MANU/UP/1765/2020

Equivalent Citation: 2020(6) ALJ 501

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (LUCKNOW BENCH)

Misc. Single No. 14905 of 2020
Decided On: 15.10.2020
Appellants: Sheetal Tripathi and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: U.O.I and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sangeeta Chandra, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Sarvesh Kumar Dubey and Ananttika Singh
For Respondents/Defendant: A.S.G., Abhishek Bhatnagar, Savitra Vardhan Singh and
Vivek Singla
ORDER
Sangeeta Chandra, J.
1. Heard Sri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sarvesh Kumar
Dubey for the petitioners, Sri Chetan Mittal for respondents no. 2 to 4 and Sri Savitra
Vardhan Singh for respondent no. 1.
2. This writ petition has been filed by six young students who had taken the Entrance
Exam/Selection Test held by Indian Institute of Management, Rohtak for admission to
an Undergraduate and Post Graduate Course called the Integrated Programme of
Management 2020 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPM').
3 . Prayer as framed in the writ petition is for quashing of results dated 31.8.2020
announced by the respondent no. 2 and for a mandamus to the respondent nos. 2 to
4 to re-conduct the Entrance Exam for the said course in accordance with the
guidelines released by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of
India and the UGC.
4. The facts relevant for decision of the petition, as mentioned by the petitioners, are
that respondent no. 2 introduced the course called Integrated Programme in
Management combining Management studies of Undergraduate and Post Graduate
Classes of five years and a student undertaking such a course would be given a BBA
and MBA Degree on passing out successfully. The respondent no. 2 announced the
criteria for admission in February, 2020 for Academic Session 2020-2025. The
Entrance Exam was scheduled to be held on 1.5.2020. The admission was to be done
taking into account marks obtained in an Aptitude Test held to gauge Quantitative
Ability, Logical Reasoning and Verbal Ability of candidate together with a Written
Ability Test, and also taking into consideration the Past Academic Record and the
scores secured in Personal Interview. The percentage of marks assigned to each of
such parameters as given in the initial advertisement was 50%, 10%, 10% and 30%
respectively.

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 5. Due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and nationwide lock down since 24.3.2020,
the petitioners received an email dated 21.4.2020 saying that the Aptitude Test due
to be held on 1.5.2020 stood postponed and the registration date for taking the IPM
Entrance Exam was extended up to 4.5.2020. Later on, on 9.5.2020, the respondent
no. 2 announced that the Aptitude Test was going to be held on 21.5.2020 via
internet-based assessment system and before the actual Test, which was going to be
held on 21.5.2020, three mock examinations were to be held to familiarize the
students with regard to the requirements of the said Test to be held on 21.5.2020.
The dates announced for such mock exams were 15.5.2020, 17.5.2020 and
19.5.2020. An hour before the holding of the mock examination on 15.5.2020, the
students were notified of its cancellation. On 17.5.2020, the candidates were
informed via email that the online Aptitude Test had been indefinitely postponed.
6 . On 11.6.2020, a new methodology was devised for conduct of examination. The
candidates were now to appear for Centre-based Aptitude Test on 28.6.2020. Two
days before the actual conduct of the Centre based Aptitude Test, the candidates were
informed that the same stood cancelled. On 11.6.2020, the candidates were informed
that now the Aptitude Test was to be conducted through virtual mode on 20.7.2020
with effect from 3:30 PM to 5:00 PM. The original 120 minutes examination was
condensed into a 75 minutes examination containing two Sections; Section 1 was of
45 minutes in which 60 Multiple-Choice Questions had to be answered dealing with
Quantitative Ability, Logical Reasoning and Verbal Ability. The MCQ part of the
examination was now to carry 60% weightage as opposed to 50% proposed earlier.
Section 2 pertaining to Written Ability Test was to be held thereafter where a
candidate had to write two essays of 250 words each in 30 minutes. Written Ability
Test was now to be given 20% weightage as compared to earlier 10% announced for
it. The email sent on 11.7.2020 nowhere stated the weightage of marks for Personal
Interview and Past Academics, but it was assumed by the candidates that since 60%
were assigned to the Aptitude Test and 20% assigned to Written Ability Test, the
interview would be assigned 10% weightage and so would the Past Academic Record.
7. On 18.7.2020, the respondent no. 2 provided Google form links for Section 1 and
Section 2 of the Test proposed to be held on 20.7.2020. It has been submitted that
Google Documents are devoid of any form of referral tracking system i.e. a candidate
would easily forward that link to anyone who could appear in the examination
without the knowledge of the respondent no. 2. The technical requirements
mentioned along with the Test schedule required the applicants to use a
laptop/desktop computer with minimum internet bandwidth of 512 KBPS.
Smartphones were allowed only in case of emergency. The use of any kind of study
material like books or journals would amount to a malpractice. However, on the same
day, in another Circular posted on the Website of the respondent no. 2, it was
conveyed to the students that the Aptitude Test is an open book exam.
8. The Aptitude Test and Written Ability Test was held on 20.7.2020 and petitioners
nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 were unable to sign-in for several minutes losing precious time
allotted to them. The petitioner no. 4 suffering from COVID-19 and being quarantined
at Anandi Water Park situated on Canal Road, Faizabad, had no internet connection
inside the building and was forced to sit on the terrace in the sweltering heat of July
afternoon to take the Test.
9 . The petitioners received an email on 17.8.2020 from the respondent no. 2
congratulating them for being shortlisted for Personal Interview. The criteria for
selection was again changed and now candidates were to be shortlisted on the basis

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 of fulfillment of either Category A cut-off marks or Category B cut-off marks as
mentioned in the email. Category A comprised of minimum cut-off marks for Aptitude
Test and Written Ability Test and Category B comprised of minimum cutoff marks for
Past Academic Record i.e. Class 10th and 12th Examination marks. The respondent
no. 2, it is apparent, after conduct of the Aptitude Test and the Written Ability Test
and before the holding of the Personal Interview made two separate categories for
admission to IPM Course. These two separate categories were either on the basis of
marks obtained in the Aptitude Test and Written Ability Test or on the basis of Class
10th and 12th results. The parameter of 60% marks for Aptitude Test and 20% marks
for Written Ability Test was abandoned and subsequently deleted from the Website
without any email to individual candidates notifying them of the change of procedure.
10. Based on this new selection criteria, a total of 5030 candidates were shortlisted
for 180 seats. The Personal Interview had to begin on 21.8.2020 via Google Duo
(video conferencing) and was to go on till 28.8.2020 with a break for the weekend in
between. A total of eight panels were constituted for conducting the interviews. With
great difficulty, due to repeated technical snags, the petitioners were able to
complete the interview. The interviews having been concluded on 28.8.2020, the
respondent no. 2 announced the results within three days i.e. on 31.8.2020.
11. It has been submitted in Para 30 of the writ petition that rather than publishing a
list on the Website of selected and waitlisted candidates, the respondent no. 2
notified the candidates of their application status by way of login ID portal. The
ground for rejection of a candidate was not mentioned, but only the fact of rejection
or admission.
12. Mr. Vivek Raj Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sarvesh Kumar Dubey and
Ms. Anantika Singh advocates, argued before this Court that by means of various
affidavits exchanged between the parties, it has now come out that the respondent
no. 2 based the entire selection on Past Academic Record and Personal Interview and
did not take into account either the Aptitude Test or the Written Ability Test which
was held on 20.7.2020. The grievance of the petitioners is that by the Indian Institute
of Management Act, some 20 institutes of national importance spread over the entire
nation have been brought under a single system of administration and control. The
Indian Institute of Management Act, 2017 notified on 31.12.2017 prescribes under
Section 8(3) that admission to every academic course or programme of study in each
Institute shall be based on merit assessed through transparent and reasonable criteria
disclosed through its prospectus, prior to the commencement of the process of
admission in such Institute. However, in the case of IPM, it has been argued that till
date, no prospectus has been published by the respondent no. 2, specifying the
process of admission. The process of admission specified on its Website in February,
2020 was changed in June, 2020, not only with respect to the manner of conduct of
the entrance Test, but also with regard to the weightage to be given to each section
of the selection procedure. The students would have no grievance if centre based
written examination was changed to virtual mode examination due to the COVID-19
situation, but the examination being conducted by virtual mode should be ensured to
be free from malpractices and transparent and fair procedure. The examination had
not been conducted as those of IITs and the students not being proctored, it was
open for candidates to forward the link to any person who would appear on their
behalf impersonating them and clearing the exams. Also, not only the criteria of
weightage was changed repeatedly, the Aptitude Test and Written Ability Test which
was held on 20.7.2020 was given a complete go by and students were finally selected
only on the basis of Past Academic Record and Personal Interview.

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 13. It has been submitted by the petitioners' counsel that the Rules of the game were
changed during the playing of the game and even thereafter, as after the interviews
were held with effect from 21.8.2020 up to 28.8.2020, the results were declared only
on the basis of Past Academic Record and Personal Interview.
The counsel for the petitioners has relied upon observations made by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ajay Hasia etc. versus Khalid Mujib Sehravardi
MANU/SC/0498/1980 : (1981) 1 SCC 722, where a Constitution Bench observed that
"the oral interview Test is undoubtedly not a very satisfactory Test for assessing and
evaluating the capacity or caliber of candidates. In the absence of any better Test for
measuring personal characteristics and traits, the oral interview Test must, at the
present stage, be regarded as not irrational or irrelevant though it is subjective and
based on first impression and its result is influenced by many uncertain factors and is
capable of abuse. Yet, in the matter of admission to a college or even in the matter of
public employment, the oral interview Test should not be relied upon as an exclusive
Test, but it may be resorted to only as an additional or supplementary Test and,
moreover, great care must be taken to see that persons who were appointed to
conduct oral interview Test are men of high integrity, caliber and qualification." It
was observed further that under the existing circumstances, allocation of more than
15% of the total marks for oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and
would be liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. It was observed that
allocation of a high percentage in the case at hand, i.e. Thirty three and a half
percent for oral interview could be regarded as infecting the admission procedure
with arbitrariness and selection of candidates made on the basis of such admission
procedure could not be sustained. It was further observed that an interview which did
not take more than a few minutes on an average would be certainly bad because it
would be impossible in such an interview to ascertain the merit of a candidate with
reference to factors required to be taken into account for assessing the merit and
caliber of a candidate.
14. It has been argued that in the case of Ajay Hasia (supra), the Supreme Court was
considering a case relating to selection of students for a technical course in a
regional Engineering College. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment
rendered in Minor A. Peeriakaruppan and Shobha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu
MANU/SC/0055/1970 : (1971) 1 SCC 38, where the Supreme Court in Paragraph 13
observed that earmarking 75 marks out of 275 marks for interview, prima facie,
appeared to be excessive. The Supreme Court after referring to a treatise by a well-
known author C.W. Valentine, namely, "Psychology and its Bearing on Education"
referred to marks given to the same set of persons interviewed by two different
competent Boards and went on to say that even when the interviews are conducted
by impartial and competent persons on scientific lines, very many uncertain factors
like initial nervousness on the part of some candidates, the mood in which the
interviewer happens to be, and the odd questions that may be put to persons
interviewed may all go to affect the result of interview.
15. The learned counsel further referred to a judgment rendered in D.V. Bakshi and
others versus Union of India and others, MANU/SC/0359/1993 : AIR 1993 Supreme
Court 2374, where it was observed in Paragraph 6 that a distinction is to be drawn
between interviews held for competitive examination for admission to educational
institutions and selections for higher posts in public employment. In the case of
educational institutions such a distinction has relevance for the reason that can you
teach young students whose personality has yet to develop and, therefore, greater
weight has to be given to their performance at the written examination rather than at

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 oral examination.
16. In a preliminary objection filed as to the maintainability of the writ petition, the
respondent nos. 2 to 4 have raised three grounds. Firstly, it has been submitted that
since the dispute pertains to admission in IPM course of respondent no. 2 which is
situated in District Rohtak in the state of Haryana, the writ petition filed before this
Court is not maintainable on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. The "cause of
action" according to the respondents is the change of selection procedure adopted by
the respondent no. 2. The change of selection procedure was advised by the
Academic Council and approved by the Executive Council of the respondent no. 2 at
Rohtak Haryana. Since no part of cause of action occurred within the territorial limits
of this Court, the writ petition ought to be dismissed on grounds of lack of territorial
jurisdiction under article 226 (2) of the Constitution.
17. It has further been stated that in the admission procedure/policy declared on the
website by the respondent no. 2 an exclusive jurisdiction clause was also included
whereby all disputes in respect of admission or legal remedies, etc were subjected to
Rohtak jurisdiction only. The relevant clause reproduced in the short counter affidavit
is as under "any disputes arising out of or in respect of admission to IPM programme,
the decision of Director of IIM Rohtak, or any other designated official shall be final.
All matters involving disputes or legal remedy shall be subject to Rohtak
jurisdiction".
18. It has further been submitted that the petitioners have not impleaded candidates
who have been selected and are seeking quashing of the entire result which will
directly affect the selected students. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Prabodh Verma and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh; MANU/SC/0061/1984 : 1984
(4) SCC 251, has observed that those whose rights were concerned were not made
parties not even by joining some of them in representative capacity, the matter
therefore came to be decided in their absence. It was observed that "a High Court
ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as
respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in the
representative capacity if their number is too large, and therefore, the Allahabad High
Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the Sangh's writ petition
without insisting upon the reserved pool teachers being made respondents to the
petition, or at least some of them being made respondents in the representative
capacity, and had the petitioners refused to do so, ought to have dismissed their
petition for nonjoinder of necessary parties....."
Additionally, it has been submitted that the IPM course has commenced from
09.09.2020 and a total of 210 students have started attending classes.
19. It has further been submitted that the writ petition is also hit by the principle of
estoppel as after participating in the interview and finding themselves unsuccessful
they have filed the present writ petition. The Supreme Court has observed in several
cases that a person who has participated in the selection process after knowing
everything, cannot be allowed to turn around and challenge the selection process.
20. A detailed counter affidavit has also been filed to the contents of the writ petition
and two supplementary affidavits filed by the petitioners regarding the merits of the
controversy. The respondents do not dispute that they did not publish the admission
procedures for different courses run by them in a prospectus. They also do not

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 dispute that they changed the criteria for selection thrice after issuing initial
advertisement on their website. However, this Court after hearing the counsel for the
parties at length had reserved its order only for consideration of the preliminary
objections raised by the counsel for the respondent no. 2 to 4.
2 1 . The question of maintainability of the writ petition on grounds of lack of
territorial jurisdiction of this court to entertain the same shall be considered
afterwards by me. I shall consider the object of non joinder of necessary parties and
estoppel first.
22. The second objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is with
respect to nonjoinder of necessary parties. It has been submitted that the preliminary
objection regarding the maintainability of the petition was filed on 09.09.2020 before
this court. On 09.09.2020, at least 210 students who had taken admission have
started attending classes at Rohtak. None of them were even attempted to be
impleaded as respondents despite knowledge being derived from the objections filed
by the respondents. This Court finds that the petitioners have taken a specific case
that merit list was never published on the website. This fact has not been denied.
Therefore the onus was on the respondents to disclose the names of admitted
students while filing the objections. They chose not to do so. The petitioners have
also made no attempt to find out the names of successful candidates. This court is
bound by the observations made in the case of Prabodh Verma (Supra).
23. The third objection taken by the respondents is with respect to "Estoppel". There
cannot be any estoppel. There may have been an argument relating to acquiescence.
However the question of acquiescence cannot stand in the way of the petitioners as
the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Gupta and Others Vs. State of U.P.
and Others, MANU/SC/0354/2005 : (2005) 2 SCC 827 has observed in paragraph-13
that the criteria for merit list was subsequently changed and therefore challenged.
Consequently, no candidate had any occasion to protest as the criteria was abruptly
changed by the State Government. The Division Bench rightly overruled the objection
as to the maintainability of the writ petition by taking the view that there was no
question of estoppel and the candidates who had applied and were not selected could
not be said to be estopped from challenging the process of selection. If the criteria
for admission was disclosed only at the stage of shortlisting and not at the time of
issuance of advertisement it would not lie in the mouth of the respondents to contend
that the unsuccessful candidate cannot challenge the selection process having
participated in the same. Similar observations have been made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Dr. (Major) Mita Sahai vs. State of Bihar and others,
where it has been observed by the Supreme Court that if it was not for erroneous
interpretation of the Rules, with regard to work experience, the appellant would have
been selected. It observed in paragraph 17, 18, and 19 as follows:-
"17. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel prevents a candidate from
challenging the selection process after having failed in it as iterated by this
Court in a plethora of judgments including Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of
Bihar, observing as follows:
"16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part
in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19%
marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the appellant is not
entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the
appellant's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have

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 even dreamed of challenging the selection. The appellant invoked
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit
list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the appellant
clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High
Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ
petition."
18. The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent candidates from
trying another shot at consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein every
disgruntled candidate, having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of
getting a second chance.
1 9 . However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the
candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the
prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a
candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating
consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely
because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is
sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a
candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation
of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the
selection process."
24. In the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Agarwalla & Another
Vs. National Law School of India University Bengaluru and Others; Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 1030 of 2020, the Supreme Court entertained a Public interest litigation.
The Supreme Court had observed that online Test at home with technological
measures cannot ensure transparency and the Test held would be completely
compromised and may even be manipulated by the participants and coaching centres.
The Supreme Court observed that permitting home based online Test could not have
ensured transparency, fairness and integrity of the examination specially when the
Test was to be conducted for entrance into a premier law university of the country.
Moreover the requirement of fulfilling technological support as required by NLAT
could not have easily been procured by a large number of students. It observed in
paragraph 95 as follows:-
"95. We thus conclude that home based online examination as proposed by
the respondent No. 1 University for NLAT-2020-21 could not be held to be a
test which was able to maintain transparency and integrity of the
examination. The short notice and technological requirements insisted by the
University deprived a large number of students to participate in the test
violating their rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."
25. This Court now feels it appropriate for coming back to the first objection. When
the Constitution of India was framed Article 226 as it originally stood therein,
provided that every High Court shall have power, "throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority
including in appropriate cases any Government within those territories, directions
orders or writs--".
2 6 . Some of the decisions rendered by different High Court's gave a wider
perspective regarding territorial jurisdiction to the High Court's and observed that the

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 High Court could exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of authorities
situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such tribunal or authority
exercises power in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of a person
residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High Court. Later A
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Lt. Colonel Khajoor Singh Versus Union
of India & Another, MANU/SC/0039/1960 : AIR 1961 Supreme Court 532, had
observed otherwise. Consequently an amendment to the Constitution was brought
about by the Parliament by addition of sub-clause 2 to Article 226 in 1976. By
addition of this clause, the High Courts were conferred jurisdiction to issue directions
orders or writs to any Government Authority or person exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises
for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such government or
authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
2 7 . The phrase "cause of action, wholly or in part" has not been defined in the
Constitution (42nd Amendment). It has been referred in Section 20 of The Civil
Procedure Code and in common parlance is "the existence of those facts which give a
party or right to judicial interference on his behalf".
28. The Supreme Court in the three judges decision rendered in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu; MANU/SC/0759/1994 : 1994(4) SCC 711, has
observed in paragraph 5 as follows:-
"5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause--
notwithstanding anything in Article 32--and provides that every High Court
shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate
cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other
purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its
power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had
arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of
the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear
that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs
for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of
the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in
part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or
the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is
issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the
High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of
action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at
best its case in the writ petition."
29. The Court further observed in paragraph 6 as follows:-
"6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle
of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a
judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh
[MANU/PR/0037/1888 : ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98, 102 : 15 IA 156] Lord Watson
said:

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 "... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which
may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to
the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other
words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive
at a conclusion in his favour."
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the
court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness
or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High
Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered
on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise
whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore,
the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the
facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs
5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the
cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."
30. In Chand Kaur vs. Partab SinghMANU/PR/0037/1888 : (1987-88) 15IA 156, Lord
Watson said: "...the cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which
may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief
prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as a
cause of action, or in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asked the
court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour". Therefore, in determining the objection
of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts, read it in support of
the cause of action into consideration, albeit, without embarking upon an enquiry as
to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether
High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain any petition must be answered on
the basis of facts as made out in the petition, the truth or otherwise where of being
immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be
decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.
31. " I n Read vs. Brown, Lord Esher, MR., adopted the definition for the phrase
cause of action that it meant "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It
does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but
every fact which is necessary to be proved."
(emphasis supplied)
32. In Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), the three Judges Bench however did observe and
cautioned that the High Court merely on the ground of some insignificant event
connected with the cause of action, taking place within the territorial limits of the
High Court to which the litigant approaches at his own choice or convenience, may
not to transgress its jurisdiction.
3 3 . In State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Swaika Properties and Another,
MANU/SC/0304/1985 : 1985 (3) SCC 217, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
mere service of a notice would not give rise to any cause of action unless service of
notice was an integral part of the cause of action.

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 3 4 . In Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and another,
MANU/SC/0696/2001 : 2002 (1) SCC 567, it was held that in order to confer
jurisdiction on the High Court, it must be disclosed that the integral facts in support
of the cause of action, do constitute a cause so as to empower, the court to decide
the dispute and that the entire or part of it arose within its jurisdiction. It was held
that the mere fact that a writ petitioner carries on business at a particular place or
that correspondence was made by it and received at that pace, is not an integral part
of cause of action. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the
basis where of a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with
the prayer made therein, cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would
confer jurisdiction on the court. It observed that a distinction has to be made
between a legislation and an executive action. A Parliamentary Legislation will apply
to the entire territory of India. If passing of a Legislation gives rise to a cause of
action, writ petition questioning the constitutionality that of can be filed in any High
Court of the country the cause of action will arise when the provisions of the Act were
implemented and shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. In the
case of executive action however the court must have requisite territorial jurisdiction.
The question of situs of the respondents and its relevance was also considered in the
case of Kusum Ingots.
3 5 . In M/s. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Another,
MANU/SC/0430/2004 : 2004 (6) SCC 254, Hon'ble Supreme Court after defining the
phrase cause of action observed that cause of action implies a right to sue. The
material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the
cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has however been
judicially interpreted inter-alia to mean every fact that would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the
defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. For
every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not the plaint of the writ petition as
the case maybe, shall be rejected summarily. The Supreme Court cautioned that the
entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is
necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the ' material facts
'. The expression 'material facts' is also known as integral facts. All necessary facts
must form an integral part of the cause of action. The question as to whether the
court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at that on
the basis of pleadings made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise there of being
immaterial.
3 6 . After referring to the judgment rendered in Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal, MANU/SC/0026/1975 : 1975 (2) SCC 671 and in U.P. Rashtriya
Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad vs. State of U.P. and others, MANU/SC/0422/1995 : 1995
(4) SCC 738, it was observed that the decision is an authority for the proposition that
a place from where an Appellate Order or Original order is passed may give rise to a
part of cause of action although the original order was passed at a place outside the
said area. When a part of cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, it
will be for the petitioner to choose his forum. It observed in paragraph 26 and 27 of
Kusum Ingots (supra) as follows:-
"26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari
Parishad [MANU/SC/0422/1995 : (1995) 4 SCC 738] that the situs of issue of
an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning
of the expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is

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 not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent
the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined
to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would
include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive
order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a
case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive
instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof.
Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered
to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of
action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or
issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon
a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof.
27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive
authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause
of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original
authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted
at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other
words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of
action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose
jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the
appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the
original authority merges with that of the appellate authority."
It observed thereafter in paragraph 30 as follows:-
"we must however remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of
action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same
may by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling
the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the court
may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine
of forum conveniens."
3 7 . The learned counsel for the respondent Sri Chetan Mittal has placed reliance
upon judgment rendered in Alchemist Limited and Another vs. State Bank of Sikkim
and others; MANU/SC/1290/2007 : 2007 (11) SCC 335, where the appellant had
argued that a part of course of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
the High Court at Chandigarh because the appellant company had its registered and
corporate office at Chandigarh the said company carried on business at Chandigarh,
the offer of the appellant company was accepted and the said acceptance was
communicated to the Appellant at Chandigarh, part performance of the contract took
place at Chandigarh in as much as Rs. 4.5 crores had been deposited by the appellant
company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as per the request of the first respondent,
the Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to
ascertain the bona fides of the appellant company, negotiations were held between
the parties at Chandigarh and the letter of revocation was received by the appellant
company at Chandigarh and the consequences of revocation of contract were felt at
Chandigarh. On the other hand, the respondent had submitted that neither of the
above facts nor circumstances could be said to be a part of cause of action conferring
jurisdiction upon the High Court at Chandigarh.
3 8 . According to the respondents, all substantial, material and integral facts
constituting a cause of action were within the territory of the State of Sikkim and

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 hence the High Court was wholly right in dismissing the petition on grounds of want
of territorial jurisdiction. Paragraph-10 of the judgment rendered in Alchemist Limited
and Another (supra), is quoted hereinbelow:-
"10. The respondents, in this connection, relied upon the following facts:
(i) registered and corporate office of the first respondent Bank is at
Gangtok i.e. Sikkim;
(ii) secretariat of the second respondent State is situated at Gangtok
i.e. Sikkim;
(iii) offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok;
(iv) all offers were scrutinised and a decision to accept offer of the
appellate Company was taken by the first respondent Bank at
Gangtok;
(v) the State Government's decision not to approve the proposal of
the appellant Bank was taken at Gangtok;
(vi) the meeting of the Board of Directors of the first respondent
Bank was convened at Gangtok and a resolution was passed to
withdraw the letter dated 20-2-2004 at Gangtok;
(vii) a communication was dispatched by the first respondent Bank
to the appellant Company on 23-2-2004 from Gangtok."
3 9 . The Supreme Court observed that for the purpose of deciding whether facts
averred by the appellant petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of
action, one has to consider whether such facts constitute a material, essential or
integral part of the cause of action. If it is, it forms a part of cause of action. If it is
not, it does not form a part of cause of action. In determining the said question, the
substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to be considered. Even if a
small fraction of the cause of action arises within the Jurisdiction of the court, the
court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it
must be "part of cause of action" nothing less than that. The Supreme Court placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by it in Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd.,
MANU/SC/0696/2001 : 2002 (1) SCC 567, where the company had contended that it
had its head office at Gujarat and carried on business at Gujarat and the benefit of
passport scheme under the Exim policy shall be available to it in Gujarat. It was
argued that the company was carrying on its business at Ahmedabad. Orders were
placed from and executed at Ahmedabad; documents was sent and payment was
made at Ahmedabad; credit of duty was claimed for export handled from Ahmedabad;
denial of benefit of Exim policy adversely affected the petitioner at Ahmedabad; the
company had furnished bank guarantee and executed a bond at Ahmedabad etc. The
contention was negatived and petition filed by Union of India was allowed.
4 0 . The petitioners have stated in paragraph-2 of the writ petition that they had
applied for IPM and appeared for the selection Test from Lucknow, UP. Territorial
jurisdiction of the Lucknow High Court to hear the matter is conferred by this Court's
observations in Birla Institute of Technology vs. Yamini Shukla reported in
MANU/UP/0056/1996 : AIR 1996 Allahabad 244. The Appellant before the Division
Bench had referred to the judgment rendered in Angile Insulations Vs. Davy Ashmore

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 India Ltd. and Another, MANU/SC/0338/1995 : 1995 4 SCC 153, where the Supreme
Court held that when two courts have the territorial Jurisdiction over a matter and a
part of cause of action had arisen in one of the courts, the parties have agreed to vest
jurisdiction in one of such courts to try the dispute which may arise between them,
then only that Court of which jurisdiction has been agreed upon by the parties, will
try the dispute even if a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of the other court. This Court observed that cause of action is not only
the last link of the chain which leads to the filing of a case. It means the bundle of
facts which are necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to a decree or order
claimed by him. The last action in the case of the writ petitioner was the non-
selection in interview. The conduct of the entrance exam at Lucknow, was preceded
by the entire selection process commencing from the date of filing of application to
the respondent having taken the Test held at Lucknow and it culminated on the date
the result was declared. A part of cause of action for the appellant arose at Lucknow
as the first link in the process of selection and admission to the MCA course offered
by the Birla Institute of Technology started at Lucknow, only the last link in the chain
that is the holding of the interview at Ranchi and declaration of result at Ranchi
would not determine the territorial jurisdiction.
41. With regard to the judgment rendered in Birla Institute of Technology Ranchi vs.
Yamini Shukla, MANU/UP/0056/1996 : AIR 1996 Allahabad 244 this court can only
say that in a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Rajendra Kumar Misra vs.
Union of India, MANU/UP/0815/2004 : 2005 (5) AWC page 454, this Court observed
that mere residence of a litigant would not allow him to choose a forum conveniens
the proper course for a High court is to try and find out and follow the opinions
expressed by later Larger Benches of the Court in preference to those expressed by
earlier benches of the court. It was also observed that in order to understand and
appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what was the
facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had
to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a
sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as full exposition of law.
42. In reply to the preliminary objection raised by the respondents the counsel for
the petitioners has also placed reliance upon judgment rendered by the Delhi High
Court in Independent News (India TV) Vs. India Broadcast Live LLC and others
reported in MANU/DE/1703/2007 : 2007 (35) PTC 117; it has been argued that in the
said case relating to trademark infringement the Delhi High Court observed in para
48-"where the website is not merely passive but is interactive permitting the
browsers to not only access the contents thereof but also subscribe to the services
provided by the owners/operators, the position would be different. However, as
noticed in the judgment rendered in Cyber Cell Inc. Case (supra), even where a
website is interactive, the level of interactive interactivity would be relevant and
limited interactivity may also not be sufficient for the court to exercise jurisdiction. In
Pana Vision International LLP case (supra), it was found that the registration of
plaintiffs mark as a domain name by the defendant had effect of injuring the plaintiff
in California and therefore the court had jurisdiction. In Compu Serve case (supra)
again it was found that the defendant had contacted Ohio to sell his computer
software's on the plaintiffs Ohio-based systems and sent his goods to Ohio further for
their ultimate sale and thus those Courts had jurisdiction. In the present case, the
website India TV live.com of defendant no. 1 is not wholly of a passive character. It
has a specific section for subscription to its services and the options (provided on the
website itself) for countries whose residents can subscribe to the services include
India. The services provided by the defendant no. 1 then that's be subscribed to and

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 a field of in Delhi India that is within the jurisdiction of this Court...".
43. It has been submitted that the procedure of conducting of online examination
being new to academic institutions in India, the principles can be drawn from matters
dealing with jurisdiction relating to a worldwide entity. Google document and Google
duo link were shared by the respondent with the petitioner and these were interactive
third-party links that could be accessed from any part of the country, thus, giving
jurisdiction to this court as all the petitioners had appeared for the Aptitude Test and
Personal Interview from Lucknow. As the process of examination started at Lucknow,
it can safely be said that a part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow. The entrance
examination can be said to be the first stepping stone for admission to IPM.
Candidates could only qualify for the course after taking Personal Interview, which
the petitioners appeared in from Lucknow.
4 4 . The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the judgment relied
upon by the counsel for the petitioners in the case of India TV live.com (supra) is
inapplicable to the facts of the case as it related to an anti-suit injunction action filed
in India in the Delhi High Court to pre-empt the filing of such a suit abroad by the
respondent. It has been submitted that in paragraphs preceding the paragraph on
which the petitioners have placed reliance on, the Delhi High Court had discussed the
purpose of filing anti-suit injunction applications and the principles governing the
entertaining of the same. It has been argued that an anti-suit injunction is an order
passed by the court that prevents an opposing party from commencing or continuing
a proceeding in another jurisdiction or forum. If the opposing party contravenes such
an order issued by a court, a contempt of court order maybe issued by the domestic
court against that party. The anti-suit injunction action is filed often as a means to
prevent forum shopping. It has been submitted that the judgment rendered by the
Delhi High Court therefore can not be considered as a binding or even a persuasive
precedent.
4 5 . This Court on due consideration of rival submissions finds that the crucial
question to decide the issue of territorial jurisdiction, this Court may ask from itself
as to whether the filing of application online from Lucknow, the participation of the
petitioners in the online Aptitude Test and Written Ability Test and thereafter the
Personal Interview could be said to be actions which need to be proved before the
petitioners can be granted the relief they pray for. There is no dispute regarding any
of the aforesaid actions undertaken by the petitioners. The respondent no. 2 has not
denied the online applications being filed by the petitioners and their appearance in
the Aptitude Test or the Written Ability Test or even the Personal Interview. These
facts are not required to be proved by the petitioners for claiming the relief of
quashing the result declared on 31.08.2020 by the respondent. The facts that need to
be proved by the petitioners before they can claim any relief are the facts relating to
the alleged change in criteria of selection after the issuance of the initial
advertisement on the website by the respondent inviting applications and after the
holding of the Aptitude Test the Written Ability Test and Personal Interview. The
respondents have squarely denied any arbitrary change in criteria. It is their case that
the decision was taken by the Executive Council on the basis of recommendations
made by the Academic Council to widen the field of selection in order to make it all
inclusive and egalitarian so that the greatest number of candidates could be
considered for selection so that the best among them could be given admission. Such
a decision was taken at Rohtak. This court therefore finds substance in the argument
raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that this writ petition cannot be
entertained at Lucknow for want of territorial jurisdiction.

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 4 6 . It is dismissed as such with the liberty to the petitioners to approach the
appropriate forum for challenging the arbitrariness, if any, of the respondents in
conducting the selection for IPM course.
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