THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Daniel Pekarsky, PhD

Introduction
The title of this discussion, "The Role of Culture in Moral Development", points to two
different, albeit inter-related, questions:

first, what role does culture play in moral development?; and

second, what is the proper responsibility of a culture in guiding the moral growth of its
members? This paper does not systematically explore what the proper role of a culture is in the
area of moral growth, and it recognizes that precisely what this role should be is rightly subject
to debate. At the same time, it takes it for granted that because, as I will discuss, the social
universe that children encounter inevitably, and for better or for worse, influences their moral
growth, a community needs to view itself as responsible for the moral growth of its members.
This paper argues that while this communal responsibility cannot be adequately discharged
through special-purpose institutions like schools, such institutions, if thought of in the right way,
may be capable of playing a significant role in the process of moral growth. The reasons for this
view will emerge through our inquiry into the role that, intended or not, culture does play in the
moral development of its members. Before embarking on this inquiry, and because terms like
"culture" and "moral development" are far from self- explanatory, let me preface my remarks
with a few comments concerning how I will be interpreting these terms in the context of this
paper.

I will be using the term "culture" in a fairly intuitive and very broad sense to denote the totality
of the social environment into which a human being is born and in which he/she lives. Culture in
this sense includes the community's institutional arrangements (social, political, and economic)
but also its forms of art and knowledge, the assumptions and values embedded in its practices
and organization, its images of heroism and villainy, it various systems of ideas, its forms of
work and recreation, and so forth.
I turn now to the concept of moral development.

By "moral development" I will be referring to the process through which a human being acquires
sensibilities, attitudes, beliefs, skills, and dispositions that render him or her a morally mature or
adequate human being. Of course, this definition is, at best, a mere shell, empty of content; for it
tells us nothing about what those sensibilities, attitudes, beliefs, skills, and dispositions are that
mark one as a morally adequate human being. There are two reasons for leaving this matter open.
The first is that it may be presumptuous to present a positive account of this matter too quickly in
the face of what we all know, namely, that the character of this moral content is a subject of rich
debate across the whole of human history down to our own time. The second is that, for present
purposes, it may be unnecessary to offer a positive account of the content of a desirable moral
character. That is, much that I intend to say here does not require settling, even tentatively, on an
account of a morally desirable or adequate character. At the same time, lest this account be
affected in ways I don't recognize by the moral concerns at work in my own thinking on moral
development, let me intuitively identify some of these concerns. Briefly, these concerns grow out
of reflection on two matters: the Nazi Holocaust and kindred phenomena, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, social psychological and other research suggesting that the perpetrators of the
atrocities our century has witnessed may not be as different from "the rest of us" as "we" might
want to believe. Attention to such matters has led me to attend to those features of moral growth
that are associated with two kinds of sensibilities, attitudes, principles, and dispositions: those
that enable us to resist dehumanizing other human beings in thought and conduct in precisely
those situations when there might be a disposition to engage in such dehumanization; and those
that enable us to view ourselves as responsible for preventing such dehumanization when we see
it going on. While this account of the moral domain is neither fully clear nor complete, it may
help to illuminate the background the informs my approach to problem of moral growth and
cultural context. Though I am doubtful that the approach would be substantially different were
my interest in the subject grounded in other kinds of moral concerns, this possibility needs to be
allowed for.
Against this background, my purpose in this paper is to use a powerful classical perspective on
the role of culture in mediating our moral experience and development to highlight a difficult
human problem. I then proceed to sketch out what might be called a classical American response
to this problem, a response, strongly associated with John Dewey, that gives pride of place to
educating institutions. While this response is not, to my mind, as compelling as the problem it
addresses, I conclude by suggesting that, despite its possible shortcomings, we should avoid
prematurely dismissing it. I turn now to the characterization of the problem.
Ancient Wisdom on a Perennial Problem
Both Jerusalem and Athens - the culture of the ancient Israelites and the culture of the ancient
Greeks, each of which has substantially influenced contemporary Western civilization - speak
instructively concerning the role that culture plays in the moral life of human beings.
Commenting in Hellenistic times on the Biblical verse, "Noah was a righteous man, and perfect
in his generation," Rabbinic commentators intimate two very different interpretations:

1 "In his generation, R[abbi] Yochanan pointed out, but not in other generations. However,
according to Resh Lakish, the verse intimates that even in his generation Noah was a righteous
man, all the more so in other generations."
On the first of these interpretations, Noah is only relatively righteous; that is, relative to his
perverse contemporaries, he looks very good, but this does not mean that he would be judged
good by any absolute standard. This interpretation coheres with other rabbinic commentaries
which emphasize that Abraham was, morally speaking, far superior to Noah.

2 The other interpretation, however, is more germane to our topic. According to Resh Lakish, if
Noah was capable of remaining righteous in the midst of the unbridled perversity that surrounded
him on all sides, how much more so would he have been in a community in which morally
adequate conduct was the norm! At work in Resh Lakish's observation is the insight that our
moral outlook and conduct are, in the normal course of events, strongly influenced by the culture
that surrounds us; and that, therefore, the person who is capable of arriving at moral insights that
go beyond - and indeed defy - what is the norm in his or her culture, or who is able to maintain
integrity in the midst of a perverse community, is a most extra-ordinary human being -- much
more so than the one who behaves well in the midst of a community in which the norm is good
conduct.

Interestingly, Plato expresses a very similar idea in a famous passage of the Republic:
Is not the same principle true of the mind, Adeimantus: if their early training is bad, the most
gifted turn out the worst...Or do you hold the popular belief that, here and there, certain young
men are demoralized by the instructions of some individual sophist? Does that sort of influence
amount to much? Is not the public itself the greatest of all sophists, training up young and old,
men and women alike, into the most accomplished specimens of the character it desires to
produce?
Whenever the populace crowds together at any public gathering, in the Assembly, the law courts,
the theatre or the camp, and sits there clamouring its approval or disapproval, both alike
excessive, of whatever is being said or done....In such a scene what do you suppose will be a
young man's state of mind? What sort of private instruction will have given him the strength to
hold up against the force of such a torrent, or will save him from being swept away down the
stream, until he accepts all their notions of right and wrong, does as they do, and comes to be just
such a man as they are? And I have said nothing of the most powerful engines of persuasion
which the masters in this school of wisdom bring to bear when words have no effect. As you
know, they punish the recalcitrant with disenfranchisement, fines, and death.
How could the private teaching of any sophist avail in counteracting theirs? It would be great
folly even to try; for no instruction aiming at an ideal contrary to the training they give has ever
produced, or will ever produce, a different type of character -- on the level, that is to say, of
common humanity....[Y]ou may be sure that, in the present state of society, any character that
escapes and comes to good can only have been saved by some miraculous interposition.

3 It is noteworthy that in this passage Plato identifies three critical variables that jointly give rise
to the moral character of a human being: native traits (or what we might call genetic endowment
or pre-dispositions); early childhood experience; and, finally, the surrounding culture. For our
purposes, Plato's reference to innate traits that bear on our moral development, while interesting,
is not immediately relevant. More relevant are the points pertaining to early childhood
experience and to the power of the surrounding culture.
Let us begin with the power of the surrounding culture. Much like Resh Lakish, Plato offers the
social psychological insight that the overwhelming majority of individuals will prove incapable
of resisting the voice of the culture that surrounds them: in the typical case, their values, their
beliefs, indeed, their very perceptions will tend to mirror those of the surrounding culture. To be
sure, some individuals may at times find themselves in social contexts (like certain educational
or religious settings) that enable them to take a step back from the culture's norms and to
apprehend and affirm moral values that diverge from the culture's drift; but such counter-cultural
values are unlikely to survive in a meaningful way when these individuals re-enter day-to-day
life in the culture.
Viewed against the background of Nazi Germany and some of the other horrors of the twentieth
century, Plato's suggestion that an individual is unlikely to maintain his or her value-
commitments and moral givens in the face of a surrounding culture that represents and rewards
different values rings all-too-true; and it may threaten to engulf us in pessimism concerning the
human future. For this reason, it is important to note that Plato's perspective is not as pessimistic
as one might think at first. Note, first, that along with its darker implications Plato's insight
concerning the power of culture to shape our outlook and conduct also carries the more
comforting implication that if the culture surrounding us embodies and rewards conformity to
desirable social norms, it will tend to call forth conduct in the individual that is coherent with
these norms; it can lead us to behave much better than we otherwise would, stilling or in any
case muting less desirable impulses that might, in the absence of the culture's pull, lead us to
reprehensible conduct.
It is, secondly, noteworthy that Plato qualifies his claims concerning the power of culture over
the individual in an important respect which is worthy of careful attention; for he intimates that
there is one kind of person who may be capable of withstanding the culture's pull! Who is this
exceptional individual? It is the person who, having been born with the right native endowment,
has also been properly brought up. A sound education in childhood offers, Plato suggests, a
measure of protection in adulthood against the countervailing power of the culture!
This sounds like a very promising qualification of Plato's general view; but, as we shall see, it
proves much less hopeful than one might initially think. The reason for this is that, for Plato, a
proper up-bringing is impossible in the absence of a morally adequate cultural environment. And
this brings us face-to-face with the problem of early childhood education as understood by Plato.
For if it is true that adults are powerfully influenced towards conformity with the culture that
surrounds them, all the more so young children! In their case, the surrounding culture does not
challenge and overpower their pre-existing values and dispositions, for these do not yet exist;
rather, the culture creates these values and dispositions! Hence, Plato's insistence that the culture
that surrounds young children in the form of real and fictional role-models represent ideals of
conduct that are proper to a human being.
Then we must compel our poets, on pain of expulsion, to make their poetry the express image of
noble character; we must also supervise craftsmen of every kind and forbid them to leave the
stamp of baseness, license, meanness, unseemliness, on painting and sculpture or building...We
would not have our Guardians grow up among representations of moral deformity, as in some
foul pasture where, day after day, feeding on every poisonous weed they would, little by little
gather insensibly a mass of corruption in their very souls. Rather we must seek out those
craftsmen whose instincts guides them to whatsoever is lovely and gracious; so that our young
men, dwelling in a wholesome climate, may drink in good from every quarter, whence, like a
breeze bearing health from happy regions, some influence from noble works constantly falls
upon eye and ear from childhood upward, and imperceptibly draws them into sympathy and
harmony with the beauty of reason, whose impress they take.

4 Thus, Jerusalem and Athens speak with one voice on the question of the role of culture in the
moral life: culture is enormously powerful, tending to shape individual human beings in its
image. Embedded in this view is a sharp critique of those who hold that "moral education",
understood as formal classes designed to promote moral growth, has the power to nurture moral
attitudes, dispositions, and sensibilities that improve on what day-to-day life in the culture
encourages. How quickly, says Socrates, will the learning acquired at the hands of a teacher
dissolve in the face of the allure and the threats presented by the crowd (the culture!). Do not,
then, expect much help from courses in ethics designed to stimulate moral growth; and do not
expect much from listening to, and even being temporarily moved by, the stirring insights of a
moral sage. Such influences do not amount to very much so long as they are incoherent with the
moral messages being forcefully and continuously communicated by the cultural environment.

5 It follows from this analysis that rather than trying to strengthen direct instruction in the
schools, our efforts should be directed towards weaving around the children of the community a
cultural totality that will nurture them with images of moral goodness which will seep deeply and
enduringly into their souls. When we do this, says Plato,
rhythm and music sink seep into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest hold there,
bringing that grace of body and mind which is only to be found in one who is brought up in the
right way. Moreover, a proper training in this kind makes a man quick to perceive any defect or
ugliness in art or in nature. Such deformity will rightly disgust him. Approving all that is lovely,
he will welcome it home with joy into his soul and, nourished thereby, grow into a man of a
noble spirit (Plato, 1966, p. 90).
Unfortunately, this solution is itself seriously problematic: for it would appear to be naively
unrealistic to think that we have the capacity to reshape the larger culture in such a way that the
child is surrounded and nurtured by a worthy moral ideal; for better and/or for worse, we are far
from knowing how to re-shape cultural attitudes and dispositions in accordance with our wishes.
Indeed, those who seek the kind of cultural transformation that is being suggested as a condition
of adequate moral education often turn to education to launch this transformation.
We have, it would appear, a chicken-and-egg problem: education is the key to the transformation
of the culture's attitudes regarding morality; but, if Plato is right, the effectiveness of such
education depends on a culture that supports the message delivered by educational institutions. Is
there a way out of this vicious -- a term particularly appropriate, give our subject-matter --
circle?

An Approach to the Problem

To my way of thinking, there may -- and I use the word "may" deliberately to signify something
short of full confidence -- be a way out of this dilemma. This way out is grounded in the insight
that schools and families are not just vehicles of "direct instruction", but are themselves cultures.
That is, they are social institutions in which are embedded a rich array of norms, customs, and
ways of thinking. While it may true that schools, thought of as vehicles of direct instruction, are
not in a position to compete with the beliefs and values that suffuse the larger culture, it may be
that the culture of the school, if organized around a moral vision that improves on what is
available in the larger culture, would prove a worthy competitor. This distinction between
schools as vehicles of direct instruction and schools as cultures and the suggestion that the power
of schools as educating institutions lies largely in their influence as cultures are forcefully
articulated by John Dewey in his classic book Democracy and Education. Commenting on the
desirability of bringing about a culture in which work is so organized that

1) a
better fit obtains between aptitudes and interests, on the one hand, and occupational role,
on the other, and
2) wor
kers experience work as an arena in which to grow and to contribute to the life of the
community, Dewey turns to education as the path towards this ideal. But in doing so, he
explicitly disavows the suggestion that education can accomplish this mission via direct
instruction. He writes:
Success or failure [in achieving a more adequately organized society] depends more upon the
adoption of educational methods calculated to effect the change than upon anything else. For the
change is essentially a change in the quality of mental disposition - an educative change. This
does not mean that we can change character and mind by direct instruction, apart from a change
in industrial and political conditions. Such a conception contradicts our basic idea that character
and mind are attitudes of participative response in social affairs. But it does mean that we may
produce in schools a projection in type of the society we should like to realize, and by forming
minds in accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult
society.

6 What this means concretely for Dewey is that it would be futile to attempt to nurture, say, the
spirit of social cooperation or the expectation that work is an arena for personal growth through
any kind of direct instruction. There is, however, some likelihood of success if such values are
woven into the very fabric, or organization, of day-to-day life in the school community, so that
students encounter and absorb them as a matter-of-fact by-product of participating in the life of
this community.
More generally, so long as the power of education to shape basic moral beliefs and dispositions
is identified with isolated efforts to impart skills, understandings, and insights, there is little
reason to think it can compete with the larger culture that surrounds the child -- especially if the
cultures of educating institutions themselves don't cohere with the contents of direct instruction.
But the moment we begin thinking of educating institutions as themselves forms of culture in
which the child is immersed, the situation changes dramatically. Of course, one should not be
naive about our ability shape the ethos of a school-culture in accordance with our aspirations;
this too, as many an educational innovator and reformer will attest, can be most difficult.
Nonetheless, it is significantly more manageable than the effort to directly transform the culture
of the larger community. And if the culture of the school-community can thus be shaped, there is
reason to hope that it will influence the young in ways that will endure even in the face of a
larger culture that is at variance with the school-based dispositions and attitudes that they are
acquiring.
"There is reason to hope" -- but hope is not the same as certainty or even great confidence.
Imagine a school-community that successfully embodies a culture that is at one with our highest
moral aspirations, and that throughout the life of this school -- in the teachers, in the curriculum,
in the hallways, in the lunchroom, on the bulletin boards, etc. -- these moral aspirations live as
social reality. It remains an open question whether a child who goes through such a school but
continues to inhabit a larger culture that is at variance with the school- culture will be decisively
influenced by the school-culture, rather than by the larger culture; and skeptics may also wonder
whether whatever good is accomplished in such an environment will rapidly wash-out when
graduates enter an adult world that is unsupportive and punishing of the attitudes and
dispositions encouraged by the school. Such doubts are important and serve to caution us against
the kind of naive optimism that might lead us to hold that the school can solve our problems.
But if, as just suggested, it is appropriate to avoid a dogmatic conviction that schools are
adequate to the challenge of nurturing moral sensibilities and dispositions that challenge what is
the norm in the larger society, it is also important to avoid assuming in advance that because of
the concerns just raised schools are necessarily powerless in this arena. There is no strong
empirical basis for such a view, and it is a view which discourages the very educational
experiments that have the potential to give us data that will speak to this question.
There is also an additional (and very different kind of) consideration that augurs well for the
power of the school relative to the larger culture. The suggestion that the larger culture will
overpower whatever the child learns through the culture of the school may be built on an
assumption which, though not identified and challenged in this discussion, is, at least in our own
society, questionable. This is the assumption that the "the larger culture" is singular rather than
made up of multiple voices. While this may be reasonably true of some cultures, it is arguable
that in an open, multi-cultural society like our own the child encounters a multitude of cultural
voices in the course of growing up, many of which are at cross-purposes. Because the effect of
these voices may be, if not to cancel each other out, at least to weaken each one, the voice of the
school-culture, if it represents a compelling moral outlook in a consistent way over many years,
may prove very powerful -- in the same way even a small minority coalition may powerfully
affect the course of a society if various other and possibly much larger political parties cancel
each other out.

7 But even if this question concerning the power of educational institutions relative to that of the
larger culture can be satisfactorily addressed, it must be noted that there are other significant
questions in need of addressing that I have largely bypassed in this discussion. For example: 1) is
it even possible to develop an educational environment that is radically at variance with the
larger culture of the community? And assuming it is possible to develop a few demonstration-
sites of this kind, is it realistic to imagine such institutions on a mass-scale in a country like the
United States? 2) Even if principle we agree that schools can and should be created that are
organized around a moral ideal that is different from what is accepted in the larger culture, what
is this moral ideal -- and who in a democratic society that is grounded in the Constitution and
that is home to heterogeneous groups representing a diversity of moral outlook should be
empowered to determine educational policy in this area? Though the beyond the scope of this
paper, such questions are important and need to occupy an important place in our communal and
educational agenda.

Retrieved from : https://parenthood.library.wisc.edu/Pekarsky/Pekarsky.html

UNIVERSITY OF MAKATI Department of Social Sciences, Philosophy, and Humanities

College of Arts and Letters
Disclaimer: The contents are owned by respective sources indicated and does not intend to
infringe any copyright ownership