Republic of the Philippines

Province of Bohol
LUNGSOD SA BACLAYON

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN

Re: Punong Barangay TITO C. CUAJAO, et al

Grave Abuse Of Authority, for acts constituting
violations of R.A. 3019 or Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and violation of Art. III,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
x--------------------------------------------------------/

POSITION PAPER

PREFATORY STATEMENT

This is a case for Grave Abuse of Authority, for acts constituting violations of R.A. 3019
or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and violation of Art. III, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution filed against the Barangay Officials of Sta. Cruz, Baclayon, Bohol by private
complainants Carmela C. Cadagdagon and Geronides A. Gonzaga.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

Based on the stipulation of facts during the Committee Meeting of the Whole held last
January 11, 2021, it is undisputed that the Barangay of Sta. Cruz, through its barangay officials
requested the Bohol Electric Cooperative I (BOHECO I) to install secondary lines pursuant to
the request of some residents thereon.
That the posts for needed for the secondary lines will have to be erected over some
private lots. Respondents Brgy. Kagawad DARWIN JUMANG-IT (Jumang-it for brevity) and
Brgy. Kagawad DOMINADOR Y. CALIZAR (Calizar for brevity) identified the area.

ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED:

Whether or not the act of the respondent constitutes illegal dismissal.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

On the issue of GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

Jurisprudence defines GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY as a misdemeanor committed

by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily
harm, imprisonment or other injury constituting an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority1. To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there
must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant's allegations. 2 Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.3

In the instant case, complainant Geronides Gonzaga stated in paragraphs 19 and 20 of his
affidavit, thus:
1
See Vicsal Development Corporation v. Dela Cruz-Buendia, A.M. No. P-12-3097, November 26, 2012, 686
SCRA 299, 308, citing Rafael v. Sualog, A.M. No. P-07-2330, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 278, 287.

2
Nedia v. Judge Laviña, 508 Phil. 9, 19 (2005).|||

3
Miro v. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 788 (2013).||
 19. That Brgy Kagawad Dominador Y. Calizar castigated me for being so indifferent
and unconcerned but I told him we should be consulted because we are the owners of the land
and we have all the rights to protect and preserve the same, then argument between us ensued;
20. That after a while, Punong Barangay Tito C. Cuajao and Brgy. Kagawad Darwin J.
Jumang-it arrived with some barangay tanods and a police officer, really trying to show their
force to intimidate us and I was so afraid, intimidated and threatened;

Likewise, complainant Carmela Cadagdagon also stated in paragraph 10 of her

Complaint-Affidavit, to wit:

10. That Punong Barangay Tito C. Cuajao and Brgy. Kagawad Darwin J. Jumang-it
arrived with some barangay tanods and a police officer, showing their force and trying to
intimidate us

However, the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee as a Whole held last January 11,
2021 would show that complainant Geronides Gonzaga admitted that he challenged one of the
barangay officials to a fistfight prompting respondent Jumang-it to call respondent Cuajao to
come to the scene with some barangay tanods.

Meanwhile, during the second hearing of the Committee of the Whole last January 25,
2021, Ms. Phoebe Kristine D. Gallego acknowledged that she was present during the above-
narrated incident and that she was the one who called for police assistance for fear that the
confrontation between the complainants and the respondents would eventually result in a brawl.

Since the act of petitioner in facilitating the installation of a secondary line was not
without a valid reason it could not be considered excessive use of authority upon the
complainants. On the contrary, it would have been simpler and less burdensome had gone to the
office of the Punong Barangay and/or to BOHECO and informed them of their objections to the
installation of the secondary lines over their land. This case could have ended then and there and
so with the animosities that affected the parties. As we view it, complainants were neither forced
nor compelled to surrender a portion of their property to the barangay. All that respondents did
was to facilitate the installation of the secondary electric line of BOHECO in behalf of the
thirteen, or so affected residents. Those affected residents are entitled to the delivery of basic
services of the barangay as much as complainants do. If complainants think, on a preconceived
notion, albeit erroneously, that they were being intimidated by the barangay officials while in the
performance of their functions, that was of their own making. Under these facts, these
representations cannot help concluding that the charge of oppression is baseless or essentially
superficial as to justify a finding of guilt.

On violations of R.A. 3019

Republic Act 3019 defines and punishes at least 11 acts/offenses in Section 3 alone.
However, these representations find the allegations against the respondents to be unsubstantiated;
that the complainants, through vague allegations and generalizations, have failed to satisfy the
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in an administrative proceeding; and bare
allegations are not proof4.
We therefore recommend that the charge for violation of R.A. 3019 against the
respondents be dismissed for lack of merit
|||

On violation of Article III, Section 9 of the 1987

Constitution

4
Real vs. Bello, 513 SCRA 111

2
 While it is true that by virtue of RA 71605, Congress conferred upon local government
units the power to expropriate and that two legal provisions limit the exercise of this power to
wit: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws 6; and
(2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation7, the
same is not applicable in this case because Barangay of Sta. Cruz did not cause the installation of
the secondary line nor did the said LGU paid for the same.
As borne out of the records of the meetings of the Committee as a whole, the endeavor
was purely between private parties. This is precisely the reason why BOHECO merely required a
deed of easement/consent of private land owners and not an expropriation proceeding.
Lastly, these representations would like to borrow the words of Justice Alfredo Caguioa
in his Concurring Opinion in Villarosa vs. People of the Philippines, to wit:

“xxx xxx xxx I would like to reiterate anew my sentiment that our penal
laws on corrupt public officials are meant to enhance, instead of stifle, public
service. If every mistake, error, or oversight is met with criminal prosecution,
then no one would ever dare take on the responsibility of serving in the
government. We cannot continue to weaponize each little misstep lest we lose
even the good people in government. Indeed, while public office is a public trust,
the constitutionally enshrined right to presumption of innocence encompasses all
persons — private individuals or public servants alike.”8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and in the interest of justice, these

representations so move that this instant case be please DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

5
Section 19 of RA 7160 provides:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws . . .. (italics supplied).
6
Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
7
Article III, Section 9, 1987 Constitution
8
CAGUIOA, J., concurring, JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
Nos. 233155-63. June 23, 2020 (EN BANC)