CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.

JD3A
EJERCITO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Ejercito is the owner of Trust Account and a Savings Account which were originally
opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export and Industry Bank.
Estrada was subsequently charged with Plunder. The Special Prosecution Panel filed
before the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing
the President of Export and Industry Bank to produce documents of the Trust Account
and Savings Account belonging to Ejercito and statement of accounts of one named
“Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon during the hearings. The SB granted the request.

Estrada filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas claiming that his bank accounts are
covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under
any of the exceptions stated therein. Ejercito further averred that the disclosure being
fruit of the poisonous tree, the prosecution may not use the same in court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information obtained are fruits of the poisonous tree.

HELD:

No. RA 1405 is broad enough to cover the Trust Account of Ejercito, however, such
protection not absolute. The law provides for exceptions and 2 of which are present in
this case: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. 

Ejercito’s contention that plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty is without
merit. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from  the
rule making bank deposits confidential. The crime of bribery and the overt acts
constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public officers, noble idea that “a public
office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the
full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny”
applies with equal force.

The "fruit of the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In
the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover,
there is no basis for applying the same in this case since the primary source for the
detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts – the investigation previously
conducted by the Ombudsman – was lawful.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
CECILIA ZULUETA VS. CA, AND DR. ALFREDO MARTIN

FACTS:

Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. The former entered the office of
Dr. Martin and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta. The RTC declared him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties in this case and ordered Zulueta to return the properties and pay damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents obtained by Zulueta are admissible in evidence.

HELD:

No.  The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS and ERWIN ESPINOSA

FACTS:

Espinosa and Salita were married. A year later they separated in fact and Espinosa
subsequently sued for annulment on the ground that Salita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage although
the same became manifest only thereafter. 

Salita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his
Bill of Particulars, Espinosa specified that  at the time of their marriage, his wife was
psychologically incapacitated in that she was unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession, who is newly qualified Doctor of Medicine. That she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused Espinosa to lose his job. Salita was still not contented with the Bill
of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the specific essential
marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of
Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the
subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.

HELD:

A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or
causes of action." Ultimate facts are "those facts which the expected evidence will
support." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for
bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless
already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for
matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information
may be obtained by other means.

The Court sustains the view of the CA that the Bill of Particulars filed by Espinosa is
sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. It is evident that Salita can
already prepare her responsive pleading. Espinosa has already alleged that "she
(petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession"
Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking
for information on evidentiary facts, which are facts necessary to prove essential or
ultimate facts.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
W-RED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ASIA INDUSTRIES, INC.,

FACTS:

Petitioner, on several occasions, purchased from respondent electrical equipment worth

P976,487.18, covered by eighteen sales invoices. Petitioner was able to pay
P701,877.93, leaving a balance of P298,183.05, inclusive of interest at the rate of 14%
per annum. For petitioner's failure to settle its remaining obligation, respondent
instituted on an action for sum of money and damages.

Petitioner denied receipt of some of the items stated in the sales invoices and alleging
that certain electrical equipment delivered to it were defective or faulty, for which proper
demands for replacement were ignored by respondent.

In the instant petition, petitioner maintains that the sales invoices presented by
respondent were inadmissible for being mere photocopies which were not authenticated
by respondent's lone witness. Likewise, the Statement of Account showing petitioner's
unpaid obligation to respondent was not identified and authenticated by the person who
prepared it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not photocopies of original documents are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

No. While only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record
shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. Hence, it is
not accurate to say that the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court.

Petitioner’s objection as to the admissibility of the statement of account on the ground

that it was not authenticated and identified by the person who prepared it was also
without merit. Respondent's only witness, Ms. Ramas, was not entirely incompetent to
testify on petitioner's obligation. It was sufficiently established that Ms. Ramas, was in
charge of monitoring the credit purchases of customers, including petitioner.
The factual findings of the trial court and the CA, which are not shown to be manifestly
erroneous or unsupported by the record, deserve great respect. The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. Thus, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive.
In this case, we find no cogent ground to disturb the conclusions of the CA and the trial
court. We, therefore, affirm the appealed decision.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELO H.
FLORES,

FACTS:

Flores purchased from PNB Casino unit two (2) manager’s checks worth P500,000
each for P1,000,040. Flores presented these checks at the casino, however, PNB only
agreed to encash the checks after a lengthy discussion, but only one (1) of the checks.
It deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken
down to five (5) manager's checks of P100,000.00 each. 

Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared
by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to such an
arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to PNB
through its Malate Branch so that the check may be encashed but to no avail. Flores,
thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned
events. A Formal Demand was made by Flores’ counsel but PNB persisted in its refusal
to honor the check.

PNB insisted in its Answer that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges were
actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two (2) manager's checks worth
P1,000,000.00. It alleged that due to Flores' "demanding attitude and temper,"
petitioner's money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at that time was still new at her job,
made an error in good faith in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00. The actuations of
Flores allegedly distracted the personnel manning the unit. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the receipt is the best evidence to prove if Flores paid the PNB Casino
unit.

HELD:

Yes. A "receipt" is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money has
been paid or goods have been delivered. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and
is not conclusive. Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the case at bench,
an exhaustive review of the records fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient and
strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in petitioner's own receipt (as
to the amount of money it actually received).

The subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or "that which affords the
greatest certainty of the fact in question.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR.,
MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., v. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA,

FACTS:

Atty. Mendoza, a former Municipal Judge and a practicing lawyer, is legally married to
Felicitas. Atty. Mendoza allegedly abandoned Felicitas in favor of his paramour, Marilyn,
who is also married. Atty. Mendoza and Marilyn  have been cohabiting openly and
publicly as husband and wife. Atty. Mendoza had fathered two children by Marilyn she
declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May
12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate.

In 1995, after filing his certificate of candidacy, Atty. Mendoza alleged that he was
separated in fact from Felicitas. During the proceedings in the IBP the complainants,
who were his political opponents, were able to present the birth certificate of the
children. Atty. Mendoza argued that those testimony are mere hearsays and that the
birth certificates are not admissible as evidence since it was obtained illegally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the birth certificates are admission in evidence.

HELD:

Yes. Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the
issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the
inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1.

Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against
persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissible in evidence. 
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules
on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in
question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLAND L. MELOSANTOS

FACTS:

Melosantos was arrested through a buy-bust operation during which he was caught in
the process of transacting the sale of 1 kilogram of "shabu" with the arresting team.
SPO1 Manlatao testified that he was the poseur-buyer and that he was at the Shell Gas
Station infront of Unimart, Greenhills around 9:30 o'clock in the morning together with
Supt. Elenzano, SPO4 Velasco, including the confidential informer, waiting for
Melosantos who had previously agreed to sell 1 kilogram of shabu at P450.00 per gram.

SPO1 Filomeno testified that the proposal to buy 1 kilogram of shabu, relayed through
an Easy Call Unit, emanated from SPO1 Manlatao; he further declared that when the
poseur-buyer showed the money to the suspect, both the poseur-buyer and suspect
went to the car where the shabu was shown to the poseur-buyer and that when the pre-
arranged signal was given and Melosantos was apprehended.

Melosantos claimed that no buy-bust operation was conducted and that a certain
Michael Ty is the one who was caught with drugs. The latter allegedly wanted buy
Melosantos’ Mitsubishi Lancer and while on test-drive, Ty asked Melosantos to proceed
to Greenhills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an oral or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is not based on the

personal knowledge of the witness.

HELD:

Yes. Indeed, any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person not on the witness stand. By virtue of this legal aphorism, no
probative value can attach to the alleged confession of Carlos albeit no objection
thereto was interposed by the defense.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Valdez is charged for violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. Valdez was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, planted, cultivated and cultured
seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants. He was arraigned pleaded not guilty to the
charge.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Tipay, SPO2 Libunao, SPO2
Morales, SPO1 Tobias and PO2 Balut, who testified how the information was received,
the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of
Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
looked around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut.

PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and Valdez allegedly
admitted it was his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of Valdez
standing beside them and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the PNP
Crime Lab for analysis which produced a positive result.

The defense presented Valdez as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know and
asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found. Five armed policemen
were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if
he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

HELD:

No. There was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it
is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm.
Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants
were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant.
But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the
excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.
The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions. The confiscated plants were evidently obtained
during an illegal search and seizure. The Court also finds that said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants
as evidence to convict appellant.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEDRO BONGALON now substituted by FILIPINA BONGALON vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, CECILIO BONGALON and AMPARO BONGALON

FACTS:

Rosalia was the owner of Lot No. 525-A covered by OCT No. RO-17402 (23825) issued
in her name which was later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-67656, also issued in
her name. Rosalia died intestate in 1940, survived by her husband and five children.
Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Cirila
a part of Lot No. 525-A for P100.

On the same day, Cirila, and again Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora, executed a Deed
of Absolute conveying to Pedro "a part of" Lot No. 525-A also for P100. The same
notary public notarized both deeds of sale on that same day. Thereafter, Cirila executed
another Deed of Absolute Sale conveying Lot No. 525-A to Amparo for P4,500. Amparo
subsequently declared Lot No. 525-A in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes in 1977 and 1978. Even before the execution Deed of Sale, Amparo and
her family were already occupying a 32-square meter portion of Lot No. 525-A where
her house stands.

Meanwhile, Pedro executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate declaring that Cirila is

the only heir of Rosalia and that he is, in turn, the only heir of Cirila. Based on this
Extrajudicial Settlement, Pedro secured the cancellation of title covering the lot subject
matter of this case and obtained another title issued in his name. Pedro sued
respondents and alleged in his complaint that he is the registered owner of lot and
respondents occupied it through his tolerance. Despite his repeated demands to vacate
the said lot, respondents failed to do so.

However, respondents claimed that Pedro fraudulently obtained the title by executing
the Extrajudicial Settlement. Amparo claimed that on the contrary, she is the owner of
Lot No. 525-A based on Deed of Sale. As counterclaim, respondents sought the
nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement and of TCT No. T-67780. During the trial,
Pedro introduced in evidence other documents to prove his ownership of the lot, such
as (1) Exhibit B and (2) Conchita’s Affidavit confirming the sale under Exhibit B. The
RTC admitted these documents in evidence over the objection of respondents. The CA
reversed RTC and said that Exhibits B and C should not have been admitted since they
were never alleged in the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Exhibits B and C are admissible in evidence

HELD:

Yes.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
It was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the RTC should not have admitted in
evidence Exhibits B and C because Pedro Bongalon failed to allege these documents in
his complaint. What was at issue before the RTC, as raised in the pleadings filed by the
parties, was the ownership of Lot No. 525-A. Pedro Bongalon offered the pieces of
evidence in question to support his claim of ownership over Lot No. 525-A. The fact that
Pedro Bongalon did not mention Exhibits B and C in his complaint is not a reason to
rule them inadmissible. While TCT No. T-67780 was Pedro Bongalon’s principal proof of
ownership, it did not preclude him from presenting other pieces of evidence to prove his
claim. This is especially relevant because of his testimony that he executed the
Extrajudicial Settlement only because the Register of Deeds of Albay required it for the
issuance of TCT No. T-67780.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn stayed in her grandmother’s house, despite her intention to
go forth Tuguegarao City. At 10:00 am, Yatar was seen at the back of the same house
where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin
saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended
from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of the house, Judilyn
didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein.

An hour later, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt(without collar) and
blue pants and noticed that the latter’s eyes were “reddish and sharp.” Yatar asked
about the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk with the
latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived.

In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house
turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope.
Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife and she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and
naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Police came to the scene and
they found Kathylyn’s clothes and undergarments beside her body and a white collared
shirt splattered with blood 50-meters away from Isabel’s house.

Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was
convicted for the same by the RTC. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred
in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of
the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from
is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA
testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving much weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.

HELD:

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled
rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the DNA of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness
on DNA print or identification techniques. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOERAL GALLENO

FACTS:

Evelyn, the 5-year old daughter of Rosita together with the former’s younger brother
was left to the care of their uncle, Emeterio and aunt, Penicola. Emeterio and Penicola
left their residence to work at the sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar.
Their three children had all earlier left for school. The only persons left in the house
were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.

At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno was on his way to his Lola Esing to have
his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and
found the two children left to themselves.

Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind,
life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.

ISSUE:

Whether or not giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors
was proper.

HELD:

As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions.
It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the
facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. 1, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890).
However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the
special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in
reaching a judgment (Ibid., p. 886).

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the
expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference
is wrong.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD3A