Pollution Adjudication Board v.

Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 112

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board may issue an immediate cease and desist ex parte order
against Solar

RULING: Yes. Section 7(a) of PD 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease
and desist orders whenever:

(a) the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an “immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or

(b) such discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by them.”

It is not always essential that the Board prove that an “immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists before an ex parte cease and
desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do
exceed “the allowable standards set by them.” The determination of “immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” is only necessary when the
effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by
the Commission.

The two inspections conducted in 1986 and 1988 concluded that there was at least prima
facie evidence that the effluents from Solar’s plant exceeded the maximum allowable
levels of physical and chemical substances. Furthermore, the previous owner of the plant
facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 1985
directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water
treatment plant was completed and operational. Notably, the Board refrained from issuing
the ex parte order until re-inspections were conducted on 1988.

The law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations further provide that should the
establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contest the correctness of the
prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such
establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order.
Solar should have availed of this remedy instead of going to court to seek nullification of
the Board’s Order and Writ of Execution.

Prudential Bank (now BPI) v. Rapanot, 814 SCRA 334

HELD:

NO. The Bank was not deprived of due process before the HLURB. The Bank was able
to set out its position by participating in the preliminary hearing and the scheduled
conferences before the Arbiter and even assert its special and affirmative defenses in its
Answer to Ronald’s claim.
It was a clear fact that the Arbiter merely acted in accordance with the 1996 Rules of
Procedure of the HLURB when it rendered its decision on the basis of the pleadings and
records submitted by the parties.
 a. Circumstances by which a person is formally charged in administrative
proceedings as distinguished from a criminal proceeding

Nava II v. Artuz, 838 SCRA 1

Anent A.M No. MTJ-08-1717, it is well to note that in an earlier Decision dated August 29,
2017, the Court had already found respondent guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of Official Documents for deliberately and
calculatedly lying in her October 28, 2005 and November 6, 2006 PDS about the fact that she
had been formally charged and had pending cases to make it appear that she is qualified for the
judgeship position. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC22 - which provides that administrative
cases against a judge for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and falsification are automatically
considered as disciplinary proceedings against him or her as a member of the Bar - respondent
was made to show cause why she should not be disbarred. As the OBC correctly pointed out,
"[i]nstead of showing cause and proving to the Court why she should not be suspended,
disbarred, or otherwise administratively dealt with, [respondent] opted to focus more on
attacking and impugning [Atty. Nava II's] integrity and credibility"23 and conveniently brushed
aside her omissions in her PDS as "mere error in judgment."

e. Form and Promulgation of Judgment

American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287

Arocha v. Vivo, 21 SCRA 532
RULING

Petition granted. CFI Manila ruling reversed and set aside.

Whether the decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing the decision of BSI re:
citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian, was antedated and promulgated beyond the one-year
prescription period. – NO.

Pursuant to Section 27 (b) of CA 613, as amended by RA 503, the decision of the BSI
shall become final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners, or in the
absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it,
motu proprio, of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the said
decision.

In the instant case, the BSI decision declaring Pedro Gatchalian a Filipino was rendered
on July 6, 1961. Therefore, this decision would have been final on July 7, 1962.

While it is true that the date on the Board of Commissioners' decision reversing the
original BSI decision on Pedro Gatchalian's Filipino citizenship was changed from July
20, 1962 to July 6, 1962, such correction does not suffice to convict the three members of
the Board of Immigration Commissioners of maliciously antedating their decision,
considering the presumption of regularity in official actuations, and the serious
implications of the charge, which amounts to no less than a falsification of official
documents. Such an offense cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

Based on the pieces of evidence presented, it would appear that the Board of
Commissioners' reversal of the BSI decision was indeed made on July 6, 1962. The
notification to Gatchalian’s counsel that such decision was rendered and the warrant of
exclusion all bore the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the reviewed decision of
the BSI. More importantly, the official minutes of the Board's proceedings clearly
showed that the resolution to exclude was adopted on July 6, 1962. It must be noted that
the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion
was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in
extenso was prepared, written and signed.

The alterations observed by the CFI of Manila are susceptible of the explanation that the
date July 20 was originally placed by the stenographer or typist because it was then that
the reasoned and extended decision was typewritten in final form, but that it was
corrected to July 6, the date it was voted, because the decision in extenso must relate back
to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily, the extended
opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to
reverse the findings of the BSI. The Secretary's certificate shows that the Board of
Immigration Commissioners acted upon not less than eight immigration cases (including
that of Pedro Gatchalian's) on July 6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to prepare
and sign fully reasoned decisions in all these cases on the same day.

Furthermore, it would have been senseless for the Board of Immigration Commissioners
to have taken a vote and decided the Gatchalian cases on July 20 (and there is no
evidence that they ever did so), because the Commissioners were familiar with the law
and knew that such a decision would be useless, as the period of review had already
lapsed since July 6.

Whether the fact that the original 1961 BSI decision was marked "Noted" by two of the
three Commissioners meant the decision was confirmed by the Board of Commissioners
and had therefore become non-reviewable. – NO.

Even disregarding the ambiguity of the term "Noted", the former Immigration
Commissioners appeared to have acted individually in this particular instance and not as
a Board. This was shown by the different dates affixed to their signatures (see FACTS)
that they did not actually meet to discuss and vote on the case.

Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely
in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas
should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion.
And second, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9 of the Secretary of Justice, all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal
from or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, are set
aside. This nullification included the 1961 BSI decision.

Whether Pedro Gatchalian's claim that he was not given an opportunity to be heard by the
Board of Commissioners renders the reversal of the 1961 BSI decision null and void. –
NO.

In reality, the right to representation by counsel before the Immigration Commissioners is

only granted by the Immigration Law in cases of appeal by the alien from an adverse
decision of the BSI.

Arocha, in representation of Pedro Gatchalian, failed to deny the findings of the

Immigration Commissioners that Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of a
forged cablegram, purportedly signed by the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, and apparently authorizing Gatchalian's documentation as a Filipino.
Such failure to deny imports admission of its truth by Gatchalian, and established that his
entry was indeed irregular. Too, neither Arocha nor Gatchalian appealed the decision of
the Commissioners of Immigration to the Department Head.

Whether Pedro Gatchalian's release from detention was proper. – NO.

The enforcement of the order to release Pedro Gatchalian was in plain violation of section
15, Revised Rule 102, and in patent excess of CFI of Manila's jurisdiction.
Sec. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal — When the court or judge has examined
into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but
such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the
officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner
does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.

As applied in the instant case, the Immigration Commissioner actually interposed an

appeal, which should have prevented Pedro Gatchalian's release from detention. Despite
the timely appeal, though, Gatchalian was still released.

DOCTRINE

The mere fact of a retyping of dates on the face of documents, without further evidence
of record, does not suffice to impute malice to the concerned officials, considering the
presumption of regularity in official actuations, and the serious implications of the
charge, which amounts to no less than a falsification of official documents. Such an
offense cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Neria v. Com. of Immigration, 23 SCRA 806

Serrano v. PSC, 24 SCRA 867
TOPICAL ISSUE:

WON the PSC erred in not making a statement of the facts, regarding the qualification
and financial ability of the applicant and other factors constituting the criterion, used as
basis in granting or dismissing/ denying the application – NO

Serrano relies on the constitutional provision that “no decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.” The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The PSC is not a court of
record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision.

Dagdag v. PSC – The PSC is not a judicial tribunal, its functions being limited and
administrative in nature.

Filipino Bus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. – The PSC is not a court.

It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the
scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of Serrano’s
application in the manner followed by the PSC.

Ang Tibay v. CIR – While the CIR is “free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements,” it does not mean “that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process.” The case
also enumerated seven cardinal rights, the last being “that quasi-judicial tribunals (such
as the PSC) should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered.”

It does not admit of doubt that when in a decision under review respondent PSC did not
even bother to refer individually to petitioner and state why his application is either
dismissed or denied, there was a violation of the above cardinal primary right.

The gravity of such a failing is underscored not only by deprivation of a right to which
petition is entitled, but also by the obstacle placed on the responsibility entrusted to the
Court of reviewing decisions and orders of the PSC.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Gabatin – The Court accords deference to a finding
of facts of the PSC, unless it could be shown that evidence in support thereof is lacking.

It is all the more essential then that each and every application should be considered
strictly on its merits and the relevant facts in support of an order, ruling or decision be
carefully inquired into and clearly set forth. Otherwise, the exercise of the power of
review by this Court might be condemned to futility. Necessarily then, such an arbitrary
fiat as the denial or dismissal of an application , without any statement as to why under
the evidence such a result is called for , is plainly bereft of support in law. Even if there
was a lack of interest or failure on the part of an applicant , calling for a dismissal of his
petition, such a conclusion must find support in the competent evidence before the PSC
and must be so indicated in the order.

SIDE ISSUE:

WON the PSC erred in denying his application, even though the evidence he presented to
show he has all the qualifications required to entitle him to a certificate of public
convenience.

Serrano would have the Court pass on the sufficiency of his evidence. But the evaluation
of the evidence is primarily for the PSC. The summary denial of his petition, as above
noted, was plain and palpable error. There is a need then to remand the matter to the PSC,
so that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law.
Only after it has rendered its decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does , the
power of review on the part of the Court come into play.

RULING: The decision of the PSC, insofar as it dismissed or denied the application of
Serrano, is set aside. The case is remanded to back to the PSC to consider the evidence
submitted by Serrano, and thereafter , to render a decision either approving or denying
the same based on the facts as found which must be set forth therein

Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205

e.1 Memorandum Decision Defined and Conditions for its validity

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Jurado, 916 SCRA 482

The question as to whether the OP may adopt by reference the findings and conclusions
of the HLURB was priorly raised and squarely resolved by the Court in Solid Homes,
Inc. v. Laserna wherein we ruled:

The constitutional mandate that, no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, does
not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In
fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of memorandum
decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with
the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared
that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.

Laserna, citing Francisco v. Permskul,36 reiterated the conditions when incorporation by

reference is allowed: (a) the memorandum decision must embody the findings of facts
and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision; (b) the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution; and (c) resort to memorandum
 decision may be had only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both
parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications
involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.

The OP's Decision satisfied these standards given that copies of the HLURB's Decision
and Resolution were attached as annexes; the HLURB's Decision and Resolution itself
complied with the requirements of the Constitution; the decision of the OP stated that it
was convinced that the HLURB's Decision and Resolution were correct only after it
evaluated and studied the case records; and that the case was an ordinary complaint for
specific performance where Solid Homes' appeal was found to be without merit.

Further, in Laserna, we emphasized that the Constitutional requirement that no decision

shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative
proceedings. The administrative decision satisfies the requirement of due process for as
long as it is supported by evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs
the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision. At bar, the OP's Decision
reviewed the evidence relied upon by the HLURB and even arrived at an independent
conclusion that Solid Homes' defenses of lack of privity of contract, res judicata and
laches are without merit.

1. Jurisdiction

1.1 Quasi-Judicial Body and Agency defined

Balangauan v. Court of Appeals (Cebu City), 562 SCRA 186

ISSUE:

Whether or not the public prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation; and the DOJ,
in reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor, both perform adjudicatory functions, in such a
way that their finding of no probable cause to hold petitioners liable to stand for trial, have the
same effect as judgements of a court

RULING:

No. It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,

and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those
of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such
that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information against a person charged with a
criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.
In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first
resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBC's motion for
reconsideration.

Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals' decision and
resolution are tainted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause, this Court finds
the petition dismissible.

RATIO: A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.

De Lima v. City of Manila, 883 SCRA 618

1.2 It cannot enlarge, alter or restrict a law

Soriano v. Secretary of Finance, 815 SCRA 316

Sections 1 and 3 of RR No. l0-2008 added a requirement not found in the law by
effectively declaring that an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of
P30,000 is no longer entitled to the MWE exemption provided by RA No. 9504. Said sections
are therefore null and void. The legislature granted to the lowest paid employees additional
income by no longer demanding from them a contribution for the operations of government. This
was the essence of RA No. 9504 as a social legislation. The government, by way of the tax
exemption, sought to afford increased purchasing power to this sector of the working class.
Accordingly, workers who receive the SMW as their basic pay remain MWEs and their receipt
of other income during the year does not disqualify them as MWEs. They remain MWEs entitled
to exemption as such, but the taxable income they may receive in excess of the statutory
minimum wage may be subject to appropriate taxes.

An administrative agency may not enlarge, alter or restrict a provision of law; it cannot
add to the requirements provided by law. The treatment of bonuses and other benefits that an
employee receives from the employer in excess of the P30,000 is taxable. However, the
treatment of this excess cannot operate to disenfranchise the MWE from enjoying the exemption
explicitly granted by RA No. 9504.

1.3 Other Cases:

Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379

Sunset View Condominium Corp. v. Campos, 104 SCRA 295
Philex Mining Corporation Reyes, 118 SCRA 602
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483
Union Bank of the Philippines v. HLURB, 210 SCRA 558
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA, 231 SCRA 292
Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284
Werr Corporation International v. Highlands Prime, Inc., 817 SCRA 145

4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the Same Fact

Co San v. Director of Patents, 1 SCRA 518

SC: - In the cancellation proceedings, the question refers to the validity of the design
patents issued to respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio, while in the criminal case, the inquiry is
whether Co San unfairly competed against the luggage of said respondent protected by
design patent no. 7.

 The first is within the cognizance of the Patent Office (Sec. 28, RA 165, as amended);
the second, under the jurisdiction of the CFI (Art. 189, RPC, as amended by RA 172).

 The acquittal of petitioner by the CA was not based on cancellation of a patent, but on
the opinion that the accused (petitioner) had not deceived or defrauded complainant
(respondent).

- The failure of the trial court, in a civil suit, to admit in evidence a former judgment of
acquittal in a criminal action against the defendant is not error. The fact that the evidence
in the criminal prosecution was insufficient to show that the defendant was guilty of a
crime does not bar the right of the offended party to maintain a civil action for damages."
(Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).

- A judgment of acquittal in a criminal action for fraudulent registration of a trademark in

violation of Section 18 of Act No. 666, cannot be invoked as res judicata in a civil action
based on unfair and malicious competition on the ground that the facts of the latter are
different and have not been passed upon in the judgment rendered in the former case."
(Ogura v. Chua and Confesor, 59 Phil. 471).

- The petition for cancellation should be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
PNR v. Domingo, 42 SCRA 142
Villanos v. Subido, 45 SCRA 299
 The decision of the Court of Appeals which found Villanos guilty of libel is NOT enough
basis for Commissioner’s decision in the administrative case which arose from the same
allegedly slanderous remarks.

 To begin with, the said decision was never presented, even informally, as evidence during the
investigation. It was just attached to the records by the Superintendent when he indorsed them to
the Bureau of Public Schools without even advising Villanos about it. Thus, she had no chance to
present evidence which could have blunted the effects of said decision. And she had a right to
present such evidence.

 A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis
for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that
matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal
case.

 Notwithstanding the fact that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they
cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating
circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the
criminal cases.

 At any rate, it is settled in this jurisdiction that even where criminal conviction is specified by
law as a ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not
ex proprio vigore justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such
conviction.

o As held in the case of Lacson v. Roque, “not even final conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, as distinguished from conviction pending appeal, dispenses with the requisite notice
and hearing. Final conviction is mentioned in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code
as ground for proceeding administratively against the convicted officer but does not operate as
automatic removal doing away with the formalities of an administrative hearing.”

Josue v. People, 903 SCRA 14