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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES; PROMOTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ALL PHASES OF NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT; SOCIAL JUSTICE IS FOR THE DESERVING, WHETHER HE BE A
MILLIONAIRE IN HIS MANSION OR A PAUPER IN HIS HOVEL. — We have
repeatedly stressed that social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for
the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his
hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in
favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply
because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the
mandate of the law.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J : p
We have repeatedly stressed that social justice — or any justice for that
matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the
poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according
to the mandate of the law. 1
On 7 May 1957 Victor G. Valencia acquired the first parcel covered by TCT
No. H-T-137 from a certain Bonifacio Supnet. The only tenant of the property at
that time was a certain Digoy Besario who was succeeded by his son Jesus
Besario. On 2 July 1961 Valencia and Jesus Besario terminated their landlord-
tenant relationship through a public instrument voluntarily executed by them,
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thus reverting the actual physical possession of the property to petitioner
Valencia.
On 22 October 1962 Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease
agreement over his two (2) parcels of land with a certain Glicerio Henson.
Before the ten (10)-year lease expired, apparently without objection from
Henson, Valencia leased the property for five (5) years to Fr. Andres Flores
under a civil law lease concept beginning 21 August 1970 or until 30 June 1975
after which the lease was cancelled and inscribed as Entry No. 1578 in TCT No.
H-T-137. The lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores was subject to a
prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia's
written consent. This was admitted by the parties as reflected in the DAR
Investigation Report and Recommendations. 2 The prohibition against
subleasing or encumbering of the land apparently included the prohibition
against installing a leasehold tenant thereon. Incidentally, it may be mentioned
that in the prior lease agreement with Henson no such prohibition was
stipulated.
During the period of his lease, Henson instituted Crescenciano Frias and
Marciano Frias to work on the property, although only Crescenciano Frias
apparently remained in the land while Marciano Frias must have abandoned his
cause if any, as he was not impleaded in this case; neither did he appear on
record to have been issued a CLT in his name.
During the lease of Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco Obang (as
overseer), Rogelio Tamayo, Federico Jare, Feliciano Lobresco, Melchor
Moncada, Rosendo Lobresco, Victoriano Montefalcon, Santos Gargaya, Catalino
Mantac, Herodita Semillano, Ernesto Lobresco, Natividad Lobresco and Alfredo
Demerin, along with Crescenciano and Marciano Frias, to cultivate the land.
These farmhands shared their produce with Fr. Flores. Subsequently, Francisco
Obang, Santos Gargaya, Crescenciano Frias, Federico Jare, Rosendo Lobresco,
Juliano Magdayao, Ernesto Lobresco, Feliciano Lobresco, Catalino Mantac,
Victoriano Montefalcon, Ambrosio Semillano, Rogelio Tamayo and Edilberto
Lobresco, became recipients of CLTs and are collectively referred to herein as
private respondents.
When the lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores expired on 30
June 1975, Valencia demanded that private respondents vacate the premises.
Instead of complying with the demand, they refused and continued cultivating
the land despite the demand for them to vacate. Valencia wanted to regain
possession of his property so he could work it by administration, having in fact
appointed Bernie Bautista as overseer until petitioner could retire from the
government service.
In his initial step in his long and agonizing journey, Valencia filed a letter
of protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual
possession of his property that was subject of the civil law lease agreement. On
20 March 1976 his letter was referred to the DAR Regional Office in Cebu City.
Meanwhile, without the knowledge much less consent of Valencia, private
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respondents applied for Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property.
On 10 December 1985, while the investigation was being conducted by
the DAR pursuant to petitioner's letter of protest of 20 March 1976, but before
it could be terminated, the DAR issued the questioned CLTs to private
respondents. The DAR Team Office in Canlaon City pursuant to the Operation
Land Transfer Program under Pres. Decree No. 27 and Letter of Instruction No.
474 identified the following persons as farmer-beneficiaries: 3
Petitioner contends that DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, is valid
not being contrary to law and jurisprudence, and should be accorded respect
being the Agrarian Reform Secretary's construction of the law that his
Department administers and implements.
Public respondents, on the other hand, aver that Secs. 15 and 20 of Book
VII of E.O. No. 292 which are cited as the legal bases of DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3
refer to the procedure for administrative appeals from an agency to the
Department Head which in this case is the DAR through its Secretary. They
argue that there is no provision for appeal to the Office of the President since in
the administrative structure the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the alter ego of
the President. They contend that Sec. 23 of Book VII cites the finality of the
decision of the appellate agency without providing for a further appeal, and
that Sec. 25 provides for judicial review from an agency decision, as they point
to Sec. 54 of R.A. No. 6657 14 and SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95. 15
On the other hand, the purpose of SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95, now embodied
in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is to invoke the constitutional
power of judicial review over quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of
Agrarian Reform under R.A. No. 6657 and the Office of the President in other
cases by providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Section 54 of R.A. No.
6657 is consistent with SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 and Rule 43 in that it establishes
a mode of appeal from the DARAB to the Court of Appeals.
I n Angara v. Electoral Commission this Court upheld the promulgation of
the rules of procedure of the Commission since they were necessary to the
proper exercise of its express power to hear and decide election contests
involving members of the legislature, although not specifically granted by the
Constitution or statute. 17 We ruled 18 —
. . . the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 138, 139 ). In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
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exercise of its exclusive power . . . must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission
(emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil
Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is
there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from
subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold
tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly
stated therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from
employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An
extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas v. Court of
Appeals. 22
When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be
limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally
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cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already an existing agricultural
leasehold relation, i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land.
The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold
Relations," which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land;
not until then. This is precisely what we are still asked to determine in the
instant proceedings.
To better understand Sec. 6, let us refer to its precursor, Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
1199, as amended. 23 Again, Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 assumes the existence of
a tenancy relation. As its epigraph suggests, it is a "Limitation of Relation," and
the purpose is merely to limit the tenancy "to the person who furnishes the
land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the
person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within his immediate farm household." Once the tenancy relation is established,
the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein stated. Obviously,
inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such authority, civil law lessees as landholders cannot install
a tenant on the landholding. Neither Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844 nor Sec. 8 of R.A.
No. 1199 automatically authorizes the persons named therein to employ a
tenant on the landholding.
According to Mr. Justice Guillermo S. Santos and CAR Executive Judge
Artemio C. Macalino, respected authorities on agrarian reform, the reason for
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844 and Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 in limiting the relationship
to the lessee and the lessor is to "discourage absenteeism on the part of the
lessor and the custom of co-tenancy" under which "the tenant (lessee) employs
another to do the farm work for him, although it is he with whom the landholder
(lessor) deals directly. Thus, under this practice, the one who actually works the
land gets the short end of the bargain, for the nominal or 'capitalist' lessee
hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest." 24 This breeds exploitation,
discontent and confusion . . . The kasugpong, kasapi, or katulong also works at
the pleasure of the nominal tenant. 25 When the new law, therefore, limited
tenancy relation to the landholder and the person who actually works the land
himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm
household, it eliminated the nominal tenant or middleman from the picture. 26
It must be noted that Valencia never extended the term of the civil law
lease, nor did he negotiate with respondents for "better terms" upon the
expiration of the lease. He wanted precisely to recover possession of the
property upon the expiration of the contract on 30 June 1975, except from
Mantac with whom he already entered into a tenancy contract as herein before
stated. Valencia appointed an overseer to prepare for his eventual takeover
and to cultivate the property through labor administration after his long years
in the government service. Verily, the intention of Valencia after the expiration
of the lease contract was for him to cultivate the land by administration, or by
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himself, and not to surrender possession, much less ownership, to the private
respondents.
There may be apprehensions that should Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844 be
construed as not to vest the civil law lessee or legal possessor with automatic
authority to install tenants, it would in effect open the floodgates to their
ejectment on the mere pretext that the civil law lessee or legal possessor was
not so authorized by the landowner.
This is more imagined than real. In the very recent case of Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals, decided 30 July 2002, this Court resolved the issue of whether
the private respondents should be considered agricultural tenants of the
petitioner. 34 The Court ruled that the respondents were not instituted as
agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees of the land. This was evident from
the contract of lease executed by the parties. The respondents were neither
"impliedly" instituted as tenants nor designated as agricultural lessees by
reason alone of the acquiescence by petitioner to the continued possession of
the property.
In Caballes v. DAR 40 the Court held that all these requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship. The absence of one does not make an
occupant or a cultivator thereof or a planter thereon a de jure tenant. This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. 41
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents'
self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish
the claimed relationship. 43 The fact alone of working on another's landholding
does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. 44
Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be
concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.
45 Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a
As to the civil law lease between Valencia and Fr. Flores, the prohibition
against subletting the property without the written consent of Valencia must be
upheld. Thus, there is no tenurial security for private respondents designated
by the civil law lessee, except for the oft-mentioned Catalino Mantac.
Even as we uphold time and again the existence and validity of implied
agricultural tenancy agreements, we encourage the forging of written
documents to prevent ambiguity as to the terms set by both parties and for
them to express their intent in clear language. This would minimize and even
prevent the "shotgun approach" to tenancy relations imposed by some officials
of the Government without complying with the essential requisites of tenancy
as provided by law. Agreements must be entered freely and voluntarily by the
parties concerned without the influence of third parties, much less the
Government, making representations for either side. An express tenancy
agreement would facilitate the aims of the agricultural tenancy laws and
promote social justice for both landowner and tenant.
With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his
"direct descendants," the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows
landowners whose lands have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the
area originally retained by them provided the original homestead grantees who
still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No.
6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the
homestead. 50 The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be
compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule. 51
However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct
descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be
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addressed by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and
his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit
provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise of the
administrative agency concerned.
It is appalling to note that it took over twelve (12) years for the Agrarian
Reform Team 202 of the Canlaon City Office of the DAR to act on a simple
matter calling for a preliminary determination of tenancy status, in spite of a
telegram sent on 30 March 1976 by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform directing
the Team Leader of A.R.T. 202 to investigate and submit a report on the
landholding of petitioner Valencia. 52 This is truly a travesty of great magnitude
and a clear-cut case of undue delay and administrative injustice, for the rights
of the landowner must equally be protected just as passionately as the rights of
the tenant-tiller, especially so that in the meantime he has been deprived of
the actual possession of his property which he envisioned to cultivate himself
after retiring from the government service; worse, he was not paid his
landholder's shares in the harvests, and there is no telling when, if ever, he will
ever be paid by private respondents who claim to be his "tenants." EHSTDA
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616;
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, and
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118745, 6
October 1995, 249 SCRA 149.
2. In re Operation Land Transfer Protest, Victor G. Valencia, Protestant,
Investigation Report and Recommendations, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office No. 25, Dumaguete City. See Rollo , pp. 72-
73.
3. Rollo , pp. 62-63. Pres. Decree No. 27 ordered the emancipation of all tenant-
farmers as of 21 October 1972, the date it was decreed. The Decree applies
to all tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn under a system of share-crop or lease tenancy, whether classified
as landed estate or not. L.O.I. No. 474 issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27
provides that all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven (7) hectares or
less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands or more than
seven (7) hectares in aggregate areas, or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families, are now placed
under the land transfer program of the government. L.O.I. No. 474 was
issued on 21 October 1976. See V. Agustin, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines: Republic Act No. 3844 (As Amended) With Notes and Comments
(1st ed., 1981), p. 79.
4. (a) Ernesto Lobresco to Francisco Palermo, Jr., P3,000.00 for four (4)
croppings and to Hazel Bautista P3,000.00 for five (5) croppings; (b) Melchor
Moncada to Virgilio Marquez P3,000.00 for five (5) croppings; and, (c)
Francisco Obang to Florencio Suanque P10,000.00 for five (5) years.
5. Rollo , pp. 70-71.
6. See Note 2 and Rollo , pp. 69-71.
18. Ibid.
19. Sec. 7, No. 3, Chapt. 2, Bk. IV, Exec. Order No. 292 (1987).
23. Sec. 8. Limitation of Relation. — The relation of landholder and tenant shall
be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm
household.
24. Santos and Macalino, The Agricultural Land Reform Code 11 (1963 ed.). See
also M. German, Share and Leasehold Tenancy 32 (2d ed., 2001).
25. Id. at 213-214.
26. Id. at 214.
27. III J. Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation 40 (1968 ed.).
28. See Secs. 37 and 44 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.
31. Ibid.
32. 119 Phil. 923 (1961).
43. G.R. No. 60287, 17 August 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 439.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. G.R. No. 108941, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 190, 199.
47. In the Matter of the Petition for Exclusion from Operation Land Transfer
Involving Parcels of Land Situated at Barangay Linothangan, Negros Oriental,
Victor G. Valencia, Protestant, Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
Hon. Benjamin T. Leong, DARRO Adm. Case No. VII-117-89, 12 July 1991, p. 8.
See Rollo , p. 84. The written civil law lease contract between Valencia and Fr.
Flores was marked as Annex "I".
48. Ibid.
49. See Note 6.
50. See Sec. 6 of Rep. Act. No. 6657, as amended.
51. Ibid.
52. Rollo , p. 68.