People vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.

188165, December 11, 2013

DOCTRINE:
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices; Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019, which punished any public officer for “[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.”—In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184 (1984), in which the principal issue was whether or not
the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr.,
then a Fiscal, was a “contract or transaction” as to bring the complaint within the ambit
of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any public officer for
“[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in the
negative, and pronounced: It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must
be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a
contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. In
the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.

FACTS:
The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in
G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of SB-08-CRM-
0266 entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez,
Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article
294, of the Revised Penal Code. The relevant case for this topic is G.R. No. 189063.
Where upon Sandiganbayan’s finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred
inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the
respondents, it dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 (involves robbery)
mainly to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case. The
State contended that the delay in the resolution of the case against the respondents
was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman. Citing
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court held that the speedy disposition of
cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by
listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the investigation, and then
laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the case
due to the violation of the respondents’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases
HELD:
No. Sandiganbayan was right in dismissing the case upon finding that there had been
an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case
No. SB-08-CRM0266. The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article
III of the Constitution. It is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. The fact-finding investigation and
preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and
five months. The Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time
just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge
the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive,
and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the
respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. The
guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution would
be defeated is the State’s argument that the fact-finding investigation should not be
considered a part of the preliminary investigation (because the former was only
preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the former should not be
factored in the computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation) is
accepted.

It is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the delay
was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State failed. There was really no sufficient
justification tendered by the State for the long delay of more than five years in bringing
the charges against the respondents before the proper court.
Lumauig vs People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014
DOCTRINE:
Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Failure to Render
Accounts; Petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him
in the present case given the differences between the elements of the two
offenses.—To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
following elements must be present: (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) That said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or
her public positions; (3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; (4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) That the public officer has
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. On the
other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or
separated therefrom; (2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or
to a provincial auditor; and (4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after
such account should be rendered. The glaring differences between the elements of
these two offenses necessarily imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or
innocence of the accused would certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner’s
acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him in the present case given the
differences between the elements of the two offenses.

FACTS: