CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.

JD3A

RULE 131, SECTION 3 (l)

LACSASA M. ADIONG vs.COURT OF APPEALS and NASIBA A.

NUSKA

FACTS:

Mayor Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nasiba A. Nuska to

the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar which is also duly
approved by the CSC. Mayor Adiong, upon election to office, issued a
memorandum informing all temporary casual municipal employees of
the termination of their appointment and directing them to clear
themselves from money and property accountabilities.

Due to the Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment

coupled with her failure to make a courtesy call on Adiong as the new
mayor, he terminated her services and appointed Samporna in her
stead. On August 27, 1995, Nuska wrote Mayor Adiong requesting for
her reinstatement and payment of salaries. Mayor Adiong failed to act
on the request.

Nuska appealed to the CSC and the latter held that the termination of
Nuska was not in order and that she should be reinstated in her
position.

On March 17, 1997, Mayor Adiong filed a motion for reconsideration

but the CSC denied the same.

Mayor Adiong filed a petition for review with the preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order with the CA but the latter dismissed
the same and affirmed the resolution of the CSC.

ISSUE:

Whether the presumption that “a person acting in a public office was

regularly appointed or elected to it” was upheld in this case.

HELD:
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A

Yes, the SC ruled in favor of the presumption.

The Constitution mandates that: "No officer or employee of the civil

service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
the law." In this case, Nuska had a permanent appointment to the
position. She thus enjoyed security of tenure as guaranteed by law.

The reasons advanced by Mayor Adiong why Nuska's employment

was terminated were the following: failure to make a courtesy call,
failure to submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to work
which was tantamount to abandonment.

The Court ruled that failure to make a courtesy call to one's superior is
not an offense, much less a ground to terminate a person's
employment.

Nuska's failure to submit her appointment papers is not a cause for

her outright dismissal. It was not shown that Nuska was informed of
the memorandum requiring those with permanent appointments to
submit their papers. At the very least, Mayor Adiong could have
reminded her to submit the documents without terminating her
employment immediately.

On the alleged abandonment, Nuska's failure to perform her duties

was involuntary. In her August 27, 1995 letter to Mayor Adiong, she
claimed that she did not resign and she considered her termination
from the service as illegal. She insisted on her reinstatement. Clearly,
there was no abandonment of office.

Furthermore, Mayor Adiong failed to comply with the requirements of

due process. Mayor Adiong did not bother to ask Nuska to explain
why she had not submitted her appointment papers as required nor
did he take time to act on her letter of August 27, 1995.

When the Constitution mandated that a government official or

employee may not be removed or suspended without due process of
law, the law presumes, in protecting such rights, that "a person acting
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A

in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it," and that

"official duty has been regularly performed.

RULE 131, SECTION 3 (ee)

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES vs.THE

SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting Edgar and

Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; and
ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation
in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual
disqualification from public office.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A

The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners

possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the
grounds that (a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested
himself of his pecuniary interest in said cockpit; (b) as of April 1992,
Teresita Teves was of record the owner/licensee of the cockpit; and
(c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other
from 1983 until 1992, their property relations as husband and wife, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal
partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over
which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest
is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under
the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court ruled in favor of the presumption that a thing once
proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the presumption.

The essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(h) of the

Anti-Graft Law are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction;
3. He either
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
by any law.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the spouses of violation of Section 3(h)

of the Anti-Graft Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the
evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary
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interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is prohibited under Section

89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

The evidence for the prosecution also has established that Edgar
Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in
question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao,
Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January
1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit.
Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over
the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed
because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is
usual with things of that nature. His affidavit  dated September 27,
1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the
management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason
that he could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity
due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the
cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990.
Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were
transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon
because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such
their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article
160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A