Adoption

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A.

"MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 188801| October 15, 2014

Doctrine: The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing
of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and
other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is
not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.

Facts: 
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court
sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a
Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had
been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts
to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two
children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied
the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always
offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

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Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry.  P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . .
should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could
not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

Issue:
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?

Held:
YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA
8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

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The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

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REPUBLIC v CA and Zenaida Bobiles

FACTS: Zenaida, who is married to Discoro Bobiles, filed alone a petition for adoption to adopt
Jason Condat. Upon compliance with all the requirements for a petition for adoption pursuant to
PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), the trial court granted such petition. This was then
affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner now contends that the non-inclusion of Discoro Bobiles as a petitioner in the adoption
case is a jurisdictional defect, to which the lower courts erred in not dismissing the petition
outright. That pending the resolution of the petition for adoption, the Family Code already took
effect. Pursuant to the Family Code, the husband and wife should jointly file the petition for
adoption. Since this was not complied with by Zenaida, then the petition should have been
dismissed by the lower courts.
ISSUES:
1) WON the CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption filed by Zenaida. (NO)
2) WON the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition to
adopt Jason Condat in favor of Spouses Discoro and Zenaida. (NO).
RULING:
1) NO.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter
of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.12 We do not find in the present
case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.

The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is
remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in
the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future
actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before
their enactment. 13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes
are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those
begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect
only procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises.15

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The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in
nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of
failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the
petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance. 

2) NO.

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not
apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by
granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not
being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the
same.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly
made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the
child. 

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our

child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise
residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor child, JASON
CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial
Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for whatever it is

worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT,
by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in
any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of
his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his
part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit.
Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be
eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child
must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the
form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case
and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well

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as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to
hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to
sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and
technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to
invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

Additional Notes:

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and
PD 603)

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of
the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount
consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another,
and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of
protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to
make rules to accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests
of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the
absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will
not be disturbed. 

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for
the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the
trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with
the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written
consent of the children of the adopters.

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HERBERT CANG v CA and SPOUSES RONALD CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married on January 27, 1973 and had
three children.
Meanwhile, respondents Sps. Ronald and Maria Clavano were the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna.
When Anna learned of Herbert’s extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of herein
defendants sps. Clavano, she filed for a petition for legal separation with alimony pendete lite
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which approved the same, stating that
Sps. Cang agreed to :

1. “live separately and apart or from bed and board.”;

2. that their children shall be entitled to a monthly support of 1k from the date of filing of the
complaint; and
3. that Anna shall be entitled to enter into any contract or any agreement with any person
or persons, natural or juridical, without the written consent of the husband or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband’s consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated.

Herbert Cang then left for US where he sought a divorce from Anna before the JDC of State of
Nevada, which issued the same and granted sole custody of their minor children to Anna,
reserving “rights to visitation at all reasonable times and places” to Herbert. Afterwards, Herbert
married an American wife and became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced the
latter and never remarried. To add, Herbert worked in Tablante Medical Clinic and allotted a
portion of his earnings to be remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and also
deposit in the bank in the name of their children.

In 1987, respondents sps filed for a Special Proceeding for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children in the RTC of Cebu, and such was signed by the then 14y/o Keith signifying consent to
his adoption. Likewise, Anna filed an affidavit of consent alleging:
1. Herbert had “evaded his legal obligation to support” his children;
2. Her siblings had been helping her take care of the children;
3. That she will be leaving to the US to attend to a family business and leaving the children
would pose a problem; and
4. Herbert had “long forfeited his parental rights” over their children.

Anna presented the decision of the JDR; Herbert left to be an illegal alien in the US (); and that
it was Herbert who divorced her.

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Upon learning of the petition, Herbert returned to the Philippines to file an opposition. Pending
resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody over his children.
RTC of Cebu Branch 19:

1988: Issued an order stating that Anna had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children,
therefore custody should be transferred to the father, Herbert.
RTC of Cebu Branch 14:

1990: Granted and approved the decree of adoption for the Cang children to sps Clavano and:
1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though they were in fact the
legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
They found Herbert to be "morally unfit to be the father of his children" on account of his being
"an improvident father of his family" and an "undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based on
the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of Anna Marie,
Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the
Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City; the deposits were recently made in attempts at verisimilitude;
and by Herbert’s naturalization as US citizen, he is an alien and loyalties with his Filipino
children is in open question.

CA:

Affirmed the decree of adoption by the RTC. It cited Art. 188 of the FC which requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that
the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio)

“In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso,
supra), or the withholding of the parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to display
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first
error.”

ISSUE:

WON MINOR CHILDREN BE LEGALLY ADOPTED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF

A NATURAL PARENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER HAS ABANDONED THEM

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HELD:
On Dec. 17, 1986, EO91 was issued and it amended Art. 27-31, 33, and 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code:

"ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the

following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social
Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement
agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-
placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may
be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents."
(Emphasis supplied)

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.  As such,
when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable
law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides
for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption states:

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or
parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said
parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted."

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The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. The requirement may however be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child; or such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” Hence, the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parent/s, provided that the
petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
Furthermore, only an affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Herbert’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by him.
“The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by
his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence 16
dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.”
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon" means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis
is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another,
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children
as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with
his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and
catered to their whims.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account
the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his
admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel
if they were given to adopting parents. To add, The transfer of custody over the children

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to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive
petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
Hence, in the present case, it may not be deemed that Herbert as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, despite the court awarding Anna custody in the legal separation
case. The award was arrived at by the court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to compromise, there was
no factual finding that Herbert was an irresponsible person that he should be deprived custody
of his children or be grounds for depriving him of his parental authority.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and
Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

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172. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO, 169 SCRA 575

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.

Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child for adoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes,
spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An
Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The
petition for adoption was filed by petitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition.

Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a
letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they
would get back their child. Petitioners refused. As a result, while petitioners were out at work,
the Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that
she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house.
Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no
desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her.

ISSUE: WON the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custody over Angelie Ann
Cervantes.

RULING: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted to petitioners,
Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five
(5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well
as social standing of the contending parents.

Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law husband and
wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina
Carreon had also previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she
lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up
with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values
of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better
than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a
married man, can most likely give her.

Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of
the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 

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MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC

FACTS:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Macario Tamargo (Jennifer's
adopting parent) and spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, (Jennifer's natural parents) filed a
complaint for civil damages against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc (Adelberto's natural
parents) with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he
bad acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed
a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption.

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal
had been filed out of time.

2. Whether the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody
was yet lodged with the biological parents.

RULING:

1. YES. In view of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of

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technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period
for appeal.

2. NO. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him.

The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious

liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may
be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

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 Adoption

Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that
the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to
be held liable for the ensuing damage.

The Court do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may
be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability
for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless
and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness
for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be
vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then
with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

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 Adoption

174. Lahom vs Sibulo

FACTS

Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's
nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own.
Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin.
Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of
affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. Alleging that (1) respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom to the frustrations of her husband
Diosdado until the latter died, (2) respondent remained indifferent to petitioner (now a widow)
and would only come to Naga to see her once a year, (3) respondent was jealous of petitioner’s
nephew and nieces, (4) for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in
Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner
would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son ad (5)
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent.
Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act went into
effect.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.

RTC RULING
Dismissed petition to rescind the decree of adoption.

“Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an
adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the
legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five
(5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any,
had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court).”

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 Adoption

ISSUE
WON the petition to rescind the decree of adoption should be granted. (NO)

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
The adoption cannot be rescinded because of RA 8552 removed the right of the adopter to
rescind the adoption.

RULING
The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that
the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the
society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree
and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of
the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It
is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the
best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of
the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.

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 Adoption

Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter
may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

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 Adoption

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 | March 31, 2005
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
FACTS
On August 31, 2000, Honorato Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.
The trial court granted the petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall
be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. The trial court, however, denied the same holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she
is subsequently adopted by her natural father
HELD
YES. The SC held that there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of
the FC, as amended by RA No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Art. 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and maintain the child’s relationship with her
natural mother because as provided Art. 189(3) of the FC and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552
(law on adoption) the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

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 Adoption

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

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 Adoption

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006

FACTS:

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the USA, of Filipino parentage and
a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin alleged in her petition:

 That when Manuel died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos;

 Their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children
by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption;

 The minors are being financially supported by Landingin and her children, and relatives
abroad;

 As Maria passed away, petitioner desires to adopt the children;

 The minors have given their written consent to the adoption;

 She is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend
time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his
willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.

Subsequently, the court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34
of PD 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than the date set for the initial
hearing of the petition. The OSG also entered its appearance. Since her petition was
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.

Landingin testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees,
to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings. Landingin marked in evidence
the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of
said consent.

Later on, the Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD submitted a Child Study Report finding the
minors eligible for adoption as the minors and also the mother of the minors voluntarily

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 Adoption

consented to their adoption by Landingin. Their Affidavit of consent were all attached to the
Report.

However, petitioner failed to present the DSWD Offiicer as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

The RTC, finding merit in the petition for adoption, granted the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, raising that there was no consent of
the proposed adoptees’ bio mother, no written consent of Landingin’s children, and Landingin
failed to establish that she is in a position to support the proposed adoptees.

The CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to
adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother.
Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children.

Landingin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Thus, Landingin filed a
petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE/s:

(a) Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos (NO)

(b) Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s
children sufficiently complies with the law (NO)

(c) Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees (NO)

RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

(a)

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava, that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration xxxx. Every reasonable intendment should
thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the
law.

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that xxxx the Court’s liberal position
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

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 Adoption

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter,
if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.

We note that in her Report, the DSWD social worker declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and was able to be interviewed, it is incredible that the social worker would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children.
Neither did Landingin bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

Landingin, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came
back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is
the paternal relatives, including Landingin, who provided for the children’s financial needs.
Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Landingin further
contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was
pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting,
Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by
the petitioner.

Petitioner Landingin’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial
court, RA No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal

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 Adoption

guardian of the minors will suffice. If the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, Landingin should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect
and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. In this case, Landingin relied solely on her
testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her
children.

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

xxxx Since the mother left for Italy, minor-siblings had been under the care and custody
of their maternal grandmother. xxxx Landingin, together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the
time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial
support but very minimal. xxxx

When she left for Italy, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-
in-law xxxx.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month the children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the
needs & education of minors up to present.

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country
by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed
by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise,
Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as
compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of
severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced
that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her
guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the
child that takes precedence in adoption.

(b)

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 Adoption

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence the DSWD Social Workers’s Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized in Guam,
USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this
country it needs to comply with the authentication requirements under Section 2 of Act No.
2103.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-
cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

(c)

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support
the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children
and her siblings. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has
savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a
month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial
backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the
Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely
on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The
law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in
keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered.
Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children,
in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of Public Health &
Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD: At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15
an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is
to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but
the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing
of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees
is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings

25
 Adoption

and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The
Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and
nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any
case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

26