1.

2 The EXCEPTIONS to non-delegation:

Sigre v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 15

FACTS:
       
        Presidential Decree No. 27 issued by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed the entire
country as a “Land Reform Area” and further decreed the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil, transferring to them ownership of the land they till.
        Sigre was Gonzales’ tenant in Iloilo and previously paid Gonzales a lease rental of
32 cavans per year which he stopped and instead started to remit lease rentals to LBP
pursuant to DAR’s memorandum circular which set the guidelines of lease rental
payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD 27.
Lilia Gonzales, acting in her capacity as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay,
filed a petition for petitioner and Mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the
Philippines from accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to turn over
to Gonzales the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre.
 
ISSUE:
       
        Is Presidential Decree No. 27 valid and constitutional?
 
LAW:
        Presidential Decree No. 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership
of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the
purchase by tenant-farmers, long-recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the
lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum
retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and
subject to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued Memorandum
Circular No. 6, series of 1978.
 
RULING/RATIO:
 
        The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by
the law. One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As
emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom
from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the
land they’re tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems
have been encountered in the expeditious implementation of the land reform program,
thus necessitating its promulgation. The rationale for the Circular was explicitly
recognized by the appellate court when it stated that “The main purpose of the circular is
to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his
amortizations on the purchase price of the land. . . . The circular was meant to remedy the
situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his
favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual
obligor for said purchase price.” Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has
the force of law and is entitled to great respect.

Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide
for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes."[18] (Italics supplied)
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18,
1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). x x x.
The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who has reached
the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years
of service under  Civil  Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise
be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of
P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of
the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has
no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146."[16] 

The Facts:
Sometime in May 1991,[1] Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of
Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had
already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13)
years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by
exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership"[2] issued by the Government Service Insurance
System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of
Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to
comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with
the following date "2/28/91."
            In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised
Davao        City. Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

            "Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to
M.C.         No. 65 of         the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder             quoted:
            'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years shall       not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious          
reasons in which case the       retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'

            IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador
[M.]            Rabor as             Utility Worker in that office, is already non- extend[i]ble." [3]

            Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July
1991          letter of             Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting
for work        effective August 16,    1991."[4]

Decision:
 
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions
of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the
present Civil Service Law. 

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that

extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give
apremium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against
those who enter the  service  at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of
next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified
young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed
the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension."[24] (Italics supplied

Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold
that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July
1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
 ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

1.3 Ethical basis of the principle

U.S. v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327

Facts:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to
regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods
by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector
may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that
in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is
manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397
because under said Circular, only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the
Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable
penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court –
this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be
liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different
from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding
$100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that
specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being
delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is,
that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility
by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes
the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
 judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening
mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress.
Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No.
1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
 

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386
FACTS: 
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios
Fernando to allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above
or below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of
regulation in the transport sector which the government intends to implement and to make
progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus
Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to
LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the Department
Order & to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o
benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB
w/c was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was
readily granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: 
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing
authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of
Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable
because a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also,
to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic state of
affairs ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can
increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.

1.4 The advantages of delegation of power to administrative agencies

Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

FACTS: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school
year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of
the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). 
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
ARGUMENTS & ISSUES RAISED:
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.” The standards set for subordinate legislation
in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando
in Edu v. Ericta — “The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained
as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe transit upon the roads.'” We believe and so hold that the
necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and
regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements
of the non-delegation principle.

1.5 How must the doctrine be interpreted.

Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment,

108 SCRA 757
FACTS

On September 14, 1981, the Free Telephone Workers Union filed a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices against PLDT. The Union was claiming that: (a)
there was a unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; (b) that such
implementation resulted in the illegal terminations and suspensions of the Union's officers and
members; and (c) there were violations of the CBA, particularly the policy on sick leaves.

During the conciliation meetings, the Union expressed its willingness to have a revised Code of
Conduct that would be fair to all concerned. It also pleaded that in the meanwhile, the Code of
Conduct being imposed be suspended, to which PLDT refused. As such, the labor dispute was
brought up to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
In the meantime, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amended Art. 264 of the Labor Code regarding
strikes "affecting the national interest." The amended article now reads: "In labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as
may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or
distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.

Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as
he may issue to enforce the same."

Despite the fact that the labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union and PLDT
was still pending before the NLRC, and despite the fact that there was no actual strike to speak
of, the Free Telephone Workers Union still filed a petition before the SC challenging the
constitutionality of the amended Art. 264 of the LC.

The Union was arguing that the delegation to the Minister of Labor and Employment (now the
SOLE) of the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, was
an undue delegation of legislative powers and was violative of the workers' right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.

RULING

Petition denied. On its face, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amending Art. 264 of the LC is NOT on
its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
power. 

Whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amending Art. 264 of the LC was an undue delegation of
legislative power. – ON ITS FACE, NO. BUT THERE COULD BE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION.

Three reasons why the SC dismissed the Union's petition: (a) The allegation that there was undue
delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny because at the time the petition
was filed, there was no strike in progress (i.e., the Minister of Labor and Employment had not
yet exercised his power to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute); (b) the doctrine of
qualified political agency lends legitimacy to actions by ministers (now cabinet secretaries); and
(c) a study of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 would show that the law satisfies the completeness test
and does not in any way confer legislative powers to the Minister of Labor.

UNION'S PETITION IS PREMATURE

While the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 has not been demonstrated, there is no
ruling on the issue of unconstitutional application, especially so as to any alleged infringement in
the exercise of the power of compulsory arbitration of the specific modes provided in the
Constitution to assure compliance with the constitutional mandate to "afford protection to labor"
being at this stage premature.

The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for
the Union within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national
interests, but only when a strike is in progress (which is not the case in the present petition, there
being no strike yet).

There is no ruling on the question of whether or not the amended Art. 264 of the LC has been
unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and
free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by PLDT, the matter is NOT YET
ripe for judicial determination.

In any event, there is an unconstitutional application of a law when a law "fair on its face and
impartial in appearance is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand." An example of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is
ordained by the fundamental law (e.g., the protection of labor) is ignored or disregarded.•    As a
reminder, the SC held that when it comes to the application of the amended Art. 264, arbiters are
required to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.

QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY

Secretaries of departments exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in
any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of
executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.

As applied in the present case, any act by the Minister of Labor proceeding from the power
conferred upon him by the amended Art. 264 of the LC shall be subject to the President's
approval or disapproval.

Villena v. Secretary of Interior: "All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."

Philippine American Management Co. v. Philippine American Management Employees

Association: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as
forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, 'each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise authority.'"

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 130 SATISFIES THE COMPLETENESS TEST

Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation of such power
may be discerned. In fact, the subject law satisfies the completeness test; Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest."

People v. Exconde: "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."

Edu v. Ericta: "What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws
and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or riot there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness
of the measure enacted."

Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission: "The principle of non-delegation 'has

been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modem governments giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."

A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

DOCTRINE

The Constitution is not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS-WFTU)

v. Ople, 137 SCRA 108

There is this reinforcement to the conclusion that no such claim as unlawful delegation of
legislative power would prosper in the now authoritative doctrine that the rigid and inflexible
approach in People v. Vera  14 has virtually fallen into innocuous desuetude. As pointed out in the
recent case of Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment: 15 "it would
be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social and
economic problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an unduly
restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation.
Fortunately with the retention in the amended Constitution of some features of the 1973
Constitution as originally adopted leading to an appreciable measure of concord and harmony
between the policy-making branches of the government, executive and legislative, the objection
on the grounds of non-delegation would be even less persuasive. It is worth repeating that the
Prime Minister, while the choice of the President, must have the approval of the majority of all
members of the Batasang Pambansa, At least a majority of the cabinet members, the Ministers
being appointed by the President, if heads of ministries, shall come from its regional
representatives. So, also, while the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the
Batasang Pambansa for the program of the government, it must be one approved by the
President.' While conceptually, there still exists a distinction between the enactment of
legislation and its execution, between formulation and implementation, the fundamental principle
of separation of powers of which non- delegation is a logical corollary becomes even more
flexible and malleable. Even in the case of the United States with its adherence to the
Madisonian concept of separation of powers, President Kennedy could state that its Constitution
did not make the Presidency and Congress rivals for power but partners for progress [with these
two branches] being trustees for the people, custodians of their heritage. With the closer
relationship provided for by the amended Constitution in our case, there is likely to be even more
promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies and thereafter unity and vigor in their
execution. A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine, therefore, would be an obstacle to
national efforts at development and progress. There is accordingly more receptivity to laws
leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary
to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar,
Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.' He then went on to state that 'the occasions for delegating power to administrative
offices [could be] compassed by a single generation.' Thus: 'Power should be delegated where
there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the
legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to
lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where
the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of
continuous decision . His perceptive study could rightfully conclude that even in a strictly
presidential system like that of the United States, the doctrine of non-delegation reflects the
American 'political philosophy that insofar as possible issues be settled [by legislative bodies],
an essentially restrictive approach' may ignore 'deep currents of social force.' In complainer
terms, and as applied to the Philippines under the amended Constitution with the close ties that
bind the executive and legislative departments, certain features of parliamentarism having been
retained, it may be a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation, The spectre of the non-
delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers. 16 Such an observation applies to the judiciary as well.

1. Congress may intervene in Administrative Agencies

Phil. Interisland Shipping Assn. of the Phils. v. CA, 266 SCRA 489
Facts:
Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various groups
rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines.
On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor
pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES
FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO
FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially
the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation;
that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to
its... implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations.
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986.
Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e.,
the shipping lines and the pilots, the... fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it
(PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and that
consequently E.O. No. 1088 had ceased to be effective.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a decision[5]
holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under obligation to comply with E.O.
No. 1088 because the order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal.
The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. The petition was filed in this Court which
later referred the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072.
In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division[6] of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, by
dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072.
Issues:
Issue No. 1
Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and
Petitioners are Bound to Obey it
 Issue No. 2
Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the
Appeal of Intervenors from the Decision of the
Trial Court Invalidating Administrative Order
No. 02-88 of the PPA
Issue no. 3
Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and
Decide the Contempt Charges... against Petitioners
Ruling:
For issue no. 1
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973
Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in
Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the
rates of charges fixed... by it through the imposition of uniform rates.
As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby
withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by
the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District."
We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may
increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.
For issue no. 2... both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court. In G.R. No. 100109,
the government's petition was dismissed for lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The... dismissal of the
government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481 for the review of the same
decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those stated... in the
government's petition. It is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the merits of a
controversy.[16] Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of... the Court of
Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct.
For issue no. 3
The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the
remand of the case to the trial... court.[20] Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts.
The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in G.R. No. 100109, petitioners
rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction
as... embodied in its decision would be properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents'
complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful
processes of a... court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as
the order previously prohibited by the court.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject to any valid defense
which petitioners may interpose.
Principles:
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.

3. Subordinate legislation

Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614

4. Findings of Facts should be respected. Reasons.

Dela Salle Araneta Univesity v. Bernardo, 817 SCRA 317

Facts:
On February 26, 2004, Bernardo filed a complaint against DLS-AU and its owner/manager,
Dr. Oscar Bautista (Dr. Bautista), for the payment of retirement benefits. Bernardo alleged
that he started working as a part-time professional lecturer at DLS-AU (formerly known as
the Araneta University Foundation) on June 1, 1974 for an hourly rate of P20.00. Bernardo
taught for two semesters and the summer for the school year 1974-1975. Bernardo then took
a leave of absence from June 1, 1975 to October 31, 1977 when he was assigned by the
Philippine Government to work in Papua New Guinea. When Bernardo came back in 1977,
he resumed teaching at DLS-AU until October 12, 2003, the end of the first semester for
school year 2003-2004. Bernardo's teaching contract was renewed at the start of every
semester and summer. However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed Bernardo
through a telephone call that he could not teach at the school anymore as the school was
implementing the retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was already 75 years
old, Bernardo had no choice but to retire. At the time of his retirement, Bernardo was being
paid P246.50 per hour.
Yet, Dr. Bautista, in a letter[8] dated February 12, 2004, stated that Bernardo was not
entitled to any kind of separation pay or benefits. Dr. Bautista explained to Bernardo that as
mandated by the DLS-AU's policy and Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), only full-
time permanent faculty of DLS-AU for at least five years immediately preceeding the
termination of their employment could avail themselves of the post-employment benefits. As
part-time faculty member, Bernardo did not acquire permanent employment under the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, in relation to the Labor Code, regardless of his
length of service.Aggrieved by the repeated denials of his claim for retirement benefits,
Bernardo filed before the NLRC, National Capital Region, a complaint for non-payment of
retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT PART-TIME EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE
COVERAGE OF THOSE ENTITLED TO RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. [7641].
Ruling:
The Court declared in Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission[20] that retirement
benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening
the burden of worrying forhis financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and
service to the employer. Retirement benefits, where not mandated by law, may be granted by
agreement of the employees and their employer or as a voluntary act on the part of the
employer.In the present case, DLS-AU, through Dr. Bautista, denied Bernardo's claim for
retirement benefits because only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU are entitled to said
benefits pursuant to university policy and the CBA. Since Bernardo has not been granted
retirement benefits under any agreement with or by voluntary act of DLS-AU, the next
question then is, can Bernardo claim retirement benefits by mandate of any law?We answer
in the affirmative.Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social legislation. It precisely intends
to give the minimum retirement benefits to employees not entitled to the same under
collective bargaining and other agreements. It also applies to establishments with existing
collective bargaining or other agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are
less than those prescribed in said law.[21]Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7641, reads:Art. 302 [287]. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired
upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided however, That an
employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreement shall not
be less than those provided herein.In the absence of retirement plan or agreement providing
for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the
age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty five (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-
 half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.

Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753

The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, 13 and a perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative cases manifest
sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. Thus,
Sec. 5 Administrative Adjudication; How Conducted —
a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated in Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 6770, the respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and other evidences
submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other
evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, together with
proof of service of the same on the complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10)
days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.
b) If, on the basis of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by the parties; the investigating
officer finds no sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings, the complaint may be dismissed.
Otherwise, he shall summon the parties to a preliminary conference to consider the following
matters:
1) Whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other evidences they will present at
such conference;
2) Should the parties desire a formal investigation to determine the nature of the charge,
stipulation of facts, a definition of the issues, identification and marking of exhibits, limitation of
witness and such other matters as would expedite the proceedings;
c) After the preliminary conference, the investigating officer shall issue an order reciting the
matters take up during the conference, including the facts stipulated, the evidence marked and
the issues involved. The contents of this order may not be deviated from unless amended to
prevent manifest injustice.
d) Should hearing be conducted, the parties shall be notified at least five (5) days before the date
thereof. Failure of any or both of the parties to appear at the hearing is not necessarily a cause for
the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be allowed to present his evidence in
the absence of the adverse party who was duly notified of the hearing;
e) Only witnesses who have submitted affidavits, served on the adverse party at least five (5)
days before the date of his being presented as a witness may be allowed to testify at the hearing.
The affidavit of any witness shall constitute his direct testimony, subject to cross-examination re-
direct examination and re-cross-examination;
f) The parties shall be allowed the assistance of counsel and the right to the production of
evidence thru the compulsory process of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum.
Petitioner further assails the failure of the Graft Investigating Officer to call the parties to another
preliminary conference after their failure to appear at the first one. He contends that the lack of
any kind of hearing for evidence presentation resulted in "what may be termed, in the lingo of
'civil procedure', a 'judgment on the pleadings'" 14 . At the onset, it is worth pointing out that
petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to present his side at the scheduled preliminary
conference. His non-appearance thereat is attributable to no one else but himself and he cannot
be allowed to now pass the buck to the Graft Investigating Officer who had complied strictly
with the above quoted procedure in the conduct of administrative investigations. Furthermore,
undisputed is the fact that not only did the Office of the Ombudsman give due course and
consideration to petitioner's counter-affidavit, but it also entertained and resolved his motion for
reconsideration which is not ordinarily allowed in the adjudication of administrative cases where
the penalty imposed is suspension of not more than one month. Thus, contrary to petitioner's
claim, he was in fact given all opportunity to be heard, albeit through pleadings.
In point is the case of Concerned Officials of the MWSS vs. Hon. Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, 15 where this Court upheld the validity of an order issued by the Ombudsman without
prior hearing, in this wise:
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 16
Hence, a formal or trial type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. So long as a party is afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process is complied
with.

5. Filling-in of details

Alegre v. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil. 394

FACTS:
Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows: The Fiber
Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of
Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment
abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis
upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general
order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the
foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and
agencies as shall make request therefor.
Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to reads as follows:

No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in
quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled,
inspected, and certified as in this law provided.

The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and
baling of fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is squarely
presented as to whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative
power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of
legislative power
 RULING:
No. Section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality greater
than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified
as in this law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and
bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its
execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the
Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose
and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o
legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber
Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature
could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have
to be vested in a board of commission.

RATIO:

Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature must declare a policy and fix a
standard in enacting a statute conferring discretionary power upon an administrative agency, but
the agency may be authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the purposes of the legislation
and carrying it into effect. When the legislature laid down the fundamentals of a law, it may
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is
necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode of proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.

6. Executive-Administrative Rulemaking and Regulation

Book VII, Administrative Procedure, Secs. 1 to 9, Administrative

Code of 1987

a) Requisites for an administrative regulation to have the force of law

Perez v. LPG Refillers Assn. of the Phils., 492 SCRA 638

FACTS.

1. Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders.

2. The law also provides a monetary penalty of P20,000 to P50,000 against those who
violate the said law.

3. Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33.

4. LPG Refillers assailed the circular as B.P 33, the delegating statute, does not expressly
penalize the acts enumerated in the circular.
 5. RTC : Circular is nullified on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in
B.P 33

6. Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC

ISSUES

W/N RTC erred in declaring the circular null and void and prohibiting the implementation of
the same ---- YES

HELD

1. For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself.

2. The circular complies with both requisites. For the first, the circular merely enumerates
the various ways by which the criminal acts enumerated in B.P 33 may be committed. As to
the second, B.P 33 provides a penalty of P20,000 to P50,000 against those who violate the
said law.

3. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an
amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers,
the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless,
does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere
fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter
to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of
penalties.

4. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the
corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law,

Purisima v. Phil. Tobacco Institute, Inc., 822 SCRA 632

FACTS:

On December 20, 2012. Pres. Benigno Aquino III signed RA 10351 also known as the
Sin Tax Reform Law. The mentioned Law amended RA 8424.  On December 21, 2012,
the Sec. of Finance, upon the CIR’s recommendation, imposed tax individually on
cigarette pouches of 5’s and 10’s even if bundled in packaging combinations not
exceeding 20 sticks.
As a result, the PTI filed a petition before the RTC for declaratory relief with an
application for writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC favored the PTI and granted its
petition. Hence, the Sec. of Finance and the CIR through the Office of the Solicitor
General filed an instant petition. Meanwhile, the SC issued a TRO against the PTI and
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition to impose tax on combination
pouches of 5’s and 10’s not exceeding 20 sticks rather than taxing individually pouches
of 5’s and 10’s.

RULING:

No, the SC affirmed the decision of the RTC.  Basing from the intention and clear
interpretation of RA 10351, combined with the deliberation made during the bicameral
conference of Congress, tax should be imposed on cigarette pouched by machine as
packaging combination of 20 cigarette sticks as a whole and not to individual packaging
combinations on pouches of 5’s and 10’s.  The SC stated further that the BIR went
beyond its jurisdiction by imposing additional burden to the Tobacco Sector through
issuance of its revenue regulations.  In so doing, the BIR made an amendment which
was not under its functions.  The amendments of laws, according to SC, were one of
Congress’ primary concerns and functions.