Approaches to the Study of Globalization INTRODUCTION Even after more than two decades of intense scholarly serutiny, ‘globalization’ has remained a contested and slippery concept. In spite of the remarkable proliferation of research pro- ‘grammes for the study of globalization, there are many different approaches to the study of globalization. Since the beginning of self conscious academic inquiries into multiple pro~ cess of globalization in the early 1990s, aca- emics have remained divided on the ut various methodological approaches, the value of available empirical evidence for gauging the extent, impact, and direction of globalization, and, of course, its normative implications. The failure to arrive at a broad scholarly consensus on the subject attests not only to the contentious ‘ature of academic inguiry in genera, but also reflects the retreat from generalizing initiated in the 1980s by the influential ‘poststructuralist tum’ away from “grand narratives’. As Fredric Jameson (1998) astutely points out, there seems to be litle utility in forcing such a complex set of social forces as globaliza- tion into a single analytic framework. It seems Manfred B. Steger tomake more sense to survey variousapproaches, to globalization by linking them to the debates oon the subject that have been taking place over the last two decades in two separate but related arenas. One battle has been mostly fought within the narrow walls of academia, while the ‘ther has been unfolding in the popular arena of public discourse. Although there are some com- ‘mon themes and overlapping observations, the academic debate differs from the more general discussion in that its panicipants tend 10 focus, oon the analytical rather than the normative or ideological dimension of globalization. Cenainly, there has been an explosion in the number of books and articles on the subject published by both academic and trade outlets. Consulting the electronic database Factiva, which holds some 8,000 newspapers, maga Zines, and reports worldwide, the global studies, scholar Nayan Chanda (2007) showed that the ‘number of items mentioning globalization grew from a mete two in 1981 10 a high of 57.235 in 2001. Since then, it has stabilized at an annual average of about 45,000, Many of the principal participants in the academic debate reside and teach in thea ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION wealthy countries of the northern hemi- sphere, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, Their disproportionate intellectual influence reflects not only exist- ing power relations in the world, but also the global dominance of Anglo-Ameriea Although they share a common intellectual framework, these scholars hold radically dif- ferent views regarding the definition of glo- balization, its scale, chronology, impact, and policy outcomes. Part of the reason why there is so much disagreement has to do with the fact that globalization itself is a frag- ‘mented, incomplete, uneven, and contradic tory set of social processes. Rosenau (2003), for example, has defined globalization in terms of what he calls “fragmegrative dynamics’ to ‘underscore the contradictions, ambiguities, complexities, and uncertainties that have replaced the regularities of prior epochs’ Academics often respond to the analytical challenge by tying to take conceptual possession of globalization — as though it ‘were something “out there” to be captured by the ‘correct’ analytical framework. Indeed, as Rosow (2000) has pointed out, many jchers approach globalization as if they were dealing with a process or an object without a meaning of its own prior to its con- stitutionasa conceptual ‘territory’, Moreover, since it falls outside the boundaries of estab- lished academic disciplines, the study of globalization has invited armies of social scientists, scholars in the humanities, and even natural scientists to leave their mark on an intellectual tetra incognita, As a result, various scholars have appro- ached the concept of globalization by analys- ing and describing a variety of changing economic, political, and cultural processes that are alleged to have accelerated since the 1970s. No generally accepted definition of globalization has emerged, except for such broad descriptions as “increasing global inter- connectedness’, “the expansions and intensi- fication of social relations across world-time and world-space”, “the compression of time and space’, ‘distant proximities’, ‘a complex range of processes, driven by a mixture of political and economic influences’, and ‘the ideas, swift and relatively unimpeded flow of capi- tal, people, and ideas across national borders (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Held and McGrew, 2007: Lechner and Boli, 2011; Robertson, 1992: Steger, 2013: Waters, 2001), A number of researchers object to those characterizations, some going so far as to deny the existence of globalization alto- gether. And yet, the last few years have also seen some emerging areas of consensus as well as the rise of the new transdisciplinary field of ‘global studies” Tis the purpose of this chapter to provide 4 general overview of the principal academic approaiches to the subject proposed by lead ing global studies scholars since the 1990s. ‘These range from the suggestion that globali- zation is litle more than “glohaloney’, 10 conflicting interpretations of globalization as economic, political, or cultural processes. Although such different approaches are necessary for gaining a better understanding of globalization, | will ultimately argue that these social-scientifie approaches to the subject ought to be complemented by inter- pretive explorations of the ideational and normative dimensions of globalization. GLOBALIZATION AS ‘GLOBALONEY’ A small and rapidly decreasing number of scholars contend that existing accounts of globalization are incorrect, imprecise, or exaggerated. They note that just about every- thing that ean be linked to some transnational process is cited as evidence for globalization and its growing influence. Hence, they sus- pect that such general observations often amount to little more than ‘globaloney” (Held and McGrew, 2007; Rosenberg, 2000; Veseth, 2010). The arguments of these glo- balization crities fall into three broad catezo- ries, Representatives of the first group dispute the usefulness of globalization sufficiently precise analytical concept. Members of the second group point to the limited nature of globalizing processes, emphasizing that the world is not nearly as integrated as many globalization proponentsAPPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION 9 believe. In their view, the term ‘globaliza- tion’ does not constitute an accurate label for the actual state of affairs, The third group of critics disputes the novelty of the process while acknowledging the existence of mod- crate globalizing tendencies. They argue that those who refer to globalization as a recent process miss the bigger picture and fall prey to their narrow historical framework. Let us examine the respective arguments of these three groups in more detail. Rejectionists Scholars who dismiss the utility of globalization aan analytical concept typically advance their arguments from within a larger criticism of similarly vague words employed in academic iscourse, Besides globalization, another ofien- cited example for such analytically impov ished concepts is the complex and ambiguous phenomenon of nationalism. Craig Calhoun (1993), for example, argues that nationalism and its corollary terms ‘have proved notoriously hard concepts to define” because ‘nationalisms are extremely varied phenomena’, and ‘any efinition will legitimate some claims and del- egitimate others’, Writing in the same critical vein, Susan Strange (1996) considers globaliza- tion a prime example of such a vacuous term, suggesting that it has been used in academic discourse to refer to “anything from the Internet to a hamburger’, See also Clark (1999: 34-40). Similarly, Linda Weiss (1998) objects to the term as ‘a big idea resting on slim foundations’. Scholarly suggestions for improvement point in two different directions. The first is to challenge the academic community to provide additional examples of how the term *globali- zation’ obscures more than it enlightens. Such empirically based accounts would serve 2s a warning to extreme globalization proponents. Ultimately, the task of more careful research- crs should be to break the concept of globali- zation into smaller, more manageable parts that contain a higher analytical value because they can be more easily associated with empirical processes. This rationale underlies Robert Holton’s (1998) suggestion to abandon all general theoretical analyses in favour of middle-range approaches that see specific explanations of parti The second avenue for improvement involves my own suggestion to complement the social-scientific enterprise of exploring globalization as an objective process with more interpretive studies of the ideological project of globalism. Following this argument, the central task for scholars working in the emerging field of globalization studies would be to identify and evaluate the ideological manoeuvres of prominent proponents and opponents who have filled the term with values and meanings that bolster their respective political agendas, Sceptics The second group emphasizes the limited nature of current globalizing processes. This perspective is perhaps best reflected in the writings of Wade (1996):and Hirst, Thompson and Bromley (2009), See also. Rugman (2001). In their detailed historical analysis of economic globalization, Hirst and ‘Thompson (2009) claim that the world economy is not a truly global phenomenon, but one centred on Europe, eastern Asia, and North America, The authors emphasize that the majority of eco- nomic activity around the world still remains primarily national in origin and scope. Presenting recent data on trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows, the authors warn against drawing global conclusions from increased levels of economic interaction in advanced industrial countries. Hirst and ‘Thompson advance an argument against the existence of economic globalization based on empirical data in order to attack the general misuse of the concept. Without a truly global ic system, they insist, there can be no such thing as globalization: *[AJs we pro- ceeded [with our economic research} our skepticisin deepened until we became con- vinced that globalization, as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth.” Doremus et al. (1998) and Zysman (1996) reached a similar conclusion, Buried under an avalanche of relevant data, one can nonetheless detect a critical- normative message in the Hirst~Thompson0 ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION thesis: it is to show that exaggerated accounts, of an “iron logic of economic globalization’ tend to produce disempowering political effects. For example, the authors convincingly demonstrate that certain political forces have used the thesis of economic globalization propose national economic deregulation and the reduction of welfare programmes. The imple mentation of such policies stands to benefit neo-liberal interests, But there also remain a number of problems, «with the HirstThompson thesis, For example, as several critics have pointed out, the authors set overly high standards for the economy in order to be counted as ‘fully globalized”. See, for example, Held et al. (1999) and MeGrew and Held (2007). Moreover, their efforts to construct an abstract model of a perfectly «globalized economy unnecessarily polarize the topic by pressuring the reader to either com- pletely embrace or emtrely reject th globalization, Perhaps the most ser coming of the Hirst—Thompson thesis lies in its attempt to counteract neo-liberal economic determinism with a good dose of Marxist eco- nomic determinism. Their argument implicitly assumes that globalization is primarily an eco- nomic phenomenon. As a result, they portray all other dimensions of globalization ~ culture, politics, and ideology — as refleetions of deeper economic processes. While paying lip service to the multidimensional character of globoliza- tion, their own analysis ignores the logical implications of this assertion, After all, if glo- balization is truly a complex, multilevel phe nomenon, then economic relations constitute only one among many globalizing tendencies, It would therefore be entirely possible to angue for the significance of globalization even if it can be shown that inereased transnational eco nomic activity appears to be limited to advanced industrial countries. Modifiers The third and final group of globalization critics disputes the novelty of the process, implying that the label ‘globalization’ has ‘often been applied in a historically imprecise manner. Robert Gilpin (2000), for example, confirms the existence of globalizing tenden- cies, but he also insists that many important aspects of globalization are not novel devel- ‘opments. Citing relevant data collected by the prominent American economist Paul Krugman, Gilpin notes that the world econ- ‘omy in the late 1990s appeared to be even Jess integrated in a number of important respects than it was prior to the outbreak of World War I. Even if one were to accept the most optimistic assessment of the actual volume of transnational economic activity, the most one could say is that the post-war international economy has simply restored globalization to approximately the same level that existed in 1913. Gilpin also points to two additional factors that seem to sup- port his position: the globalization of labour was actually much greater prior 0 World War I, and international migration declined considerably after 1918, Hence, Gilpin ‘warns his readers against accepting the argu- ments of “hyper-globalizers’. For a similar Burtless et al. (1998) and assessment, se Rodrik (1997). Similar criticisms come from the propo- nents of world-sysiem theory. Pioneered by neo-Marxist_ scholars such as_Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) and Andre Gunder Frank (1998), world-system theorists argue that the modern capitalist economy in which we live today has been global since its inception five centuries ago. See also Chase-Dunn (1998). For a Gramscian neo-Marxist perspective, see Rupert and Smith (2002). World-system theorists reject, therefore, the use of the term globalization’ as referring exclusively to relatively recent phenomena. Instead, they emphasize that globalizing tendencies have been proceeding along the continuum of modernization for a long time. The greatest virtue of the world-system critique of globalization lies in its historical sensitivity. Any general discussion of globali- zation should include the caution that cross: regional transfers of resources, technology, and culture did not start omy in the last fewAPPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION " decades. Indeed, the origins of globalizing tendencies can be traced back to the political and cultural interactions that sustained the ancient empires of Persia, China, and Rome. On the downside, however, a world-system approach 10 globalization suffers from the same weaknesses as the Marxist economic Geterminist view pointed out above in my discussion of the Hirst-Thompson thesis. Wallerstein (1990) leaves litle doubt that he considers global integration to be a process Griven largely by economic forces whose essence can be captured by economistic an lytical models. Accordingly, he assigns to culture and ideology merely a subordinate role as ‘idea systems’ dependent on the “real” ‘movements of the capitalist world economy. However, more recent studies produced by world-system scholars (Amin, 1996; Carroll et al,, 1996; Robinson, 2004) acknowledge that the pace of globalization has significantly quickened in the last few decades of the twen- tieth century. Ash Amin (1997), for example, has suggested that much of the criticism of globalization as a new phenomenon has been based on quantitative analyses of trade and output that neglect the qualitative shift in social and political relations. This qualitai Gifference in the globalizing process, he argues, has resulted in the world-capitaist system's new configuration as a complex network of international corporations, banks, and financial flows. Hence, these global developments may indeed warrant a new label. In their efforts to ‘gauge the nature of this qualitative difference, workd-system theorists like Barry K. Gills (2002) have begun to focus more closely on the interaction between dominant-class inter ests and cultural transnational practices. In so doing, they have begun to raise important normative questions, suggesting. that the ele- ments of the ‘ideological superstructure” — polities, ideas, values, and beliefs ~ may, at times, neutralize or supersede economic forces. Leslie Sklair (2002), for example, highlights the importance of what he calls “the culture ideology of global consumerism’. Overall, then, all three groups of globali- zation crities make an important contribution to academic approaches on the subject. Thei insistence on a more careful and precise usage of the tetm forces the participants in the debate to hone their analytical skills. Moreover, theit intervention serves as an important reminder that some aspects of glo- balization may neither constitute new devel- ‘opments nor reach to all corners of the earth. However, by focusing too narrowly on abstract issues of terminology, the globaliza- tion critics tend to dismiss too easily the significance and extent of today’s globaliz- ing tendencies. Finally, the representatives of these three groups show a clear inclination to conceptualize globalization mostly along economic Lines, thereby often losing sight of its multidimensional character. GLOBALIZATION AS ECONOMIC PROCESS ‘The widespread scholarly emphasis on the economic dimension of globalization derives partly from its historical development as a subject of academic study. For various ounts of economic globalization, see, for example, Cohen (2006), Dicken (2001), Rodrik (2007), Sassen (1998) and Stiglit (2006). Some of the earliest writings on the topic explore in much detail how the evolu- tion of international markets and corpora- tions led to an intensified form of global interdependence. These studies point to the growth of international institutions such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association, and other regional trading blocs. The most comprehensive treat- ‘ment of this nature is Keohane (1984), For a ‘more recent update of his position on globali- zation, see Keohane (2001, 2002) and Keohane and Nye (2000). Economic accounts of globalization convey the notion that the essence of the phenomenon involves. ‘the increasing linkage of national economies through trade, financial flows, and foreign direct investment ... by multinational firms” (Gilpin, 2000: 299). Thus expanding economic vty is identified as both the primary aspect2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION of globalization and the engine behind its rapid development. Many scholars who share this economic perspective consider globalization a real phe~ nomenon that signals an epochal transforma~ tion in world affairs. Their strong affirmation of globalization culminates in the suggestion that a quantum change in human affairs has taken place as the flow of large quantities of trade, investment, and technologies across national borders has expanded from a trickle to a flood (Gilpin, 2000: 19). They propose that the study of globalization be moved to the centre of social-scientifie research According to this view, the central task of this research agenda should be the close examina~ tion of the evolving structure of global eco- ‘nomic markets and their principal institutions, Studies of economic globalization are usu- ally embedded in thick historical narratives that trace the gradual emergence of the new post-war world economy (0 the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference and its post-war evolu- tion (Schaeffer, 2005). During its operation for almost three decades, the Bretton Woods system contributed greatly to the establish- ‘ment of what some observers have called the ‘golden age of controlled capitalism” (Luttwak, 1999: xii, 27). According to this interpretation, existing mechanisms of state control over international capital movements made possible full employment and the expansion of the welfare state. Rising wages and increased social services secured in the wealthy countries of the global north a tem= porary class compromise. Most scholars of economic globalization trace the accelerating integrationist tenden- cies of the global economy to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the rise of “neo-liberalism’ in the 1980s and its ascendaney to dominance with the 1989-91 collapse of command-type econo- mies in Eastern Europe. In addition to the issue of free trade, perhaps the two most important aspects of economic globalization relate 10 the changing nature of the produe- tion process and the liberalization and inter- nationalization of financial transactions. Indeed, many analysts consider the eme gence of a transnational financial system the most fundamental economic feature of our time. Its key components include the deregu- lation of interest rates, the removal of credit controls, and the privatization of govern- ment-owned banks and financial institutions. As sociologist Manuel Castells (2000: 53) points out, the process of financial globaliza- tion accelerated dramatically in the late 1980s as capital and securities markets in Europe and the United States were deregu- lated, The liberalization of financial trading allowed for the inereased mobility among different segments of the financial industry, with fewer restrictions and a global view of investment opportunities. Moreover, these scholars emphasize advances in data processing and information technology that contributed to the explosive growth of tradable financial value. New sat- elite systems and fibre-optic cables provided the nervous system of Internet-based tech- nologies that further accelerated the liberali- zation of financial transactions. Most of the growth occurred in the purely money-dealing currency and securities markets that trade claims to draw profits from future produ tion. Aided by new communication technolo- gies, global rentiers and speculators earned spectacular incomes by taking advantage of weak financial and banking regulations in the emerging markets of developing countries. However, since these international capital flows can be reversed swiftly, they are capa ble of creating artificial boom-and-bust cycles that endanger the social welfare of entire regions. The 1997-8 Southeast Asia crisis was one such economic disaster ere~ ated by unregulated speculative money flows, followed by similar debacles in Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Argentina (2000-3), and, most importantly, the Global Financial Crisis (2008-9), which, in tum, contributed greatly to the current European Debt Crisis. While the creation of international finan- cial markets represents a crucial aspect of economic globalization, many scholars utiliz~ ing this approach point to another importantAPPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION B economic development of the last three dec- ades that involves the changing nature of global production: powerful transnational corporations (TNCs) with subsidiaries in several countries. Their numbers skyrock- ted from 7,000 in 1970 to 80,000 in 2011 Consolidating their global operations in. an increasingly deregulated global labour mar- ket, enterprises like Wal-Mart, General Motors, Exxon-Mobil, Mitsubishi, and Siemens belong to the 200 largest TNCs, which account for over half of the world’s industrial output. The availability of cheap labour, resources, and favourable production conditions in the Third World enhanced both the mobility and the profitability of TNCs. Accounting for over 70 per cent of world trade, these gigantic enterprises expanded their global reach as their direct foreign investments rose approximately 15 per cent annually during the 1990s (Gilpin, 2000: 20). ‘Their ability t ‘outsource’ manufacturing jobs ~ that is, to cut labour costs by dispers- ing economic production processes. into many diserete phases carried out by low- ‘wage workers in the global south — is often cited as one of the hallmarks of economic globalization. GLOBALIZATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS Economic perspectives on globalization can hardly be discussed apart from an analysis of political processes and institutions. Most of the debate on political globalization involves the weighing of conflicting evidence with regard to the fate of the modem nation-state, In particular, two questions have moved to the top of the research agenda, First, what are the political causes for the massive flows of capital, money, and technology across terri torial boundaries? Second, do these flows constitute a serious challenge to the power of the nation-state? These questions imply that economic globalization might be leading to the reduced control of national governments over economic policy. The latter question, in particular, involves an important subset of issues pertaining to the principle of state sov- ereignty, the growing impact of intergovern- ‘mental organizations, and the prospects for global governanc An influential group of scholars considers political globalization as a process intrinsi- cally connected to the expansion of markets. In particular, steady advances in computer technology and communication systems such as the World Wide Web are seen as the pri- mary forces responsible for the creation of a single global market. See, for example, Bryan and Farrell (1996), Kurdle (1999), Rao (1998) and Weiss (2011). As Richard Langhome (2001: 2) puts it, “Globalization has happened because technological advances have broken down many physical barriers to worldwide communication which used 10 limit how much connected or coop- erative activity of any kind could happen over long distances.” According to even more extreme technological-determinist explana- tions, polities is rendered powerless in the face of an unstoppable and irreversible techno- economic juggemaut that will crush all gov= cernmental attempts to reintroduce restrictive policies and regulations. Economies is por- trayed as possessing an inner logic apart from and superior to politics. As Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell (1996: 187) assert, the role of government will ultimately be reduced 10 serving as ‘a superconductor for global capitalism’. Perhaps the most influential representative of this view in the 1990s was Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995, 2005). Projecting the rise of a “borderless world” brought on by the irresist- ible forces of capitalism, the Japanese busi ness strategist argues that, seen from the perspective of real flows of economic activ- ity, the nation-state has already lost its role as a meaningful unit of participation in the lobal economy. In the long run, the process of political globalization will lead to the decline of territory as a meaningful frame- work for understanding political and social change. No longer functioning along the lines of discrete territorial units, the political“ THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION oder of the future will be one of regional economies linked together in an almost seamless global web that operates according to free-market principles. For a more recent example of the ‘end of the nation-state thesis" from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, see Prem Shankar Jha (2006). A second group of scholars disputes the w that large-scale economic changes sim- ply happen to societies in the manner of natu- ral phenomena such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Instead, they highlight the central role of politics — especially the successful mobilization of political power ~ in unleash- ing the forces of globalization (see, for example, Gowan, 1999; Kapstein, 1999; Korten, 2001: Luttwak, 2000). Hence, this group of scholars argues for the continued relevance of conventional political units, operating cither in the form of modern nation-states or “global cities’, Saskia assen’s (1991, 2007, 2008) work empha- sizes the key role played by global cities in the organization and control of globally ori- ented economic and social processes. See also Amen et al. (2006) and Brenner (2006). ‘At the same time, most proponents of this view understand that the development of the last few decades has significantly constrained the set of political options open to states, particularly in developing countris Jan Aart Scholte (2005), for example, points out that globalization refers to gradual processes of “relative deterritorialization” that facilitate the growth of ‘supraterritorial” relations between people. Scholte empha- sizes, however, that his concession to deter ritorialization does not necessarily mean that nation-states are no longer the main organ- izing forces in the world. Equipped with the power to regulate economie activities within their sphere of influence, states are far from being impotent bystanders to the workings of global forces. If conerete political decisions were responsible for changing the intemna- tional context in the direction of deregulation, privatization, and the globalization of the world economy, then different political deci. sions could reverse the trend in the opposite direction, For an excellent exposition of this, argument, see Cohen (2001). See also Garrett (1998), Helleiner (1994, 1996) and Paniteh (1996: 83-113). The core message of this ‘group of academies is loud and clear: poli is the crucial category upon which rests a proper understanding of globalization, A third group of scholars suggests that globalization is fuelled by a mixture of political and technological factors. John Gray (1998: 218), for example, presents glo- balization as a long-term, technology-driv process whose contemporary shape has been politically determined by the world’s most powerful nations. According to Gray, itis the ultimate objective of the neo-liberal Anglo- American initiative to engineer a global free market. Predicting that the world economy will fragment as its imbalances become insupportable, Gray foresees a gloomy end- ing to the current political efforts to establish 4 single global market: ‘Trade wars will make international cooperation more dif cult... As global laissez-faire breaks up, a deepening international anarchy is the likely human prospect. A far less pessimistic version of a perspec~ tive that combines technology and polities to explain globalization can be found in Castells’ (1996-8, vol. 3: 356) series of stud ies over nearly two decades focusing on the network society’. The Spanish sociologist Separates the powerful forces fuelling glo- halization into three independent processes: “The information technology revolution; the economic crisis of both capitalism and stat- ism, and their subsequent restructuring: and the blooming of cultural social movements.” For a more recent assessment, see Castells (2009), Castells points to the rise of a new ‘informational capitalism’ based on inform: tion technology as the indispensable tool for the effective implementation of processes of socioeconomic restructuring. In this context, he acknowledges both the crisis of the nation-state as a sovereign entity and the devolution of power to regional and local governments as well as to various suprana- tional institutions. On the other hand, CastellsAPPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION 5 also emphasizes the continued relevance of nation-states as crucial bargaining agencies that influence the changing world of power relationships. As new political actors emerge and new public policies are implemented, the role of culture increases. While pointing to the potential for global economie and eco- logical disasters brought on by globalization, Castells (1996-8, vol. 3: 379) ends on a far more positive note than Gray: “The dream of the Enlightenment, that reason and science ‘would solve the problems of humankind, is within reach: A fourth group of scholars approaches political globalization primarily from the per- spective of global governance. Represent atives of this group analyse the role of various national and multilateral responses. to the fragmentation of economic and political sys- tems and the transnational flows permeating through national borders. See the various essays collected in Wilkinson (2005). Some researchers believe that political globaliz tion might facilitate the emergence of demo- cratic transnational social forces emerging from a thriving sphere of “global civil soci- ety’. This topic is often connected to discus sions focused on the impact of globalization on human rights and vice versa ~ see the essays im Brysk (2002), For example, Martin Shaw (2000: 16) emphasizes the role of global political struggles in creating a ‘global revolution’ that would give rise to an interna- tionalized, rights-based Western state con- glomerate symbolically linked to global institutions. Thus, he raises the fascinating prospect of ‘state formation beyond the national level’, Democratic theorist John Keane (2003: 98) has put forward a similar model of what he calls “eosmocracy’ — a ‘messy and complex type of polity understood, as ‘a conglomeration of interlocking and overlapping sub-state, state, and suprastate institutions and multidimensional processes that interact, and have political and social effects, on a global scale’. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, both Shaw's and Keane’s opti istic vision of a post-imperial multilateralism irected by a Westem political conglomerate seems 10 be out of step with the reality of a unilateralist American Empire Political seientists such as David Held and Anthony MeGrew (Held et al. 1999) articu- late in their writings the need for effective global governance structures as a conse- quence of various forees of globalization. They portray globalization as. diminishing the sovereignty of national governance, thereby reducing the relevance of the nation- state. Much to their credit, Held and McGrew are two of the most vociferous advocates for ‘moving the academic debate on globalization ina more ideational and normative direction. In Held’s view, neither the old Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states nor the post-war global system centred on the United Nations offers a satisfactory solution to the enormous challenges posed by political glo- balization. Instead, he predicts the emergence of a multilayered form of democratic govern ance based on Western cosmopolitan ideals, international legal arrangements, and a web of expanding linkages between various gov- emmental and non-governmental institutions. Rejecting the charge of utopianism often levelled against his vision, Held (1995: 96-120) provides empirical evidence for the existence of a tendency inherent in the glo- bralization process that seems to favour the strengthening of supranational bodies and the rise of an international civil society. He pre- dicts that democratic rights will ultimately become detached from their narrow relation ship 10 diserete territorial units. If Held’s perspective on political globalization is cor rect, then its final outcome might well be the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan democracy” that would constitute the ‘constructive basis for a plurality of identities to flourish within a sirueture of mutual toleration and accounta- bility’. For a more detailed elaboration of his vision see Held (1995, 2006). In fact, even in the post-9/I1 context, Held refuses to aban- don his hopes for restructuring world order toward a ‘cosmopolitan social democracy characterized by ‘strong competent govern ance at all levels ~ local, national, regional, and global (Held and McGrew, 2007: 131).16 ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION A number of academic crities have chal- lenged the idea that political globalization is fuelling a development toward cosmopolitan democracy. Most of their criticism boils down to the charge that Held and MeGrew indulge in an abstract idealism that fails to engage with current political developments on the level of policy. Some crities argue that the emergence of private authority has increasingly become a factor in the post-Cold War world. In their view, global collective actors like religious terrorists and organized criminals are not merely symptoms of the weakening nation-state, but their actions also ddim the prospects for the rise of cosmopoli- tan democracy. See, for example, Hall and Biersteker (2002). Moreover, sceptics like Robert Holton (2011: 202-3) raise the suspi- ion that Held and MeGrew do not explore in sufficient detail the cultural feasibility of global democracy. As. cultural patterns become increasingly interlinked through glo balization, crities argue, the possibility of resistance, opposition, and violent clashes becomes just as real as the cosmopolitan vision of mutual accommodation and toler ance of differences. GLOBALIZATION AS CULTURAL PROCESS Held and McGrew might respond to these criticisms by arguing that one major strength of their approach lies in viewing globalization mensional phenomenon, but as @ multidimensional process involving diverse domains of activity and interaction, including the cultural sphere. Indeed, any analytical account of globalization would be woefully inadequate without an examination of its cul- tural dimension. A number of prominent scholars have emphasized the centrality of culture to contemporary debates on globaliza- tion, As sociologist John Tomlinson (1999: 1) puts it, ‘Globalization lies atthe heart of mod cm culture: cultural practices lie atthe heart of globalization.” ‘The thematic landscape tra- versed by scholars of cultural globalization is, ot as a one: vast, and the questions they raise are too numerous to be completely fleshed out in this short survey. Rather than presenting « long laundry list of relevant topics, this seetion focuses on two central questions raised by scholars of cultural globalization. First, does globalization inerease cultural homogeneity, ‘or does it lead to greater diversity and hetero- geneity? Or, to put the matter into less aca- demic terms, does globalization make people more alike or more different? And second, how does the dominant culture of consumer- ism impact the natural environment? Most commeniators preface their response to the first question with a general analysis of the relationship between the globalization process and contemporary cultural change. ‘Tomlinson (1999: 28), for example, defines cultural globalization as a “densely growing network of complex cultural interconnec- tions and interdependencies that characterize modern social life’. He emphasizes. that global cultural flows are directed by power- ful international media corporations that uti- lize new communication technologies to shape societies and identities. As images and ideas can be more easily and rapidly trans- mitted from one place to another, they pro- foundly impact the way people experience their everyday lives. Culture no longer remains tied to fixed localities such as town and nation, but aequites new meanings that reflect dominant themes emerging in a global context, This interconnectivity caused by cultural globalization challenges. parochial values and identities, be the linkages that connect culture to fixity of location ‘A number of scholars argue that these pto- ccesses have facilitated the rise of an increas ingly homogenized global culture underwritten by an Anglo-American value system, Referring to the global diffusion of American values, consumer goods, and life- styles as ‘Americanization’, these authors analyse the ways in which such forms of “cultural imperialism’ are overwhelming more vulnerable cultures. The American soci- ologist George Ritzer (1993), for example, uuse it underminesAPPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION ” coined the term ‘MeDonaldization’ to deseribe the wide-ranging process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society, as well as the rest of the world, On the surface, these principles appear (© be rational in their attempts to offer effi- cient and predictable ways of serving peo- ple’s needs. Only toward the end of his study does Ritzer allow himselt to adciress the nor mative ramifications of this. process: when rational systems serve to deny the expression of human creativity and cultural difference, they contribute to the rise of irrationality in the world, In the long run, MeDonaldization leads to the eclipse of cultural diversity and the dehumanization of social relations, The American political theorist Benjamin R. Barber (1996: 17) also enters the norma- tive realm when he warns his readers against the cultural imperialism of what he calls “MeWorld’ ~ a soulless consumer capitalism that is rapidly transforming the world’s diverse population into @ blandly uniform market, For Barber, MeWorld is a product of ‘superficial American popular culture assem- bled in the 1950s and 1960s and driven by expansionist commercial interests: “Tts tem- plate is American, its form style ... [mJusie. video, theater, books, and theme parks ... are all constructed as image exports creating a common taste around common logos, adver- tising slogans, stars, songs, brand names, jin- gles, and trademarks." For a more sceptical assessment of the supposed ‘Americanness” of globalization, see Marling (2006). Barber’s account of cultural globalization contains the important recognition that the colonizing tendencies of MeWorld provoke cultural and political resistance in the form of ‘jihad’ ~ the parochial impulse to reject and repel Western homogenization forces wher ever they can be found, Fuelled by the furies of etimonationatism and/or religious funda- mentalism, jihad represents the dark side of cultural particularism. Barber (1996: 19) sees Jihad as the ‘rabid response to colonialism and. imperialism and their economic children, cap- italism and modernity’. Guided by opposing visions of homogeneity, jihad and MeWorld are dialectically interlocked in a bitter cultural struggle for popular allegiance. For a neo- Marxist perspective on the rise of a global capitalist monoculture, see Schiller (1995: 17-33). As might be expected, Barber's dia- lectical account received a lot of public atten- tion after the events of 9/11. They also helped to resurtect Samuel Huntington's 1993 thesis ofa ‘clash of civilizations’ involving primarily the West and Islam (Huntington, 1997: 26-7, 45-8). It is one thing to acknowledge the powerful cultural logic of global capitalism, but it is quite another to assert that the cultural diver sity existing on our planet is destined to van- ish. In fact, several influential academics offer contrary assessments that link globaliza- tion to new forms of cultural diversity. See Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (1992, 1996). Berger and Huntington offer a highly unusual version of this ‘pluralism thesis’, Emphasizing that cultural globalization is ‘American in origin and content’, they nonetheless allow for ‘any variations and sub-globalizations’ on the dominant US cultural theme in various parts of the world (2002). Roland Robertson (1995: 25-44) has famously argued that global cultural flows often reinvigorate local cultural niches, Contending that cultural glo- balization always takes place in local con- texts, Robertson predicts a pluralization of the world as localities produce a variety of unique cultural responses to global forces. ‘The result is not increasing cultural homoge- nization, but ‘glocalization’ — a complex interaction of the global and local character ized by cultural borrowing. These interac- tions lead to a complex mixture of both homogenizing and heterogenizing impulses, Often referred 10 as “hybridization” or ‘ere= lization’, the processes of cultural mixing are reflected in music, film, fashion, language, and other forms of symbolic expression, Sociologist in Nederveen Pieterse (2003: 117), for exam- ple, argues that exploring ‘hybridity’ amounts to ‘mapping no man’s land’, For Nederveen Pieterse, the hybridity concept “does not pre- clude struggle but yields a multifocus view on18 ‘THE SAGE HANDEOOK OF GLOBALIZATION struggle and by showing multiple identity on both sides, transcends the “us versus them” ualism that prevails in cultural and political arenas’. Ulf Hannerz, (1992: 96), 100, empha sizes the complexity of an emerging “global culture’ composed of new zones of hybridiza tion, See also Mendieta (2007). In addition to addressing the question of whether globalization leads to cultural homo= geneity or heterogeneity, scholars like Nederveen Pieterse, Hannerz, and Robertson seek to expand the concept of globalization by portraying it as a multidimensional ‘field’ In their view, globalization is both material and a mental condition, constituted by com= plex, often contradictory interactions of ‘global, local, and individual aspects of social life. Cultural theorists such as Ulrich Beck (2000: 102) and Arjun Appadurai (1996) have refined this argument by contrasting common interpretations of globalization as a ‘process’ with the less mechanical concept of ‘slobality’, referring to ‘the experience of living and acting across borders’. Appadurai identifies five conceptual dimensions or ‘landscapes’ that are consti- tuted by global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, (shifting populations made up of tourists, immigrants, refugees, and exiles), tech- noscapes (development of technologies that facilitate the rise of TNCs), finanseapes (flows of global capital), mediascapes (elec tronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information), and ideoscapes (ideologies of states and social movements). Each of these si ns the building blocks of the pes” cont new ‘imagined worlds’ that are assembled by the historically situated imaginations of per sons and groups. spread around the globe (Appadurai, 1996: 33). Suspended in a global web of cultural multiplicity, more and more people become aware of the density of human relations. Their enhanced ability to explore and absorb new cultural symbols and mean- ings coexists in uneasy tension with their growing sense of ‘placelessness’, Focusing on the changing forms of human perception and consciousness brought on by global cul- tural flows, Beck and Appadurai discuss subjective forms of cultural globalization that are often neglected in more common analyses of ‘objective’ relations of interdependence. To some extent, then, scholars of cultural globalization have shown more willingness to engage in sustained investigations of the normative dimension of globalization than their colleagues in political science or eco- nomics. The same is true for those research- ers who have explored the connection between cultural globalization and the natu- ral environment, especially in light of the escalating problem of global climate change Afterall, how people view their natural envi- ronment depends fo a great extent on their cultural milieu, For example, cultures steeped in Taoist, Buddhist, and various animist reli- gions often emphasize the interdependence of all living beings ~_a perspective that calls, for adelicate balance between human wants and ecological needs. Nature is not consid- ered a mere ‘resource’ to be used instru- mentally to fulfil human desires. The most extreme manifestations of this anthropo- centric paradigm are reflected in the domi- nant values and beliels of consumerism. The US-dominated culture industry seeks to convince its global audience that the meaning and chief value of life can be found in the limitless accumulation of material possessions. The two most ominous ecologieal prob- Jems connected to the global spread of con- sumer culture are human-induced global climate change, such as global warming, and the worldwide destruction of biodiversity. Indeed, the US Union of Concerned Scientists has presented data suggesting that the global average temperature increased from about 53.3F in 1880 to 57.9°F in 2000. Further increases in global temperatures could lead to partial meltdowns of the polar ice caps, causing global sea levels to rise by up (0 three feet by 2100 ~ a catastrophic develop- ment that would threaten the many coastal regions of the world. The potential economic and political ramifications of global climate ‘change are dire, particularly for people living in developing countries in the global south.APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION 9 With regard to the loss of biodiversity, many biologists today believe that we are now in the midst of the fastest mass extinetion of living species in the 4.5-billion-year history of the planet, Environmental sociologist Franz Broswimmer (2002), for example, fears that up to 50 per cent of all plant and animal species ~ most of them in the global south ~ will disappear by the end of this cen- tury, For a comprehensive overview of facts and data related to global climate change, see Philander (2008). For a more readable account, see Gore (2006). An interesting crossover among economic, political and ecological dimensions of glo- balization is the use of market based policy instruments to manage environmental prob- lems. Initiatives such as carbon “taxes”, ‘trad- ing’, and biodiversity *banks’ have emerged in policy discussions at national and global levels about approaches to global warming, spe and overpopulation Implicit in the use of these market-based policy tools, however, is still the driving neo- liberal ideological assumption that the mar- ket can self-regulate and solve all problems, that capitalist based consumerism is a sus- tainable way to live, even an appropriate way to address ecological problems created by capitalist over-consumption in the first place. extinction, CONCLUSION This chapter introduced the main academic approaches to the study of globalization by linking them to the lively ongoing debate on the subject. Stil, this overview does not encompass all topics of the ever-expanding discourse on the subject. In addition 10 exploring the economic, political, and cul- tural dimensions of globalization, many scholars have raised a number of additional topies, such as the structure and direction of transnational migration flows, the emergence of transnational social movements such as the women’s movement, the spread of global pandemics, transnational crime, eyber erime, and the globalization of warfare, military operations, and military technology linked to a transnationalization of defence production One of the most comprehensive surveys on the subject can be found in Held et al. (2007). But rather than providing a full account of every conceivable aspect of the debate, the purpose of this chapter has been to show that there exists a variety of approaches to the subject, but no scholarly agreement on a sin- ule conceptual framework for the study of globalization. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that any overly objectivist approach to globalization is bound to over look the insight that all social-scientific con- cepts are simultaneously analytical and normative. This dual status of concepts means that they never merely describe that to which they refer, but are also necessarily engaged in a normative process of meaning construction (Offe, 1996: 5). It is virtually impossible for globalization scholars to interpret the public discourse on the subject apart from their own ideological and political framework. Hence, as I have argued in my work on the subject, it is important 10 explore the ideological dimensions of globalization by secking make sense of the contemporary emergence of various new “globalisms’, @3 well as by taking into account the various ideological commitments of globalization researchers (Steger, 2008). In spite of the obvious dan- gers inherent in this move, the inclusion of one’s own beliefs and values does not neces sarily invalidate one’s research project. As the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) has pointed out, the motiva- tions and prejudices of the interpreter condi- tion every act of understanding Hence, it would be a mistake to consider the researcher's values and preconceptions solely as a hindrance to a proper understand- ing of social processes. In fact, the interpret- er’s inescapable normative involvement enables the very act of understanding. 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