be
storage capacity for 1.7 million cubic meters
of oil.
The committee's recommendation was
submitted in March 1971. The
horseshoe-shaped harbor was preferred, but
it was clear at the same time that the costs
involved with that kind of harbor, along the tank to the sea floor. With the existing
with the uncertainty as to whether it could seabed conditions at Ekofisk, this was
be done in the North Sea, made the solution regarded as a very problematic design in the
unrealistic. After this proposal was rejected dimensions here required. French design in
in the spring of 1971, Phillips decided to concrete was world renowned. The
investigate the possibilities of building a Frenchmen had at an early date developed
storage tank at Ekofisk. The tank could techniques that commanded respect.
function as a buffer storehouse in bad Furthermore, there were builders in Norway
weather. When the weather prevented with long experience in the use of slipforms
tankers from lying into the buoys and in the construction of larger concrete
loading, the production could simply be buildings. Examples of this were grain silos
redirected to the tank — and continue — in Stavanger, among other places, and in
without any shutdown in production from connection with the construction of water
the field. A similar tank had been built out of storage tanks for electricity purposes. But
steel and put into service in the Arabian there were many misgivings. Among other
Gulf. things, there had been little or no experience
with how a concrete structure of these
Concrete or Steel dimensions would react to the constant
Intense efforts were under way to find exposure to saltwater waves.
potential builders of such a tank. By Spring The two French concrete alternatives
1971, four alternatives had been found: two were also different. One involved a subsea
in steel and two in concrete. The steel tanks tank on the sea floor, while the other
were of American design, while the concrete involved having the top of the tank extend
models were French. There was a certain above sea level. The one design - the subsea
amount of preference for the steel tanks, but tank — was nearly square in shape, while the
further contact with the builders brought other was shaped like a cylinder with
some problems to light. Chicago Bridge Co., separate storage cells. A model of the subsea
one of the suppliers in question, could not tank was being completed in France, and
meet the time requirements which had been Carl C. Anderson was sent to the French
set. Another problem was locating a site for coast on the Atlantic side to be present at
building such a steel giant. It would have to the launching. Due to postponements, Carl's
be done in the U.S.A., and towing across the trip was in vain, but a few weeks later the
Atlantic involved great risk in itself. Also a report came from France that the
problem was the fact that one of the steel construction had collapsed when positioned
52 designs involved the necessity of fastening on the ocean floor. Only the remains in the
form of large concrete blocks were left on
the ocean floor. This unfortunate result
didn't exactly give the skeptics a weaker leg
to stand on, but a decision had to be made
soon and the work begun.
Sales Job
There was no way back. Carl C. Anderson
and three other Phillips engineers took
along the four bids and shut themselves into
a room at the Esso Motor Hotel in
Stavanger. There they would stay until they
settled on a recommendation for an
alternative. We all know the result, but
selling the solution to the partners in the
Phillips Group, to the Norwegian
authorities and, not least, to Phillips top
management in the U.S. at that time was
viewed as a difficult task. But there was no
alternative. It was necessary to get under
way and have the Tank in place the
following summer - in 1972 — if the work
was to be kept on schedule.
A.G. Doris, the French company that
designed the Tank, had secured a building
site at Hinnavagen in Stavanger in
cooperation with the two Norwegian firms
of F. Selmer and Hoyer-Ellefsen. Both of
these companies had experience with
concrete constructions. This Norwegian
solution also made it easier for the
Norwegian authorities to approve the
concept. Edwin Van den Bark, then head of
Phillips International Group, relates that the
combination of French design experience
and Norwegian building experience in
concrete led him to support the choice at an
early stage, based on the criteria which the
solution would have to satisfy. It was C.J.
«Pete» Silas, head of Phillips' Europe-Africa
Division in London, who was given the task
of convincing the board that this was not a
«crazy» idea, but a project which could be
practically carried out. Silas relates that he
was very well prepared when he met with
the board to present the plans. Leonard
Mead, Engineering Department, was with
him at the presentation to answer questions.
Silas went in detail through the construction
and the criteria that were set. After the
presentation Silas expected a number of
difficult questions and many objections, but
the gathering appeared to accept the
proposal. One of the questions that came up
was: What would happen to the Tank if it
collided with a ship? Pete Silas says the only
answer he could give was that, in that case,
the ship would sink pretty fast. Thus the
board approved the plans and the project
could get under way that fall, after the
partners and the Norwegian authorities had
given their approval. The latter had a big
question about the plans for the Tank at that
point in time: «What would Phillips do with
the big deck space on top of the Tank?» The
reply was — according to Carl C. Anderson:
an offshore supply base!
All Clear Signal
In March 1972 the Ministry of Industry
gave its fundamental consent to the Phillips
Group's technical plan for Phase II
development. By that time the work had
progressed greatly. The first platform
contracts had already been signed on 29
December 1970. Then contracts were Carl C. Anderson
entered into for the jackets for 2/4 FTP, 2/4 was one of four
engineers who had to
B, and 2/4 C. choose one of the four
alternatives for a
Gas Negotiations storage tank at
Ekofisk. From 1968
The question as to what should be done until 1988 he was a
with the gas from eventual discoveries in key figure in Ekofisk
the North Sea became a real issue for the operations.
first time in 1968, when the reserves on Cod
became known. The Norwegian
Government appointed a committee - the
Cod Committee - with the Ministry of
Industry's undersecretary, Odd G0the as
chairperson, for the purpose of studying
possible solutions. When the third
delineation well on Cod reduced the
discovery by half — and made it clear that
Cod on its own was not commercial, the 53
 work was partially brought to a halt.
But in August 1970 a new committee was
appointed - the Ekofisk Commission — with
the same chairperson as for the Cod
Committee.
The questions of utilization and
transportation of the gas to shore were part
of the committee's assignment. From the
Phillips Group, Torvild Aakvaag of Norsk
Hydro, Ed Jobin and Paul W. Tucker from
Phillips were appointed as members. With
regard to the dry gas, the committee
reached the conclusion fairly soon that
transportation to shore in Norway was not
an option. First and foremost since there was
no market for gas in this country — and
because gas as a fuel in the production of
electricity was not competitive with
hydroelectric power.
The Phillips Group began putting out
feelers for gas customers already in the fall
of 1970, parallel with the Ekofisk
Commission's studies on the matter. The
effort was headed up by Paul W. Tucker,
who was manager of Phillips' gas and gas
liquids department at the Europe-Africa
Division in London.
As the size of the gas reserves became
better charted, the marketing could also
become more active, relates Paul W. Tucker.
Preliminary meetings were held with
potential gas customers all over Europe:
England, Scotland, France, West Germany,
Sweden, Denmark — yes, even interested
parties in Poland turned up and a meeting
was conducted in Warsaw. Many of the first
likely customers dropped out after they
realized that the Phillips Group wanted to
sell all the gas in one package. Few of them
were large enough consumers of gas that
they could take on such quantities. After
Tor and West Ekofisk were discovered, the
total volume came to approximately one
billion cubic feet per day.
This meant that there were four serious
purchasing groups left: Ruhrgas in West
Germany (already included here were Gaz
de France, France, and Distrigaz from
Belgium), Gazunie in the Netherlands,
British Gas Corporation (BGC) in England,
and a group consisting of chemical concerns
in West Germany.
There gradually developed hard
negotiations and a lot of tug of war. Paul W.
Tucker relates that at one point there was a
54 fifth customer, the British electric power
service, but they could no longer participate
for fear of competing with BGC.
The four possible buyer groups were
reduced to three, in that Ruhrgas and
Gazunie — after a long night of negotiations
in London - agreed to join forces as one
group. Thus this group strengthened its
position, but negotiations continued a while
longer with the other two interested parties.
However, it gradually became clear that
the Ruhrgas group, which Paul W. Tucker
calls «the great alliance*, was willing to
extend itself farthest to satisfy the
requirements of the Phillips Group. This was
especially true with regard to price
escalation. British Gas on its part was not
willing to come close to the Phillips Group
on this point. Neither were the chemical
companies willing to extend themselves
particularly far on this point, so for a period
in 1972 negotiations were held almost
exclusively with the Ruhrgas consortium.
After some time, British Gas showed
renewed interest, but again it led nowhere.
Therefore the negotiations were again
concentrated on the consortium.
Another point which now began to be a
part of the Phillips Group's negotiation
strategy was the fact that there would have
to be an additional contract for the new
fields - Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell.
Exploratory drilling there showed great
possibilities for three new commercial fields.
A sales contract with British Gas would
mean that the gas pipeline would go to
England, and thus the British would
practically be able to dictate conditions for
the second contract, since there was little to
indicate that the new discoveries could
justify another pipeline — to the Continent,
for example. Therefore the Phillips Group
preferred the consortium on the Continent
where there were other competitive buyer
groups and where the same pipeline could
be used - under otherwise equal terms
between the consortium and British Gas.
The matter of full price escalation was
decisive, and the Phillips Group was able to
conclude negotiations and reach an
agreement with the consortium.
Gas Contract
The first sales contract for gas was signed in
Oslo on 22 January 1973. The buyer group
consisted of Gaz de France and Distrigaz
from Belgium, in addition to Ruhrgas from

West Germany and Gazunie, Netherlands.
Ruhrgas purchased 50%, while the
remaining 50% was divided between the
other three companies. The contract that
was signed was contingent upon the
necessary approvals from the governments
in the respective countries; but on the
assumption that the approvals would be
forthcoming, deliveries were to start in
October 1975. Also included in the contract
was a condition that the gas pipeline from
Ekofisk would go ashore at Emden in West
Germany.
This first gas contract from the
Norwegian side of the North Sea has since
become a model for sales contracts to
follow. For the first time in history, a seller
obtained 100% price escalation. The
escalation could occur within a period of six
months. The price was linked to competing
energy forms - and not to crude oil as, for
example, Statoil's contracts would be later
on. This has meant that the Phillips Group's
contract has not reaped the enormous
profits during periods when the price of
crude oil was high — nor low prices when
the opposite has been true. It is also
interesting to note that, according to Paul
W. Tucker, the French company in the
consortium had tried during the
negotiations to bind the sales contract to
deliveries of French goods and services for
On 22 January
19 73, representatives
of the companies in
the Phillips Croup
could sign the first
gas agreement along
with the buyer
consortium on the
Continent. This took
place at Norsk
Hydro in Oslo. At
far left is Paul W.
Tucker, who headed
the negotiation
delegation for the
Phillips Group. In
7974, the same
parties entered into a
new agreement for
the natural gas from
Alhuskjell, Eldfisk
and Edda.
the Ekofisk field development - a condition
which in 1986 almost upset a sales contract
for gas from Troll and Sleipner.
When the contract negotiations became
more concrete, all the companies in the
Phillips Group participated in the meetings.
A gas committee had been formed in which
all the companies were represented, but
with Paul W. Tucker as chairman.
New Contract
In April 1974 the same companies signed
another gas contract for delivery of gas
from Edda, Eldfisk and Albuskjell. In the
process of reaching this agreement, serious
negotiations with other buyer groups never
entered the picture, since the consortium
was willing to go along with the same
principles as in the first contract. The
volume in the second contract was 646
million cubic feet per day with deliveries to
start in October 1976.
The two contracts taken jointly involved
a total daily gas delivery of nearly two
billion cubic feet from the Ekofisk area.
Phase HI Is Expanded
At the end of 1970, the scope of Phase III
development was expanded in relation to
the original draft since the West Ekofisk and
Tor fields had been discovered. 55
 All signs indicated that both fields were
commercial when viewed in connection
with the total development of the Ekofisk
field. Eldfisk was also a possible commercial
field, but the first and second wells on the
structure were disappointing. Further
exploratory drilling was necessary in order
to establish the size of the field.
The first development plans for the Phase
III fields were based on full processing of oil
and gas on Tor, while West Ekofisk and Cod
were to have simple processing on smaller
platforms. The latter two fields were first
and foremost gas and condensate fields.
From the three fields, oil and gas would then
go via pipelines to the Ekofisk Complex and
directly into the pipelines to shore. One
such development plan required a separate
processing platform on Tor — based on
approximately the same principle which we
know today from Eldfisk.
Then at the beginning of 1972, the belief
that Eldfisk could be quite a large
commercial field was confirmed — while at
the same time Albuskjell and Edda indicated
that those two structures also could be
developed. To confirm this, drilling went on
at as fast a pace as the equipment would
allow, but there was a limit to the number of
rigs the Phillips Group could have in
operation. And there were plenty of other
structures in blocks 2/4 and 2/7 that could
contain oil and gas. Since there were rigs
from other companies in operation on the
neighboring blocks, possibilities existed for
a really gigantic development in this area,
southernmost on the Norwegian continental
shelf.
With these new suppositions, a new
development model began to take shape at
Phillips. New cost analyses showed that this
model was favorable — at the same time as
flexibility became greater in the case of new
discoveries. And the discoveries could be
smaller and still profitable. This new
development plan took as its starting point
the available deck space on the Ekofisk Tank
which was under construction in Stavanger.
During the Tank's earliest planning stages,
the Norwegian authorities had asked
Phillips what this space would be used for.
The answer revealed that Phillips at that
point in time were not quite sure themselves
— but it could always be used as an offshore
supply base. Now there emerged the idea of
5O building a large processing facility for oil,
gas and NGL from the Phase III fields. The
alternative to this central facility turned out
to be not decentralized processing on each
field, but several steel platforms for this type
of central processing center. The latter
would apply in case the Tank could not bear
the weight of such a processing center. Two
or three steel platforms would be necessary
in that case. Another important factor which
pointed in the direction of centralized
processing had come up in connection with
the negotiations on the sale of the gas. The
various buyer groups were very concerned
about the stability of the gas production —
and this kind of centralized processing
would increase the stability of the deliveries
considerably, as compared with several
small facilities on each field.
In May/June 1972, the go-ahead signal
was given by the necessary companies and
public authorities to build a 20-meter deck
over the entire Ekofisk Tank. This worked
well, since construction delays already
prevented its being towed to location
before the summer of 1973. Thus the deck
could be built inshore in Stavanger.
The scope of Phase III grew
tremendously during this period. In addition
to the pipeline projects and receiving
terminals, which were gigantic projects in
themselves, the development of six fields
lay ahead. And on top of it all came the
processing facility on the Tank. The
timetables drawn up were scant, so it was a
question of rolling up shirt sleeves and
getting the work under way as quickly as
possible. The plans for the first section of
the development were completed during the
course of 1972. West Ekofisk would be
developed with a very simple wellhead
platform like the Phase II platforms — with a
two-phase pipeline in which oil and gas
would be transported together to the
processing facility at the Complex.
It was decided that Tor and Cod would
be constructed according to a new model
with simple, first level separation on the
platforms. This meant that these platforms
would have to have a flare installation
connected to the platform by a bridge, as a
safety measure. The design contracts on
these two platforms were awarded to the
Kvcerner Group. It was the first commission
of this type to be awarded a Norwegian
company. Work on these three platforms
got under way during the course of 1973.

At the end of that year the necessary
parameters for Eldfisk and Edda were
established, and Albuskjell followed shortly
thereafter. Eldfisk was to be developed with
three platforms. On the southern structure a
drilling and production platform would be
connected to a separate processing platform.
On the northern structure a combination
platform was sufficient. The Edda platform
was fairly similar to the northern Eldfisk
platform. These platforms also had first level
separation before separate oil and gas
pipelines transported the products to the
Ekofisk Complex.
Albuskjell, like Eldfisk, was divided into
two structures, and two platforms were
necessary — one on Shell's block 1/6 and one
on the Phillips Group's block 2/4. Both
platforms were built with first level
separation before separate pipelines took oil
and gas to the Ekofisk Complex.
Work on these last six platforms could
begin during the last half of 1974.
It may well be said that there were two
parts to Phase III platform building: West
Ekofisk, Cod and Tor represent the first part,
The Ekofisk Tank
while Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell represent with both the 20 and
the second part. 30 meter decks in
place. The 30 meter
The Processing Facility deck covers 65
percent of the
on the Tank northern part of the
Tank. While the
The capacity and scope of the Tank's lower deck was built
processing facility were established during in Stavanger before
the course of 1972 and 1973. After Eldfisk, the towout of the
Tank, the 30 meter
Edda and Albuskjell came, there had to be an deck was installed on
expansion. the field.
A 20-meter steel deck was built over the
entire surface of the storage tank. This was
done for the most part while the Tank lay
inshore in Stavanger during the winter and
spring of 1972/73. After the Tank had
reached its Ekofisk destination, work got
under way on the construction of a
30-meter deck to cover 65 percent of the
northern section. This was made of concrete
and was largely prefabricated by Doris, the
builder, before it was hoisted into place.
Together these two decks provided a
10,700 square meter floor space - the
equivalent of 2-3 steel platforms. The
building of the processing facility on top of
what was initially to have been a subsea
storage tank was thus quite a stroke of
genius, viewed in economic terms.
The production parameters set were one
million barrels of crude oil per day and two
billion standard cubic feet of gas. Explained
simply, the processing facility consists of six
main separators, three glycol dehydration
units for gas, three gas dewpoint units, four
gas compressors to give the gas sufficient
pressure to start the trip by pipeline to
Emden, heat exchangers, coolers, and hot oil
furnaces — plus computer-controlled
metering systems which communicate via
satellite.
A space problem gradually developed on
the Tank, and it was decided to build a
separate riser platform for receiving the
pipelines from the Phase III platforms — plus
a separate flare stack for the processing
facility — north of the Tank.
57
 A Long Way from Landing Sites

Selecting a location for bringing oil and gas from actually put on the agenda as early as 1968 with
Ekofisk to shore involved somewhat more than the first discovery on Cod. When it turned out
simply making a geographical choice. A number that Cod was not found to be commercial, the
of approaches to the problem were woven into questions were put on ice until the Ekofisk
each other in such a way that the geographical discovery was confirmed in 1970.
choice seemed to determine the other questions.
The Norwegian authorities and the Phillips Linguistic Complications
Group had two different points of departure. For The Phillips Group did not initially view as
the Phillips Group the question was mainly of an problematic the decisions to be made in
economic nature. Where could the crude oil, the connection with choosing a destination for the
liquid gas and dry gas from Ekofisk be crude oil. On the other hand, there was another
transported to shore in a technically justifiable aspect involved where gas was concerned, and it
and most economical way? Naturally the was felt that the sales contract would determine
economic considerations were given high where the pipeline would end. But with regard
priority by the Norwegian authorities as well, to the oil, Phillips took a stand fairly early in
but at the same time, ensuring national control favor of Teesside in England. This decision was
of Norwegian natural resources was at least as based on several conditions, with important
important. Another vital factor was the ability to elements being the depth of the Norwegian
create new jobs on Norwegian soil. In other Trench and pipelaying technology. But the
words — while the Phillips Group had practical Phillips Group did not foresee, early in 1970, the
economics as a starting point, the Norwegian Norwegian political conflict which could arise.
Government was thinking in terms of social One reason for this was a linguistic
economics. misunderstanding — or a translation problem,
Negotiations in transportation questions according to Anders O. Waale, long-time head
turned out to be a long process. The matter was of Phillips' Oslo office. At Phillips it was long
believed that since the company had been
Anders O. Waak awarded a «production license* in the 1965
followed at dose
range the concession round, that included - in addition to
negotiations on the an exclusive exploration permit for a specific
landing of oil and area — a production permit for whatever might
gas from Ekofisk. He eventually be found in that area. In other words,
was the first
Norwegian to be
they were not aware that the question of
appointed Vice production and transportation of oil and gas to
President of Phillips shore required a new political debate in
Petroleum Company parliament. The English language distinguishes
Norway. Waale's between the words «license» and «permit». This
experience in oil
started in Venezuela difference does not exist in Norwegian. It was
with Gulf Oil. That thought that since the «production license* had
company brought been awarded, only a «permit» (consent) was
him back to required by the Ministry for construction of the
Norway, and in
1972 he began
physical installations and laying of the pipelines
working for Phillips. — not a new political discussion in parliament.
For a number of Phillips' interpretation was soon altered, and for
years he has been the more than three years a debate roared on in
manager of the Norway as to where the oil and gas from Ekofisk
company's office in
Oslo. should be brought to shore — and on what terms.
To be sure, this debate was overshadowed by
the EEC (European Economic Community)
58 debate going on at the same time, but the latter
 In 1973 the
Norwegian Trench
was an obstacle in
the landing issue as
it separated the
Norwegian
mainland from the
continental shelf and
Ekofisk. To cross it,
pipes would have to
be laid at a depth of
3 72 meters — while
the route to Teesside
had a maximum
depth of only 92
meters. In 1973,
pipelaying
technology had not
reached that far
down — nor could
divers operate at
such depths.

was also drawn into the transportation debate
since the terminal alternatives outside of
Norway were in EEC countries or countries that
were in the process of joining the European
community.
The Ekofisk Commission
In August 1970, the Government appointed a
committee which was designated the Ekofisk
Commission. Its task was to consider the
question of transportation to shore. The
composition of the committee was similar to
that of the Cod Committee of 1968 - with
deputy secretary Odd G0the as chairman.
But before this committee was able to fulfill
its commission, something happened which
interfered with their work. In a Storting report
in April 1971, the Government proposed a
rule of principal for Norwegian oil operations
which stated that petroleum extracted on the
Norwegian shelf should be piped to shore in
Norway. During discussion on this report in the
Industry Committee, the Storting report was
used as a starting point for the formation of
what would be called «the ten oil
commandments*. The seventh «commandment»
stated that «petroleum from the Norwegian
continental shelf shall as a rule be transported to
shore in Norway, with the exception of the
particular case where socio-political
considerations provide a basis for another
solution.* Ideally this was a fine
«commandment», but two important facts that
needed to be considered had been disregarded:
the Norwegian Trench represented an ocean
depth in which a pipeline of the dimensions in
question had never before been laid - and, there
was no market for the dry gas in Norway.
When the Ekofisk Commission presented its
recommendation in February 1972, the
conclusion with regard to dry gas was clear:
fVVhere there's a
will, there's a way,»
is how the artist
described this
solution to the
problems of the
Norwegian Trench.
59
 In 1971, not transporting gas to shore in Norway was not of
everybody wanted a interest, because it was not possible to establish
landing terminal in a market in Norway large enough to take on the
their own backyard,
In Egersund, a enormous quantities of gas from Ekofisk. The
committee was set up Continent or Great Britain were logical terminal
to fight landing at points for the dry gas, depending on which was
Eiger0y. In a letter to most favorable economically.
the editor of the
Stavanger Aftenblad
The conclusion was not quite so clear where
in late May 1971, transportation of the crude oil and liquid gas was
such a landing concerned, but the committee ended up
alternative was recommending a pipeline to Teesside. The most
described as a threat significant argument against transporting oil to
to the local
community. shore in Norway was the Norwegian Trench.
Pipelines had never been laid at ocean depths
such as those — and it was one thing to lay the
line, but quite another to repair and maintain it.
The committee had considered two terminal
locations for oil and liquid gas — Teesside, UK,
and Eigeray near Egersund in Norway. The
distance to Eigeray was the shortest — 270 km as
compared with 345 to Teesside. But the pipeline
thoroughfare to Eigerey had the deepest point
at 3 72 meters, as compared with 92 meters on
the stretch to Teesside. Digressing a bit, it can
be noted that the local population in the
Egersund area did not view the terminal
question favorably, and a committee to protest
the action was quickly formed when it was
learned that the area was under consideration.
When the Ekofisk Committee's
recommendation was placed on the desk of
Secretary of Industry Finn Lied, the Government
under the leadership of Trygve Bratteli found it
necessary to spend more time going through the
approaches to the problem. It was vital that they
be certain in two areas before making a decision:
•first, that it was in fact impossible to lay a
pipeline across the Norwegian Trench to
Norway - or that this solution was totally out of
the question economically when compared with
Three locations on
the Norwegian coast
were evaluated in
connection with
landing from
Ekofisk; Lista,
Eiger0y and Sola.
Also considered were
Teesside in Great
Britain and Emden
in West Germany.
60
Teesside — and, in case of a terminal in England,
that Norwegian control would be ensured and
that Norway would somehow be able to turn
the resources into concrete jobs. In order to
provide an answer as to the possibilities of
pipelaying in the Norwegian Trench, the Phillips
Group was directed to obtain bids for laying a
line to Norway and to England from possible
pipelaying firms. It was felt that this would
provide the final answer. Norwegian control of
the pipeline could be ensured through
Norwegian participation in the pipeline
company, while new jobs could be gained in
several ways. For a time the alternative of using
the gas for a gas power plant was of interest, but
this idea was dropped due to the high costs
involved. What remained then was possible
development of a Norwegian petrochemical
industry with liquid gas components from
Ekofisk as raw material.
The Time Pressure Factor
Impatience began to be a factor within the
Phillips Group. It was important for several
reasons that a final decision be reached. A
contract for sale of the gas had been signed in
January 1973, and it was based on a fixed
starting point for deliveries, in October 1975.
The capacity for pipelaying at sea was likewise
quite limited — and regardless of where the line
ended up, barges would have to be contracted if
they were to be available in 1973. There was
actually a danger of losing a year — maybe two —
if contracts were not secured as soon as possible.
Regardless of where the line would go, this
operation would be so extensive that as much as
70% of the existing capacity for pipelaying at
depths such as these would be involved.
In addition, there was a special situation in the
steel market. There was such a shortage that
steel prices were rising from week to week and
delivery time became longer and longer. The
Phillips Group decided to make its purchases, to
be able to meet its time schedule before the
prices went even higher. They also had to get
under way with production of the pipes and put
on the protective coating, so that everything
would be ready when the starting signal came.
 To complicate the picture further, receiving The first tanker
terminals were to be built at the ends of the carrying NGL from
lines. Suitable sites had to be found and acquired, the Teesside terminal
is on its way to
and preparations made for the construction of Noretyl's plant at
these large facilities. They would have to be Rafnes in Bamble in
large after new fields were discovered in the 7979. As
Ekofisk area and the reserve estimates increased. compensation for the
Teesside landing of
In 1972 the Ekofisk development was already on crude oil and NGL,
its way to becoming decidedly the largest the Phillips Group
industrial project in Norwegian history. signed an agreement
The Phillips Group and the Norwegian that ensured
authorities were well aware that delays in the development of a
Norwegian
project would mean big delays in the anticipated petrochemical
flow of income. The development within oil and England clearly showed that the technology industry.
prices was bright, as perceived by the industry for laying pipes of the dimensions in question at
itself — and by Norway, which was in the such great depths as the Norwegian Trench
process of becoming an oil nation. represented did not exist. And it would
probably take at least two or three years before
Negotiations such a task could be completed. Many solutions
During the period from the latter half of 1972 to were also discussed as to how the Norwegian
May 1973, a number of negotiations were going Trench could be traversed. One of the plans
on between the various parties involved. The proposed but soon rejected was to lay a
Norwegian authorities negotiated with Great so-called spaghetti-line - that is, many narrow
Britain and West Germany as to what rules pipelines — across the trench itself. If a problem
would apply if the terminal locations were arose, it would simply be a matter of bringing up
Teesside and Emden. Not least would the the pipe that caused the problem and replacing it
matters of jurisdiction and taxation have to be with a new one. The basis for this idea was the
clarified with these countries. In addition, the fact that pipeline dimensions would have to be
authorities and the Phillips Group negotiated on very large in order to meet the capacity
an agreement that would ensure liquid gas for requirements, but narrow pipes of 8 and 12
the development of a Norwegian petrochemical inches could be laid at the depths in question. In 1971 it was
Some of the toughest negotiations were to important for
industry. And at the end of 1972 - after Statoil
Ingvald lllveseth,
had been established — negotiations were take place between the Phillips Group and Minister of Industry,
initiated directly between the Phillips Group and Statoil/the Norwegian authorities. In the case of to stress that ifjxren
Statoil as to ownership of the pipeline. The liquid gas, the Phillips Group was prepared to go were selected as a
negotiations between Norway and West to great lengths to accommodate the Norwegian landing site, this part
of the country would
Germany went well, and a framework wishes — as a kind of compensation for the fact not become a
agreement was reached. that the oil pipeline would go to Teesside and Norwegian
It was a slower process with Great Britain, but not to Norway. When the final agreement was Rotterdam.
acceptable solutions were reached here as well.
The fact that these agreements were going to be
necessary soon became apparent. The round of
bidding for the laying of pipelines to Norway

61

Another example of ready, Norway was ensured a sufficient amount
the vehement of liquid gas components, delivered to Norway
newspaper discussion
that followed the
at a price that provided a very favorable starting
landing issue in point for the development of a new, competitive
Norway. On 31 petrochemical industry. The agreement stated,
January 1973, among other things, that the Phillips Group
Arbeiderbladet refers
would pay transportation charges on the liquid
to Norwegian
companies' demands gas from Teesside to Norway. The result of this
that the landing site contract was the construction of the
be in Norway, petrochemical facilities at Rafnes in Bamble,
Telemark.
Norpipe
The really tough and difficult negotiations were
fought out over the ownership of the pipelines
and receiving terminals. These negotiations
were held directly between the Phillips Group
and Statoil, the latter represented by Jens Chr.
Hauge, chairman of the board, and Arve
Johnsen, managing director.
The Phillips Group had initially agreed that
the State should be guaranteed influence and
control in the pipeline company through
participation. The Group also launched an offer
of 10 percent ownership/participation. But the
State wanted more.
From January 1973 to May of that year, an
uninterrupted series of negotiations were held.
Anders O. Waale relates that the members of the
Phillips Group who were traveling to Norway
during this period were regular guests at Hotell
Bristol in Oslo, and negotiations were going on
night and day. In addition to negotiation
meetings, there were constantly deliberations
within the Phillips Group at which all the
companies were represented — companies from
five different countries. The companies had high
level representation: participating for Phillips
were present-day Chairman of the Board Pete
62 Silas5, head of operations in Norway, J. T. Clark,
and his assistant, J. Fox Thomas, plus a number
of financial and legal experts — along with the
company's experts on the sale of oil and gas.
Anders O. Waale was present during the
negotiations, and he offers these general
observations:
«We (the Phillips Group) received in letter
form a long list of demands from the ministry.
So we sat down here in the office and found that
we had many very good reasons for not
accepting the demands. We decided then to call
a meeting with the ministry in order to present
these good reasons, which we then did. And
without exception, within a short time after
meetings such as these, we would receive
written notice that all the demands listed had to
be accepted - and in addition, the ministry had
arrived at further requirements that had to be
met. It turned out as time went by that the
situation would repeat itself, that every time we
had been in the ministry new demands were
imposed.
«In order to reach a solution, agreements were
entered into on all fronts. It was finally agreed
that the Phillips Group and Statoil would each
have 50 percent shares in Norpipe. At the same
time, Statoil would only provide 50 percent of
the capital stock — and the capital stock was to
make up 10 percent of the investments. In other
words, Statoil would receive half ownership in
Norpipe with only a 5 percent investment. It
was further a condition that Statoil have the
chairman of the board position. According to
Norwegian stock legislation, the chairman of the
board has a double vote in case of a tie. Neither
the Phillips Group nor the Group's lending
institutions were able to accept this. By the
standards of that day, very large sums of money
were involved. (The first loan to finance the
pipeline was for 600 million dollars.) One must
remember that the price of oil lay at $2.50-3.50
per barrel.
«We found it totally unreasonable that Statoil,
with a 5 percent investment in the pipeline
company, should have the deciding vote over
the Group, which was responsible for 95
percent. Therefore, it was decided early on that
the chairman of the board should not have a
double vote. That was a clear condition in the
negotiations between the Phillips Group and
Statoil,» relates Anders O. Waale.
Dramatics
Early in March 1973 agreement had been
reached on all points - or so the Phillips Group
representatives thought. But on the afternoon of
March 1, the very day the Storting report was
discussed in governmental conference, prior to
cabinet action at the palace the following day,
the Phillips Group received word from Jens Chr.
Hauge that the report would go to the cabinet
 But the tension was still there — in spite of During the
everything. And the stakes were high. Out in negotiations between
the companies in the
the North Sea, barges, supply boats, and
Phillips Group and
tugboats lay ready to begin one of the world's various Norwegian
largest pipelaying operations, the oil line to authorities, Hotel
Teesside. What could torpedo the project was a Bristol in Oslo
«no» vote from the parliament — with the became a permanent
base for the
economic consequences that would involve. companies'
The representatives from the Phillips Group representatives. The
gathered at Hotell Bristol on the afternoon of 26 Phillips Group
April, while Anders O. Waale had the task of represents an
international group
following the debate in the Storting. During the of companies —from
course of the day he had reported back by the US, Belgium,
telephone as to what was going on, important France, Italy and
standpoints taken by key persons and other such Norway.
things. When the voting finally took place -
very late that evening — he noted the results and
hurried over to the Bristol.
It was a noisy gathering which suddenly
became quite still - and attentive - when he
came into the room. Most of those present had
been in Oslo with few interruptions throughout
the previous 3-4 months and had been
participating in an endless series of internal and
external meetings. It was quiet while Anders O.
Waale recounted the outcome of the voting. Voting 90-3, the
without the clause regarding the chairman of the This, of course, brought on a very audible Storting decided in
board's single vote. That was Thursday — and a expression of joy and relief over the fact that the favor of landing
hectic evening and night lay ahead. The Phillips matter had been brought to a successful end. crude oil and NGL
Group could not accept the change in this at Teesside, while the
Then there were hurried departures. Everyone
gas would go to
central element in the agreement, and a letter to wanted to inform his headquarters of the Emden in West
the Minister of Industry was composed. J. Fox outcome. Germany.
Thomas delivered the letter to the ministry
Friday morning — just before cabinet minister
Ola Sjak Brask was to go to the cabinet meeting
at the palace. Then something unique happened:
a Storting report that was on the cabinet agenda
was withdrawn. What made this situation most
unusual was the fact that all the media people
had received, as was usual, an advance copy of
the report in order to acquaint themselves with
it, but with the right to make it public only after
a certain date. Thus the situation was such that
the journalists had the report, while the ones it
had been intended for — the members of
parliament — did not.
The case really created waves — but through
some quick and intense meetings during the
week that followed, the matter was cleared up
and the report could pass through cabinet as it
was originally intended, with a Norpipe
chairman of the board from Statoil without the
double vote.
It still had to be passed by the parliament, but
in spite of the fact that the Government led by
Korvald was a minority Government, everyone
expected that it would be adopted. The
optimism was due in part to the fact that the
Industry Committee had been on a fact-finding
tour of Emden and Teesside, and the signals
from the committee members were positive.
 Ekofisk Becomes a «Cih/»
The jack-up rig
"Gulftide" turned
Norway into an
oil-producing nation.
Its capacity was
approx, 40,000
barrels of oil per day
from four subsea
wells. The gas was
flared.
«We are hoping that the results of the test
production will be positive, and that this
will incorporate Norway into the ranks of
oil-producing countries. The start-up of oil
production at Ekofisk is therefore something
that can turn out to be a red-letter day for
Norwegian economic history.* With these
words, Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli
performed the unveiling of a
commemorative plaque in the dining room
64 on «Gulftide», 9 June 1971 at Ekofisk. Today
it can be recorded that Trygve Bratteli was
right — and to a greater degree than most
people would have predicted in 1971.
Just a little over 17 months after Ekofisk
was discovered in December 1969, the
temporary production platform was ready
to begin production. The official opening
for production took place on 9 June, and on
16 June the first test production was under
way.
In a very tight time schedule for start-up
preparations, everything had looked
promising at the end of May, but during the
last week before the day of the opening,
technical problems arose when ice formed in
some of the subsea valves. That meant that
the first Norwegian-produced oil had to
wait until 15 June before the taps were
opened. Up until 8 July there was only test
production. On that date the taps could be
opened for the real thing.
The «Gulftide» jackup rig was chosen
because it was available on the market - and
in Bartlesville Phillips went to work on
fitting familiar processing equipment for oil
and gas into the limited space on board. Oil
and gas would flow to the platform from
four wells through separate lines. On the
platform water would then be removed
from the oil and gas. The gas would be
burned off in a flare in «Gulftide's» drilling
derrick, while the oil would go via pipelines
to two loading buoys connecting the
platform with tankers. The processing work
on «Gulftide» was relatively simple. The
problem was to tailor-make the equipment
for the platform. In London and Stavanger,
however, the tasks were more difficult.
There it was a question of attending to the
subsea wellheads that were to be used,
 A solemn group of
industrial leaders
and politicians listen
to Prime Minister
Trygve Bratteli on
"Gulftide," 9 June
1971. His words
about this becoming
a red-letter day in
Norway's economic
history came true.

fortifying the «Gulftide» to meet North Sea concept had only been employed in harbor
requirements, and developing a buoy areas. Now they were to be placed in the
loading system for an ocean territory where middle of the North Sea at a depth of 70
this technology had never been tested. meters — while they had previously only
In order to gain some time, it was decided been used at 27 meters.
that the three delineation wells which
The Rebuilding A number of
«Ocean Viking» had drilled in order to chart reporters were
Ekofisk, in addition to the discovery well, The Am0yfjord near Stavanger was the present during the
should be turned into production wells. At site for the rebuilding of «Gulftide» to equip solemn occasion on
"Gulftide" — only
the top of these would be placed it for conditions at Ekofisk. There the one thing was
hydraulic-operated wellheads. The first tests processing equipment was placed on board lacking: crude oil.
with subsea wellheads had been made and reinforcements were carried out on the Technical problems
delayed production
earlier, but to a limited extent and not in drilling derrick, helicopter deck, hangar, and start-up until 8 July.
areas so exposed to inclement weather or at platform legs. One of the difficult points in But Aftenposten still
depths as great as at Ekofisk. The solution this rebuilding was simply determining stated that Norway
had been inaugurated
was to have these wellheads made and then what requirements should be placed on a at Ekofisk as an oil
reinforce them at the Phillips Base in platform that would be situated in the North nation.
Dusavik near Stavanger.
Then oil pipelines and control cables were
to be laid from each of the four wells to
«Gulftide». There they would rise together
in one caisson to the platform. The
construction of this caisson or riser was in
itself a big job. No less challenging was
finding a solution for securing it to the sea
floor and to the platform in such a way that
it would hold under the worst weather
conditions imaginable out in the middle of
the North Sea.
Weather conditions were also the biggest
problem in connection with the construction
of the loading buoys. Phillips had had
experience with loading buoys, but that

5 - Giant Discovery
 "Gulftide" afloat on
Ameyfjord near
Stavanger. Here the
platform was
reinforced to face the
storms in the North
Sea — while at the
same time processing
equipment for oil and
gas was installed.
Sea for the purpose of producing oil. In spite
of the fact that Norway is a typical seafaring
nation, the most elementary data regarding
wave conditions at Ekofisk was lacking.
Other than the experience that had been
gained since exploratory drilling began in
1966, there were observations from weather
ships and ships passing through the area to
go by. What we today refer to as the
100-year wave was at that time fixed — on a
rather shaky foundation - at 19.4 meters.
The calculations on which this figure was
based were made by the New Orleans firm
of A.H. Glenn & Associates. This figure was
used as starting point in the rebuilding of
«Gulftide». New problems were constantly
arising for which solutions had to be found.
Det norske Veritas was authorized by the
Norwegian Government to carry out
inspections and officially approve the work
66 on the platform. The contract would have
significant consequences for this
well-known ship certification company,
which thereby became actively involved in
the oil industry.
Not even within Phillips was there any
great expertise in offshore oil production.
The company had offshore operations, but
under totally different conditions than were
anticipated in the North Sea. Therefore
Brown & Root was used as principal
consulting firm. Minor discussions were
continually going on between Phillips and
the authorities as to how things should be
done. One question that was discussed for a
while was whether the pipelines from the
subsea wellheads should be buried — or
whether they should lie on the sea floor and
gradually become covered through natural
processes. Many of the discussions that
arose had their origin in a concern for the
environment and the fishing industry. One
 The pipelaying barge
"Hugh W. Cordon"
is ready to lay pipes
at Ekofisk. In the
background:
"Gulftide" and the
tugboat "Paris
Teriot".

Onboard the Brown

of the main problems confronting
Norwegian politicians was the probability
of oil spills and hence the damage to sea life
which could result. Then as now, the various
business interest groups took opposing
stands.
A number of questions were also raised in
connection with the new regulations on
working hours which forged their way into
the North Sea arena. On the exploration
rigs, the crew worked one week offshore
and had one week free. On «Gulftide» during
the early period, from late fall of 1970 until
production was under way, it was requested
that the commuting specialists work 14 days
onboard and then have one week off. This
was finally accepted by the Norwegian
authorities.
The construction work out at Ekofisk
started at the end of 1970. At that time the
okay came to begin laying the pipelines
between the wellheads and «Gulftide».
Brown & Root was awarded that contract,
and it was pipelaying barge «Hugh Gordon*
which would become the first to lay oil
pipes on the Norwegian shelf.
The really difficult task was positioning
the riser that would bring the pipes and the
control cables from the sea floor on up to
«Gulftide». It weighed 200 tons, was 42
inches in diameter and approximately 91
meters long. It was a huge operation
with the equipment of that time - even
without the weather gods' adding to the
& Root barge "Hugh
W. Gordon"
everything is readied
for the laying of
pipelines between
"Gulftide" and the
four subsea
wellheads.
difficulty. But it turned out well in the end,
and the riser was in place.
Production
The principle behind production on
«Gulftide» was so simple that it must be
regarded as almost ingenious. From the
subsea wellheads the oil and gas went to the
platform where it passed through two
separation levels for removal of gas and
water with simultaneous reduction of the
enormous pressure. The gas was burned off.
The oil then passed on through pipes to the
loading buoys where the tankers were
moored. A hose then conducted the oil
directly into the tanks on the ships.
Production could only go on when there lay
ships loading. As soon as a ship was loaded
to capacity, the oil flow was directed to the
other loading buoy where the oil was
conducted onboard the next ship in the 67
A Creek tanker loads
crude at the loading
buoy, following
processing on the
platform in which
oil, gas, and water
were separated, the
crude produced on
"Gulftide" was
pumped to the
loading buoys and
then on into tankers.

same manner. The problem with this four wells continued to produce to near the
principle arose when weather conditions maximum amount of 10,000 barrels per day
were such that the tankers had to pull away — as had been foreseen. Neither was there
from the loading buoys because of high any sign of the drastic reduction in pressure
winds or waves. When that happened, which some people thought would come as
production had to be shut down from the a result of the high pressure in the reservoir.
wellheads immediately. That was done from Phillips carried out a number of tests, all of
the platform. With the prevailing weather which pointed in one direction: the reservoir
conditions at Ekofisk, production had to be at Ekofisk was as big as it had appeared to
shut down at regular intervals. During the be at the start, and production capacity was
first year production was shut down 25% of as good as the optimists had predicted. But
the time. About 20% was due to the there was one problem to be dealt with in
weather, while the remaining down time the difficult chalk reservoir — the wells had
had other, technical causes. A number of to be acidized before production could get
technical problems arose necessarily during under way.
this gigantic test project, but they were
solved one by one and improvements were
made. It was particularly the experience
gained from technical problems connected
An oil sample is
studied on with the loading buoys, oil hoses, and
"Gulftide". The mooring lines that led to improvements.
operators onboard Production started cautiously on 8 July
the platform were
hired by contracts. 1971, with only one well until September of
Phillips later used the that year. Then no. two started producing, a
platform for training month later the third one was ready, and in
the company's own
operators who were February 1972 all four wells were in
to man the operation.
permanent
platforms.
But the most gratifying and encouraging
result throughout this first year of
operations at Ekofisk was the fact that the
reservoir did not show signs of collapsing
like the skeptics had believed it would.
68 Production figures showed that each of the
Focusing on the Colossus
On the 14th of May in 1971, the Phillips Group
signed a contract with the French company C.G.
Doris for construction of a concrete storage tank
for the Ekofisk field. The agreement marked the
end of an intense decision-making process which
went on during the first months of 1971. There
were a number of questions in connection with
this pioneer project — the most fundamental
being whether such a tank would float, so that it
could be towed from the construction site to the
field.
Internally at Phillips and within the Phillips
Group, all doubt was swept away. Good help in
this respect was provided by the tight time
schedule that had been set up — the storage tank
had to be out on the field during the course of
the summer of 1972 if the development was to
follow the overall time schedule. This also
contributed to the desire to begin construction
work on the tank even though the Norwegian
authorities had not given their formal approval.
Building Site
Even before the contract with Phillips had been
signed, C.G. Doris had made contact with
Norwegian building contractors Ing. F. Selmer
to obtain a non-binding price estimate for the
concrete work on such a tank. Selmer had
figured a quick price estimate and turned in their
offer. In April/May 1971, Doris came back to
Selmer and wanted a binding bid — the project
would be realized. Ingeni0r F. Selmer A/S had
long experience with concrete constructions
from water tanks, grain silos and support
columns for bridges. The company was
considered Norway's most experienced in the
slip-forming technique — perhaps even on a
worldwide basis. The firm had just completed a
larger power project in Australia, thus adding to
the company's good reputation. But the
Australia project had also taught F. Selmer an
important lesson — that it was not wise to drain
all the company's resources on a project with a
time limit. Considering the building time with
which Doris was operating in connection with
the storage tank, the company felt that they
needed assistance. Hoyer-Ellefsen was among
the three leading contracting firms (along with
The dimensions of
the Ekofisk Tank are
impressive. Oslo's
city hall could easily
fit within the limits
of the Tank's outer
wall. Comparing it
with familiar
buildings onshore
makes it easier for
everyone to-
comprehend the
Tank's enormous
Selmer) in this particular field in Norway, and
the two companies agreed to cooperate on the
project. The first problem that had to be solved
- and quickly - was the selection of a building
site. The location would have to satisfy a
number of requirements, of which the most
important were: a large area that could be turned
into a dry dock, an infrastructure that could
handle such a large and intensely time-limited
project, ocean depths nearby where the actual
slip-forming could be carried out and, for
towout, depths of 60 meters or more out to
open waters.
The location that plant manager Knut
Tovshus and production manager Gunnar
Vinnvik at F. Selmer took note of was Dirdal —
a small village at the inner end of Hogsfjord in
the rural district of Gjesdal in Rogaland County.
While they were awaiting the results of ground
testing, a contract was signed with the
landowners. This took place without the
involvement of the district officials, and when
word of it reached Gjesdal district late in the
evening on 17 May 1971, there was an uproar.
Principal questions regarding Norwegian local
democracy were raised, Stavanger Aftenblad
raised questions about democracy in a feature
article on 19 May, and the case ended up before
the parliament. From district quarters a 69
 comprehensive district hearing was indicated
before a stand could be taken in the matter — and
in the meantime the responsible parties within F.
Selmer began the search for alternatives.
Jattavagen in Stavanger was then named as an
alternative — and new ground testing was
carried out. In contrast to Gjesdal, they
were met with open arms in Stavanger, and the
case was pushed through municipal procedures.
Stavanger had learned that in the oil industry
things should happen fast — and as often as not
they did. «American tempo», it was called, and
Stavanger had already shown that the city was
able to meet the demands that were made.
While the discussion on Dirdal vs. Jattavagen
was going on, the results came in from the
ground tests in Dirdal. The conclusion was
relatively clear — Dirdal was not suitable since it
would be necessary to go down to a depth of 40
meters in the ground before a dry dock could be
secured against water seepage. That left Jatta-
vagen, and even Stavanger Aftenblad applauded
the fact in an editorial on the 2nd of June.
Gunnar Vinnvik says in retrospect that
he is glad Dirdal wasn't chosen. If that had
happened, the construction work would have
completely overburdened the infrastructure —
roads, water works, etc., would not have been
The tiny community
of Dirdal was able to carry the load, and the project would
initially picked as have had to be moved in the midst of the
fabrication site for construction work.
the Ekofisk Tank. On 4 June the contract between Ing. F. Selmer
The choice created
and the City of Stavanger was signed. The city
quite a stir since the
local authorities were was guaranteed a harbor for 550 pleasure boats
not the first to be in return when the project was finished. Only in
informed. This retrospect has the extent of this contract become
coverage in clear, now that we have experienced the
Stavanger Aftenblad
from 3 June 197 T.
building of one Condeep platform after another
refers to the at Hinnavagen.
parliament's
discussion of the Construction Start-Up
principals involved
It wasn't until 14 June 1971 that Stavanger's city
in this case of
deficient council formally approved the contract with Ing.
information. F. Selmer. At that time work on the dry dock had
already begun, with leveling. The following
week, work was under way on the wall
which would keep the water out. Then it was full
steam ahead with dredging and preparing the
10 x 110 meter cavity behind the 300 meter
long dry dock wall.
The work went on all summer in Jattavagen,
while local industry in the Stavanger area
managed to secure subcontracts for the work.
The main contractor was C.G. Doris. The two
French firms Europe-Etudes and UIE were big
suppliers, while Ing. F. Selmer and
H0yer-Ellefsen were the largest suppliers of
parts with responsibility for the construction
and concrete work. Stavanger Spennbetong and
O.C. 0straadt in Sandnes had prefabrications —
including the breakwater elements
(approximately 8,000), Singel & Grussenteret
was to deliver 120,000 cubic meters of sand,
while Norsk Hammerverk was to supply the
5,000 tons of reinforcement steel that was
needed. There were also a number of smaller
suppliers. Moreover, the work on the tank came
during a period of low activity within the
building sector in the Stavanger area, and peak
employment on the building project would be
close to 800 people.
The activity continued almost day and night
so as to be finished by the middle of August,
when the actual construction work was to start.
Doris had a one-year delivery schedule, with the
date for completion set at 1 August 1972.
Delayed Start-Up
The Norwegian authorities had not yet
approved the drawings for the tank when, in the
first half of August, everything was ready for the
actual construction work to begin. Det norske
Veritas had been given approval responsibility
by the Ministry of Industry. The first problems
already showed up the day after the work had
begun. Veritas could not accept the calculations
that Doris submitted for the base section.
Veritas felt that the structural analyses were
insufficient and that new figures had to be
submitted. This led first to the decision that the
bottom should be built with a system of
concrete ribs under the base slab, while the
original plans were based on a flat bottom.
Consequently, the dry dock had to be made
one meter deeper before the slip-forming could
begin. While that work was going on, further
objections to the base construction came from
Veritas. The first foundation work had started up
when Veritas' intervention brought it to a halt
on 23 August. Now the amount of
reinforcement and the thickness of the base
section were in question.
These difficulties stemmed, of course, from
the fact that there was no experience from
similar constructions on which to build. This was
Jåttåvågen near
Stavanger, before
construction start on
the Ekofisk Tank.

The foundation of
the Ekofisk Tank is
taking shape. It is
obvious that the area
has now been turned
Mo one giant
drydock.

71
 Whether or not the the first time that concrete would be used in
Tank would float oil-related structures offshore. Norwegian
became a favorite standards had not been established for
discussion topic for
Stavanger's citizens. conditions such as these, and questions were
Under the heading raised as Veritas received documentation from
"Safety First", the Doris. Another problem that soon showed up
artist's comments was the fact that the French firm Doris was
ran as follows: "As
an added safety
unaccustomed to the close association with a
precaution during State inspection agent. This resulted in Veritas'
towout of the Tank, being treated in an almost stepmotherly fashion
one of our fishermen for a while. By the time Veritas was able to see
has donated a good the documentation for construction of the
old-fashioned
bailer." various parts, it was much too late, and the work
was either already under way or about to begin.
Naturally, this had to lead to delays based on the
Norwegian way of working. Fortunately action
was taken at last, and the climate of cooperation
improved considerably. contrast to the Condeep platforms in which the
It wasn't until 30 September that all areas of construction work moves steadily upward until
disagreement were cleared up and work could the full height is achieved, and submersion
resume. Comprehensive tests were then made doesn't take place until the superstructure is
on the construction — at Norges Tekniske attached — the Ekofisk Tank was built by its
H0gskole in Trondheim, among other places — being gradually lowered into the sea as the work
and the results led to an increase in the amount progressed. Thus its height above sea level was
of reinforcement steel and in the thickness of the rather constant. The evening before towout
base. from dry dock was to take place, a hasty
decision was made to hold a christening
Construction Method ceremony. Ann Doney, wife of Phillips'
The original plans involved completing the base representative at Jattavagen, C.E. «Chuck»
section for towout from the Jattavagen dry dock Doney, had the honor of being godmother. So
around Christmas 1971. The delays and Ekofisk I was christened with real champagne.
resulting extra work meant that the towout
could not take place until 24 February 1972. It Floats
The actual slip-forming was to be done at There were plenty of skeptics who believed that
Hillevag where water depths were satisfactory Ekofisk I would not be able to float. How can a
for the technique that had been developed. In concrete colossus weighing 45,000 tons float?

But the Tank did

actually float, and
was anchored at
Hillevag near
Stavanger. There
dip-forming could
get under way on the
storage cells deep
inside the structure.

72

The law of Archimedes was referred to in
newspaper articles on the days prior to the
event. When the day arrived, there were a lot of
binoculars aimed at the colossus for the purpose
of following the development at close range.
And Ekofisk I floated! Its clearance margin
above the seabed, however, was only 30
centimeters on account of the extra base
elements, but at high tide the operation went
even more smoothly than had been expected. At
Hillevag the Tank was moored with two
hydraulic anchoring devices on land while two
newly-developed «mud anchors* were extended
out into the fjord. And Stavanger Aftenblad ran
its third editorial on the Tank: with «Ekofisk I» as
its title, it called the event an «oil adventure in
our own swimming pool.» The editorial was
concluded with the words, «May good fortune
follow you on the ocean floor.»
Slip-forming
Preparations for slip-forming were begun as
The breakwater
elements in the
Tank's outer wall
were prefabricated
and hoisted Mo
place. At one stage it
was necessary to fill
in the holes in the
elements to maintain
buoyancy.
soon as the Tank was moored. Selmer's slip-form
technique was used on the nine storage cells at
the center of the construction.
The structure connecting these tanks with the
breakwater wall around them was also
slip-formed, while the breakwater wall consists
of prefabricated rings that were cemented
together. It was also this latter process that
presented a bit of a problem, and during the
work's start-up phase it became necessary to
close up the holes temporarily in order to
increase buoyancy. Veritas' decision, to the
effect that concrete to be lowered into the sea
had to be of a certain age, slowed down the
progress. The result was that the structure grew
upward at a rate of three centimeters per hour —
60 centimeters per 24 hours.
Work continued around the clock — for the
most part with a total of 750 men in activity,
spread over three shifts.
As Easter 1972 approached, the work was
going well — while at the same time Veritas' 73
 Inspection of the
structure is carried
out by divers using a
diving bell.
The construction
technique involved
the Tank's being
sunk lower into the
water as work
progressed.
testing of the construction continued. Again the
testing was carried out at NTH in Trondheim -
Norway's only harbor laboratory. There the
Tank was exposed to the 100-year-wave to
measure its effect on the structure.
Additional Approval Problems
Even though work on the Tank progressed
normally throughout the spring and summer of
1972 -until the structure reached its full height
on 21 June, there was a vigorous tug-of-war
going on the whole time between Veritas and
Doris, and between the Ministry of Industry and
Phillips as builder. The problems that had arisen
at construction start-up had been taken care of,
but the unusual situation resulting from the fact
that building work had begun prior to approval
of the drawings added to the difficulties.
At the end of March, the disagreement as to
reinforcement calculations and stability was so
great that the Ministry of Industry
recommended that Phillips stop the work. There
was hectic meeting activity all that spring, and
independent experts from the University of
Calgary, Canada were called in.
With the exception of a strike and a few days'
pause due to strong winds, the work went on
continuously, and this approval process had no
effect on the daily activity. The problems were
solved as they went along, and the goal then
was to be finished in October 1972.
Outfitting
As the concrete work approached completion
there were a number of other tasks in full swing.
A lot of equipment was to be placed on board.
The pumping capacity for receiving 350,000
barrels of crude oil production per day was to be
installed, and the capacity leaving the Tank
would be 720,000 barrels per day. Purification
equipment was also installed so that the water
discharged into the sea would fall safely within
the requirements of the Norwegian authorities.
The work was complex — and much more
extensive then had been anticipated at the start.
74 Production manager on the Tank, Gunnar
Vinnvik, tells it like this: «I'm not sure we would
have taken on the project had we foreseen at the
start all that the task involved. But today, of
course, when we see the consequences, we're
glad it was done.»
Tourist Attraction
The daring efforts involved in the building of
the Ekofisk Tank made it quite an attraction,
during the construction period, for people in the
oil business around the world. In August 1972
those in charge of the concrete work could
report that over 3,000 people had visited the
Tank. These were oil people who wanted to get
a closer look at the giant and possibly use the
building principles in their own development
projects.
At the same time, there were a great many
who were interested in the Tank but not allowed
to go on board. The structure became a part of
the Stavanger skyline, and «visitors» via
binoculars and pleasure craft became part of
everyday exprience for the people working
on board.
Modification of Plans
During the course of 1972, the Ekofisk
development became steadily more complex as
compared with the starting point. Six new fields
had been added — in 1972 alone Edda and
Albuskjell were discovered, while the size of
Eldfisk was established. And at this point in time
in 1972, no one knew where it all would end.
There were still plenty of potential structures for
discoveries in the concession area. The need for
processing of oil and gas greatly increased in
volume. 2/4 FTP had a 350,000 barrel capacity.
But that was expected to be sufficient only for
production from the main Ekofisk field. Greater
capacity was necessary for handling the six
satellite fields which had now been discovered —
plus extra capacity for eventual new discoveries.
At the same time, it was made definitively clear
that the Phillips Group's intention was to lay
two pipelines from Ekofisk to shore — one oil
line and one gas line. The technical solutions in
this instance required a central starting point for
the lines. That would provide the flexibility of
being able to link up new fields without any
production halt to speak of - as opposed to
link-ups on the pipeline itself on the ocean floor
— and was on the whole a more economical
solution.
Since the concentration of platforms was
taking shape with 2/4 C, 2/4 FTP, 2/4 Q and
2/4 Tank, this was a sensible and logical starting
point. Furthermore, the Tank had a large area of
about 1.8 acres available, which could be utilized
almost without additional cost.
That which had been planned at the start as a
storage tank was designated to be the site where

all oil and gas from the satellite fields would be
accumulated and sent on toward onshore
destinations.
Extending the Timetables
The increased complexity of the development
project resulted in the need to extend all
timetables. The first plans, aimed at being ready
to start up permanent production from fixed
platforms on the Ekofisk field in early 1972,
could not be realized.
Start-up time was constantly being moved
forward, and the concession for the test phase
from «Gulftide» was extended by the authorities.
This meant that there was no need for the Tank
out on the field during the summer/fall of 1972.
The delays in completion work on the Tank
from 1 August to October 1972 also made
Phillips skeptical about undertaking a towing
operation during a season when the first fall and
winter storms might be encountered en route.
In late summer of 1972, the Phillips Group
decided to build a deck over the whole Tank and
another deck above that one, covering 65
percent of the structure. This could have been
done out on the field, but it would have
involved both increased expenses and greater
risk. It was safer to do parts of the job in
sheltered waters near shore. At the end of
September, casting began on the support
columns for the lower, 20-meter deck which
would cover the whole Tank, including the
breakwater wall. And during the course of the
winter the deck was installed. The upper deck
After it was towed
out of the dock, the
Ekofisk Tank became
a Stavanger
landmark. The
slip-forming took
place near the city's
center, and everyone
could follow the
progress.
was to be installed out on the field when the
Tank was in place.
After the 20-meter deck was finished, it was
equipped with the necessary conveniences so
that people could stay there and work on the
final tasks - both en route to Ekofisk and when
the Tank had reached its destination. A
helicopter deck was part of this work, since the
Tank would not be connected to the other
platforms by bridge until later.
Preparations for Towout
Spring 1973 was marked by tasks preparing for
towout. The route to be followed had already
been decided back in May 1971 by
representatives of Doris and Selrner. Naturally,
this was an important factor in the selection of a
building site. The Tank's depth during the tow
would be about 60 meters, and the most difficult
and crucial part of the towing operation would
be the stretch from Hillevag to H0gsfjord.
Another important and critical point was
crossing the Norwegian Trench - while the
setting operation on the seabed out on the field
was decidedly the most risk-filled. This had to be
done carefully to avoid incurring damage, but it
was equally important to do it in such a way that
it would be as resistant as possible to waves,
weather and wind.
Discussions in this connection began before
start-up on the construction work and resulted
in the casting of a ribbing system in concrete
below the bottom slab. Out on the field where
the Tank was to be located, ground tests were 75
 made by Norges Geotekniske Institutt. They
showed that the seabed consisted of a 26-meter
thick layer of sand over harder clay. Computer
simulations had predicted that the Tank would
gradually work its way down into the ocean
floor until it stood so firmly that it would be
affected very little by weather conditions.
Towout day was set for 8 June 1973. All
preparations had been completed, and six big
tugs with a total of 45,000 horsepower were in
place. The warning notice for ships in the area
had been published in the newspapers. Weather
forecasts during the tow period were good —
and safe in the hands of a French meteorologist
brought by Doris from France. Just before 10:00
a.m. on 7 June the all-clear signal came from the
Ministry of Industry. But then a few hours later
the Veritas bomb was dropped . . .. Less than 12
hours before the towout was to begin, Veritas
sent word that documentation on the
measurements of the seabed where the Tank
was to stand were insufficient. Veritas was
not satisfied with, or convinced by, the
measurements Doris had carried out. Veritas was
not sure that the ocean floor was as flat as Doris
and Phillips had calculated it to be. The result
was that the Ministry of Industry required
measurements of the seabed — therefore, the
towout was postponed. On 12 June the tug
«Simson» was on location at Ekofisk and in the
process of taking new measurements, utilizing
echo sounding. However, weather conditions
were not ideal, and doubt arose as to the quality
of the measurements. But the analysis work
began at Veritas and continued around the clock.
The question was whether the results of these
Many people
sacrificed a night's
sleep between 19 and
20]une 1973 in
order to watch the
towout of the Tank.
But new questions
were raised — and the
towout delayed.
76
measurements would be the same as for the ones
Doris had carried out. What Veritas feared was
great local unevenness in the seabed, indicating
a danger of cracks forming in the base of the
Tank.
Based on the measurements, the conclusion
was that concrete would be injected under the
base of the Tank after it was put into position -
thus creating a kind of foundation. It was
possible to do this since pipes were molded into
the structure — initially intended for sending
through measuring instruments. With that came
the all-clear signal and the official okay to start
the tow - this time from the Petroleum
Directorate. That was June 19th. But then new
problems arose. Some of the anchor chains had
already been cut in preparation for the start of
the 8 June towout, but a couple were left. The
new towout starting time was set for just after
midnight on June 20th. People from the
Stavanger area went down to the fjord that fine
summer night to witness the event. But they
were disappointed — and had given up their
night's sleep for nothing. The job of burning
through the anchor chains took longer than
planned, and towout was again delayed.
Business at Last
At 2:15 a.m. on 21 June, the six tugs put their
45,000 horsepower to work on the 215,000 ton
Ekofisk Tank. Two boats were out in front, two
behind and one at each side. One of the world's
greatest maritime operations to date could get
under way. Stavanger Aftenblad devoted its
fourth editorial to the Ekofisk Tank that day:
«A Local Event of Worldwide Significance* —
 In the eurly morning
hours of 21 ]une
1973, things finally
begin to happen. Six
tugs with a total of
45,000 hp began the
215,000 ton tow
from Stavanger to
Ekofisk.

stating that, «The monument to a new
technological era is today journeying through
our district.*
The Tank followed the route which has since
become the established one in connection with
Condeep construction by Norwegian
Contractors at Hinnavagen. The route went
from Hillevag past Usken and out into
Hogsfjord and, from there, in a straight line
northward between the islands of Talgje and
Fogn, Fogn and Finnoy, around Krabbeskjaer and
out into Boknafjord.
The towout surpassed all expectations, and
none of the many emergency plans that had
been developed were needed.
Setting the Tank
During towout to the field, the Tank extended
66 meters down into the water. In order to place
it at a depth of 70 meters, water was pumped
into the tanks while it was towed into position.
Right before it was to be lowered, one last check
of the exact position was made before it was set
in place.
Phillips' plan was initially that the Tank would
be placed on a continuation of the straight line
formed by the southernmost flare, 2/4 FTP, 2/4
Q, and 2/4 C. Because of the uncertainty
surrounding the seabed conditions, the Tank
was positioned a little farther to the west. Thus
came the characteristic break in the middle of the
Ekofisk Complex.
It turned out, however, that seabed conditions
were better than feared, and the job of injecting
concrete under the Tank could be omitted.
In order to secure the Tank, it was filled with
water and some sand as ballast. The sand came
from Dirdal — the place originally designated as
building site for the Tank. Nearly 48,000 tons of
sand were shipped from there out to the field.
Instead of the concrete foundation which was
to have been cast under the Tank, a steel skirt
was built around it on the seabed. Steel plates
were pressed down into the seabed so that there
would be no danger of the ocean currents'
forming any trenches which could then lead to
unevenness in the seabed.
More Work
After most of the work of situating and securing
the Tank had been completed in late summer of
1973, Doris went to work on building the
30-meter deck. In this instance components were
shipped out and assembled on the field.
The work to finish the Tank in the manner in
which the expanded plans for its use required
went on for a long time and was part of Phase
III in the field development. It was not until
December 1974 that the work was completed.
The Ekofisk Tank has first and foremost
become a nerve center and a junction for the
production at Ekofisk. The need for buffer
storage in bad weather disappeared when the
pipelines were put into service. But as reserve
storage, in case of damage to the line, it has
The route of the tow
had been decided in
1971. The most
critical phases were
the narrow passages
between the islands
outside Stavanger,
the crossing of the
Norwegian Trench,
and the actual
positioning at
Ekofisk. Waiting
areas had been
defined, in case the
weather caused
trouble.
77
 The Ekofisk Tank is
towed in towards the
existing platforms at
the Complex. The
lowering was done
by pumping water
gradually into the
Tank — until it was
standing on the
bottom.

The Tank is in place project and led to close supervision of the

and the 30 meter
deck installed. The
work on P platform
is under way, and
the Tank lies like a
separate island
without any
connection with the
southern part of the
Ekofisk Complex.
meant extra security for production stability on
the field.
Consequences
The construction of the Ekofisk Tank was a
milestone in the total Ekofisk development —
and also became a great milestone within
Norwegian oil operations. It is difficult today to
imagine the North Sea petroleum industry
without the concrete platforms. But when the
decision was to be made as to whether to
construct the Ekofisk Tank, there was no
experience on which to build. Knowledge and
techniques were taken from other areas and
combined to form a new product — with the
conviction that it could be done.
There were many skeptics. The whole
building process was marked by boldness. A
concrete tank had collapsed while being
launched in France. That cast a shadow over the
construction work. It also partly explains the
many interventions by Veritas, the inspection
agency. Strength and stability calculations for a
concrete tank that would have to withstand
pressures from the sea in one of the world's
roughest ocean territories were not to be viewed
lightly. The fear of oil spills and resulting
pollution overshadowed nearly every other
issue in the petroleum industry's first years in
Norway.
For Norwegian building contractors Ing. F.
Selmer and H0yer Ellefsen, who together
formed the company Condeep Group, the
building of the Ekofisk Tank marked the start of
a new industry. The experience gained from
working with concrete on the Tank formed the
basis for the platform concepts which were later
realized. And they were realized because the
building of the Ekofisk Tank proved that
concrete was a suitable material for platforms at
sea. The fact that the French concept of the
breakwater wall was dropped in favor of
slimming down the structure as much as possible
in the vulnerable zone around sea level does not
alter this. It just proves that the companies were
able to apply the knowledge and experience to
further development.
In the very same year that the Ekofisk Tank
was towed out from Stavanger, the companies in
the Condeep Group signed contracts to build
three more platforms. Since that time there have
been countless more — the structure is
continually being improved and modified. But
the Ekofisk Tank was the first.

78
Permanent Production
There was hectic activity and tension in the
air for the crew manning the control room
oh FTP platform that April evening. Their
big «exam day» had finally arrived. Months
of hard work on preparations and testing of
equipment were over. Tonight it was
happening - the first crude oil from well 13
on 2/4 Ekofisk Alpha was being processed
on the platform. Water and gas were
separated out and the crude oil sent on by
pumps into the pipeline, which would lead it
to loading buoy no. 1 where the tanker
«Elisabeth Fernstrom* lay ready to receive it.
Everything was functioning perfectly, and at
10:00 p.m. they were able to record the
arrival of the oil at the loading buoy, and its
final journey through lines down into the
tanks on the ship.
Thus the first oil produced from fixed
platforms on the Norwegian continental
shelf became a fact late in the evening on 25
April 1974. Phase II in the Ekofisk
development was under way — and during
the months that followed, several
production wells were drilled and tied into
the processing on FTP platform.
The road leading up to this April evening
in 1974 had been a long one — no reason to
deny it. Nearly four and a half years had
gone by since the Ekofisk field had been
established — and the first timetable had
fixed production start-up from the
permanent platforms at first quarter 1972.
But in spite of the fact that the timetable
had missed its target by two years,
production start-up was a huge triumph for
the Phillips Norway Group. With many
odds against them, they managed to
develop this gigantic oil field in the middle
of the North Sea - in one of the world's
roughest bodies of water and at a depth of
70 meters, deeper than oil platforms had
ever been placed. A number of unknown
problems had turned up along the way as
Phillips, the operator, set to work on the
tasks. Problems which no one could have
foreseen — they had to be experienced
through practical problem-solving.
The Hundred Year Wave
The telephone conversation dropped like a
bomb on Phillips' construction department
in London that day in February 1971. A
representative from the Glenn firm in New
Orleans had just told Project Manager
Before start-up on
the Ekofisk
development, the
100-year wave was
calculated at 19.4
meters. However, it
turned out that the
calculation base was
inaccurate, and in
1971 the wave
increased to 23.7
meters. This had
great consequences
for the development,
since the Phase II
platforms were under
construction. The
result was nearly a
year's delay.
Leonard P. Meade that the size of the
100-year wave the company had provided
for Phillips the previous fall appeared to be
too small. Glenn would shortly be sending
over new documents which showed that,
based on the firm's latest calculations, the
100-year wave for the Ekofisk area had
increased from 64 to 78 feet. If the company
maintained this calculation, it would lead to
long delays for the entire Ekofisk
development since the first platforms were
already under construction in New Orleans
and Ravenna, Italy. Leonard P. Meade felt
downright taken in, and he decided to
contact the second largest and second most
highly-regarded firm within this branch to
check the new calculations from Glenn. But
first he had to halt construction on the two
platforms which was already under way,
and likewise stop preparations on the other
three platforms and on the jackets for the
south flare.
When that had been done, a check of the
calculations for the 100-year wave was
initiated, with Phillips' maritime expert,
Wayne Cannon, in charge. It turned out as
time went by that new data from the winter
of 1970-71 had forced Glenn to modify
their calculations.
The data base was not good. Exact 79
 measurements did not exist. The hard winter
of 1970-71 upset all previous suppositions,
and it became clear to all involved that the
first calculations were not good enough: the
new 100-year wave for the North Sea was a
78-footer. That meant almost a year's
setback, but the «Gulftide», which was on
location at Ekofisk and being readied for test
production, was confirmed that the rig
satisfied the new requirements.
Planning Start-Up
Planning work on the permanent
development of the Ekofisk field began in
early 1970, while drilling of confirmation
wells on the field was still going on. Despite
the fact that the decision had been made to
complete the test period with «Gulftide», the
permanent development plan was in the
works at the same time. The designing of
the platforms in the first construction phase
— Phase II - began as early as 1970.
Early that same year Phillips, as operator,
associated with contractors Brown & Root
in Houston for the purpose of planning the
platform structures, while the company's
own Engineering and Construction section
in Bartlesville would handle the processing
equipment. Brown & Root had experience
with platform design from the British sector
of the North Sea — and from the Gulf of
Mexico. The firm was regarded as one of
the leaders in the field.
During the first part of 1970, Phillips
began a moderate build-up of the company's
own project group at the London office.
Leonard P. Meade was the first project
engineer, while in August 1970 E.G. «Carl»
Johnson came from Bartlesville and became
engineer number two. Up to the spring of
1972 the office kept growing steadily, to a
total of 8-10 engineers. Carl Johnson was
responsible for the development at Ekofisk —
an assignment he kept until 1978.
The reservoir calculations that had been
made on the basis of the first two wells at
Ekofisk provided the criteria for the
development plan that was launched early
in 1970. No other field had been found yet
in the area — drilling was under way on what
would later become both West Ekofisk and
Tor, and a little later drilling would begin on
what was to become Eldfisk. But for the time
being, all criteria for design of platforms and
equipment were based on Ekofisk alone.
80 The platforms developed for Phase II
were relatively simple platforms, the models
for which were obtained from previously
developed fields in other locations around
the world. These plans were then
tailor-made for conditions at Ekofisk. The
platforms were simple in that there was no
processing on board. Emphasis was on
wellhead platforms which simply brought
up the oil and gas - then transported it to
the processing platform. The injection
platform, on the other hand, was more
advanced, because it would return to the
reservoir the gas that came up with the oil.
Since pressure in the Ekofisk reservoir was
so high, the compressors which were to
propel the gas down into the reservoir
would have to be sufficiently powerful to
exceed reservoir pressure. However, the
firm that produced the compressors felt that
it would not be a problem to build
compressors such as these.
The first contracts for construction of the
platforms at Ekofisk were signed at the end
of 1970. The others were signed in the
beginning of 1971, and the contract for the
Ekofisk Tank followed in May 1971.
Everything was ready for implementing the
plans.
Starting Signal at Sea
The crane barge «Choctaw» had had to put
into the Stavanger harbor involuntarily for
more than month. Every day the weather
forecasts were checked carefully to see if
conditions out at Ekofisk were such that it
could weigh anchor and move into action,
but the North Sea had obviously decided to
be difficult.
Since the beginning of October 1971,
everything had been ready to start
construction on what was to become the
Ekofisk city in the middle of the North Sea.
The first three bridge supports to be
positioned on the seabed, together to make
up the south flare in Ekofisk city, were
placed on barges. On board the «Choctaw»
was the necessary equipment for piling the
tripods to the seabed. The method to be
used in the piling and foundationing
operation was developed by engineer Bill
Bowles at Phillips. The plan chosen was like
the one the Americans used when they built
their famous skyscrapers. The piles would
be bored down through the legs on the
bridge support. Deep down in the seabed a
hole was then made which would be

cemented — and the cement would extend
up into the steel pile itself. This kind of
structure had never been tested in oil
operations, but the extreme weather
conditions in the North Sea demanded a
solid foundation for platforms which had to
be able to withstand waves up to 23 meters
high.
At the end of November, the weather
finally began to settle down and the all-clear
signal was given for the «Choctaw» to set
course for Ekofisk. There was much
excitement both on board the barge and at
Phillips' offices in Oslo, at Dusavik near
Stavanger, and in London. The theories
would finally be given practical application.
Then on I December 1971, the time was
ripe. A bridge support was launched, and
the «Choctaw» was able to maneuver it into
position and get started on the foundation
work. Everything looked good. Even
6 - Giant Discovery
The derrick barge
"Choctaw" is piling
the bridge support
for the south flare.
This was the first
structure installed on
what was to become
the Ekofisk Complex
— on I December
1971.
The three bridge
supports and the
bridges are in place —
the flare itself is the
only thing lacking at
the south end.
though all the piling was not completed at
that time, the bridge support was properly
secured and everything was ready to move
on to number two. However, the weather
threatened to interfere again, but it was
decided to go ahead while conditions were
moderately good. The barge with support
number two was steered toward the
«Choctaw» so that the latter could hoist the
bridge support off the barge and launch it.
That's when it happened. One of the legs on
the bridge support was struck against the
«Choctaw» when a wave pitched the barge
against the crane barge.
A quick inspection of the bridge support
verified that it could not be launched before
repairs were made. Its course had to be set
for Stavanger and the shop — before support
number two could be launched on 7
February 1972. Fourteen days later the third
support was launched, and the «Choctaw» 81
 Two of the platform
jackets — FTP and C
- for Phase II of the
development were
built in the US. Here
one of the jackets is
being towed from
sunny Texas to
rougher conditions in
the North Sea.
was able to concentrate on the foundation
work. That was no easy job either, and it
was the summer of 1972 before all three
bridge supports were satisfactorily secured
to the sea floor.
On the Way
The building of the Phase II platforms was
well distributed — both geographically and
among various companies. This was
absolutely necessary in view of the tight
schedule. If everything had been
concentrated around a few building sites,
the schedule would have been hopeless
from the start. A good portion of FTP was
built in Houston, Texas, by Brown & Root.
There both the steel jacket and many other
parts of the platform were built. C platform
was also built in the USA — the jacket was
built by McDermott in Morgan City, La.
Ingram Saipem in Ravenna, Italy, built most
of Bravo platform, while Heerema/UIE built
the jackets for Alpha and Q platforms in
France. Several of these same companies had
other parts of the platforms, but at different
construction sites. In addition, the same
companies would supply crane barges
which would handle the assembling of the
platforms out at sea.
The awarding of contracts was based on
82 normal bidding competition, but it has been
admitted in retrospect that the pattern on
the owners' part within the Phillips Group
was well reflected in the choice of building
sites for the various platforms. Carl Johnson,
who had principal responsibility in this
process, says that he never felt any pressure
in this area from the companies, but that the
awarding of contracts occurred as a natural
consequence of the criteria that had been
set. With regard to Norwegian shipyards,
they were not involved in the competition
for the simple reason that they were totally
occupied with shipbuilding.
While the crane barge «Choctaw» was
taking advantage of the best days in
February 1972 to position and pile the
bridge supports for the south flare, the first
platform jacket embarked on its voyage
across the Atlantic from Houston. On 19
February the tugboat set out with the FTP
jacket. Nine days later the jacket for Q
platform embarked on a shorter voyage
from St. Wanderville, France, to Ekofisk. As
it turned out, the shorter trip became the
longer one. A good distance out in the
North Sea, the tugboats that were towing
the Q jacket encountered a proper winter
storm, and the barge carrying the jacket
broke loose. Attempts to bring new hawsers
on board had to be abandoned, and the tug
had more than enough to handle just riding
out the storm. The barge with the jacket,
which was to serve as the foundation for the
first housing platform in the North Sea, was
drifting on its own. For a while all was quiet
— they weren't able to fix its location. Carl
C. Anderson and Ken Ehlers in Stavanger
chartered a jet plane from Braathens SAFE
and made a search but without result. Then
came the report from Shetland that the
barge was heading toward the rocky
shoreline there. A rescue was impossible,
and both barge and jacket were tossed
against the shore. Carl Johnson, Carl C.
Anderson, and Ken Ehlers took a trip up to
Shetland from London to inspect the
damage, but it was a foregone conclusion.
The jacket had to be declared a total loss.
This was a tough blow for the development
plans — but there was no time to lose, and a
new jacket was ordered right away from the
same yard — without any bidding. There
was a problem, however, with steel. At that
time in 1972 - and for several more years -
there was a worldwide steel shortage crisis.
However, Phillips had some steel on hand
which had been purchased in connection
with the new hundred-year wave that was
calculated in 1971, and this supply was sent
immediately to France so that construction
on the replacement jacket could get under
way as quickly as possible.
The jacket for FTP was more fortunate
with the weather - at least at the outset.
Everything went according to plan until it
was launched at Ekofisk. Then the weather
gods wanted to have their say, and the
jacket had to be parked on the seabed for
some time during the month of March,
before it could be situated in its proper
location.
While the piling and foundation work on
FTP was going on, another tow set out from
the USA. The jacket for C-platform
embarked from New Orleans on 30 May,
while the jacket for Bravo was being readied
for towout from Ravenna, Italy. The first to
arrive at Ekofisk was the jacket for C. The
crane barge «Hercules» had just hoisted the
flare tower and the two outer bridges into
The first platform to
be placed on the
seabed as part of the
Ekofisk development
was the FTP jacket.
Here the module
support frames are
being lifted onto the
jacket.

The construction of
the FTP platform
went fast in 1972.
At the same time the
2/4 C jacket was
positioned and piled
to the seabed.

83
 Parallel with the
installation of the
platforms at the
Ekofisk Complex, the
jackets for
production platforms
A and B were set,
and the construction
work began. Here the
module support
frame for B platform
is being hoisted.
position before C-jacket was launched and
set next to FTP.
It was a hectic summer out on the field —
with a tendency toward traffic jams in the
vicinity of the FTP-C-flare tower complex.
«Choctaw» and «Hercules» were assisted by
crane barge «DB-16», «Challenger» and
«Champion», while «Barge 2 79» did
pipelaying. In addition, the combination
vessel «Hugh Gordon* was still on location
in the area. If we also include tugs, barges
and supply boats, the picture will be
complete. Between 7,000 and 8,000 people
had their employment out there.
On 16 August the Bravo jacket was
reported in place, and on 28 August the
Alpha structure was in position. Toward the
end of the month the two deck sections for
FTP were hoisted onto the jacket.
The rest of the modules and equipment
packages for FTP were hoisted as soon as
the deck was installed, and by the end of
September only the compressors were
lacking on FTP. Eumech, the Brown & Root
company, was working full steam on
assembling the various sections on FTP,
while on the three other jackets piling and
foundation work was going on.
The Weather
In September the weather again became a
factor in the work offshore. There had been
some summer storms, but no more than
must be expected in the middle of the North
Sea. In October, on the other hand, the
picture changed and only half of the month
had good working weather. November was
even worse — only 9 working days, while
84 December was somewhat better with 12
days. When conditions are like that, a lot of
time goes to rigging up and rigging down
equipment — and to maneuvering the
anchors. The piling and foundation work on
A, B and C continued when the weather
permitted, but on FTP the finishing touches
could be made regardless of the weather.
There only the compressors were lacking.
The most critical factor during this period
was the shortage of beds. The wreck of the
Q-jacket delayed progress, and so the crews
had to be quartered around on the crane
barges and in temporary containers on FTP.
The replacement jacket for Q platform lay
ready for towout in Rotterdam, but the
weather prevented any movement there.
The 12 fair weather days in December
were put to good use. The foundation work
on C-jacket was completed, and the last
bridge connecting FTP with the south flare
was hoisted into position.
But on the last day of the year, the
weather gods took revenge. While the
vessel doing piling work on B-jacket was
moving away from the jacket because of the
weather, which was getting worse, it
collided with one of the legs. The damage
turned out to be so serious that that whole
platform leg had to be cut loose from the
rest of the jacket and replaced. This also
necessitated inventing new techniques for
cutting out the old leg and installing a new
section. It wasn't until April 1973 that the
leg was in place and the foundation work
could be completed.
The Winter Months
Conditions at Ekofisk during the winter
months were - and are - rough. Today
people talk about the weather window
between April and October when all
operations requiring the use of hoisting
vessels are carried out. The experiences
from the winter of 1971/72 also stimulated
discussion within Phillips as to whether it
was right to keep offshore work going
during the winter. The conclusion was that,
in spite of high costs due to a lot of waiting
on the weather, the winter season provided
some workdays that were important for
completing the construction phase and
putting the field into production. Carl
Johnson relates that, out of the year's 365
days, Phillips' engineering section figured at
the start of the 1970's that a little over 160
were working days. He admits, however,
that the strain was great when week after
week went by with as many as 30 different
vessels just lying out in the North Sea at the
expense of the Phillips Group. Even back
then, the daily expenses for a fleet like that
represented around a million dollars. The
contracts were written, to be sure, in such a
way that there were two different rates —
one for waiting on the weather and one for
working, but, with the cost increase during
the development period, there were large
sums involved. An important factor, looking
back on that period, was the size of the
vessels. In the «childhood» of this oil activity
in the North Sea, the vessels were smaller
than those of today. This was true both in
tonnage and, not least, in engine power and
navigation/maneuvering capability. The
vessels were also of different types, in that
the old ones were flat bottom barges and
converted ships, versus today's semi-
submersible models which are much more
stable.
1973
At the start of the new year, the activity out
on the field was at its peak. Nearly 1,000
people were in action at Ekofisk. Now the
final phase in the construction of the
platforms was to be completed, as well as
the pipelaying between the production
platforms and FTP — and FTP and the
loading buoys. In addition, a new platform
had appeared on the development scene.
The original plans were such that C platform
would be connected to the storage tank via
two bridges. The bridges were to be
supported by a small jacket - a tripod.
Phillips engineer Bill Fischer, who was the
The Ekofisk
Complex as per 23
March 7973. The
flare is in place, most
of the FTP modules
have been hoisted
onto the platform,
and the hook-up
work has begun. The
piling of C jacket has
been completed,
while piling work on
the replacement
jacket for the
accommodations
platform, Q, is in
process.
85
 Ekofisk in the fall of
1973: "Gulftide"
was producing full
scale from the four
wells in the test
phase: production
platforms 2/4 A (in
the foreground) and
2/4 B (behind the
Complex) were being
commissioned. At
the Ekofisk Complex
the deck modules
have been installed
on both!/4 Cand
2/4 Q.
company's representative at Brown & Root
in Houston, felt that instead of just a small
supporting jacket there ought to be a
platform with pump modules which could
serve as the starting point for the oil
pipeline to shore. He presented this idea
before the engineering section in London
late in the fall of 1972 - and Carl Johnson
relates that, «We received the idea, chewed
on it a couple of days, and found the
proposal sensible.* Within a short period of
time all the companies involved had
accepted the idea - and in February 1973
the platform was under construction in
Inverness, Scotland. The platform was given
the designation 2/4 P.
2/4 Alpha
The foundation work/cementing of the piles
was completed during February 1973, and
all preparations for hoisting the modules
were completed. The crane barge
«Challenger» lay ready by the jacket when
the report came from Rotterdam that one of
the deck sections had fallen down during
loading on the barge. The damages turned
out to be small, however, and could be
repaired in one month's time. A strike at the
yard in Rotterdam meant further delays, but
in April the deck sections were en route to
Ekofisk. That marked the end of the
weather's cooperation, and a spring storm
forced the tow to turn back. It was May
before it finally succeeded, and during the
month of June the «Challenger» had hoisted
86 all the modules into place - and the quarters
could begin to be used at the end of the
month. The installation and finishing
touches took two months before the drilling
derrick could open its first well on the 2nd
of September.
2/4 Bravo
The collision damages to the one platform
leg delayed the assembling of the platform.
It was May before the foundation work was
completed and the jacket was ready to
receive the deck modules. But then things
happened fast. During the course of June
and July 1973 all the modules were hoisted
onto the platform. Then three months of
finishing touches followed before the first of
the two drilling derricks — rig 41 — could
start on the first production well. The other
derrick required more work, and it was not
operational until December.
2/4 Charlie
The foundation work was completed as
early as December 1972, but because of
delays with the deck modules — and the long
transportation distance across the Atlantic -
it was July before «DB-22» could hoist the
top of the platform into position. The
compressors which would return the gas to
the reservoir were still lacking — they were
lifted onto the platform on 16 and 17
August.
Then on the 2nd of October, the drilling
derrick could be put into use, while
installation of the powerful compressors
was in full swing. Viewed in the total
 The bridge between
the Q and C
platforms is being
hoisted into position.
The jacket here is for
C platform.

context, they were vital to production gas injection was synonymous with reduced
start-up, since the Norwegian authorities oil production.
had set clear upper limits as to how much
gas could be burned off. And the gas came 2/4 FTP
up from the reservoir with the oil - so no The hoisting on FTP was done in 1972 — 87
 The Q jacket is
maneuvered into
position by a derrick
barge.
with the exception of the pumps which
would take care of transporting the oil from
the platform to the two loading buoys. Due
to weather conditions the tug with the
pumps, which were manufactured in the
U.S.A., was detained in Rotterdam for
several months. It was 18 June before they
were lifted into place and installation could
begin. The finishing work on the pumps
went on during the rest of the year,
somewhat delayed because the bridge
connection between C-platform and the
Tank was lacking. P-platform and the bridge
support were under construction along with
A lot of pipelines had
to be laid between
the different
platforms and
processing platform
FTP. Here pipes are
being laid between
2/4 B and the
Ekofisk Complex.
88
the bridges, but it looked like it would be
1974 before they were in position.
2/4 Quarters
On 10 March the jacket was set in its proper
position between FTP and C-platform, and a
temporary deck was made in the
anticipation that foundation work would be
done. On 9 June the permanent deck was in
place, and the following week Q was
connected by bridge with FTP. Temporary
living quarters were also installed, since the
permanent quarters had been slightly
damaged in a fire during insulation work at
the construction site. But the delays in the
setting operation resulted in the installation
of the permanent quarters as early as 22
June. A short month of installation work
went by before 185 people could resume
residence in «old Q» at the end of July.
Pipelaying
The internal network of pipes on the Ekofisk
field has gradually become complex. The
Brown & Root barge «Hugh Gordon* laid
the first pipes between «Gulftide» and the
four subsea wellheads in 1970 and 1971. In
1973 all the pipes between the two
production platforms, A and B, and FTP
processing platform were laid. In addition,
pipelines were laid from FTP out to the
loading buoys. One of the loading buoys
had to be moved to provide a safety margin
in relation to the new platforms. At the end
of each line connecting platforms, a riser
was also installed which took the lines from
the seabed on up to the platform. To
complete the picture, the plans at that time
 There was enormous
interest in what was
happening at
Ekofisk. King Olav
visited the Ekofisk
Tank. Next to the
King, who has his
arms on the railing,
we see Phillips'
Chairman of the
Board, Bill Martin,
and Norwegian
Minister of Industry,
Ingvald Ulveseth.

were to let the four subsea wellheads after well was drilled and put on stream, so
produce to the permanent platforms, so that that in April 1976 a total of 31 wells on the
new lines had to be laid there as well. And three platforms were producing - 11 on
after the lines had been tested and found in Alpha, 16 on Bravo, and 4 on Charlie. In
order, they were buried. addition to the 4 production wells, Charlie
had 8 injection wells for gas.
Production Start-Up
During the course of September and Distressing Compressors
October 1973, drilling got under way on The Norwegian authorities had imposed
the production wells from the four drilling clear limitations on the Phillips Group as to
derricks on 2/4 A, B and C. The first on the amount of gas that could be burned off.
stream was the derrick on A-platform at the This also formed a ceiling for oil production,
beginning of September. since the gas is brought up with the oil from
The plans for Phase II - the Ekofisk field
itself - included, for the time being, about
40 wells. 2/4 B platform was
In April 1974, all the equipment and all equipped with two
derricks to be able to
the necessary pipelines were tested and drill as many
ready to receive the first production. And production wells as
on 25 April, the crude oil flowed from the possible within the
shortest time frame.
first production well, A-13, through the One of the derricks
system. Up until June only A-platform was was later removed
in production along with the four subsea from the platform.
wellheads which had produced to «Gulftide»
during Phase I. When «Gulftide» halted
production in May, all the preparations had
been made so that the wells could gradually
be connected to the permanent platforms.
On 13 June the first well on Bravo - B7 —
was put on stream, as was B-17 from the
same platform 14 days later. On the 4th of
July, C-13 on Charlie was able to join in the
crude oil production, and so all three of the
production platforms in Phase II were on
stream.
During the course of 1974 and 1975, well 89
i
 The work of linking
the Ekofisk Tank
with the rest of the
Complex has begun.
At right the bridge
between C platform
and bridge support
no. 3 is being lifted
into position. As the
third bridge, between
214 P and the Tank,
is about to be lifted,
the accident happens
- the crane topples
over. Derrick barge
«DB 22> incurred the
most damage and
was put out of action the reservoir. A solution was required for
for several months.
saving the gas until a gas line from Ekofisk
to shore could become operational. The plan
that was built into Phase II involved two
powerful compressor modules on 2/4 C
which would pump the gas under high
pressure back into the reservoir. With the
abnormal pressure that was in the Ekofisk
reservoir, this would be a great challenge.
Until that time compressors had only been
built to 6000 psi capacity. In order to exceed
the pressure in the Ekofisk reservoir, 9000
psi would be necessary. The manufacturer
felt that this would not be a problem, but
when the first compressor was started up on
18 May 1974, it turned out that 2000 psi
was its maximum. A vibration problem
prevented the compressor from reaching
peak capacity.
Good advice was in great demand, and it
turned out to be a very hectic summer and
fall working non-stop to solve the problems.
The first attempts were unsuccessful. The
American manufacturer and experts from
every quarter were brought in. The
situation, as it was, meant reduced oil
production from the field. As Christmas
neared, a temporary solution had been
found which caused one of the compressor
units to function — and on 21 December the
first gas could be injected back into the
reservoir.
The compressor problems limited
production for six months - and almost
another year would go by before a
permanent solution was found and
improvements made. It was 1975 before all
eight injection wells were in use, and the
daily gas injection rate lay at 480 million
standard cubic feet.
The Ekofisk Tank Is Readied
90 When the Tank was set in place, work began
to make it operational. This work went on
throughout the fall of 1973, while at the
same time the preparations and construction
work continued for its Phase III function as a
processing facility.
The limitations on the Tank's usage were
related to its lack of linkage with the rest of
the Ekofisk Complex. The new platform -
2/4 P — was to be positioned between the
Tank and 2/4 C. Three bridges, and one
support jacket for the bridges, would
establish this linkage. But for the time being,
the Ekofisk Tank lay by itself like an island.
In September support jacket BS3 for the
bridges was set. While the foundation work
was going on, bad weather set in — storms
that continued almost without let-up from
November until February. This was
probably the worst winter experienced at
Ekofisk. The jacket for P-platform lay ready
for towout, but it was not until March 1974
that the weather would allow the towing
operation to get under way. During the
launching, it turned out that one of the
buoyancy tanks which would cause the steel
giant to float, as well as assist in the setting
operation, had a leak. The jacket sank.
Inspection by divers revealed that damage
was minimal, and crane barge «DB 22»
managed to lift it up from the sea floor and
deposit it in its proper location. It was June
before the foundation work had been
completed and the deck sections could be
hoisted into place. The bridges between P
and C platforms were then hoisted into
position — but when the third bridge,
between P and the Tank, was to be lifted,
the bridge fell down.
Fortunately, the damage to the bridge
itself turned out to be no greater than could
be repaired, but it was worse for crane barge
«DB 22» which was put out of function for
the remainder of the year.

On 23 July the bridge could finally be
hoisted into position, and the Tank was
connected with the rest of the Ekofisk
Complex «mainland». The task of connecting
the various pipelines, which would run
along the roofs of the bridges, could get
under way.
On 23 July 1974, the
The Ekofisk Tank Is Inaugurated Ekofisk Tank has
During November the coupling work was been connected with
finished and Ekofisk I was ready for use. Just the rest of the Ekofisk
Complex. Now the
in the nick of time. Winter storms set in, and pipelines can be
on 3 December the first oil was transferred made ready to allow
to the Tank. Buoy loading had to be for use of the Tank
should the weather
stopped on account of the weather. Before stop buoy loading to
the Tank became operational, total tankers.
production had to be shut down whenever
the weather hindered the tankers from lying
near the loading buoys. Now it was simply a
matter of diverting the crude oil from the
loading buoys to the storage cells in the
Tank.
During the next 20 days, the Tank was
properly tested in the area for which it was
constructed. By 23 December there were
900,000 barrels of oil in the storage cells.
The Ekofisk Tank stood the test
brilliantly. During the period from
December 1974 to October 1975, when the
oil pipeline to Teesside was put into
operation, buoy loading was impracticable
40 percent of the time. This was either due
to the weather or because some technical
failure made it impossible. During only one
percent of this period did production have
to be shut down. Therein lay the Tank's
merit.
The equipment used
on the derrick barges
is of considerable
dimension. In the
background, the
Ekofisk Tank.
91
 From Ekofisk
to the Consumer
The pipelines from
Ekofisk will go to
Teesside in Great
Britain and Emden
in West Germany.
The Storting's
decision was in
accordance with the
recommendation of
the Phillips Group.
Gas to Emden, crude
oil and NGL to
Teesside.
When the Storting finally passed a
resolution concerning transportation of
Ekofisk oil and gas in the late part of April
1973, it came as a confirmation of the
solution toward which Phillips had been
working.
Early in 1972, advance investigation was
carried out in England and West Germany
with a view to finding suitable areas for
receiving terminals for crude oil/NGL and
dry gas. The pipeline routes under
consideration were likewise studied in
connection with the work of the Ekofisk
Commission, and transportation systems to
Teesside and Emden were among the
alternatives given most thorough
evaluation.
The application to build a pipeline to
Teesside with a receiving terminal was sent
to the Norwegian authorities in the spring
of 1972. In the beginning of January 1973,
92 after agreement had been reached on the
first sales contract for dry gas with the
buyer group on the Continent, the
application to transport dry gas to Emden
was also forwarded to the authorities.
For the Phillips Group it was important to
have a quick decision in the matter of
transportation. The field development plans
required that the crude oil line become
operational during the course of 1974. This
was based on the fact that Ekofisk would be
ready to start full production. The gas
contract called for deliveries to start in 1975,
and then the gas line and the terminal at
Emden needed to be ready. An equally
important argument from the Phillips Group
was based on the practical problems
associated with the building of the world's
two longest subsea pipelines and two
terminals which were among the largest
ever built. The steel crisis meant that steel
ought to be ordered as soon as possible so
that valuable time would not be lost.
Furthermore, the actual pipelaying
operation would require a large share of
those pipelaying vessels capable of handling
pipes of the dimensions in question at the
ocean depths necessary in the North Sea.
The contracting of vessels for the 1973
season should already be done in 1972 to be
on the safe side.
When Storting passed its resolution, the
companies in the Phillips Group had
invested in the very solution that was
chosen. Steel had been secured, and
production of the pipes was well under way.
By the end of March 1973, 60% of the pipe
lengths to Teesside had been produced and
18% had been given the necessary
protective concrete coating.
On 22 May 1973 McDermott was able to
 The laying of pipes
for the pipeline to
Teesside started in
early fall of 1973
and was completed
in 1974, while the
443 km Emden
pipeline was laid in
1974. Three
companies were
working
simultanously on
different sections in
order to complete the
work as quickly as
possible.

begin the actual pipelaying on its stretch. In
addition to McDermott, Santa Fe and
Brown & Root had been contracted to lay
pipes, so that three vessels would be
operating simultaneously.
The goal was to complete the pipelaying
by the end of 1973, finish building the
terminal at Teesside by the end of 1974, and
have both the gas line and the Emden
terminal operational during the last half of
1975.
Ownership Terms
Norpipe A/S owns both the pipelines to
Teesside and Emden and the four booster
platforms, 36/22 A, 37/4 A (Teesside), and
H-7, B-ll (Emden). At Teesside, Norpipe
UK Ltd. owns the crude oil section of the
plant, while the Phillips Group owns the
liquid gas facility. At Emden, the Phillips
Group owns the whole plant. These were
the results of the negotiations between the
Norwegian authorities and the Phillips
Group in 1972 and early 1973, and the
negotiations between the Norwegian
authorities and their counterparts in England
and West Germany, respectively.
93
 In the early 7970s,
great demand made
steel prices soar.
Phillips had to begin
steel purchasing at
an early stage.
The pipes were given
a concrete protective
coating before being
transported to the
pipelaying vessels.
The Oil Pipeline
Design work for the pipeline was in full
swing in 1972. The production estimates
from the Ekofisk area were compared with
pipeline technology. In both of these areas
there was some uncertainty. Naturally the
production estimates had to be based on
anticipated peak production from the 7
fields in the Ekofisk area — plus the fact that
there had to be available capacity for future
new discoveries in the region. The Phillips
Group ended up with an estimate of
between 750,000 and 1.3 million barrels of
oil per day. This was then seen in relation to
pipeline know-how, with the final result
being a 34-inch line all the way from Ekofisk
to Teesside (1 million barrels of oil per day).
Under consideration during the process
were both a 36-inch line (approximately 1.3
million barrels per day) and combinations of
different dimensions on sections of the
distance. In order to attain the 1 million
barrel capacity, powerful pumps would be
necessary to provide sufficient starting
pressure at Ekofisk — and, in the form of two
booster stations, maintain this pressure
along the way. This resulted in the building
of two booster platforms (37/4A and
36/22A) which divided the distance to
Teesside into nearly equal lengths. Since
that time the capacity of the oil pipeline has
94 turned out to be too great in relation to the
need. When the Ekofisk area was producing
at peak levels in 1980, only about half the
pipeline capacity was utilized. This means
that one of the booster platforms has never
been needed, while the other one was only
necessary during a short period while
production was at its highest. 36/22A was
de-manned in 1985, while 37/4A was
de-manned in 1987. Delay in production
start-up on the fields was one of the reasons
there was not greater utilization of the
pipeline capacity. This meant that the
anticipated peak production was not
reached, but was spread out over several
years instead. In retrospect it is easy to say
that the pipeline was constructed with an
unrealistically high capacity. But it is
important to remember that exploration
activity in the Ekofisk area was far from
concluded when the design criteria were
established. Moreover, the Phillips Group
and the Norwegian authorities were
contemplating other fields on the
Norwegian shelf which could utilize the line
— as well as the fact that Phillips foresaw
transportation contracts from the British
sector. «Even if we were to make the
decision today, we would do the same
thing,» says Bill Boyce, who was a central
figure in the decision-making process. «The
plan chosen was and is the ideal solution
when all related factors are considered.*
The Pipelaying Operation
It became obvious early on that the time
goal set for the pipelaying operation was
too optimistic. In June there were three
contracted companies under way with their
vessels, but Santa Fe in particular was
having equipment problems. In addition,
DnV came on the scene with new and
stricter requirements for the technique to be
used. The pipe lengths were welded
together manually on board the pipelaying
vessel, the welding seam was inspected, and
the pipes were lowered into the sea.
By the end of August, 51% of the pipes
had been laid, but the effects of the weather
conditions had already been felt. During the
month of July, work had to be stopped all of
three times — the last time due to a proper
summer storm.
The stormy weather on 26 July caused
two vessels to suffer line breakage, while the
third vessel was damaged. In spite of the
weather, McDermott was finished with its
section as early as 25 September. The
pipelaying vessel was then directed to help
Santa Fe with its section, but that didn't
help. After only a few working days in
November, it was decided that the work
should be halted, not to be resumed until
February. At that point there were
approximately 42 km left of the stretch.
Brown & Root was finished with its section
in the beginning of November.
It would take until 22 May 1974 before
the two pipelaying vessels «L.B. Meaders»
and «LB-23» had finished the last part of the
pipeline. That is, the final kilometers near
Ekofisk were not laid until the month of
June. But 40% of the line still remained to be
buried, and parts of this burying process
would prove to cause problems. A kind of
sled was used on the ocean floor to get the
line sufficiently covered. But it was often the
case that the sled had to be pulled several
times over the same area in order to achieve
satisfactory results. Reinforced equipment
and new methods became necessary on
some of the stretches — and when that didn't
prove sufficient in late summer of 1975, it
was necessary to level out with gravel and
pebbles over the line so that everything
would be ready for the opening.
The Platforms
In March 1974 the jacket for booster
35,000 of these pipe
lengths were needed
for the gas pipeline
from Ekofisk to
Etnden alone. Total
weight of the pipes
was 209,000 tons -
plus 275,000 tons of
anti-corrosion
compounds.

The pipe lengths

were welded together
manually onboard
the pipelaying vessel
and then lowered to
the seabed. This was
an operation
requiring the
cooperation of the
weather gods.
Particularly during
the laying of the
Teesside pipeline in
1973, the weather
caused extensive
problems and the
work had to be
stopped for long
periods of time.

95
 To attain a capacity Norpipe. It was an operation utilizing the
of one million barrels
of oil per day, two most advanced technology of the day. As
booster platforms many as 3,000 people were involved in
were installed on the activities connected with the actual
Teesside pipeline.
37/4 A (photo)and pipelaying. Also historic were all the safety
36/22 A are located systems built into the line to ensure against
in the British sector. leakage and external damage. A system of
The two platforms
are almost identical. remote-controlled safety valves makes it
possible to close off the line within a brief
span of time. Furthermore, the pressure
variance between the water at the ocean
depth in question and the oil in the pipeline
would keep any leakage to a minimum
amount of oil. The difference in pressure
platform 37/4A was positioned and causes the water to hold the oil inside the
foundation work was begun. This work line. The safety system was put to the test
would run into difficulties because of big when, in summer of 1977, a ship's anchor
rocks in the seabed, and extra powerful damaged the line outside Teesside. There
equipment had to be used. In August was no leakage, but a section of the line was
36/22A was also positioned on the ocean replaced the following summer.
floor. Both the platforms were somewhat Another safety system developed by
delayed due to late steel deliveries and Phillips was radar surveillance of the line, so
problems at their building sites in France that it is possible to observe from Teesside
and Scotland, respectively. During the whenever ships approach the pipeline route.
course of 1975 the two platforms were This system, which is a refinement of a
assembled, while the pump modules were system Phillips developed at Ekofisk during
lifted onto the platforms and installed in the the height of the hectic construction phase,
period from late 1976 to 1978. There was has proven very effective, and since 1977
no rush with this work since the delays in there have been no accidents in connection
the development of the fields at Ekofisk with the pipeline.
postponed the anticipated peak production.
The pumps on P platform alone could Opening at Teesside
transport 540,000 barrels of oil per day from On 21 October 1975 the official opening of
Ekofisk to Teesside. the first phase of the Teesside terminal took
place. 780 guests from around the world
Final Preparations
During the period from June 1974 until the
The cleaning devices pipeline was put into operation in October
that are sent through 1975, a number of tests were carried out in
the pipelines are
called tpigs». There
order to get the line ready. Each stretch —
are several different from Ekofisk to 37/4, from 37/4 to 36/22,
types — both with and from 36/22 to Teesside - was checked
and without
((intelligences.
separately. Leaks were found and repairs
During the made.
commissioning of the In the beginning of August 1975, two
pipeline, intelligent
cleaning devices are
«pigs» were sent into the pipeline from
passed through the Teesside. These two devices carried out a
line to register final inspection of the line to find possible
defects.
irregularities, and in September it could be
said that the pipeline was mechanically
complete — ready to receive the first crude
oil.

Historic Event
The laying of the oil pipeline was a
96 historical triumph for the Phillips Group and

were on hand to witness the fact that the
first crude oil from Ekofisk had completed
the 354 km trip and was secured in one of
the storage tanks in Europe's largest tank
facility with a 7.5 million barrel crude oil
capacity.
The oil had begun the journey from
Ekofisk on 15 October, but it was not until
four days later that it reached the
northeastern coast of England. Just filling
the line took a million barrels of oil. Three
days after the opening ceremony, the first
tanker was able to depart the jetty.
But there were a number of flies in the
ointment during those October days in
1975. According to the plans, the whole
terminal should have been finished at that
time, but only a good 50% of the
construction work had been completed.
Ever since construction had begun in fall of
1973, it had been plagued by unfortunate
events that on many occasions put gray hair
on the head of Carl Post, Phillips' man in
charge of construction at Teesside. The oil
crisis delayed steel deliveries. When the
deliveries finally came, it happened that
they didn't meet the strict specifications that
7 — Giant Discovery
The Teesside
Terminal is officially
opened, and a toast
of crude oil proposed.
From left: Phillips'
Managing Director,
Wm. C. Douce,
British
Undersecretary of
State for Energy,
John Smith and
Norwegian Minister
of Industry, Ingvald
Ulveseth.
were necessary for a plant of the Teesside
type.
Furthermore, there had been labor
disputes and strikes along the way. This was
a very unsettled period for the labor market
in England. One trade group after another
went out on shorter or longer strikes and
go-slow protest actions. A strong set of
shoulders was required for tackling all the
conflicts that arose.
And there was more to come. At the time
of the opening in October, much of the
work on the terminal and the jetties
remained to be done. While the receiving
system for crude oil was functioning, it was
not yet possible to receive liquid gas. This
was quite a critical situation, since a lot of
liquid gas was being produced at Ekofisk.
Temporary solutions had to be found on the
field while waiting for Teesside to be ready.
Finally in March 1979 the Teesside
facility was able to receive liquid gas, and by
the end of that month Noretyl's plant at
Rafnes in Bamble received the first shipload
of propane.
97
 The land level at
Seal Sands had to be
raised five meters (15
fed) to secure the
terminal against the
sea. This is how the
site looked in 1974
after the work had
been going on for
about a year.

A major dredging
and piling program
was necessary in
order to construct the
loading jetties at
Teesside. 12 million
cubic meters of sand
and silt were pumped
up and dumped at
the terminal
construction site.
Teesside
Back in the beginning of 1972, Phillips made
its first surveys and held meetings with the
authorities in Teesside in connection with
transportation of Ekofisk oil, and possibly
dry gas, to shore. Phillips was already
established in the area through joint
ownership with ICI in the P.I.P. refinery.
Moreover, Teesside lies on the northeastern
coast of England, in the vicinity of the town
of Middlesbrough, which is a strategic
location in relation to a pipeline route from
Ekofisk. There were available industrial
areas suitable for the construction of a
receiving terminal, and the authorities were
favorably inclined to the establishment of
new industry. Unemployment in this area is
extremely high, even by British standards,
and has remained nearly constant at around
20% since World War II.
An important factor was the possibility of
98 building up a harbor for larger tankers. This
was necessary since the facility at Teesside
would function primarily as a receiving
station/transit storage center. Developing a
complete refinery was never in the plans.
Through a stabilization process, the liquid
gas components are separated from the
crude oil. After temporary storage, the oil is
ready for sale. Where liquid gas was
concerned, it was necessary to build a
facility which extracted the most important
components: ethane, propane, isobutane,
and normal butane. In addition, methane
would be extracted and used for fuel in the
terminal plant.
During the summer of 1972, it became
clear that the terminal would be located at
Seal Sands, while the oil storage facility
would eventually be located in the
bordering area of Greatham. Eventually,
because Phillips — in cooperation with ICI —
worked a couple of months on plans for
storing the crude oil in nearby shutdown
mines. In October this alternative was
finally abandoned, and efforts were
concentrated on building storage tanks with
a capacity of 750,000 barrels each at
Greatham.
In November 1972 option agreements for
the Seal Sands area were signed, and during
the winter and spring of 1973 all
preparations were made so as to be able to
start on the construction work as soon as
possible after Storting had passed its final
resolution — and the necessary approvals
had come from local British authorities.
 In June 1973 the extensive dredging Pipelaying in the
landing zone
work required to make the loading berths presented problems.
deep enough could begin. While this work Sand had to be
was going on, 12 million cubic meters of removed and a
corridor was made
sand and stone were brought up and utilizing steel plates.
deposited at Seal Sands where the terminal
would be built. This area had to be raised
approximately 5 meters so as to withstand
the forces of the sea.
In the summer of 1972, the construction
schedule was based on completion in
mid-1974. It became clear early on that this
goal was unrealistic. The construction
project involved an enormous amount of
work - and the following year's goal was
that the crude oil receiving facility be
finished in April 1975, that the stabilizer
trains for crude oil be operational in
October 1975, and that all seven trains be
functioning one year later.
In October 1973 work was fully under
way on the foundation for the first storage
tank and the piling within the actual
terminal area. The following month about
900 people were at work on the facility.
That was when the first effects of the oil
crisis began to be felt. Phillips had ordered
50,000 tons of steel from British Steel.
The construction of
the Teesside plant
was in itself a huge
task, followed with
great interest. The
photo shows, among
others, Phillips
Chairman of the
Board, Bill Martin
(right) and manager
of Phillips'
Europe-Africa
Division, Pete Silas
(left) on an inspection
visit in 1975.

99
 The NCL plant at
Teesside had most
delays in relation to
the orginal schedule.
Wlitle the crude oil
facilities were ready
in the fall of1975,
the NGL plant
became operational
in 3979, The
processing and
tanker loading
facilities cover a 500
acre plot of land, the
tank farm at
Creatham 3 75 acres.

The tanker loading Because of the oil shortage, British Steel had
facilities at Teesside cut back to a three-day work week. This led
consist of four jetties
for loading crude oil to delivery delays — in spite of the fact that
into tankers of up to construction of the terminal had been given
150,000 dead weight dispensation from the authorities'
tons. At full capacity
this part of the plant economizing measures. Steel from France
can handle nearly was also greatly delayed — by 3 to 5
half of Great months.
Britain's daily
consumption of oil. In the spring of 1974 the most critical
There are also four labor conflicts arose, and it became obvious
jetties for loading that the work progress schedule could not
NGL products Mo
carriers of varying be met. Every effort was made to reach
capacity up to agreements with the labor unions in
60,000 cubic meters. question, but the agreements were
constantly breached — or new groups would
come in and issue demands.
With approximately 1600 people
involved in the construction work, spread
over a number of contractors and
subcontractors, the project was large by any
standards.
In December 1974, a 24-inch reserve line
between the terminals and the P.I.P. refinery
was ready. The line was actually to function
in such a way that when the pipeline
between Ekofisk and Teesside was
operational, the incoming line could be
connected with the P.I.P. facility and use the
refinery's jetty. Since the pipeline from
Ekofisk was not ready, this line was not yet
necessary — but it was put into use right
100 after the pipeline from Ekofisk became
operational in October 1975 for regular
deliveries to the refinery.
Finally Finished
In May 1980 the last insulation worker
finally left the terminal area in Teesside and
the plant was completely finished. From the
time the reception of crude oil began at the
end of October 1975 until 1980, the
construction workers were constantly
plagued by delays due to labor conflicts. But
where the crude oil was concerned, the
terminal was functioning and Ekofisk was
able to produce at full capacity. During the
course of March 1979, the NGL plant also
became fully operational. Capacity at the
terminal is 1 million barrels of crude oil per
day — the same as for the pipeline. In
addition, the NGL plant has a 50,000 barrel
capacity.
Since production start-up, a number of
measures have been carried out to increase
efficiency at Teesside. The 100% reserve
equipment preparedness that was built in
was reduced without its affecting delivery
stability. Since its start-up, the plant has shut
down operations no more than a few hours
due to its own difficulties.
Gas with Complications
An international gathering of about 600
participated at the opening of the receiving
 The opening of the
443 km gas pipeline
from Ekofisk to
Emden and the
terminal was a great
event. Here we see
three key players in
connection with the
pipeline: from left,
Phillips Petroleum
Company Norway's
Managing Director
in 3977, Gordon
Goering, Norwegian
Minister of
Petroleum and
Energy, Bjartmar
Gjerde, and
Managing Director
of Statoil, Arve
Johnsen. The latter
was also Board
Chairman of
Norpipe, owner of
the Emden pipeline.
The three are
standing where the
36-inch pipeline
enters the Emden
plant.

terminal for gas at Emden and the 443-km
line from Ekofisk to 0stfrisland on 8
September 1977. But one country had not
sent its invited representatives: Denmark.
And the Danes were the reason there was
no Ekofisk gas in the extensive and
advanced facility on opening day.
The pipeline from Ekofisk had to cross 48
km of Danish sector in the North Sea on its
way to Emden. The essence of the dispute
was the burying of the line. The Phillips
Group and Norpipe had reached an
agreement with the Norwegian authorities,
102 and the Norwegian authorities had reached
an agreement with their West German
counterparts — but the Danes adopted a
very rigid stand in the matter. If the line
were not buried in the literal sense of the
word, it could not be put into operation.
A comprehensive burying program for those
kilometers where the line traverses the
Danish sector had gotten underway in 1975.
In October 1976 Phillips and the burying
companies responsible agreed that what
could be done had been done — but the
Danes were not satisfied. New attempts
were made in the spring of 1977 including,
among other things, laying 625,000
sandbags over the pipeline - manually by The Danes — here
divers, but this was not accepted either. symbolized by
Danish Minister of
The pipeline was to lie in a two-meter wide Economic Affairs,
trench with a one-meter covering. Period. Per Heekkerrup —
The Danish-Norwegian dispute were regarded by
many as the stopper
threatened to delay considerably the whole responsible for the
start-up of gas deliveries. That was when absence of gas in the
Norway's Minister of Industry Bjartmar pipeline at the
opening of the
Gjerde went to Copenhagen. Emden facilities. The
The Danish minister, Ivar N0rgaard, who artist's comment:«/
was the government official with hereby have the
honour of opening
responsibility in the matter, was away on the world's
vacation. Minister of Industry Bjartmar best-plugged gas
Gjerde talked with N0rgaard's vacation pipeline.*
covering the line with sandbags, while the
replacement, Minister of Finance Per
permanent solution involved dumping
Hadkkerrup. The two arrived at an
gravel over the pipeline.
agreement that received both governments'
All formalities were thereby taken care of,
approvals.
and on 14 September the first dry gas could
The Danish conditions were that the
be conducted into the system at the Ekofisk
work to cover the line should continue and
Complex.
be completed by 1 July 1980. As a
temporary solution, the Danes accepted In the Beginning
Areas in 0stfrisland had been regarded as
possible landfall locations ever since the
pipeline plan for gas had been launched. In
the summer of 1972, when the gas
negotiations began to lean more and more
toward the consortium headed by Ruhrgas,
new surveys were made and discussions
held with West German authorities about
landfall sites and pipeline routes. When the
gas contract was secured in January 1973,
625,000 bags were
filled with sand,
largely by soldiers on
leave, loaded
onboard supply
boats and manually
laid over the gas
pipeline by divers on
the 48 km stretch
across Danish
territory in the North
Sea.

103
Extensive foundation
work was necessary
at the Emden
terminal. The choice
of the terminal site at
the mouth of the
river Ems, 7 7 km
outside the town of
Emden, entailed
special design
challenges. Here too
the land level had to
be raised because of
the high
ground-water level.

In the landing zone, begin in October/November of that year.

the pipeline had to be
buried in order to be
of minimal
disturbance to the
area's natural
environment.
agreement was reached as to the choice of a
site at Rysumer Nacken, approximately 17
km outside the town of Emden. The location
was ideal based on the considerations that
had to be made regarding landfall sites for
the subsea line — and for the further
distribution of the gas to West Germany,
the Netherlands, Belgium and France.
The formal application for this
transportation plan was sent to the
Norwegian authorities on 2 January 1973.
During the spring and summer of 1973,
necessary preparations were carried out, and
104 construction work on the terminal could
Then the area where the terminal is located
was filled with sand and stone from the Ems
River so that the terminal itself would lie on
dry land. As in Teesside, the whole area had
to be raised so that the river would not
flood it during storms. A number of
preparations also had to be made on the
pipeline route, and the German navy spent
several months mine-sweeping. One mine
was found right on the pipeline route.
On 5 April 1974, the pipelaying barge
«Choctaw I» was in action, and little by little
the work was under way. Most of it was
done during 1974, and the pipelaying job
had the weather gods on its side. Two of the
barges set new 24-hour records. In
September one of the barges managed,
among other things, to lay 189 pipe lengths
for a total of 2300 meters. With manual
welding of the lengths, that was an
impressive performance.
Further Bounds Are Extended
The gas pipeline to Emden extended

technological bounds. From the very start
the Phillips Group had ambitious goals for
the line. Due to pipeline technology, it
was not possible to lay 42-inch pipes at the
depths to be found between Ekofisk and the
second compressor platform, H-7. But in the
original application to the Norwegian
authorities, the plan was to try to lay a
36-inch line to H-7, and from there lay a
42-inch line to Emden. However, this plan
had to be revised after consultation with the
pipelaying companies - and the result was a
36-inch line the whole distance. It was the
first time a subsea gas line was built with
two compressor platforms.
The 443-km line was the longest welded
steel construction in the world - and it took
35,000 pipe lengths having a total weight of
209,000 tons, plus 275,000 tons of
anti-corrosion materials and concrete
coating.
The motive power also was of impressive
dimension. The four gas turbines on the
Ekofisk Tank, which power the centrifugal
compressors that give starting assistance to
An extensive pipe
system had to be laid
in the terminal urea.
The North Sea gas is
cleaned and metered
before it is sent on
into new pipelines to
the buyers.
the gas, have a total of 120,000 horsepower.
In October 1974, only the last piece in
toward the Ekofisk Complex and in the
shoreline zone on the West German coast
remained. This work was completed during
the spring of 1976.
The work between the German islands
and in the muddy tidewater area involved
many practical problems.
Consideration also had to be given to the
rich animal and bird wildlife in the area. A
catamaran type of pipelaying vessel was
developed for this task. In addition, it was
necessary to cross the island of Juist which is
a conservation area. Among other
restrictions, cars are prohibited from driving
there. The pipeline route crossed right over
this island.
Compressor Platforms
The two compressor platforms B-ll and
H-7 on the gas pipeline are very similar to
the two equivalent booster platforms on the
oil line to Teesside. The relatively simple
platforms were set in position in the summer 105
 The pipeline from of 1975 (H-7) and the spring of 1976 (B-ll).
Ekofisk comes ashore On these platforms too, foundation work
at the left corner of
the plant. The gas was made difficult due to seabed conditions,
goes through a and the work took longer than planned.
cleaning process in During the summer and fall of 1976, all the
the pink heater
towers, then
modules were hoisted into place, and the
advanced metering platforms were finished in the spring of
equipment, before the 1977. However, a number of problems arose
gas is distributed to
the buyers' pipelines
with the risers, which turned out to be
from the terminal. moving toward the platform leg, but this
Half of it goes to too was resolved to satisfaction. In June
West Germany,
while the rest is
1977 everything was ready for start-up on
divided between the line — everything except the compressor
France, Belgium and modules for the two platforms. They were
the Netherlands.
not in place until 1978 — and operational in
1979. Both platforms are equipped with
three turbines which provide a total of
90,000 horsepower on each of the
platforms.

According to Plan
When the first gas was received early in the
morning on 17 September 1977 in Emden,
the terminal had been ready for the gas for
almost two years. For once, in connection
with the gigantic Ekofisk development, the
106 construction work had gone according to
 Communication is
an important factor
in the transportation
system. Emden is
connected with
Ekofisk via a satellite
telephone system.

the time schedule. The Dusseldorf firm of

Fluor GmbH was responsible for both
design and construction of the terminal.
From the time the work began — with the
nearly 3,000 piles to be pounded in — until
the terminal stood finished, the work went
on every day. There were no serious labor
disputes or delays that kept activity from
continuing. The Emden pipeline
was the first subsea
Because of the location, building the plant pipeline in the world
was a tough job. On a slightly windswept to be equipped with
expanse way out toward the river's mouth compressor stations
between the two end
and the North Sea, the construction process stations. Each of the
had to combat the three greatest hindrances: platforms has three
wind, rain, and sand. During the building turbine compressors
which help maintain
period, the weather was very bad. Due to the pressure in the
the high ground water level, the work pipeline.
became more difficult during periods of hard B-U (top) is located
at the end of the first
rain - while during dry spells, the constant one-third of the
wind made the sand roam all over, making it pipeline, while H-7
miserable both for the workers and for the (bottom) is at the
location closest to
constructions, which required great Emden.
cleanliness. Sand in the machinery, in other
words.
Despite these hindrances, phase I of the
terminal was finished in December 1975.
But back in the summer of that year it had
been decided that the capacity should be
increased to as many as 9 parallel «treater
trains* for the gas. So, parallel with the
completion of phase I of the plant,
construction work on the second phase
began. That section was finished in July
1977. Thus the whole terminal was ready
for production when the first gas was
received in mid-September.
And production took a rapid incline from
the start. After a gradual breaking-in period
of two days, production reached one billion
cubic feet of gas on the third day — on 20
September 1977.
One of the world's largest receiving
terminals for dry gas was in operation, as a
link in the development of the Ekofisk area. 107
 The Development Project
Is Completed

December 2, 1979. The first drops of crude handled the final treatment of the
oil from 2/7C, the Edda platform, had production before the buyers could take it
reached the Ekofisk Complex the night over.
before. During the day gas production also Out on the field and along the pipelines,
got under way. 22 platforms were in operation. During
Approximately 10 years after the drill bit 1979, 139,764,409 barrels of crude oil,
from «Ocean Viking» had finished well 2/4-2 527,109,305 million standard cubic feet of
and confirmed the enormous oil and gas gas and 7,087,776 barrels of liquid gas were
field, five other fields were discovered in the produced.
same area, and six other fields (Cod was What had been deserted waters around a
discovered before Ekofisk) in addition to the single drilling rig 10 years earlier had turned
main field were developed and on stream. into a luminous city of platforms and vessels
The pipelines to Emden and Teesside where over 1,000 people had their regular
provided for transportation of the gas and place of employment.
oil to shore. Large receiving terminals «Oil adventure», it has been called — but it
When the Edda
platform was put on
stream in December
7979, the Ekofisk
development was
completed — an
extensive and
complex pioneer
project that had
taken almost ten
years.
The Ekofisk
Complex is mirrored
by night lights, but
behind the lights
there is hectic
activity. Operations
go on day and night.

108

neither was nor had been an adventure.
Rather an unending struggle against the
forces of nature in the outer reaches of
technology, where most of the work was
being done for the first time under just such
natural conditions.
It had taken time — several years longer
than foreseen in the original plans. It had
cost more than the budgeted amount. But
oil and gas prices were also totally different
from what they had been when the
exploration activity began. Oil prices had
risen from about $2.00 per barrel to around
$20.00. The Ekofisk area had become a gold
mine for Norway — and for the companies in
the Phillips Group.
The Satellite Fields
While the first two construction phases in
the development of Ekofisk consisted of 10
platforms, the last phase was even more
extensive. By the time it was completed,
Phase III (development of West Ekofisk,
Tor, Cod, Eldfisk, Albuskjell and Edda) had
come to consist of 12 steel platforms, the
processing plant atop the Ekofisk Tank, the
north flare, and 7 flare structures in
connection with the isolated production
platforms on the satellite fields.
The complexity of the development
increased in relation to the construction of
Activity is hedic on
the jacket of the
bridge support that is
to hold the flare on
Albuskjell 1/6A.
West Ekofisk - or
2/4 D platform -
was the first satellite
field on stream in the
Ekofisk area.
the main field, Ekofisk. Now development
was under way on 6 fields simultaneously,
in addition to the processing facility on the
Tank.
It started with West Ekofisk. The building
of the platform would go on for nearly four
years. The jacket was set in October 1973,
but it was the end of November 1977 before
the platform was in regular production. The
delays were essentially due to the fact that
the fire in the riser on Ekofisk 2/4A in 1975
had made it necessary during an extended
period to use West Ekofisk for quartering
the crews doing repairs on 2/4 A. When 109
 Cod was the first
field found in the
Ekofisk area.
However, it did not
become commercial
until the main field
was discovered. The
Cod platform is
located approx. 75
km north of the
Ekofisk Complex,
and is the only
production platform
in the area that
cannot he seen from
the Complex. Cod
and Tor were the
first platforms
designed by a
Norwegian company
— Kvxrner.

West Ekofisk came on stream, the 11 other
platforms in Phase III were in place and
being assembled. West Ekofisk, Cod, and
Tor made up the first part of the third
development phase.
Furthermore, Cod and Tor were of
Norwegian design — Kvaerner, the first
Norwegian company so involved, was
awarded the job of creating these two
platforms. The Cod platform was first on
stream, on 26 December 1977 — while Tor
platform followed suit a half-year later. Cod
represents a bold development in many
ways. It began with a long discussion as to
whether or not experience gained from the
Ekofisk Tank indicated that it would be best
to go with a concrete jacket. A time-
consuming process was carried out in which
several bids on such a concrete jacket were
obtained, but in the end it was concluded
that the steel jacket was the least costly
alternative. Of the 6 fields around the main
field, Cod is located farthest from the
Ekofisk Complex — approximately 75
kilometers. Therefore the pipeline solution
was an important element. While the other
satellite fields had separate oil and gas lines
— with the exception of West Ekofisk which
is located near the Ekofisk Complex, it was
decided early on to go with a single pipeline
110 from Cod. This two-phase line would
transport both oil and gas/liquid gas. The
pipeline transportation from Cod to the
Ekofisk Complex has functioned well since
production start-up, despite the fact that
researchers have not yet solved the many
problems connected with transporting oil
and gas in the same pipeline.
Cod was the first platform in Phase III and
became a model for the others. It is of bolder
design with larger modules, compared with
the Phase II platforms. The principal of a
modular support system instead of a module
support frame (MSF) was given practical
application for the first time on the Cod
platform. It proved to be so successful that it
was later utilized on the other platforms.
One of the important reasons behind
Cod's representing a new generation of
platforms is the fact that there was a
development at that time toward greater
capacity for crane barges. They were able to
hoist heavier modules into place. The crane
barge «Champion», for example, had an
1150-ton capacity and could lift quarters
modules weighing around 800 tons without
great difficulty. Thus more advance work
could be done onshore before the modules
assumed their positions on the platform.
The development of Cod illustrates many
of the problems associated with platform
building in the North Sea during that period.
It started during towout of the jacket. A
surprisingly early fall storm caused a
towline between the tug and the barge
carrying the jacket to break. Thus the barge
and jacket were left to drift on their own in a
churning North Sea. This situation
continued for 13 hours before a new towline
could be brought on board the barge and
the voyage to Cod could be resumed. The
storm wouldn't let up, however, and for
nearly a month the tug lay waiting for the
weather to change before the jacket could
be set on the ocean floor.
The jacket on Cod didn't become a long
drawn-out affair simply because of the
concrete alternative and the weather
conditions. It began earlier — with the fact
that the jacket for P platform on the Ekofisk
Complex had sunk during the setting
operation the year before. (It turned out that
one of the buoyancy tanks fastened to the
jacket had sprung a leak due to a somewhat
hard launching.) Therefore no chances were
to be taken with the Cod jacket — it was
reinforced in every possible way so as to
avoid a similar fate. These episodes well
emphasize the kind of factors that,
unforeseen and beyond all time schedules,
could complicate the building of one
platform — thereby also causing problems
for the others that were waiting in line.
There was a shortage of both crane barges
and tugboats, so they had to be used by
turns for the various platforms. Thus delays
on one platform meant the next one in line
would have to wait.
A strange episode took place after the
drilling had started on the production wells
on Cod. As was usual at Ekofisk, Phillips had
aimed at using the permanent platform for
delineation drilling on the reservoir. When it
turned out that both the first and second
wells drilled from the platform were dry, it
was widely rumored that the platform itself
had been placed on the wrong site! This
rumor also reached the newspapers, which
consequently ran big headlines to that
effect. It was only after the third well struck
Tor platform is seen
during the final stage
of the hook-up work.
The derrick barge
«Champion», with
tugboats, is lifting
the last modules into
position.
The Tor platform in
1984. Compared
with the photo
above, here we see
that the living
quarters have been
replaced.

Ill
 Albuskjell 2/4 F
during installation.
In the foreground the
flare jacket. At the
rear of the platform
we see that the
drilling module and
derrick an among
the units still to be
hoisted into place.
oil and gas-producing layers that these
speculations died out.
Start-Up
Phillips had the company's own crews who
were experts at starting up a new platform.
The company brought from the USA its
foremost experts in this area when new
platforms were to be put on stream. The
norm was that about 100 persons be
engaged in the start-up work on a platform.
Each platform consists of a great number of
separate systems which are to function on
their own — and along with all the others.
The start-up crews traveled from platform
to platform, as the construction work was
finished, in order to make the systems
function and get the platforms on stream.
There could be many surprises along the
way. As examples of some of the unforeseen
112 problems that could turn up, we will
mention some of the episodes that took
place during the start-up process on Tor
platform. When the hot oil system on Tor
was to be tested, one of the pumps refused
to pump anything at all. The machinery
functioned according to the instruction
book, but not a drop came out of the pump.
The only thing to do was take it apart to
find out what was wrong. When the supply
pipe on the suction side was brought up, it
turned out that the flange gasket on the
pump casing lacked a hole in the center!
A similar episode occurred when the glycol
was to be filled for the first time. As the
glycol was filled, a terrible racket was heard
from inside the tank itself. The filling
process was stopped and the glycol drained
out. The hatch in the side was opened, and
what appeared? That's right — one whole,
apparently forgotten scaffold with wood
plank and all. It was the wood plank that
made the racket when the glycol was
poured in and the plank began to float.
These episodes strike a humorous chord
when retold today, and one wonders how
they could have happened. The answer lies
in the fact that, with so many different
systems - and crews — involved in the
building of a platform, communication is not
easy. Often one crew will leave the platform
on the same helicopter that is bringing the
new one. Thus information as to the status
on a job cannot be passed on from crew to
crew. But, to be perfectly fair — the building
of the platforms, and the start-up operations,
took place for the most part without too
great complications or too many episodes
like the ones described above.
Albuskjell, Eldf isk and Edda
During the period from mid-19 75 to the end
of 1979 six platforms on these three fields
were assembled, production wells were
drilled, and production was started up.
First to come on stream were the two
Albuskjell platforms,in the middle of 1979.
These twin platforms are of a slightly
different construction from the other Phase
III platforms, since they have water-filled
module support frames which are to help
hinder heat build-up in the event of a fire.
Furthermore, Albuskjell 1/6A was the first
platform at Ekofisk with a Norwegian-built
jacket. It was built by Aker — the first order
of this type placed with a Norwegian
shipyard.
Fall of 1979 was perhaps the most hectic
period during the entire Ekofisk
development. After the Albuskjell platforms
had come on stream, the three Eldfisk
platforms and Edda remained. Work went
on at full capacity in order to get everything
ready - and at Eldfisk 2/7A (also called
«Devil's Island» during this period), the
production wells were drilled with two
derricks operating at the same time.
On 7 August 1979, Eldfisk A came on
stream, along with the attached processing
platform, Eldfisk FTP. On 28 October,
Eldfisk B followed suit - as did Edda
platform on the 1st of December.
The Ekofisk Complex Grows
Oil and gas from the six satellite fields
would be received at the Ekofisk Complex.
The first phase in this development was the
processing facility on the Ekofisk Tank.
After the Tank was in place in the summer
of 1973, Doris, the contracting firm, began
The two Albuskjell
platforms are almost
twin platforms —
very similar in
design. They are
somewhat different
from the other Phase
III platforms in that
the module support
frame is jilted with
water to limit
generation of heat in
case of fire.
Albuskjell
II6A (top) is the first
platform at Ekofisk
with a Norwegian-
built jacket — by
Aker. At bottom:
Albuskjell 2/4F.

113

8 — Giant Discovery
 Eldfisk B is situated
northernmost on the
Eldfisk field.

Eldfisk A and FTP

are the platforms
located furthest south
in the Ekofisk area.
For a while the A
platform was
equipped with two
derricks and was
dubbed "Devil's
Island" during the
height of activity.

The crane ship

"Micoperi 26" doing to build a new deck 30 meters over water
piling work on the level. The deck would cover 65% of the
jacket for Eldfisk Tank. The prefabricated concrete deck was
FTP. In the
background: the finished during the spring of 1974. Parallel
jacket for Eldfisk A. with the building of the deck, a total of 72
equipment modules for the actual
processing facility were built at various sites
in Europe and the U.S.A. The first
equipment modules were hoisted onto the
Tank early in the fall of 1974, and until May
1976 new modules were continually being
placed on board. As soon as the first
114 modules were in place, the installation
 Edda2/7Casit
looked in 1985. Edda
was identical with
Eldfisk B, but the
derrick and drilling
module were
removed. They were
totally rebuilt and
placed on water
injection platform
2/4-K. In 1988
equipment for
handling production
from Tommeliten
was installed on
Edda.

In 1975 anew
process could begin — and this work platform was added
continued all the way up to May 1977. A to the Ekofisk
good portion of it was done by Brown & Complex, 2/4R. It is
a riser platform — the
Root through their subsidiary Eumech. This point at which the
company employed Spanish and Italian pipelines from all
labor to a great extent, and it was perhaps Phase lllfields come
into the Complex.
not so surprising that the 6-story container The gas pipeline to
block where those employees were Emden also descends
quartered came to be known by the exotic to the seabed from
2/4R. Generators
name of «Chinatown». were added later, so
Completion of the processing facility on that all the electricity
the Tank was made difficult by the fact that for the Complex is
produced on R
the liquid gas plant at Teesside had not been platform. In the
finished on schedule. This resulted in the foreground we see
necessity to alter the processing system so that the jacket for the
north flare has been
that the liquid gas produced along with the gas line to Emden. Thus 2/4R was created at set.
dry gas and oil could be injected back into the start of 1973, and the jacket was set
the reservoir by NGL pumps on 2/4C north of the Tank during first quarter 1975.
platform. This continued until the time the After it turned out that the oil line to
liquid gas could be received at Teesside — Teesside required a new platform - 2/4 P —
March/April 1979. the number of platforms in the Ekofisk
The processing facility on the Ekofisk Complex grew to 6, plus the two flares.
Tank nearly doubled the capacity for
treating oil and gas at the Ekofisk Complex.
This also led to the need for a new safety «The North Sea Hilton»
valve — flare no. 2 — which was situated When the activity at Ekofisk reached its
north of the Tank. peak in February/March 1977, there were
The original plan was for all the pipelines 7,400 people at work on the installations
from the satellite fields to come directly in and the vessels commissioned In connection
to the Tank. But with 6 fields - and 2 lines with the construction. Housing all of these
from most of the fields — the number of people was an enormous undertaking, and
pipelines was too great. There was also the the solutions chosen involved leasing
necessity of having a starting point for the quartering^rigs — so-called Hotels — and 115
 There is a difference placing temporary quartering containers on
between
accommodations
the permanent platforms. During this period
standards on Phillips chartered the «Henrik Ibsen», the
exploration rig «Alexander L. Kielland», and the «Dyvi
"Ocean Viking" and
2/4-H. New
Alpha» rigs. In addition, crews were
regulations in the quartered on the many vessels located in the
late 1970's specified area.
two beds per room,
and the new hotel
It was a difficult job anticipating
platform had to be quartering needs. They varied from month
modified midway in to month throughout the year, depending
the building process.
Each room is also
upon completion of the modules at the
outfitted with a various onshore building sites.
private bathroom. Looking at the development in the
number of persons directly employed in the
construction of the Ekofisk area out on the
field, there were approximately 800 in 1973,
4,000 in 1975, 7,400 in 1977 - decreasing
gradually then to just under 2,000 in 1979.
These figures include only contractors
engaged directly in the construction of the
platforms and the laying of the pipelines. In
addition come Phillips' own employees.
Compared with today's standards for
accommodations in the North Sea,
conditions during that period were
miserable. But the requirements set were
also less strict, and the periods an individual Complex was made in 1975. The jacket was
spent out on the platform were shorter. As set in 1977, and occupancy could begin in
the labor unions grew stronger, the early September 1978. With all its recreation
demands related to quartering standards opportunities — in addition to the high room
were given higher priority, and the standards, the platform was soon dubbed
Norwegian authorities followed suit by «the North Sea Hilton*, after the well-known
luxury hotel chain. The cinema, exercise
room with sauna, light and pleasant sitting
Peak activity in the rooms, chapel, etc., made 2/4H
Ekofisk development
was reached in
representative of a whole new generation of
1976-77 when over platforms. Later the standards were raised
13,000 people were even higher on the new fields, but 2/4H was
involved in the work.
The chart has been
the first and set the course for the others.
taken from the Moe It is important to be clear about the fact
Committee's report that housing standards at Ekofisk during the
no. 2 concerning cost
analyses on the
construction phase were no lower than on
Norwegian similar fields — or at onshore facilities. But
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
continental shelf. from the perspective of today's standards
they seem primitive. There did occur a
change for the better, however. During
setting stricter requirements. The transition construction of the quarters on Cod, the
from the temporary housing containers with Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)
6 bunks per room to 2/4H's 2-man rooms took part in the designing for the first time.
with private bath is considerable. But it also In cooperation with the operator and the
reflects the transition from a hectic employee organizations, they managed to
construction phase to a more stable arrive at a set of regulations that everyone
production phase where it is possible to could live with. In 1978 came the regulation
estimate quartering needs. that there should only be 2 persons in a
The decision to build a separate housing room. In the temporary quartering
116 platform in addition to 2/4Q on the Ekofisk containers there were as many as 6 — that is,
Ekofisk 2/4H - as it looked in 1985. On the helideck we see a Boeing Chinook machine from Helikopter Service.
The hotel platform has 268 beds (2 per room), offices, cinema, exercise room with sauna, chapel, and various other recreation rooms.
 3 people could sleep in the room at one
time, since the bunks were assigned in such
a way that 3 were on the shift opposite the
other 3. The regulation on 2-man rooms was
made retroactive and resulted in the Phillips
Group's having to implement a quarters
replacement program. Between 1.5 and 2
billion kroner were spent on replacing some
of the quarters and renovating others. It
began with new quarters modules on 2/4Q,
and platform after platform followed suit
until 1983.
Project Organization
The overriding goal for the development of
the Ekofisk area was forward progress —
even though this might entail an increase in
costs. This meant that planning, purchasing,
and building activity had to be carried out
with a high level of overlapping. Bid
invitations were sent out even though detail
planning was only about 30% complete,
while the normal requirement would have
been closer to 70%. The same was true for
construction work on the field, which was
carried out with great crew effort in order to
achieve maximum progress.
The development was under the
supervision of the E & C (Engineering &
Construction) project task force, which was
located in London but directed by the
operator in Oslo, then later moved to
Stavanger with reporting responsibility
back to Phillips' Europe/Africa Division in
London. The latter reported to the Natural
Resources Group (NRG) in Bartlesville.
Project management in E & C, London, had
at their disposal a group of project engineers
who then had responsibility for the
representatives at the various
subcontractors, and at the building sites. A
construction manager in Stavanger was in
charge of that portion of the work that took
place on the field.
There was a steady increase in
Stavanger's share in the development. More
and more of the work in field development,
processing and project planning was turned
over to Norway. At the end of the
development period, almost the entire E &
C staff in London was also transferred to
Stavanger.
Phillips completed the project with a very
small organization. However, during the
most hectic periods this led to the need to
hire service companies whose employees
functioned as Phillips' own.
In spite of this fact, Phillips has probably
carried out a greater portion of the technical
planning than has any of the other operators

In 1976, four key

individuals in
Phillips Petroleum
Company were
honored by being
designated
commanders of the
order of St. Olav.
Phillips' Chairman
of the Board, Bill
Martin (no. 2 from
the left} was
decorated
commander with
star, while Edwin
van den Bark, Pete
Silas and Ward W.
Dunn were decorated
commander. In
connection with the
ceremony of the
exclusive Norwegian
orders, Minister of
Petroleum and
Energy Bjartmar
Gjerde observed that,
"when things go well
for the (Phillips)
Group, things go
well for Norway too.'

118
 This flow chart
P.P. CO NORWAY
{STVANGER)
shows the main
structure of the
organization in
P.P. CO. ENGINEERING SERVICES
charge of the
PROJECT MANAGER
(LONDON) development of the
Ekofisk area. At top
we find Phillips
Petroleum Company
PROJECT ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
E & S SPECIALISTS
(LONDON)
(LONDON) (STAVANGER) Norway. The actual
- LEGAL
- INSURANCE
project organization
-CONTRACT
AUDITING is headed by the
- FINANCE TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS
- PLANNING
-COST ESTIMATING
(STAVANGER) project manager of
- PURCHASING
-TECHNICAL
the engineering unit
STRUCTURAL
ELECTRICAL in London. This unit
OTHERS
DESIGN REPRESENTATIVE SITE REPRESENTATIVE
CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION
SUPERINTENDENT
was again split in
TECHNICAL SERVICE SUPERINTENDENT
CONTRACTS
LONDON/STAVANGER/AT SITE] (AT SITE}
(STAVANGER) (STAVANGER) two — a construction
-DNV
-HYDROTECH
- MAPLE
section in Stavanger
-OTHERS
INSPECTORS
CONSTRUCTION
SUPERVISORS
CONSTRUCTION
SUPERVISORS
and an engineering
{AT SITE) (AT SITE) (AT SITE)
section in London.
The London
DESIGN CONTRACTS FABRICATION CONTRACTS
MARINE CONSTRUCTION OFFSHORE HOOKUP, organization was
CONTRACTS MODIFICATIONS S MAINTENANCE
responsible for design
- BROWN a ROOT -AKER
- BROWN 4 ROOT - BROWNAKER
and actual
- MCDERMOTT - BROWN & ROOT
- NORCONSULT -C.G.DORIS - HEEREMA
-MICOPERI
- DEGROOTHMV
-OIS
construction of the
- WORLEY -OIS
-OTHERS
-TECHNOMARE
-KVÆRNER
-MCDERMOTT
-OTHERS
- MCDERMOTT
- OTHERS different onshore
units, while
Stavanger was
responsible for the
activities at Ekofisk.
Over this
organization were
the Phillips
on the Norwegian shelf. committees which followed the Europe-Africa
In addition to the varying levels within development step by step. Every month, Division in London
Phillips' own organization, the partners and revised cost estimates were made which and the main office
the Norwegian authorities are also involved in Bartlesville, as
were attached to the progress reports. well as a number of
when decisions have to be made. All capital When the original development of the 7 partner committees.
projects exceeding 3 million dollars have to fields, the pipelines, and the terminals at The partner
be approved by a Phillips executive companies, of course,
Emden and Teesside was completed, the have always played
committee. The partners are brought into figure came close to 40 billion kroner. a central role in the
the picture when costs will exceed 1 million There were many good reasons for the final
dollars. decision-making
fact that neither cost estimates nor time process.
schedules were kept — the most important,
Time and Money of course, being the fact that it was very
The overriding emphasis on forward difficult to foresee all the aspects of a
progress in the development necessitated pioneer project such as this. In spite of the
(based on an isolated costs analysis) that it fact that the Phillips Group chose to go with
be more expensive than the project ideal. well-known and proven solutions wherever
For the companies involved, however, it possible, new avenues were not to be
was important to start producing as soon as avoided. The members of the so-called Moe
possible. They were bound by contract for Committee, who studied the development
sale of the gas, and a very favorable projects on the shelf and presented their
development in oil and gas prices occurred report in 1980, calculated that between 15%
which made the venture profitable on the and 20% of the solutions in the Ekofisk
whole. development were pioneering efforts.
«One of the worst tasks I had in In addition to being a period of new
connection with the development was technical solutions and practical problems
having to submit new and higher — often a with the environment and the weather, the
lot higher — cost estimates to management 1970's were also a decade of inflation. The
at regular intervals.* This is Bill Boyce's inflation quickly ate up the value of the
comment on the cost aspect of the project. kroner and the dollar, and necessitated
He was located in Bartlesville during the revision of the original cost estimates. For
first phases of the project and participated at the Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell fields alone,
the same time in the important partner development costs increased by 470 million 119
 The rental costs for
derrick barges
increased greatly
from 1972 to 1978,
and had a
considerable impact
on the total costs of
the development.
While the daily rate
in 1972 was approx.
USD 30,000, in
1978 it was close to
USD 95,000. The
table is taken from
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
the Moe
Committee's report
no. 2. dollars as a result of inflation. An important
factor was also the explosion in steel prices.
The oil crisis, too, had a considerable effect
at the beginning of the development.
Delays due to reduced productivity by the
subcontractors because of the oil crisis were
a part of everyday reality during this period.
Nor can the weather's influence be
underestimated in this connection. During
the winter months between September and
April, an entire fleet of crane barges, barges,
supply boats, and tugs could simply lie
inactive, waiting for some fair weather days
so the job could be done — at the Phillips
Group's expense, of course. Despite two
different rates for working and waiting on
the weather, the final bill increased when
month after month went by with storms and
bad weather offshore. And if big hoisting
jobs didn't get done in late summer of one
year - due to delays at the onshore building
site, it could be necessary to wait nearly half
a year before the weather became
cooperative. That was the case for some of
the larger modules to be hoisted on:o the
Ekofisk Tank. And since the modules were
not hoisted into place, it followed that the
installation work could not get started. Thus
delay bred delay — and cost increase.
Another important factor in this picture was
the gradual cost increase on the vessels that
were required. In the beginning of the
construction period, a crane barge could be
leased for between 10,000 and 15,000
dollars per day. Because of the great
demand toward the mid-1970's, the rates
went up to 75,000-80,000 dollars.
Ekofisk was no longer the only region under
development. Field development was going
on in both the British and Norwegian
sectors. This situation was exploited to
some degree by the shipowners, so that
existing contracts had to be renegotiated.
Another factor of significance on the cost
side was the new regulations concerning
working hours. Phillips believes that close
to 25% of the extra costs for offshore
installation work stemmed from the new
regulations that led to shorter working
hours offshore and more free time onshore.

This chart of the

Phase 1
entire Ekofisk
development — Phase I Eko 2/4 A
including Emden and 2/4 B
Teesside — indicates 2/4 C
very clearly the 2/4 FTP

enormous scope and 2/4 Q

parallelism of the 2/4 P

2/4 T
project.
The chart is taken Phase 3 Ekof. S. (2/4 T)
from the Moe V. Ekof. 2/4 D
Committee's report Cod 7/11A

no. 2 on the cost Tor 2/4 E

Ekof. 2/4 R
analysis of the
development project Pipeline E.
on the Norwegian Pipeline T.
continental shelf. mpietion Phase 3
Edda 2/7 C
Eldfisk 2/7 A
2/7 B
2/7 FTP
Albuskjell 2/4 F
1/6 A
Hotelpl. 2/4 H

Emden, Gal

Teeside, Crude oil

Teeside, NGL

120

Summary
When the first phase of permanent facilities
was planned in the Ekofisk development,
not all the fields to be included in the project
were known. This made it extremely
difficult to measure how large the cost
increases were - or how much more time
the development took than planned. If we
take as a basis the Moe Committee's
comments regarding delays, then Phase II
was delayed by approximately 6-9 months,
the first part of Phase III by 15 months,
while Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell were
delayed by approximately 2-3 years.
The committee concludes with the
statement that the Phillips Group had better
control over the first phase of the
development than the last part. This may
well contain a certain degree of truth, but
then the committee has chosen to ignore the
fact that development complexity became
much greater with six fields under parallel
development as opposed to one in the other
phase. In addition, the Phillips Group had to
The scope of the
Ekofisk development
was extraordinary.
At one point work
was under way in 4 7
yards in 7 different
countries — while at
the same time the
Emden and Teesside
facilities were under
construction,
including the gas and
oil pipelines. Add to
that the processing
equipment on top of
the Tank, pictured
here.
carry out modifications on Phase II because
new fields were constantly being tied into
the system. At one point, projects for the
Ekofisk development were under way at 47
work sites in 7 different countries.
Furthermore, construction of the Ekofisk
Complex, the pipelaying on the two lines,
and, construction of the terminals in Emden
and Teesside were going on at about the
same time. All of this put together means
that Phillips and the Phillips Group were
working at that time with the largest
development project to date in Norway.
When new ground was being broken
simultaneously to that degree, it was not
possible for everything to progress
according to plan.
One example of unforeseen events is
found in the building of the 2/4H platform.
While the platform was under construction,
along came the regulation to the effect that
there could only be two people living in one
room. The plans had to be altered from
4-man to 2-man rooms — and the final bill
came to 172 million dollars extra.
121
 2/4 K
2/4 B

2/4 R
Riser platform. The pipeline which 2/4 S
connects the Cod, Albuskjell, West \ Riser platform which
Ekofisk, Edda, Eldfisk and Ula fields to connects the Statpipe
Emden in West Germany starts pipeline with the Ekofisk if
here. The platform also supplies
Complex. >~""v-'"'i|j
the entire Ekofisk Complex with
electricity.

2/4 G 2/4 T
Riser platform Storage tank for one
which ties Valhall million barrels of oil,
to Ekofisk. processing facilities for
separation of oil, gas;
NGL and water. The
production in the
Greater Ekofisk Arpa is 2/4 H 2/4 P 2/4 C
controlled from the Living quarters. This is where the oil Production platform.
control room at the Tank. Accommodations pipeline to Teesside It produces from the^
platform. starts. Sufficient middle part of the
pressure is provided by Ekofisk reservoir.
strong centrifugal Gas-is reinjecte^djinto
pumps. Spare parts for the reservoir from four
the entire field are also of the wells.
stored on this platform.
 Here's What Happens
ai ihe Ekofisk Complex
The Ekofisk Complex is the central point for the
11 production platforms in the Ekofisk area. All
oil and gas lines from the 7 fields in the area lead
to the Complex. Add to this the Ekofisk
Complex' significance as the meeting point for
oil and gas lines from fields lying outside the
area. The Valhall field is tied into the Ekofisk
system via riser platform 2/4G, which is
connected by bridge with the Ekofisk Tank. Gas
from the Statpipe system (Statfjord, Gullfaks and
Heimdal) is conducted into the system via riser
platform 2/4S which lies to the east of 2/4R. Oil
from the Ula field comes by pipeline to 2/4R
and is tied into the system. (The gas from Ula is
piped to Cod — and on into the system to the
Ekofisk Complex.)
What happens then to the oil and gas that
comes to the Ekofisk Complex? The basis for
understanding what happens lies in some central
laws of physics. The processing will remain a
mystery unless we become familiar with these
laws. To aid our understanding, let's refresh
some of our knowledge of physics:
«A liquid will give off vapor until we achieve
a balance between the liquid and the gas/vapor
phase over it.» If we heat it up or lower the total
pressure, more of the liquid will go over into the
vapor phase. If we increase the pressure or lower
the temperature, some of the gas/vapor will be
«pressed» back into the liquid.
«Oil and gas consist of molecules built up of
hydrogen and carbon, and are therefore also
called hydrocarbons. Oil contains most
compound and heavy hydrocarbons, while gas
consists of simpler and lighter hydrocarbons. By
varying the pressure in an oil/gas mixture, we
vary the relationship between oil and gas — and
the composition of the two.»
We utilize the above when we want to
separate oil and gas and treat the gas in the
processing facility at the Complex.
There are five separators (large high-pressure
tanks where oil, gas and water are separated
from each other) at the Ekofisk Complex. These
tanks receive the oil and gas flow from the 7
fields: Ekofisk, West Ekofisk, Tor, Cod,
124 Albuskjell, Eldfisk and Edda.
1. The West Ekofisk Separator receives oil, gas
and water from West Ekofisk. It operates at a
pressure of approximately 34 bars. The gas goes
from there to the intermediate compressors, the
oil to the interstage separator (4) and the water
to the water treatment facility (11).
2. Dry Gas Separator I receives gas from
Albuskjell and gas and liquid from Cod. (Cod
does not produce oil, but some liquid resembling
condensed gas.) It operates at the same pressure
as the West Ekofisk separator. The gas goes to
the pump compressor and the liquid to the
interstage separator (4).
3. Dry Gas Separator //receives the gas from
Eldfisk. It operates at a pressure of about 60 bars.
The gas goes from there to the dehydration
facility (7). Any liquid goes to the interstage
separator.
4. The Interstage Separator receives oil and gas
from Edda and Tor, oil from Eldfisk and
Albuskjell, and oil/liquid from the three
separators mentioned above. It operates at a
pressure of about 14 bars. The gas goes via a
compressor where the pressure is increased to
34 bars and is sent on through the pump
compressor to the dehydration facility (7). The
oil goes to the low stage separator (5), and the
water that is extracted goes to the water
treatment facility (11).
5. The Low Stage Separator receives oil and
some of the gas from 2/4FTP, a separation
platform for the Ekofisk field, plus all the oil
from the interstage separator (4). It operates at
about 6 bars pressure. The gas goes via a
compressor where the pressure is increased first
to 14 bars and then to 34 bars, on through the
intermediate compressors to the dehydration
facility (7). The oil goes through pumps for
measurement, and the water goes to the water
treatment facility (11).
6. Pumps and Metering. From the low stage
separator the oil is pumped toward the metering
station. But first the liquid gas is mixed in. In the
metering station tests are continually being
made on the oil to determine the quality — and
the amount of oil being produced. After the
metering station, the oil from the Valhall field
(Amoco) and the Ula field (BP) is added before it
goes on to P platform and its big pumps — and
from there into the pipeline to Teesside,
England.
7. The Dehydration Facility receives gas from
all the separators — either directly or via different
compressors that bring the pressure up to
approximately 60 bars. The dehydration facility
consists of 6 big towers (vertical tanks) where
the gas comes into the lower section. On its way
up in the tanks, the gas meets a descending flow
of glycol. The glycol absorbs water and water
vapors in the gas so that a nearly waterless gas
goes on to the dew point unit (8). The water is
evaporated from the glycol by heating it up.
After the glycol is cooled, it is used again for
extracting water from the gas. If the water is not
properly extracted in the dehydration facility,
this may cause serious icing problems in the dew
point unit.
8. In the Dew Point Unit, the gas is cooled to
approximately -20° C, the same temperature as
in a home freezer. But the dimensions are totally
different, and the chilling capacity is equivalent
to more than 100,000 home freezers. At this
temperature and the high pressure (60 bars),
so-called wet gas is extracted in liquid form. This
is principally ethane, propane, and butane. This
wet gas, also called NGL (natural gas liquids), is
mixed into the oil at the pump and metering
station (6) and piped to Teesside. The «dry» gas
from the dew point unit is injected back into the
reservoir (9) or piped on to the pipeline
compressors (10) for transporting to Emden.
9. Gas for Reinjection goes from the dew point
unit to 2/4C platform, where powerful
compressors increase the pressure to
approximately 400 bars in order to be able to
force the gas back into the reservoir. The
amount of gas reinjected depends on how much
gas the buyers on the Continent want. The
reinjection of gas has a favorable effect on the
reservoir and increases oil production levels.
10. Pipeline Compressors receive the gas from
the dew point unit after it has gone through an
accurate metering station where amount and
composition are registered. In the compressors
the pressure is increased to approximately 600
bars before the gas is conducted into the pipeline
to Emden, West Germany. The Statpipe gas and
gas from the Valhall field pass through the same
compressors.
11. Water Treatment: The water extracted in
the separators contains too much oil for it to be
discharged directly into the sea. The oil content
is not so high that it would lead to serious
pollution, but it can be improved. At the Ekofisk
Complex this is achieved by piping all water
produced into the Ekofisk Tank. The Tank holds
a little oil (approximately 50,000 barrels) on top
and the rest water (approximately 950,000
barrels). Here the water is kept for a long time so
that all the oil has plenty of time to be extracted.
Then nearly oil-free water can be discharged
into the sea without endangering fish and other
living organisms in the waters around Ekofisk.
125
 Costly Lessons
Several campaigns
have been carried out
to motivate the
employees to «think
safety* before a work
operation is started.
At Ekofisk it has
been proven that
much of the safety
gain rests with the
individual in the
form of safety
consciousness.
The year 1987 was one of great challenges
within the area of safety at Ekofisk. The
work on the jacking of the six steel
platforms at the Ekofisk Complex put both
people and equipment to tests which,
according to the statistics, should have
resulted in accidents. More than 11 million
working hours were logged by Phillips and
contractors during that year. The safety
record showed fantastic year-end results.
Only minor injuries - and, for the first time,
Phillips' own employees managed to work 3
million hours without loss of on-the-job
time due to injuries. A very impressive
record, considering the type of work that
the jacking operation entailed. Many of the
jobs had to be done below the platform
decks - even throughout a winter season. A
big safety and security plan was designed to
spot and minimize the risks involved.
Attention was given both to the equipment
and to motivating the individual who would
be doing the job. Quite often, in situations
such as these, thought is only given to the
equipment: is it good enough? Experience
126 from Ekofisk shows that it is just as
important to work with the people.
It is difficult to evaluate fully the
achievements on the field. The mainland of
Norway has very incomplete loss and
accident statistics, and an unambiguous
basis for comparison is lacking. However,
SINTEF — in cooperation with Norsk Hydro
— has worked up some statistical material
comparing the offshore oil industry with
land-based industry. Based on this material,
after 11 million working hours in the
building and construction industry, for
example, a fatal accident can be expected.
Within mining, the number of anticipated
fatal accidents would be five. On permanent
offshore installations, one death could be
expected during such a period.
The safety and security work is a good
investment, and it pays prompt dividends.
The safety system is built into the
installations at the same time as usage
procedures are drawn up with safety in
mind. And, of no less importance is the fact
that everyone is given instruction in usage
based on the safety aspect. It is not without
reason that one of the safety
superintendents out at Ekofisk, veteran Egil
Berle, raises the question now and then as to
whether the work in the area of safety is
perhaps being overdone and the
information aspect too intense? Safety really
has top priority in the work being done at
Ekofisk today.
But the good safety statistics have not
been achieved without effort. Since the
beginning of offshore activity in 1967,
accidents have occurred that have claimed
many lives. The offshore oil industry is a
high risk industry where both the
environment and the product itself have
built-in dangers.

It has cost a lot to reach the point where
we are today.
In addition to pointing to the causes, the
investigations and studies have also
been forward-looking, pointing to the
improvements that could be made. In a
cooperative effort on the part of the
companies, the authorities, politicians, and
the individual employee, measures have
been taken that have shown that the
accidents have led to changes in a positive
direction for the total safety picture on the
oil installations.
The principles for safety in the oil
industry are based on the individual
licensee's internal supervision, while the
authorities' inspection via NPD is a check on
the company's own supervision. Phillips has
established a separate department for
quality assurance and quality control
(QA/QC). This group carries out regular
inspections of all the installations — and
performs a sort of internal policing function.
The main responsibility for quality
assurance and quality control lies with the
individual employee, so that the QA/QC
group is complementary to this
responsibility. Departmental manager
Magne Ognedal in NPD's division for
safety and work environment says it is
seldom that the Directorate gives praise to
the companies, but Phillips has actually
been praised for the company's preventive
On all platforms
there are bulletin
boards with
information on
different aspects of
the safety work. It is
necessary to try at all
times to be on the
offensive with
preventive safety
work.
safety work, in a press release issued by the
NPD.
Unfortunately, no one can say that
accidents will not happen again — and no
one can say that we have come so far now
that there is no room for improvement.
Working with safety is an ongoing process
in which there is work to be done with both
equipment and people.
In this chapter we will be looking at some
of the accidents that have befallen the
Ekofisk community - and the
safety/security program that has been
developed to provide the best possible
protection for this special community. We
make no pretensions about presenting any
«correct» or «complete» account. But these
events have their place in the history of
Ekofisk and therefore belong in this book.
Limitations on time and space preclude our
giving the Bravo blowout and the
«Alexander L. Kielland* catastrophe
complete coverage here. Books have already
been written about these accidents, and
more will probably be written in the future.
Instead, our account will be based on
statements from some of the people
involved - and the lessons learned from
these events. For as catastrophic as the
«Kielland» accident was, it did lead to
changes that have had great significance for
the safety programs on our oil installations.
127

The First Years
Compared with today's technology, both
the equipment and the training of crews was
limited during the first phase of activity in
the North Sea. Phillips had few of its own
employees out on the rigs, and the work
was largely entrusted to the contractors.
ODECO, owners of «Ocean Viking»,
manned the rig. Norwegian regulations at
that time were limited. But the operators
had guidelines by which the contractors had
to work.
The Norwegian regulations were based
to a great degree on things that applied to
shipping and, in this connection, had to be
inadequate in some areas.
As is the case within society in general, it
was difficult to make laws and rules before
there was experience on which to base
them. In developing the first rules, Statens
Oljerad (the State petroleum board)
cooperated with NSOC (North Sea
Operators Committee) and the individual
Safety statistics in
the North Sea have
shown steady
improvement. Those
involved in the
actual drilling
operation represent
one of the most
vulnerable groups.
Here a derrickman
is at work on a
drilling rig, in 1970.
128
operators. The Norwegian authorities
established, by Royal Decree of 25 August
1967, special safety regulations for
exploration and drilling for subsea
petroleum deposits. These regulations were
later superseded by a new Royal Decree of
3 October 1975 covering the same area.
These safety regulations only applied to the
exploration phase. They were, however,
modified for the development of Ekofisk by
conditions which the Ministry of Industry
placed on the Phillips Group. Then special
safety regulations were set down on 9 July
1976 for the production phase. These
regulations clearly place senior
responsibility for the activity in the hands of
the licensees, which responsibility is carried
out for practical purposes by the operators.
The regulations have since been revised
several times.
Early Start
The first Norwegians with Phillips to work
on the field were hired on 12 February 1973.
One of the twenty recruited at that time was
Egil Berle. As early as February 1971, he
started working as an operator for Canam,
the company that owned the «Gulftide» rig.
After a short career as operator on
«Gulftide», he has since been with the Safety
and Security Department and followed the
development there.
When he joined the department in
December 1973, the company's own
American employees were already there
with responsibility for what at Phillips is
called «Safety». Andy Anderson was in
charge of this area, and he was very active.
One of his main tasks was to train
Norwegians so that they could gradually
become actively involved in safety work.
During the early phase on «Gulftide»,
safety meetings were already being held
where great emphasis was placed on
personal safety. A handbook was developed
in Norwegian and English on the subject —
and this was also part of the training offered
to the first Norwegian employees with
Phillips. This training was a combination of
onshore theory and practical training out on
«Gulftide» — to teach the subject through
experience.
Helicopter Accident
From the time the activity began, the

helicopter has been the work bus carrying
the crews back and forth between the rigs
and land. Until 9 July 1973, this traffic had
gone well without big problems or
accidents. On this date everyone connected
with the offshore oil activity was given a
warning to the effect that this too was a
vulnerable area.
Jarle Urke, currently senior
superintendent, Operations Support, at
Ekofisk, was busy that July day. A well-
deserved vacation was at hand — he would
be going home to his «roots» in Alesund.
Newly shaven, he boarded the Sikorsky
helicopter on «Gulftide» and promptly noted
that it was a clear, fine day.
On the trip out from Forus, the helicopter
had stopped off at «Ocean Viking», which
lay north of «Gulftide», to take on fuel. On
the trip in, there were 15 passengers, two
pilots, and — in addition to the baggage —
one motor for a «Jet Ranger* helicopter.
Jarle Urke found a seat aft in the
helicopter, with his back to the direction of
flight. He relaxed in the seat and
daydreamed about the cod-fishing he would
soon be doing on the coast of M0re. The
fear of flying was unknown to him, and he
never considered the possibility of
something going wrong. The North Sea
helicopter traffic had been flying for 7-8
years without an accident.
There are twenty miles between every
checkpoint along the route in to Forus, and
9 — Giant Discovery
Crew change on
"Gulftide", During
the first years, one
could travel to and
from rigs and
platforms without
any kind of personal
safety equipment
onboard the
helicopters.
the helicopter reported from the first point
at 1438 hours.
About halfway between Ekofisk and
Forus, Jarle Urke and the other passengers
were suddenly shaken out of their
daydreams. The even drone of the motor
was drowned out by a powerful boom from
the tail area, and the whole machine started
shaking and jolting from strong vibrations.
Co-pilot Johannes Tveita immediately put
the machine over on auto rotation and
checked the RPM indicator. The helicopter's
speed had dropped to 80 knots and was
falling rapidly toward the 60 knot mark. For
Tveita it felt like he still had some control,
but in spite of his efforts to turn to the left,
the machine pulled toward the right. After
10-15 seconds, the noise from the tail
section disappeared, and at the same time
the strong vibrations ceased. Capt. Steinar
Fredriksen turned on the NO SMOKING
and FASTEN SEAT BELT signs, and then
sent the «Mayday» signal three times on the
radio. The signals were picked up by
Stavanger Radio at 1444 hours.
Back in the cabin there were two pilots
among the passengers. They got hold of
their lifevests, and the other passengers
followed their example. A minute later the
helicopter had dropped to an altitude of 150
feet, and the pilot started leveling out the
machine. In that way he could put the
helicopter down on the water. But the
waves were around four meters, and a 129
 Three of the
passengers are sitting
on the helicopter
wreckage when the
rescue helicopter
arrives.
The three men are in
relatively good
shape, and are
hoisted onboard the
rescue helicopter in a
basket.
breaker immediately knocked off the left
pontoon while the machine lay over to the
left on the water.
Jarle Urke had managed to put on his
lifevest, but when the helicopter hit the
water he must have lost consciousness for a
moment. When he came to, the helicopter
had completely capsized, and he was
hanging upside down, belted into his seat.
He released his seat belt and fell down into
the water. When he got up on his feet, he
registered that the water level aft in the
cabin was above his knees and rising
rapidly. Most of the water probably came in
through the open baggage door at the front.
It was difficult to get his bearings, but he
saw a bit of light from the nearest window
and, with a single blow from his left hand,
he knocked the pane out. Along with a
mechanic from Helikopter Service, he
managed to get out through the window.
130 Until that point he hadn't observed any
panic among the passengers to get out. But,
once outside, it became hectic. Some people
had only managed to get their vests halfway
on, others were having trouble because only
one of the vest's lungs had filled with air,
and still others didn't know how to swim.
Those in the best shape swam around
helping the others. It was blowing from the
northwest at 25-30 knots, and the air
temperature was 1°C. The water was 1°
warmer.
Jarle Urke knew that there was already a
helicopter on its way from Forus to Ekofisk,
but he was also aware that it was probably
full of passengers and that it most likely did
not have a rescue lift on board. Just the
same, it was an uplifting sight when the
Sikorsky machine appeared, and shortly
afterward lifevests and life rafts were thrown
out. One of the rafts hit the water right next
to him, and along with five others he
managed to climb on board. Four others
were clinging to the pontoon that had been
torn off the helicopter.
Then the Scottish trawler «Cavalier»
showed up. It had seen the helicopter's
strange behavior and set its course for the
site of the accident. Young Scotsman Innes
McPherson tied a line around himself and
jumped out into the high, cold waves. When
the first casualty was brought on board,
McPherson had to jump out once again to
help another of the four people on the
pontoon. Two of these, however, were so
severely exhausted that they did not survive
the accident.
When the «Cavalier» had taken on board

all those who had been on the pontoon, it
continued toward the raft — and, while Jarle
Urke and the four others were being helped
on board the trawler, two rescue helicopters
came on the scene. One was from the
military rescue service, while the other was a
Helikopter Service machine. Both were
equipped with rescue lifts. Two persons
were picked up by the first helicopter, but
one of these was too weak to survive. Three
people were also lifted up from the wrecked
helicopter itself and were in relatively good
shape. One last casualty was found by
divers later that evening inside the wrecked
machine.
The wreckage was towed to shore and an
investigative commission was appointed to
find the cause of the accident which claimed
four lives.
The commission concluded that the
probable cause of the accident was that a tail
rotor blade was broken loose. This led to the
rotor's falling off the helicopter along with
the tail gearbox. It is the latter which runs
the tail rotor. Thus the helicopter went out
of balance and had to make an emergency
landing.
As a result of this accident, several
reinforcements were made on the tail rotor,
and the time intervals between inspections
and overhauling of the gearbox were
shortened. Another important result of this
accident was the requirement that a lifevest
and survival suit be placed under each seat
in every helicopter.
Fire on 2/4 Alpha
Until April 1974, production was only from
the temporary facility on «Gulftide». Then
the first production well on 2/4A came on
stream — and gradually more and more wells
on this platform and 2/4B and 2/4C were
completed and put in production. The fact
that «childhood illnesses* were revealed The wrecked
helicopter was towed
during that first period was only natural and to shore. Here the
part of the process involved in putting new investigating
equipment to the test in earnest. Just how committee will check
it carefully to find
great the stresses would be that the out what caused the
equipment would have to endure had, quite accident that claimed
naturally, not been foreseen. The North Sea four lives.
environment showed once again that
traditional solutions were not adequate.
Production Supervisor Ray Sligar was in
the drilling office at around 1600 hours on
that first day in November, 1975. The office
was in a container on the south side of the
quarters on Ekofisk 2/4 Alpha - right below
the helicopter deck. The first thing he
noticed was a shaking in the platform, and
he thought it could have been caused by a
supply boat that had collided with a
platform leg.
«I grabbed my helmet right away and set
course for the east side of the platform. But I
was stopped by a wall of flames. The only
thing that could be done was to make my
way back to the drilling office and activate
the yellow shutdown button to stop
production — and, at the same time, start the
fire pumps.» Along with two men from the
Moran drilling firm, Ray Sligar set out for
the west side of the platform, but there too
he was halted by a sea of flames. The flames
rose above the helicopter deck, and the
three made their way across the pipe deck
and into the second floor of the quarters.
There the crew had gradually assembled,
and Ray learned that probably everyone
was there - and in good shape. However, he
2/4 A platform was
the first to be put
onstream at Ekofisk.
The picture provides
a good look at the
two rescue capsules
onboard.
131
 wanted to check and went down onto the
first floor. It was black with smoke down
there, and he had to crawl along the floor.
He made his way on into the galley — but it
was already on fire, and he had to get out
the same way he had gone in. On the west
side of the platform he saw that one of the
lifeboat capsules was aflame - and that the
paint on the outside of the quarters was also
burning. His tour continued to the control
room to see whether everything was okay -
then to the storage area and on to the fire
pump room. Everything looked in order.
This is the riser that Then Ray came to think about a tank of
corroded and caused helicopter fuel. It was standing on the pipe
the fire on Ekofisk deck, and once up there he got a fire hose
2/4 Alpha. The riser
is approi. 10 inches aimed at the tank.
thick. In the meantime the crew had managed to
lower the lifeboat to the water. They had
left the platform without his having noticed
it. That is, the whole crew was not on board
the lifeboat. In addition to Ray Sligar, a
Spanish cook and an electrician from Moran
were still on the platform. At this point they
observed that one of the rescue capsules
was gone, but didn't know that it had fallen
down in the attempt to lower it to the
water.
In the lifeboat there were 63 people. 59 of
these were quickly taken on board a supply
boat, but the lifeboat went back to the
platform to pick up the three people
remaining. Before Ray Sligar disembarked,
he managed to direct a fire cannon toward
the tank containing the helicopter fuel on
the pipe deck.
The lifeboat circled the platform to check
whether anyone was in the water. At the
same time, a supply boat had come on the
scene to tow the rescue capsule to the
Ekofisk Complex.
While this was going on, the «Seaway
Falcon* diving ship was lying by Alpha
platform, ready to turn its water cannons on
the platform. Because of the high water
pressure, the ship had to wait until everyone
had been evacuated. Ray Sligar had reflected
over why this had not happened sooner, but
when he saw the damage that was done to
the quarters by the water, he was glad he
was safely away from the platform before
the powerful jets of water were aimed in
that direction.
Three of the six crew members on Ekofisk
2/4A who had tried to evacuate the
132 platform via the rescue capsule died as a
result of the injuries they incurred. During
their attempt to release the capsule, correct
procedures had not been followed - the
result being that the capsule was released
about 26 meters over the water and fell into
the sea.
Since that time these rescue capsules have
been secured in such a way that today it is
impossible to release them into a free fall
while they are on their way down. Only
when they have reached the water can they
be released. Another result of this accident
was that Phillips immediately established
the rule whereby everyone coming onto a
platform where he/she hasn't been during
the past year must go through a safety
course on the platform. One of the most
important parts of this safety check is to
ensure that each person knows the way
from his cabin to his lifeboat - and how the
lifeboat is to be handled. The fact that there
are lifeboat coxswain today appointed from
among the crew on the platform makes it
less likely that a visitor would have to
handle the lifeboat alone, but each person
must have learned how to operate it.
The cause of the fire on 2/4 Alpha was
that the riser on the over 10-inch thick test
pipeline from the platform to 2/4FTP at the
Ekofisk Complex had rusted through. A
cement cap on the outside of the pipe in the
wave zone, where the pipe goes up onto the
platform, had fallen off. Sea water and the
heat from within had then caused the
corrosion to eat its way through the pipe,
and the fire started when the mixture of oil
and gas at a pressure of 1050 psi met the
oxygen in the air.
The built-in safety system functioned
perfectly, so that it was only the oil and gas
that were in the pipe that were set afire.
When the oil and gas had burned out, and
the flames were not fed anymore, the fire
stopped by itself. It was well A-13 on Alpha
that was producing in the test pipe, and the
safety valve down in the well closed off
production automatically.
At this point in 1975 the three production
platforms 2/4A, 2/4B, and 2/4C on the
main Ekofisk field were on stream. Total
daily production lay at around 300,000
barrels.
Comprehensive investigation went on
during the days following November 1. The
accident with the capsule that claimed three
lives was most important, but it was also
necessary to find out what caused the fire. It
became clear at an early stage that the
solution chosen for the riser in the splash
zone was not good. The question that was
immediately raised, and which every effort
was made to answer, was: What condition
were the other risers in, on the various
platforms? On Wednesday, 5 November,
production was shut down on 2/4B by
order of the Norwegian authorities. After
inspection of the risers on the platform was
finished, permission to resume production
was granted on 7 November. It was clear at
the same time that Phillips, in cooperation
with NPD and DnV, had to find a new
solution for the risers.
The result was that similar risers on the
various platforms had to be replaced with a
more robust and safer design in the splash
zone. This would be an expensive task, but
it proved once again that the solutions at
Ekofisk could not automatically be based on
experience from other oil installations in
other environments. We can clearly see
The fire on 2/4A received wide coverage how the corrosion ate
in the mass media and started a public through the pipe
after the protective
debate on the subject of working conditions concrete coating had
on North Sea oil installations. Only 14 days fallen off. All risers
after the fire, the Government set up a of this type were
replaced after the
committee (the Halden Committee) whose fire.
job it would be to consider the Work
Environment Act's application to petroleum
operations. The conclusion in the
committee's first report, which came out in
July 1976, was that the act, with some
amendments, would be made applicable to
permanent installations. The floating rigs
came under maritime legislation. The second
report came out a year later and was a
supplement to the first.
The damage after the fire on 2/4A was
fairly extensive. It took close to 6 months to
repair the platform, so it was not back in
production until 5 March 1976. The crews
working on Alpha during this period were
quartered on West Ekofisk, which meant
that drilling of the production wells on that
field — and preparation of the platform for
start-up — had to be postponed. There was a
shortage of bed capacity at Ekofisk, and the
repair work on 2/4A took first priority.
The Bravo Blowout
The fire on 2/4 Alpha was the first larger
accident directly tied to the oil activity in
the North Sea. But while the Alpha fire was
a press event, the blowout on 2/4 Bravo on
22 April 1977 exceeded it all. And the
blowout from well no. 14 on Bravo had
great consequences, both for Phillips as
operator and for Norwegian oil activity in
general.
But first let's go back to the chronological
development. After 2/4A went back on
stream, production from the Ekofisk field
was stable. Construction on the satellite 133
 The Ekofisk 2/4B
platform is
producing from the
northern part of the
Ekofisk reservoir,
The blowout on 22
April 1977 occurred
during the
overhauling of well
B-U.
fields was in full swing, and start-up was
imminent on West Ekofisk, Cod and Tor.
Work was also under way on the final
stretches of the pipeline to Emden, and gas
deliveries were anticipated during the latter
half of 1977.
The 2/4 Bravo platform went on stream
in early summer of 1974 and gradually
became the major producer of oil and gas at
Ekofisk. In spring of 1977, production from
the platform was around 150,000 barrels of
oil per day, and this made up about half of
the total production from the Ekofisk field.
When a well has been in production for a
while — how long depends on many factors
- it must undergo a workover in order to
maintain its production capability. At the
beginning of April, this overhauling was
under way on well B-14 on Bravo. The well
had been on stream for just under two years
and needed to be overhauled. As with all
drilling jobs on Ekofisk, the task was carried
out by Moran - later called Morco and Aker
Norcem Drilling.
We'll let acting production supervisor on
2/4 Bravo, Olaf Bendiksen, tell about the
events on the platform that Friday evening,
22 April 1977.
«The work was under way on the well,
and from the top of the production valve
(Christmas tree) on the cellar deck, a riser
was installed leading up to the next deck
where the safety valve was to be connected.
So the riser was open. I wondered why it
was taking so long to install the safety
134 valve, but — as production supervisor at that
time -1 wasn't platform superintendent and
so didn't have anything to do with the
overhauling.
«Several times on that Friday evening I
had been over by B14, and like a number of
others on the platform, I felt a certain
amount of uneasiness as long as the safety
valve was not in place. Before going to bed,
I went by the office and asked Asbjorn
Hansen, usually my shift partner in the
control room, to wake me right away if
anything happened.
«I hadn't been in bed long when the
telephone rang — and over by the riser I
could ascertain that the drilling mud was
now trickling and running over the edge.
The crew at work on the well tried to put a
stop to this by installing a riser pipe about
15.5 meters long on top of the wellhead. At
the top of the riser pipe there is a safety
valve (BOP), and by installing the riser and
BOP on the wellhead and closing the valve,
the well is brought under control. But since
the riser was filled with drilling mud, this
attempt did not succeed. The flow of drilling
mud from the riser was increasing rapidly. It
flooded over the safety valve and sprayed
out over the crew working there. From the
well a steadily increasing noise could be
heard — and it became clear to all of us there
on the drill floor that the well was out of
control.
«As production supervisor, I was also
responsible for the evacuation. I
immediately sounded the general alarm on
the platform, and over the public address
system everyone was ordered to go to the
lifeboat stations. From that moment on, all
my attention was concentrated on getting
everyone on board to safety — without
injuries or accidents occurring in the
process. The accident with the rescue
capsule on 2/4 Alpha came to mind.
«While the crew found their places in the
lifeboats and rescue capsules, the steward
went through all the cabins to be sure no
one was left. While this was going on, the
flow of drilling mud from the well had
increased to a spray that rose up under the
drill floor. The operators had halted
production from the other wells by
implementing the yellow and red shutdown
controls — and up on the drill floor some of
the crew were occupied with trying to
secure the well.»
There were 112 people on Bravo that
Friday evening — and 16 minutes after the A dose-up of the
column of oil and gas
general alarm sounded, Olaf Bendiksen was that shot up from the
able to press the button for the alarm well, completely out
signaling evacuation of the platform. By this of control.
time the drilling mud had become black and
mixed with oil - and it started to smell like
gas.
Arvid R. Omdal, the radio operator on
duty, had maintained contact the whole
time with the transportation coordinator on
the Ekofisk Tank, and with the radio room
on 2/4Q. After the lifeboats and capsules
left the platform, this information was
passed on to those receivers. Arvid and two
others were the last people to leave Bravo
platform. They had to lower the lifeboat
manually before they went down the ladder
to the spider deck, where they would be
picked up by a rubber boat from the
«Seaway Falcon*.
Olaf Bendiksen went along in a rescue
capsule that was picked up by the supply
boat «Jakobiturm». From there, he and the
drilling supervisor were hoisted up onto Q
platform.
In the office on Q the mood was somber
— reports that had come in from the vessels
taking part in the rescue work showed that Sunday morning the two well-killers,
two people were missing. «I knew this had along with three representatives from
to be a mistake, and went through the lists. I Phillips, were put down on the helideck on
saw there that the report from the Bravo — the first people to board the
«Jakobiturm» could not be right. There were platform after the blowout. They were to
32 of us in the capsule that was picked up by get a closer look at the situation. After this
the boat, and after we were hoisted onto the tour of inspection, their work got under way
platform there should have been 30 left. The with preparing the equipment that was
report showed 28. A quick count on the necessary for making the first attempt to
deck of the supply boat proved me right, stop the blowout. One element that hung
and our jubilation raised the roof in the over the crew the whole time was the
office on Q platform. All 112 had been danger of the platform's catching fire. That
safely evacuated from Bravo.» would make the job much more difficult.
In the meantime, well B-14 had run wild — Therefore it was necessary to secure all the
and the first blowout in the North Sea was a equipment against creating sparks.
reality. Management at the Ekofisk Wednesday, April 2 7th — five days after the
Complex and at the Phillips Base in blowout began — everything was ready for
Tananger had started working on how the making the first attempt at halting the oil
well could be brought under control. From and gas flow from well B-14. But the
the reports coming in, it soon became clear attempt failed. Another try was made that
that this task was one that had to be turned same day, but once again it turned out that
over to experts. Just before midnight, the the equipment could not withstand the
Red Adair Co. in Houston was contacted. enormous pressure in the well.
The company was renowned for being the Again on Thursday, April 28th, an
best in the business. Saturday evening, attempt was made, but this too was in vain.
«Boots» Hanson and Richard Hatteberg from It was now obvious that more powerful
that company were in Stavanger and were equipment would be required, and it was
flown out to the «Choctaw» barge, which ordered from the U.S.A. However, the men
would be their base for the rescue operation. on board the «Choctaw» did not want to 135
 The first "well-
killers" have come
onboard the platform
to find out how to
attack the blowout.

wait, and they worked at reinforcing the

The blowout made a equipment on their own. In addition to the
deafening noise, and
the wellkillers had to two men from the Red Adair Co., crews
use ear protection. from Moran and Phillips were also among
Here]erry Dupree, the group working on Bravo platform.
«Boots» Hansen and
Paul (Red» Adair are Friday 29 April, Red Adair himself came
onboard the out to the platform to take part in the work
"Choctaw", which — but again the attempt failed. It looked as
was used as a base
for the rescue action. though it would be necessary to wait for the
reinforced equipment. But once more they
worked at reinforcement on board the
«Choctaw» - and on Saturday, April 30th,
another attempt would be made.
At 1100 hours the crew on Bravo moved
away from the safety valve (BOP) to close
A newspaper slates by remote control the reinforced shutoff
that Norway is
holding her breath mechanism they had made. It worked.
while work is going Seconds passed — and after 5 minutes the
on to stop the crews could go to the safety valve and finish
blowout.
the job. At 1130 hours on 30 April, it was all
over.

Media Event
The blowout on Bravo and the successful
fifth attempt to stop the runaway well could
have been described just that simply. The
fact that working conditions for the
«well-killers» under the rain of oil were
extremely difficult and danger-filled is part
of the story.
But it isn't possible to describe the 7 1/2
day Bravo blowout so simply. The blowout
"Choctaw" and
Bravo were
connected by a
gangway. "Boots"
Hansen is coming off
Bravo, virtually
covered with the
greasy, brown oil.

137
 Mass media
designated "Boots"
Hansen as rescuer.
This is how the artist
imagines the problem
solved, and in the
caption he says
laconically: "That's
that."
was probably the biggest media event in
Norwegian history up to that time.
Only hours after the blowout was made
known, journalists from all over the world
poured into Stavanger. At one point, close
to 300 journalists, photographers, and
reporters were assembled to follow the
events out at Ekofisk.
For what was happening in the Bravo
blowout was something that everyone had
speculated was possible, but it had not
happened since the start-up of oil and gas
production in the North Sea.
If we go back in time to the early days in
North Sea oil activity, this very question
about the risk of pollution and its
relationship to fishing interests and ocean
ecology was a main subject of debate. This
was particularly true in the Norwegian
debate, but it was also an important issue in
other countries bordering on the North Sea
basin.
The major TV broadcasters, newspapers
and news magazines had their
representatives in Stavanger, in addition to
a very substantial Norwegian delegation.
The Norwegian authorities organized an
action command in cooperation with the
rescue center for southern Norway at Sola.
The director of Statens Forurensningstilsyn
(the State pollution board), Hans Chr.
Bugge, was appointed to head up the work,
while then Minister of Environmental
Affairs Gro Harlem Brundtland was the
Government's representative.
Out at Ekofisk very little happened the
first five days of the blowout. Oil and gas
was pouring out of the well in great
quantities, while the «Seaway Falcon* was
constantly spraying water over the platform
to cool it off. The crews were preparing for
the attempt to stop the blowout, but for
journalists and reporters back in Stavanger,
it was «dead time*. Two press conferences
were arranged daily, but it cannot be denied
that the press representatives were
dissatisfied with the information they

An enormous
number of press
representatives
followed the
attempts to end the
blowout. The
international
gathering of media
people was kept
updated through
regular press
conferences. Some of
the key players are
seated at the table in
the right corner: with
his back to the
photographer, Hans
Chr. Bugge, the
State Pollution
Control Authority:
Dag Meier-Hansen,
the Norwegian
Petroleum
Directorate (NPD);
Gordon Goering,
Phillips, and Haakon
Blaauw, Phillips.

138
 To reduce the danger
of fire and explosion,
the Bravo platform
was kept under a
constant stream of
water from the
diving vessel
"Seaway falcon".
We can see clearly
how the brown oil
covers the entire
platform.

received. The fact that they were kept far

Another unsuccessful
away from the events at Ekofisk was no attempt to stop the
doubt also a factor. However, plane trips blowout. The
over the field were later arranged so that "block" that is being
is carried away had
photographers could get their pictures. But burst because of the
they were not allowed to go on board the high pressure.
«Choctaw». For reasons of safety, and out of
consideration for the «well-killers», it was
not permitted.
The main issue for the media at this point
was the poor state of emergency
preparedness — the equipment that would
clean up oil that had spilled into the sea.
And the fact that this was a weak point was
not concealed by the Minister of
Environmental Affairs, in her many
interviews during this period. It was hardly
surprising that Storting representative
Asbjorn Haugstvedt, during the Storting
debate on 12 December 1978, said that
what he remembered best from the Bravo at that time, Gordon Goering. He had come
blowout was the Minister of Environmental out to Sola to meet Red Adair and
Affairs and Red Adair. Red Adair himself accompany him to Ekofisk. Red Adair was a
appeared on the scene on Friday, 29 April. colorful person, and a couple of rash
As head of Phillips' Exploration & statements on his part to the effect that they
Production group at headquarters, Edwin would take care of the situation in no time
Van den Bark personally asked Red Adair to led the mass media to make him out to be a
make the trip to Stavanger. Rumors to this hero before the job was done. When the
effect had naturally reached the press, and same Red Adair returned from Ekofisk after
when the plane landed at Sola there was an the task had been completed on Saturday
enormous band of press representatives. afternoon, he was given the same royal
Red Adair was almost frightened by the stir, reception by the press. A press conference in
according to Phillips' head man in Norway Atlantic Hall in Stavanger almost made him 139
A happy Paul "Red"
Adair is
congratulated by
Phillips' Managing
Director, Gordon
Goering (left), after
the blowout has
finally been stopped.
look like a saint where the blowout was
concerned.
One of the great mysteries speculated
about by the press was how much Phillips
had to pay Red Adair for the job. Figures in
the two-digited million amount were
regularly mentioned in print. We will unveil
the mystery here and now: the check came
to $257,000, according to Gordon Goering.
And he ought to know - he signed it. In
addition, round trip air fares for three people
were covered. In this connection, the events
in the following story came to pass. The
three men had already had their round trip
tickets paid for. But changes in their plans
meant that new tickets had to be purchased.
Phillips demanded — and received — full
compensation for the first tickets, recalls a
smiling Gordon Goering.
The Consequences
The first concern to surface after the
blowout was the effect of the crude oil on
the ocean environment. A comprehensive
effort was initiated to clean up as much of
the oil as possible, but the equipment
proved to have great limitations. As many
as 22 vessels participated at one time in the
cleanup work. About 9,500 tons of crude oil
were discharged during those 71/2 days
that the blowout lasted, according to
Phillips' investigations based on studies of
the well. The first official figure was over
140 twice that amount — approximately 20,000
tons. Only a very small part of that could be
collected -just under 1,000 tons.
The question as to whether or not to use
chemicals to break down the oil was
debated hotly during those first days. The
Minister of Environmental Affairs gave
Phillips permission to use some chemicals in
areas closest to the platform — for safety
reasons — but otherwise chemicals were not
used.
It turned out that the oil underwent a
natural breakdown process in the sea — and,
sometime after the blowout, ocean
researchers at the Havforskningsinstitutt
(ocean research institute) in Bergen could
confirm that no environmental damage as a
result of the Bravo blowout was found.
Later it came to light that the time of year in
which the blowout occurred and other
natural conditions, such as waves and wind,
were favorable. No pollution was found
onshore, since the oil spill gradually broke
up and never reached the beaches around
the North Sea.
Nevertheless it was, naturally enough,
the possible environmental effects of the
blowout that had the greatest consequences
in Norway. When the blowout occurred,
agreement had almost been reached on
extending the oil activity northward along
the coast — north of the 62nd parallel — the
following year. The Bravo blowout and the
debate surrounding it resulted in about a
two-year delay in starting exploration in the
north.
Furthermore, the unsuccessful oil clean-up
efforts gave impetus to the development of
emergency preparedness programs along
the coast. Both the authorities, oil
companies, and suppliers of clean-up
equipment intensified their efforts in this
aspect of preparedness.
The Cause of the Blowout
Four days after the blowout, an
investigative commission was appointed to
find the causes. The commission concluded
that «the blowout came as a result of a series
of circumstances which contributed directly
or indirectly in varying degrees, namely:
unfortunate practices in the documentation
of the installations, marking of equipment
and instructions as to their use, weaknesses
in the established and approved work
program, unfortunate planning of the work
on the platform, improvisations instead of
program revision, faulty judgement in
critical situations, weak supervision and
control, and unreasonably long work
periods for some persons.* On the basis of
this conclusion, it was then pointed out that
the blowout to a great degree must be
attributed to human error - and that the
background cause was that organizational
and administrative systems in this case were
insufficient to attend to safety in a
satisfactory way.
This conclusion led necessarily to
changes - within Phillips, the operator, and
on the part of the Norwegian authorities.
The changes were also such that, as far as
possible, systems were developed that
would make a recurrence unlikely. When the
debate on the Bravo blowout came up in the
Storting on 12 December 1978, the political
bodies had invested a lot of time getting to
the bottom of all the circumstances.
Committee chairman Rolf Hellem also said
in his contribution to the debate that the
Industry Committee, which was discussing
the case, had held meetings with ten
different ministries, institutions, associations
and Phillips, «and I must add that I can't
recall the committee's handling a case in
recent years with so many hearings along
the way.»
A concrete result of Storting's handling of
the case was improvement in education and
training within oil operations. The day
before the report came up for debate, the
Storting voted an additional sum of 14
million kroner for improvements in this
sector. However, there was political
agreement that the blowout should not alter
the basic principle that those in charge of
operations are also responsible for their own
supervision — that is, that the operator shall
establish necessary inspection procedures.
The authorities' control shall in every way
be regarded as additional to the licensee's
own inspections. The Bravo accident
(is) the biggest
Phillips' head man in Norway in 1977, civilian action (in
Gordon Goering, says almost ten years after Norway) since
the blowout that the 7-8 days it lasted were World War II, state
the newspapers after
the darkest days in his life. Before he went it is all over. Another
to be interviewed by the author, he looked newspaper reports
through his scrapbook of news clippings on that Bravo has been
tamed, but that the
the Bravo blowout - and found that he was loss in revenues for
still unable to view it objectively. There Norway is at least
were too many emotions on his part tied to NOK 300 million.
The same newspaper
the event. also writes that flags
But at the same time he emphasizes that were raised in
the lessons that he, Phillips, and the Stavanger when the
news came — and
Norwegian authorities learned were that "Seaway
enormously valuable. «After the blowout, Falcon" made a V
and the report of the investigative sign with its water
guns out on the field
commission became available, everyone was when the blowout
concentrating on one thing: to do
141
 everything possible to ensure that it would
not happen again. Therefore positive
measures were implemented which, for
Phillips, have meant that similar things have
not happened since,» says Gordon Goering.
He had to take pretty many rough «blows»
himself from the mass media during the time
of the blowout. The damage to the actual
platform after the blowout proved to be
limited. By the end of May 1977, the
clean-up work had been completed and the
platform was back in production.
Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo continued to be a busy
and very central platform in the Ekofisk area.
In addition to being the production platform
where a good deal of the oil and gas from
the Ekofisk field was brought up, attempts at
water injection from the platform were in
progress from 1981 to 1983. On this busy
platform, a six-year record of no accidents
resulting in lost time on the job was
achieved in 1987. A fantastic performance
by the crew, which goes to show that it
pays off when everyone works together and
pulls in the same direction. No other
platform in the Ekofisk area had managed
such a record before that time.
Tragic Helicopter Accident
On 23 November 1977, at 0909 hours, a
Sikorsky helicopter took off from Forus on
its course to booster platform B-11. En route
to that platform, which is located on the
German continental shelf along the gas
pipeline to Emden, the helicopter was to
land at the Ekofisk Complex.
Along the route to Ekofisk there are
several checkpoints where the helicopters
are to report in to Stavanger Radio. At 0931
hours, it reported in from the first
checkpoint - «Alpha». After that, nothing
142
was heard from the machine. Ten
passengers and a crew of two were onboard.
Another helicopter that took off an hour
later discovered wreckage and people in the
water about 30 nautical miles southwest of
Varhaug radio lighthouse. An attempt to
bring up a survivor failed. A rescue
operation was carried out, but no survivors
could be found.
The helicopter flew in the lowest air
corridor to Ekofisk - 500 feet - on account
of the weather. The investigative
commission that was set up never managed
to establish the cause of the crash.
However, it was established in the report
that it appeared that the helicopter had hit
the water at high speed — and a possible
cause was that they were not aware of how
close they were to the sea, thus colliding
with the water through no fault of the
machine itself. The wreckage was found at a
depth of 300 meters and brought up, but
neither could it provide clues as to the cause
of the accident.
In the investigative report, it was pointed
out that there ought to be warning signals
installed on the radar altimeter in all
helicopters — as well as crash position
indicators. This was also done on all the
helicopters trafficking in the North Sea.
Another consequence of this accident was
that survival suits or lifevests were required
during flights on helicopters flying over the
sea. Up until that time, neither suits nor
vests had been required. Recording
equipment was also installed so that, in the
event of an accident, it would be possible to
play back the conversation in the cockpit
and thus be better able to reconstruct what
had happened.

The Catastrophe
Gale winds from the southwest and
showers. This weather formed the frame
around the very solemn ceremony that took
place at Smiodden near Stavanger on 20
March 1986. Crown Prince Harald unveiled
a monument over the «Alexander L.
Kielland* accident in the presence of a great
number of the surviving relatives, survivors
of the accident, and others who wanted to
show their concern. «A monument for hope
and the future» can serve as the motto for
the sculpture as it stands there on a slope of
naked rock looking out to the North Sea.
In his speech, Crown Prince Harald said,
among other things, that this was the worst
industrial accident ever to befall Norway.
He touched on the fact that Norway, as a
fishing and shipping nation, had
experienced many ill tidings from the sea,
but that what made the «Kielland»
exceptional was its scope; the fact that it
happened in a totally new industry; and that
there was immediate coverage in every
home, via television, radio and newspapers,
of everything that took place.
He concluded by emphasizing the
sculpture's significance as a monument to
those who died, a symbol of our sympathy
for their surviving loved ones, a sign of
gratitude for those who survived the
catastrophe, and a lasting reminder to us all.
Very many people
had found their way
to Smiodden near
Stavanger when
Crown Prince
Harald unveiled the
monument to the
"Alexander L.
Kielland" accident.
The monument
consists of a broken
chain placed on a
slope of naked rock
by the sea. Below the
monument itself
there are plaques
with the names of
those who lost their
lives in the accident.
Aud Iversen from F0rre in Tysvasr, a rural
district which lost many in the accident,
concluded her speech on behalf of the next
of kin and the survivors with these words:
«A monument such as this shall also be an
expression of hope and the future for all of
us: hope that the time will come when
women and men can feel safer both on the
job and in society in general.*
History of the Rig
The «Alexander L. Kielland* was built at the
CFEM French shipyard for Stavanger
Drilling and was delivered in 1976. It was
originally built as a drilling rig, but already
on its first mission for Phillips in July 1976 it
was used as a quarters rig on H-7, the
compressor platform. The rig was built on
the so-called «pentagon» principle, with five
legs or columns bound together by
bracings.
Between 15 July 1976 and 1 August
1979, the «Alexander L. Kielland» was used
as a quarters rig, along with the «Henrik
Ibsen» and the «Dy vi Alpha», here and there
in the Ekofisk area. From the time it left the
shipyard, the «Kielland» was equipped with
temporary quarters so that it had 348 beds
on the day of the accident.
On 1 August 1979, it was moved from
Albuskjell 2/4 F to the Edda platform.
On the day of the accident, the «Kielland» 143
 "Alexander L.
Kielland" was
used as an
accommodations rig
during the
development of the
Ekofisk area. Here
(lie rig is connected
with Albuskjell
2/4F.

had been lying with a bridge over to Edda,

but because of the bad weather the rig had
to pull away from the platform.

Ekofisk, 27 March 1980

Baste Fanebust has been working for many
years as boat coordinator at the Ekofisk
Complex. He was on duty that evening in
March 1980, and he has prepared this
account of what happened:
«I had just downed a solid «komle»
(dumpling) dinner on the hotel platform and
was preparing to return to the watchtower
on the top of the Ekofisk Tank. Before I set
out over the bridge from the hotel, I
fastened my helmet on tight and zipped my
jacket, because the nasty wind had picked
up considerably. I turned up the volume on
. SB s my walkie-talkie and looked at my watch —
precisely 1830 hours, and I walked faster so
as to catch the evening news. It was likely to
This is how the be a quiet night on duty, with newspaper
accommodations rig reading and maybe a little letter writing; the
was connected with supply boats had long since been riding out
the platform, by
means of a bridge. the weather.
When the accident «I had only gone a few meters out on the
happened on 27 bridge when there came a sputtering sound
March 1980, the
weather had made it over the walkie-talkie, and my heart did a
necessary to pull the flip-flop when I picked up the message:
rig away from the 'Mayday, mayday, Alexander Kie '
Edda platform.
Then it was quiet. I stopped and listened.
144 Nothing. A few seconds later I heard the
supply boat 'Normand Engineer' calling the myself against the wind across the open
'Kielland' — but with no response. Then he helideck; it was getting dark, and through
called me: 'Charlie Transport. Normand the patches of fog I saw that the sea was
Engineer, channel 9. Did you hear that?' going big and black with gray-white crests
'Yes, 'Engineer' — it sounded like a of foam. The whole situation was unreal,
Mayday call from the 'Kielland': are you and several times during that evening I had
near there?' the sensation of observing myself from the
'Yes, I'm less than two nautical miles outside — as in a very realistic nightmare
north of Edda.' from which you expect to wake up at any
'Okay, you move full speed down there moment. For this just couldn't be true -
and see.' could it?!»
Immediately after that I told Didrik Let's go a few minutes back in time and
Stonghaug on the 'Normand Skipper', which let the two captains, Christian Naess on the
was in the same area, to do the same - and 'Normand Engineer' and Didrik Stonghaug
while I was jogging toward the Tank I on the 'Normand Skipper' tell their stories.
managed to give orders to most of the other
vessels on the field to head toward Edda and First, Christian Naess:
the 'Kielland'. As I reached the elevator on «I was standing forward in the wheel
the Tank, Christian Naess on the 'Normand house when I heard the 'Mayday' call, and
Engineer' called me again, and with audible when I went over to the VHF to answer, I
doubt in his voice told me that the crane guess I wasn't taking it too seriously. But
operator on Edda claimed that the when I didn't get any reply, I called up
'Alexander L. Kielland' was about to capsize! Charlie Transport and was told to head out
«Inside the elevator I met a couple of
operators; one of them chuckled my way: Boat Coordinator
'You look pale, Baste. . .too many Baste Fanebust
relates how he
dumplings?' I just shrugged my shoulders, experienced the
and when he noted how intensely I was "Alexander L.
listening to the walkie-talkie, he became Kielland" accident.
serious:
'Has something gone wrong?'
The 'Kielland' has put out a Mayday, but
we can't make contact — it's apparently
about to capsize. . .'
«They stared at me unbelieving, but we
said no more while the elevator crawled up
between stories. I had to bend over to brace
Christian Ncess (left)
and Didrik
Stonghaug were
captains onboard
"Normand
Engineer" and
"Normand Skipper"
when the accident
occurred. The two
supply boats were
directed into the
accident area where
they participated in
the difficult rescue
action.

145

10 - Giant Discovery
 Words can scarcely
describe a picture like
this. We see the four
pontoons which are
all that can be seen of
the "Kielland". In the
foreground, Edda,
and behind, the
"Seaway falcon".
at full speed to see what was actually going
on. I turned the ship around and tuned the
VHP over to Edda's work channel. There I
made contact with the crane operator:
'What's actually going on over there?' I
asked.
The 'Kielland' is capsizing/ was the
answer I received. I still didn't grasp the
seriousness of the situation. It struck me that
the crane operator must have been a
landlubber who wasn't quite able to express
himself if the 'Kielland' was tilting over and
listing on account of the rolling. We were
rolling hard ourselves in the heavy sea, and I
thought that for him in the crane it might
look as if the 'Kielland' would capsize, while
it really was only in a 'hard roll' and would
come back again.
146 «We were moving at top speed in a
southerly direction toward the 'Alexander L.
Kielland', and we were getting pretty close.
While I was talking with the crane operator,
he suddenly cried out: 'Now it's going over
— now its legs are in the air!' We had already
understood that something serious was in
the works, but now it became clear to us
that the situation was quite precarious. The
crew put on their survival suits, hung the
rescue net over the side of the ship, and
made ready for the rescue operation. At this
point in time, the crane operator on Edda,
Arne J0rgensen, had already begun to fish
people up from the rough sea with the
personnel basket.
«About 12-15 minutes had now gone by
since the 'Mayday', and the first thing I saw
inside the accident area was a big, gray
shadow on our starboard side. It struck me

that the shadow had to be the quarters —
which had sort of been knocked off as the
rig tipped over. In the mist it became so
enormously big — but it turned out to be the
torn off D-leg I was passing. And then. . .
then we were suddenly in the thick of it!»
Didrik Stonghaug:
«We were crossing with the 'Normand
Skipper' between Edda and the Ekofisk
Complex, and a few minutes before 1830
hours we passed the 'Normand Engineer'. I
was sitting and listening with half an ear to
Farsund Radio; there was someone on board
the 'Alexander L. Kielland' talking with his
wife at home. The reason I was listening was
that we were waiting in line and were to
have the next call. Suddenly I heard,
'Mayday, mayday, Alexander Kielland' on
VHP channel 9, and at the same time the
conversation between the 'Kielland' and
Farsund Radio was suddenly cut off. Farsund
Radio — not aware of the reason for the
cut-off at that point, of course — called me
up and asked if I wanted the call now that I
had ordered.
'No, forget it,' I answered, and rushed
over to the radar. There I could actually see
that the 'Alexander L. Kielland' simply
'disappeared' from the screen. When I
turned the 'Normand Skipper' around, there
was a terrible reeling and bucking, and the
crew came running up onto the bridge to
find out what was happening. Just an hour
earlier, before supper, we had had a rescue
drill on board. Among other things, we had
tested the survival suits, and somebody had
made a remark like, 'Oh, well — let's just
hope we'll never have to use these. . .' But
now they were all suiting up — suddenly it
was the real thing!»
Christian Naess:
«As we passed the leg, we met a raft and a
lifeboat. We saw that there were people in
the raft, but decided that both they and
whoever might be in the lifeboat were
relatively safe. The crane operator on Edda
had reported that there were a lot of people
in the water, and so we moved on toward
Edda and the 'Kielland'. And sure enough,
there were a lot of people in the sea; a whole
lot of them were already lifeless. I can see
the picture before my eyes — but I can't
count them anymore. I figure there were 7-8
floating on their stomachs or backs, most of
whom had survival suits on. There were 3-4
men struggling for their lives around a
wooden crate, and one of them had
managed to crawl up on it. He was paddling
furiously now — surely out of fear of being
smashed against us. We had the rescue net
out on our starboard side; there were two
men who managed to hang onto it, and we
got them pulled on board. A little further
astern, we got hold of a fellow in a survival
suit — but the suit was so slippery that we
couldn't hold onto him. The dejection after
an experience like that cannot be
described. . .. The same thing happened
again with another person somewhat later —
if only there had been a loop on the suit,
maybe we could have. . . On and around the
wreck of a lifeboat we saw 5-6 people who
were holding on for dear life, and we set our 147
 Survivors were
transported by
helicopter to
Stavanger where
they were received by
health personnel.
course in that direction. While we were
moving toward it, several men fell off it, and
we managed to pull up two of them. The
'Alexander L. Kielland' had now completely
capsized, and we were up close to the four
pontoons. They remained visible until it was
so dark that we could no longer see
anymore people in the water.»
Didrik Stonghaug:
«We came on the heels of the 'Normand
Engineer', and the scene that met us when
we caught sight of the 'Alexander L.
Kielland' will remain with me as long as I
live. One time I saw a painting of the
sinking of the Titanic', and that came back
to me when I saw this inferno of broken up
lifeboats, torn rafts, and people in the sea. I
said to those who were standing around me
that if as many as 10 men could be saved
from this, it would be a miracle of God
«First a raft came toward us. It was full of
people, but the raft was in one piece, and
when we confirmed that the people on
board were not in any immediate danger,
we let it go by. Soon afterward another raft
came: it was all torn up, and the two who
were hanging onto the remains were really
in bad shape. But, fortunately, we managed
148 to get them on board. When we were
finished with that operation, so many boats
had come into the accident area that there
was actually a danger of collision. But as we
were about to pull out and continue our
search toward the northwest with the wind
behind us, a lifeboat came up alongside us.
From it we managed to pull onboard the
'Normand Skipper' those who were most
exhausted, plus some others who took the
chance of jumping over — 12 people
altogether. The same number chose to stay
in the lifeboat and wait for better weather
conditions.»
Christian Naess:
«As I mentioned, more boats had arrived
on the scene, and it was pretty crowded in
by the 'Kielland'. 'Safe Truck' was lying
there and rescued 5 men, and Tender
Power' managed to wrest 2 people from the
sea. In that connection, we mustn't fail to
mention First Mate Sven Erik Pedersen who,
with a line around his waist, jumped
overboard and, after much struggling in the
violent weather, managed to rescue a man
who — totally exhausted - was clinging to a
wooden crate. In addition to the darkness,
fog now set inn — it was thick as soup, and
we weren't able to see anymore survivors in
the water. Neither could we see anymore
rafts or lifeboats, even if we kept on looking
with radar and searchlights.
«Everything was as unfavorable as it
could be: the southeasterly winds churned
up a sea of mighty swells, then came the fog
and the darkness, with an air temperature of
+ 7°C (40°F) and + 4° in the water. . .We
kept on searching in a northwesterly sector,
but the current was apparently stronger
than the wind — for one lifeboat that drifted
off was located later that night southwest of
Edda. On board the lifeboat they had a
portable radio transmitter; we could barely
hear them over medium wave — and, based
on the information we were able to pick up,
they should have been in the vicinity of the
Albuskjell platforms. In reality, they had
drifted in the opposite direction.*
Didrik Stonghaug:
«We knew very many of the people
working on the 'Kielland' personally, but
since the stormy weather had created some
complications in connection with crew shifts
that day, we didn't know exactly who was
on the rig when the accident happened. Our
Mate, Reidar Vermundsen, was
undoubtedly the most anxious, for his
brother, Vegar, worked on the 'Kielland'. I
was happy when I could call up Baste on
Charlie Transport and tell him that his friend
and fellow mate Eivind Egeli was among
those who had jumped over to us from the
lifeboat.
«While I was standing there maneuvering,
someone suddenly slapped me on the
shoulder and said, 'Hi!' I turned around and
froze — felt goose bumps all over my body.
There stood Vegar as large as life in the
wheel house, , ,
«All of us who in one way or another
were involved in the catastrophe and the
rescue operation have relived that evening
and night many times since. The feelings we
have are difficult to describe, and I won't
attempt to do so either. The numbers tell the
story: it is deeply tragic that 123 people
died, and it is more than fantastic that 89
survived. Here we have mentioned but few
of the people who took part in what the
English newspaper Daily Express described
on 29 March 1980 as . . .an honorable result
in a rescue operation that must be
characterized as unique in history. But there
are so many, many more who deserve their
own place in the history of the worst
accident and the greatest rescue operation in
living memory. We could have told about
rescuer Mike Yarwood, who lowered
himself from the British helicopter into the
wind-lashed sea and managed to winch 36
survivors up from a raft and a lifeboat. We
At first it was
difficult to get a
handle on how many
people had actually
been onboard the
accommodations rig.
Those who came on
shore were registered
immediately.
149
 Olav Skotheim,
Phillips engineer,
was in the cinema on
the "Kielland" when
the accident
happened. He
managed to put on a
survival suit, jumped
into the sea and was
soon picked up by a
crane on the Edda
platform. He was in
such good shape that
he was able to attend
a press conference
shortly after he came
onshore — along with
Phillips' Information
Officer, Per Erik
Bj0rklund.
The British
newspaper "Daily
Express" may well be
used as an example
of newspaper
coverage on the day
after the accident.
123 persons lost their
lives in the accident.

could have told about more than two dozen

small fishing boats that defied the elements
and came to the rescue. We could have told
about the crew on 'Active Rey' who had to
take on 30 dead from the other boats on 30
March. We could have told. . ..
«Altogether there were 7 planes and 19
helicopters from Norway, Denmark, West
Germany and England that participated,
along with 9 naval vessels and 71 civilian
vessels from the whole North Sea basin.
Only a few have been mentioned — none
will be forgotten.*

Epilogue
It is natural that an accident of such scope
and consequence as the wreck of the
«Alexander L. Kielland» should receive much
attention during the time following. The
debate surrounding the accident still
emerges from time to time, and it will
probably do so for many years. It was and is
the worst accident in modern times in
Norway.
We do not intend to go through the
accident's many aspects and the questions
that it posed. A comprehensive
investigative report is available, and several
150 books and research reports have been
written on the causes and events. Court
cases are still going on in connection with
the accident and who was at fault.
We will only give a brief account of the
main conclusions of the investigative
commission's report, and look at some of
the steps taken to prevent similar accidents.
The investigative commission ascertains
that the direct cause of the rig's capsizing
was a fracture in D-6 bracing. Thereafter
several bracings were broken loose, and
D-leg was torn loose — resulting in the rig's
listing and then turning completely over. In
the report, the cause of the break in the D-6
bracing was ascertained to have been a
break due to material fatigue, as a result of
excessive material stress. In this bracing an
opening had been cut and a small support
tube welded in place to hold a hydrophone,
an instrument to help control the rig's
position (in relation to the wellhead).
Inspections after the accident show that the
fillet weld had been given a somewhat
unfortunate shape, and at the same time the
weld penetration in the hydrophone support
tube was too small. Properties in the steel in
the hydrophone stand - low strength and
toughness in the through-thickness
direction — combined with the unfortunate
fillet weld, plus the high level of stress, led to
the fracture in the weld connection between
the hydrophone and the bracing, and in the
hydrophone stand as well. Some of the
fractures must have occurred before the
platform was assembled.
Moreover, the designed failed to perform
a fatigue study on the platform, and the D-6
brace had a low fatigue life. The designer
also treated the hydrophone support tube as
a detail of equipment rather than as a
structural element.
After the fall of D-leg, the «Alexander L.
Kielland* heeled over right away until the
angle of the tilt reached 30-35°. Then the
platform assumed a stable position on its
side in the sea. From this position it
continued to tilt slowly over and sink, until
20 minutes later it went completely over.
In its recommendations, the investigative
commission says that the safety level for
movable drilling rigs should and can be
improved. A number of conditions on the
construction and inspection side are
mentioned which should be followed up.
The commission was particularly occupied
with the fact that control during
construction should start already in the
drawing stage and be followed up
throughout the whole process and continue
after a rig is in operation.
In the case of preparedness and rescue
equipment, the commission's
recommendations aim at strengthening the
degree of readiness both on the platform
itself and outside the platform. In categorical
terms, we can mention coordination of the
various licensees' readiness programs,
auxiliary vessel coverage, rescue equipment
for regular supply boats and division of the
continental shelf with rescue helicopter(s) in
each zone.
Most of the investigative commission's
recommendations have today been
accepted, and have become a part of
The broken D-6
bracing from
"Alexander L. Kielland"
was towed to Stavanger
and examined by the
investigative
commission. Here we
see the break at the
hydrophone support
tube which the
investigative
commission found to be
a key cause of the
accident. The rig was
also towed to
Stavanger, and after
several attempts it was
finally turned right side
up in September 1983.
The rig was sunk to a
depth of 700 meters in
Nedstrandsfjord in
Rogaland.
151
 As part of the
emergency
preparedness
program, several
courses have been
developed to prepare
employees in the
North Sea for the
worst. Under way
here is a drill in how
to extinguish a
helicopter fire.

meaningless. But when the ability to learn

Phillips employees at
a work environment from mistakes is intact, a positive
course at the development toward a safer place of work
Norwegian occurs. One often has the impression that
Maritime Academy
of Damage Control safety is a question of economics for the
and Sea Rescue in companies involved. It costs to provide a
Haugesund. high level of safety. In reality, accidents cost
more than do provisions to ensure safety.
Phillips' manager of Safety and Security,
Torger Lode, says the company has saved
many times over what it has invested in
increased safety. Today he has become more
Instruction in how to occupied with the fact that society in
use a life raft is part
of the basic safety
general must become more aware of the
course for employees great savings that result when the mishap
on oil installations. and accident frequency goes down. The oil
One of the tasks is to
turn the raft over.
industry today is probably the industry
where the safety requirements are greatest.
But the Norwegian society could earn more
by reducing accident levels than on what it
gets back from the oil industry in the form
of taxes and duties.
Basic to the safety philosophy as it is
found in 1988 at Ekofisk is prevention. An
everyday reality on oil installations in the intense preventive effort is taking place on
Norwegian sector of the North Sea. the technical side with frequent and regular
inspections and replacement programs.
Preparedness There are many years of experience on
Great advancement has been made in the which to build, and it is to a great degree
level of safety on the installations in the possible to foresee the need to replace
Ekofisk area since operations began. Safety equipment. Thus it is possible with a high
too is a result of a learning process both for degree of certainty to say where the
the organization and for the individual bottlenecks are.
152 employee. Mishaps and accidents seem Intensive programs in training and
motivation for the individual employee are Posters are utilized in
safety campaigns at
also going on. If employees are not Ekofisk.
safety-conscious and able to «think safety*
before they carry out an operation, sound
technical systems are to little avail. During
the 1980's a number of safety campaigns
and programs have been implemented to
inspire absolutely everyone working at
Ekofisk, the base in Tananger, in Oslo,
Emden and Teesside to «think safety*. These
apply both to the work situation and to the
home.
The home, moreover, is the place where
most accidents occur. The motivation
program has borne fruit — both among
Phillips' own employees and among the
many contractors and their employees who
are an important part of Ekofisk operations.
Various types of safety meetings,
recording of near-accidents and minor
injuries, and awards for working without
injury over longer periods have been
introduced. One of the systems for Phillips' D E I E R DI N S I K K E R H E T VI S N A K K E R OM
IT'S YOUR SAFETY WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
own employees is an award for every time
all the employees have worked 1 million (Norwegian air ambulance service). In
working hours without injury leading to addition to being a fine award for the
a lost work day. The award takes the form individual, this gift helps maintain the
of a gift to every employee - preferably important medical preparedness for which
safety-related gifts, often aimed at the that institution stands.
employee's family. One example is Since 1985, all Phillips employees have
membership in Norsk Luftambulanse been members, and in 1987 the company
The safety program
at Phillips not only
concerns people at
Ekofisk but
employees at the
Tananger Base as
well. Here a digital
board in the
reception area at the
main office shows
how many working
hours have passed
without an accident
leading to a lost day
on the job. When the
employees complete
one million hours,
each one receives a
safety award from
the company.

153
 All platforms with
living quarters have
a sick bay and a
medic. The medics
often have special
training in acute
medicine, in order to
handle the
emergencies. The
medics can always
contact an "oil
physician" on duty
onshore who can
advise as to
treatment until the
patient is sent ashore.

could hand over to the institution a check Helicopter Preparedness

for close to a half-million kroner for
membership in 1988.
Out on the platforms an organization has
been built up of Safety and Security
representatives, whose job it is to prevent
mishaps and accidents. They must approve
all work assignments that contain an
element of danger.
They shall also, on their own initiative,
see to it that the preparedness of the built-in
safety systems and routines is always first
class. Thanks to this organization, today
there is a Safety and Security representative
for every 11 employees out on the field.
On each platform there is also a medic
and a sick bay equipped to provide acute
medical aid. The medics are often specially
trained in acute medicine and are well
prepared to handle crisis situations. In their
everyday work, they are assigned tasks
related to preventive hygiene among those
who are working offshore. This work, plus
the work environment in general, has
become of steadily increasing importance
for the medics. Both the medics and the
Safety & Security representatives have been
a part of the crew at Ekofisk since early in
the 1970's, but the scope and quality of the
services have improved, based on the
experience gained since production start-up.
Both of these groups have support sections
within onshore operations which assist with
technical guidance.
154
Since 1981 special helicopters have been
included in the permanent readiness
program at Ekofisk. The Search & Rescue
(SAR) service has become an important
cornerstone in the total preparedness
program. Up until the end of 1985/early
1986, a Bell 212 helicopter was equipped for
this special service, but then it was decided
that two machines should be part of the
readiness program. The helicopters are
specially equipped with technical aids and a
lift, which allow them to carry out rescue
operations in the area very effectively. It has
been proven on several occasions that the
24-hour preparedness has also been very
valuable for shipping in the area. In the case
of shipwrecks, the helicopters have been
able to haul up the crew soon after the
emergency signals have been received.
Along with the standing readiness of the
military, with helicopters onshore, the SAR
service is among the most effective that can
be utilized today. With the long travel time
from onshore bases to the Ekofisk area,
having the special Search & Rescue service
helicopters reduces waiting time from hours
to only a few minutes when assistance is
needed.
 An advanced search
system has been
installed in the
helicopters to
facilitate the search
for people in the sea
under difficult
weather conditions.

Rescue helicopters
are a vital part of the
contingency at
Ekofisk. In 1988,
there are two such
helicopters at the
field.

155
 Organization under
Rapid Expansion
Since 1964 when Fred Terry came to live in
Oslo as Phillips' only employee in Norway,
there has been a fantastic development
within the company's organization. The
discovery of Ekofisk in December 1969 —
and the decision to develop the field —
transformed Phillips from an exploration
team to an operating organization.
The company's organizational position in
relation to the parent company in
Bartlesville, Oklahoma has also changed
significantly. From being a small section of
the company's Europe-Africa Division,
directed from London, the organization in
Norway has become a division in its own
right and one of the most important
cornerstones in the concern.
The transformation from being a small
exploration department to becoming one of
the largest operators on the Norwegian
continental shelf is reflected in all areas of
the organization: size, depth, complexity,
physical need for office and base space, etc.
In this chapter we will be looking at the
organizational development up to 1988 —
and some of its most important functions in
relation to the platforms at Ekofisk.
The Organizational Development
Phillips' head office in Norway was located
in Oslo until September 1976. That was
when the head office was moved to
Tananger. The «main event» in the activity
in Norway as a whole, the development of
Ekofisk, dominated to the extent that the
move was a natural one. Up until 1976 the
formal responsibility for Phillips'
exploration activity in Sweden and
Denmark was also in the hands of the
156 managing director at the Oslo office.
It was also natural that, when Phillips was
setting up operations in Norway, the
nation's capital was chosen to house the
head office. The need for close contact with
the central Norwegian authorities in
connection with the application for and
awarding of production licenses, and the
resulting start-up and breaking-in period, led
to Oslo's being the logical choice. From
Fred Terry's one-man office in 1964, the
staff grew steadily. Three times it became
necessary to move into larger office facilities
so as to have room for everyone. As one of
the first companies to become an operator,
Phillips had its own geology, geophysics
and engineering departments located in
Oslo to direct the exploration on the
Norwegian shelf. Up until late 1973/early
1974, there was only a base operation in
Stavanger, related to the exploration
activity and the Ekofisk development.
In 1973/74 the «Ekofisk Region» was
formed. This organizational unit had the
responsibility for production license 018 —
exploration and development tasks in that
which is known as the Ekofisk area.
The head office in Oslo directly
administered all the activity outside of 018.
Even though the Ekofisk Region was
formally under the auspices of the head
office in Oslo, the manager of the Ekofisk
Region reported directly to the head of
Phillips' Europe/Africa Division in London.
This was a result of the great dimensions
involved in the development of the Ekofisk
area. The head office for the activities in
Norway, and for Sweden and Denmark as
well, was directly responsible to
Europe/Africa Exploration in London.
The responsibility for activities in

Norway actually continued to be shared
between Oslo and Stavanger all the way up
till 1981 when the Norwegian division was
established.
The Ekofisk Region
The growth in the Phillips organization in
Stavanger occurred, naturally enough,
simultaneously with the phases in the
development of the Ekofisk area. During the
first years, from 1965 to 1969, the job was
strictly one of exploration. In addition to
administration, involving a few people
onshore, Phillips representatives were
needed out on the rig. There was also a
warehouse function at the onshore base in
Dusavik near Stavanger.
This organization functioned until the
resolution came regarding development.
Then the situation was totally changed, and
the company had to start building up an
organization to cover all aspects of the
operation. Momentum was gained in 1973
when the company began to recruit its own
In 1981 the
employees at
Phillips' main office
at Tananger moved
into a new, modern,
14,000 square meter
office building. The
building houses
around 700 persons.
In addition to offices,
there is also a large
cafeteria with an
outdoor area.
employees to run the platforms at Ekofisk.
Up to that point, the work during the
construction period had been carried out for
the most part by hired contractors. The
further development of the organization
occurred mostly then in connection with the
preparation of new platforms for production
start-up. This was a continuing characteristic
until 1981.
Within the onshore organization the
same thing occurred — greater activity
offshore meant more support and follow-up
work at the Tananger base. As time went
by, the administrative work previously
handled in London and Bartlesville was also
transferred to Norway — and in September
1976 the head office function that had been
located in Oslo during the early years was
moved to Tananger. Remaining in Oslo was
a small but important group whose job it is
to maintain contact with the central
Norwegian authorities.
Within the onshore organization it also
became necessary to increase the number of 157

The chart shows the departments because of the scope of
historical
development within
operations at Ekofisk. One example was the
hiring for Phillips as establishment of a Public Affairs
operator. From 1973 department.
numbers increased
rapidly until 1980,
The developmental characteristic of the
when growth leveled organization can best be described as one of
off. The percentage of continual growth - interspersed with great
American employees
fell drastically leaps in the number of employees as a result
during the period of new fields coming on stream. In addition
1973-1987. there has been a steady Norwegianization of
the staff throughout the period. The need
for American expertise decreased gradually
as the Norwegian employees gained
sufficient experience. The same is true on
the manager levels — an ongoing
Norwegianization, greatest offshore.
The Personnel Development
In 1966, Phillips in Norway had 12
employees, 8 in Oslo and 4 in Stavanger. In
the years that followed, there was
somewhat of an increase in the numbers, but
It was particularly in
connection with
it was not until 1973 that there was any real
production start-up recruiting program. That occurred in
for Phase III preparation for production start-up on
platforms that the
increase in manning
platforms 2/4A, 2/4B, 2/4FTP, 2/4Q, 2/4C
occurred. and 2/4T (the Tank). In 1973 manpower
3000
I Expatriates
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
numbers increased to 315, 2/3 of whom
were Norwegian employees. The number of
employees that year was distributed equally
between on- and offshore. The base
development was under way.
The following year Phillips grew by 212
employees — mostly offshore. The
percentage of Norwegians in the
organization rose from 58 to 70 during the
course of 1974. The problems experienced
by the Norwegian merchant marine as a
result of the oil crisis during the winter of
1973-74 were now beginning to leave their
mark on the bulk of applicants. Eight days
on the job and eight days at home with a lot
of leisure time were welcome changes for
seamen not accustomed to seeing their
families for three to six months at a time.
Experienced machinists and first mates
would prove to be the stock of the
production operators at Ekofisk during the
years to come. That skilled seamen with
deck experience were hired is an important
factor.
In March 1974 the first known manpower
prognosis for the company was made. It
states rather categorically that: «The
manpower total in all areas of operation will
be lower than today's 527 employees when
the construction phase is over.»
By the end of 1975 Phillips had begun to be
recognized as a strong employer — the tenth
largest in Rogaland County.
The preparations for start-up in Phase III
— the satellite fields — led Phillips into a very
active recruiting phase in 1976. During the
course of a two-year period, the number of
employees doubled, and the prognosis said
that «an evaluation of future growth

indicates that we will total 1100 employees
in the spring of 1977 — and we will reach a
peak of 1400 employees in 1980.» Six years
prior to the company's peak year, the
prognoses missed their mark by over 80%.
The employee count reached the 1000
mark in 1976, and it was the Maintenance
section that showed the greatest growth.
Advertisements for mechanics, electricians,
roustabouts and painters brought in over
100 applicants per day at the highest point —
and the hiring process began to take on the
characteristics of an «assembly line»,
according to Svein E. Abrahamsen, then
Industrial Relations representative in charge
of recruiting. «We hired 425 on the
Norwegian payroll in 1976 - and had the
feeling we had just begun,* he says.
The pressure on the recruiting group
continued. In 1977, 493 new employees
were hired after 967 had been in for
interviews. Ninety percent of those who
were offered jobs accepted. The number of
applicants for each position varied from 10
to nearly 100.
Phillips had difficulty recruiting
Norwegian civil engineers in the
mid-1970's. Company management began
In late 1977/early
1978, Phillips
launched a big
recruiting campaign
to increase the staff
of engineers. The
campaign was
successful, and many
of the company's key
personnel on the
technical side were
employed at that
time.
to wonder whether it was even possible to
hire the number of experienced civil
engineers required for the immediate future.
An effort had to be made — and in late
1977/early 1978 Phillips started an
aggressive recruiting campaign. Big ads
announced that the company needed
thirty-two civil and other engineers with
experience. The campaign brought
surprisingly positive results as around two
hundred qualified applicants turned up.
If we look at the manager level on the
technical side of the organization, we will
find many who were employed after that
large-scale recruiting program: Helge
Volland and Trond Rese — offshore
managers at Ekofisk in 1988, Rolf Wiborg —
engineering manager, Kjell J0rgensen and
Hans Anvik — section managers.
The company's biggest year in the area of
personnel growth was 1978. As many as
563 new people were employed that year.
In each of the months of April and June,
over 70 people were hired. The majority of
these were hired for the Maintenance
section, but both Engineering and
Administration onshore were now
experiencing strong growth - with 40 and 159
 36, respectively, during the year.
On I January 1979, only 22% of the
Norwegians in the company were employed
onshore. A new recruiting campaign was
initiated, and Phillips sought sixty new
people for the Engineering and
Management Information Services (data
processing) departments. During 1979, five
hundred new employees were received into
the organization — and during the three-year
period from 1979 through 1981, the number
of Norwegians employed onshore was
doubled. In January 1982 there were 2566
permanent employees at Phillips Petroleum
Company Norway. The offshore
organization was then about to culminate,
since all the fields had been developed — and
the next increase in this area occurred in
connection with startup on 2/4K, the water
injection platform. Similarly, the regulations
concerning working hours which became
effective on 1 January 1987 required that a
few new positions be filled, but the point of
saturation appeared to have been reached.
The Norwegianization Process
«Norwegianization» was neither a concept
of interest nor a defined goal in connection
with the oil activity in Norway during the
earliest period. There were very few
Norwegians with experience in oil
exploration and production, and the
international oil companies brought in their
own people to fill the expert and managerial
functions.
Phillips brought in their employees from
the U.S.A. or from other areas of
international activity. For all practical
purposes there were Americans in all the
managerial functions those first years. One
exception was Anders O. Waale at the Oslo
office who, as the first Norwegian on board,
was made vice president of the company
back in 1973.
But the process was under way. The
Norwegian employees represented a
steadily growing portion of the total
manpower. By the end of 1987, the
Norwegianization process in the offshore
organization was nearly complete. 99.48
percent of all whose place of work was
Ekofisk were on the Norwegian payroll. In
the total organization at that time, 96
percent were Norwegian. It is at least as
pleasant to note that the Norwegianization
lOO has also been strong at the manager level —
72 percent of these positions were held by
Norwegians at the close of 1987.
There was a total of 2489 permanent
employees at Phillips by the end of 1987. In
addition, there was the all-German staff
numbering 76 at the Emden terminal
reporting to Tananger. In Teesside there
were 277 employees in the all-British staff
also reporting to Norway.
The development in the
Norwegianization process has been due to a
combination of natural development and a
strong desire on the part of the Norwegian
authorities. In 1980 the authorities gave
clear signals to the effect that a
Norwegianization process was desirable. Its
aim would be to build up Norwegian
expertise within the oil industry, and help
the foreign operators become better
adapted to a Norwegian industrial and
economic environment. However, this
would take time. If we go back to the end of
the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's,
the market for Norwegian petroleum
experts was very tight. There were many
companies in the same situation, competing
for the qualified employees. The limited
access to this expertise was also combined
with increased activity on the exploration
front, with the opening of the shelf north of
the 62nd parallel.
Phillips has never wanted to force the
Norwegianization process to the degree
that the company might have the
misfortune of promoting employees on the
basis of their nationality — and not on the
basis of their knowledge and experience.
That would profit neither the individual, the
company nor the authorities. Thus it takes
time to develop employees who can step
into leadership positions - both technically
and administratively.
The big breakthrough in the process on
the technical side occurred in 1984 when
Knut Am was appointed the first
Norwegian offshore manager with
responsibility for production and
maintenance on the 24 platforms in the
Ekofisk area. As a result of this appointment,
the starting signal was fired for the really
big Norwegianization process at Phillips.
Since then Knut Am has become vice
president and managing director, while Rolf
Wiborg took over the important
Engineering Department as its manager.
Contributing to the fact that the
 From an almost
all-American start
within Phillips'
activities in Norway,
Norwegian
employees now
dominate on all
levels of the
organization. This is
especially true at
Ekofisk where in
1988 the
Norwegianization
process can be said to
be complete.

Norwegianization process gathered
headway in 1984-85 was a large-scale early
retirement program which Phillips
implemented worldwide. At the same time
as many expatriates in leading positions
were taking retirement, many Norwegians
were ready with experience and ability to
step into the top jobs.
Base Expansion
When telling the story about Phillips'
establishment in Stavanger, it is tempting to
draw a comparison with the company's
founder, Frank Phillips. He started his career
as a barber. And Phillips' first offices in
Stavanger were in what had previously been
a barber shop. The facilities were taken over
in December 1965 and consisted of an old
house that was situated in the backyard of
Smedvig Tankrederi A/S at Verksgaten 13.
The offices were quite simple, but met the
needs of up to four employees until new
facilities could be moved into in October
1966. The house has now been torn down.
From this starting point, it is possible to
divide the further development into three
main phases. Typical for each phase was the
fact that the newly acquired facilities
gradually proved to be too small, resulting
in the need to set up «satellite offices* of
various types and in various locations in the
local district. 161

11 — Giant Discovery
 The first dynamite
blast at what was to
become the supply
base in Dusavik was
duly photographed.
This u>as the starting
signal for the oil
activity onshore in
Stavanger.

Until 1973, Dusavik

was the main base
for the activity that
supported the
operations at
Ekofisk. This
combined warehouse
and office building
then became too
small, and the main
office was moved to
Tananger.
The Dusavik Base - 1966-1973
The contract for Phillips' first base of
operations in Norway was signed with
Smedvig Tankrederi on 25 April 1966. The
contract included the leasing of outdoor
storage and quay areas plus a newly
constructed combination warehouse - and -
office building of relatively modest
dimensions, compared with the standards of
that time. The area leased was located at
Dusavik, near Stavanger, and was the first
establishment on what would become one
of the district's two large supply bases for
the oil activity. It was from this base that the
drilling operations resulting in the discovery
of Ekofisk were served.
The contract for the area at Dusavik
would expire in 1981, but Dusavik
functioned as the main base for the activities
162 in the Stavanger area only until 1973.
When growth within the organization
picked up momentum in 1973, the facilities
at Dusavik became too small, and additional
space was leased. There was obviously a
great deal of creativity involved, as facilities
were utilized in a soap factory and a Chinese
restaurant, as well as in the bar and other
parts of the Alstor Hotell in Stavanger.
Many of the people who were hired in 1973
probably remember that their interviews
were held at Atlantic Hotel.
The Phillips Base - 1973-1981
An establishment of sorts occurred in 1972
at Aker Norsco's base at Risavika near
Tananger, but it was not until 1973 that the
main base for Ekofisk operations moved
from Dusavik and the so-called H-building
began to be used. The contract with Aker
Norsco, which was signed in the summer of
1972, included rental of an outdoor storage
area, quay, warehouse, canteen and office
building — in other words, a complete base.
Each of the buildings was specially
constructed for its use. The contract gave
Phillips the opportunity to buy the base at a
later point, and this was done in the summer
of 1979.
Between 1973 and the present, there has
also been the need, in varying degrees, for
Phillips to lease both warehouse and office
facilities from Aker Norsco. This has either
been in the form of temporary office
barracks or permanent buildings.
From 1973 to 1976, the exploration
activity with «Ocean Viking» continued to
be handled from the Dusavik base. Then the
contract with the rig expired, and the
activities that were still necessary were
moved to Tananger. Due to the shortage of
space in Tananger, the Training Department
was moved to Dusavik. Thus the Dusavik
base was the Training Center until 1981.
The space shortage also made it
necessary for a long time to lease facilities
all around the Stavanger area. This became a
steadily growing problem, so in 1978
planning got under way for a considerable
expansion of the base in Tananger.
The Phillips Base from 1981
The new building was formally dedicated in
August 1981. It had gradually begun to be
used as of December 1980. After the new
building was finished, a complete rebuilding
of the old H-building was undertaken, so
that it would be of the same standard as the
new one.
The new building represented a
In 1973, Phillips'
onshore organization
moved into the H
building in
Tananger. The base
was part of the Aker
Norsco base, but the
lease gave Phillips
the option to
purchase the area.
This was done in
1979.
significant improvement in working
conditions for many employees, and it
contributed to increased efficiency by
bringing large sections of the organization
together under one roof.
It was intended that these buildings
should cover Phillips' needs for office space
- with the exception of the E & C branch.
However, it was clear before the building
was occupied that this would not be the
case. For the most part, though, they did
manage to get along without leasing
facilities outside of Tananger.
At the end of 1981, in order to handle the

The H building in
Tanangersoon
became too small,
and a new office
building was
inaugurated in 1981.
The old H building
was then modernized
and built into the
new one. In 1988 the
company has at its
disposal approx.
20,000 square meters
of office space,
10,000 square meters
of storage facilities,
and an 850 square
meter workshop in
Tananger..

163
 development within the supply services to
Ekofisk, Phillips signed an agreement with
Aker Norsco for the construction of a larger
and more modern warehouse. This building
- plus connecting offices — was occupied in
late 1982/early 1983, and it is regarded as a
model construction within its area of usage.
In 1983 the green light was given for the
water injection project at Ekofisk. As a result
of this, there was a need for more office
space for the E & C division. It was
important to get started as soon as possible,
and three months after the contract with
Aker Norsco was signed, the new building
on «the hill» in Tananger was finished.
In 1988 Phillips has at their disposal in
the Stavanger area 20,000 m2 of office
space, 10,000 m2 of warehouse space, and
850 m2 of workshop space in Tananger. In
addition there is the Oslo office on
Munkedamsveien.
The Base Function
In 1988 the Phillips base in Tananger
functions both as head office for the
company's activities in Norway and as
supply base for the 25 platforms in the
Ekofisk area.
The activities in Tananger can be divided
into two main functions: base and supply
operations and the administrative and
organizational management of the Ekofisk
area.
There are approximately 750 employees
in Tananger — around 150 of whom are
involved in the base and supply aspect of
the activities. The other 600 are working
with tasks that support the operations at
Ekofisk in other ways. We find technical
sections that function as developmental
departments for corresponding sections out
on the various platforms - and we find
independent departments involved with
other tasks that an operator is obligated to
carry out. The largest departments today
are Engineering and Management
Information Services, both of which have
well over 100 employees. Management
Information Services is, moreover, a part of
the Financial Branch, which is also a very
important and central part of the
organization. E & C also makes a good
showing, but the organization varies in size
according to the projects on which they are
164
lO4 working at a given time. This branch is its
own independent organizational unit,
reporting directly to headquarters in
Bartlesville. The branch functions as a
detached consultant for the operator on
larger projects.
When an organization grows to the size
of Phillips, it is impossible to keep from
building up a rather extensive
administration. Not only does the
operational support for the around 1600
persons working out on the field require
administration; there are also the constantly
increasing requirements from the authorities
for the company to report on and discuss
various tasks.
Supply and Transportation
Services
The platforms out in the North Sea are small
communities where a lot of different
supplies are needed in order for everything
to function on an everyday basis. One
aspect of this service is that which can
briefly be categorized as food and drink.
The other aspect is the whole spectrum of
material needed in order for the production
technology to function as it must.
At the base there is an organization of
about 150 persons engaged in seeing to it
that the platforms have what they need -
and organizing the transportation back and
forth between Ekofisk and the base. This
organization can roughly be divided into
two sections: the purchasing and contract
section and the warehouse section. These
two sections complement each other, and
the purchasing and contract section steps in
when the items or spare parts requested are
not available in the warehouse. The onshore
stock of spare parts contains approximately
23,000 different articles, at a total value of
140 million kroner. Today all the steps in
this process are set up for automation and
extensive use of data processing systems.
The platforms can order parts from the base
via computer terminals.
About 100 purchase orders, on the
average, are handled every day — which
says something about the extent of this part
of the operation. In addition there is a
special mechanical shop which is part of this
organization. Equipment that comes in for
repairs is checked out here first, to see if it
can be fixed locally - before the equipment
is eventually sent on. Furthermore, equipment
that has been purchased is inspected in the An ultramodern
warehouse building
shop to ensure that it is in working order provides for an
before it is sent out to the platforms. effective supply
Almost every day there is a supply boat service to the
platforms at Ekofisk,
leaving the base in Tananger, setting out on The stock of spare
the 12-hour trip to the Ekofisk area. The parts consists of
boats are loaded with containers, and the approx. 23,000
different articles at a
tanks on board are filled up with water and value of NOK 140
fuel. In 1988 there are three supply boats in million.
the shuttle traffic back and forth between
Tananger and Ekofisk - and between the
various platforms out on the field.
The development has consistently gone
in the direction of fewer and larger boats,
and the three trafficking the stretch today Before being shipped
have a dead weight of from 2500 to 3200 to Ekofisk, the
tons. They are equipped with four side deliveries are checked
thoroughly at the
propellers, which makes them easy to base. Computer
maneuver when they are being positioned systems ensure that
for loading and unloading next to the the orders from the
platforms are quickly
platforms. They have 5000-6000 filled.
horsepower engines and can do 14-15
knots. The crew of 11 work shifts of four
weeks on board and four weeks onshore.
In 1985 a total of 322,000 tons of goods
were transported to Ekofisk, while the total
for the previous year was 277,000 tons. In
1985 the supply boats had to make 330 trips
between Tananger and Ekofisk to keep the
platforms supplied.

Small Boats in Trouble

A large and
There were no Norwegian supply boats
comprehensive stock
when the activity started at Ekofisk. The of casing and
first ships to be put into the traffic were built production pipes is
necessary at the base.
on the basis of experience from the Gulf of
Mexico and sailed under British, German,
and Dutch flags. Danish boats were also
involved early on.
The first two supply boats Phillips leased
were the «West Shore* and the «Kent Shore*,
both flying the British flag. These two were
typical of that first generation of supply
boats, and compared with today's boats
they were small craft. The dead weight was
less than 700 tons, and the horsepower was
not particularly impressive either. The
engine power was 1700 and the side
propeller had 150 horsepower. Also
characteristic was the fact that the deck
space was quite small, and the boats were
often built with a freeboard of one-half
meter. All the sacks of supplies were stacked
on the deck on loose pallets, and the crew
often had a tough job of it when all that had
to be transferred to rigs and platforms out 165
 "West Shore" was there occurred a gradual replacement of the
one of the first
supply boats in
old, smaller vessels with larger and more
Ekofisk traffic. It modern ones. Greater engine power, more
was registered in side propellers, and higher freeboard were
England, and was a
little less than 700
among the features that came onto the
tons. "West Shore" market with the Norwegian boats.
was shipwrecked
near "Gulftide" on 6
January 1971. All
Peak Activity
onboard were During the most hectic phase toward the
rescued. end of the 1970's, Phillips had as many as 29
supply boats under charter at the same time.
The boat market was overflooded.
Therefore the pattern was to operate with a
permanent minimum tonnage under
long-term contract — usually one to two
years — and go out on the market when
The job onboard the there was a need for extra tonnage.
supply boats could be
very rough when the In order to be able to handle the supply
weather acted up. service, two supply boats were usually
This photo from leased for each rig. One of the vessels was
1974 shows clearly
that working on deck used as a kind of stand-by vessel for the rig
under such while the other one went in to pick up
conditions is no supplies. Then the returning boat took over
laughing matter.
the readiness service after having been
unloaded. With this arrangement the boats
were out at sea for long periods and in at
on the field. The fact that the boats were shore for short periods. (As a rule, the
equipped with only one side propeller also vessels were loaded/unloaded onshore
made it very difficult to keep the boat at all regardless of the time of night or day that
steady. When the weather was at its worst they arrived, then sent right out to the field
during the fall and winter storms, there was again. The crew remained on board for six
a great risk of being washed overboard. The weeks, then had three weeks off.)
crew could be standing in water up to their In 1979 and 1980 the supply service
waists while attempting to get the boat reached its peak with 421,000 and 427,000
unloaded, and more than once the load was tons, respectively, of total goods. This was a
ruined by the volumes of water washing culmination of the steady increase since the
over the deck. start of construction on the permanent
There was remarkably little interest in platforms.
supply boats on the part of Norwegian
"Safe Truck" loads shipowners during those first years. The
containers at P probable reason for this was that the oil
platform in 1984. activity was regarded as uncertain, and
Compared with
"West Shore", "Safe times were good within traditional
Truck" has, among Norwegian shipping. When discoveries
other things, a bigger were made in the North Sea, and at the same
engine and better
maneuverability. time there was a period of depression within
traditional shipping, the interest picked up.
With Norwegian experience from fishing
and shipping, it was natural that new
constructions intended for the supply boat
trade were developed with North Sea
conditions in mind. New, modern boats —
second generation boats — came on the
market in the 1970's, and Phillips leased
their first Norwegian supply boat in 1972.
166 That was the «West Eagle». After that time,
 Being on a supply
boat at Ekofisk can
be tough even in "our
time". "Normand
Skipper" struggles
against the weather
— with the Edda
platform in the
background.

During the early

During the early period the traffic was years at Ekofisk the
not only between Ekofisk and Stavanger, cargo was placed on
but also between Ekofisk and English pallets on deck -
very vulnerable to
harbors — Great Yarmouth in particular. damage. This is now
Phillips had a collection area there for much avoided by the use of
of the equipment that would be transported containers.
out to the new platforms at Ekofisk.

Helicopters
The transporting of people to and from the
platforms in the Ekofisk area has since day
one primarily been via helicopter. We recall
Ingvar Bjornevik's narrative on the first trip
from «Ocean Viking* to Teesside, with an
open helicopter doorway that resulted in his
having to sit and keep the baggage from
falling out. That was when the rig was
located on the British continental shelf. As
soon as the «Ocean Viking» came over on
the Norwegian side of the North Sea
boundary line, Helikopter Service took over
the transportation to and from the rig.
When the «Gulftide» was on location toward
the end of 1970, Helikopter Service had four
Sikorsky S61's in the North Sea personnel
traffic. There wasn't much traffic, compared
with later years — four/five trips per week,
according to Kjell Rott. He heads up the
group in the Transportation section with
responsibility for helicopters in 1988. In
1970 he was part of the crew on the
«Gulftide» when it came on the scene.
During that first period, transportation of
personnel between the various rigs and
work barges out on the field was by supply
boat - and with personnel baskets as
elevators. At the beginning of 1971, a Bell
204 machine was leased by Phillips, so it
took over the job. Since then it has primarily
been in fog situations that the supply boats
out on the field have had to take over for
the helicopters as «local buses*. Helicopter
transportation increased on a level with the
activity out on the field. The Sikorsky
machines were the work horses to and from
Ekofisk, while the Bell 204 was replaced by
the «Jet Ranger* and supplemented by the
Bell 212 in internal (shuttle) traffic at
Ekofisk.
After the helicopter accident in 1973, 167
 A Sikorsky 56 IN
unloads passengers
on 2/4H platform.
This type of
helicopter used to be
the work horse in the
North Sea traffic.
However, accidents
in the 1970s
prompted a search
for alternatives — the
results being the
Boeing 234 Chinook
and Super Puma
helicopters.

500.000
The chart shows the transportation. Helikopter Service has
helicopter traffic Forus — Ekofisk
Shuttle gradually invested in more Sikorsky
between Forus
Heliport and Ekofisk
400.000 machines, and in 1988 the company has 19
— and internal at its disposal.
shuttling on the field, When transportation needs were at peak
in terms of numbers
of passengers. The
300.000 levels in 1979, Phillips had 17 departures
peak was reached in daily from Forus Heliport to Ekofisk. During
1978-79. In 1978 morning hours, these machines went like
approx. 500,000 200.000
passengers were buses at 15-minute intervals.
transported. Normally a Sikorsky S61 can take 13
passengers to Ekofisk, but weather
conditions make it necessary to calculate the
number of passengers and load size prior to
each departure on the basis of fuel reserves,
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 temperature and wind conditions. In the
Until 1983, the worst instance, it was only possible to carry
Sikorsky S61N IS61
• Boeing
three passengers on the 11/2 hour trip out
dominated Ekofisk
traffic. In 1983 the ei Super Puma to the Ekofisk Complex.
Boeing Chinook was 6000 The great amount of traffic to and from
put into service — Ekofisk causes big problems when the fog
and as of 1984 this 5000
two rotor helicopter sets in — and it particularly makes itself felt
took over most of the in the spring and fall seasons. For as many as
4000
traffic. In 1984 the three days the fog can lie and make all traffic
French Super Puma
was also introduced. impossible. Then the crews waiting to go
After a close call on out have to be put up in hotels and boarding
1 May 1987, the houses in the Stavanger area. If it happens in
Chinook was
grounded, but was the middle of the week, it can be a problem,
back in traffic again and Kjell Rott recalls that it was necessary to
toward the end of the go all the way to Moi (nearly halfway to
year. In 1987, the
Ekofisk traffic 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Kristiansand) to find a vacancy.
constituted 43 When the fog lifts again, it becomes
percent of Helikopter Helikopter Service had only three Sikorskys necessary to fly at full capacity in order to
Service's total
offshore activity. left. The traffic was so heavy by then that bring the situation back into balance. The
they couldn't handle it. In addition to greatest number of flights required after just
Ekofisk, Frigg was in the midst of its such a fog situation was 47 by Sikorskys
construction phase, and there was extensive from Forus to Ekofisk.
exploration activity on the Norwegian shelf.
Therefore the offshore working period for New Helicopters
the crews was increased by one day, from After the helicopter accidents in 1977 and
168 seven to eight days, to lessen the need for 1978, Helikopter Service began to
cooperate with a number of operators, 2/4K platform almost brought about a
including Phillips, to find types of return to the conditions of the «old days*. A
helicopters that could replace the Sikorsky. total of 68,235 passengers were flown out
It was concluded that the Boeing BV234 during that year, while 175,978 were moved
Chinook and the French Super Puma could between the platforms. With these figures in
be used. Helikopter Service has purchased mind, it is easy to understand that the traffic
both of these models. The choice for Ekofisk coordinators in the tower on 2/4H have
use was the Boeing Chinook. This more then enough to keep themselves
helicopter, which has been used by the occupied. It is not unusual for one helicopter
military for over 20 years, had in its civilian to be on the platform's helideck while two
model a seating capacity of 44 — later others wait in line in the air for opportunity
modified to 40 — and great fuel capacity. to land. The helicopters hover in a steady
This has made the scheduling of traffic to stream — especially in the morning, at
Ekofisk easier and more flexible. Fewer midday, and in the evening, in connection
flights mean fewer flying hours and thus with the three regular shuttle periods. Then
increased safety. In addition, the three there are two Bell 212's in flight in order to
helicopters of this type owned by
Flying in a helicopter
Helikopter Service have such a great over the North Sea
capacity that it is possible to catch up during the summer
quickly after a fog situation. can be a hot
experience. The
survival suit, which
Records all passengers have
The record year for traffic to and from to wear, is
uncomfortably
Ekofisk was 1979. That year 75,510 warm. Particularly
passengers were flown the distance. Out on in the older
the field 365,560 persons were transported helicopters without
air conditioning,
between the platforms. The figures can passengers can begin
compare with any medium-sized Norwegian to feel "cooked".
airport. The year 1987 was also a busy one.
The jack-up project and the construction of
The tower on 2/4H
is a busy work site.
In 1987 alone,
68,235 passengers
were flown to and
from Ekofisk. On the
specially designed
helideck is a Boeing
BV234 Chinook
which can take 40
(44) passengers.

169
 The Ekofisk
communications
center is located on
the Tank. At right
we see the satellite
antenna — while the
two antennae at
left are
troposcatters that
handle the
communication
to Cod, B-U.H-7,
Emden and Teesside.

handle the traffic. Sometimes a Sikorsky is a satellite station, equipment for data
machine also comes out from Forus to lend processing control, over-horizon radio
assistance. This flight is called the (otherwise normally found in military
«champagne flighb, since it leaves Forus at systems), radar, electronic telephone
4:30 a.m in order to be at Ekofisk in time for exchanges, video systems, laser beam radar,
the morning shuttle to begin. etc. In other words, Ekofisk conceals one of
the world's greatest offshore
Communication communication systems.
Both at Ekofisk and at the base in Tananger Parallel with the flood of oil and gas
there is a group of highly qualified workers through the pipe systems between the
who are involved with anything but oil and platforms, to Teesside, and to Emden, there
gas. Computer technology and electronics is an invisible «pipe system» with a «flood»:
are their main occupation. At Ekofisk there of talking via telephones, of data between
computers, of words from word processors
and telex machines. Around the clock the
The communication reports go between the platforms, Emden,
flow between Ekofisk
and Tananger is
Tananger, and Teesside - whether «riding»
handled by a satellite on radio waves directed toward the satellite
in orbit more than platforms from the Ekofisk Complex, or
36,000 km over the
Equator. The signals
«shot» out from Ekofisk toward a target no
to and from the base larger than a car, located 36,000 kilometers
in Tananger go via above the Equator. This point is a so-called
Ihe ground station at
Eik. geostationary satellite which sends
messages back down to the ground station
near Moi and on to Tananger, or to the tower
at Sola airport, for example.
When a helicopter lands and takes off
from Ekofisk, Sola is notified by satellite.
Flight control at Ekofisk maintains radio
contact with the helicopter and supplies
weather data provided by, among other
things, computers, and laser beam radar on
2/4H which measures cloud altitudes, etc.
The helicopter is navigated by means of
electronic eyes that see small flares, where in
the light is long radio waves. These radio
170 flares, as they are called, are found on most
of the platforms. When the passengers «The world's largest and most advanced
disembark at Ekofisk, a report is sent via the communication system,* was the way many
computer screen and satellite network to the people described the satellite system for
computer center in Tananger. Boats are Ekofisk when it was opened for use. Since
followed by radar located on the Ekofisk then, new fields have been developed and
Tank. Radar waves follow the horizon and new systems put into operation — but
register all movements on the sea within the Ekofisk was the first.
horizon, both day and night, in foggy or fair Nevertheless, probably the greatest
weather. improvement that has taken place for the
Boats can be called up over the radio by employees out at Ekofisk was when they
the «harbor captain* - or the boat were able to get Norwegian TV coverage of
coordinator at Ekofisk. the 1986 world championship in soccer.
On the outlying platforms, it is the radio Before that time they had not been able to
operators who follow the helicopter traffic — receive television signals from the
and boat traffic, if necessary. They have Norwegian mainland, but during the
their radio systems available for summer of 1986 a new satellite was
conversations with sea and air traffic, the employed. Thus it became possible at Ekofisk
Ekofisk Complex, coastal radio stations, etc. to receive news and programs simultaneously
In the case of an accident, when important with the family back home.
messages arid alarms have to be sent, an
electronic alarm system functions and sends
out pre-determined alarm signals. Norwegian television
made its debut at
Ekofisk in 1986, just
before the world
championship in
soccer. Thus ended
the day-old news
reports on video
cassettes. A minor
revolution in the
choice of leisure
activities on the
platform.
At the same lime
Ekofisk also got its
own licensed local
TV, making possible
the local
transmission of its
own programs — as
was done during the
jack-up operation in
1987.

171
 Norway in Miniature
29 February 1988: The alarm has been
sounded at the Ekofisk Complex. A British
drilling rig, the «Santa Fe 135», has broken
loose in the hurricane that is harrying, and it
is drifting from the British sector toward the
Cod platform. Calculations show that it is
drifting right toward the platform and will
be in collision position at about 3:00 in the
afternoon. In the Danish sector, south in the
North Sea, a barge and several fishing boats
are in distress and can be a threat to Danish
oil installations. Compressor platform
B-11 on the gas pipeline is within the range
of visibility from the threatened platforms
and may itself be vulnerable.
Helicopter traffic between Forus and
Ekofisk has been halted on account of the
172
wind. A wind velocity of 60 knots is
maximum for movement to be allowed on
the helidecks.
At Forus, three Sikorsky helicopters are
being readied for evacuation of the Cod
platform. During the morning hours, 19
people are evacuated to the Ula field.
Later that afternoon it becomes clear that
the runaway rig will pass Cod with a 3,000
meter clearance. At the same time, control
has been recovered over the situation in the
Danish sector. In addition to a wind velocity
of up to 78 knots, waves between 40 and 60
feet (12-18 meters) high have been reported.
The emergency center at Sola can begin
to demobilize — the crisis situation is over
without any loss of human life. Out at

Ekofisk the crews can relax — after weather
conditions have once again created tension
and uncertainty. But since the majority of
crew members have many years of
experience out here, the fact that Mother
Nature wants to have her say has become
part of their everyday reality. With the
exception of on Cod, where production was
shut down while the crisis was a possibility,
oil and gas continued to flow up from the
depths despite the weather. That is why the
crews are there - to try to keep production
going around the clock as long as there is no
threat to safety.
The regular workday for everyone out at
Ekofisk is a matter of routines, as at any
other work site. The difference lies in the
environment in which the work assignments
are carried out. The Ekofisk Complex was
christened Ekofisk City early on. At that
time there were only three platforms and a
flare structure that were interconnected.
Today there are nine platforms connected
by bridges. Nearly 1400 meters from flare
to flare. One of the world's largest
concentrations of connected offshore oil
installations. A work site where close to 400
people reside and work around the clock.
12-hour shifts for everyone. There's not so
much to do those 14 days out there — other
than work, eat and sleep. A comprehensive
recreation program has been developed, and
there is a good deal of ingenuity in creating
The control room
operators on the
Ekofisk Tank control
the most important
oil and gas processes
in the Ekofisk
system. The control
room is the "brain"
of the Ekofisk
community.
changes of pace in the everyday activity -
but what the individual looks forward to is,
of course, going home. For 14 days you are
cut off from the outside world, then you
have 3 weeks of free time. Then another trip
out by helicopter and 14 more days
offshore, followed by 4 weeks of free time.
The concentration of working time yields
good returns in the form of leisure time and
togetherness with family and friends, but it
can be plenty hard from time to time being
away from loved ones for 14 days.
Newspapers and television are links with
the Norwegian mainland. In that way it is
possible to keep up with events, so that you
don't have to feel like the world has passed
you by while you were standing still for a
two-week period.
But most of the people thrive at Ekofisk —
yes, very much so. It seems that if you make
it through the first year you're likely to stay

In the middle of the

North Sea - between
Norway and Great
Britain — is Ekofisk.
The endless ocean is
interrupted only by
platforms. Ekofisk
City was the name
journalists gave the
Complex —
indicating a
community with all
the functions
necessary for people
to live and work
here. Almost 1,400
meters from flare to
flare — 9 platforms
interconnected by
bridges.

173
 Catering is
important in an
isolated community.
Oil and gas
platforms are known
for their excellent
food. Chef Willy
Osuldsen and
colleague, Leif
Andreassen served
delicious and
substantial food on
Cad in 1983.
Catering services at
Ekofisk have always
been handled by
contractors.

The cabins are light

and pleasant-like
this one on 2/4K.
Two persons share a
cabin and bathroom.

on. The turnover percentage is extremely
low - so low that it can be a cause for
concern. When you talk with people about
it, there are few who can imagine going
onshore to a regular 8:00 to 4:00 job. «We're
too used to it,» they say.
Furthermore, the salary level is generally
higher than for the same jobs onshore.
Offshore bonus, it's called, and it amounts
174 to about 47%6 over base pay. A standard of
living is established that is not easy to give
up.
Development
To compare conditions on the platforms of
today with the early period would not be
quite fair. It's so easy to say that the way it
is today is the way it always should have
been. It's important to be aware that there is,
at all times and in all places, an ongoing
 Fishing is a natural
leisure activity on the
platforms. The
platforms seem to
have a reef effect
which attracts fish.
Kare Pedersen was in
the habit of fishing
for his dog — and
drying the fish at a
suitable place on
Ekofisk 2/4/1,

Medic Reidun
Thompson on Edda
had great fishing
luck. At the
photographer's
bidding she pulled in
a fish in a matter of
minutes.

Magnus Refsland
and Werner Hein
had no luck this
time. The crab pot
they put out from
B-n, on the gas
pipeline to Emden,
only attracted
starfish - whereas
both crab and lobster
had previously found
their way into the
trap.

175
 Tin's is the way the
"driller" works on
2/4K. There is
plenty to attend to
while the drillbit eats
its way down, foot
by fool through the
formations, toward
I he reservoir. The
drilling at Ekojisk
has always been
carried out by
contractors — and for
several years Aker
has been responsible,
for the activity on
the drill floor.

This is how the drill

floor looks from the
derrick. It's a long
way down — and the
derrickman has an
airy work site. There
have been
improvements in the
equipment used for
drilling — one
example being the
automatic
pipehandling system
now in use on 2/4K.
The fact that the
equipment is of
Norwegian origin
shows that
Norwegian
companies have
something to
contribute in this
field.

176
 The drill bit is on its
way down from
2/4C platform at the
Ekofisk Complex.
On the drill floor the
crew is working full
steam. Length by
length is added to the
drill string — the
formations
containing oil and
gas are approx. 3000
meters down.

177

12 - Giant Discovery
 Technology has
made enormous
progress since the
first platforms were
built. 2/4K, which is
the latest addition at
Ekofisk, is equipped
with ultra-modern
digital control
systems.

Oddbjern
Stangeland had as
development. It is up to us to ensure that
his place of work the development is for the better.
booster platform At Ekofisk, as at other work locations,
37/4A until it was
demanned in 1986.
there is the tendency to recall «the good old
The platform, which days». Working conditions, housing
was to ensure that conditions, safety, shift schedules have all
the pressure in the
pipeline enabled
seen an enormous development since the
transportation of early 1970's. This is related not only to a
more than 540,000 general development but also to the natural
barrels of oil per day,
was now
life process that an oil and gas field goes
superfluous. This through. First there is a hectic construction
was already the case phase where most emphasis is on getting
with the other
booster platform —
everything in place, the equipment to
36/22. No one was function, and the platform on stream. Then
let go — everyone comes the more stable operations phase —
was given new jobs
in the Ekofisk area.
before the unavoidable reduction phase
comes along. One day the resources in the
earth begin to diminish; they are not
inexhaustible.
The Ekofisk community will live on for
many decades to come, but it has been
through the first phase — development — and
is currently in the operations phase. This
will last a good way into the next century, and efficiency increased wherever profitable.
but production has been on the decline since The housing conditions in the temporary
1980. quarters cannot be compared with today's
During its life's course thus far there has two-man rooms with private bath. Since the
been a tremendous development. Into what two roommates usually work on opposite
was a rather simple production technology shifts, each person has what amounts to his
the world of data processing has made its own room during his time off. The shift
178 entry, and improvements have been made rotation began with 7 days on the job, 7
Platform Manager
Jan Aasend watches
while heavy lifts are
carried out on 2/4/4.
At age 21 he joined
Phillips as em
operator - and has
made a career with
the company. As
platform manager on
Ekofisk Alpha in
7985, he was in
charge of one of the
biggest producers of
oil and gas in the
Ekofisk area.

A cleaning unit, a
pig, has done Us job
in the pipeline and
has reached the
Ekofisk Complex.
I he pipelines have to
be cleaned regularly
in order for oil or gas
to pass as smoothly
as possible through
the lines. This "pig"
has come to 2/4G
from the Valhall
field - and is taken
out of the receiver by
Operator Helge
Vestad.

179
 days at home. Then it went to 8 days well-known artists. Most of the foregoing
offshore, 8 days free, and now 14 days were non-existent during the first years. The
offshore, three weeks free — 14 days telephone automat that makes it possible to
offshore, four weeks free. The recreation stay in touch with home mustn't be
programs have kept pace: radio, TV, forgotten. Great improvement. The entry of
newspapers, movies, exercise rooms with women into the male community was
sauna, and live entertainment featuring perhaps one of the biggest changes. First the
gals came out as medics and in catering —
The Ekofisk later on they moved into almost all the
community has its
own pastor. Here we
functions. «Bastion» after «bastion» has fallen.
see Trygve Hestnes Despite a certain amount of passive
leading a gathering resistance in the beginning, most people
in the chapel on
2/4H. However,
now agree that this has led to
much of the "oil environmental improvements.
pastor's" workday The environment has also gone through a
consists of meeting
the crews at their job
noticeable change as a result of the
stations on the Norwegianization process. From having
platform. been an almost totally American
environment with infusions of other
In the Cinemu on
2/4H films were
nationalities, where the language was
shown three times a English — it is now a Norwegian milieu.
day until Norwegian Many have come to the conclusion that this
television found its
has made the environment too
way to Ekofisk m
1986. Before TV, one-dimensional, less rich in diversity. But at
films were an the same time it has meant new challenges
important leisure
activity on all the
for Norwegians.
platforms. The film In spite of the Norwegianization, the
screen has now been language at Ekofisk will never be only
replaced by a "wide
screen" and
Norwegian. Oil-related terminology is in
Norwegian English, and the English expressions have
broadcasting's stuck - but now with a more Norwegian
programs, diction. When mixed into a Norwegian
sentence, for outsiders it would sound
completely foreign, but for those who work

The lounge is the

meeting place before
and after work ~ lor
a cup of coffee and
the latest
newspapers.
Newspapers are a
cornerstone of the
recreation program -
and newspapers from
all over Norway find
their way to the
platforms. Albuskjell
1/6A is no exception.

180
The females' entry
into the male society
was met with some
skepticism, but has
been a very positive
experience. Today it
is inconceivable not
to have women
onboard the
platforms. And
bastion after bastion
has fallen. Initially,
women were
employed as medics
and catering
personnel Now they
are found in any
profession. Margaret
"Maggi" Knudsen
went offshore in
1982. Photographer
Arnulf Husmo's
picture of her was
one of four motifs by
him from the oil
activity made into
stamps by the postal
service in 1986.

181
 Coffee breaks are
important when
work is spread out
around the platform
where smoking is
strictly prohibited.
The electricians'
shop, as it is called
on Edda, is a regular
meeting place for
coffee breaks at nine
and three o'clock.
Fresh cakes from the
kitchen are standard
fare.

The radio operators

are also
entertainment
managers. They are
in charge of radio
and music channels
plus video and TV
transmittal. Both
Mindor 1 Hellevik
and Ulf Andreassen
on Albuskjell 2/4F
came to Ekofisk from
the merchant marine.

182
 Welcome to Tor
heliport. The deck is
clear for landing.
This is how Arvid
Hansen - popularly
called Htii-Hansen —
greeted us when we
arrived at the Tor
platform.
Incidentally, he
represents the
veterans on the field
— having worked on
"Ocean Viking" as
night cook.

with it every day it is just as natural as The heliguards on

eating. It takes time for newcomers to
acquire full language proficiency.
The Outlying Platforms
The Ekofisk Complex is large and can seem
alienating. There are so many people there
at one time that it is impossible to get to
know them all. The situation is totally
different on the outlying platforms. There
the crews can vary from 15 (on compressor
platforms B-ll and H-7) to over 100 (on
2/4K). 2/4K probably tends more toward
the Ekofisk Complex than toward the
representative outlying platforms like Cod
and Albuskjell A. On these platforms the
regular crew numbers around 40, but with
great variations over this number during
well workovers or other larger maintenance
operations.
But the number is small enough that
everyone knows everyone and can
interrelate in an informal manner. The rules
on the platform are made accordingly, and
during coffee breaks and in the evenings the
catering personnel can serve up something
extra — which cannot practically be done at
the Ekofisk Complex.
The coffee breaks, moreover, are
institutions at Ekofisk. It doesn't have
2/4H enjoy some
rays of sunshine
before servicing the
next helicopter.
anything to do with less work being done
than at other work locations — rather that
people are spread out when they're working
and it is good to get together over a cup of
coffee and cakes. The 9:00 coffee break and
the 3:00 coffee break are important to
remember. They don't take place in the
dining room — but in some workshop
instead, or in the electrician shop as it's
called on Edda.
It is often said that all the platforms at
Ekofisk are alike. From the outside they look
pretty much alike — and the organization is
also similar. But it is the people who make
the milieu, and the milieu varies a lot from
platform to platform. After visits to all the
platforms, the conclusion drawn is that each
one has its distinctive character. This is due
to the crew, and to their ability to create and 183
It is necessary to put the platform, the same code is registered,
on a survival suit
before boarding the and if you will be moving on to another
helicopter. Phillips platform the same routine is followed. In
requires all Ekofisk that way it is possible to keep track at all
passengers to wear
such a suit. times of the whereabouts of everyone on
the field. With 25 platforms, this is
necessary in the event of an emergency
situation.
The data-based MTS system replaced a
manual register in 1981. As time went by,
the extent and number of moves became so
great that it had to be computerized. In
addition to containing data as to where each
individual is located, the system also tells
whether his/her health certificate is in order
and that the safety training has been
completed.
The Super Puma has
landed on 2/4K. The After the code has been stated during
heliguards see to it check-in at the heliport, the next safety
that the rules for check awaits — Security. It is prohibited to
conduct on the deck
are observed. carry alcohol or medicaments to the
platforms. Furthermore, no one is to be
under the influence of alcohol or narcotics
upon departure. This check is made before
permission is given to go on board the
helicopter - and it also includes a routine
inspection of all the passengers to ensure
that no one is carrying weapons, bombs or
explosives.
shape the milieu around them. There is, When the inspection has been passed, it's
however, one common trait — the informal on with the survival suit. It is not exactly
tone that is found on all the platforms. At comfortable, but Phillips has decided that
what work sites do we experience even the everyone traveling out to Ekofisk must wear
boss going around dressed in jeans and a one during the flight.
flannel shirt during working hours? That's Once aboard the helicopter, there is
right, at Ekofisk they do. The jeans society another safety orientation — before the
may be one characteristic that immediately machine can take off.
calls up associations of an informal Upon arrival at the platform the code is
environment. registered with the radio operator — or at
the reception desk, at the same time as bed
assignments are made. But before a person
can do anything at all, there is another
safety orientation - this time concerning
safety on the platform. The regular crew is
spared this orientation, but all newcomers or
persons who haven't been on board during
the last 12 months have to go through it.
Emphasis here is on escape routes, alarm
signals and the platform's safety systems.
Special lifeboats, capsules and rafts are
included. Each person must be able to help
himself in the case of an accident — in spite
of the fact that regular crew members on the
platform have their assigned tasks in such
instances. Some are lifeboat coxswains and
184 others are on the fire brigade. Everyone is
given special training in his/her emergency
Hdiguard Vigdis
function. Steylen receives the
When the necessary form has been signed boarding card from a
— then you are ready to do the work you passenger departing
from the Hotel
were sent out to do. platform.
The fact that this safety orientation on
the platform is important to have is
confirmed when the regular drills are carried
out. Once every 14 days there is a drill -
and then it is important to know what you
are supposed to do.
Even in connection with daily work
assignments, the routines are permeated
with the fact that safety is the number one
priority. All work that contains an element course, in Rogaland county, in which the
of danger requires the approval of several city with the most Phillips people is
persons. Just taking a photograph with a Stavanger, with Sandnes and Sola following.
flash requires permission to do «hot» work. It is also in these towns, plus Gjesdal, Time
The place where the picture is to be taken and Randaberg municipalities, that the
must first be approved as being free of gas majority of people working at the main
before permission will be given. office reside.
Phillips' policy with regard to recruiting
From All Over Norway to fill vacant positions at Ekofisk and at the
Today there are residing in each of Tananger base is that, as far as possible,
Norway's 19 counties — or, if you will, in employees should be recruited from
223 of the nation's municipalities — one or Rogaland - or from neighboring counties if
more Phillips employees whose work the applicants are qualified. And qualified
location is either offshore at Ekofisk, in the applicants for 90% of the jobs within the
Oslo office, or at the main Tananger base. company's offshore organization have been
But the majority of the employees live, of found in Phillips' own district. The type of
New personnel - or
persons who have
not been onboard
during the past 12
months - are given a
safety briefing when
they arrive on the
platform. Special
attention is paid to
evacuation
possibilities, with
emphasis on use of
the lifeboat. Gunnar
Likvern on Eldfisk
2/7B demonstrates
how to use a
emergency beacon.

135
 Much electrical
equipment must be
inspected on the
platforms, and the
electricians have
plenty to do. AH of
the satellite
platforms, for
example, have their
own generators
supplying electricity.

Materials man
Harald Sivertsen on
P platform is in
charge of 5500 parts.
This warehouse
supplies all the
platforms with
articles and spare
parts.

186
 Maintenance is an
ongoing process on
the platforms, and
paint in particular is
a big item of
consumption. Bjørn
Andreasen and
Arvid Kval are
seeing to it that the
lifeboat platform on
Albuskjell 2/4F is
given a facelift.
One of the operators'
tasks is to check the
wellhead area (right).

There are many

different turbines on
the platforms, and a
group of specialists
travels around doing
overhauls at regular
intervals. Here the
turbine on Eldfisk
2! 7A is being
checked.

187
 One of the radio
operators' tasks is to
update the
Manpower Tracking
System whenever
personnel arrive or
leave the platform.
Hans Olav Rudi is
seated at the
computer terminal
on Cod.

Only when oil

samples are taken
can one actually see
the oil brought up
from the reservoir.
Operator Bj0rn
Skrede procures an
oil sample on Edda.
The samples are
analyzed in the
laboratory on the
Ekofisk Tank.

188
personnel most difficult to find are workers Norway. But unlike the offshore employees,
in the more specialized fields, such as these people have to move to Rogaland. In
instrument technicians, automation other words, working at Ekofisk allows
technicians, processing technicians, and people a great deal of freedom to live where
specialists within data processing and they want. Thus Phillips has an instrument
telecommunication services. These are technician who works a small farm in upper
personnel whom the labor market has Jostedalen, in Sogn & Fjordane, and one
traditionally seldom seen, and for whom who lives in Troms0.
there has been much competition.
Therefore, it is necessary to reach out across A chat on the stairs
the entire country to find qualified at informal Ekofisk.
applicants.
The fact that there are today relatively
large number of employees living in both
eastern and northern Norway goes back to
the four-year period between 1976 and
1979 when as many as 1,981 workers were
recruited. At that time the labor market was
so tight that it was necessary to obtain
qualified people from other areas — and this
also resulted in a rather wide distribution of
employees. The fact that Phillips found
people then who liked working at Ekofisk
shows up in the fact that over 90% of those
employees are still working for the
company.
The onshore organization also must
recruit people from other sections of the
country. Particularly in the data processing
and engineering departments it has been
necessary for Phillips to recruit from all over

In connection with
the seabed subsidence
at the Ekofisk
Complex, wave
measuring laser
instruments were
installed. Advanced
technical equipment
becomes part of
everyday routines.

189
 Much is required of
the extensive cable
network on the
platforms. Outdoor
cables are constantly
exposed to rough
weather. Here
replacement work is
under way on
booster platform
37/4/1.

190
 The leisure activities
available on the
platforms are many
and well-organized.
Exercise rooms with
saunas have become
standard. The
equipment in the
exercise rooms, at
least, should leave no
excuse for not
keeping f i t . Some
prefer a less
physically
demanding game of
billiards. The Ekofisk
March has become
an annual event on
all platforms. A
specific track is
walked as many
times as will total 10
km. The march is
registered by Norges
Turmarsjforbund
and included in the
march calendar, but
participation is
limited to the
employees on the
field.
TV is probably the
most popular leisure
activity — often in
combination with
some newspaper
reading and friendly
gathering in the
recreation rooms.
Many have been
bitten by the
"darts-bug" on
Ekofisk 2/4B, and
the target is a
popular gathering
place.

191
 Phillips' team on
Eldfish2/7Bin
1985: 21 persons
gathered on the
pipedeck. This is
everybody — with the
exception of a radio
operator and an
operator who are on
duty. The total crew
consists of 23
persons. Personnel
from various
contractors, for
example, catering,
are always present as
The Offshore Organization
Despite the informal social atmosphere at
Ekofisk, there is, of course, a well-defined
organization. The offshore or regional
management is located at the Ekofisk
Complex with an offshore manager having
senior responsibility. Reporting to him/her
are the administration, engineering,
production, safety, and drilling departments,
as well as departments for support functions
and the head safety delegate.
The production, or operations,
department is the largest (1,180 persons), to
which operations on the Ekofisk Complex
and the other platforms report.
Traditionally there were no
superintendents on the various platforms
through whom all reporting was carried out.
Each individual department reported
independently to offshore management at
the Ekofisk Complex. The production
supervisor had senior responsibility in case
of an evacuation, but otherwise the
reporting from the platforms was not done
through one particular office. This was
changed in 1983, when each platform
became an organizational unit with a
platform superintendent. This created
clearer reporting channels — and the model
was so successful that the same principle
was also applied to the Ekofisk Complex.
But in spite of this there is extensive
communication between the departmental
staff within offshore management at the
Ekofisk Complex and the various
departments on the outlying platforms. It
has to be that way. In the same way there is
a great deal of communicating between the
various groups at Ekofisk and their
corresponding departments in the onshore
192 organization. The formal reporting routines
go via offshore management, but in an
effective organization there must necessarily
be direct communication outside of the
formal channels.
Every position in the offshore
organization is shared by up to three
persons. The rotation system makes this
necessary. Thus there are three people who
have the job of offshore manager. In some
of the supervisory positions, the shifts also
include onshore office hours, so that there
will be good communication between
onshore and offshore management. And
communication is a key to effectiveness in
an organization where several people share
a position. This situation puts everyone in
the offshore organization to special tests.
Head Safety Delegate
The Ekofisk Committee organizes most of
Phillips' employees at Ekofisk. This union
also has an arrangement for a full-time
position as head safety delegate with a
coordinating function. This is an
arrangement which goes a long way back in
time and which is intended to function as a
safety valve. The head safety delegate
reports directly to the offshore manager.
Since 1981 the Norwegian national union
(LO) has also had a full-time position
offshore as an «ombudsman».
The safety delegate system allows the
employees who are not in agreement with
management's evaluation of issues relating
to safety and security to bypass the formal
organization and take their views to top
management. There is a safety delegate on
each of the platforms in the Ekofisk area.
 193

13 - Giant Discovery
 The Future of Ekofisk
As of today, 1988, of the discovered fields
on the Norwegian shelf only the gigantic
Troll field will outlive Ekofisk. Troll will go
on stream around 1995. Ekofisk, the first
commercial oil and gas field on the
Norwegian shelf, can also be among the last.
If we consider the fundamental significance
of the Ekofisk Complex for transportation of
oil and gas from Norway, we can foresee
activity at Ekofisk up to the year 2100. It is
noteworthy that most of the new fields that
have been and are being tied into the
transportation system of which Ekofisk is a
part have shorter lifetimes than the main
Ekofisk field and Eldfisk. The reservations
that must be taken in a time perspective
such as this are the development of the price
of oil and gas, and the costs of operating
and maintaining the installations. But based
on the knowledge and experience available
today, the activity at Ekofisk will extend
well into the next century - and well past
the expiration date for the Phillips Group's
license, 31 August 2011.
In other words, Ekofisk will be important
in the future as well. With current methods
for production of oil and gas, between 70
and 80 percent of the resources will still be
left in the reservoirs. Thus it is important
that these resources be given optimum
utilization. In this connection the Phillips
Group has a great social obligation. It was
on the basis of just such a perspective that
the water injection projects have been
initiated; it was the reason behind the
6-meter elevation of the six steel platforms
at the Ekofisk Complex during the summer
of 1987; it was the background on which the
choice was made for a lasting protective
194 barrier around the Ekofisk Tank, instead of
temporary solutions; and it was the point of
departure for the studies on nitrogen
injection into the top of the Ekofisk
reservoir.
How long it will be profitable to produce
from the fields in the Ekofisk area depends,
of course, on the price of the products and
on whether a market exists — but also on
how competent Phillips, as operator, is at
finding solutions that reduce costs.
In this chapter we will be looking at the
unique projects that have been carried out to
ensure the future of Ekofisk: water injection
and the jacking project. In addition, we will
take up the matter of the lifetime of the
seven fields in the Ekofisk area.
Water Injection
For a long time water injection has been a
central element in increasing the level of
production for oil and gas fields producing
from sandstone reservoirs. For Ekofisk,
which produces from a fractured chalk
reservoir, this is far from a matter of course.
It has never been done before.
The work to find solutions which could
maximize the degree of recovery for the
field began right after the discovery had
been made. Many raised the question as to
whether it was at all possible to produce oil
and gas from the field over a long period.
The test production phase provided a good
answer to this — and throughout the 1970's
researchers worked with the problems
surrounding increased recovery and water
injection — along with gas injection. The
degree of recovery was originally estimated
to lie at between 15 and 19 percent of the
oil reserves. Even this was a great quantity
from such a gigantic reservoir as Ekofisk, but

every percentage point in increased
recovery would yield large profits —
provided they could be attained without
huge extra investments. The main problems
were concerned with whether the water in
the reservoir would damage the production
wells — and to what degree the chalk would
manage to absorb the water so that more oil
could find its way to the production wells.
After a period of laboratory research,
equipment for a test phase was installed on
the 2/4 Bravo platform early in 1981. In
April 1981 injection of water into the
reservoir's lower section — the chalk or Tor
formation — was under way to measure its
effect. At the same time a preliminary design
study was begun so that realistic figures for
the project's economics could be drawn up.
By the fall of 1982, there were sufficient
data and prognoses to ascertain that with
the necessary investments the project was
only marginally profitable. The drop in oil
prices and the uncertainty in that area which
began in January 1983 reduced the
economic outlook for the project to an
unacceptable level, from the point of view
of practical economics.
Even at an earlier point in time the
ambition level for the project was reduced.
The point of departure had been two water
injection platforms, one by 2/4A and one by
2/4B, so that the whole reservoir could be
covered. The economics in this plan proved
Water injection
platform 2/4K is an
important element in
the future prospects
for Ekofisk. Water is
injected into the
reservoirs under high
pressure to enhance
production of oil and
gas. 2/4-K is located
next to Ekofisk 2/4B;
at right, we see derrick
barge "DB 102"
which was used
during the
construction of the
platform.
to be too weak, and the result was one
platform by 2/4B which would be able to
handle injection into two-thirds of the lower
reservoir. Furthermore, there was still a
degree of uncertainty — despite the results
from the test project on 2/4B. It neither was
nor is now possible to see whether it will
function over the whole field. This will not
be clear until sometime during the 1990's, in
the form of the production from the
reservoir. This means that, among other
things, the 15 percent lower limit for
recovery remains the same with water
injection into chalk, while the upper limit is
increased from 19 to 22 percent. In terms of
oil quantities, expectations for the project
come to about 170 million barrels.
Negotiations
In order that the water injection might have
optimum effect, Phillips had arrived at a
time schedule in 1982 that presupposed a
positive decision during the summer of
1983. Then the onshore construction work
could begin in 1984, installation of the
platform by 2/4B in 1986, and start-up of
injection at the end of 1987. Advance
drilling of wells during the two years the
platform was under construction was part of
the plans, so that the platform could become
operational for injection as soon as possible.
Based on the Phillips Group's conclusion
that water injection into the lower reservoir 195
 Kåre Kristiansen
took over as
Minister of
Petroleum and
Energy in the midst
of the negotiations
between the Phillips
Group and the
Ministry on the
taxation of 'the 2/4-K
project. Under the
headline "Injection
Anyway at Ekofisk"
in Stavanger
Aftenblad on 9
August 1983, the
artist makes the
following comment
on the situation:
"New oil ministers
are not to be trifled
with."
- chalk - was not a profitable business
venture, negotiations between the Group
and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(NPD)/the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy were begun in the spring of 1983.
NPD had for some time been interested in,
and had worked to promote, water injection
as a means of reservoir conservation. From
the point of view of the Norwegian
Government, it was good national
utilization of resources to implement the
project - plus the fact that the job of
building the platform would give
Norwegian industry welcome work during a
difficult period. At this point there began
what would develop into quite a tug of war
between the companies in the Phillips
Group and the Ministry. Bill M. Boyce,
managing director of Phillips in Norway at
that time, characterized the negotiations as
some of the most difficult and most
important in his career. Not only because a
positive result was reached in which both
the Ministry and the Phillips Group
achieved what they wanted by means of
compromise, but also because the
negotiations maintained their tension
throughout, until agreement was reached on
9 August 1983.
The Phillips Group needed changes in the
tax conditions for the project - as compared
with what was standard for the
development projects in the North Sea.
Down through the years the Ministry had
refused similar requests from the companies,
and was initially of the opinion that this
project was no exception.
During the most difficult phase, the
196 Government changed hands, and Minister
of Petroleum and Energy Vidkun Hveding
was replaced by Kare Kristiansen. Norway
went from being led by a purely
conservative government to a non-socialist
coalition government.
The agreement reached modifies the tax
terms so as to make them better suited to
the nature of the project. Taken into
consideration is the fact that eventual
income from increased production as a result
of water injection into the chalk reservoir
will not be forthcoming until a later point in
time - sometime after the beginning of the
1990's. In addition, the project was classified
as research. Cost estimates showed that the
agreement gave the starting signal for a
project of between 12 and 15 billion
Norwegian 1983-kroner - at least
two-thirds of which would go to
Norwegian industry in the form of
contracts.
The Starting Signal
During 1982 and 1983 a number of
preparations were made for the new
platform, which was designated 2/4K.
When the special legislation was passed
concerning the tax conditions for the water
injection project at Ekofisk, the process
could gain momentum - and during the fall
of 1983 and spring of 1984, the construction
contracts were awarded. A good portion of
these contracts were landed by Norwegian
shipyards - the two largest being for the
jacket, which was built by Aker-Verdal, and
the module support frame, which went to
Haugesund Mekaniske Verksted.
On 6 August 1986 the quarters module
was hoisted onto 2/4K platform, and this
was the last lift to be carried out. The
installation work could then get fully under
way, and it went on until the end of 1987.
The 2/4K platform is the largest steel
platform in the Ekofisk area, and it looks
impressive next to 2/4B, with which it is
connected by bridge. Furthermore, the
platform is a new generation in the Ekofisk
scheme of things - data processing and new
technology have been utilized as
extensively as possible.
On 28 December 1987 purified seawater
could be injected into well K-30, and water
injection into the Lower Cretaceous
reservoir was under way. A few days later
well K-4 was also ready, and by the end of
1991 a total of 20 wells will have been The "DB 102"
derrick barge set the
prepared and utilized as water injectors. 2/4K jacket in 1986.

Phase II
2/4K platform can produce approximately
350,000 barrels of purified water per day.
This is far more than needed in the original
water injection project. And parallel with
the building of K platform, a test project was
carried out in the upper section of the
reservoir — Danian, or the Ekofisk formation.
Laboratory research was also carried out to

The 2/4K living

quarters are hoisted
into position on the
platform by "DB
102". In 1986, this
derrick barge was the
world's largest with
a maximum capacity
of 12,000 metric
tons.

Water injection from

2/4K started in late
December 1987. The
platform's daily
capacity is 350,000
barrels of purified
seawater.

197
 The illustration
shows the methods Water Water Nitrogen Water Water
which the Phillips injection Production injection injection Production injection Production injection
Group sees in 1988
as being the most
important ways of
increasing
production from the
main field at Ekofisk.
Water is injected
into the lower
reservoir — and Mo
the lower part of the
upper reservoir.
Nitrogen would be
injected into the top
of the reservoir, and
if implemented, the
project will mainly
increase Ekofisk's gas
production.

find out whether water in that section of the
reservoir would cause the chalk structure to
collapse. Both the research project and the
laboratory tests were positive.
The Phillips Group tried first to reach an
agreement with the Norwegian authorities
to extend the water injection toward the
south by means of a new platform, 2/4W.
The idea was to improve the economics of
the 2/4K project. (The price of oil had
dropped drastically since the project was
approved.) However, the proposal was
turned down by the Ministry. The
authorities were not willing to allow the
same tax settlement for the new platform as
for 2/4K — without going through the whole
process again with a new Storting
report, and all that it would entail. With
that, a process was initiated within the
Phillips Group to find other solutions —
solutions that were cheaper but did not
offer the same long-term flexibility.
The result is that the Ekofisk Complex
has to manage without the south flare in
daily operations. The eight injection wells
will be placed on the bridge support north of
the flare. The wells must be drilled from a
198 jack-up rig, and a pipeline has to be laid to
convey high pressure water from 2/4K to
the Ekofisk Complex. It is also necessary to
drill six new production wells from 2/4A
platform and eight new production wells
from 2/4C. This means that both these
platforms must be somewhat modified.
Calculations show that the expanded
water injection project can yield additional
volume of approximately 190 million
barrels of oil equivalents.
On this basis the Phillips Group decided
in late 1987/early 1988 to go ahead with
the project, and the authorities gave their
approval in the spring of 1988.
Nitrogen
The search for other methods besides water
injection for increasing production levels
from the main Ekofisk field has been going
on for many years. After the subsidence of
the sea bed was discovered came the
alternative of injecting nitrogen in order to
keep the reservoir pressure up, thereby
counteracting the subsidence.
During the discussion that began in the
summer of 1985, the amount of 600 million
cubic feet per day was mentioned - which
would require a special facility for removal
of nitrogen from the natural gas produced.
After the subsidence problem was solved
in another way, Phillips and the Phillips
Group started taking a look at nitrogen
injection into the top of the reservoir to
increase production of oil and gas. Despite
the fact that the studies are not yet
complete, they look very promising. The
work will be carried out with a smaller
facility for injection of around 200 million
cubic feet of nitrogen per day as the
optimum.
The preliminary analyses seem to indicate
that the extra quantities of oil and gas
recovered through the nitrogen program
will be as great as through the 2/4K project.
The formal decision as to whether this
project will be realized may be made in the
spring of 1989.
Ekofisk Is Sinking
There had been talk among some of the
people working on the Central Ekofisk
Complex as to the fact that the platforms lay
deeper in the water than before. A
boat-landing on the east side of the Ekofisk
Tank was more or less under water, while it
had previously been visible in the 1970's.
The same was true for a landing on a
horizontal bracing on the jacket below
2/4C. But no one had started investigating
in earnest to see if the platforms really lay
deeper in the water than previously. There
are an unbelievable number of factors
involved in the ocean's water level. , . as
many as 87 different natural conditions, to
be exact.
Late in the fall of 1984 the matter was
given serious attention. It started with
sounding measurements on the bridges to
check clearance margins for anchor-handling
boats. These results were compared with
data from 1974 and 1976. Then the
reservoir engineering section was asked to
explain a difference of 2-2.5 meters. After
that, photographs taken in the early and
mid-1970's were gone through and
compared with recent ones. Yes indeed, the
platforms and the Ekofisk Tank lay distinctly
deeper. Fewer rings could be seen above
water level on the breakwater wall around
the Ekofisk Tank.
The alarm was sounded — subsidence of
the ocean floor below the platforms of the
Ekofisk Complex was a fact. What the Phillips
Group had discussed as a possibility in their
application for test production in 1970 had
become reality, but none of the phenomena
that would have been clear signs of its
happening had turned up in connection with
production. The fact that it had not been
discovered out on the field may seem
strange for outside parties, but people grow
accustomed to sights that they see on an
everyday basis. Since the subsidence had
happened millimeter by millimeter over the
years, it is natural for it not to have been
noticed. Once again Ekofisk had come up
with big surprises — the field seemed never
to cease offering new challenges.
Phillips set about a number of activities to
observe and chart the subsidence
These two photos of
the Ekofisk Tank,
from 1975 and
1986, respectively,
dearly show that it
lay deeper in the sea
in 1986 due to the
subsidence of the
seabed.
199
 Several measuring
methods were used to
map the extent of the
subsidence — and
check the subsidence
rate. A satellite
system took
measurements from
above, wave radar
measured the
distance to the sea
surface from the
bridge between 2/4H
and 2/4C - and,
finally, pressure
gauges were placed

phenomenon. Several systems of measure
were utilized to determine the rate of
subsidence — among others, satellite
measurements of several of the platforms in
the Ekofisk area. After some months, it
became clear that the seabed was sinking at
a rate of between 40 and 50 centimeters per
year. In April/May of 1985, there was
sufficient data to be able to say that the
platforms lay about 2.5 meters deeper in the
water than when they were installed. The
subsidence had occurred over an area that
was approximately 6,000 meters in diameter
and bowl-shaped. The greatest subsidence
was under the Ekofisk Center. From that
area it diminished so that the subsidence
below 2/4A and 2/4B was approximately 1
meter. In addition to the subsidence on the
main Ekofisk field, a lesser subsidence of
about 60 centimeters was revealed at West
Ekofisk.
The Safety Factor
The first question that was asked when the
200 subsidence phenomenon was brought to
light was whether it was still safe for crews
to stay on the platforms. The question was
quickly answered in the affirmative. Then
the measurement results were considered in
relation to the hundred year wave, and to
how vulnerable the platforms had become
to it. It soon turned out that there was still
clearance, but that solutions would have to
be found quickly if the safety level for both
the crews and the platforms was to be
maintained, in case the rate of subsidence
continued at the same speed.
How Does It Happen?
Subsidence of oil-, gas- or even
water-producing reservoirs is a known
phenomenon. As the liquid or the gas is
taken out of the reservoir, the pressure
drops. As a result, the structure in the layer
of rock where the oil and gas — or water — is
located has to bear the greater part of the
weight of the rock layers above it. In the
Ekofisk reservoirs, the pressure at
production start-up in 1971 was about 7200
psi. In 1988 it was down at 3800 psi. Chalk
is a soft material, compared with sandstone,
for example, from which most of the other
oil and gas fields on the Norwegian shelf are
producing. In the reservoir, compression of
the chalk occurs as a result of the pressure
reduction. This does not need to result in
subsidence of the seabed — if the rock layers
above the reservoir are strong enough to
withstand the weight of the 3,000 meters of
overburden. On the Ekofisk field this area
between the seabed and the reservoir does
not have this strength to a sufficient degree.
Therefore the compression traveled
upwards, all the way to the ocean floor. The
same phenomenon exists in connection with
the production of ground water in Mexico
City and London.
Countermoves
Phillips worked at full capacity in early 1985
to find effective countermoves. Ever since
the permanent platforms had come on
stream, gas had been injected back into the
reservoir from 2/4C. This also served as a
brake on the fall of pressure in the reservoir.
The Phillips Group was committed to
deliveries of gas to the buyer group on the
Continent, and negotiations were under
way to be able to free up larger quantities of
gas for injection into the reservoir. In
August 1985 the agreement was ready —
and on 22 August the volume of gas for
injection could be increased by 25%. This
was the equivalent of around 350 million
standard cubic feet per day. Then the 2/4C
platform had to be protected before the
winter season of 1985-86. It was the one
hardest hit by the subsidence, along with
the south flare.
On 2/4C it was determined, through
model testing, that streamlining the deck
beams would reduce possible wave stress on
the platform structure by more than 40%.
The work on rounding off the beams was
therefore begun during the summer of 1985.
Permanent Solutions
A number of alternatives were gradually
identified and reviewed with a view to
finding solutions that would secure Ekofisk
for the future. The significance of the
production from the Ekofisk area as a source
of income for Norway and the companies in
the Phillips Group — as well as the
significance of the transportation junction
for exporting oil and gas from the
Norwegian shelf — made it necessary to find
a solution. In 1984 alone, the Ekofisk area
contributed about 20 billion kroner to the
Norwegian national treasury.
Three main alternatives were
noteworthy. Norsk Hydro proposed a
solution involving wave-suppressors
around the Ekofisk Complex. Enormous
cement blocks — or even sunken super
tankers — could reduce the effect of the
Seabed surveys from
the early 197O's were
compared with new
surveys to determine
the exact subsidence.
The result indicated
a saucer-shaped
subsidence area with
a diameter of 6,000
meters, with the
Ekofisk Complex in
the center.
201
 hundred year wave to the extent that the
platforms would be safe. Research was done
in the ocean laboratory in Trondheim. But
the solution was a very expensive one — and
the results and the effect were uncertain.
The second alternative was ribbing — or
moving all the equipment from the lower,
20-meter deck up to a higher level on the
platforms. In that way the deck would
become part of the jacket, and the platforms
would have about 10 extra meters to go on.
Part of this work was in the process of being
done as a temporary solution to gain time.
Full scale, it would both be costly, result in
less space (which could lead to the need for
a new platform), and involve a very long
shutdown period to carry it out. The
production loss and the consequences for
gas deliveries were also important reasons
for not choosing this solution. The
alternative that remained was elevation of
the platform decks.
Jack-Up
When the proposal was first launched, it
seemed to most people like something out
of science fiction. It was received with
skeptical laughter by many - including
Phillips management.
The questions were many, and the
problems to be dealt with seemed
impossible in the beginning. The French
company Technip had done something
similar, on a small scale, for an oil company
in the Arabian Gulf - and they felt it could
be accomplished on a large scale on the six
steel platforms in question at the Ekofisk
Complex.
In April 1986 it was clear that Phillips, as
operator, would choose the jacking solution.
In a report to the partners and authorities
this was the definite conclusion.
The six-meter jacking of the six steel
platforms and the crane-hoisting of the two
flares plus 2/4G platform decidedly
amounted to the most favorable solution.
This would secure the platforms against a
subsidence of at least 7.5 meters, and
preserve flexibility and space for the future.
For while they had been working at full
capacity on the physical alternatives on the
platforms, different models had been
computer-simulated to calculate the extent
of the subsidence — and, not least, to
determine how much the total subsidence
202
2i02i would be. All the models reached the
conclusion that the total subsidence
resulting from compression of the reservoir
would come to around 6 meters. If there
should also occur a compression of the
3,000 meter area between the reservoir and
the ocean floor, the total subsidence could
come to 11-11.5 meters, but there was
nothing that indicated this would happen.
Furthermore — should this «impossibility»
occur, it would be possible to carry out
another jacking operation.
The companies in the Phillips Group and
the authorities gradually approved this
decision - and the summer of 1987 was the
time set for the jacking operation.
But an important element still remained in
order for the solution to be complete. How
could the Ekofisk Tank be secured? It could
not be jacked up.
(For the actual jacking operation — see the
special feature story at the end of this
chapter.)
The Protective Barrier
Parallel with the preparations for and
implementation of the jacking project,
Phillips worked at full capacity, along with
various groups of experts, to find a
satisfactory method of securing the Ekofisk
Tank.
It became clear early on that jacking was
not the solution here, and efforts were
concentrated as time went by on two
possibilities. One was to build a protective
wall around the Tank between the 20- and
30-meter levels. This alternative was
discussed thoroughly, but there was no
getting around the fact that this would only
be a temporary solution — and there were
many questions surrounding the problem of
ventilation. The other alternative was to
build a protective barrier around the whole
Tank - outside the breakwater wall. This
would be a permanent solution that would
secure the «heart and brain» of the entire
Ekofisk system for the future.
The Phillips Group chose the more
permanent solution — the final decision was
made in the beginning of 1988. The cement
wall will be built in two sections that will be
fitted together around the Tank,
approximately 3 meters outside the
breakwater wall. It is constructed by slip
forming like a regular concrete platform.
Then it will be towed out to the Ekofisk
Tank in two parts, maneuvered into

position, fastened together and lowered
onto the ocean floor. The concrete wall will
be built like a double wall, each one about
one-half meter thick. From the inner to the
outer wall there will be about 18 meters, and
the whole structure will be around 106
meters high — and tower 30 meters above
sea level.
In February 1988 the contract for the
protective barrier was awarded to the new
Norwegian company Peconor — with the
date of completion set for the summer of
1989.
Lifetime of the Fields
There are many factors of uncertainty which
must be considered when we attempt to
calculate the lifetime of the Ekofisk area.
First and foremost, our starting point must
be the fact that oil and gas fields have a
limited life duration. Oil and gas are not
renewable resources — they must come to an
end at some point or another. These are
facts that we have to accept. Then it is up to
the authorities and the licensees to work
things out so that the resources are utilized
in the best possible way.
An oil and gas field is no longer
commercial when costs exceed income. For
the Ekofisk area — the seven fields and the
transportation system — this is a very
complex set of problems. Each of the seven
fields must be evaluated on its own - while
at the same time a good deal of joint costs
help keep operation costs down for the
individual field. Furthermore, income from
This is how the
Ekofisk Complex
will appear after the
protective barrier
around the Tank is
added in the summer
of 1989. The details
on the drawing of the
barrier are not
correct — cranes and
lifeboats, for
example, will be
installed on the
barrier.
processing and transportation of oil and gas
from other fields - and potential new
discoveries — mean that the lifetime of the
whole Ekofisk area can be extended.
But the opposite can also occur through a
catastrophic fall in oil and gas prices. If this
should happen, all the calculations would
have to be re-done, and there would be a
totally different picture from the one which
forms the basis for the figures in this
account. They are based on calculations
made in 1986 and 1987 - and on predictions
as to the price development as it is
perceived in 1988.
Marketing Prospects
When the decision was made to develop
Ekofisk, the price for a barrel of crude oil of
comparable quality lay at around
$2.00-2.50. If we take inflation into
consideration, this would be equivalent to
about $11.00 per barrel in 1988. The price
development in recent years has shown
fluctuation from around $20.00 down to
$13.00-14.00, but for the most part it has
stayed at $16.00-18.00.
This means that it will continue to be
profitable to operate the Ekofisk area.
Making an accurate prediction as to the
future development toward the year 2000 -
and even 50 years beyond — is difficult. The
analyses Phillips has done on behalf of the
Phillips Group for the fields in the Ekofisk
area have taken as their average price
$18.00 per barrel - with $15.00 as the
minimum and $20.00 as the maximum. 203
 Remote control and
demanning of the
two Albuskjell
platforms are being
considered in order to
reduce operating
costs — and thus
increase the life span
of this field.
These figures have been used as the basis for
the lifetime calculations for the seven fields.
In addition to the oil price, the marketing
prospects for gas have become at least as
important. Little by little gas has become a
greater financial contributor for the Phillips
Group than oil. This has to do with the fact
that it is possible to recover comparatively
larger amounts of gas than oil - and that,
through the gas sales contracts, production
has been limited in relation to that which
would have been possible with maximum
production.
Therefore the availability of gas to the
European market will be decisive for price
development. That a gas market will exist
seems to be quite clear. This is also bound
204 up with the discussions on tying the gas line
to Emden to the Danish transportation
system — and perhaps to Sweden as well.
The Swedes have voted to shut down their
atomic energy plants, and gas may be an
alternative.
The Edda Field
During the summer of 1987, Edda
production - viewed in isolation - became
unprofitable. The field has fluctuated on
both sides of this point, as the prices of oil
and gas have evolved. The decision to
develop Tommeliten, however, has
lengthened the field's lifetime. In 1988
Statoil sold the gas from the first
development phase on Tommeliten up to
the year 1992, but no one believes that this
field, which has been developed with subsea

installations and is remote-controlled from
Edda, will have such a short lifetime.
Tommeliten will probably exist until
2003-2005, and that gives Edda a lifetime
that is dependent upon Tommeliten's.
Cod
The Cod field, as the only producing
sandstone reservoir in the Ekofisk area to
date, has constantly come up with positive
surprises. Every time perforations in the
wells are carried out, the production
increases. Viewed in isolation, the lifetime of
the field would seem to extend to just past
the year 2000, but there are many factors
which indicate that the field and the
platform will be in operation much longer.
There are also prospects for new
commercial discoveries in this area - which
could be tied in to the platform. Norsk
Hydro has made a discovery northeast of
Cod, and there are other interesting
structures which remain to be drilled in the
area.
The Phillips Group has completed a deep
well from the Cod platform down to the
Jurassic formation, but the reservoir was too
impervious and, at the same time, it
contained little gas to propel the oil up to
the platform. On the basis of that well, the
Phillips Group has given up hope of finding
anything commercial in the cellar under the
Cod reservoir.
Albuskjell
Albuskjell has split owner interests 50-50
between the Phillips Group and Norske
Shell. This means that questions
surrounding the field's lifetime are
two-sided. For the Phillips Group which
owns the pipelines to the Ekolisk Complex,
processing at the Complex, and has
ownership in the pipeline system to shore,
the field viewed in isolation has a lifetime
extending to the year 2000-2002.
The work to try to extend the lifetime of
Albuskjell includes studies on de-manning
the platforms - and operating them by
remote control from the Ekofisk Complex.
How much this will lengthen the field's
lifetime remains to be seen.
Albuskjell produces 98% from the Lower
Cretaceous reservoir. Only 2% comes from
the Upper Danian formation. Experiments
are being carried out to increase recovery
from the Danian formation, but the results
are uncertain. Furthermore, if the
experiments on the Danish shelf are
successful, it may be possible to drill
horizontal wells through this formation.
This would increase production from the
field.
Albuskjell is a gas and condensate field.
Therefore it is not only increased recovery
that determines its lifetime, but also the
market demand for gas.
Another factor for the Albuskjell
platforms is the possibility of tying in fields
that lie in the British J-block. Phillips is
operator there and is working now on
possible development solutions, including a
tie-in with and processing on the Albuskjell
platforms. This may be possible even if the
Albuskjell platforms are de-manned and 205
 remote controlled from the Ekofisk
Complex.
West Ekofisk
During the start-up phase, much seemed to
indicate that West Ekofisk was the field that
would be producing for a very long time. As
it has turned out, producing the reservoir
has gone faster than expected. This is not
due to the field's being smaller than
assumed, but rather because productivity
has been very good. In 1988 the lifetime for
West Ekofisk appears to extend to sometime
between the years 2000 and 2005.
In the slightly longer term, the platform is
a candidate for de-manning. In the short
term, the maintenance activity on the wells
is too great for this to be possible. It is
difficult to de-man a platform with a lot of
activity on the drill floor around the clock.
The pressure in the reservoir on West
Ekofisk during the start-up phase was about
the same as for Ekofisk - 7200 psi.
However, the pressure here has fallen more
quickly than in the main field, and in 1988 it
is at 2000 psi. West Ekofisk mainly produces
gas.
Tor
The production development on the Tor
field has been interesting. At start-up, a
maximum production per well of between
2000 and 5000 barrels of oil per day was
expected. When production got under way
in earnest, it turned out that the wells were
producing 15,000-20,000 barrels per day.
Therefore the production peaked early, and
fell soon thereafter.
The lifetime of oil
and gas fields
depends on the price
development and
production costs. The
1988 life span
analysis for the seven
Ekofisk fields is
shown here, with the
darker color
illustrating the
shorter life scenario.
The Phillips
Group's license for
the seven fields will
expire in the year
2011.
206 1990 1995 2000
With gas-lifting of oil in the wells, Tor
has had its lifetime extended considerably,
and in 1988 calculations show that the field
will live beyond the license period, which
expires in 2011.
Eldfisk
Along with the main Ekofisk field, Eldfisk is
the field that will be producing longest in
the Ekofisk area. There is much that
indicates that Eldfisk will extend to the year
2035.
The two Eldfisk platforms produce from
three reservoirs — and it is the Eldfisk 2/7B
platform in the north, producing from the
northern reservoir, which has the longest
lifetime. However, one goal is to try to
balance out the lifetimes of the platforms.
This would pay off the day the installations
were to be removed, so that as many as
possible could be removed at the same time.
The Eldfisk field represents great challenges
for the operator and licensees. There is a
compound structure in the reservoir that
offers new possibilities. Water and nitrogen
injection are being investigated, but the
economics here will scarcely be as good as
on the Ekofisk field.
South Eldfisk
In 1988 the Phillips Group drilled a deep
well on South Eldfisk. One of the early
exploration wells had been drilled there but,
because of problems, that well was not
tested properly. The pressure is enormously
high -just under 14000 psi - and that
places extra demands on the testing and
production equipment. This well, the 2/7-
2005 2010 2015
 The drilling rig
"Dyvi Stena" tests
the discovery in well
2/7-20X on South
Eldfisk on 7 June
1988. If this find is
commercial, it will
either be developed
by subsea wellheads
or a small wellhead
platform.

20X, will be equipped with a subsea wellhead
tied to Eldfisk 2/7A-FTP for a long-term
test. Should the discovery be sufficiently
large, a new wellhead platform may be a
possibility.
Whether or not this might then hold
significance for the lifetime of the field will
depend upon the size of eventual
discoveries.
The Ekofisk Field
The lifetime for the reservoir on the main
Ekofisk field could possibly extend to
between the years 2040 and 2050. As a
result of water injection expansion and
possible injection of nitrogen, these are the
perspectives in 1988 for the main field in the
Ekofisk area. Viewed in connection with the
transportation function at the Ekofisk
Complex, the field's lifetime can be further
extended. This is especially true for
production platform 2/4C where
Engineering Manager Rolf Wiborg of
Phillips believes there can be production
until the year 2100.

207
 «Jack
M.H. "Mike"
McConnell is
Managing Director
of Phillips Petroleum
Company Norway
in 1988.
«This is a once-in-a-lifetime experience.* This
was typical of the comments made by many of
the nearly 15,000 people involved, in one way or
another, with the jacking project at the Ekofisk
Complex during the summer of 1987.
Lifting the heavy steel platforms nearly 6.5
meters by means of hydraulic jacks, swinging
6-meter long extension spools into place, and
then lowering the platforms onto the extension
spools all seemed like a fairy tale — or like gazing
into the future with no foundation in reality.
The span of time in which the project was to
be carried out was probably more questionable
than were the many technical aspects of the
project. A three-year project was to be
implemented during the course of sixteen
months.
When the decision was made as to the plan of
operation, a project organization was formed in
record time under Phillips E & C division. The
designing work on the various platforms to be
jacked up — or lifted by the «DB 102» crane barge
— was distributed among many companies so as
to avoid capacity — related limitations. Overall
coordination was in the hands of the French firm
Technip, which was responsible for the idea and
208 the basic solutions.
During the fall of 1986 the first construction
work was begun by the subcontractors. For a
start, a rail system had to be made below all six
of the platforms. In order to bring the heavy
jacking equipment into position by the platform
legs, there had to be a transportation system.
The cranes on the individual platforms could not
reach in. Over 2,000 meters of monorails
were prefabricated, and the assembling could get
under way in early 1987. This turned out to be
quite an extensive operation, because a number
of pipelines and tanks had to be moved in order
to make room for the tracks.
The installation work at Ekofisk was carried
out by two companies, OIS (Oil Industry
Services) and HKG (Haugesund Kaldnes de
Groot). They had three platforms each to make
ready. For a long time it looked as though the
timetables would not hold. In February and
March 1987 the work was well behind schedule,
but in April and May a maximum effort was
made by all involved. «We're going to pull this
off,» seemed to be everyone's attitude. A
maximum effort was made not only out at
Ekofisk, but also among the many thousand
employees of the various contractors spread all
over Europe.
The first major milestone in the project was
reached on 31 May when the first platform leg
was cut to make room for the force majeure of
the jacking program — the bolted flanges. Before
this operation took place, the jacks had already
been installed and made operational, so the
weight that the platform leg normally holds was
transferred to the jacks.
During the weeks that followed, leg after leg
was cut and flanges installed. The data system
that would steer the jacks and coordinate the
whole operation was tested.
The trial run, before the really big hoist of
four platforms simultaneously on the south side
of the Ekofisk Tank, was' the jacking of 2/4H
hotel platform. At midnight on 16 July
everything was ready; at 0348 hours the starting
signal was given. Within 12 hours' time the job
was done. The 10,500 ton deck section of the
platform was elevated 6 meters. The operation
had gone better than anyone had believed it
would, but there was room for a little polishing
work for jacking supervisor Mo Hobley and his
 Small glimpses of the
preparations for the
jacking of the six
platforms at the
Ekofisk Complex
during the summer
of 1987. The first to
begin work
underneath the
platform decks were
the scaffolding
builders. They were
faced with many an
airy challenge during
the project. After
2,500 meters of
monorails were in
place, the first jacks
could be fitted. The
platform legs were
then cut, and bolted
flanges welded on to
the legs. Jacking
Manager Mo
Hobley checks out
the jacks, while the
finishing touches are
put on the six meter
long extension
spools.

209

14- Giant Discovery

 Platform 2/4H has
been jacked up. It
took less than 12
hours to elevate the
platform, and the
extension spools may
now be slid into
place. The Hotel
platform was the
first test applying the
principles in practice.

crew before the big trial of strength.
The original plan was to jack up five
platforms simultaneously in August, but it was
decided that 2/4R to the north of the Ekofisk
Tank should be elevated by itself — before the
four platforms to the south. On 15 August 1987
at 1430 hours the elevation was under way with
a jacking speed of 40 mm per minute. The lift
took just less than 24 hours — as compared with
the 72-hour plan.
On 17 August everything was ready once
again — now the last four platforms were to be
elevated at the same time. In that way a
minimum of cables and pipelines would have to
be severed. Only the ones leading into the
Ekofisk Tank would need to be cut. The Tank
would remain as before. During the course of 14
hours and 24 minutes, the platforms were
elevated 6.4 meters. Then they could be lowered
onto the extension spools - and the jacking job
was completed.
A whole world participated in the applause
210 that followed.
Out at Ekofisk, however, the work continued.
While production was shut down so the jacking
operation could be completed, necessary
maintenance work was carried out. Furthermore,
the pipes that had to be cut were to be
connected again before everything would be
ready for production start-up.
And after a shorter pause than planned,
Ekofisk could resume production — and oil and
gas deliveries. That was perhaps as great a
triumph as the jacking operation itself.
Within a month after the elevation was
accomplished, the crews were able to
disassemble the jacks, hydraulic power units and
other necessary equipment. The entire job was
finished.
Once again there was tangible proof of the
saying, «Ekofisk — One of a Kind».
 By dusk on 16 July
1987 the job on
2/4H was done. In
21 hours and 43
minutes, less time
than had been
estimated, the
platform legs had
been extended by six
meters. It was just in
the nick of time,
though, as the
weather turned bad
and during the rest of
the month was such
that the margins set
for the jacking
operation could not
have been met.

The next jacking

project was the 2/4R
platform, north of
the Ekofisk Tank. It
was jacked up on 15
August, and the
biggest challenge
began some 24 hours
later — the four
platforms: 2/4P,
2/4C,2/4Qand
2/4FTP. This
jacking was
completed in approx.
14 hours — and on
the morning of 17
August 1987 the
entire job was done.

Ill
 Ekofisk and Norway

«In a way it can be said that the Ekofisk

discovery was one of the most important
events in our postwar history.* This is how
Norwegian historian Yngvar Ustvedt7
evaluates the significance of Ekofisk.
The Ekofisk discovery represented
Norway's inauguration as an oil nation. And
when the first tanker with
Norwegian-produced crude oil docked at
the Shell refinery at Sola on 4 August 1971,
it was only fitting that the first drops were
poured into a special bottle to be presented
to HRH King Olav V. Ekofisk Production
The Ekofisk discovery was also the first By the end of 1987 the seven fields in the
discovery of significance in all of the North Ekofisk area had produced more than 1.3
Sea, and it stimulated exploration activities billion barrels of crude oil and 100 billion
throughout the North Sea Basin. cubic meters of gas, plus a considerable
When Ekofisk was discovered, the climate amount of NGL.
for continued exploration had cooled From a modest start in July 1971, peak
considerably as compared with the first production was reached in 1980 when the
years when the virgin territory was opened average daily production came to 427,442
up for the wildcatters. The question often barrels. The highest single day production
asked is, what would have happened to the measured that year was 624,000 barrels.8
Production of crude
exploration activity in the North Sea
oil from the Ekofisk without the Ekofisk discovery? Would the
area began on a oil companies have turned their backs on the
small scale in 1971.
In 1972, daily
North Sea — would the past 20 years in
production had Norway have lacked the label «the oil
reached approx. epoch«? Hardly, but it would have meant a
40,000 barrels, and
remained stable until
delay in Norway's «oil age». Both Phillips
1974/75 when the Petroleum Company's chairman, Pete Silas,
permanent platforms and Statoil's former managing director,
were put on stream.
Up to 1980 there
Arve Johnsen, agree on this point. And the
was a steady timing for the really substantial income to
increase as field after the State from oil taxes and royalties would
field was put into
production. be important. When the oil crisis hit in 1973,
(Chart shows annual Norway was in a unique position as
production figures.) compared with other countries in Western
212 Europe — in a few years' time it would 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Since the peak year of 1980, production
has declined, and in 1987 it averaged
142,232 barrels per day. This figure is
especially low due to the four-week
shutdown in connection with the Ekofisk
jacking operation and as a result of the 7.5
percent production curtailment imposed by
the Government.
The same development has occurred
within gas production. When the gas pipe-
line became operational in September 1977,
daily gas deliveries were in excess of one
billion cubic feet within a few days' time. In
the peak year of 1980, production reached
1.7 billion cubic feet per day. Gas volumes
have not experienced the same degree of
decline as for oil; in 1987 gas production
had declined to 0.9 billion cubic feet per day
on the average.
The NGL facilities at Teesside became
operational in 1979, and the volume trend
has been somewhat different from that of oil
and gas. Peak production was reached in
1983, with a daily average of 44,278 barrels.
In 1975 the training
ship "Christian
Radich" visited the
Ekofisk Complex. In
addition to the
platforms at the
Complex we see
Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo
on the right with its
characteristic two
derricks.
Price Development
Dramatic — that has to be the best way to
characterize the price development for crude
oil since Ekofisk was declared commercial on
13 January 1971. The price of Libyan crude
lay at $2.53 per barrel in January 1971. In
July, when Ekofisk started initial production,
the price had increased to $3.42. The year
1971 marks a historic point in the price
development. From the turn of the century
until 1971, the real price of crude oil was
fairly stable. The big jump carne in 1973
when the price passed $11.50 by year end.
And the price continued to spiral. In January
1980 Libyan crude oil had topped $26.00 -
and one year later the price hit $40.30 per
barrel.
The good news for the Phillips Group
and the Norwegian authorities was that oil
prices increased in step with increases in
Ekofisk production. This, of course, meant
that income estimates for this whole period
were far surpassed by the price
development. This in turn had a great 213
 Until 1974 the gas
produced was burned
impact on the profitability of the fields and
off in the flare on meant that the owners of the Ekofisk fields
"Gulftide". When were able to pay off their investments
the permanent 600 mill
platforms came on
during «the good years».
stream, gas injection
into the reservoir Taxes and Royalties
was started by
means of the
400 mill Norway's first petroleum tax legislation was
injection equipment passed in 1965, prior to the awarding of
on 2/4C. We see licenses in the first concession round. The
that production
increases —gradually 200 mill law's objective was to make Norway, and
until it takes a leap the Norwegian continental shelf, attractive
when the Emden gas for oil exploration. Since the level of risk
pipeline is opened in
1977.
was considered to be very high, the tax
level for the oil industry was set lower than
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
for other industry. The municipal tax was
reduced so that the total tax level was set at
Production ofNGL 42.8 percent, as compared with 50 percent
— natural gas liquids
-started up in 1979. for other stock companies. However, these
16 mill
The reason for the moderate tax rates lasted only until
late start-up was a 1 January 1972, when the municipal tax was
delay in the 14 mil
completion ofNGL increased to the regular rate and the tax base
facilities at Teesside. for oil production matched that of the
Peak production was 12 mi onshore industry.
reached in 1983
when the average When Ekofisk production got under way
daily production of in earnest in 1975, new special tax
NGL was more than regulations were passed. This came about as
44,000 barrels.
a direct result of the strong increase in the
oil price — combined with the fact that the
Norwegian shelf had become attractive as a
result of the added discoveries of the Frigg
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
and Statfjord fields. Total taxation was
increased to 75.8 percent. In 1980 the
special tax was further increased from 25 to
35 percent, which brought the total tax bite
to 85.8 percent.
On 1 January 1987 the tax rules were
revised once more. The tax level was to

214
 "Perhaps the most
therefore be expected to benefit the difficult task will be
Norwegian economy.*10 explaining why oil is
In Storting report no. 50 for 1970/71, the as expensive in
socialist Norway as
financial expectations for Ekofisk were
in capitalist
expressed in number terms. countries." The artist
Income to the State from the discovery was has put these words
into the mouth of
set at a minimum of NOK 100 million/ Minister of Finance
maximum of NOK 500 million during a Per Kleppe, seated
20-30 year period. It turned out quite along with Minister
of Petroleum and
differently in reality, and as early as 1974 Energy Bjartmar
the issue of what to do with all the oil Gjerde on a barrel of
money was raised in a Storting report.11
By the end of 1987, operator Phillips
Petroleum Company Norway alone had
paid in excess of 62 billion kroner in taxes
and royalties to the Norwegian State. If we
reflect the strong decline in the price of oil.
aggregate the amount from PPCoN to
The basic principles of the new tax policy
include the whole Phillips Group, the State's
were to distinguish between old and new income is more than 168 billion kroner. This
licenses — wherein new licenses were amount is not quite accurate since the
defined as those awarded after 1 January co-venturers have different write-offs, but
1986. For new licenses the royalty burden the figure draws a realistic picture of the
was removed, while the special tax for all
licenses was reduced from 35 to 30 percent. The red curve
indicates Phillips'
I Phillips Norway Group
Expectations and Reality 25
I PPCoN
contribution in the
9 form of taxes and
In Storting report no. 22 for 1965/66 the royalties from
economic expectations for the oil activities 20 milliarder Ekofisk. These
were expressed for the first time in figures. figures are used as
the basis for
Exploration expenses for the companies in calculating the
15 milliarde
the first licensing round were estimated at a contribution of the
minimum of NOK 600 million — and it is entire Phillips Group
lOmilliarde — in other words,
stated as a condition that the companies total taxes and
operate from bases in Norway and utilize royalties from the
Norwegian industry and the Norwegian 5 milliard Ekofisk area (blue
curve). The figures
work force to the extent that they are are not entirely
competitive. «Substantial shares of the accurate since the
above mentioned NOK 600 million must 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 various members of
the Phillips Group
have different tax
deductions.

215
 The catering service
on the platforms has
resulted in the
establishment of a
new industry.
Stavanger Catering
and Norske Chalk
are examples affirms
which have had
important contracts
on the Ekofisk
platforms. Here a
container of supplies
is being unloaded on
2/4H at the Ekofisk
Complex.

Oil and gas

production's
value-generating property of the fields in
percentage of the License 018 — the Phillips Group's share in
Norwegian gross the Ekofisk area.
national product was
on the increase
The best illustration of the significance of
throughout the the oil industry for the Norwegian economy
1970s. In 1980, it can be seen in its impact on the GNP. From
was 16 percent. The
only sectors
a zero start in 1971, the industry reached a
exceeding this were high of 19.8 percent in 1985. The
"Manufacturing" preliminary numbers for 1987 indicate that
plus "Public, social this share has been reduced to just above 10
and private services."
The figures are taken percent.12 Direct income to the State in 1985
from Norway's amounted to approximately NOK 46.6
Statistical "Yearbook
billion.13
1981.
Although the GNP share fluctuates with
the price development and production
volume, the opportunities these amounts
have provided and continue to provide for
The gross national Norwegian politicians should be obvious. In
product is one way of this context, how they have used or plan to
measuring an
industry's value to 80 milliarder use this income is of little interest. The
society. The chart Ekofisk discovery in 1969 opened up new
reflects the oil development opportunities for the
industry's increasing
importance to the 60
milliarder Norwegian society.
Norwegian society.
The peak was
reached in 1985 with
A Norwegian Oil Industry
40 milliarder When the exploration activities on the
a gross national
product of NOK 96 Norwegian shelf got under way in 1966, the
billion.
offshore industry was viewed as an
20 milliarder
opportunity. Norway had no industry with
experience from this new field. The attitude
within traditional industry was one of
216 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 reserve — there was a tendency to «wait and
 see» where this new industry was going The use of
Norwegian share Norwegian goods
before getting involved. The Aker Foreign share and services has
Mekaniske Verksted was one of the first gradually increased
Norwegian firms to become directly 6 milliarder during the
development and
involved, with the building of «Ocean operation of the
5 milliarder
Viking*. In addition, Rogaland County and Ekofisk area. One
Stavanger in particular were especially 4 milliarder reason is better access
to goods and services
aware of the opportunities this new industry — another is
offered. Arne Rettedal was a key individual 3 milliarder improved
as mayor of Stavanger at the time. He made competitiveness.
every effort to help the oil companies feel 2 milliarder
welcome in Stavanger. According to 1 milliard
Rettedal it was only natural to grasp any
opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the
traditional Stavanger industries of fishing 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
and canning. Phillips not only made sure
that the drilling company ODECO placed
the order for the construction of «Ocean on by the Norwegian authorities to handle
Viking* in Norway, but also saw to it that the control functions, and the firm was
Norwegian goods and services were used in already involved in the modifications on
support of the exploration activities. "Gulftide".
Helikopter Service was in the picture from Norwegian yards were invited to bid on
the very beginning. Later the Rosenberg the first Ekofisk platforms, but with full
Verft in Stavanger was commissioned to order books they were not interested in
carry out modification work on the jack-up submitting bids. One exception was the
rig «Gulftide», and Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk joint venture which undertook the
supplied turbines for electric power construction of the Ekofisk Tank — resulting
generation. later in the formation of Norwegian
Det norske Veritas was appointed early Contractors.

Aker- Verdal is one of

the shipyards
developed to serve
the oil industry -
and its influence was
also felt outside
southwestern
Norway, The
shipyard has
undertaken several
major projects for
Ekofisk — most
recently the jacket for
water injection
platform 2/4K.

217
 The impact of A happy breakthrough occurred in 1973
Norway's oil Rogaland
industry on Rest of Norway when Kvaerner Engineering was awarded
employment has the contract for all engineering design work
increased steadily 60.000
on the Tor and Cod platforms.
from the start.
Rogaland's status as 50.000
Aker became more directly involved
"no. 7 oil county" is through the fabrication of the jackets and
quite natural, since modules for the new platforms. In many
40.000
all of the major
organizations are ways it can be said that Norwegian industry
based in the really became adapted to the offshore
Stavanger area. industry as a result of the crisis within
20.000
shipping.
That this development coincided with the
Ekofisk development was only natural, since
it was the only area under development
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
until the Frigg field got under way. The
Albuskjell 2/4F in
Trondheim? Yes, the
living quarters that
were replaced in
1983 were given to
Trondheim College
of Maritime Studies
along with a sum of
money for
transportation and
installation at
Ladehammeren.
There the living
quarters are used in
the training of future
"oil workers".

218
extent of Norwegian industrial involvement
has continued to grow - and through the
support of offshore contracts and research
and development projects, Norwegian
industry has established a firm footing in the
oil and gas industry.
Norwegian Oil Companies
Norsk Hydro joined the Phillips Group in
1967 as a result of the agreement between
Phillips and Agip — and the Petronord
Group. Participation in the Ekofisk
development program gave Hydro a good
foundation for its development into a
Norwegian oil company. In terms of
know-how and experience as well as
economics, this development has been of
great value for Norsk Hydro, which as
operator in 1988 is in the process of
developing Oseberg, its first oil field.
As early as 1973 — less than one year
after the State oil company was founded,
Statoil became 50 percent owner in the
Norpipe pipe and transportation system.
This involvement provided Statoil with its
first direct revenue-generating project on
the shelf.
In 1988, Statoil joined the Phillips Group
through an agreement with the two French
companies Total and Elf. An even trade
made Statoil 1 percent owner in the first
field development in Norwegian waters.
Ekofisk has been a good "training school"
for experts who have become key players in
the development of other fields. Many years
of experience from Ekofisk could be applied
to the development of and operations on
the many new fields on the Norwegian
shelf.
As a result of Ekofisk, a Norwegian oil
environment has grown up. As new fields
have been discovered and developed, the
offshore industry has grown in scope and
significance. But it all began with Ekofisk in
1969. In 1987 more than 60,000 persons in
Norway were employed in oil-related
activities. From a small but significant start
at Ekofisk twenty years ago, Norway has
evolved from being an energy importer to a
net exporter of energy.
In this book it has
been our hope to
show that Ekofisk
has indeed strewn
"flowers" around the
Norwegian society,
all the positive effects
that this first oil and
gas field on the
Norwegian
continental shelf has
had on Norway and
the nation's
inhabitants.
219
 Postscript
By Anders O. Waale
With this book we have tried to give a
historical account of Ekofisk, from the
events that led to the discovery of the field
in 1969 - until today, 1988. Of course,
everything has not been included. Every
single company in the Phillips Norway
Group, for example, could have described its
own individual decision-making processes
in connection with its participation in
Ekofisk, and the experiences and
contributions of the company. We must
remember that the Phillips Norway Group
consists of companies, both state-owned
and private, from five different nations.
Individual decisions have been made that
have had major consequences. One example
is the exchange of ownership interests in
1967, when Phillips and Agip together
transferred 20 percent of the "Ekofisk
license" (018) to the Petronord Group -
which meant that Norsk Hydro, Elf, Total
and three small French companies acquired
shares in Ekofisk. Petrofina did not want to
2.20 take part in this exchange of shares. The
company kept its original 30 percent in the
"Ekofisk license", and probably had good
reasons for doing so.
Much could also have been said about the
Norwegian authorities - and politicians'
evaluations and decisions in connection
with the oil era in general and the Ekofisk
activities in particular. Some aspects have
already been recorded. It will be a challenge
to the writers of Norway's oil history to
include all relevant aspects of the national
decision-making process in connection
with the petroleum activities.
The history of Ekofisk remains to be
completed. New chapters will be written in
the years ahead. Certain themes are
predictable, but unexpected events will also
occur - both positive and negative. All of
this only confirms that the activities in
connection with Ekofisk are dynamic,
exciting, challenging and rewarding — and
that Ekofisk will continue to be an
important element in the Norwegian oil
saga well into the 21st century.
Ekofisk Milestones

1962
27 October - Owen D. Thomas, Ward W. Dunn and Silvio Eha from Phillips, the first oil company
interested in the Norwegian shelf, meet Trygve Lie in Oslo.
29 October — Phillips applies for oil and gas concessions on what may become the Norwegian shelf.

1963
6 June — Phillips is granted permission to carry out seismic tests.

1964
22 October — Phillips Petroleum Company Norsk A/S is established with its main office in Oslo.

1965
13 April — The first concession round is announced.
18 August — The awarding of first round concessions is made public; the Phillips Group is awarded
three licenses over a total of 11 blocks.
6 November — Ed Crump arrives in Stavanger, then opens Phillips' office in that city.

1966
19 July — The Esso-operated rig "Ocean Traveler" spuds in block 8/3. The first drilling on the
Norwegian shelf is under way.

1967
14 July - "Ocean Viking" begins exploration on the Norwegian shelf for the Phillips Group -
well 16/11-1.

1968
24 June - Press release from Phillips on the discovery in block 7/11, Cod.

1969
21 August - "Ocean Viking" begins drilling on well 2/4-1.
18 September - "Ocean Viking" begins drilling on well 2/4-2.
25 October — Core samples show that the drill bit is in an oil and gas reservoir of chalk,
the samples saturated with oil.
25 December - "Ocean Viking" is towed off location at well 2/4-2.

1970
27 January — Drilling begins on the first delineation well, 2/4-3.
2 June — In a press release Phillips announces that the Ekofisk discovery is "giant".
August — The Ekofisk Commission is appointed by the Government for the purpose of studying
landing alternatives from the Ekofisk field.
3 September — The Phillips Group applies for a permit to carry out test production on the Ekofisk field.
12 November -- "Neptun 7" completes work on the discovery well on West Ekofisk. Good test results.
17 November — The drill bit from "Ocean Viking" has reached total depth on the first well at Eldfisk.
However, test results are poor. 221
 22 November •- "Orion" completes work on the discovery well on Tor for the Amoco/Noco group.
The Phillips Group contributes 50% of costs.
29 December — The Phillips Group signs a contract for the building of the 2/4 FTP, B, and C platforms.

1971
13 January —The Phillips Group delivers the declaration of commerciality for the Ekofisk field.
February — The hundred-year wave for Ekofisk is readjusted from 19.4 to 23.7 meters,
causing great delays.
2 April — The Norwegian authorities give the Phillips Group approval for test production from
«Gulftide».
14 May - The Phillips Group signs a contract with the French firm C.G. Doris for construction of
the Ekofisk Tank.
9 June — Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli formally opens test production on «Gulftide».
15 June — Test production from «Gulftide» gets under way.
1 December — The «Choctaw» crane barge launches the first bridge support to the south flare.
The first link in what will become the Ekofisk Complex is in place.

1972
February — The Ekofisk Commission presents its recommendation. The conclusion: neither oil nor
gas will be piped to shore in Norway.
1 March — The Ministry of Industry approves the Phillips Group's technical plan for the Phase II
development.
3 September — «Ocean Viking» completes work on the discovery well on Edda (southwest Ekofisk).
26 October — «Zapata Nordic» completes work on the discovery well on Albuskjell for Shell.
The Phillips Group paid 50% of the costs.

1973
22 January — The Phillips Group signs the first gas sales contract with the consortium on the
Continent.
26 April — Norwegian parliament (Storting) approves landing of oil and NGL at Teesside and gas
at Emden.
22 May — Laying of the pipeline to Teesside gets under way.
1 July - The Ekofisk Tank is in place on the field.
9 July — A Sikorsky S61N helicopter on its way from «Gulftide» to Forus makes an emergency
landing in the sea. Four of the seventeen men onboard lose their lives.

1974
25 April — Start-up of oil production from well A-13 on Ekofisk 2/4 Alpha. The first permanent
platform in the Ekofisk area, and on the Norwegian shelf, is on stream.
3 December - The Ekofisk Tank receives the first crude oil for storage.

1975
15 October - The first crude oil goes into the pipeline to Teesside, and four days later reaches the
terminal in Great Britain.
25 October — Official opening of the Teesside terminal.
1 November — A riser on 2/4 Alpha catches fire as a result of corrosion. Three members of the crew die
when a rescue capsule falls during the lowering operation.

1976
September - Phillips' Norwegian headquarters moves from Oslo to Tananger near Stavanger.
October - Employee no. 1000 is hired at Phillips Petroleum Company Norway.

1977
22 April — The Bravo blowout. Well B-14 on 2/4 Bravo goes out of control during overhaul work,
and the North Sea's first blowout occurs. No personal injuries.
30 April — The Bravo blowout is ended.
2 May - Production start-up on West Ekofisk 2/4D platform.
8 September — Official opening of the gas terminal at Emden.
17 September — The first gas reaches the Emden terminal.
23 November - A Sikorsky S61N helicopter with twelve people onboard crashes enroute from Forus to
222 compressor platform B-ll. There are no survivors.
26 December - Production start-up on Cod 7/11.

1978
24 May — Production start-up on Albuskjell 1/6A.
28 June — Production start-up on Tor 2/4E.
26 July - Production start-up on Albuskjell 2/4F.
3 September - Occupancy begins on hotel platform, 2/4H.

1979
March - Teesside receives the first NGL production from Ekofisk.
7 August — Production start-up on Eldfisk A and FTP.
28 October — Production start-up on Eldfisk B.
2 December — Production start-up on Edda. Thus the last production platform on the seven oil
and gas fields in the Ekofisk area is on stream.

1980
27 March —Accommodations rig «Alexander L. Kielland» capsizes near the Edda platform.
One hundred twenty-three people die in the worst accident in Norway's history.

1981
15 April — The water injection pilot project in well B-16 from Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo gets under way.
6 August — The new building which houses Phillips' headquarters in Norway as well as Ekofisk
operations is inaugurated.

1982
1 October - The Valhall field begins production of oil, and the first oil arrives at the Ekofisk Complex
to be transported to Teesside.

1983
13 July — Gas from Valhall comes into the Ekofisk system.
9 August — The Phillips Group and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy reach agreement on
adjustment of taxation terms for the Ekofisk water injection project.

1984
26 November — Subsidence of the seabed under the Ekofisk Complex is recognized.

1985
15 October — The Statpipe pipeline is in operation, and gas from Statfjord goes into the pipeline
to Emden.

1986
20 March - The monument to the «Kielland» accident is unveiled by Crown Prince Harald
at Smiodden near Stavanger.
26 July — The water injection pilot project in the lower part of the Danian reservoir gets under
way in well B-16 from Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo.
6 October — The Ula field goes on stream, and the oil goes into the Ekofisk system for transportation
to Teesside.

1987
16/17 July — 2/4H is jacked up six meters.
15/16 August — 2/4 R is jacked up six meters.
17 August - 2/4FTP, Q, C, and P are jacked up six meters.
28 December - Water injection begins in well K-30 from 2/4K platform.

1988
February — The contract for construction of the protective barrier for the Ekofisk Tank is signed by
the Phillips Group and the new Norwegian firm Peconord.
15 July - The Norwegian authorities approve the plans for Phase II of the water injection project.

223
 Art Credits
PerDybvigldl, 171
Roar Hagen 196
John Hult 198, 201
Henry Imsland 21, 29, 59, 60, 72, 103, 138, 214, 215
Leif Raa 96, 169
Trog, London Daily Mail 37
Stale Adland 13, 25, 48, 51, 69, 79, 170, 193

Notes
1 This version is based on interviews with Owen
Thomas and Ward W. Dunn in the fall of 1986, in
addition to the weekly reports they made during the
trip.
2 The official name is Phillips Norway Group. Through
- out the rest of the book it will be shortened to
Phillips Group.
Photo Credits 3 The «Blucher» is the German warship which was sunk
by Norwegian artillery as it attempted to invade
Academy Studios Ltd. 101
Oslo on 9 April 1940.
Adresseavisens Forlag 59
4 Pounds per square inch. Normal pressure at a specific
Leif Berge 85
depth is the same as the pressure within a column
Billedsentralen 128
of salt water.
Per-Arne Carlsen 58
5 C. J. «Pete» Silas was appointed Chief Executive
Egil Eriksson 19, 34 (bottom), 67 (top), 71 (top),
Officer and Chairman of the Board of Phillips
129, 162 (top)
Petroleum Company in 1985.
Baste Fanebust 145 (bottom)
6 This applies to offshore employees receiving hourly
Odd Furenes 46, 157, 219
wages. For other categories it varies between 25 and
Leif Hauge 36, 166 (top)
40 percent.
Jan B. Henriksen 32, 148, 149, 150, 153, 184 (top),
7 Yngvar Ustvedt: Overflod og oppr0r, vol. 3,
208
page 488.
Husmo-foto 6, 96, 107 (center and bottom), 108,
8 Including NGL production.
109 (bottom), 110, 111 (bottom), 113, 114 (top and
9 Stortingsmelding no. 22 1966/67 -Exploration and
center), 115 (top), 117, 122, 126, 131 (bottom),
production of petroleum reserves on the
145 (top), 152, 154, 155, 165, 166 (bottom), 167,
Norwegian continental shelf in the North Sea.
169 (bottom), 170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179,
10 Stortingsmelding no. 22 1966/67, page 4.
180 (top and bottom), 181, 182, 183, 184 (bottom),
11 Stortingsmelding no. 25 1974/75 - The place of the
185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191 (except top right),
petroleum activity in Norwegian society.
192, 195, 199 (right), 203 (with retouch by
12 From Statistisk Sentralbyra 1988, GNP - oil and gas
Svein Bjur), 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 216, 217, 218,
production, drilling and pipeline transportation.
220, 224
13 Min. of Petr. & Energy: Survey of taxes and royalties
Infofilm og video A/S 55, 74, 77, 84, 89 (bottom), 90, 94,
from the oil industry to 1/1 -88.
95 (bottom), 98 (bottom), 99 (top), 103 (bottom),
121
Published by Phillips Petroleum Company Norway,
BorgeKalvig 53
Public Affairs,
Bjorn Stale Laerdal 61, 109 (top), 111 (top), 112,
P.O. Box 220,
116 (top), 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 151
4056 Tananger, Norway
Eirik Moe 127, 143 on behalf of the Phillips Norway Group.
N.A.M.-foto 8
Harry Nor-Hansen 116 (bottom), 180 (center)
Reprints permitted with source reference.
NTB 16, 20, 23, 97, 102, 118, 213
Reprints of artwork and photos prohibited.
Phillips-archives, Bartlesville 9, 10, 14, 30, 33, 34 (top),
35, 68, 73, 81 (top), 82, 86, 88 (bottom), 91,
Translation from Norwegian: Minda M. Laerdal.
98 (top), 99 (bottom), 100,
104, 105, 106, 107 (top), 115 (bottom),
Photo editing, graphic design, layout and cover design:
166 (center) Eirik Moe.
Phillips-archives (Tananger and Oslo) 22, 27, 28, 39, 47,
52, 57, 64, 65, 67 (bottom), 71 (bottom), 72, 75, 78, The text is set in Palatino and printed on
81 (bottom), 83, 87, 88.(top), 89 (top), 93, 95 (top), Phoeno Matt from Papierenfabrik Scheufelen.
103 (top), 114 (bottom), 130, 131 (top), 132, 133, 134, Typesetting and paste-up: Verbum A.s.
162 (bottom), 163 (top), 191 (top right), 199 (left) Reproduction and printing: Bryne Offset A.s.
Stavanger Aftenblad's archives 26, 66, 76 Binding: Emil Moestue A.s.
Finn E. Stramberg 146
Knut S. Vindfallet 138 ISBN 82-991771-1-1 (English edition)
224 Fjellanger Wideroe A/S 163 (bottom) ISBN 82-991771-0-3 (Norwegian edition)