PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

plaintiff, vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL

SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO (acquitted), GERALDO GALINGAN,
EDDIE CALDERON (at large), BALOT CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY MENDOZA
(at large), accused.

MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.

FACTS:

On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper

Mario were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some
cigarettes. As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly
barged into the store and announced a hold-up.SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor
and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime scene. SPO1
Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots coming from
inside the store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street.PO3 Pastor was then on the street
while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ranand hid behind a concrete
marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters. Unfortunately,
in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered
that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and cash amounting to P81,000.On
September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan
decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial,
she testified that she was present in all the our meetings in which the plan to rob the
Masterline Grocery was hatched. On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability
for the felony. Each of them claimed to be somewhere else at the time the crime
happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn
the credibility of the lead witness for the prosecution, Naty Panimbaan

ISSUE:

Whether Naty’s testimony was inadmissible to prove conspiracy pursuant to the res
inter alios acta rule.

HELD:

No, the testimony was not inadmissible.

Res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
“the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.”

This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless
the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence.
The Court held that the res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations
or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In the present
case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in open court and
therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO
alias "OGCO", appellants.

FACTS:

The witnesses testified that six (6) men came to the house of Cesario Alcantara
threatening to attack and burn it should they not be let in. Once inside, the masked
group of men turned off the lights, hogtied Cesario, pushed him facedown and covered
him with blankets. They asked for money and Teresa gave them P400. Teresa was then
led to the kitchen. During this time, her daughter Marites was raped by four men. Then
Marites was led to the kitchen where the culprits threatened to abduct her if her mother
would not give them money. Teresa then gave them an additional P1,000 while the
group took three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken. Then they left the
house, all the while speaking in the Manobo dialect.

Dr.Manuel testified that the physical examination he conducted that there were

lacerations on Marites’ genitals indicative of actual sexual contact. Marites testified in
open court that she was raped by Ricky alias Ogco Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul
Jona. She said that she came to know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and
that he often goes to their house to buy bananas. She also said that she came to know
Joel Janson because he is always going to Mateo since he has a relative there.

Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she was not certain of the
identity of her perpetrators at the time of the incident or immediately thereafter.
According to her, it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended for another crime, and
after he ‘confessed’ to the police, that she was able to confirm her suspicion. When
asked in open court, she was not able to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy in her
initial sworn statement before the police and her testimony later.

ISSUE:

Whether the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson can be used against Ricky
Pinantao.

HELD:

No, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky
Pinantao.

An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized

unless repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to
cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay
as against said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.

Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao are acquitted of the crime of robbery with rape.
ALBERT F. KIEL, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ESTATE OF P. S. SABERT, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Kiel along with William Milfeil commenced to work on certain public lands known as
Parang Plantation Company situated in Cotabato. Kiel subsequently took over the
interest of Milfeil. In 1910, Kiel and Sabert entered into an agreement to develop the
plantation. Sabert was to furnish the capital and Kiel was to manage it. They were to
share and share alike in the property. It seems that this partnership was formed so that
the land could be acquired in the name of Sabert, Kiel being a German citizen and not
deemed eligible to acquire public lands in the Philippines.

Kiel developed the plantation but during the War, he was deported from the Philippines.
Afte a few years, Sabert and 5 other people organized the Nituan Plantation Company.
Sabert transferred all of his rights in two parcels of land to the Nituan Plantation
Company.

In this same period, Kiel appears to have tried to secure a settlement from Sabert
however, the latter died before any amicable arrangement could be reached.

ISSUE:

Whether the admission of the plaintiff is prohibited as evidence.

HELD:

Yes.

Pursuant to The Code of Civil Procedure in Section 383, parties to an action or

proceeding against an executor or administrator of a deceased person upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person, who "cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occuring before the death of such deceased person." are considered as
incompetent witnesses.

The Court also cited the case of Maxilom v. Tabotabo where it was held that "A party to
an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person, upon a claim
against the estate of the latter, is absolutely prohibited by law from giving testimony
concerning such claim or demand as to anything that occurred before the death of the
person against whose estate the action is prosecuted."
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.

FACTS:

Two years after his election, several allegations were made against Estrada regarding
corruption and of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists
from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. Some
Congressmen moved to impeach Estrada and call for his resignation. The Philippine
National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. Estrada again
appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing
the nation. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 

ISSUE:

Whether Estrada resigned as President.

HELD:

Yes.

The facts of the cases show that Estrada did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.

However, his intent to resign was shown from his conducts revealed from the Angara
Diary. This is considered as an adaptive admission. An adoptive admission is where a
defendant, knowing the content of an accusation against him, adopts the truth of the
accusation by his words or conduct.

In the Angara Diary, it was revealed that petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for
president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

Furthermore, when Angara asked Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option
of "dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently. The
petitioner even expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit
but said he would never leave the country.

This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign.
His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.

An adoptive admission is where a defendant, knowing the content of an accusation

against him, adopts the truth of the accusation by his words or conduct.
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PABLO RAYMUNDO, ET
AL.,Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS:

On the morning of the 17th day of January, 1908, a dead body was found in
a zacate field close by a narrow lane in Santa Ana. There were two or three wounds in
the throat and neck, and one in the abdominal region. The medical officer who
examined the body found that death had resulted from the wounds inflicted in the throat
and neck, and that it must have occurred some seven or eight hours prior to the
autopsy. The body was identified as that of a policeman named Vicente Delgado, who
on the day prior to his death was on duty in precinct No. 16, Paco district, from 3 o'clock
in the afternoon until 44 minutes after 10 that night, his precinct including Calle
Panaderos, off which the body was found.

Four persons, Pablo Raymundo, Felix Arcangel, Lorenzo Gutierrez, and Apolonio
Leyva, were charged with the assassination of the deceased in an information filed by
the prosecuting attorney.

The defendants were tried separately, and Raymundo and Arcangel were convicted as
principals, and Gutierrez and Leyva as accomplices of the crime of assassination,
marked with the aggravating circumstances of deliberate premeditation and nocturnity.

The principal witness testified as to the manner in which the deceased died. Her
testimony as to the manner in which the deceased was murdered and as to the
connection of the accused with the commission of the crime is corroborated by
independent evidence of the fact that all four of the accused were in the immediate
vicinity of the scene of the crime at or about the time that it was committed.

As to the defendant, Raymundo, her testimony is conclusively corroborated by an

extrajudicial confession made by him in the presence of several police officers after he
was arrested, wherein he gave a detailed account of the commission of the crime
substantially identical with that given by Juliana.

As to the defendant, Arcangel, her testimony is substantially corroborated by his

extrajudicial admissions and self-incriminating statements made after his arrest, wherein
he admitted having participated in the commission of the crime and having struck one of
the blows inflicted by the attacking party.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in taking into consideration extrajudicial confessions and
admissions of some of the defendants as against their codefendants.
HELD:

Yes.

Subsection 6 of section 298 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that evidence may
be given upon a trial "after proof of a conspiracy" of "the act or declaration of conspirator
relating to the conspiracy," and the reason upon which this rule rests renders it is
applicable in criminal as in civil trials; it always being understood, however, that "acts
and declarations of a conspirator cannot be admitted as against a coconspirator, unless
such acts were performed or declarations made in aid or execution of the conspiracy,"
and, therefore, that "the acts and declarations must occur during the life of the
combination, that is after the formation of the corrupt agreement, and before the
consummation or abandonment of the object of the conspiracy."

Applying this doctrine, it is evident that the trial court erred in finding in the extrajudicial
confessions and admissions of Raymundo and Arcangel corroboration of the evidence
introduced in the separate trial of the coaccused.

Except as it appears from these confessions and admissions there is no evidence in the
record of the existence of a conspiracy, or of the connection of Gutierrez therewith, for
any length of time prior to the commission of the crime, the facts admitted respectively
by Raymundo and Arcangel being the only evidence in the record upon which a finding
of deliberate premeditation could have been based and also because an examination of
the whole opinion, taken together with the following citation quoted therefrom in brief of
counsel for Gutierrez, appears to sustain counsel's contention that not only as to Leyva,
who is specifically mentioned in the citation, but also as to Gutierrez, the trial court took
into consideration the extrajudicial statements made by Arcangel and Raymundo in
making findings of fact as to the participation of Gutierrez in the commission of the
crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO LUAYON @
"Willy," ALFREDO SABIOR, JACINTO MORENG, RODOLFO TONIACAO, NEMESIO
ELICOT, FRESCO ELICOT, NESTOR PATIGUE, PEDRO PETORBOS, MARIA
GAILANAN and DOMINGO BARLIZO, Accused, WILFREDO LUAYON @ "Willy,"
ALFREDO SABIOR, RODOLFO TONIACAO and JACINTO MORENG, Accused-
Appellants.

FACTS:

Alejandro Castillon, former barangay captain of Sabangan, Asuncion, Davao, was

reported missing in the morning of January 13, 1987.

A complaint for murder against ten (10) persons, namely, Luayon, Patigue, Toniacao,
Moreng, Sabior, Fresco Elicot, Nemesio Elicot, Pedro Petorbos, Mario Gailanan and
Domingo Borlizo, was filed by the Asuncion station commander.

Alejandro Castillon, was a gold panner with eight (8) children. At about four o’clock in
the afternoon of January 12, 1987, Castillon was at the "purok" some seven (7) meters
way from his residence. His wife, Conchita, saw how Patigue approached Castillon and
invited him to a drinking spree. Castillon declined the invitation but an hour later, he
changed his mind and decided to join Patigue’s group.

It was about six o’clock that night when Neria Miranda, whose house was located 30
meters away from the "side back" of the house of Patigue, saw "the accused" drinking at
Patigue’s store. Later that night, around nine o’clock, she heard noise coming from
Patigue’s house. Neria went up her own house and through the window, she saw
Toniacao and Luayon proceeding to the back of Patigue’s house but they did nothing
there. She asked her husband what the two were doing but he told her not to mind them
at all.

At around 9:30 that same evening, Rebeche was having dinner when she heard the
noise of cracking bottles from the house of Patigue. Looking out, she saw someone she
did not recognize being mauled. She called her uncle Manga, and told him of what she
saw.

Manga also heard the noise of crashing bottles but he did not mind it at all until Maria
Luz called his attention to it. Maria Luz, who lived in the next house barely 3 meters
away from his own, even went to his house to relate what she saw. As he was then by
the window, he saw at a distance of 50 meters, Toniacao, Luayon, Sabior, Moreng and
Patigue mauling somebody. Manga went down his house to verify. He crawled behind
some plants to a place around 30 meters from the house of Patigue. From then, he
testified that he clearly witnessed Castillon being mauled by Luayon. He was only 31
meters away from the store.
On the other hand, no independent witness supported the defendant’s testimonies

The trial court rendered a decision finding that Luayon’s act of striking Castillon with an
iron bar while his head was bowed and the act of his co-accused "in helping one
another in mauling" Castillon "were acts of treachery, conspiracy and resort of superior
strength"

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in holding that there was conspiracy amoung the accused.

HELD:

No. Criminal conspiracy was deduced by the trial court from the "joint acts of the
accused in helping one another." To establish conspiracy, two or more persons must be
shown to come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony. It is not,
however, necessary that direct proof be adduced to establish such agreement. It can be
inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a
common intent or design to commit a crime. What is essential is that there is unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective.

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown

that he had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. Such
an act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or
of a moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy. Once conspiracy
has been established, all the conspirators become liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their individual participation in the crime because, in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all, the guilt of one is the guilt of all.

Manga positively testified that he saw appellants, in the company of Patigue, help each
other in mauling the victim. He saw that Luayon used an iron bar, Sabior, a bottle of
"grande", Moreng, a piece of wood, and Patigue, a bottle of "family" Coca Cola. These
objects are lethal when used with force upon a person. In the case at bar, the use of
these objects resulted in the instantaneous death of Castillon. The fact that each of the
appellants was armed with these objects shows that indeed they had a common
objective in mind — to finish off Castillon.

Even after the commission of the offense, appellants acted in unison in trying to cover
up the crime. Appellants Sabior and Luayon led the carabao with the victim on its back,
towards the cemetery, away from the scene of the crime. For his part, Toniacao,
assisted by Fresco Elicot, cleaned up the place with sand in a bid to hide the traces of
the crime.

Against these positive proofs of their culpability, each of the appellants interposed
simple denial while admitting that they, in fact, where at the scene of the crime
immediately before it was perpetrated. Such bare denials, unsupported as they are
independent evidence, are no more than self-serving assertions. It is a weak defense,
and it cannot prevail over the declaration of credible witnesses who were able to
positively identify them as the authors of the crime.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEGUNDO BADILLA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

In the evening of March 7, 1924, Pedro Ferrer, justice of the peace of the municipality of
Sagay, Occidental Negros was fatally wounded in the house of one Leocadia, who
stated that she had inflicted the fatal wound in defense of her honor. She was
immediately arrested and two days later, while still in prison, made a confession
implicating Badilla, Restituto Tupas, Julian Domingo, Quirino Araez and Jovito
Carmales in the commission of the crime.

The persons mentioned were thereupon arrested and on the following day, Julian
Domingo and Jovito Carmales confessed that they were participants in the crime and on
the same day the provincial fiscal filed a complaint charging Segundo Badilla, Restituto
Tupas, Catalino Gonzalez, Julian Domingo, Jovito Carmales, Quirino Araez, Agaton Dy-
Cayco and Leocadia Desamparado with the crime of murder.

At the preliminary investigation, the fiscal presented a motion asking that Leocadia
Desamparado and Jovito Carmales be excluded from the complaint on the ground that
they were the least culpable of the accused and that their testimony was necessary to
establish a case for the prosecution. This motion was granted by the acting justice of
the peace. 

ISSUE:

Whether the confession of Leocadia and Julian can be taken into consideration as a
circumstance in judging the credibility of the testimony of an accomplice.

HELD:

The general rule is that extrajudicial declarations of a coconspirator made before the
information of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible
in evidence as against in a criminal case has the constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. It has however, been held
that where extrajudicial confessions had been made by several persons charged with a
conspiracy and there could have been collusion with reference to the several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is
confirmatory of the testimony of an accomplice. 

The Court also cited the case of US vs Lancaster stating that where three persons were
jointly charged with a conspiracy, one of whom made a voluntary confession, another
was permitted to become a witness for the Government under implied pardon and
testified and the third made a declaration during the pendency of the criminals
enterprise, the court saying among other things that ". . . while the testimony of the
accomplices could not corroborate each other and while the confession of Clemens
cannot be considered as evidence against the other prisoners yet the unanimity of
statements of the three made without the opportunity of conference or without proof that
they did confer is a fact which tends to corroborate the three statements so made. . . .

In other words while an extrajudicial declaration of a coconspirator may not be directly

introduced in evidence against another coconspirator as proof of specific facts it may
nevertheless under certain conditions be taken into consideration as a circumstance in
judging the credibility of the testimony of an accomplice.

In the present case there is no indication that the three declarations were the result of
collusion or that the declarants had the opportunity of conferring with each other before
making the declaration. Neither is there any valid reason to believe that the statements
made by the declarants were laid in their mouths by other persons. On the contrary, the
declarations themselves indicate that they were spontaneous expressions of what was
in the minds of the declarants at the time. All three declarations were legally before the
court and we do not think that in these circumstances the court erred in giving some
consideration to the fact that they were very similar to each other and substantially in
accord.