GLIZZA MAE F.

BERGADO SPL 11-05-2020

CASE DIGEST
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES (R.A. NO. 3019)

1. Raquil-Ali M. Lucman vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan 2ND

DIVISION [G.R. No. 238815, March 18, 2019]

FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that, private complainants Hadji Abdulwahid D. Bualan
(Bualan et. al.) and three others went to the office of Lucman, then the Officer-in-
Charge (OIC)-Regional Executive Director (RED) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII, to discuss with the latter their intended
applications for the issuance of Free Patent title. During the said meeting, Lucman
allegedly demanded Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) from
them as consideration for the grant of their applications. Private complainants acceded
but asked to pay in installments.
Initially, Bualan et. al. gave Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1, 500,000.00) to
Bualan. However, despite their initial payment, their applications remained pending.
Thus, private complainants filed a joint complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of General Santos City.

ISSUE: Whether Lucman is guilty of the crime of violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019.

RULING: Yes.
Section 3 (c) of RA 3019 states:
“Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any
person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has
secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or
license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without
prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.”
As may be gleaned from above, the elements of the crime charged are as follows:
(1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or
obtain, for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or indirectly
requested or received from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit for himself or for another; and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.
It is undisputed that Lucman was a public officer at the time the offense was
committed, then being the OIC-RED of the DENR, Region XII. As the OIC-RED, he had
the authority to grant applications for Free Patents, such as the ones filed by private
complainants. Lucman demanded Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00) and actually received One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,500,000.00) from private complainants, and that these amounts were for and in
consideration of the grant of their applications.
2. Concepcion C. Daplas V. Department of Finance, et. al.,
G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017

FACTS:
Two (2) complaints were filed against petitioner by the DOF in the Ombudsman
averring violations of Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. 3019, Section 8 of R.A. 6713, Section 2
of R.A. 1379, Article 183 of the RPC and E.O. 6, constituting Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, arising out of
her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and net
worth, business interests, and financial connections, and those of her spouse in her
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs). The Ombudsman found
petitioner guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its
accessory penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of the charges arising out of her failure to
disclose her SALN and those of her spouse.

RULING:
No.
Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under
both the administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to
warrant petitioner's dismissal from service. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the
public officer or employee, and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be
emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does
not automatically amount to such an offense.
Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to
dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth
becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other
sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and
acquisitions.
Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a
wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's
and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her
business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad
faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges
of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple
Negligence in accomplishing her SALN.

3. ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., et. al.

 G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007

FACTS:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the
loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle
Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). After
examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined
under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized;
and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted. Consequently, Atty.
Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. It dismissed the complaint holding
that the offenses charged had already prescribed. It bears mention that the acts
complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982.
Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the
(sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted. Equally important to stress is that
the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when
there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing
them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans. The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13.
Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued
defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans.
Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging
respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are
proscribed by the Constitution. The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed.

RULING:
The crime charged had not yet prescribed.
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, thus:
It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the... loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission. Since the prescriptive period commenced to run
on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have been
made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the
criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when
the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or
arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality.
4. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY,
G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014

FACTS:
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in
Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and
(f) of RA No. 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” by Tuares for allegedly
withholding her salary for the month of June 2002.
The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002
because of her failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for
Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month.
The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was “singled out by respondent Caberoy as
the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because,
as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression and violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f)
of RA 3019.

HELD:
No.
Caberoy was charged with oppression and violation of RA 3019, however, the
Ombudsman, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression. Thus, the Court need not
discussed the violation of RA 3019.
Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any
person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity,
or excessive use of authority. To be held administratively liable for Oppression or
Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the
complainant’s allegations. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman
contradicted itself when it found and held that petitioner was guilty of “oppression” for
not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact
she has been paid albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established
from the table where it was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25,
2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.
There was delay in the payment of salary because “it is a well-known fact that
in the government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly
accomplished and approved before one can collect his salary.”