BỘ GIÁO DỤC VÀ ĐÀO TẠO

TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KINH TẾ TP.HCM

HOW DOES BRI AFFECT MARITIME TRADING IN THE

AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY BETWEEN CHINA AND EUROPE

Lecturer: Ph.D Dinh Tien Minh

Student’s name: Le Vu Thanh Thao
Student’s ID: 31171021879
Class: MRC01 K45
HOW DOES BRI AFFECT MARITIME TRADING IN
THE AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY BETWEEN CHINA
AND EUROPE

Le Vu Thanh Thao
School of International Business - Marketing, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh city
KMC01 K45: International Marketing
Lecturer: Ph.D Dinh Tien Minh
November 20th, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENT
A. China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI). 1

I. The basis for forming the China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). 1

1. China's domestic context since the 18th National Congress. 1

Economy 1

Society. 2

Internal Political Situations. 2

Foreign Affairs. 3

II. Content, Objectives, and Plans of the initiative. 3

1. Objectives of the initiative. 4

From China's point of view. 4

From the world's point of view. 4

2. Plans of the initiative. 6

B. BRI affects maritime trading in the agriculture industry between China and Europe. 6

I. The overall impact of the BRI on Europe. 6

The BRI effects on maritime trading between China and Europe. 8

II. BRI affects maritime trading in the agriculture industry between China and Europe.

11

1. Trend Changes of Agricultural Trade between China and the B&R Countries. 11

2. The BRI effects on agricultural trading between China and Europe. 13

 TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 11

Figure 2 12

Figure 3 15

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1 4

Table 2 13

Table 3 15

Table 4 16

Table 5 16
A. China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI).
I. The basis for forming the China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI).
1. China's domestic context since the 18th National Congress.
a. Economy
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to the decline of the real estate market, the
decrease in domestic demand and the unstable export industry. Yet, China’s
economy had gradually recovered since 2010 and reached 7.7% since 2012-2013.
In 2012, there were some typical government challenges: Conflict between the
pressure of economic slowdown and overproduction, especially in the steel and
building materials industry; Production and business costs of all kinds increased
while innovation capacity was limited; There are many potential risks in the financial
and banking markets…
In 2013, the structure of high investment imbalance and deficit consumption was
not only not resolved but also increased. While the trend of the world was the
investment/GDP ratio decreased, China’s investment had been at a high level and
continued to increase, consumption had been in short supply, the consumption/GDP
ratio had decreased and the ratio savings/GDP increased.
b. Society.
China was facing a wide range of issues, from growing grievances about evictions
and land seizures to ones related to pollution, labor abuses, food safety, and ethnic
unrest in "autonomous" regions.
Stemming from the tense social situation with ethnic minorities in autonomous
regions, such as: Xinjiang and Tibet, tensions and social contradictions had sparked
protests, bombings, suicide car crashes aimed at destroying the state, demanding
secession, causing more instability and social riots. Besides plotting to wipe out the
pro-democracy faction in Hong Kong, the national government also hatched plans to
retake Taiwan, de facto independent since 1949.
The unbalanced economic development and the widening regional disparity make
the gap between rich and poor in China more obvious. The gap between rich and
poor affects social justice and sustainable development of China, directly affecting
people's rights in the distribution of social benefits.
c. Internal Political Situations.
China's society was quickly developing, and the interaction between civil society and
the country's one-party authoritarian government a critical gauge of change.
Officially becoming the president since March 2013, Mr. Xi Jinping has held three
important positions in the State of China: President, Chairman of the Central Military
Commission and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.
 2. Foreign Affairs.
China was also dealing with a geostrategic problem called the "The Malacca Dilemma”.
Because of the dependence on the Middle East for energy products and having had no
control over the route, any disruption would have an adverse effect on energy security
and China's enduring food.
Along with the deepening globalization process, the US was promoting strategic
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Being the two big countries in the world meant
both the US and China had to struggle and cooperate in a governing relationship.
II. Content, Objectives, and Plans of the initiative.
1. Content of the initiative.
In 2013, President Xi Jinping officially introduced the initiative with the original name
of One Belt One Road and it later was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Table 1

Summary of the BRI

Source. Guojia Fazhan he Gaige Weiyuanhui et al., “Tuidong Gongjian Sichouzhilu

Jingjidai he 21 Shiji Haishang Sichouzhilu de Yuanjing yu Xingdong.”

The BRI consists of 2 main components: Belt and Road. “Belt” means “Silk Road
Economic Belt”; “Road” means “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. The "Silk Road
Economic Belt" is designed with three main branches connecting China through Central
Asia and Russia to Europe; from China through Central Asia, West Asia, the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean; from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian
Ocean. "The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" with the basic content is the revival of
the ancient Silk Road at sea, connecting China's seaport system with the main ports in
Southeast Asia and South Asia. Asia, Africa and Europe; incorporate the development
 of an economic corridor across the Indian Ocean. The Chinese government also
provided specific gateways from China to economies, including: Xinjiang Autonomous
Region, provinces: Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Yunnan and the Tibetan region.
Actually, there is a hidden but very important component, though it is the soul
component of the BRI, the way of information. This structure is a three-dimensional
structure but is fundamentally interconnected, envisioned as the three prongs of
China's way to the world. In terms of formal mechanics, it is possible that all three are
two-way roads, with going and returning. However, in fact it is a one-way arrow road,
the Chinese arrow goes out, searching for export market, consuming excess products,
creating influence, seeking allies that depend on them and gradually control them,
creating a chain of countries that are influenced and follow China, gradually creating a
new world order led by China and set the rules of the game.
2. Objectives of the initiative.
a. From China's point of view.
The idea comes from the desire to strengthen the connection between China and
many other countries on the route from Asia to Europe. This was convinced to
benefit all residents along the route.
The Chinese authorities believed this transport infrastructure as the first step
towards the creation of an Eurasian "economic corridor" that would allow the
development of Central Asian economies not bordering the sea, as well as their
future integration with European and Asian markets. The new Silk Road was
supposed to reach across Southeast Asia and feature a maritime city extending across
the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, too.
Its vision identifies the use of economic industrial zones as a space for
cooperation, and will focus on building “efficient, safe and smooth” sea lanes
connecting major ports on the BRI.
b. From the world's point of view.
Synthesized from many sources, BRI is believed to have 6 main objectives.
First of all, this is a strategy to counter the efforts of the US, EU and partners in
forming trade agreements to keep China out of partnership networks. Because of
being tightened with the Chinese economy, other countries in the BRI network will
be made to “share destiny for all mankind”.
Second, the initiative is an attempt to pull Asian countries to integrate and depend
on China, in order to create a new power system in Asia centered in Beijing as a way
 to confront America's "Pivot Strategy 1" to Asia. Obviously, this is an effort by China
to send a message that Asia is its own.
The third goal of the BRI is using economic approaches ranging from support,
direct investment, to exporting national development policies to Asian countries as a
way to relieve maritime and border disputes. By offering economic “carrots” to the
claimants, China wants the countries involved to comply with its sovereignty claims.
Via building infrastructure, taking advantage of existing agreements and
removing tariff barriers, the BRI’s fourth goal is to allow the Chinese economy to
integrate more deeply into other dynamic economies. As a result, the Chinese
economy will increase exports, solving the already redundant production capacity.
Fifthly, the “grand strategy” is a way to improve the social and economic gap
between Chinese coastal and inner provinces. Its infrastructure connectivity helps
connect the central and western inner provinces, where wages are inherently low. In
addition, following the model of "the flying geese model" can promote stronger
economic connections between the coast and inland, creating momentum for the
development of higher-value products in the coastal provinces.
Last but not least, the BRI serves as a way to address the security challenges of the
Western border and the problems of energy security. The economic integration of
China's western provinces with the world's value chain system through trade links
with neighboring partners enhances the ability to fight terrorism, separatism and
extremism religion in the region.
In short, the BRI aims to both promote the sustainable development of China's
domestic economy and establish a new economic system where China stands in the
middle of dominating the economies of other countries around to make them
dependent on the Chinese economy. In addition to avoiding China's isolation on the
world trade arena, such a system also helps China to gain influence to implement
other policies from politics to diplomacy, for example: resolving territorial disputes
or building alliances.
3. Plans of the initiative.
The initiative is not an organization and does not have a coordinating entity. However,
it is a government-led initiative. The BRI Vision Document defines the development of
the initiative as a flexible process, each place is different, and China will work with
other countries along the way to have an appropriate roadmap, and coordinate the
national development program with regional cooperation plans.

1 The "Pivot strategy” is an attempt to enhance Asia's place in US foreign policy. This strategy is primarily to
strengthen America's ties with Asia, not to contain China. But this strategy is also to remind China that the US is
not withdrawing from Asia.
 China established three financial institutions to fund the initiative, including the Silk
Road Fund (SRF) (2014) with an initial estimated capital of 40 billion USD, the Bank
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with $100 billion in capital and New
Development Bank (NDB) with $50 billion. These financial institutions will provide
capital for the construction and development of fields, such as electricity, energy,
transport, telecommunications,...
Regarding infrastructure projects, President Xi Jinping stepped up investment in
infrastructure construction to the outside, including railway projects, seaports, energy
pipelines, highways and border crossings with streamlined arrangements.
Besides, China planned to promote cultural and population exchanges with
countries along the BRI, through training programs organized by the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism, or organizing cultural events,... The plan also includes
strengthening domestic people's connection with art and cultural activities and events
held at embassies and cultural centers in the participating countries.

B. BRI affects maritime trading in the agriculture industry between

China and Europe.
I. The overall impact of the BRI on Europe.
While China and the European Union are at opposite ends of the Eurasian continent, the
boom in trade coupled with China's rise to world power has made their relations
increasingly multilateral. The launch of the BRI initiative, which extends to the EU itself,
has raised questions about the initiative's impact on Europe.
The BRI was launched twenty years after the EU itself began to implement the project
to create a transport corridor connecting Europe with China through the Caucasus and
Central Asia. In this regard, both the EU and China have been working towards what the
World Bank calls "one of the key features of the 21st century", namely the reunification of
the Eurasian continent after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the justification
for the above transport links is clear: the EU, China and their countries will benefit from
the opening of continental sea lanes to supplement more than 90% of European trade.
Europe China will be shipped by sea or air.
The BRI began as a network of land corridors running through Eurasia, with a maritime
network through the Indian Ocean. Because the Chinese infrastructure initiative was
planned in the late 1990s, China's influence in Central Asia predates the BRI declaration.
China had established commercial ties with EU-affiliated nations like Ukraine, Belarus,
Turkey, and the South Caucasus.
 In 2019, China achieved two notable successes in expanding the influence of the BRI
into Western Europe. First of all, China succeeded in signing with Italy a BRI agreement.
Italy clearly found its need for infrastructure investment far more urgent than criticism
from other EU member states. With the signing of the BRI, Italy hopes to have greater
access to China, a potential market for "Made in Italy'' goods. In addition, the BRI
promises to add capital to the Italian economy. China has urged the Italian government to
push ahead with a plan to connect high-speed rail between Italy's Turin and France's
Lyon. In the second place, China persuaded Greece, which benefited from China's
investment in the port of Piraeus, to turn the forum "16 + 1" into "17 + 1".
At the time when Chinese technology group Huawei was struggling to get into 5G
networks in Europe, such diplomatic and economic links were valuable. However, the
experience with the BRI of the countries that have participated first had not been very
pleasant. European countries also saw a number of projects fail or struggle to prove their
worth. Montenegro borrowed about 1.3 billion euros to build the highway to Belgrade.
The loan had boosted the country's national debt from 63% to 80% of GDP, while the
economic benefits of this project are uncertain. Two consulting firms, including one hired
by the European Investment Bank, opposed the project, arguing that the traffic volume
was not enough to cover the costs.
Moreover, China has succeeded in aligning information technology with its "Digital
Silk Road" strategy. After 5 years of implementation, China had achieved many important
achievements when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding on building e-commerce
with 19 countries in Asia-Europe-Africa. As a result, Chinese technology enterprises can
penetrate and prevail over technology rivals from the US and the West in dominating
markets in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Romania, etc. Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran... are capital markets controlled by technology enterprises from
Europe such as Nokia, Ericsson.
Through technology and digital economy fairs with many countries participating in the
BRI, Chinese businesses have implemented 1,334 information technology and digital
technology projects along the "Technical Silk Road" corridor” with three continents Asia -
Europe - Africa, in which, the focus is on the regions: Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Central
Europe, Eastern Europe and East Africa. At the same time, deploying new technologies
such as: Internet of Things, big data, digital infrastructure and "Smart Africa" projects
with 26 countries in Africa and Alibaba Group (China) ) is the main investor.
The BRI's most important infrastructure projects, as far as the EU is concerned, are
railways and ports. By bringing down transportation costs and increasing trade volume,
the BRI's investments in rail and port infrastructure will undoubtedly affect trade relations
between China and Europe. The new connections will increase trade and have an impact
on all European countries' trade with Asia. A gravity model is used in a simulation by A.
Garca and J. Xu to show that "a 10% reduction in rail, air, and ocean transportation costs
increases trade by 2%, 5.5 percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively." the specific composition
of trade flows.
Recent events have demonstrated the necessity for a new approach that prioritizes
European interests over European standards and principles. The EU must behave as a
European power as well as a European project. In this regard, China's rise presents
significant opportunities: Beijing's involvement in Central Asia, and more recently,
Belarus and Ukraine, has helped to bolster the region's sovereignty and independence,
which is a common EU goal. All the rhetoric of a Russian-Chinese alliance obscures the
fact that China's objectives in Eurasia appear to be more aligned with the EU than with
Russia from a geopolitical standpoint.

The BRI effects on maritime trading between China and Europe.

Seaports play an important role in Europe's economic development strategy when up to
70% of import and export volume is transported by sea. Recently, seaports in Europe have
also attracted the attention of Chinese corporations, as the result of the BRI.
Piraeus port is a typical case of success in China's investment strategy focusing on
seaports in Europe in recent years. The increased connection of the port of Piraeus to the
inland railways attracted large companies to Piraeus. HP, Hyundai and Sony all decided
to open logistics centers in Piraeus and use the port as the main distribution hub for
shipments to Eastern and central Europe, as well as North Africa.
The Chinese state-owned Cosco Shipping Ports group has been operating the container
terminal in Greece's Piraeus since 2008. Since then, Cosco has set foot in Rotterdam
(Netherlands), where it owns 35% of the shares. Euromax port, 20% stake of Antwerp in
Belgium and is planning to build a new port in Hamburg (Germany).
Specifically, the MOU opens up opportunities for China Traffic Construction Company to
invest and manage the two ports of Genoa and Trieste. Genoa is the largest and oldest
seaport in Italy. The cooperation promises to create benefits for both sides. With the
management of the seaports of Italy, next to the port of Piraeus in Greece.
Trieste would be a golden egg for China if Beijing was approached, SCMP newspaper
commented. This is considered the closest gateway to the Mediterranean Sea of a series of
countries located deep in the continent such as Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
"While Italy shouldn't fend off Chinese investment in ports a priori, it should ensure
that national security is safeguarded, and coordinate closely with the EU and Nato, whose
security interest might also be affected by Chinese activities in Italian ports," Lucrezia
Poggetti, a specialist in Italy-China relations at the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for
China Studies said. "China's global port acquisitions could serve, beyond commercial
interests, China's military purposes. China could develop commercial ports into facilities
serving its strategic goals… While this might not be the reality for European ports in the
short term, this is something to consider in longer-term assessments of China's presence in
Italian ports."
In 2017, the BRI sea route was considered to be the most important part in terms of
volume and value of goods traded between China and Europe. This is believed to
strengthen the position of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe as the main end point
of the BRI shipping route.
The three simultaneous phenomena (Suez expansion, naval gigantism and global
alliances) are gradually strengthening the competitive advantage of the Europe-Far East
route, making it even more convenient than the trans-Pacific route for Chinese cargo
bound for the North East coast of America. These developments give the Mediterranean a
new level of "centrality" within China's main trade segments with the EU and the US. This
development offered all Mediterranean ports new opportunities to give Chinese shippers
faster access to the most important European markets. This led to fierce competition that
includes not only ports, but also global terminal operators and multimodal transport and
logistics service providers.
Additionally, the BRI can affect the security of European maritime trade and energy
routes. In addition to controlling a tenth of the European port capacities in southern Spain,
Italy and Greece, China has also acquired the entire container terminal in the sea port of
Zeebrugge, Belgium, also in the heart of Europe. China's sophisticated large-scale overseas
naval base in Djibouti enhances the country's projection capabilities in waters close to
Europe. This, combined with the first Sino-Russian naval exercise in the Baltic Sea, created
growing unrest in Brussels. European Commission President Juncker explicitly warned
against the acquisition of strategic assets such as ports by foreign countries. The
Commission was also developing a mechanism to control foreign investment in sensitive
sectors, critical infrastructure, energy, energy and telecommunications, high-tech
companies and defense technology, led by calls from Germany, France and Italy.
China's potential and power has been constantly increasing with the ambition to impose
China's interests around the world. China shapes the European order in two ways: (i)
Influences the US strategic approach and US involvement in Europe; (ii) Sino-Russian
political dynamics and extensive bilateral cooperation between these two countries to
assert their power in Europe.
 Figure 3

Official BRI participants by year of joining

Source. Nedopil, Christoph (2021): “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative''; Shanghai,
Green Finance & Development Center, FISF Fudan University, www.greenfdc.org.

II. BRI affects maritime trading in the agriculture industry between China and
Europe.
1. Trend Changes of Agricultural Trade between China and the B&R Countries.
With a long history of agricultural civilizations and rich natural and market resources,
the B&R countries have become an essential part in world agriculture and an important
partner of China on agricultural products trade and cooperation.
As shown in Figure 3, the agricultural products trade between China and the B&R
countries increased from $5.9 billion in 1995 to $62.1 billion in 2014, with an average
growth rate of 12.5% per year. The first expansion of agricultural products trade
between China and these countries appeared in 2001 and was then interrupted by the
2008-2009 financial crisis. The second expansion came out right after the establishment
of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2010. Though slowed slightly due to the 2012
financial crisis, the trade situation had recently been recovering. In general, regardless
of the disturbance of the two financial crises, the first characteristic of agricultural
products trade between China and the B&R countries turns out to be a steady and
sound growth trend.

Figure 2

Agricultural trade between China and the B&R countries: 1995-2014.

Source. He, M. , Huang, Z. and Zhang, N. (2016) An Empirical Research on Agricultural

Trade between China and “The Belt and Road” Countries: Competitiveness and
Complementarity. Modern Economy, 7, 1671-1686. doi: 10.4236/me.2016.714147.

The second characteristic of agricultural products trade between China and the B&R
countries is the overall deficit, following Table 2. The volume of import was
approximately twice of that of export. China’s import volume from the B&R countries
rose from $3.4 billion in 1995 to $40.09 billion in 2014, increasing by 12 times and the
proportion had increased from 19% to 25%, with an average growth rate of 13% per
year. China’s export volume of agricultural products to the B&R countries rose from
$2.47 billion to $22.01 billion, increasing by 9 times, and the proportion had increased
from 16% to 30%, with an average growth rate of 12% per year which is below the
import growth rate. The increasing volume and proportion also suggests that China
and the B&R countries were much more interdependent in agricultural products trade.

Table 2

Agricultural trade flows between China and the B&R Countries.

 Source. He, M. , Huang, Z. and Zhang, N. (2016) An Empirical Research on Agricultural
Trade between China and “The Belt and Road” Countries: Competitiveness and
Complementarity. Modern Economy, 7, 1671-1686. doi: 10.4236/me.2016.714147.

2. The BRI effects on agricultural trading between China and Europe.

“We will actively pursue agricultural cooperation and development overseas, establish
large-scale offshore centers for farm product production, processing, storage, and
transportation, and cultivate internationally competitive multinational agricultural
companies”, China said in regards to food security. The BRI's motivations for agri-food
security, as well as regional development, intersect, and it will be critical to ensure that
they are mutually beneficial.
In 2016, a number of revelations about huge land purchase contracts in France,
Australia, and Canada surprised the public, and especially made the political leaders
bewildered because they did not know anything about signed agreements. It is
noteworthy that in France, the authorities were belatedly learned that a Chinese
investment fund had purchased 1,700 hectares of land in the Berry region, in central
France, to grow wheat. According to observers, the movement to buy farmland started
around 2008, with the price crisis of agricultural products and the closure of some
export markets. At the time, China and some Gulf countries found it necessary to buy
farmland elsewhere to grow crops, and ship produce back to their own countries, to
secure food supplies.
 Yet, China still has to rely heavily on imported food to meet the sudden increase in
demand for food due to its growing population, decrease in arable land, water
shortage, and lack of water. other resources. The situation of the COVID-19 pandemic
puts China at risk of food shortages.
Agricultural investment is now inextricably linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
which focuses on countries between China and Western Europe.
Since then, they have expanded their control of the global seed industry by acquiring
a majority stake in Syngenta, a Swiss seed giant. Additionally, Chinese companies have
been promoting investments in alfalfa farms in the US and Bulgaria.
Imports of consumer-oriented products have continued to grow, with meat, dairy
and horticultural products leading the way. Domestic meat and milk prices are rising
due to increased demand, slow growth in domestic supply, and rising costs of feed,
labor, and land, making imported meat more competitive in China. African swine fever
disrupted the domestic supply of pork, leading to price increases for all types of animal
protein, as well as a sharp rise in food prices in 2019, which boosted protein imports.
With $ 6.4 billion in pork imports in 2019, China was the world's largest pork market,
while the EU was one of the top suppliers with 16% market shares measured by retail
value.
China was also the world's largest importer of dairy products, valued at $ 12 billion
in 2019. In 2019, the EU was China's largest milk supplier, dominating the infant
formula market with a 45 percent market share of the total dairy products.
China has become the main agricultural trading country of the B&R countries,
surpassing both the European Union and the United States, as was previously expected.
And that includes the countries of Western and Central Europe.
China plans to import more than $ 170 billion in goods from Central and Eastern
European countries in the next five years, said Xi at the Beijing summit, which was
supposed to take place in April but was postponed due to the pandemic. China also
plans to establish a wholesale market for agricultural products in the Central and
Eastern European region and an exchange program for young agricultural workers.

Table 3

Trade indicators between EU27 and China

Source. European Commission (2019): Agri-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet: European
Union – Nigeria. European Commission. Available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries.

Figure 4

Structure of EU Agri-Food trade with China, 2010 - 2020

Source. European Commission (2019): Agri-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet: European

Union – Nigeria. European Commission. Available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries.

Table 4

Evolution of 20 top EU Agri-Food exports to China, 2016 - 2020

Source. European Commission (2019): Agri-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet: European
Union – Nigeria. European Commission. Available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries.

Table 5

Evolution of 20 top EU Agri-Food imports from China, 2016 - 2020

Source. European Commission (2019): Agri-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet: European

Union – Nigeria. European Commission.
Reference

Almir Mustafic (2016). CHINA’S ONE BELT, ONE ROAD AND ENERGY SECURITY
INITIATIVES: A PLAN TO CONQUER THE WORLD? . Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/233833274.pdf

Andrej Krickovic, Igor Pellicciari (March 2021). From “Greater Europe” to “Greater
Eurasia”: Status concerns and the evolution of Russia’s approach to alignment and
regional integration. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350114657_From_Greater_Europe_to_Greater
_Eurasia_Status_concerns_and_the_evolution_of_Russia
%27s_approach_to_alignment_and_regional_integration

Bao Duy (20/3/2019). Ý tính đưa 4 cảng biển lớn vào 'Vành đai- Con đường'. Retrieved
20/10/2021, from
https://tuoitre.vn/y-tinh-dua-4-cang-bien-lon-vao-vanh-dai-con-duong-
20190320094536151.htm

Benjamin Kang Lim, Frank Jack Daniel (2012). Insight: Does China's next leader have a
soft spot for Tibet?. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-xi-idUSBRE87T1G320120830

Dekker, Brigitte, Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Eric Siyi Zhang (2020). Unpacking
China’s Digital Silk Road. Clingendael Report. Retrieved from
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/unpacking-chinas-digital-silk-road.

Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao. An Interpretation of Xi’s Taiwan Policy—and Taiwan’s

Response, Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/31/2002611832/-1/-1/1/6-LIAO%20FOR
%20PDF.PDF

Ettore Dorrucci, Gabor Pula and Daniel Santabárbara (2013). China’s Economic growth
and rebalancing. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp142.pdf
François Godement ( June 2017). China and the Mediterranean: Open for business?
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_and_the_mediterranean_open_for_business

Grace K.S. Ho (February 2019). China’s Belt and Road Initiative - A Changing Global
Landscape for Agricultural and Food Business Development. Retrieved 20/10/2021,
from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332319300_China
%27s_Belt_and_Road_Initiative_-
_A_Changing_Global_Landscape_for_Agricultural_and_Food_Business_Development

Grain (18 Feb 2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: Chinese agribusiness going global.
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://grain.org/en/article/6133-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinese-agribusiness-
going-global
Grzegorz Stec (February 2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative is Neither a Strategy,
Nor a Vision. It is a Process. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.eias.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/EU_Asia_at_a_Glance_Stec_BRI_2018-1.pdf

Hideo Ohashi (2018). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the context of China’s
opening-up policy. (Department of Economics, Senshu University, Tokyo, Japan).
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615?
needAccess=true&

Horia Ciurtin (May 29, 2019). The “16+1” Becomes the “17+1”: Greece Joins China’s
Dwindling Cooperation Framework in Central and Eastern Europe. Retrieved
20/10/2021, from
https://jamestown.org/program/the-161-becomes-the-171-greece-joins-chinas-
dwindling-cooperation-framework-in-central-and-eastern-europe/

How will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests? Retrieved 20/10/2021,
from https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative

James Pomfret (2021), Analysis: End of the road for Hong Kong's democratic dream as
China 'improves' its voting system. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-hongkong-democracy-a-
idUSKBN2AX1IF

Janaka Wijayasiri, Nuwanthi Senaratne . China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Sri
Lanka. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/12/5550/19.pdf

JEFFREY A. BADER (2016), How Xi Jinping Sees the World…and Why. Retrieved
20/10/2021, from
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/xi_jinping_worldview_bader-
1.pdf

Jessica Batke. Central and Regional Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi’s Second
Term. .Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm56jb.pdf

Joel Wuthnow (2017). Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: Strategic
Rationales, Risks, and Implications (National Defense University Press Washington,
D.C.). Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-
12.pdf

Karsten Friis,Olav Lysne (03 October 2021). Huawei, 5G and Security: Technological
Limitations and Political Responses. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12680

Li, Shi, Hiroshi Sato and Terry Sicular, eds. (2013). Rising Inequality in China:
Challenges to a Harmonious Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. The
Challenge of High Inequality in China

Mandip Singh (2013). Malacca: No More A Dilemma For China? ( Senior Fellow and
Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the IDSA) .Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/Malacca%20-%20No%20More%20A
%20Dilemma%20For%20China.pdf

Nadège Rolland (January 25, 2018). China's Belt and Road Initiative Five Years Later.
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later

Maryla Maliszewska and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2019). The Belt and Road
Initiative: Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/126471554923176405/pdf/The-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative-Economic-Poverty-and-Environmental-Impacts.pdf
Li, W. (2017). Construction of Humanistic Silk Road with Sharing Cultures and
Intercommunicating Souls Based on Chinese Civilization Wisdom. IOSR Journal of
Research & Method in Education (IOSR-JRME), 7(2), 1-5.

Luis C. Blancas, Ana Božičević, Kristijan Rogić, Ivona Bajor, Luka Novačko..Croatian
Logistics Opportunities for Sustainable Competitiveness. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35709/Croatian-
Logistics-Opportunities-for-Sustainable-Competitiveness.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Min He, Zequn Huang, Ningning Zhang (January 2016). An Empirical Research on
Agricultural Trade between China and “The Belt and Road” Countries:
Competitiveness and Complementarity. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312321813_An_Empirical_Research_on_Agri
cultural_Trade_between_China_and_The_Belt_and_Road_Countries_Competitiveness_
and_Complementarity

China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance
Landscape (2018). Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-
investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf

He, M., Zequn, H., & Ningning, Z. (2016). An Empirical Research on Agricultural Trade
between China and ―The Belt and Road‖ Countries: Competitiveness and
Complementarity. Modern Economy, 1671-1686.
https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2016.714147

Central Compilation and Translation Press, Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China, The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s
Republic of China); Xinhua, “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan Achievements a Milestone for
Centenary Goals,” October 26, 2016.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/26/c_134748390.htm

Sawaya Jank, M., Guo, P., & Helena Galvão de Miranda, S. (2020). China-Brazil
partnership on agriculture and food security. Portal de Livros Abertos da USP.
Retrieved 2020, from
http://www.livrosabertos.sibi.usp.br/portaldelivrosUSP/catalog/book/468.

GRAIN, 2008. Seized: The 2008 land grab for food and financial security. GRAIN
Briefings,October. Available from: http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=212.

Pu, M. & Zhong, Y. 2020. Rising Concerns over Agricultural Production as COVID-19
Spreads: Lessons from China. Global Food Security, 26: 100409. (available at
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2020.100409).

Chemnitz, Benjamin Luig, and Mute Schimpf (eds), Agrifood Atlas: Facts and Figures
about the Corporations that Control What We Eat, (Brussels: Heinrick Böll Foundation,
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe), 2017, pp.38-39. Posted
online at:
http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/agriculture/2017/agrifood_atlas.pdf.

Gooch, Elizabeth and Fred Gale. China's Foreign Agriculture Investments, EIB-192, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, April 2018.

Niemi JK (2020) Impacts of African Swine Fever on Pigmeat Markets in Europe. Front.
Vet. Sci. 7:634. doi: 10.3389/fvets.2020.00634

Zolin, M.B., Cavapozzi, D. and Mazzarolo, M. (2021), "Food security and trade policies:
evidence from the milk sector case study", British Food Journal, Vol. 123 No. 13, pp. 59-
72. https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-07-2020-0577

He, M.; Huang, Z.; Zhang, N. An Empirical Research on Agricultural Trade between
China and “The Belt and Road” Countries: Competitiveness and Complementarity.
Mod. Econ. 2016, 07, 1671, doi:10.4236/me.2016.714147.
S.Frederick Starr/Svante E. Cornell/Nicklas Norling, ‘The EU, Central Asia, and the
Development of Continental Transport and Trade’, Central AsiaCaucasus Institute/Silk
Road Studies Programme, Silk Road Paper, Washington D.C.-Stockholm, December
2015.
Casarini, Nicola (2019), ‘Rome-Beijing: Changing the Game. Italy’s Embrace of China’s
Connectivity Project, Implications for the EU and the US’, IAI Papers, No. 19,
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1905.pdf.

Muratbekova, Albina (2020). Geopolitics versus Technology: the Case of Huawei.

Retrieved from
https://eurasian-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Weekly-e-bulletin-
07.09.2020-13.09.2020-No-271.pdf.

Nadège Rolland (December 2018). China’s Ambitions in Eastern Europe and the south
Caucasus. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rolland_china_eastern_europe_south
_caucasus.pdf

Nikkei Asia (2021). China builds Digital Silk Road in Pakistan to Africa and Europe.
Retrieved from:
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-builds-Digital-Silk-Road-in-
Pakistan-to-Africa-and-Europe.

African Union Commission. (2021). Africa's development dynamics 2021 digital

transformation for quality jobs: Digital transformation for quality jobs. Addis Ababa:
OECD Publishing.

Herrero AG, Xu J (2017) China's belt and road initiative: can Europe expect trade gains?
China World Econ 25:84–99

Jing Men. Between Human Rights and Sovereignty –An Examination of EU-China
Political Relations. European Law Journal, Wiley, 2011, 17 (4), pp.534.
ff10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00564.xff. Ffhal-00659893
Frans-Paul van der Putten, “Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The
Relevance for the EU and the Netherlands”, in Clingendael Reports, 14 February 2014,
http://www.clingendael.nl/ node/5439.

Jakóbowski J, Popławski K, Kaczmarski M (2018) The Silk Railroad. The EU-China rail
connections: background, actors, interests. Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw
SRM (2018), Italian Maritime Economy. China, energy corridors, ports and new routes:
geomaps of a changing Mediterranean, 5th Annual Report, Giannini, Naples
Mohan, G. (2018). Europe’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative. German Marshall
Fund of the United States. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18802

Dutton, Peter A.; Kardon, Isaac B.; and Kennedy, Conor M., "China Maritime Report
No. 6: Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint" (2020). CMSI China
Maritime Reports. 6. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/6

Esteban et. al (2020): Europe in the Face of US-China Rivalry, Madrid.

Hui Jiang (September 29, 2020). China: Evolving Demand in the World’s Largest
Agricultural Import Market. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/china-evolving-demand-world-s-largest-agricultural-
import-market

Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, Paul Stronski, Thomas De Waal (October13, 2021).
China’s influence in southeastern central and eastern europe vulnerabilities and
resilience in four countries. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/13/china-s-influence-in-southeastern-central-
and-eastern-europe-vulnerabilities-and-resilience-in-four-countries-pub-85415

Kent E. Calder (2016). Prospects for the China-Europe relationship and global
implications. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.spf.org/global-data/SPF_20170810_02.pdf

Reuters Staff (FEBRUARY 29, 2020). Italian regional chief sorry for saying Chinese eat
'live mice' . Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-health-italy-idUSL8N2AT0G3
Sandra Schorrer (2020). China's objectives with the Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved
20/10/2021, from https://www.grin.com/document/968102

Shearman & Sterling (May 15, 2020). Foreign Investment Review in Europe: Key
Considerations for Investors and Latest Developments Prompted by COVID-19.
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Perspectives/2020/05/Foreign-Investment-
Review-in-Europe-Key-Considerations-for-Investors-and-Latest-Developments-
Prompte.pdf

TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2021, Catching technological waves

Innovation with equity. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tir2020_en.pdf

The Suez Canal after the expansion Analysis of the traffic, competitiveness indicators,
the challenges of the BRI and the role of the Free Zone (2018). Retrieved 20/10/2021,
from https://www.sr-m.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/srm_alexbank_suez_2018.pdf

The new Suez Canal: economic impact on Mediterranean maritime trade (2015).
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.alexbank.com/document/documents/ALEX/Retail/Research/Other/EN/Ne
w-Suez-Canal_2015.pdf

Tu Xinquan. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?. Retrieved

20/10/2021, from
http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_3.1_is_the_belt_and_road_initiative
_a_chinese_style_regionalism.pdf

Valerie Hopkins, James Kynge (April 10 2019). Montenegro fears China-backed

highways will put it on the road to ruin. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.ft.com/content/d3d56d20-5a8d-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a

Wayne M. Morrison ( 2015). China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and
Implications for the United States. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20150911_RL33534_7d506d97ac04bd17c079bd879
1c8dfee1da3eb65.pdf
 Wei Shan, NUS East Asia Institute (2019). Xinjiang casts uncertainty over the Belt and
Road Initiative. Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/11/29/xinjiang-casts-uncertainty-over-the-belt-and-
road-initiative

Xinhua (2013). China Gini coefficient at 0.474 in 2012. Retrieved 20/12/2121, from
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-01/18/content_16140018.htm

Xinhua ( March 28, 2015). Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road .
Retrieved 20/10/2021, from
http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2015-03/28/content_35182638.htm

Yu Xie and Xiang Zhou (2014). Income inequality in today’s China. Retrieved
20/10/2021, from https://www.pnas.org/content/111/19/6928.