Villar, John Ezra G.

SPL
JD 3-3

Probable cause for Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019

PEDRO G. SISTOZA v. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Ombudsman, and ELISEO CO.
G.R. No. 144784. September 3, 2002
BELLOSILLO, J.
DOCTRINE: To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the
prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not
presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest
partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award
earlier made by his subordinates despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest
price.
FACTS:
The case revolves around a public bidding for the supply of tomato paste to be used as ingredient in the
diet of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison. Filcrafts Industries Inc. was the lowest bidder but winner of
the bidding was Elias Co. Filcrafts Inc. who came in second place because although they were offering a
lower price, the product they were offering did not meet the specifications set by the PBAC.

The necessary documents were passed around 3 divisions of the PBAC for scrutiny and approval before it
finally landed with petitioner, the Director of BOC, for final approval. One of the bidders filed an affidavit-
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging criminal and administrative charges for violation of
Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Eventually,
Petitioner Sistoza filed for a motion for reinvestigation, claiming that there was no probable cause.

ISSUE: Did the Ombudsman had probable cause to file the charges against the petitioner.

RULING: No. Clearly, the issue of petitioner Sistoza's criminal liability does not depend solely upon the
allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be proper.
For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been rigged, an issue
that we do not confront and decide in the instant case, this pronouncement alone does not automatically
result in finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying
upon the documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie case against petitioner
for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding
procedure, a circumstance which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith,
gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase
order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his knowledge that
the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that
petitioner perpetrated these acts in the criminal manner he is accused of, there is no basis for declaring
the existence of probable cause.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019/Conspiracy

CESAR P. GUY v. PEOPLE
GR Nos. 166794-96, Mar 20, 2009
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Elements of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019:
a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
b. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
c. That his action caused:
i. Any undue injury to any party, including the government; or
ii. Giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.

FACTS: The petitioners were charged with three (3) separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of
R. A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36, namely: an elevated path walk, a
basketball court and a day care center.

After they were found guilty by the SB, they filed separate MRs which were also denied. The petitioners
questioned the decision, claiming that the prosecution evidently failed to prove the guilt of petitioner and
his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt and further miserably failed to prove the allegation of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt. They also raised the Lacson case as a defense.
ISSUE: Was the petitioners guilty of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019?
RULING:
Yes. First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for their official duties or
functions as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in relation to their duties and functions
underlies their violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Second, the undue injury caused to the government
is evident from the clear deviation from the material specifications indicated in the project plans such as
in the case of the basketball court and elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard materials in the
case of the day care center. Otherwise stated, "the People did not get the full worth of their money in
terms of the benefits they will derive from the (above) sub-standard infrastructure projects."[37] Third,
unwarranted benefits were accorded to Amago Construction when the three projects were not inspected
and supervised during construction, allowing it to cut costs and save money by using substandard
materials and deviating from the specific materials and measurements prescribed in the work programs.
Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments for the projects even before the processing
of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government from refusing or deferring payment on
account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is clear that from the very inception of the
construction of the subject projects up to their completion, petitioners had exhibited manifest partiality
for Amago Construction, and acted with evident bad faith against the government and the public which
they had sworn to serve.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Prescription period of Rep. Act No. 3019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN “KOKOY” ROMUALDEZ AND SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 166510 April 29, 2009
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled
only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.

FACTS: Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with violations of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, The cases were filed on 5 November 2001 with the SB.
However, the information alleged that the act was done from 1976 to February 1986. The act in question
was his alleged dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial
Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50.
According to the information, this was done by his influence with his brother-in-law, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.

ISSUE: Was the criminal action or liability extinguished by prescription?

HELD: The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the
subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of Rep.
Act No. 3019.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the PCGG that preceded it
could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth
cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption
cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG
leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having
tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement
of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the
first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when the
Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. As such preliminary
investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the
offense had already prescribed as of such time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by mere
amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be
adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal
complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when
the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Probable Cause
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESSIE B. CASTILLO et al.
G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.
DOCTRINE: Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor
committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of probable cause is
limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be
issued against the accused.
FACTS: Cesar Sarino is the registered owner of a piece of land with properties that he leased to Pepito B.
Aquino and Adriano G. Samoy who are in turn subleasing it to several stallholders. In September 1999,
respondent Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to the stallholders Notices of
Violation of the National Building Code on the grounds that the structures they were occupying were
erected without building permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy
having been first secured. After repeated failure to comply, a task force from the Bacoor Municipal Hall
effected the closure of the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences on Feb 16, 2000.
Lessees Aquino and Samoy thereafter filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against
respondent Bacoor Municipal Mayor Jessie B. Castillo and other municipal officials for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019. The case was decided in favor of the respondents.
Thereafter, Sarino filed a case with the Ombudsman with the same set of facts and cause of action with
the office of the ombudsman which in turn was decided in favor of Sarino due to the existence of
probable cause.
ISSUE: Did the SB err in overturning the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause resulting in the
dismissal of the case against respondents?

HELD: In the instant case, there is no question that both the original and amended Informations were
valid on their face because they complied with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Also, a scrutiny of
the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Ombudsman which precipitated the filing of the original
Information and the subsequent Memorandum dated August 4, 2004 recommending the amendment of
the Information would likewise show that the finding of probable cause against the respondents were
sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. As a matter of fact, in the Resolution dated August 22,
2002, the Ombudsman took pains to mention each element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 and then one by one adequately explained how and why those elements were satisfied.
Hence, as the amended Information was valid on its face and there is no manifest error or arbitrariness on
the part of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan erred in making an executive determination of probable
cause when it overturned the Ombudsman’s own determination.
The Sandiganbayan could have just revoked the previously issued arrest warrants and required the
Ombudsman to submit additional evidence for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants based on the
amended Information.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

RA 3019 Section 3(e); Ombudsman

HILARIO P. SORIANO vs OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, HON. MARILOU B. ANCHETA-MEJIA, Graft
Investigation Officer II, and ATTY. CELEDONIO P. BALASBAS
G.R. No. 160772; July 13, 2009
CARPIO, J.
DOCTRINE: There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.
FACTS: An affidavit-complaint was filed against Palad for an alleged Falsification of Public Documents and
Use of Falsified Document. Atty. Balabas was in charged with the case issued a Resolution on 27 August
2001 recommending that Palad be charged in court with Falsification of Public Documents and that the
charge of Use of Falsified Document be dropped for lack of merit.

Palad eventually filed a Motion to Re-Open Case, claiming that there was no copy of the subpoena or any
notice regarding the complaint given to her. The case was reopened and Atty. Balasbas issued a subpoena
to the parties setting the case for investigation. This prompted the petitioner to filed a criminal complaint
against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019). This was dismissed by
the Ombudsman, thus the case.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Balabas guilty of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019?
RULING: NO. Apart from the Court recognizing the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed, the Court found that the charge was lacking.

Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, thus:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, are as follows:
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

In Albert v. Sandiganbayan, we discussed the second element, to wit:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

The law also requires that the public officer’s action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions. x x x

Petitioner failed to show that Balasbas acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence in issuing the subpoena. As further pointed out by the Office of the Ombudsman in its
Resolution of 29 July 2002, there was no undue injury because petitioner "had suffered no actual
damage."
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Overpriced bid doesn’t mean violation right away

OFELIA C. CAUNAN, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181999; 183001 September 2, 2009
NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE: The lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross
disadvantage to the government
FACTS: The consolidated case revolves around the purchase of a total of 142,612 pieces of "walis ting-
ting” at either P25 per piece and P15 per piece, depending on the supplier without complying with the
requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding. It was also stated that the transactions were clearly
grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the
Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team. The petitioners requested for a reconsideration and a
subsequent appeal to the COA but both were denied successively.

After trial and a flurry of pleadings, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and
Marquez guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019?

HELD: NO. The court agreed with the petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third
criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject
contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an
overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not
sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately
proven.

The lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross disadvantage to
the government. As we had occasioned to declare in Nava v. Sandiganbayan, the absence of a public
bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may
open the door to graft and corruption. However, this does not satisfy the third element of the offense
charged, because the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. After all, penal laws
are strictly construed against the government.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Conspiracy in RA 3019 with spouses

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 154182             December 17, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Doctrine: The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or
of moral assistance to his co-conspirators.
Facts:
Edgar Teves, then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, was found guilty of violating Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law together with his wife, Teresita Teves. According to the court, issued the
appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one
Daniel Teves and that the Teves had direct financial or pecuniary interest therein being that it was actually
owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

Apart from the other issues raised, the spouses questioned the charge of conspiracy against Teresita.

ISSUE: Was there conspiracy in this case?

Held: Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established separately
from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must
reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.
Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to
be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is
the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act
as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act
must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators.
The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the
violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those
acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not
prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have
divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as
stated earlier, considering her property relation with her husband, her ownership would result in vesting
direct prohibited interest upon her husband.
In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the
prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible
for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of
petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Chain of custody

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMY LIM y MIRANDA

GR No. 231989, September 4, 2018
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE: Immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest
may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses
required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory
action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault
FACTS: Romy Lim y Miranda was found guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5 of Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. He was caught in a buy-bust operation in Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City where he was arrested ang
brought to the PDEA Regional Office with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. It should be noted
that the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items were not signed by Lim and Gorres there was no
signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
media as witnesses. The officers contended that the latter issue was due to the unavailability of the
aforementioned people required even with the notice that they gave them.

According to the accused, it was a set up by the police and that during the inquest proceedings, Lim,
without the aid of counsel, admitted ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that
the police would imprison him. The case revolves around questions of the validity of the chain of custody
that took place.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner guilty of violating RA No. 9165?
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items
at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending
officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme
danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-
assault. The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white
substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought
from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he
immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that.
they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to 101 Carin and the one that he
recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively,
with both bearing his initial/signature.

IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene
because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.35 102
Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in
the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort
to contact them. He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to
their operation as they might leak the confidential information. We are of the view that these
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.
Villar, John Ezra G.
SPL
JD 3-3

Plea bargaining a drug case

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA vs HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE: If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

FACTS:
Estipona, Jr. was accused of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for illegal possession of 0.084 gram of shabu. He then filed a Motion to
Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and
be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia). However, it was denied by the trial court, stating that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases. The MR was also denied.

Therefore, Estipona raised the that Section 23 of the aforementioned law is unconstitutional as it
encroaches upon the Supreme Court's rule-making power and therefore violative of the equal protection
clause.

ISSUES: Is Section 23 of RA no. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said law,
unconstitutional for being violative of the constitutional right to equal protection of the law

RULING: YES. Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to
the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions."Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a
rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.

As for the rule making power of the courts, the Court ruled that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments